Soldiers speak about their six months in the kill zone. When the 128th Mechanised Brigade asked at a training ground last autumn who was willing to go into the ‘kill zone’, the term used for the most dangerous stretches of the 1,200-km front, two soldiers volunteered.
And the rest visibly breathed a sigh of relief.
Hennadiy and Mykhailo, whose story was reported by the New York Times, spent a long six months “at zero” rather than one, and described in detail how they managed to survive on the front line in the Zaporizhzhia region.
Their account shows how, despite drone warfare, the basic work — holding or capturing new positions — is still done by infantry, which remains indispensable even in this war, where a technological advantage can mean the difference between life and death.
Both set out by car from the village of Prymorske and, when they were about 1.5 km from their destination, began a slow and extremely dangerous journey.
It was most dangerous when they had to move.
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The EU’s border force Frontex is getting overhauled next Tuesday (27 October) by a European Commission determined to give the Warsaw-based agency a larger role in deportations, more resources, and more agility to deploy.
The Brussels-executive has already proposed increasing the agency’s budget to €12bn, spread out over seven years. The money is being discussed as part of a larger drawn out EU budget fight among EU states.
Budget tussles aside, the commission has already dropped clues into what it wants from the new agency, following demands from its political masters at the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP).
The EPP had wanted to expand the border force to 30,000 from the proposed 10,000. But it is unlikely the 30,000 will be met given the difficulty of finding recruits.
Frontex currently has around 1,250 officers, who are directly employed by the agency. Its standing corps also includes officers provided by member states on long- and short-term assignments. That means they are not all on the Frontex payroll.
European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen, ahead of this month’s EU summit, instead spoke of a “substantial increase” of the Frontex standing corps, without committing to a number.
She also called for European Border and Return Reserve, a Quick Reaction Force for crisis deployment, a Return Coordination Centre to accelerate and improve returns including from foreign states, and social media snooping to gauge any possible Ceuta-like mass arrivals.
The agency is also likely to get more personal data sharing powers with the EU police force Europol.
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In its latest statement, Parliament condemns Houthi missile and drone attacks against Saudi Arabia and the movement’s military offensive in Yemen. Its demand for a terrorist designation signals pressure for a tougher European response. But the distance between a parliamentary declaration and an effective security policy remains considerable. europarl.europa.eu
The underlying case extends beyond disrupted trade. Civilian seafarers have paid with their lives. EU Today’s reporting on the fatal attack against the True Confidence documented how the maritime campaign crossed a deadly threshold in March 2024. Merchant crews became targets in a conflict over which they had no control. That history gives Parliament’s initiative a compelling human dimension.
Yet a terrorist listing is a specific legal instrument. Parliament’s demand does not itself impose one. Under the EU’s counterterrorism sanctions framework, listing requires an earlier decision by a competent national authority. The Council determines additions to the list, with measures including asset freezes and restrictions on making funds or economic resources available. Political resolve must therefore become a defensible legal case.
If adopted, designation could strengthen pressure on financial intermediaries and commercial networks supporting the movement. Its practical value would depend on identifying assets, tracing transactions and coordinating enforcement across jurisdictions. A designation that changes compliance procedures without materially constraining procurement would deliver less than its advocates expect.
The operational problem is equally demanding. Financial restrictions cannot intercept an incoming missile or accompany a vulnerable tanker. Europe must sustain protection at sea while pursuing disruption ashore through sanctions enforcement, intelligence cooperation and diplomacy.
As Defence Matters examined in its analysis of Operation Aspides reinforcement, additional warships bring requirements for trained crews, weapons, aviation, maintenance and replacement deployments. The mission’s defensive mandate protects civilian shipping, but effective coverage depends on what deployed vessels can sustain. Fleet totals alone offer an incomplete measure of European capacity.
This exposes the strategic imbalance. Attackers can impose uncertainty across a shipping corridor without controlling every mile of it. Defenders must reassure commercial operators repeatedly. Even successful interceptions may leave insurers and shipowners questioning whether the next voyage is worth the risk.
The threat also reaches beyond the immediate approaches to Yemen. EU Global’s coverage of the tanker incident west of Yanbu explained the potential implications for Saudi Arabia’s alternative oil-export route. The Houthis claimed responsibility, while the maritime warning did not identify the attacker. That distinction matters: sound policy requires separating verified incidents from claims designed to amplify a movement’s apparent reach.
For Europe, the implication is broader than naval security. Pressure on shipping and energy infrastructure can transmit regional instability into freight costs, delivery schedules and business confidence. Protecting maritime access is an economic responsibility as well as a defence commitment.
There is also a humanitarian test. Measures intended to constrain Houthi leadership must preserve legitimate assistance to civilians living under its authority. The EU framework already contains humanitarian exceptions allowing specified organisations to undertake necessary transactions. Implementation must give banks and aid agencies sufficient clarity to use them.
Otherwise, excessive caution by intermediaries could obstruct permitted activity. European governments should anticipate that risk through clear guidance and working arrangements with humanitarian organisations, while maintaining scrutiny against diversion.
Parliament has raised the political stakes. Governments now face a more demanding task: combining legal pressure with resources and measurable objectives. Success should mean fewer attacks, safer crews, disrupted support networks and reliable humanitarian access.
A terrorist designation could contribute to those outcomes. Its credibility will ultimately depend on whether Europe can turn a forceful institutional statement into sustained action across finance, diplomacy and the sea.
Announcing the decision in Strasbourg on Thursday, 22 October, European Parliament President Roberta Metsola said the award reflected the European Union’s commitment to multilateralism and international institutions.
Metsola praised the Court for its work in upholding international law and justice. The announcement was met with a standing ovation in the parliamentary chamber.
The decision comes amid an escalating confrontation between the European Union and the administration of US President Donald Trump over the ICC’s jurisdiction and independence.
On 9 October, the United States imposed sanctions on the ICC as an institution, extending measures previously directed against individual judges and prosecutors.
The restrictions place the Court under the US Treasury’s sanctions regime, limiting financial transactions involving American individuals, businesses and institutions. Washington has issued several temporary and limited exemptions intended to allow specified operations to continue.
The measures followed earlier sanctions against senior ICC officials, including Court President Tomoko Akane, and form part of Washington’s campaign to prevent the tribunal from exercising jurisdiction over American personnel.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has argued that the ICC threatens American sovereignty by asserting authority over nationals of countries that have not accepted its founding treaty.
The Court rejected the latest restrictions, describing them as an attempt to obstruct the administration of international justice.
Established under the Rome Statute, the ICC operates independently of national governments and investigates serious international crimes where its jurisdictional requirements are satisfied.
Neither the United States nor Israel is a party to the Rome Statute.
The dispute with Washington has intensified since the ICC issued arrest warrants in November 2024 for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant over alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity connected with military operations in Gaza.
Israel rejects the Court’s jurisdiction and disputes the allegations. Washington has similarly opposed the proceedings against Israeli officials.
The ICC has also pursued investigations into Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In March 2023, its judges issued arrest warrants for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova, Russia’s commissioner for children’s rights, over the alleged unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children.
Further warrants followed in 2024 against senior Russian military commanders and officials in connection with attacks on Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure.
The proceedings demonstrate the geographical scope of the Court’s investigations, although its ability to secure arrests depends heavily on cooperation from individual states.
The ICC has no independent police force and relies on national authorities to execute its warrants.
The ICC’s nomination for the Sakharov Prize was submitted by the Socialists and Democrats group in the European Parliament.
Its selection comes as European lawmakers examine how the EU should respond to American sanctions affecting the Court and organisations supporting its activities.
The October restrictions have raised practical questions about access to banking, technology services and other infrastructure required by the tribunal.
European governments must also consider how to support an institution established through an international treaty while maintaining relations with Washington.
The Sakharov Prize carries no legal authority to reverse American sanctions or compel governments to cooperate with ICC investigations. Nevertheless, the award represents an explicit institutional endorsement of the tribunal at a time when its operations face increasing external pressure.
The ICC was selected from three finalists announced earlier this month.
The other nominees were Tanzanian opposition leader Tundu Lissu and Iranian sisters Taraneh and Romina Rahimi, whose cases have attracted international attention over political persecution and judicial proceedings.
The Sakharov Prize, established by the European Parliament in 1988, is named after Soviet physicist, dissident and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Andrei Sakharov.
It recognises individuals and organisations defending human rights, freedom of expression and fundamental liberties. The award includes €50,000.
Previous recipients include Nelson Mandela, Malala Yousafzai and imprisoned journalists.
In 2025, the prize was awarded jointly to Belarusian journalist Andrzej Poczobut and Georgian journalist Mzia Amaglobeli.
The formal presentation of the 2026 prize is scheduled for 16 December at the European Parliament in Strasbourg.
The award places the ICC alongside previous Sakharov laureates while drawing further attention to the unresolved dispute between Washington and European governments over international criminal jurisdiction.
The missile landed between the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, a UNESCO World Heritage site, and the Holy Presentation (Sviato-Vvedenskyi) Monastery. Monastery buildings, homes, shops, cafés and other civilian infrastructure sustained damage in the surrounding area.
Zelenskyy disclosed that Russian forces had used three cluster-equipped ballistic missiles during the assault. Ukrainian authorities described weapons designed to explode in the air as they approach their targets, distributing explosive submunitions over an area approximately 400 metres in diameter.
After receiving reports from officials overseeing emergency operations across Ukraine, the president accused Moscow of deliberately choosing a weapon capable of inflicting extensive civilian casualties in a densely populated district.
“This was a deliberate choice of weapon and area of deployment,” Zelenskyy said.
He maintained that there were no military installations in the vicinity and that the attack had been intended to inflict maximum damage on civilians and their property.
Pecherskyi is one of Kyiv’s oldest districts, containing religious institutions and architectural monuments associated with centuries of Ukrainian history.
Among them is the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, established in the 11th century and subsequently developed into an important centre of Eastern Orthodox Christianity.
The complex includes historic churches, monasteries and an extensive system of underground caves. Together with Saint Sophia Cathedral and its related buildings, it forms part of a UNESCO World Heritage property that has appeared on the List of World Heritage in Danger since 2023.
Thursday’s explosion occurred in the area separating the Lavra from the Holy Presentation Monastery. Ukrainian authorities identified damage to buildings belonging to the latter, alongside neighbouring residential and commercial premises. Assessments of the destruction across the historic district were continuing.
This was not the first occasion in 2026 on which Russian weapons had damaged the area’s religious heritage.
On 15 June, a Russian drone struck the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra complex, causing severe damage to the Dormition Cathedral. Its roof and structural elements suffered extensive destruction, prompting UNESCO to undertake emergency stabilisation measures.
Ukraine’s Security Service subsequently published evidence identifying fragments of a Russian Geran-2 drone recovered from the site.
The October strike has again exposed the vulnerability of the capital’s historic religious buildings, as well as the civilian neighbourhoods surrounding them.
The reported choice of ammunition has particular implications for the investigation into the attack.
Whereas a conventional missile warhead delivers its explosive force around a principal impact point, cluster munitions release numerous smaller explosive devices capable of striking separate locations across a broad area.
In an urban environment, such weapons can cause casualties and destruction well beyond an intended target. Unexploded submunitions may remain dangerous after the initial attack, posing further risks to residents and emergency workers.
The International Committee of the Red Cross has warned that deploying cluster munitions in populated areas creates a high likelihood of indiscriminate effects.
Under international humanitarian law, military operations must distinguish between civilian persons and objects and legitimate military targets. Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited.
The reported deployment of cluster warheads in central Kyiv therefore raises questions about whether those requirements were observed. Zelenskyy’s account of the three missiles had not, at the time of reporting, been independently established through publicly available forensic evidence.
The Pecherskyi explosion was one incident in a much larger attack on the Ukrainian capital.
According to Zelenskyy, Russia launched 21 ballistic missiles against Kyiv in three successive waves overnight. Ukrainian authorities reported at least two people killed and more than 30 wounded, with strikes damaging apartment buildings, commercial premises, transport infrastructure and energy facilities.
The bombardment took place shortly after Russian President Vladimir Putin met US presidential envoy Steve Witkoff in St Petersburg on Wednesday, 21 October.
During their discussions, Putin indicated that Russia was prepared in principle to resume negotiations with Ukraine and the United States, potentially in November. However, no confirmed timetable emerged.
Witkoff’s visit followed consultations in Norway between American, Ukrainian and European representatives over possible arrangements to end the war.
The renewed diplomatic activity has done little to resolve the underlying disagreements. As EU Today has previously examined, Moscow continues to advance territorial demands while the parties remain divided over Ukraine’s future security guarantees.
Meanwhile, Kyiv faces an immediate requirement for additional air-defence ammunition.
Zelenskyy has repeatedly appealed for more Patriot interceptor missiles capable of engaging ballistic targets. Difficulties surrounding American military assistance and intelligence cooperation have increased tensions between Washington and Kyiv at a time when Russia is intensifying attacks against Ukrainian cities.
The latest strike also presents Ukrainian investigators with the task of establishing whether the reported use of cluster munitions against a historic civilian district constituted an unlawful attack.
For Zelenskyy, the bombardment following Putin’s latest diplomatic discussions demonstrates that Moscow’s military conduct remains unchanged. He has argued that Russia’s actions provide no evidence of a genuine intention to bring the war to an end.
Europe’s Black Sea security problem has become a test of credibility. Merchant vessels face deadly attacks near EU member states, crews are being placed in danger, and Ukrainian export routes remain vulnerable. Yet Brussels is still discussing whether to consider a naval response.
The European Parliament’s latest resolution, adopted on October 22nd by 432 votes to 52, with 88 abstentions, delivers a forceful political message. MEPs hold Russia responsible for attacks on civilian vessels and for extending its aggression into the western Black Sea.
The harder question is what follows. Parliament wants the EU and member states to consider a naval operation, alongside stronger NATO engagement and closer cooperation between Bulgaria, Romania and Türkiye. That is a serious proposal. It is also several consequential decisions short of an operational mission.
Ships, aircraft, defensive weapons, command arrangements and rules of engagement cannot be supplied by parliamentary language. Governments must commit them—and accept responsibility for what happens when an approaching drone threatens a merchant vessel.
The economic stakes are already clear. As EU Today previously reported, attacks threatening routes off Bulgaria have widened the pressure on Ukrainian agricultural exports and neighbouring economies. Higher insurance costs and shipowners’ reluctance to enter dangerous waters can undermine trade without any formal blockade being declared.
That makes maritime insecurity an effective instrument of coercion. Every additional voyage becomes a commercial gamble, while exporters and importing countries absorb costs created by a war they cannot control.
EU Global’s earlier coverage of drone attacks off Bulgaria similarly highlighted the threat to commercial navigation and NATO’s southeastern frontier. These incidents demonstrate how quickly a conflict centred on Ukraine can impose direct burdens on neighbouring European states.
Parliament is unusually pointed about Bulgaria’s conduct. It criticises Sofia’s ambiguous response, challenges Prime Minister Rumen Radev to match requests for allied solidarity with action, and urges Bulgaria to stop delaying participation in NATO’s counter-drone initiative.
The principle is sound. Collective security depends on national governments contributing to the arrangements from which they seek protection. Political hesitation becomes particularly difficult to defend when commercial crews bear the immediate risks.
Nevertheless, Bulgaria cannot reasonably be expected to solve a regional security crisis alone. Nor can Romania. A credible response requires shared surveillance, coordinated interception procedures and practical cooperation with Türkiye.
There is movement. Defence Matters reported on October 21st that NATO was reinforcing regional surveillance through aircraft, drones, radar systems and specialist personnel. Those measures should improve detection and investigation, although they do not constitute a standing naval escort operation.
That distinction matters. Detecting an incoming threat is essential; defeating it before it reaches a civilian vessel requires a further chain of decisions and capabilities.
Any proposed naval deployment also faces geographical and diplomatic constraints. Türkiye controls passage through the Turkish Straits under the Montreux Convention, which imposes restrictions on warships. A workable mission must therefore be developed with Ankara and grounded in a realistic assessment of available regional forces.
Calling an operation “European” does not resolve those difficulties. Its value would depend on its mandate, resources and ability to protect shipping while managing escalation.
Parliament also wants the EU’s Black Sea maritime security hub operationalised rapidly. Better information sharing and infrastructure protection are sensible objectives. But institutional coordination must produce measurable operational improvements, rather than another layer of meetings between organisations already describing the same threat.
Funding deserves similar scrutiny. MEPs propose using unspent SAFE resources and ensuring that the next long-term EU budget addresses regional defence needs. Governments should explain which capabilities can actually be financed, procured and deployed—and when.
The resolution identifies the danger. Europe’s failure would be to treat that diagnosis as an achievement sufficient in itself.
Merchant crews need protection during their next voyage. Ukraine needs reliable access to export markets. Bulgaria and Romania need capabilities that arrive before another emergency.
Brussels has issued its warning. Governments must now demonstrate that European maritime security means more than condemning the consequences of its absence.
The European Parliament on Thursday (22 October) backed a three-year delay to the EU’s methane rules for oil and gas importers, two years more than the European Commission proposed last week.
MEPs also voted to extend the delay to European oil and gas producers, which goes beyond the commission’s plans.
The text now forms parliament’s position for negotiations with member states, whose ambassadors failed to agree on Wednesday.
Under the amendments, tabled by the conservative European People’s Party (EPP), importers would only have to prove that their oil and gas meets EU monitoring standards from 2031, instead of 2027 under the current law.
Reporting on methane intensity would also be delayed from 2028 to 2031.
A separate amendment from a cross-party group of 36 Romanian and Bulgarian MEPs, which also passed, delays reporting obligations for EU operators by three years, to 2030.
MEPs also approved an amendment, tabled by Dutch Socialist MEP Mohammed Chahim, that the extra time should not apply to oil, gas and coal from countries under EU sanctions, which in practice means Russia.
A far-right Patriots for Europe proposal to suspend the regulation altogether was rejected, as was a push by the conservative ECR group to delay parts of the rules even longer.
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A grassroots student-led coalition threatens to upend Serbia’s political landscape as the EU-candidate country heads to the polls on Sunday
Serbia’s 6.5 million voters go to the polls on 25 October in a watershed parliamentary election characterised by civil unrest, a new political landscape, allegations of irregularities, an uncertain outcome and the potential of far-reaching consequences.
Here is a brief guide to the key issues.
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© Photograph: Pierre Crom/Getty Images
© Photograph: Pierre Crom/Getty Images
© Photograph: Pierre Crom/Getty Images
The International Criminal Court (ICC) has received the EU’s Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought.
Reacting to EU Parliament president Roberta Metsola’s announcement of the prize winner on Thursday (22 October), the Hague-based court said it is “thankful” for the recognition of the court and its officials.
“This award comes at a time when the court and its officials face unprecedented challenges, including sanctions aimed at disrupting the court’s judicial mandate,” ICC president judge Tomoko Akane told EUobserver in a statement.
The parliament’s recognition “underscores the importance of […] support to enable the Court to carry out its mandate independently and impartially, in the service of justice and the victims of the gravest crimes,” said the Japanese judge.
The court’s win comes after US president Donald Trump put his weight behind Israeli efforts to discredit the international judicial body by extending sanctions against it.
The ICC investigates and tries individuals charged with war and human-rights related crimes. When it issued an arrest warrant in 2024 for Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu for alleged war crimes, the US responded by sanctioning its judges.
EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen welcomed the win, saying:
“For victims of the world’s gravest crimes, justice means a voice. The ICC must be free to pursue its mission, independently, and without pressure or intimidation. Europe stands firmly behind president Tomoko Akane, the Court’s judges and officials, and their vital work for a world governed by rules.”
New sanctions against the court were announced by the Trump administration this month after the Nobel Peace Prize went to Navi Pillay, a former ICC judge who concluded in a UN report that Israel is committing genocide in Gaza.
Tomoka said: “While this prize recognises the work of the court in combating impunity and ensuring fair trials, it is also an important recognition of the role of international justice as a cornerstone of lasting peace. In a world marked by rising conflicts, there is no peace without justice and no security without law.”
French MEP Chloé Ridel initiated the ICC’s nomination for the Sakharov Prize on behalf of the Socialists & Democrats parliament group.
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Company ordered to stop work at two sites in country, which has found itself at forefront of tech firms’ latest push
Behind a wire fence lies a vast gaping wound of earth. Before Google’s arrival a few months ago, an estimated quarter of a million trees occupied the 330 hectares (815 acres) of forest near the town of Muhos in rural northern Finland. Now they are all gone.
After the tech company illegally stripped the entire area to build a datacentre – taking even the top soil with it – all that remains is a vast expanse of mud indented with the trail marks of machinery, puddles and mounds of earth, roots and branches. Residents say that brown water flowing off the site is going into a stream that feeds the Oulujoki River.
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© Photograph: Alessandro Rampazzo/AFP/Getty Images
© Photograph: Alessandro Rampazzo/AFP/Getty Images
© Photograph: Alessandro Rampazzo/AFP/Getty Images
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