Rahman Salehi, of Salford, and Salam Ahmadyan, 36, of Liverpool, were charged on Friday, 2 October, with engaging in conduct in preparation for terrorist acts, contrary to Section 5 of the Terrorism Act 2006.
According to the Metropolitan Police announcement detailing the charges, both men are Iranian nationals and were arrested in Manchester on Sunday, 20 September.
They have been remanded in custody and are due to appear at Westminster Magistrates’ Court on Saturday, 3 October.
The arrests followed what police described as a long-running counter-terrorism investigation into a suspected plot directed against the Jewish community in the Manchester area.
Police allege that the two men were communicating with a third person overseas who may have been in Iran. No allegation has been made in the charges released so far that the Iranian government directed the suspected plot.
The particulars published by Counter Terrorism Policing allege that Salehi and Ahmadyan used encrypted communications and obtained material containing instructions for manufacturing an explosive device.
Investigators say the men acquired instructions relating to a device using powdered chlorine and vehicle brake fluid, along with video material concerning the manufacture or assembly of an improvised explosive device.
They are further accused of acquiring liquids, components and equipment, researching potential targets, obtaining images, maps and plans, and carrying out reconnaissance at locations considered as possible targets.
The Crown Prosecution Service confirmed that prosecutors had authorised charges after reviewing evidence gathered during the investigation.
Frank Ferguson, Chief Crown Prosecutor for the CPS Special Crime and Counter Terrorism Division, said prosecutors had concluded that there was sufficient evidence for the case to be put before a court.
The CPS stressed that the proceedings are now active and that both men have the right to a fair trial. The charges are allegations and no finding of guilt has been made.
The arrests took place shortly before Yom Kippur, the holiest day in the Jewish calendar, and came amid heightened security surrounding Jewish institutions in Britain.
Deputy Assistant Commissioner Vicki Evans, Senior National Coordinator for Counter Terrorism Policing, said the investigation had disrupted what police believed to be a plot targeting Manchester’s Jewish community.
The timing is particularly sensitive because it comes one year after the terrorist attack at the Heaton Park Hebrew Congregation synagogue in Manchester on 2 October 2025.
Two worshippers were killed in that attack, which took place on Yom Kippur. EU Today reported at the time on the Manchester synagogue attack and the security concerns facing Britain’s Jewish population.
The latest case also comes against the background of a series of alleged Iranian-linked threats and attacks involving Jewish and Israeli targets in Britain.
British security agencies have repeatedly warned about Iranian activity on UK territory. The government said earlier this year that more than 20 potentially lethal Iran-backed plots had been tracked by British security agencies over the preceding year.
Concerns intensified following attacks on Jewish-linked premises during 2026. In July, the government imposed sanctions on an Iran-linked organisation that had claimed responsibility for attacks on Jewish and Israeli-linked locations.
The group, the Islamic Movement of Companions of the Right, was subsequently designated under Britain’s new state-threat legislation alongside Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
EU Today has previously examined Iran-linked security threats in Britain following counter-terrorism arrests involving Iranian nationals, as well as alleged Iranian-linked plots targeting Jewish institutions elsewhere in Europe and North America.
The Manchester case comes as the British government increases security around synagogues, Jewish schools and community centres.
In July, ministers announced more than £250 million in additional funding over three years to strengthen protection for Jewish communities.
The package includes funding for more than 500 additional police officers across England and Wales, including around 80 officers in Greater Manchester, as well as additional resources for Counter Terrorism Policing.
The UK’s national terrorism threat level was raised to severe in April, meaning that an attack is considered highly likely. The government said the decision reflected both an increased threat from Islamist and extreme-right terrorism and a wider background of state-linked physical threats against the Jewish community.
EU Today has also reported on the government’s £250 million programme to strengthen Jewish community security and the broader increase in antisemitic incidents and violence affecting Jewish communities across Britain.
The allegations against Salehi and Ahmadyan will now be considered by the courts. Prosecutors have warned against publishing material that could prejudice the proceedings.
Latvians went to the polls on Saturday, 3 October, to elect the country’s 100-seat Saeima in an election taking place against an unusually tense security backdrop on NATO’s eastern frontier.
Fourteen parties and electoral alliances are contesting the election, with 1,428 candidates seeking seats in parliament, according to Latvia’s Central Election Commission. Voting takes place across five constituencies — Riga, Vidzeme, Latgale, Kurzeme and Zemgale — with polling stations open until 20:00 local time.
Security has occupied a prominent place in the campaign after a series of drone incidents brought the consequences of Russia’s war against Ukraine directly into Latvian airspace.
Prime Minister Andris Kulbergs, who took office in May after the previous coalition collapsed during a political crisis over the handling of drone incursions, is seeking a new mandate for his centrist United List. EU Today reported at the time that Prime Minister Evika Siliņa resigned after her coalition fractured amid criticism of Latvia’s response to repeated unmanned aircraft incidents along the Russian border. The collapse followed a succession of drone-related security incidents.
Kulbergs has campaigned on continued support for Ukraine and stronger Latvian defences, including additional counter-drone capabilities. His party entered election day ahead in the opinion polls, although the fragmented political landscape means coalition negotiations are likely to determine the eventual composition of the government.
An SKDS poll conducted between 4 and 16 September put United List on 14.4 per cent. Sovereign Power/Alliance of Young Latvians followed on 9.4 per cent, while Latvia First stood on 9.2 per cent. The Progressives recorded 6.2 per cent and the National Alliance 5.6 per cent. When only voters who had decided how they intended to vote were counted, seven political forces were projected to cross the 5 per cent threshold for representation in parliament.
The survey also showed a substantial pool of undecided or disengaged voters shortly before polling day, leaving considerable uncertainty around the final distribution of seats.
Russia and the war in neighbouring Ukraine have also produced sharper divisions between the competing parties.
Kulbergs has maintained Latvia’s strong support for Kyiv, while Sovereign Power has opposed military assistance to Ukraine and called for greater emphasis on negotiations. Latvia First has also sought votes among parts of the country’s Russian-speaking population, particularly in eastern Latvia, where questions surrounding language policy, relations with Moscow and the economic consequences of the war remain politically sensitive.
Latvia’s geographical position gives those arguments a significance extending beyond domestic politics. The country shares a border with Russia and Belarus and hosts allied troops as part of NATO’s reinforced eastern presence.
Earlier this year, drones crossed into Latvia from Russian territory, including incidents that exposed weaknesses in detecting and intercepting relatively small unmanned aircraft. EU Today reported in March that Latvia’s defence minister cut short a visit to Kyiv after another drone crossed the border from Russia. Further incidents followed in May.
Latvian intelligence has meanwhile warned about the changing nature of Moscow’s approach towards the country. In January, the Constitution Protection Bureau said Russia’s perception of Latvia was becoming increasingly similar to its view of Ukraine before the full-scale invasion, while stressing that it did not assess Russia as posing an immediate direct military threat at that stage. The warning was examined by EU Today earlier this year.
Riga has responded with one of NATO’s highest levels of defence expenditure.
Latvia’s Ministry of Defence says the country will spend about €2.16 billion on defence in 2026, equivalent to approximately 4.7 per cent of GDP under its updated calculation, as it moves towards a target of 5 per cent. Priorities include strengthening the armed forces, developing military infrastructure and improving defences along the eastern border. The Latvian defence ministry’s budget programme places additional emphasis on domestic defence production and military innovation.
Security is not the only issue facing voters. The cost of living, pensions, public services and regional economic disparities have also featured heavily during the campaign, particularly outside Riga.
The security debate, however, has given this election a wider European dimension. Latvia’s next government will take office while Russia’s war against Ukraine continues immediately beyond NATO’s eastern frontier and while the Baltic states are investing heavily in air defence, border protection and military readiness.
The official result will determine the composition of the 15th Saeima for the next four years. With several parties competing around the parliamentary threshold and no single force close to a majority, the subsequent coalition negotiations are likely to be almost as consequential as Saturday’s vote itself.
Oil prices fell on Friday after European governments agreed to release emergency diesel reserves, bringing additional supplies onto a market strained by disruption in the Middle East and shortages of refined fuel.
Brent crude futures fell $1.80, or 1.76 per cent, to $100.50 a barrel during trading on 2 October, while US West Texas Intermediate dropped $2.02, or 2.18 per cent, to $90.85, according to market data reported during Friday’s trading.
The fall came as the Group of Seven agreed to release 100 million barrels of oil and petroleum products from emergency stocks over four months. The package includes a substantial release of diesel during the first 20 days.
The G7 leaders’ statement on energy security and market stability said the releases would be co-ordinated through the International Energy Agency and would take account of commitments already made earlier this year. G7 governments will also discuss whether additional diesel releases are required.
The agreement marks a rapid development from the negotiations reported earlier on Friday. As EU Today reported before the G7 meeting, Washington had been pressing European governments, particularly France and Germany, to make more of their strategic diesel stocks available.
President Donald Trump had also raised the possibility of restricting US diesel exports as his administration sought to reduce domestic fuel prices. Such a restriction would have had significant consequences for Europe because the United States has become an important supplier of diesel to the European market.
A French proposal discussed by EU governments earlier on Friday envisaged European countries releasing around 50 million barrels of diesel, alongside another 50 million barrels of crude oil from International Energy Agency members.
The eventual G7 agreement also addresses the risk of export restrictions directly. The seven governments committed themselves to avoiding restrictions on energy and energy-product exports between G7 countries and called on other producers to refrain from measures that could worsen market shortages.
For Europe, the intervention comes as diesel supplies remain physically available but prices are being pushed higher by tight conditions on international markets.
The European Commission’s Energy Union Task Force met on Friday to examine diesel supplies and prices. The Commission said EU diesel supplies remained stable for the time being, but acknowledged that prices were high because of tight global markets.
The latest intervention follows a much larger emergency action earlier this year. In March, the International Energy Agency agreed its largest-ever co-ordinated stock release, making 400 million barrels available after the Middle East conflict severely disrupted international oil markets.
Europe’s contribution to that March operation consisted largely of refined petroleum products rather than crude oil, reflecting the particular pressure facing the continent’s fuel markets.
The pressure is part of a wider European energy problem. EU Today reported this week that the Middle East conflict has added more than €100 billion to Europe’s energy import bill, despite the continent receiving no corresponding increase in the physical amount of oil and gas purchased.
European governments have already committed €17.9 billion this year to measures intended to protect households and businesses from the rise in energy costs, according to an EU Today assessment of national support measures.
Diesel represents a particular vulnerability. It remains essential for road freight, agriculture, construction and large parts of European industry, meaning sustained increases in wholesale prices can feed into transport and production costs across the economy.
The present shortage also reflects changes in Europe’s refining sector. Refining capacity has fallen over the past two decades as plants have closed, increasing dependence on imported diesel and other refined petroleum products. That dependence has become more visible since the EU sharply reduced purchases of Russian fuel following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
The G7 nevertheless made clear that the emergency intervention would not be accompanied by a relaxation of measures against Moscow. Leaders said they would maintain sanctions against Russia while working with the IEA and other partners to limit the effect of market disruption on fuel and commodity prices.
The EU has separately continued to tighten measures targeting Russia’s energy revenues and its so-called shadow fleet, including restrictions connected with the maritime transport of Russian oil and petroleum products. The EU’s latest sanctions package targeting Russian energy revenues was adopted in July.
Friday’s fall in oil and diesel futures indicates that traders expect the additional stocks to relieve some of the immediate pressure on supplies. European gasoil futures, the main regional diesel benchmark, also fell sharply during the day as details of the proposed releases emerged.
The G7 has asked the IEA to monitor implementation and report within 20 days, including on whether further action is required and how emergency stocks should eventually be replenished.
For Europe, the immediate objective is to contain diesel prices without compromising security of supply. The broader issue remains unchanged: reduced domestic refining capacity and heavy dependence on imported fuel leave the European economy exposed when international supply routes are disrupted.
The Trump administration has urged France and Germany to release diesel from their strategic stocks, while raising the possibility of restricting American diesel exports if European governments fail to put additional supplies on the market.
Washington has asked Europe to release about 120 million barrels over six months, according to people familiar with the talks.
The demand puts European governments in a difficult position. Releasing reserves could help reduce prices in the short term, but it would also reduce the emergency buffer available if disruption to Russian or Middle Eastern supplies becomes more severe.
The European Commission, France, Italy, Ireland and Britain held discussions on 1 October over possible diesel stock releases. Germany has been involved separately in discussions with Washington.
France and Germany hold a substantial share of Europe’s emergency diesel reserves.
Under the EU’s Oil Stocks Directive, member states must maintain emergency crude oil or petroleum-product stocks equivalent to at least 90 days of net imports or 61 days of domestic consumption, whichever is higher.
The requirement exists to provide a buffer against major supply interruptions rather than normal market fluctuations.
Europe’s dependence on imported oil remains substantial. Oil accounted for around 38 per cent of the EU energy mix in 2024, while approximately 95 per cent of crude oil consumed in the bloc was imported.
The latest dispute follows months of mounting pressure in the diesel market.
EU Today reported in September that President Donald Trump had urged Ukraine to reduce attacks on Russian refining infrastructure as global diesel supplies tightened.
Moscow has since extended restrictions on diesel exports. At the same time, disruption to Middle Eastern refining and shipping has constrained another major source of supply, while China moved on 1 October to suspend most fuel-product exports outside Hong Kong and Macau.
The result has been a particularly sharp problem for Europe because its refining capacity has declined over the past two decades and it has become increasingly dependent on imported middle distillates.
European dependence on outside energy supplies was already becoming more expensive before the latest diesel shortage. Recent Eurostat figures showed that the value of EU petroleum-oil imports increased by 55.8 per cent in the second quarter of 2026, even though the physical volume imported rose by only 1.2 per cent.
The United States has become an increasingly important diesel supplier since Europe sharply reduced imports of Russian refined products following Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
That means a US export restriction would have an immediate impact on the European market.
EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič said after discussions with US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer that Brussels wanted a coordinated transatlantic approach to lowering diesel prices.
He said restrictions on US diesel exports would damage Europe’s economic performance and that both sides had agreed to remain in close contact.
Šefčovič also noted that the EU had exceeded its commitment to purchase US energy under the trade agreement reached at Turnberry in 2025.
US Energy Secretary Chris Wright, meanwhile, said he was “highly confident” European governments would release additional stocks.
Wright argued that coordinated action was particularly important as the northern hemisphere moved into the harvest season and towards winter, when demand for diesel and heating fuels normally increases.
Emergency releases have already been used on an exceptional scale this year.
In March, the 32 members of the International Energy Agency agreed to make 400 million barrels of oil from emergency reserves available to the market after disruption caused by the Middle East conflict.
It was the largest coordinated stock release in the organisation’s history.
A further European release would therefore come only months after governments had already drawn on strategic reserves to stabilise markets.
The pressure is increasing as oil prices again move higher. Brent crude settled above $102 a barrel on 1 October amid concerns over Chinese fuel exports and further US military deployments to the Middle East.
EU energy officials are now considering whether the immediate risk of high diesel prices outweighs the value of keeping fuel in reserve against a potentially more serious supply disruption later in the year.
Twenty-five of the EU’s 27 member states have adopted some form of energy support during 2026, according to the latest assessment of the measures.
More than two-thirds of the spending consists of measures that directly suppress energy prices rather than targeted income support.
The figure has increased since the Commission’s spring economic forecast.
Measures adopted or sufficiently detailed by 4th May were then estimated to cost €14.5 billion, equivalent to around 0.07 per cent of EU GDP. The Commission calculated that extending those measures until the end of 2026 could increase their cost to €38.6 billion.
National measures include reductions in fuel taxes and excise duties, energy vouchers, direct financial assistance and support for companies facing higher production and transport costs.
The Commission has repeatedly urged governments to concentrate assistance on vulnerable households and particularly exposed industries rather than subsidising energy use across the entire economy.
Its spring assessment found that roughly three quarters of the support then in force was not targeted specifically at vulnerable consumers or energy-intensive companies.
Broad price measures can reduce household bills immediately, but they also carry a larger fiscal cost and reduce the incentive to cut consumption when supplies are constrained.
The present shock began with disruption to oil and gas supplies caused by the Middle East conflict.
The Commission responded with its AccelerateEU package of emergency and structural measures, allowing governments to use measures including income support, energy vouchers and lower electricity taxes for vulnerable households.
Brussels says Europe does not currently face an immediate security-of-supply problem for the winter of 2026–27 because supplies have been diversified and strategic reserves remain available.
Price exposure is a different matter. Europe still depends heavily on imported fossil fuels, leaving domestic businesses and consumers exposed when world-market prices rise.
Recent trade figures underline the scale of that vulnerability. EU Today reported last month that Europe’s petroleum import bill increased by 55.8 per cent in the second quarter compared with the same period of 2025, despite only a 1.2 per cent increase in the volume imported.
Natural gas presents another risk. European storage sites entered the autumn at unusually low levels, with EU Today reporting that EU gas stocks were around 67 per cent full in mid-September, leaving the bloc more exposed if winter demand rises sharply.
Pressure has now spread into refined fuel markets as well. Russian diesel exports are restricted, Middle Eastern supply remains vulnerable and China has suspended most fuel-product exports outside Hong Kong and Macau. Washington is simultaneously pressing European governments to release diesel from their strategic reserves.
The energy shock is also affecting the wider economic outlook.
The Commission’s spring forecast had already anticipated weaker growth and higher inflation. It projected EU employment growth of only 0.3 per cent in 2026 and expected the aggregate government deficit to rise from 3.1 per cent of GDP in 2025 to 3.6 per cent by 2027.
More recent Commission estimates indicate that eurozone growth in 2026 could be somewhat stronger than the earlier forecast, while expectations for 2027 have deteriorated.
Inflation is expected to remain around 3 per cent this year and to remain above earlier projections next year. That increases the fiscal problem facing governments.
Large energy subsidies can reduce the immediate impact on households but add to public borrowing and may complicate monetary policy if they support overall demand.
The European Fiscal Board has urged member states to ensure that energy measures are temporary, have clear expiry dates and are directed at vulnerable households and businesses.
The Commission is also drawing lessons from the measures adopted after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Energy support introduced during 2022 and 2023 alone had a net cost equivalent to about 2.1 per cent of EU GDP, according to Commission calculations.
Brussels wants to avoid a second prolonged cycle of broad subsidies while accelerating investment intended to reduce Europe’s structural reliance on imported fossil fuels. That includes grid investment, electrification, renewables and measures to reduce taxes on electricity relative to gas.
For national governments, however, the immediate pressure is coming from bills paid today rather than energy infrastructure planned for the next decade. With €17.9 billion already committed during 2026, further disruption in international oil, diesel or gas markets could determine whether what was designed as temporary support has to be extended into next year.
Speaking ahead of an informal meeting of EU energy ministers in Dublin, Jørgensen said Europe had “surpassed €100 billion” in additional spending.
“We have now surpassed €100 billion that we’ve paid extra for our energy this year without receiving one extra molecule of gas or oil,” he said in the European Commission’s recording of his remarks.
The figure puts a direct cost on the price shock which has followed disruption to oil and liquefied natural gas supplies associated with the conflict involving Iran.
The effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz has disrupted one of the world’s most important energy corridors. Under normal conditions, the waterway handles roughly one fifth of globally traded oil and significant LNG volumes.
Europe remains heavily exposed because most of the oil it consumes and about 80 per cent of its gas requirements come from outside the EU.
The consequences were already visible in trade figures published before the latest ministerial meeting.
Last week, EU Today reported that the EU’s oil import bill had risen 55.8 per cent in the second quarter compared with a year earlier, even though the physical volume of crude imported increased by only 1.2 per cent.
Europe was therefore paying substantially more without materially increasing the amount of energy it purchased.
The pressure has intensified as winter approaches.
EU gas storage is around 70 per cent full, roughly 12 percentage points below the level recorded at the same stage last year. Jørgensen has warned governments to continue filling storage or consider reducing demand if required.
Possible measures include limiting temperatures in public buildings, restricting outdoor heating and switching off unnecessary public lighting, according to recommendations circulated to governments ahead of the Dublin meeting.
The informal meeting of EU energy ministers focused on energy affordability, security of supply and Europe’s continuing exposure to international fossil-fuel markets.
Irish Energy Minister Darragh O’Brien described the situation as the second major fossil-fuel shock Europe had faced in four years and argued that domestic clean-energy production was essential if the EU wanted to reduce its vulnerability to future crises.
Europe is in a stronger physical position than during the 2022 energy crisis.
It has expanded LNG import infrastructure, increased renewable electricity generation and reduced gas demand. It has also sharply reduced its dependence on Russian pipeline gas.
But that restructuring has created different dependencies.
European buyers now compete more directly for LNG on global markets, meaning events in the Gulf, Asia or the United States can rapidly affect the price paid by European consumers.
EU Today reported earlier this month that reduced LNG availability and disruption around Hormuz had left European gas storage at historically weak seasonal levels.
Diesel presents another problem.
Europe became more dependent on imported refined products after reducing purchases from Russia, with the United States now supplying approximately half of EU diesel imports.
Washington has considered restrictions on diesel exports as domestic US prices rise. European officials have urged the Trump administration not to introduce such measures, warning that they would increase pressure on international markets.
Emergency reserves provide some protection.
EU countries are required to maintain strategic oil stocks, while the International Energy Agency coordinated a release of 400 million barrels from member-country reserves earlier this year.
France and Germany hold a particularly large share of Europe’s strategic diesel inventories. Further releases remain possible if international markets deteriorate, although no new coordinated decision has yet been taken.
The current crisis is also feeding into the EU’s longer-term energy debate.
Spain, Portugal and Luxembourg are now pressing for an EU renewable-energy target for 2040, arguing that increasing domestic electricity generation would reduce dependence on imported fossil fuels.
The security argument extends beyond climate policy. An EU Today Research Desk paper published in June examined how concentrated fossil-fuel supply routes and maritime chokepoints can transmit geopolitical shocks into European prices, infrastructure and industry.
The current disruption provides a practical example.
Europe has not bought substantially more fuel, but it is paying tens of billions of euros more because the international price of the energy it imports has risen.
The immediate concern is whether supplies and gas inventories will be sufficient through the coming winter without another sharp increase in prices.
The longer-term question is how much of Europe’s energy demand can be moved away from imported fossil fuels before another geopolitical crisis produces the same result.
For EU governments, Jørgensen’s €100 billion figure provides a measure of the cost of that dependency.
The agreement targets a growing bottleneck in Europe’s energy system: manufacturers of transformers, cables, switchgear and other components are being asked to increase production while utilities and governments accelerate investment in transmission and distribution networks.
Under the deal, the EIB will provide up to €350 million in counter-guarantees, while BNP Paribas will commit an equivalent amount. The resulting €700 million portfolio of bank guarantees is expected to support companies investing in additional production capacity and supply contracts.
The European Investment Bank said the arrangement could stimulate as much as €2.8 billion in investment in the real economy.
The initiative is backed by the EU’s InvestEU programme and forms part of the EIB’s €1.5 billion Pan-EU Power Grid package. Guarantees are particularly important for infrastructure suppliers because large electricity projects often require manufacturers to provide financial guarantees before receiving contracts.
Those commitments can consume bank credit lines that companies might otherwise use to build factories, purchase machinery or finance working capital.
By sharing the risk with BNP Paribas, the EIB intends to increase the volume of guarantees available without requiring manufacturers to commit equivalent amounts of their own financing capacity.
The programme arrives as grid investment becomes one of the central constraints on European energy policy.
The EU is simultaneously attempting to expand renewable generation, electrify transport and industry, increase cross-border electricity trading and reduce dependence on imported fossil fuels.
All require additional transmission and distribution capacity. EU Today reported earlier this year that the EIB had approved almost €2 billion for clean energy and grid projects as part of a broader €10 billion financing package.
The latest BNP Paribas agreement concentrates specifically on the industrial supply chain needed to build those networks.
Grid investment is increasingly influenced by security concerns as well as electricity demand.
EU Today reported last week that Lithuania is designing part of the Harmony Link infrastructure to withstand drones, sabotage and vehicle attacks near the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. Such requirements increase the cost and complexity of new electricity infrastructure while demand for conventional grid equipment is already rising.
European manufacturers face lengthy order books for some high-voltage equipment, particularly large transformers and specialised cables. Supply constraints can delay renewable projects and interconnectors even when planning permission and financing are available.
The EIB says its guarantee programme is intended to give manufacturers greater financial capacity to respond. The arrangement follows a similar partnership between the bank and BNP Paribas covering wind-energy manufacturing.
In February 2025, the two institutions agreed a €1 billion guarantee portfolio intended to support investment in the European wind industry. The EIB has subsequently expanded its focus from generation equipment to the networks required to transport electricity.
In 2025, the EIB Group invested €33 billion in energy projects worldwide, including €11.6 billion in grids and storage, according to the institution.
European energy policy has increasingly recognised that adding generating capacity without expanding grids can create congestion, delays and periods in which renewable electricity cannot reach consumers.
Political disagreements remain over how new infrastructure should be planned and financed.
In June, EU Today reported that member states had pushed back against stronger Brussels control over cross-border grid planning, preferring to preserve a significant role for national authorities.
Financing institutions are meanwhile moving ahead with programmes intended to expand the underlying industrial capacity.
For manufacturers, the EIB–BNP Paribas scheme does not provide €2.8 billion of direct public spending. Instead, public guarantees are being used to increase the volume of private financing available, with the EIB assuming part of the risk.
The distinction is central to InvestEU, which uses EU budget guarantees and EIB financing to attract additional private capital.
Europe’s electricity transition is increasingly dependent on this less visible part of the energy system. New wind farms, solar installations, nuclear reactors and industrial electrification projects ultimately require the same infrastructure: sufficient cables, substations, transformers and transmission capacity to move electricity from producers to users.
Europe is facing more immediate cyber threats, but whether its member states are prepared to deal with it collectively is becoming a question harder to answer.
Even as drone threats, such as Russia’s bomb plot at the Leipzig-Halle airport in Germany in August, dominated European headlines in September, other, less visible hybrid attacks are also being waged against the EU every day, whose sheer weight of numbers should also cause grave concern.
Poland, for instance, recorded 4,200 cyber-security incidents in military networks and systems in 2024 and 7,100 in 2025, Polish cyber command spokesperson, Przemek Lipczyński, told EUobserver.
In 2025, Polish security systems blocked four million phishing emails targeted at soldiers and defence personnel.
And Poland aside, evolving technology meant Russian cyber-attacks “do not know any border”, said Jamila Boutemeur, the EU’s head of cybersecurity body, in what amounted to a single market for hacking.
For its part, the European Union has built its cybersecurity architecture around the Boutemeur’s European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, ENISA, in Athens, as well as the 27 national cybersecurity agencies.
But as Russia’s threat levels up, the European structure is seeing familiar problems: information is not always shared, responsibilities remain divided between national governments and EU institutions, while ENISA itself is being asked to do more with limited resources.
And the European Court of Auditors (ECA) confirmed it on 21 September in its ENISA study.
“The architecture is there, the structure is there. Now it’s a matter of willingness and trust,” to effectively fight back, said George-Marius Hyzler, the ECA’s main auditor.
“It always boils down to the same thing, lack of information sharing,” he said, identifying the EU’s key weakness.
And for Czech Greens MEP Markéta Gregorová, who is also the lead rapporteur on the EU’s incoming Cybersecurity Act 2 (CSA2), duplication of work also bedevilled the EU’s response.
“The [ECA] auditors describe a system that does not work” and was “wasteful”, she told EUobserver.
“Six European legal acts force the same company to report the same incident to different authorities. Two EU bodies monitor the same threats,” Gregorová said.
She also advocated a stronger operational role for ENISA.
But the EU fault lines have underlying political as well as legal tensions.
Cybersecurity remains largely within the competence of the member states, and governments differ in how much new power they are willing to delegate to European institutions.
And for Dimitar Lilkov, from the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, there were three main sources of friction: national security, trust, and money.
This article continues, but the full version is available only to EUobserver.com subscribers. Visit account.euobserver.com/membership
A major incident has been declared at RAF Fairford with several men arrested, residents evacuated and a bomb squad deployed amid a suspected car bomb threat.
The post RAF Fairford on Terror Alert: Residents Evacuated, Bomb Squad Deployed and Multiple Men Arrested appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.
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