The greater isolation of lesser Israel

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Over the summer, Russia intensified its use of jet-powered one-way attack drones. Flying faster and higher than the propeller-driven Shahed-136s (or Geran-2s as Russia calls their copies) that have been terrorizing Ukraine for years, these weapons are far harder to intercept. We predicted this would happen over three years ago when Iran first introduced its jet-powered Shahed-238, which itself was an adaptation of the Shahed-136. Initial variants of Russia’s copy of that drone, called the Geran-3, first appeared over the skies of Ukraine in early 2024. By mid-2025 they were becoming a real problem. Since then, the latest higher-performance variant of this weapon, the Geran-4, has added great strain to Ukraine’s dwindling air defense resources and is the source of increasing levels of destruction across the country.
The Geran-4 appeared last May, according to the Ukrainian Defense Intelligence Directorate (GUR). Unlike the Geran-3, which largely used a modified Shahed-136 airframe, the new drone has one purpose-built for higher-speed flight because “the structural strength [of the older model] was insufficient for high-speed flights, and even less so for maneuvering under high G-loads,” GUR noted.

The Geran-4’s new airframe features a blended air intake and overall “improved aerodynamic efficiency, a reinforced structure, and a turbojet engine with increased thrust,” GUR stated. “The wings are now permanently integrated into the center wing section. To reduce air resistance, the number of technological hatches on the fuselage has been minimized.”
In an overnight attack across Ukraine that lasted until Monday, “Russia launched 165 drones overnight, 79 of them jet-powered, the Air Force reported. Air defenses downed or suppressed 112, and hits were recorded at 14 locations.” You can see the aftermath of one of those attacks in the following video.
We’re under constant attack
— Antoninaodesa NAFO (@antoninaodesssa) September 28, 2026Unfortunately, just a few minutes ago, a jet-powered Shahed drone hit a residential building
. #Odesa
Burn in hell, ruzzianspic.twitter.com/EXTWM1yVIN
Recently, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) got its hands on one of these weapons. Its report offers the best view yet of what makes these drones so dangerous.
The Geran-4 is “a new, faster version of the attack drone that is proving harder for Ukrainian air defenses to intercept,” the report states. “We were given a rare opportunity to literally take this surviving drone apart and find out what makes it so much faster, more maneuverable, and more accurate.”
“The first part we uncover is the turbojet engine. It is one of the Geran-4’s most significant upgrades, allowing the drone to fly at altitudes of up to eight kilometers,” the report explained. “That’s twice as high as the older propeller-powered drones. According to specialists, drones equipped with this type of engine have already flown from Russia-occupied Crimea to Lutsk in northwestern Ukraine, a distance of more than 700 kilometers.”
RFE/RL takes apart a Russian Geran-4 drone to uncover what makes the jet-powered unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) faster, harder to intercept, and capable of operating deep inside Ukraine — from its turbojet engine and advanced camera to foreign-made communications and navigation… pic.twitter.com/WGNdlpS9w1
— Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (@RFERL) September 25, 2026
“This engine allows it to fly at speeds of up to 450 to 500 kilometers per hour over Ukrainian territory. Sometimes even faster,” RFE/RL proffered. “It flies fast and high, which is why it is still difficult to intercept.”
As the camera pans down over the engine, the reporters noted that while it is made in China, “we have investigated cases where these engines were assembled in Russia using Chinese components.”
The next component examined was the drone’s camera.
“It has several modes: daylight, night vision, and infrared,” the report stated. “The camera offers 10-times optical zoom and up to 32-times digital zoom, allowing the drone operator to view terrain from an altitude of eight kilometers.”
“If there is a relay station and it is connected to the network, an operator sitting in an automated workstation somewhere in Bryansk, Oryol, or Crimea can control the drone and guide it to its target,” RFE/RL stated.
“Once the drone is inside Ukraine, regular cellular SIM cards can help keep it connected,” the report continued. “We also found two GSM modems inside this drone. Using SIM cards, they can transmit the Geran-4’s location over mobile networks, allowing the operator to track it in real time.”
Back in 2024, we explained how Shaheds fitted with 4G modems and SIM cards from Ukrainian telecom firms, combined with a camera installed on the drone and the ability to use wireless networks, could be one of a number of avenues that would transform the Shahed into a relatively long-range reconnaissance and strike asset capable of beyond-line-of-sight real-time operations. This could help plug what at the time was a glaring gap in the Russian arsenal, although the stability of its connectivity is still unknown and providing man-in-the-loop guidances in real-time for strikes may be beyond the capabilities of this configuration, at least consistently.
Regardless, most of these drones do not have cameras or modems, they fly to a specific set of coordinates and dive on a target before detonating.
The following images offered a glimpse into that system.
— MAKS 26
Inside Russian Shahed: power bank and a SIM card of a Ukrainian operator pic.twitter.com/D5LGBMJfIv
(@Maks_NAFO_FELLA) November 29, 2023
Drone specialists who have investigated the remains of these weapons told the outlet that they had found SIM cards “from Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, and even some European Union countries. And the deeper we go inside the drone, the more foreign-made components we find.”
The RFE/RL team also found a Chinese mesh modem the Russians use to help guide the drone.
“It’s responsible, among other things, for radio and video communications. Essentially, this device allows the drone operator to see the video feed from the Geran-4 almost in real time,” RFE/RL stated. “The modem has a range of up to 300 kilometers and can also act as a signal relay. That means several drones flying near each other can relay and strengthen the signal, making it possible to control them over much greater distances.”
The discovery of the Chinese mesh modem illustrates something we reported earlier this year: “For some time now, Russia has been working on a man-in-the-loop (MITL) control capability for the Shahed/Geran, a feature that was confirmed when they started to appear with cameras and cellular modems, something TWZ explored in detail at the time. These developments allow the drone to be connected to an operator. Standard Shaheds fly autonomous routes to pre-planned targets on autopilot with no man-in-the-loop control. They are ‘fire and forget’ weapons.“
“Meanwhile, the range at which MITL can be achieved has been steadily increased. At first, the drones were adapted to exploit patchy cellular networks to provide additional connectivity when available. More recently, Shaheds have been flying with antennas allowing for direct line-of-sight control close to the front lines. This allows them to hit targets dynamically like an FPV drone, while packing a much heavier punch and being able to loiter for long periods of time. You can read all about this development here. Now, the datalink range is being extended using airborne signal relays, possibly creating a mesh network with multiple line-of-sight links.”
درون”Geran-4“ توقف محرك الـMicro-turbojet قبل الانقضاض على الهدف،
— TACTIX
وتتَّخذ وضعية الانزلاق البطيء، ربّما لتوفير الوقود او لدقة افضل اثناء البحث بالعدسة البصرية.
ايضاً يظهر بوضوح هوائيات الارسال Mesh Antennas
اثنان مثبَّتان على الذَّيل، أحدهما موجّه الى الاعلى والاخر الى الاسفل. pic.twitter.com/cQIyHhvbmm(@Tactixtm) September 27, 2026
Finally, the Ukrainian journalists found something else we have long reported on. Like many other Russian weapons, the Geran-4 even contains components made in America.
“Despite international sanctions, a significant portion of its components are still coming from abroad, highlighting gaps in global export control enforcement,” RFE/RL showcased. “We just opened up the drone’s onboard computer, and these circuit boards contain components made by a U.S. company. The markings on this component are partly worn off, but you can still see the manufacturer, Texas Instruments.”
“According to the specialists, what is actually Russian-made here is mainly the drone’s body and its assembly. This particular drone was manufactured and assembled at Alabuga, a major Russian drone production site. According to Ukraine’s military intelligence, Russia is now producing around 3,000 Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones a month at Alabuga and other facilities across Russia.”
Satellite images of the site first emerged in 2023, which you can see below.
Satellite images of the factory producing Iranian kamikaze drones Shahed-136 in Yelabuga, Tatarstan.#russia #Ukraine pic.twitter.com/07HBMwcGCs
— Dr. Khaled Alfaiomi (@Alfaiomi) November 15, 2023
As if the Geran-4 drones were not challenging enough for Ukraine, Russian Geran-5 jet-powered drones are equipped with “a DSMAC (Digital Sensor Module for Autonomous Navigation) module for navigation using reference images of the Earth’s surface, similar to the X-101 missile,” the Ukrainian technology monitoring channel Polkovnyk GSh reported on Telegram. DSMAC allows for a weapon to navigate without any external help from global positioning satellites. The Tomahawk also uses this system. You can read all about it and how AI embedded in Shahed models will be the next leap in true autonomy far beyond the front lines, even for hunting and killing targets of opportunity, in our special feature linked here.
In addition, Russia has installed mesh repeaters on these weapons for radio signals so that video of the attacks can be “recorded (and immediately transmitted),” presidential adviser on defense technology Serhii Beskrestnov, known as Flash, said on Telegram.
The Russian military is now capable of acquiring real-time, high-quality BDA of its strikes with Geran-type OWA-UAVs/cruise missiles in downtown Kyiv.
— Status-6 (@Archer83Able) September 27, 2026
In the footage below, we can see the moment of a Russian strike with Geran-5 cruise missile on the "Inkom" business center… pic.twitter.com/mPx4Kf9tmH
Though these jet-powered drones are causing major problems for Ukraine, the country is finding a way to combat them.
One way is by using Ukrainian Air Force F-16 Vipers to shoot them down, which you can see in the following video.
The moment a Russian jet-powered "Shahed" drone is shot down by an F-16 fighter jet using its M61 Vulcan cannon. pic.twitter.com/gU72HJTXUa
— WarTranslated (@wartranslated) September 23, 2026
The Russian jet-powered drones were largely outrunning the drone interceptors Ukraine began using with great success against the piston-driven Shaheds. Those interceptors were not only saving lives, but they were also saving money because they cost a tiny fraction of far more expensive, higher-end munitions like the PAC-3 MSE fired by the Patriot system or the AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile variants fired from the National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS) air defense launchers.
Seeking a more efficient and effective defense, Ukraine adapted by fielding higher-performing interceptor drones that are purpose-built to take on the jet-powered Russian munitions. Still, the engagement window for hitting the Russian drones is small, and these are more expensive to build. However, they will remain far less costly and faster to acquire than surface-to-air missiles.
In his speech earlier this week at the U.N. General Assembly, President Volodymyr Zelensky claimed that “our soldiers have already successfully tested four new jet-powered interceptor drones against Russian jet-powered Shaheds. So we are scaling up production.”
It is unclear exactly which interceptors the Ukrainian president was talking about; however, other types designed to take on Russian jet-powered Gerans have become public. One of them is the Sting S, a variant of the bullet-shaped Sting interceptor drone made by the Ukrainian Wild Hornets drone company.
On Sept. 19, the company posted a video on X claiming that “a crew from the 1020th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment took down a Russian Geran-5 using the new STING S. This drone is faster and carries a larger explosive payload than other Geran variants.”
TWZ cannot independently verify these claims.
STING S takes down a Geran-5 jet-powered drone-missile
— Wild Hornets (@wilendhornets) September 19, 2026
The crew from the 1020th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment took down a Russian Geran-5 using the new STING S. This drone is faster and carries a larger explosive payload than other Geran variants.
Big thanks to the… pic.twitter.com/Eg0rQgd1tL
When we asked for more details, Wild Hornets told us “that the tests are going well. About a dozen enemy ‘Geran-4′ jet-powered strike UAVs have already been shot down, as well as several ‘Geran-5’ models, just in the last few days. We should note that at this stage we are talking about only the first results of combat testing within a few select units.”
The Sting S “is a high-speed quadcopter-type interceptor,” the Wild Hornets spokesperson added. “When choosing this model, we took into account that the solution should be inexpensive, easy to use, and quickly scalable.”
“Furthermore, most of the targets during combat testing have been destroyed using ‘Hornet Vision Ctrl’ remote control technology,” the spokesman stated. Wild Hornets claims the system provides low-latency image transmission, long-range communication, and resistance to electronic warfare.
100 remote interceptions in 100 seconds: Hornet Vision CTRL in action
— Wild Hornets (@wilendhornets) September 3, 2026
Since deployment, Ukraine’s Defense Forces have remotely destroyed 1,000+ enemy targets using the system.
All thanks to the skill of crews taking down enemy drones with STING interceptors every daypic.twitter.com/9sUthdjsvF
“We expect this will allow us to rapidly scale up the deployment of the new interceptor once mass production begins,” the spokesperson noted.
As we have frequently noted, Russia and Ukraine continuously create new weapons and ways to defeat them. The jet-powered Russian drones, and Ukraine’s newest interceptors designed to destroy them, are the latest examples of a seemingly endless weapons evolution cycle in this war.
Contact the author: howard@twz.com
The post Russia’s Jet-Powered Shahed Drones Are Quickly Evolving As Ukraine Scrambles To Blunt Their Damage appeared first on TWZ.

Police officers were lectured about Nigel Farage in a publicly funded talk about Islamophobia, with the Reform leader's doubts about Muslims' ability to adhere to British values compared to a racially aggravated offence.
The post Police Lectured About Farage in Islamophobia Talk appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.

RT | September 29, 2026
Five young men from London who were caught near a British airbase heavily used by the US in its war against Iran have triggered a media frenzy across the London establishment’s mainstream media. The so-called “Fairford incident” lit up the British deep state media echo chamber.
However, what was initially reported as a possible Iranian or Russian-backed plot to blow up the RAF’s Fairford airbase, has so far revealed a farcical attempt to warn the British Army of a possible threat, and produced complaints from Washington, a lot of unanswered questions, and no explosives.
What happened at Fairford?
The drama in Gloucestershire, southwest England, began after a local resident noticed three vans blocking a road after midnight on Saturday near RAF Fairford, and a group of “hooded and ‘balaclava’d’ men” running from her car headlights.
Having failed to get an answer at the Ministry of Defence security hotline she dialed 999 and alerted police to “three suspicious vehicles.”
Armed counter-terror police swooped in, detained five men near the nearby village of Whelford, and found three white vans bearing fuel company insignia, raising fears they could contain explosives.
How did British security services react?
A counter-terrorism emergency was declared. About 85 local homes were evacuated, a 400-meter cordon was thrown around the scene, and military bomb disposal experts sent in a robot to examine the vehicles – which found no viable explosives.
The British mainstream security state press went into speculative overdrive, “monitoring” an incident near the key RAF base.
Who are the Fairford incident suspects?
Police have not named the five men but say all – photographed while sitting shirtless after their arrest – are British nationals from London aged between 23 and 25. They were initially arrested on suspicion of offenses under the Explosives Act and were later detained on suspicion of preparing a terrorist act.
Then, less than 24 hours after their detention, all five were released on bail.
What do British police officially suspect?
UK counterterrorism chief Laurence Taylor stressed that releasing the men did not mean the case was over. The suspects remain under “stringent” restrictions while investigators pursue “multiple new lines of enquiry,” he insisted.
US President Donald Trump, who initially claimed the men had already been under observation and were “looking to do big damage,” later complained about their release.
“We know everything about them,” he told reporters. “I would not have released them.”
Britain can hold terrorism suspects without charge for up to 14 days, meaning police were not legally forced to release the five when they did.
Who declared a foreign power was involved?
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio told Fox News that the incident “clearly involves the hands of a foreign actor.”
Tehran has warned that military facilities used for US attacks on Iran could be treated as legitimate military targets. However, it has never claimed responsibility for any strikes outside of the Middle East.
British media reports have cited anonymous sources suggesting investigators were examining possible Iranian involvement. Russia and an “islamist state” were also mentioned by Reuters, citing anonymous sources.
Tehran’s embassy in London slammed the suggestions of Iranian involvement as “unfounded and malicious speculations” that fueled Iranophobia in Britain.
How is Britain escalating war rhetoric?
British Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband used his Labour Party conference speech on Monday to call for more preparedness against growing security threats, opening his speech by pointing directly to the Fairford incident.
The media machine has been playing its part in whipping up the war hysteria. Sky News aired a mockumentary titled ‘The Wargame’ playing out a crisis leading to a possible nuclear conflict with Russia. The BBC also urged readers to ask themselves whether they are “psychologically prepared for war”.
British authorities last year arrested four Iranian nationals over what was described as a major suspected terrorist plot. Police eventually released all four from custody without charge.
Is the Fairford incident a false flag?
There is no evidence of that, and watching the story move from a worrying local incident, through to a counter-terror operation involving “possible truck bombs,” to the release of five men on bail within 24 hours and an admission that the vans involved contained no explosives, can hardly count as a well-executed false flag plot.
Can the British government be believed?
That does not mean the British government deserves blind trust on intelligence claims.
The obvious historical example is the 2003 invasion of Iraq, . Prime Minister Tony Blair strongly backed US President George W. Bush’s false claims that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. RAF Fairford itself was used by US bombers during that war.
Trump may be saying plenty about Tehran that echoes Bush’s rhetoric. But there is currently no evidence that UK Prime Minister Andy Burnham has decided to follow Blair down the same road.
What is the last refuge of a scoundrel?
When facts run out of road the British commentariat will reach the Hybrid War refueling post.
Hybrid war is by definition almost impossible to verify. Sky News, for instance, interviewed Martin Gallagher, a former police superintendent, who argued that masterminds are trying to manipulate British authorities by making them “cry wolf” now, before a “real attack” could happen in the future
Is Western Europe caught in its own echo-chamber?
Last week, Spain’s El Mundo, citing anonymous Latvian security sources, reported that the CIA had warned of a Russian kamikaze drone plot targeting Spain, France or Italy, involving merchant ships in the Mediterranean. The story raced around Europe before senior officials in Italy and France debunked it.
Last month in Sweden, a Russian couple vacationing from Spain became the focus of a security scare after camping near a property connected to the CEO of arms manufacturer Saab. Quickly labeled as possible spies or assassins in the press, the tourists were cleared of any wrongdoing and told to leave Sweden, their holiday ruined.
Germany has taken a much firmer line over an August drone incident at Leipzig/Halle Airport, which Berlin formally called a failed hybrid attack carried out by Russia. The German government has refused to disclose the evidence underlying its claim, however, fuelling speculation that the situation was staged for political reasons.
The great European drone scare of 2025 also produced some awkward endings. No evidence has been produced of any malign operation around the multiple allegations, and most have been disproven by mainstream journalists in Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark, where the army is thought to have actually shot at a passenger plane.
And then there is “Havana Syndrome.” US officials were looking for some kind of Russian, Chinese or other foreign directed-energy weapon, but only found an argument that CIA agents who were purportedly victimized should be paid compensations for the damage they suffered, regardless of its cause.
A Meliá Hotels International vai estrear a marca de luxo The Meliá Collection em Roma, em 2027, através de um acordo com o Gruppo Stay para a abertura de um hotel de 67 quartos no centro da capital italiana. A nova unidade será operada em regime de franquia e representa a terceira colaboração entre as duas empresas. Está a pensar ir comer fora? Veja aqui algumas sugestões de menus a preços económicos.
Se tem um restaurante e pretende colocar aqui – de forma gratuita – o seu menu, envio-o no dia anterior ou, no máximo, até às 10h00 do dia a que se refere para: guiaalgarve@gmail.com.
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German investigators have linked an arson attack in Munich, the planned sabotage of drone manufacturer Skyeton near Prešov, and an attempted attack using an explosive drone at Leipzig-Halle Airport to Russia’s military intelligence agency, the GRU, according to media reports.
The most important finding is that part of this network was said to have operated from Slovakia.
We do not yet know all the details of the ongoing investigation, and I trust that Slovak security authorities will thoroughly examine the circumstances of the case and determine the true scope of the entire operation.
However, according to the German security services’ findings so far, the Slovak connection is not marginal.
Slovakia may have served as one of the hubs of a wider network linked to Russia’s military intelligence agency, the GRU.
According to German security sources, two Bulgarian nationals detained after the arson attack in Munich on 3 September were part of a GRU-linked group operating from Slovakia. Incendiary devices were thrown near Rohde & Schwarz and Helsing, companies linked to the defence industry and support for Ukraine.
The same wider network was said to have been preparing an arson attack on Skyeton’s plant near Prešov, which produces reconnaissance drones for Ukraine. Slovak authorities thwarted the plan and detained Latvian and Ukrainian nationals. Another suspect was detained in Germany.
The nationality of those carrying out the attacks is not decisive.
The current model of Russian operations uses nationals of different countries, often recruited through intermediaries. A professional GRU officer can therefore remain several layers removed from the attack itself. Recruitment may take place via Telegram, payments through cryptocurrencies, and those carrying out the attacks may not even know precisely who the real instigator is.
German investigators argued there was also a link to an attempted attack using an explosive drone at Leipzig-Halle Airport on 4 August.
The target was reportedly a Ukrainian cargo aircraft used to transport material. The German government subsequently publicly attributed responsibility for the incident to Russia.
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