par Thierry MEYSSAN

Alors qu’une douzaine d’États ont déjà vécu — parfois avec succès — des manifestations de la génération Z, celles qui viennent d’avoir lieu, en France, donnent une occasion de manipuler la population. Les destructions programmées, survenues le 17 octobre, semblent préparer une sorte d’état d’urgence qui permette de suspendre l’élection présidentielle comme cela a lieu en Ukraine depuis deux ans.

Dans  cet article, j’examinerai une douzaine de manifestations de la « génération Z », c’est-à-dire les 14-29 ans, qu’elles soient organisées ou désorganisées. Si de nombreux mouvements de contestation auquel elle a participé ont eu lieu dans d’autres États, la génération Z a toujours dénoncé la corruption, le népotisme et les abus de pouvoir avant toute autre injustice.

Je conserverai toujours à l’esprit que si l’on ne peut pas provoquer la colère d’une foule, il est très facile de la détourner de son objectif initial. Ces manifestations commencent donc toujours dans l’intérêt général, mais peuvent s’égarer en chemin.

Une première caractéristique de ces mouvements est qu’ils ont tous éclaté après des scandales de corruption ou de répression. Les manifestants ne se sont pas réclamés d’une idéologie politique particulière, mais ont avant tout exprimé leur exigence de justice.

En définitive, le président Prabowo Subianto a reconnu que la jeunesse avait le droit de manifester et a fait lever les sanctions contre le drapeau pirate.

• Timor-oriental : du 15 au 17 septembre, un syndicat étudiant manifeste à Dili pour protester contre les avantages économiques accordés aux parlementaires. En définitive, ceux-ci devront se passer des voitures de luxe qu’ils avaient commandées.

• Philippines : le 21 septembre 2025, 100 000 jeunes gens défilaient à Manille contre la corruption des clans au pouvoir, les Marcos et les Duterte. 70 % des fonds destinés aux luttes contre les inondations auraient disparus.

• Paraguay : le 28 septembre 2025, des manifestations de jeunes ont débuté pour protester contre la corruption et une tentative de modification de la Constitution pur permettre à l’ancien président, le mafieux Horacio Cartes, de revenir au pouvoir. Les amérindiens se sont joints à la génération Z lorsqu’ils ont appris le transfert du bureau de l’Instituto Paraguayo del Indígena (INDI) dans une base militaire. Le mouvement a cessé le 3 octobre après que le président Santiago Peña ait annulé cette décision.

• Japon : le 3 mai 2025, 50 000 jeunes ont manifesté contre la remilitarisation de leur pays en utilisant des bâtons lumineux, comme lors des concerts de K-Pop et lors de la tentative de loi martiale en Corée du Sud. Elles se sont bientôt multipliées dans tout le pays et ont cessé par épuisement.

• Inde, le 15 mai 2026, le président de la Cour suprême assimile les jeunes chômeurs à des cafards. Un jeune étudiant en communication crée alors le « Parti du peuple des cafards ». Il organise des manifestations jusqu’à ce que le ministre de l’Éducation démissionne. Le mouvement repart, en octobre avec la protestation contre la réforme des listes électorales dont la procédure exclut les Indiens les plus pauvres. Elle se poursuit aujourd’hui, malgré l’emprisonnement de son leader [1].

La manifestation du 17 octobre en France

À partir du 18 septembre 2026, des lycéens manifestent, d’abord à Créteil, puis dans toute l’Île de France, et enfin dans tout le pays contre leurs conditions d’études. Ils sont bientôt rejoints par les étudiants. Et, un peu plus tard, par les syndicats de la fonction publique.

Des manifestations sont annoncées au plan national, le 17 octobre. Les « Gilets jaunes », c’est-à-dire le mouvement informel, de 2018-2019, contre le prix des carburants et pour la France périphérique, se joignent au mouvement. Ils poursuivent l’objectif de lutter contre la vie chère.

La police territoriale, pourtant réputée pour sa grande précision, sous-estime à 150 000 manifestants maximum ces rassemblements, tandis qu’ils seront entre 550 000 et 800 000. La direction de la police s’assure que les unités de maintien de l’ordre ne soient prévues que pour les manifestations estimées et veille à ce qu’elle ne dispose que du minimum de munitions en gaz lacrymogènes et en grenades de dispersion.

Les black blocs européens acheminent des milliers de militants, principalement d’Italie, de Suisse, d’Allemagne et de Belgique.

Analyse

Aucun événement particulier n’a déclenché la contestation lycéenne. Il s’agit d’un ras-le-bol généralisé face au sentiment d’abandon d’une génération à qui on explique qu’elle doit se contenter de locaux mal-isolés, où l’on souffre du chaud et du froid selon les saisons ; et qu’elle ne doit pas espérer avoir de professeurs lorsque les siens sont malades ; que de toute manière, elle n’aura jamais d’emploi et sera remplacée par l’Intelligence artificielle ; mais qu’elle devra quand même payer la dette et les intérêts de la dette que leurs parents ont accumulée.

Dans un premier temps, un parti politique de gauche a tenté de récupérer ces manifestations en venant se poster aux sorties des lycées. Mais tout a changé, ce 17 octobre.

Il est possible que ces responsables cachés soient en France, mais aussi envisageable qu’ils soient à l’étranger ; une hypothèse renforcée par la participation des black blocs européens.

Comment ne pas se rappeler qu’en 2011, le candidat à la présidentielle en tête les sondages, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, a été arrêté à New York pour viol, par la police locale, mais avec l’aide du Pentagone, assurant l’élection de son « ami », François Hollande ? [2]
Comment ne pas se rappeler qu’en 2017, le candidat à la présidentielle en tête les sondages, François Fillon, a été mis en cause pour avoir engagé son épouse comme assistante parlementaire sans qu’elle accomplisse de travail à l’assemblée nationale, ouvrant ainsi la voie à l’élection d’un tiers, Emmanuel Macron ?
Comment ne pas envisager qu’en 2027, le candidat à la présidentielle en tête les sondages, Marine Le Pen, soit condamnée par la justice et privée de ses droits civiques… ou que la situation exige de placer le pays sous « état d’urgence » ou encore, selon la nouvelle disposition introduite par la loi du 16 août 2026, sous « état d’alerte de sécurité nationale » ?

S’adressant à la Nation, le lendemain même, le président Emmanuel Macron a dressé un rapide bilan de cette journée de destruction [3]. Il en a conclu que les Français étaient impuissants face à ces violences. Puis, il a conclu en souhaitant rétablir l’ordre… afin que les élections puissent avoir lieu.

Publié à l’origine par  Réseau Voltaire

European Commission calls accommodation website’s approach to fraudulent listings and phishing scams as ‘absolutely substandard’

EU regulators have opened an investigation into Booking.com, alleging that the accommodation website has not done enough to protect consumers from fake listings and scams.

The European Commission, which regulates the world’s biggest tech companies operating in the EU, said Booking.com may have breached the EU’s Digital Services Act (DSA) with its “absolutely substandard” approach to tackling fraudulent listings and phishing scams, where criminals impersonate a third party to trick people to hand over money.

European Commission calls accommodation website’s approach to fraudulent listings and phishing scams as ‘absolutely substandard’

EU regulators have opened an investigation into Booking.com, alleging that the accommodation website has not done enough to protect consumers from fake listings and scams.

The European Commission, which regulates the world’s biggest tech companies operating in the EU, said Booking.com may have breached the EU’s Digital Services Act (DSA) with its “absolutely substandard” approach to tackling fraudulent listings and phishing scams, where criminals impersonate a third party to trick people to hand over money.

The body representing Europe’s peripheral regions has voiced some concerns at draft plans for the EU’s long term budget.

The Irish Presidency’s revised negotiating box for the 2028-2034 Multiannual Financial Framework proposes a total budget of € 1.622 trillion.

This, … Read more

Brussels, 21 October, (Brussels Morning Newspaper) – The European Union is implementing tougher trade protection measures designed to shield European steel manufacturers from global overcapacity and growing competition from imported products. The EU steel import rules introduce stricter … Read more

Budapest has unexpectedly obstructed the next stage of EU accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova, just a week after approving earlier negotiating chapters and days after Prime Minister Péter Magyar pledged to restore relations with Kyiv.

Hungary has blocked a procedural decision needed to advance Ukraine and Moldova’s European Union accession negotiations, raising fresh questions about Budapest’s position under Prime Minister Péter Magyar, whose government had recently agreed to remove longstanding objections to Kyiv’s membership ambitions.

The intervention took place in Brussels on Tuesday, 20 October, during a meeting of the Council of the EU’s Working Party on Enlargement and Countries Negotiating Accession to the EU (COELA). Representatives of the 27 member states were examining the screening results for the final two negotiating clusters, covering environmental policy, transport, agriculture and regional development.

According to diplomats familiar with the discussions, the Hungarian delegation refused to approve the proposed procedural step. When representatives of other member states requested an explanation, Budapest reportedly maintained that its position remained unchanged, without providing further arguments.

An Unexpected Reversal After October Agreement

The obstruction comes only seven days after the EU formally opened two additional negotiating clusters with Ukraine and Moldova.

On 13 October, the Council approved the opening of Cluster 2, covering the internal market, and Cluster 3, dealing with competitiveness and inclusive growth. The decision followed an agreement between Kyiv and Budapest on educational rights for Ukraine’s ethnic Hungarian minority.

Ukraine’s parliament adopted legislative amendments on 12 October extending minority-language education rights, and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed the legislation the same day.

The agreement had appeared to remove the principal bilateral obstacle to further negotiations. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha and his Hungarian counterpart, Anita Orbán, welcomed the development following discussions in Luxembourg.

The diplomatic rapprochement continued on 16 October, when Zelenskyy and Magyar held their first official bilateral meeting in Brussels. Both governments expressed an intention to improve relations after years of disputes under former Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán.

Magyar also invited Zelenskyy to Budapest for commemorations marking the 70th anniversary of Hungary’s 1956 anti-Soviet uprising.

The subsequent Hungarian objection has therefore interrupted a process that Ukrainian and European officials had expected to advance before the end of the year.

Agriculture and Energy Remain the Final Obstacles

Ukraine and Moldova have now formally opened four of the six negotiating clusters required under the EU’s enlargement methodology.

The remaining two are Cluster 4, Green Agenda and Sustainable Connectivity, and Cluster 5, Resources, Agriculture and Cohesion. They cover several of the most economically sensitive areas of prospective Ukrainian membership.

Cluster 4 includes environmental regulation, energy policy and transport infrastructure, while Cluster 5 encompasses agriculture, food safety, fisheries and regional development funding.

Ukraine’s agricultural sector presents particular challenges for the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy. The country’s extensive farmland and substantial grain production could affect agricultural subsidy allocations, market competition and the distribution of EU budgetary resources.

Poland and other agricultural member states have previously expressed concerns about the implications of Ukrainian agricultural integration. Such questions will require negotiation regardless of Hungary’s immediate position.

However, the 20 October meeting was not intended to settle these substantive issues. Its purpose was to advance the procedural preparations for formally opening negotiations on the remaining clusters.

Domestic Politics and the Question of EU Funding

The explanation for Budapest’s latest move may lie in Hungary’s domestic political calculations rather than a new dispute over minority rights.

Diplomatic sources have suggested that Magyar’s government is attempting to avoid accusations from Viktor Orbán’s opposition that it is making excessive concessions to Ukraine.

Although Magyar defeated Orbán in April’s parliamentary elections and has adopted a more cooperative approach towards Brussels, he has consistently opposed accelerated Ukrainian membership.

In an interview conducted on 20 October, Magyar reiterated his opposition to fast-tracking accession, arguing that membership must remain conditional on compliance with EU requirements. He also questioned whether a country at war could join the Union.

Another potential complication concerns Hungary’s financial relationship with Brussels.

The European Commission agreed in May to unlock €16.4 billion in previously frozen funds following reforms introduced by Magyar’s administration. Some disbursements remain subject to conditions, while separate disputes over EU financial penalties continue.

However, there is currently no publicly established evidence that Hungary’s objection on 20 October was intended to secure additional financial concessions. Any connection between the two negotiations remains speculative.

Moldova Caught in Budapest’s Dispute with Kyiv

Hungary’s position also affects Moldova, despite the absence of an equivalent bilateral dispute between Budapest and Chișinău.

The EU has kept the accession negotiations of Ukraine and Moldova politically aligned, seeking to advance both countries through the six negotiating clusters together.

Consequently, an objection directed principally at Ukraine can delay Moldova’s progress even when its own technical preparations satisfy the relevant requirements.

Separating the two accession tracks would allow Moldova to advance independently, but such a move would require political agreement among member states and could raise further questions about the EU’s enlargement strategy.

Ireland Seeks Agreement Before December

Ireland, which holds the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU until 31 December, has made progress on Ukrainian and Moldovan accession a priority.

The disputed procedural decision is expected to return to subsequent meetings of the enlargement working party, with senior EU and national officials still anticipating that the final two clusters could formally open in December.

The latest obstruction does not reverse the four clusters already opened, nor does it terminate accession negotiations. It does, however, demonstrate that the change of government in Budapest has not eliminated Hungary’s capacity or willingness to obstruct individual stages of enlargement.

For Kyiv and Chișinău, the immediate question is whether the 20 October decision represents a short-lived domestic political manoeuvre or the beginning of another prolonged dispute over the conditions of EU membership.

Brussels, 21 October, (Brussels Morning Newspaper) – The European Commission has launched a formal Booking.com investigation over concerns that the online travel platform may have failed to protect customers adequately from fraudulent accommodation listings, phishing scams and potentially … Read more

By  Jacob G. HORNBERGER

Join us on Telegram, X, and VK.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

Right-wing and left-wing interventionists and interventionist mainstream-press commentators are up in arms over President Trump’s decision to ease economic sanctions against Russia in connection with the Russian government’s agreement to supply diesel fuel to the United States.

The notion is that nothing — not even the midterms — must be permitted to interfere with the Cold War II racket that holds that Russia is an aggressor nation that is hell-bent on conquering the world and, therefore, that it is necessary to target the Russian populace with severe impoverishment and even death by starvation or illness with ever-more economic sanctions.

Central to this racket, of course, is Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The notion was that Russia was on the march. As soon as it conquered Ukraine, U.S. officials maintained, it would re-conquer Eastern Europe, and then Western Europe and England, and then make its way to South America, Central America, Mexico, and finally the United States, all of which Russia would reconstitute into a new Soviet Union of the world. In other words, Russia is coming to get us again.

The Cold War I racket was used to justify the conversion of the federal government to a national-security state, a type of governmental structure that came with omnipotent powers, including the power of orchestrating and committing state-sponsored assassinations. The racket enabled the national-security branch of the government to quickly become the most powerful branch of the federal government, one to which the president, Congress, and the Supreme Court decided to defer.

The Cold War I racket was also used to justify an anti-communist crusade, during which the U.S. national-security establishment targeted suspected communists, both here and in foreign countries, with destruction of reputation or even with assassination.

Beginning in 1989, the Cold War racket came to a sudden and unexpected end. The Berlin Wall was torn down, Germany was reunified, the Warsaw Pact was dissolved, the Soviet Union disintegrated, and Russian troops withdrew from Eastern Europe.

Officials in the U.S. national-security branch — i.e., the Pentagon, the CIA, and the NSA — naturally were extremely concerned. Suddenly, they had lost the justification for their existence and for the racket that they were certain would go on forever. People were talking about a “peace dividend,” which would involve a deep reduction in national-security-state spending and maybe even a restoration of America’s founding governmental system of a limited-government republic.

To replace the old racket with a new racket, new official enemies were developed, such as “the terrorists,” “the Muslims,” “the drug dealers,” and “the illegals.” They were all coming to get us, or so they said. Everyone remained deathly afraid.

But the Pentagon, the CIA, and the NSA were not about to let go of their old Cold War racket so easily. After providing Soviet officials with assurances during the negotiations over German reunification that NATO would not expand eastward, U.S. officials proceeded to do precisely that. NATO began marching eastward, absorbing former members of the Warsaw Pact and moving inexorably toward Russia’s borders, knowing full well what Russia’s reaction would be.

That was what the threat to absorb Ukraine into NATO ultimately accomplished — provoking Russia into invading Ukraine in an effort to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO. U.S. officials had been warned for years that NATO expansion, especially into Ukraine, could produce precisely such a confrontation. Yet they proceeded anyway.

Voila! The national-security branch had its old Cold War racket back, albeit in a revised format. The Russians are coming to get us … again (along with the terrorists, the Muslims, the drug dealers, and the illegals). The big fly in the ointment, however, is that Russia has been unable to conquer Ukraine. That’s, of course, a problem. If Russia can’t even conquer Ukraine, how is it going to be able to conquer Eastern Europe, Western Europe, England, South America, Central America, Mexico, and then the United States? Whoops!

Never mind that inconvenient problem. In the eyes of national-security statists, it is imperative that we continue hewing to the official narrative. Russia is coming to get us, just like before. We need ever-increasing budgets for the national-security establishment and its ever-growing army of voracious fat-cat “defense” contractors. Who cares if the United States goes bankrupt in the process? We need to again be kept “safe” from the Reds — I mean, the Russians (and from the terrorists, Muslims, drug dealers, and illegals.)

Oh, and don’t forget the Cuban Reds! They are coming to get us too. No doubt the right-wing and left-wing interventionists and the interventionist mainstream press, all of whom remain steadfast acolytes of the national-security establishment, are scared to death that President Trump might lift the old Cold War embargo and the new Cold War blockade against the Cuban people as well. Of course, fat chance of that happening given Trump’s own interventionist mindset.

Original article:  www.fff.org

Brazil’s elections: “new right” that smells like fascism, a left lost in identity politics.

Join us on Telegram, X, and VK.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

The Brazilian elections have proved fertile ground for the expression of the most common electoral stereotypes, which, by and large, are responsible for the sharp slide toward a superficial politics, barren of debate over effective solutions for our collective future, yet rich, deep down, in carnival aesthetics, more liberal or more conservative, in bitter invective, and in an exacerbated tendency toward the easy insult or even the basest personal offenses.

None of this is unfamiliar from the US, where national politics is discussed in a conservative, parochial, cramped, and backward fashion, with barricades on both sides avoiding debate on the truly divisive issues, labeled “radical”; nor is it unfamiliar from Old Europe, whose political class has lost quality to a degree that differs nothing, today, from what goes on in Brazil, Argentina, or other places marked by the submission of their leading political figures to Anglo-Zionist imperialism, to the immense power of the oligarchy, or, in the final analysis, to the need to reconcile domestic policies with the international agenda of imperialism.

As we look at a left wing caught, all too often, in individualistic, liberal identity politics — thereby diverted from the workplaces, from the factory floor, from the dramas of exploitation that underlie the deepest problems with which the majority of the population grapples — we also find a right wing that works as the other side of the coin: to the liberalism of part of the left (the liberal left) on matters of customs, the right answers with conservatism; to the left’s promises of social justice (the liberal left), the right answers with more liberalism and even “ultraliberalism.” Both end up saying very little about what really matters, focusing much of the time on side issues more closely bound to aesthetics than to essence.

Nevertheless, with a keen eye, we can always unearth what lies behind one or another piece of pamphleteering. One of the most important themes in contention today in Western societies — or Westernized ones, as is the case of Brazil, Latin America, and Latin Europe — is the tension between sovereignty and submission to Anglo-Zionist imperialism. If in Europe — in the cases of Portugal, Spain, or Italy — that tension is mediated by an already submissive EU, which tends to act as a protective layer over national tensions, then once the question of sovereignty is raised, the tendency is, one of two things: either to see it as an extension of European sovereignty, which hides the real problem, or to see it as an attempt to discuss leaving the EU, which is still regarded as taboo in broad circles of one camp or another. In Brazil, that tension lies more exposed, since there is no American Union to mediate the country’s foreign relations with the US and Israel, the great representatives of Anglo-Zionist imperialism.

And in this case, it is interesting to note that on the Bolsonaro side — from which one might expect the nationalist proposal — this does not happen, or happens only residually, because even when it does, the attempt is unmasked by the excessive support that American social networks give to Bolsonaro’s candidacy, or by the constant interference of Trump and his cronies in the Brazilian electoral process. However much the right wished to present itself as the defender of the nation and its independence, the effusive support of the US for the candidacy in question would bring the mask down, for the US — and Israel — would never support so vehemently and so openly anyone who was not subservient to them. Lula’s absence from Silicon Valley’s algorithmic command posts ends up giving away which of the two candidates is more subservient to US interests.

On Lula da Silva’s side, by contrast, the more clearly drawn proposals on the defense of sovereignty have in fact emerged — even if some of that intensity may later collide with the pragmatic dictates of realpolitik, imposed by the need to strike deals with a notoriously pro-imperialist “centrão.” Either way, this dividing line exists, and it seems scarcely credible to me that anyone in full possession of their mental faculties could choose a protégé of Trump to defend Brazil’s sovereign interests, rather than an experienced conciliator, even if not a revolutionary one.

Knowing how important this question is, afterward, for the sovereign management and use of endogenous resources and for their allocation to an independent development plan, the choice of Bolsonaro seems to me hard to defend, should the sovereign question weigh in that choice. As in the EU, the sovereignists have not found the best practices on the right either — perhaps with the exception of Viktor Orbán, who governed Hungary for sixteen years, until the April 2026 elections — but more out of a need to align with Russia and China, as a consequence of the EU’s energy and industrial choices, than out of any need to build a genuinely sovereign national project. Moreover, if further proof were needed, Orbán’s total alignment with Zionism allowed us to see that his disagreement with the EU was merely tactical, not a matter of principle or of defending national sovereignty. Orbán never for a moment renounced NATO or distanced himself from Israel and Zionism — factors he used as platforms of support against the Brussels bureaucracy. His submission to Trump, for that matter, was also explicit, and voiced with the fervor of one who saw in him “an envoy of God”!

In the case of Meloni, Babiš, and others, the question is the same: much talk, but in the end, the same alignment — which foreshadows where parties like the AfD will later turn. Faced with the fundamental questions, they too will fall in line, either with submission to Brussels or with direct submission to Zionism and US imperialism. Others, like Meloni, manage a middle path that, in the end, has the same social consequences. Where it really counts, young people keep running into unemployment, cannot find a home, watch infrastructure decay, see labor rights under relentless attack, and see their wages rapidly losing value against the brutal rise in the cost of living. There is no place where this “new right” is entrenched and seated in the halls of power where this does not happen.

Hence another important parallel persists between the Brazilian elections and what goes on in Europe and the West in general: whether in Brazil, the US, or Europe, this “new right” also uses the identity agenda as its dividing line against the left. Supposedly, the “left” — liberal, I would add — would be responsible for a decadence of customs and of cultural and religious values, for the social and moral decay of the defenders of this “woke” drift.

Now, this demarcation has served as a justification for many who once presented themselves as critics of Zionism, defenders of multipolarity, anti-imperialists, and defenders of Global South sovereignties, and who now use this supposed “wokeness” of the left to justify electing a representative of submission to imperialism like Bolsonaro. This demarcation has one problem: the only thing more “woke” than the “woke” is the one who makes wokeness the most important thing in politics, whether one is for it or against it.

On the left, many are unable to identify, in the excessively identitarian agendas, an individualistic, divisive agenda that fragments the working classes — one originating in the US itself, whose mass-manipulation services turned being “woke” (alert to social injustices) into a kind of identitarian pamphleteering. They stripped the “woke” movement of the class-based dimension and the just redistribution of wealth it once had, and gave it a panoply of identities in exchange — turning the concern with equality, social justice, and freedom, a materialist and universalist concern, into a tribalistic, individualistic concern, and, above all, one disconnected from the material dimension, that is, from the dimension of the just redistribution of the wealth produced by labor.

But on the right, when this tribalistic and individualistic drift is used as a dividing line, what genuinely distinguishes left from right is also denied. For in the historical matrix that separates left from right lies wealth: who dominates it, and how it is shared. On one side, those who hold that property and wealth must not be the measure of freedom and political initiative, and that all human beings are entitled to a life of dignity (universalism); on the other — on the right — plutocratic physiocracy: the idea that freedom and the capacity for political intervention should be measured by the wealth one has. Hence the liberal suffrages rested on a census-based — that is, identitarian — logic, in which what counted was the wealth one had, being a man, and knowing how to read and write; and were it not for the struggle, notably that of the suffragettes, to achieve what we today call “universal suffrage,” we would still be there. I suspect they, too, were accused of being “woke,” in the terms in vogue at the time!

Thus, from then on — that is, since the founding moment of the “left–right” dichotomy of the French Revolution — the right has committed itself more to the preservation of property in the hands of those who hold it, and the left more to real democracy, to economic, social, and cultural democracy, rejecting the idea that the rich must remain rich and the poor must remain poor. In a manner of speaking, this is what we call universalist progressivism, as opposed to individualist progressivism, which leans above all toward questions of individual identity.

So when this right embarks on the anti-woke logic, making this agenda the most important aspect of the political discussion — as if what really mattered were not the things that allow us to live, to sustain, feed, and enjoy our body and spirit — it does so with only one intention: to divert attention to a superficial issue, so that what is most precious to it does not enter the proposals under discussion: the just redistribution of wealth and economic, social, and cultural democracy. Thus, what matters most to it remains beyond debate, and elections turn into a carnival of little flags for and against. Whoever chooses where to vote because of someone else’s wokeness is every bit as woke as they are.

But the similarities do not end here. Another is the question of security and fighting crime: on the right, the idea is spread that crime is fought with brutal violence; on the left, it is argued that as long as there is poverty, crime cannot be eradicated. Now, it does not take much intelligence to see that the first proposal fails precisely where it is most talked about: the US. No country has more common prisoners — and few will have more political prisoners; no country spends so much on supposed crime-fighting; no developed country has so much crime. Because in the US, the breeding grounds of common crime — the Black and Latino ghettos, where desperate populations live, deprived of basic conditions of employment, education, and essential public services — remain overcrowded and ever more impoverished. But that is only the crime of the desperate, the kind that shows up on television.

Another form of crime — which also features in the right/left agenda — is the question of corruption. If this “new right” waves the banner of corruption and the left barely speaks of it, it is equally true that, once elected, this “new right” does everything except end corruption. One need look no further than Trump to find a case of incorrigible corruption. And those who remembered Bolsonarismo and expected the end of corruption were also left cursing in the desert: the Bolsonaro government was, itself, a den of corruption. Perhaps the discussion should start with the point that, to end corruption, one must end what originates it: the immense disparity in the distribution of wealth, which allows some to use their immense economic power to obtain from political power what they lack in electoral legitimacy. This crime — white-collar crime — being even more insidious and giving rise to the deep causes of the other, does not show up as often on television.

On immigration, we have perhaps the only one of the great differences between the elections in Latin America, in Brazil, and in the countries of advanced capitalism. But immigration also shows up as a form of shallow identitarianism of the right. The more the “new right” talks about “excessive immigration,” the more it forgets that those who employ these immigrants are the very same who finance and support it; that immigrants come to work in the economic sectors with the lowest wages, exploited by the most backward and conservative bosses — the social base of the radical right; and that employers only turn to immigration as a last resort, because their anti-labor agenda has left workers today unable to project a future with stability; because the young, victims of the transformation of housing into real-estate speculation, can no longer plan a future as a family; and because mothers and fathers, victims of the deregulated work schedules imposed by employers and enshrined in law by the right, have no time for their families.

Worst of all, the more they deny the necessary material conditions, the more they claim to defend the family and its values. A clear display of hypocrisy and cynicism, which denies the deep causes of the problem — a problem that affects the entire West. As they have done, it is easier to deny that the fertility crisis is intrinsically bound up with the prevailing system. Know where there was no fertility crisis? In the socialist countries of the East. Industrialized, literate, and well-fed countries, which doubled their populations in 70 years. Today, taken over by capitalism, they find themselves caught up in the same old tune of the advanced-capitalist countries. They will not get out of it until the fundamental features of an economic system change — one that not only leaves women no time to have children but also destroys family cohesion through the deregulation of work and, consequently, of life.

Now, what is most interesting about this political debate is that those who, a few years ago — those who said there was no left or right, that politicians were all the same — are now the ones telling us that salvation lies in this “new right,” and they are the ones who bristle when we tell them that this “new right” has nothing “new” about it and that, on the contrary, it reeks of classic fascism.

They are never fascists, but they submit to Zionism and the Anglo-Zionist empire; they are not fascists, but they resort to the demagogy and easy rhetoric used by classic fascism; they are not fascists, but they wave mass banners as classic fascism did; they are not fascists, but they use religion and the supposed degradation of customs to divert attention from what is essential, as classic fascism did; they are not fascists, but once in power they privatize, attack labor rights, and shut down essential public services, as classic fascism did; they are not fascists, but they attack knowledge and devalue study and individual effort, as classic fascism did; they are not fascists, but they dismiss political experience, individual and collective track records, as classic fascism did, in order to dismiss institutions; they are not fascists, but they adopt a racialist, xenophobic, supremacist, and ultra-individualist discourse, as classic fascism did; they are not fascists, but they are all anti-communist, anti-socialist, and opposed to social progress, as classic fascism was; they are not fascists, but they are backed by the oligarchy and the most backward employers, as well as by imperialism, as classic fascism was.

They are not fascists, but they smell, fly, sing, and bellow like fascists…

Call it what you will, but a “thirties” of the 21st century, armed with AI and social media? No, thank you! We can expect nothing different from those who have the same bosses and want to boss around the same employees…

Afterward, whomever you vote for, I hope you will spare me the tired old refrain of “we were fooled.”

SOURCES

Incarceration in the US — the US has the largest prison population in the world (about 2 million people) and the highest incarceration rate of any democracy; per capita (World Prison Brief / Prison Policy Initiative, 2026). https://eji.org/news/u-s-remains-world-leader-in-number-of-people-incarcerated/

Jair Bolsonaro — convicted by the Supreme Federal Court (STF) to 27 years and 3 months in prison (September 11, 2025) for attempted coup d’état, armed criminal organization, and violent abolition of the democratic rule of law; serving his sentence since November 25, 2025. https://apublica.org/especial/o-julgamento-de-jair-bolsonaro/ ; https://checamos.afp.com/doc.afp.com.A2V88ZQ

Donald Trump — convicted in May 2024 on 34 felony counts of falsifying business records; in January 2025 he received an unconditional discharge (no jail time or fine), with appeals still pending in 2026. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c4g3m95ykzko ; https://www.axios.com/2026/08/28/trump-hush-money-conviction-appeal

Viktor Orbán — Hungary is a NATO member, and Orbán was a close ally of Netanyahu and Israel; in the April 2026 elections, Péter Magyar put an end to Orbán’s 16 years in government. https://apnews.com/article/hungary-israel-euro-2024-soccer-1514e137b54b18a1fed8be8b6cd89b19 ; https://www.ynetnews.com/article/hjef3yqnbx

Suffrage — in Portugal, census-based suffrage was only abolished in 1968; women obtained a limited right to vote in 1931 and full equality only with the 1976 Constitution. https://www.europeana.eu/pt/stories/votes-for-women ; https://arquivomunicipal.lisboa.pt/fileadmin/arquivo_municipal/difusao/publicacoes/cadernos/Cad04.pdf

Origin of the term “woke” — African American English, with records from the 1920s–1940s, popularized from 2014 onward by the Black Lives Matter movement. https://www.merriam-webster.com/wordplay/woke-meaning-origin ; https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2025-09-30/how-woke-went-from-an-expression-in-black-culture-to-a-conservative-criticism

Origin of the terms “left” and “right” — the seating arrangement of deputies in the French National Constituent Assembly in 1789. https://observador.pt/opiniao/a-grande-dicotomia-o-que-ainda-separa-a-esquerda-da-direita/

Crime — the US homicide rate (≈6.4 per 100,000 inhabitants) https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/gsh/2023/GSH_2023_LAC_web.pdf

The European Union has adopted a new Arctic strategy placing security at the centre of its northern policy, reflecting growing concern over Russian military activity, vulnerable submarine infrastructure and competition for control of emerging maritime routes.

Presented on Tuesday, 20 October, by the European Commission and EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas, the strategy proposes a maritime security hub, expanded satellite surveillance, greater icebreaker capacity and improved military mobility across northern Europe.

The document marks a departure from the EU’s 2021 Arctic policy, which placed greater emphasis on climate change, environmental protection and scientific cooperation. The revised framework treats the region as an increasingly important component of European security and economic policy.

Russia’s military presence reshapes European priorities

Russia’s expanding military infrastructure in the High North is a principal concern behind the policy revision.

Moscow has reopened Soviet-era military installations, strengthened its northern forces and maintained substantial nuclear capabilities on the Kola Peninsula. The region contains strategically important naval bases used by Russia’s Northern Fleet, including facilities supporting its submarine-based nuclear deterrent.

Russian operations in the Arctic also have implications for maritime access between the Atlantic and the Barents Sea, an area increasingly important to NATO’s northern defence arrangements.

The EU intends to work more closely with NATO and its northern partners, including Norway, Iceland, Britain, Canada and the United States, while developing capabilities that complement existing military structures.

Kallas said the Arctic’s security environment had deteriorated significantly since 2021, with geopolitical competition increasingly affecting a region previously associated principally with environmental and economic cooperation.

The EU’s revised priorities reflect concerns extending beyond conventional military deployments, particularly the exposure of undersea communications networks and energy infrastructure to sabotage and disruption.

New maritime security hub and submarine cable protection

A central proposal involves establishing an EU Maritime Security Hub to improve information-sharing between member states and partner countries operating in Arctic waters.

The system would strengthen monitoring of maritime movements and support the identification of suspicious activity near critical infrastructure.

Brussels also proposes an Arctic Cable Hub, initially concentrating on the protection, monitoring and repair of submarine communications cables across the North Atlantic and Arctic.

Such infrastructure carries international data traffic and supports communications between Europe, Greenland and North America. Damage to cables could interrupt telecommunications, financial services and government networks.

The Commission’s new Arctic policy framework also supports the proposed Pan-Arctic Cable connecting Greenland directly with Europe, together with secure satellite communications through the EU’s IRIS² programme.

Further measures envisage expanded use of Copernicus satellite surveillance, improved maritime intelligence and closer monitoring of vessels associated with Russia’s shadow fleet.

These measures form part of a broader attempt to improve European surveillance capabilities without relying exclusively on military assets provided by individual NATO members.

Icebreakers, transport corridors and military mobility

The strategy also addresses Europe’s limited capacity to operate in extreme northern conditions.

The Commission wants to support additional icebreaker capabilities, which are essential for maintaining access to Arctic waters, conducting emergency operations and supporting scientific and logistical activity.

Russian icebreaker capabilities remain considerably more extensive than those available to most European countries, providing Moscow with operational advantages along the Northern Sea Route.

European investment would also support ports, railways, energy terminals and digital infrastructure capable of serving both civilian and security requirements.

The emphasis on dual-use infrastructure reflects the growing importance of military mobility across northern Europe, particularly following Finland’s and Sweden’s accession to NATO.

Improved transport links could facilitate the movement of equipment and personnel while also supporting economic development in sparsely populated northern regions.

However, the Commission has not provided a comprehensive financial allocation for the proposed security measures, leaving important questions about funding, procurement and implementation.

Brussels retreats from Arctic drilling ban proposal

The revised strategy also introduces a significant change in the EU’s position on Arctic fossil fuel development.

In 2021, Brussels proposed pursuing an international legal commitment to prohibit further oil, gas and coal extraction in the Arctic.

The new strategy maintains the EU’s opposition to environmentally damaging fossil fuel development but no longer includes the explicit ambition to secure a multilateral legal prohibition.

The adjustment follows sustained disagreement with energy-producing countries and recognition that an international agreement would be difficult to achieve under current geopolitical conditions.

Norway has argued that continued exploration in parts of the Barents Sea remains important for European energy security, particularly as production from mature Norwegian fields is expected to decline.

EU Today previously reported on Brussels’ opposition to Norwegian Arctic drilling plans and the disagreements between environmental objectives and Europe’s long-term energy requirements.

The latest strategy does not represent an endorsement of new Arctic drilling. It does, however, acknowledge the limitations of the EU’s previous diplomatic approach.

Greenland and the northern economy

Greenland occupies a prominent position in the revised strategy because of its location, mineral resources and importance to transatlantic communications.

The Commission wants to expand cooperation on digital connectivity, critical raw materials, research and infrastructure investment, while recognising the responsibilities of Greenland’s own institutions and the Kingdom of Denmark.

Brussels also intends to strengthen scientific cooperation and support Arctic communities adapting to rapid environmental change.

The Arctic is warming nearly four times faster than the global average, creating new commercial opportunities while imposing substantial costs on local populations and infrastructure.

The EU’s proposals therefore combine security measures with investment in transport networks, research facilities and economic diversification.

For Brussels, implementation will require agreement between member states with different geographical interests, defence capabilities and budgetary priorities. Cooperation with NATO will also require careful coordination to avoid duplicating existing military arrangements.

The Commission has established a significantly broader Arctic agenda than the one adopted five years ago. Its practical impact will depend on whether member states finance the surveillance systems, vessels and infrastructure that the new strategy envisages.

Romania has formed a new government after six months of political deadlock, with parliament approving a minority administration led by independent diplomat Luca Niculescu on Tuesday, 20 October. The vote brings an end to repeated failed attempts to establish an executive, although the new prime minister faces considerable uncertainty over his government’s parliamentary support.

Niculescu secured 280 votes in favour and 58 against, comfortably exceeding the 233 required for confirmation. His ministers were sworn in before President Nicuşor Dan at the Cotroceni Palace in Bucharest later that evening, formally ending the prolonged government formation process.

The new administration comprises 18 ministers, including two delegated ministers. The Social Democratic Party (PSD) controls the majority of portfolios, while independent specialists hold several important positions, including finance and foreign affairs.

A government built on temporary parliamentary support

The appointment represents a political success for President Dan, who nominated Niculescu on 5 October following three unsuccessful attempts to assemble a functioning government.

EU Today reported earlier this month on Niculescu’s nomination, which followed the collapse of previous negotiations and growing pressure on Romania’s political institutions.

The new cabinet is heavily dependent on agreements between parties that have frequently disagreed over economic policy and public spending. Although the parliamentary vote demonstrated sufficient support for its installation, the arrangement does not provide the government with a permanent majority.

The National Liberal Party (PNL) and the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) supported the investiture while remaining outside the administration.

The arrangement gives Niculescu an opportunity to govern, but each major legislative proposal will require continued cooperation between parties with competing priorities.

The Social Democrats, who hold 11 of the ministerial positions, will exercise substantial influence over domestic policy, particularly decisions involving public-sector spending, welfare and taxation.

Budget deficit presents immediate challenge

Romania’s public finances represent the government’s most urgent problem.

The previous administration, led by Ilie Bolojan, collapsed in May following unpopular austerity measures. Political opposition to fiscal consolidation has complicated efforts to stabilise the budget and meet Romania’s commitments under the European Union’s fiscal framework.

Niculescu has indicated that addressing the deficit will be an immediate priority. Finance Minister Alexandru Nazare, appointed as an independent, faces the task of establishing a credible budget programme without provoking another parliamentary crisis.

The choices are politically difficult. Spending reductions risk resistance from public-sector employees and households already affected by higher living costs, while substantial tax increases could place further pressure on businesses and consumption.

Failure to establish a credible fiscal programme would prolong uncertainty over Romania’s borrowing requirements and its ability to comply with European budgetary obligations.

Brussels has a direct interest in the outcome. Romania remains subject to EU fiscal oversight, and the European Commission will assess whether the new administration’s financial plans are consistent with the country’s obligations.

The government’s credibility will depend on whether its parliamentary supporters are prepared to approve the measures that fiscal consolidation requires.

European funds and political credibility

The change of government also comes at a sensitive moment in Romania’s relationship with European institutions.

Romania has faced scrutiny over reforms linked to the EU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility, particularly legislation concerning public integrity and institutional accountability.

EU Today previously examined the European Commission’s assessment of Romania’s integrity legislation and its implications for recovery funding.

Although the EU recovery programme reached its principal implementation deadline in August, outstanding assessments and financial decisions continue to carry consequences for national budgets.

A functioning government is therefore important not only for domestic legislation but also for negotiations with Brussels over fiscal commitments, investment and the wider EU budget.

Romania must also address longer-term weaknesses in public administration, infrastructure financing and the implementation of European legislation.

Political stability remains uncertain

Niculescu takes office against the background of Romania’s unusually turbulent political history since the annulment of the 2024 presidential election amid allegations of Russian interference.

The subsequent institutional disputes damaged confidence in the political system and contributed to the fragmentation of parliamentary support.

Opposition parties, including the nationalist Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), are positioned to challenge the government’s legitimacy and economic measures as the administration begins work.

Romania’s strategic importance extends beyond its domestic political difficulties. As an EU and NATO member bordering Ukraine and Moldova, it plays a substantial role in Black Sea security, military logistics and regional infrastructure.

Prolonged instability in Bucharest has therefore affected a country whose decisions carry consequences for European security and cross-border economic cooperation.

For the new prime minister, the immediate objective is to translate Tuesday’s parliamentary majority into support for legislation. His first serious test will come when the cabinet presents the fiscal measures that its supporters have so far struggled to agree upon.

The parliamentary vote has ended Romania’s government formation crisis. It has not resolved the disagreements that produced it.

Student activists seem set to defeat Aleksandar Vučić at the ballot box this Sunday. The EU should never have written off Serbian democracy

History may not be about to repeat itself in Serbia, but it is beginning to rhyme. Just over a quarter of a century ago, Serbian citizens turned out to vote in large numbers to inflict a historic defeat on the then strongman in Belgrade, Slobodan Milošević, who was seeking re-election as president. He lost despite his extensive control over the media, the judiciary and the security forces. When he was reluctant to leave office, Serbs poured on to the streets in their hundreds of thousands, finally forcing him to go.

On Sunday, a new generation could have the decisive voice in an equally fateful election, this time for the national parliament. Today’s strongman, Aleksandar Vučić, recently resigned as president to fight the election with the aim of swapping the locus of power from the presidency to the prime minister’s office.

The war in Ukraine can be ended permanently on terms that protect Ukraine’s statehood, meet Russia’s security concerns, and lay the foundation for a durable European security order. As another round of negotiations gears up in Norway, I propose a settlement concluded as a single package, signed by Ukraine and Russia, adopted by a vote […]

The post A viable path to peace in Ukraine appeared first on Asia Times.

The Cradle – October 20, 2026

US special envoy Tom Barrack conceded that a “ground kinetic” battle in Yemen by the US “seems fruitless” during a talk at the Global Security Forum in Qatar on 20 October.

“I think the president’s been clear that he supports Saudi Arabia and the backing that they need logistically he will supply. But America getting involved in a ground kinetic battle somewhere else seems fruitless.”

Barrack is Washington’s ambassador to Turkiye and special presidential envoy for Syria and Iraq.

He admitted that military force has failed in Yemen and that Riyadh is in a “very difficult position.”

“These kinetic reactions have never worked. It doesn’t work. It’s probably not likely that it’s going to work,” he said.

Barrack questioned whether US meddling across West Asia has helped or harmed the region, arguing that Ansarallah in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the resistance factions in Iraq would lose their reason to exist only once states took responsibility themselves.

He pressed for talks between Riyadh, Sanaa, and regional mediators, urging regional capitals to build their own alliances instead of leaning on Washington.

He went further, admitting that the US has had a hand in 23 regime changes across the region, none of which achieved their aims.

He declined to say whether the US-Israeli war on Iran launched on 28 February was a mistake, while conceding that it had unleashed unintended consequences across the region.

The admission comes as the Saudi-led coalition presses on with airstrikes on Yemen, drawing retaliatory missile and drone strikes by the Yemeni Armed Forces (YAF) on the kingdom.

Riyadh has turned to its defense partners under the Mecca pact, including Pakistan and Turkiye, after Washington declined its requests for direct US intervention against Yemen.

Barrack’s remarks follow Washington’s failed bid to subdue Yemen by military force, with more than 1,000 US airstrikes between March 2024 and April 2025 unable to halt Yemeni naval operations waged in support of Gaza, forcing the US into an Omani-brokered ceasefire with Sanaa in May 2025.

The campaign cost Washington $1 billion in its first three weeks alone, as Yemeni forces downed 17 MQ-9 Reaper drones and the US lost two F-18 fighter jets.

Ansarallah leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi said in November 2024 that the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier had retreated hundreds of miles after coming under Yemeni fire, while then US Under Secretary of Defense Bill LaPlante admitted he was “just shocked” by what Yemen’s missiles could do.

Europe fared no better, with Rear Admiral Vasileios Gryparis, commander of the EU’s Operation Aspides, telling Bloomberg in June 2024 that his Red Sea fleet needed to more than double in size and that US–UK strikes on Yemen were “not contributing to the solution,” after France withdrew one of his frigates citing the threat level.

The European Union claims that "the fundamental right to freedom of expression" only applies to journalists "acting in good faith," and that authorities do not have to give due process before freezing people's bank accounts, as these sanctions are "temporary and are not criminal in nature," according to a legal letter shared by a sanctioned journalist.

Last year, the European Union blacklisted 21 people for allegedly spreading Russian propaganda, banning them from doing business in Europe. One of them, Hüseyin Doğru, was falsely listed as a Turkish citizen living in Istanbul. In fact, Doğru is a German journalist in Berlin, making him the first European citizen on European soil to be sanctioned this way.

It was like being sentenced to "civil death," Doğru told American journalist Chris Hedges. He was banned from holding a job in Europe or having a European bank account, and authorities have restricted Doğru to a €506 ($567) per month allowance from his own money. "The sanctions are designed for people outside of Europe, so they don't really know how that should function with me, because I'm a European citizen and I'm living in Europe," Doğru told Hedges.

Last month, the civil libertarian Wau Holland Foundation hired lawyers to contest the sanctions against Doğru. And earlier this month, the Council of the European Union sent a response letter, which Doğru shared on social media, promising to escalate the case to the E.U. General Court. Although the council conceded to Doğru that he is not a Turkish citizen living in Turkey, it still insisted on the authority to punish him for his speech.

The council quoted a 2022 court case between the Russian news outlet RT and several European countries: "The protection of the right of the media and, more particularly, of journalists to impart information on issues of general interest is subject to the proviso that they are acting in good faith and on an accurate factual basis and provide 'reliable and precise' information in accordance with the ethics of journalism."

Doğru's lawyers insisted that he should be treated as innocent until proven guilty. But the council responded that sanctions fall short of a criminal punishment, so any complaint about a "violation of the presumption of innocence is therefore unfounded." In other words, because he is not accused of a crime, Doğru has fewer rights than a criminal suspect.

"People need to understand sanctions are an extrajudicial measure. They're extrajudicial. There's no court. There is no hearing, no evidence, there is no sentence by the court, nothing," Doğru told Hedges. "When you're sanctioned, you are not informed….The day when I was sanctioned, me and my wife, my wife was pregnant back then, we went to the pharmacy to buy medicine for her, and her cards did not work."

The original blacklisting decision accuses Doğru of supporting "actions by the Government of the Russian Federation which undermine or threaten stability and security in the Union" by spreading "false information on politically controversial subjects with the intent of creating ethnic, political and religious discord amongst its predominantly German target audience."

Doğru and his wife, British journalist Lizzie Phelan, previously worked at the Russian-funded publication Redfish. A few months after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, he split off to create a new website called red.media, insisting to The Left Berlin that "we are not Russian. We are not Kremlin. red.media is not funded by Russia or any other state." In the same interview, Doğru called Russia an "imperialist" regime.

But in September 2024, a Biden administration "fact sheet" on Russian propaganda offhandedly mentioned red.media, citing a hit piece on Doğru by the German newspaper Tagesspiegel. Doğru told Hedges that the U.S. fact sheet created a circular logic in German media: "They said red.media is Russian because [U.S. Secretary of State Antony] Blinken said so. But what they never said is that Blinken is referring to your articles where you never say it like that. You say there is a suspicion, it might be so."

Doğru shut down red.media in May 2025 due to the bad press. The European Union sanctioned him a few weeks later. Doğru's lawyer, Alexander Górski, told the Frankfurter Allgemeine earlier this year that the European Union didn't "even attempt to make an evidentiary case" about any ongoing connection to Russia.

The blacklisting decision also claimed that, during a pro-Palestinian student protest at Humboldt University in Berlin, red.media "coordinated with the occupiers to disseminate images of their vandalism—which included the use of Hamas symbols." Doğru told Hedges that these accusations are an attack on journalists' freedom to do their jobs.

The European Union does not have the same protections for the freedom of the press as the U.S. Constitution. Earlier this year, the Curia of the European Union ruled that simply reposting clips from Russian media could be a violation of European sanctions, even if no money changes hands, something that is explicitly exempted from U.S. sanctions under the Berman Amendment.

Still, U.S. authorities have tried to push the limits of international sanctions to censor speech. The Biden administration told an American nonprofit that "the provision of a platform for [the sanctioned individuals] to speak" was illegal, backing down after the nonprofit sued.

And the Trump administration sanctioned Italian academic Francesca Albanese for her "lawfare" calling for the prosecution of Israeli leaders and a boycott of Israeli industries. In addition to freezing her bank accounts, the sanctions forced Columbia University researchers to cut off their relationship with Albanese, and Georgetown University to close her email account. 

In the same statement accusing red.stream of being a Russian front, the Biden administration announced sanctions on two Russian news agencies. "We encourage dissent, open debate, and free discourse. But we will not stand for attempts by state actors to carry out covert activities with the goal of hijacking that discourse," the statement insisted. "The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior."

The post The European Union Wants To Punish People for Their Speech—Without Even a Trial appeared first on Reason Magazine.

Strasbourg, 2o October, (Brussels Morning Newspaper) – The European Union has announced a sweeping new Arctic security strategy designed to strengthen European defence preparedness, protect vital infrastructure and deepen cooperation with northern allies amid growing geopolitical tensions.

The … Read more

By Larry C. Johnson

Join us on Telegram, X, and VK.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

Saudi Arabia went looking for allies against Ansar Allah, and so far it has gotten statements of support. Egypt has declared its readiness to back the Kingdom, but its statement does not commit to any military involvement. Pakistan and Turkey have pledged troops under the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement signed in August, but both governments say their forces will play “a supportive rather than active combat role” against the Houthis. I have watched coalition pledges like these for decades. Cairo has not forgotten its war in Yemen in the 1960s. Islamabad has its own border with Afghanistan and a restless India to think about. Neither is going to send its soldiers into the mountains of Saada, so Riyadh will be fighting this one essentially alone.

That matters because Ansar Allah has shown it can reach the Kingdom’s economic core. In the past two weeks the Houthis have struck at Aramco facilities near Riyadh, the Shedgum gas plant in the Ghawar corridor, and the Tanajib oil facility on the Gulf coast. They hit an administrative building at Aramco’s Dhahran headquarters, the company’s historic nerve center. Now they are reportedly targeting Yanbu.

Riyadh says little about the damage, and Aramco’s chief executive insists the company’s system is intact and can be restored to its full 12 million barrels a day within days. I don’t believe it. Karl Miller, who is on the ground in the region, tells me the Saudis have suffered significant damage. That matches what we can see from the outside: a coalition that keeps announcing interceptions while fires keep burning at the targets. Repairing gas-processing trains, stabilization units and refinery components is not a matter of days. After the 2019 Abqaiq-Khurais strike, Saudi output fell by 5.7 million barrels a day, and it took about two months to recover from a single attack on an undefended site. This time the attacks are sustained and repeated, and the repair crews are working under fire.

Yanbu is the crucial target. With Iran’s navy declaring the Strait of Hormuz closed except to vessels it authorizes, Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea terminal at Yanbu, fed by the East-West Pipeline, is the Kingdom’s escape route to world markets. Flows through Hormuz fell to 11.62 million barrels a day in the week to October 13, against a baseline of 17.15 million. That bypass is already badly damaged. The East-West Pipeline is designed to carry up to 7 million barrels a day across the peninsula, pushed along by 11 pumping stations. According to my sources in the region, four of those 11 stations have been severely damaged and are not functioning. This did not come out of nowhere. In September, an attack damaged pumping facilities and knocked the pipeline largely out of service, and regional officials told the Associated Press repairs would take three to five weeks. Aramco got the line back up, and it has been hit again. A pipeline missing more than a third of its pumping stations cannot move anything close to its rated volume, however much crude is waiting in the Eastern Province.

Meanwhile Ansar Allah has seized Greater and Lesser Hanish islands and Perim inside the Bab al-Mandab, putting it astride the very sea lanes that tankers leaving Yanbu must use. Damaged production, a crippled pipeline and a contested Red Sea together mean the world loses Saudi barrels three times over: some cannot be produced, some cannot reach the coast, and what reaches the coast cannot be shipped safely.

Diesel is where this hits hardest. Diesel moves the trucks, tractors, trains and ships that carry everything else, and Europe is one of the world’s dominant diesel importers. The International Energy Agency’s October report is blunt. Middle Eastern fuel exports are below half of pre-war levels, and diesel markets “will remain tight well into 2027.” The IEA does not expect lost diesel stocks to be replenished before the second half of 2027. Diesel benchmarks topped $200 a barrel in September and remain nearly double the price of crude, which is itself around $108 for Brent, up more than 75 percent from a year ago. Ukrainian drones keep hitting Russian refineries and export terminals, so Europe’s other traditional source of middle distillates is also impaired.

So when people ask me when diesel supply returns to normal, my answer is not soon. The IEA’s timeline, which does not account for sustained damage to Saudi facilities, points to the second half of 2027 at the earliest. A real recovery is at least a year away, and probably longer.

Don’t expect the Trump-Putin diesel deal to change that. As I have argued before, the Russian barrels are a rounding error. Moscow has cleared 500,000 tons for export, roughly 3.7 million barrels, with no shipping timeline. Even if every tranche Trump announced is delivered, about 4.8 million tons in total, that comes to roughly 36 million barrels spread over months. The first 300,000 tons equals less than one day of American transport diesel demand, and the full program equals less than four. Measured against the world’s lost Middle Eastern distillate exports, it is negligible. It also depends on Russian refineries that Ukrainian drones continue to hit, and on sanctioned tankers to carry it. The deal may make for a good headline. It will not move the supply curve, and so it will not bring down the price of diesel.

Europe is already paying the political price. On Saturday, France saw its worst rioting in years. The CGT union estimated more than 500,000 people in the streets protesting the cost of gasoline, energy and food, and more than 270 were arrested. In Milan, a demonstration against wars and rising living costs ended with barricades on fire and shops looted. Protests over the cost of living have spread to Belgium and Portugal. Albania has had five straight days of violent clashes in Tirana. The immediate trigger there is anger at Prime Minister Edi Rama, but it is part of the same continental mood of people who feel their governments have stopped listening.

This is the context in which Washington is considering new strikes on Iran. The ceasefire collapsed in July and has not been rebuilt. Every round of escalation since then has raised the price of oil, and each one has given Tehran a reason to tighten its grip on Hormuz and its allies in Yemen a reason to widen their target list. Another U.S. campaign will not reopen the Strait. It will further close it. It will push diesel prices back toward their September records just as Europe heads into winter, when heating oil demand peaks.

American policymakers seem to believe the costs of this war can be exported. They cannot. Europe’s economies were already weak before the war. Factories that run on diesel-powered logistics, farmers who need diesel for the harvest, and households that heat with fuel oil cannot absorb another price spike. The riots in Paris and Milan are a warning of what a long diesel shortage does to a society. If Washington widens this war, it will be choosing to make that shortage longer and deeper, and Europe will pay the bill on its streets.

Original article: ronpaulinstitute.org