Romanian President Nicușor Dan has nominated diplomat Luca Niculescu as prime minister, beginning a fourth attempt to form a government after three previous candidates failed to secure a parliamentary majority.

The nomination was announced on Monday, 5 October, after Dan held consultations with Romania’s parliamentary parties at the Cotroceni Palace. Niculescu now has the task of finding sufficient support for a government after five months of political deadlock.

Dan said he had chosen the candidate he believed had the best chance of assembling a majority. “Romania needs a government. We need a budget for next year,” he said after the consultations, according to Romanian reporting on the nomination.

Niculescu, 55, is a former journalist and diplomat who has served as a secretary of state at Romania’s Foreign Ministry and national coordinator for the country’s accession to the OECD. He was Romania’s ambassador to France between 2016 and 2022 and was also accredited to Monaco and Andorra.

Accepting the nomination, Niculescu said his first task would be to build a parliamentary majority. He promised a government programme centred on predictable economic policy, public spending discipline, investment and Romania’s European and Euro-Atlantic commitments.

The appointment follows three unsuccessful attempts to replace the government of Ilie Bolojan, which was removed in a no-confidence vote on 5 May after the Social Democratic Party withdrew its support. EU Today reported at the time that 281 lawmakers backed the motion, bringing down the pro-European administration.

Eugen Tomac was the first candidate asked to form a government but relinquished the mandate after failing to secure sufficient support. Adrian Veștea was then nominated, but his proposed government was rejected by parliament.

The third candidate, PNL MEP Siegfried Mureșan, was nominated in September. His government received 182 votes in the parliamentary confidence vote on 30 September, well short of the 233 required. That defeat left Dan facing a fourth round of negotiations with the same fragmented parliament.

Niculescu therefore begins without an established majority behind him. During Monday’s consultations, the PSD continued to promote its own candidate, Sorin Grindeanu, while USR and AUR pressed for early parliamentary elections. PNL signalled greater flexibility but stopped short of committing itself to a new governing formula.

AUR leader George Simion has already said his party will not support Niculescu. USR, meanwhile, said it would examine the proposed cabinet, governing programme and the political majority behind it before deciding how to vote.

Under Romania’s constitution, a prime minister-designate has ten days from nomination to seek parliament’s confidence for the proposed programme and full list of ministers.

The repeated failures have also revived discussion of early elections. The president may dissolve parliament if no government receives a vote of confidence within 60 days of the first request for investiture and at least two attempts have been rejected, although dissolution is a presidential option rather than an automatic step.

Dan has so far indicated that he would prefer to exhaust efforts to form a government.

The political stalemate comes at a difficult economic moment. Romania is under pressure to reduce its budget deficit, maintain investor confidence and continue reforms tied to EU funding. The strain on the governing coalition had already become an EU fiscal issue before Bolojan’s government fell, with questions over budget consolidation and European recovery funding increasingly tied to political stability in Bucharest.

The immediate test for Niculescu will be whether his diplomatic background can translate into enough parliamentary votes to assemble a cabinet. His nomination leaves him more freedom than a candidate tied directly to one of the main parties, but the arithmetic remains unchanged: a government still requires at least 233 votes to take office.

Photo: Razvan Socol / Wikimedia Commons / CC BY-SA 4.0

Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez has called a general election for 29 November, bringing Spain to the polls months ahead of schedule after his minority government suffered a major parliamentary defeat over measures intended to tackle the country’s housing crisis.

Sánchez announced the dissolution of parliament on Monday, ending months of speculation over whether his increasingly difficult parliamentary position could force an election before the current legislature was due to expire in 2027.

In an institutional statement announcing the election, Sánchez acknowledged that his government had “made mistakes” and had not achieved everything it had set out to do.

He said problems remained particularly acute in inequality, public services and access to housing, arguing that further reforms required a larger parliamentary majority.

“To do more, we need to renew and expand people’s support,” Sánchez said. He called for a “much broader, progressive majority” capable of carrying the government’s programme through parliament.

The election will take place on Sunday, 29 November, rather than in 2027, when the current parliamentary term was due to end. Sánchez informed King Felipe VI before convening an extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers to dissolve the Cortes Generales.

Housing defeat brings crisis to a head

The immediate political backdrop to the decision was Friday’s rejection of two emergency housing decrees by the Congress of Deputies.

The government had approved the two decrees on 29 September in an attempt to address growing anger over rents and access to affordable housing.

The first contained measures to protect vulnerable households from eviction, increase the supply of affordable homes and restrict some forms of speculative property investment. It also proposed changes affecting tourist accommodation and purchases by investment funds.

The second concentrated on residential rental contracts, including provisions intended to prevent tenants from suddenly being forced into substantially more expensive agreements when existing leases expired.

Both measures were defeated. The first received 172 votes in favour and 178 against. The second was rejected by 184 votes to 166. The votes again demonstrated the difficulty facing a government whose survival has depended on agreements with several regional and nationalist parties.

Housing has developed into one of Spain’s most contentious domestic political issues as rents and property prices have increased sharply in Madrid, Barcelona and other major cities and tourist areas.

The dispute intensified following the eviction of 87-year-old Maricarmen Abascal from the Madrid home where she had lived for more than 70 years.

Abascal was removed from the property on 23 September following a dispute over the rent. Her previous monthly payment had been €500, while the owners initially sought €2,650 before reducing the demand to €1,650 — still above her pension income.

Images of the elderly woman being taken from the building on a stretcher prompted widespread public anger and helped turn her case into a symbol of Spain’s housing crisis.

Tens of thousands of demonstrators subsequently took to the streets of Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia and other cities demanding stronger protection for tenants and measures to curb rising housing costs.

Sánchez’s fragile parliamentary majority

The housing vote exposed once again the central weakness of the government formed after Spain’s inconclusive 2023 election.

The conservative People’s Party (PP) won the largest number of seats, but its leader Alberto Núñez Feijóo was unable to assemble a parliamentary majority.

Sánchez remained prime minister after securing support from Sumar and reaching agreements with Catalan and Basque parties. The arrangement allowed him to form another government but left individual pieces of legislation dependent on negotiations with parties whose positions frequently diverge.

The latest housing measures were opposed by the PP and Vox, while Catalan party Junts also voted against them.

The PP has argued that greater intervention in the rental market risks reducing the number of properties available by discouraging owners from renting them. Its housing policy has instead placed greater emphasis on increasing supply.

Sánchez’s government argues that intervention is necessary because housing costs have increasingly become disconnected from household incomes in the areas experiencing the greatest pressure.

The issue has also become increasingly relevant at European level. Housing affordability has moved higher up the EU political agenda as governments confront shortages in major cities, rising construction costs and the impact of short-term tourist accommodation.

EU Today has previously reported on the growing pressure on European governments to address housing affordability, an issue that is increasingly intersecting with debates over migration, tourism, urban development and the cost of living.

Eight years in power

Sánchez has served as prime minister since June 2018, when he replaced Mariano Rajoy after winning a parliamentary vote of no confidence.

His latest term has been complicated not only by parliamentary arithmetic but by investigations and corruption cases involving people connected with the Socialist Party, as well as disputes over migration and household costs.

The government has nevertheless pointed to Spain’s economic performance and employment figures as evidence that its policies are working. In his election announcement, Sánchez described Spain as the EU economy recording the strongest growth and employment creation.

Spain has also remained an important participant in wider European debates over Ukraine, defence expenditure and the future direction of the European Union, while Sánchez has frequently differed with some European partners over the pace of increases in military spending.

The coming campaign is therefore unlikely to remain centred solely on housing.

PP sees opportunity

Feijóo enters the campaign with the PP expected to emerge as the largest individual party according to most recent polling, but the question of whether it could govern will depend heavily on the performance of Vox.

A PP victory without an outright majority could leave Feijóo dependent on Vox to form a government, making the balance between the two parties one of the central questions of the campaign.

Sánchez, meanwhile, will attempt to rebuild the coalition of left-wing and regional voters that allowed him to remain in office after the 2023 election.

His decision effectively turns the parliamentary confrontation over housing into a national vote on his eight years in power.

“The time has come,” Sánchez said in Monday’s address, “for the Spanish people to decide what future you want for yourselves and for your country.”

Spain will now enter a compressed election campaign in which housing, the cost of living, migration, corruption allegations and the future composition of the government are likely to dominate.

The formal election process begins with the dissolution of parliament, with voters going to the polls on 29 November.

German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier has warned that political division and disinformation are placing growing pressure on the country’s democratic institutions after a succession of state elections weakened Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s Christian Democrats and strengthened parties outside Germany’s traditional political centre.

Speaking during German Unity Day celebrations, Steinmeier compared the present political climate with divisions associated with the Weimar Republic, while stopping short of saying that Germany had reached such a point.

His intervention follows a difficult September for Merz.

Alternative for Germany won 43.8 per cent in Saxony-Anhalt, while in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania the AfD finished first with 38.2 per cent. Merz’s CDU recorded just 4.9 per cent in the latter state, leaving it outside the regional parliament for the first time.

Berlin produced a different winner but a similar problem for the established parties, with Die Linke taking first place.

The combined results have accelerated the fragmentation of a party system that for much of the post-war period revolved around two large political blocs.

EU Today examined that shift after the September elections, arguing that Germany’s political centre was losing voters in several directions at once.

Steinmeier did not confine his warning to electoral arithmetic.

He criticised the use of political demagoguery and warned that organised disinformation was damaging democratic debate. He referred to material originating from Kremlin-linked actors, domestic extremists and other networks using digital platforms to amplify manipulated information.

The remarks come during an increasingly difficult period for Merz.

The Chancellor took office promising to restore economic momentum and political stability. Instead, Germany continues to face concerns about industrial competitiveness, living standards, energy costs and the ability of its political system to absorb an increasingly fragmented electorate.

The pressure is particularly evident in eastern Germany.

Before September’s elections, EU Today noted that Merz was approaching a political reckoning in the east, where the CDU was losing ground while the AfD converted dissatisfaction over migration, energy, economic policy and distrust of established institutions into electoral support.

The subsequent results were worse for the CDU than many in the party had anticipated.

In Saxony-Anhalt, the AfD finished more than 26 percentage points ahead of the CDU. In Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, the CDU failed even to cross the threshold for parliamentary representation.

The consequences extend beyond German domestic politics.

Germany remains the EU’s largest economy and one of the principal states shaping European decisions on Ukraine, defence, migration, fiscal policy and industrial competitiveness. Political instability in Berlin can therefore affect negotiations in Brussels as well as the domestic legislative programme.

Economic policy is central to the dispute.

Germany’s manufacturing sector has faced stronger competition from China, while the rupture of the previous economic relationship with Russia has increased costs for energy-intensive industries. Russia’s continuing war against Ukraine has simultaneously required Berlin to spend more on defence and provide substantial assistance to Kyiv.

The German cabinet’s 2027 budget reflects that change. The government has approved federal expenditure of €555.4 billion, including €109.7 billion for the Defence Ministry and €11.6 billion for continued support to Ukraine.

The political difficulty is that higher security expenditure comes alongside pressure to invest in infrastructure, public services and an economy struggling to recover stronger growth.

The rise of the AfD has consequently become more than a debate over whether other parties should maintain the so-called firewall preventing formal co-operation with it.

The more difficult question for Germany’s established parties is why voters are abandoning them and whether economic and political dissatisfaction can be reversed through government policy rather than coalition arrangements designed chiefly to exclude competitors from office.

Steinmeier’s intervention places that argument inside a historical frame familiar to Germans.

The Federal Republic’s post-war institutions were deliberately designed to avoid the failures of the interwar period. But constitutional safeguards alone cannot prevent political fragmentation if large groups of voters cease to regard established parties as capable of responding to the issues that concern them.

Germany enters the final months of 2026 with that question moving from the margins of its politics to the centre.

Moldova’s Prime Minister Vasile Tofan will meet senior EU officials in Brussels on Monday as the country attempts to move from the opening stages of accession negotiations towards deeper economic, security and institutional integration with the European Union.

The 10th EU-Moldova Association Council will be held in Brussels on 5 October, chaired by EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas. Tofan will lead the Moldovan delegation, while Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos will represent the European Commission.

The meeting will review Moldova’s accession process, political reforms, justice, freedom and security, foreign and security policy, trade, energy and wider economic co-operation. Regional and global security issues will also be discussed during a restricted session.

The timing is significant because Moldova has moved considerably further along the accession process during 2026.

In June, the EU formally opened negotiations on the Fundamentals cluster, which covers the rule of law, fundamental rights, democratic institutions, public administration and economic criteria. Progress in that cluster determines the overall pace of accession negotiations.

EU Today described that step as the point at which the accession bids of Moldova and Ukraine moved from political commitment to a practical rule-of-law test.

A second step followed in July when negotiations began on the External Relations cluster. That part of the process covers commercial policy, development co-operation and alignment with the EU’s common foreign, security and defence policy, including sanctions.

Moldova is consequently moving beyond the declaration that it has a European future and into negotiations over specific areas of EU law.

That process is taking place under conditions markedly different from previous rounds of enlargement.

Moldova borders Ukraine and has faced persistent Russian political pressure, disinformation campaigns and attempts at electoral interference. Energy vulnerability remains another concern, while the unresolved Transdniestria conflict leaves part of the country outside the effective control of the government in Chișinău and with Russian forces still present.

Security and accession policy have therefore become increasingly difficult to separate.

At the EU-Moldova summit in June, European leaders concentrated on accession, reform implementation and gradual integration into EU structures. The meeting took place only a week after the first negotiating cluster was opened.

EU Today argued at the time that the summit had turned Moldova into a test of whether enlargement can provide practical security and resilience for a candidate country exposed to sustained Russian pressure.

Finance is another component of that policy.

Moldova is benefiting from the EU’s €1.9 billion Reform and Growth Facility, intended to accelerate economic convergence and reforms connected to accession. The Commission’s current Moldova enlargement record shows that a second regular payment of €189 million was delivered in March 2026.

The Association Council will not decide when Moldova joins the European Union. Accession remains conditional on reforms, compliance with membership criteria, completion of negotiations and unanimous approval by the member states.

What Monday’s meeting will show is whether the process is maintaining momentum.

Moldova and Ukraine formally began accession negotiations together in 2024 and entered the first substantive negotiating cluster together this June. The two countries remain politically connected in the EU enlargement debate, although Brussels formally assesses each candidate on its own record.

The next challenge is less ceremonial.

Opening clusters demonstrates political progress. Closing negotiating chapters requires legislation to be adopted, institutions to function and reforms to be enforced beyond their appearance in government programmes.

For Moldova, that work is being undertaken while the country manages Russian pressure, energy security, economic restructuring and domestic political change.

Monday’s Association Council will provide Brussels with its latest opportunity to judge whether those pressures are slowing the accession process or whether Moldova remains capable of moving through the EU’s negotiating machinery.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has announced a new package worth more than €1.3 billion for Ukraine during a visit to Kyiv, combining additional military assistance with support for the country’s damaged energy infrastructure as German-Ukrainian industrial co-operation expands.

Merz visited the Ukrainian capital on Sunday while Russian drone attacks continued against Kyiv.

According to the Ukrainian presidency’s account of the meeting, the package includes more than €1 billion for defence and additional financing for the energy sector ahead of winter. Separate reporting put the energy component at approximately €350 million.

The visit also produced an extensive group of bilateral agreements involving governments and companies.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Ukraine and Germany had concluded 15 agreements and documents, most concerning security co-operation, production, procurement, orders for German industry and joint projects in Ukraine. He put the total value of the agreements reached during the visit at more than €8.5 billion.

A narrower set of industrial agreements reported during the visit was valued at about €6.6 billion and included air-defence, radar and drone projects.

The visit went beyond another transfer of military aid.

Germany and Ukraine are increasingly constructing a defence relationship based on procurement, industrial production and the transfer of Ukrainian battlefield experience to European manufacturers.

At the Ukrainian-German Business Forum, Zelenskyy said the new security package would strengthen Ukraine’s armed forces immediately while industrial agreements were intended to build longer-term production capacity.

The direction corresponds with a wider shift in European support for Ukraine.

Military assistance is increasingly moving away from transfers of existing national stocks towards contracts financing new weapons production. In July, the EU released €3.47 billion for Ukrainian defence procurement, including financing intended for drones, missiles, air defence and combat aircraft requirements.

Kyiv has since asked European partners to accelerate further financing as the demands of the war outpace scheduled disbursements. EU Today reported in September that Ukraine was seeking early access to part of its 2027 EU funding to close a military budget gap.

The German agreements add a bilateral industrial track to that European system.

They also reflect changes on the battlefield.

Russia has continued to expand large-scale drone and missile attacks, increasing the importance of interceptor production, radar coverage and lower-cost methods of destroying unmanned aircraft. Ukraine’s air-defence problem is increasingly an industrial one: inexpensive attack drones cannot sustainably be countered only with scarce and costly surface-to-air missiles.

EU Today has previously examined how Ukraine’s air-defence battle has become an industrial equation, determined as much by production rates and cost ratios as by the technical performance of individual systems.

German-Ukrainian co-operation is increasingly being shaped by that requirement.

Merz has presented continuing support for Ukraine as a direct German and European security interest, rather than assistance based solely on solidarity with Kyiv.

The argument has acquired greater force as German authorities investigate Russian-linked sabotage and hybrid operations on German territory.

In September, investigators reportedly traced the attempted bombing of a Ukrainian cargo aircraft at Leipzig/Halle Airport to a suspected Russian military-intelligence organiser, with EU Today reporting details of the alleged GRU-linked logistics network.

For Berlin, support for Ukraine is now increasingly seen as part of Germany’s own security.

Merz’s visit also carries a domestic political dimension. His government is committing Germany to considerably higher defence expenditure at a time when the CDU has suffered severe electoral setbacks in eastern Germany and voters remain concerned over public finances and economic performance.

Yet Germany’s military and industrial engagement with Ukraine is continuing to expand.

The new package announced in Kyiv is important in itself, particularly as Ukraine prepares for another winter of Russian attacks on its energy infrastructure. The wider development, however, lies in the growing number of defence-production agreements accompanying it.

European governments have spent much of the war debating how to replenish their own weapons stocks while sustaining Ukraine.

The German approach increasingly points towards a different model: Ukrainian operational experience, Ukrainian procurement requirements and European industrial capacity being brought into the same defence-production system.

Italy expects its budget deficit to rise above the European Union’s three per cent reference level again next year as Giorgia Meloni’s government uses new EU fiscal flexibility to finance defence and measures responding to higher energy costs.

Rome’s latest multi-year fiscal projections put the 2027 deficit at 3.4 per cent of GDP, substantially above the previous target of 2.8 per cent.

The increase follows a planned fall to 2.9 per cent this year, which would bring Italy below the EU’s three per cent threshold for the first time since 2019. The deficit stood at 3.1 per cent in 2025.

The change reflects Italy’s decision to use the EU’s national escape clause, allowing member states under specified conditions to deviate temporarily from their agreed expenditure paths.

Under the latest projections, Rome intends to use fiscal flexibility worth 0.6 per cent of GDP in both 2027 and 2028 for defence and energy-related spending. The additional expenditure amounts to roughly €29 billion across the two years, while the deficit is projected at 3.2 per cent in 2028.

The decision turns a long-running dispute over fiscal flexibility into a test of the EU’s revised budget framework.

The national escape clause was introduced in the 2024 reform of the Stability and Growth Pact. It permits a member state to deviate temporarily from its fiscal path when exceptional circumstances outside its control have a major effect on public finances, provided medium-term fiscal sustainability is not endangered.

The mechanism was subsequently used to give governments greater room to increase defence spending. In 2026, the Commission also moved to broaden its application to energy-security expenditure.

Italy has been among the governments pressing hardest for such flexibility.

In August, EU Today reported that Rome intended to use the available fiscal room fully for energy measures but only partly for defence. The decision illustrated the competition between longer-term military investment and the immediate political pressure created by household and industrial energy bills.

The latest projections make that trade-off larger.

Italy’s annual inflation rate increased to 4.1 per cent in September, from 3.2 per cent a month earlier. Meloni has sought additional room from Brussels to cushion the economic effect of elevated energy costs.

At the same time, the government has improved its growth forecasts.

GDP is now expected to expand by one per cent in 2026, compared with an earlier projection of 0.6 per cent. Growth for 2027 has been revised from 0.6 to 0.8 per cent.

Those figures provide some additional room, but Italy’s debt remains the larger constraint.

Public debt is projected to rise from 138.1 per cent of GDP this year to 138.5 per cent in 2027 before edging down to 137.9 per cent in 2028. The government now expects the debt ratio to begin falling a year later than previously planned.

That leaves Rome in an unusual position. It expects formally to bring its underlying deficit below the EU threshold while headline borrowing rises above three per cent once exceptional spending is included.

Economy Minister Giancarlo Giorgetti has said Rome is discussing with the European Commission how the calculation will affect Italy’s attempt to leave the EU’s excessive deficit procedure.

The Commission will therefore have to judge not only Italy’s fiscal trajectory but how extensively exceptional expenditure can be accommodated under rules Brussels itself has made more flexible.

That question has already generated concern.

EU Today reported last month that the European Fiscal Board had warned that exceptions were beginning to weaken the clarity of the revised rules. The watchdog has been particularly critical of allowing room initially associated with higher defence spending to be extended to energy-resilience measures.

Italy provides one of the clearest examples of the problem.

Rome is trying simultaneously to increase military capacity, protect households and businesses from energy costs and demonstrate that its very high debt remains manageable.

It has also argued that European rearmament cannot proceed unless governments have sufficient room to finance it. The same tension emerged in Italy’s debate over participation in the EU’s SAFE defence loan programme.

The EU has given governments more flexibility to manage those competing demands. Italy’s 2027 budget will show how far that flexibility can stretch before the argument returns to the credibility of the fiscal rules themselves.

The party of pro-Russian Bosnian Serb politician Milorad Dodik has emerged as the largest political force in Republika Srpska following Bosnia and Herzegovina’s general election, while several parties supportive of Ukraine and European integration recorded strong results in the country’s Bosniak-Croat Federation.

The Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), led by Milorad Dodik, has emerged as the largest party in Republika Srpska as preliminary results from Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 4 October general election continue to be counted.

The country’s Central Election Commission confirmed that preliminary results were being released following the close of polls on Sunday. The elections covered the state presidency and parliament, the legislatures of both entities and the presidency of Republika Srpska.

According to preliminary projections cited after most votes had been counted, SNSD was heading for 34 seats in the National Assembly of Republika Srpska. Pokret Sigurna Srpska (PSS) was projected to take 12 seats and the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) 11. The Coalition for the State, comprising pro-Bosnian parties based principally in the Federation, was projected to secure two seats.

The result leaves SNSD as the principal political force in the Serb-majority entity despite the removal of Dodik himself from public office.

Dodik was not on the ballot after losing his position as president of Republika Srpska following a criminal conviction for refusing to comply with decisions of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s international High Representative. EU Today previously reported on the decision to revoke Dodik’s presidential mandate after the conviction became final.

His absence from the ballot did little to remove him from the campaign. Dodik remained the dominant public figure around SNSD and continued to challenge the constitutional arrangements under which Bosnia and Herzegovina has operated since the end of the 1992-95 war.

At his party’s final campaign rally, attended by Russian Ambassador Igor Kalabukhov, Dodik told supporters that Bosnia was “dead” and described it as an “impossible country”.

The comments followed years of disputes between the Republika Srpska leadership, Bosnia’s central institutions and the Office of the High Representative over the division of powers between the entity and the state.

A different result in the Federation

The electoral picture in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the predominantly Bosniak-Croat entity, was markedly different.

With 89.45 per cent of votes counted, preliminary figures put the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) first in the election to the Federation parliament with 30.63 per cent, representing more than 212,000 votes.

The Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SDP) was second with 15.27 per cent and more than 105,000 votes. The coalition centred on the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ BiH) followed with 13.89 per cent, while the Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBiH) was fourth on 8.97 per cent.

The results illustrate the political differences between Bosnia’s two principal entities, particularly over relations with Russia and Ukraine.

SDA, SDP and SBiH have condemned Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and support Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Western orientation. HDZ BiH also formally supports European integration, although the party has at times co-operated politically with Dodik and SNSD.

Dodik has pursued a markedly different course, maintaining close political relations with Moscow and repeatedly opposing Bosnia joining Western sanctions against Russia.

The second- and third-placed forces in the Republika Srpska parliamentary contest do not present themselves as explicitly pro-Russian parties, but have supported a position of neutrality for Bosnia and Herzegovina over the Russia-Ukraine war.

Bosnia’s post-war political structure

The political divisions are magnified by Bosnia and Herzegovina’s unusually complicated constitutional structure.

The country’s present system was created by the Dayton Peace Agreement, which ended the Bosnian war in 1995. Bosnia and Herzegovina was preserved as a single sovereign state but divided internally between the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska, alongside the separately administered Brčko District.

The state has a three-member presidency representing Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs, while extensive powers remain with entity, cantonal and local authorities.

The Central Election Commission said 3,414,364 voters were registered for the 2026 general election. Voters elected the three members of the presidency, members of the state parliament, the Federation parliament, the Republika Srpska National Assembly and a series of other entity and cantonal institutions.

The election also marked the first nationwide use of biometric voter identification, ballot scanners and rapid electronic transmission of results. The new election technologies were introduced for the 2026 vote after the election authorities determined that the necessary technical requirements had been met.

Turnout, however, fell sharply compared with the previous general election, adding another element to the political picture facing the incoming administrations.

EU accession and the Dodik problem

The results matter beyond Bosnia because the country remains an EU candidate while its internal political disputes have repeatedly complicated its European course.

Bosnia and Herzegovina was granted candidate status in December 2022, and EU leaders subsequently agreed in March 2024 to open accession negotiations. The EU accession process remains dependent on further reforms, including measures concerning the judiciary, democratic institutions, public administration and the rule of law.

Disputes involving Republika Srpska have become one of the principal complications in that process.

Dodik has repeatedly questioned the authority of state institutions and the international High Representative, while also advocating greater autonomy for Republika Srpska. His opponents have accused him of pursuing policies that threaten Bosnia’s post-Dayton constitutional order; Dodik argues that he is defending powers granted to Republika Srpska under the peace agreement.

The 4 October election has therefore produced two distinctly different political landscapes.

In Republika Srpska, SNSD remains the largest force despite the legal exclusion of its leader from public office. In the Federation, several of the strongest parties favour closer European integration and have openly supported Ukraine following Russia’s invasion.

How those forces combine at state level will determine whether Bosnia and Herzegovina can advance reforms required for EU membership or returns to the institutional confrontations that have repeatedly slowed its progress towards Brussels.

Between 400 and 500 French secondary schools are expected to suspend lessons fully or partially on Monday, 5 October, as nationwide student protests continue following several days of violence, arrests and damage to educational buildings.

French Education Minister Édouard Geffray said on Sunday that the number of affected lycées was likely to be broadly similar to Friday, when between 400 and 500 establishments suspended classes.

“There will probably be just as many on Monday, but with a partial, progressive resumption of classes,” Geffray said during interviews with France 2 and France Inter.

France has around 3,700 lycées. The government says classes are being suspended where normal security conditions cannot be guaranteed, including schools damaged during the unrest or where staff have been directly targeted. French reporting on the education ministry’s latest figures said Geffray expected disruption on a similar scale to Friday.

The closures mark the latest stage in a protest movement which began in the Paris region in September before spreading to cities across France.

Students initially mobilised over conditions in the education system, including shortages of teachers and replacement staff, overcrowded classrooms, deteriorating school buildings and demanding timetables. Pressure surrounding the Parcoursup university admissions system has also featured prominently in the demonstrations. Accounts from pupils involved in the blockades have highlighted frustration over conditions in schools and wider concerns about educational inequality.

As EU Today reported on 3 October, the protests have since developed into a broader confrontation involving students, education staff, police and political activists.

Geffray said on Sunday that 24 educational establishments had been “burned or vandalised” since the unrest intensified. He also said 78 employees of the national education system had been injured.

The minister has accused organised far-left activists of infiltrating the student demonstrations and contributing to the escalation of violence.

According to the government, some education staff have been deliberately attacked because of their position within the school system. Geffray said schools would remain closed or operate only partially in cases where staff or pupils could not be adequately protected.

The political argument over responsibility for the unrest has intensified alongside the protests. Government ministers have accused activists connected with the hard-left La France Insoumise of encouraging blockades and helping to broaden the mobilisation. LFI representatives have rejected accusations that they are responsible for the violence and have continued to support the students’ underlying demands. The dispute over the political role in the protests has become part of the wider confrontation between the government and the demonstrators.

Friday brought another large-scale police operation.

Interior Minister Laurent Nuñez said 1,747 people were detained during the day, compared with 1,954 on Thursday, taking the number of arrests since the beginning of last week to more than 5,000. Authorities said around 85 per cent of those detained were minors.

Of 735 schools affected by demonstrations or disruption on Friday, “urban violence” was recorded near 158, according to the Interior Ministry. The latest official arrest figures underline the scale of the police response.

The violence has increasingly complicated attempts by student organisations to maintain the focus on their original education demands.

Representatives of student organisations met Geffray on Friday but said afterwards that they had received no sufficiently concrete commitments from the government. They called for the mobilisation to continue and announced a new nationwide day of action, described as “Act III”, for Tuesday, 6 October.

Several education trade unions are also expected to participate in Tuesday’s action. Regional reporting on preparations for Monday and Tuesday said schools were preparing for continued disruption.

The government has already made one concession. A proposed measure that would have introduced registration fees of €178 for non-grant students entering BTS vocational programmes and €270 for preparatory classes for France’s grandes écoles was withdrawn as the demonstrations intensified. The withdrawal was announced as hundreds of schools were being affected by blockades.

The protests nevertheless show little sign of ending.

Many students continue to argue that their schools lack adequate staff and investment, while teachers and parents have raised similar concerns over replacement teachers and the condition of buildings.

At the same time, the scale of the damage and the number of injuries have moved security to the centre of the government’s response.

Monday will therefore provide an early indication of whether schools can begin returning to normal before Tuesday’s planned national mobilisation, or whether the disruption that affected hundreds of establishments last week will continue into a third week.

The European Parliament’s debate on Monday, October 5th, comes at an awkward moment for Brussels. After years of confrontation with Viktor Orbán, the European Commission now believes Hungary has done enough to justify releasing €4.2 billion in cohesion funding and restoring full access to Erasmus+ and Horizon Europe.

The question before MEPs is therefore deceptively simple: have the conditions really been met, or has Brussels simply found a convenient political moment to declare victory?

The answer matters well beyond Hungary. The original dispute was not some abstract quarrel over Brussels etiquette. In 2022, the EU suspended €6.3 billion in Hungarian cohesion funding after identifying deficiencies in public procurement, conflicts of interest, corruption controls and the effectiveness of prosecutorial action. The conditionality mechanism was deliberately designed to make access to EU taxpayers’ money dependent upon safeguards for the rule of law and the protection of the EU budget.

That principle is important. If membership of the EU means anything, it cannot mean that governments receive billions regardless of whether public money is properly administered.

But Hungary has changed politically. Viktor Orbán’s 16-year rule ended with Péter Magyar’s decisive election victory in April. Magyar campaigned partly on repairing Hungary’s relationship with Brussels and unlocking the billions frozen during the Orbán years. His government subsequently notified the Commission that it had implemented the required reforms.

The Commission has now accepted that argument — albeit partially. Its September 23rd proposal says Hungary has addressed the rule-of-law breaches affecting the EU budget, citing improvements in public procurement, the anti-corruption framework, prevention of conflicts of interest and prosecutorial effectiveness. If the Council approves the proposal, €4.2 billion in cohesion commitments will be reinstated and Hungarian students and researchers will regain full access to Erasmus+ and Horizon Europe.

That is a substantial political prize for Magyar, and a substantial test for the EU.

The danger for Brussels is obvious. Having spent years insisting that European money must not subsidise corruption or institutional capture, the Commission cannot now appear to have changed the rules simply because a more congenial government has arrived in Budapest.

There is, however, an equally serious danger on the other side. If Hungary has genuinely implemented the reforms demanded by Brussels, continuing to withhold money would make the conditionality mechanism look less like a defence of European values and more like a political punishment system. That would be profoundly damaging. Rules that apply only to governments Brussels likes are not rules at all.

This is why Monday’s debate matters – and the €4.2 billion is only part of the story.

The Commission has made clear that other Hungarian funds remain blocked. Around €3.5 billion is affected by a separate mechanism, including approximately €2.7 billion linked to horizontal conditions concerning the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, including academic freedom, LGBTI rights and asylum.

Meanwhile, Hungary is still seeking access to roughly €10 billion under the Recovery and Resilience Facility. The new Hungarian recovery plan includes measures on anti-corruption, public procurement, transparency, judicial independence and stakeholder participation, with payments tied to the achievement of specific milestones.

So this is not a clean victory for either side.

For Magyar, the release of €4.2 billion demonstrates that his strategy of accommodation with Brussels is delivering tangible results. For the Commission, it provides an opportunity to demonstrate that conditionality can work: reforms are made, the Commission verifies them, and money is released.

But the real test will come afterwards. Brussels must monitor whether the reforms survive political pressure. Anti-corruption bodies must remain genuinely independent. Public procurement must be transparent. Prosecutorial safeguards must work in practice rather than merely on paper. And the judiciary must be capable of challenging the government when necessary.

That is where the European Parliament should concentrate its fire. The temptation will be to turn Monday’s debate into another referendum on Viktor Orbán. That would be yesterday’s argument. Orbán has gone. The more important question is whether Hungary’s new government has actually dismantled the machinery that generated the dispute.

There is a wider lesson here for the European Union.

Conditionality can only work if Brussels is prepared both to withhold money when standards are breached and to release it when standards are met. Anything else undermines the credibility of the entire system.

The Commission says Hungary has crossed that threshold. The Council must now decide whether it agrees.

MEPs should therefore resist both triumphalism and cynicism, if the reforms are real, Hungary should get its money.

If they are cosmetic, Brussels should keep the cheque in the drawer.

Brussels Moves to Release €4.2bn to Hungary as Magyar Unwinds Orbán-Era Dispute

Ukraine’s record on reform during Russia’s war is stronger than much recent criticism suggests. By September, Kyiv had completed 84 of 95 milestones due under the Ukraine Plan. Yet progress on a smaller group of rule-of-law commitments has been strikingly weaker. The difference between the two tells Brussels much about where Ukraine’s European transformation is encountering resistance.

Ukraine’s reform record currently produces two figures that appear difficult to reconcile.

Under the Ukraine Plan, Kyiv had completed 84 of the 95 milestones due by late September — around 88 per cent. The result was strong enough for EU governments to approve another payment of almost €3 billion under the Ukraine Facility.

Three months earlier, however, a coalition of Ukrainian organisations monitoring ten rule-of-law and anti-corruption commitments agreed with Brussels had awarded progress just 15 points out of 100.

Neither figure is wrong. They measure different programmes.

The first covers a broad reform and investment agenda extending from the judiciary and financial markets to energy, agriculture, transport, human capital and the business environment. The second examines a deliberately narrow collection of reforms concerning prosecutors, criminal investigations, anti-corruption agencies and judicial governance.

Put together, they raise a more useful question than whether Ukraine is “reforming” or “not reforming”.

Why has a country capable of delivering most of a demanding EU programme during a major war found this particular group of reforms so much harder to complete?

Russia’s aggression provides part of the answer. Ukraine has been attempting an institutional transformation while mobilising its population, financing its armed forces, repairing infrastructure and keeping a functioning state under repeated Russian missile and drone attacks. No previous EU candidate has operated under comparable conditions.

But the ten reforms where progress has been weakest have something else in common. Most concern institutions that can investigate senior officials, prosecute corruption, scrutinise appointments or otherwise place limits on the exercise of political authority.

That is what makes the comparison important.

A strong overall record

The wider reform record should not be understated.

When the European Commission released €2.9 billion to Ukraine on 2 October, it specifically credited Kyiv with implementing reforms covering the judiciary, financial markets, human capital, the business environment, energy, transport, agriculture and the green transition.

Total EU support provided under the Ukraine Plan has now exceeded €32 billion. More than €17 billion in further budget support remains potentially available during 2026, provided Ukraine fulfils the corresponding conditions.

The money is particularly important because the Ukrainian state is directing such a large share of its own resources towards defence. European financing helps keep the civilian state operating while Ukraine fights Russia.

The Ukraine Facility has therefore become more than an aid mechanism. It gives Brussels a means of measuring reform against specific commitments and releasing money when they are met.

That system has generally worked.

It also makes the areas where progress is weaker much easier to identify.

The 15/100 assessment published in June concerned ten priorities agreed in December 2025 between Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos and then deputy prime minister Taras Kachka. The score came from Ukrainian civil society, not the European Commission, and cannot legitimately be presented as Ukraine’s overall EU reform score.

It had nevertheless risen only six points from an assessment of nine out of 100 in April.

Among the unfinished commitments were changes to criminal procedure affecting high-level corruption cases, stronger guarantees for the independence and effectiveness of NABU and SAPO, reform of the State Bureau of Investigation, new arrangements surrounding the Prosecutor General, competitive recruitment within the prosecution service and further changes to judicial governance.

These are among the most difficult reforms Ukraine has undertaken since 2014 because they concern who has the authority to investigate whom.

The July 2025 episode changed the argument

The events surrounding NABU and SAPO in July 2025 remain central to understanding why Brussels is paying such close attention.

Ukraine had spent years building a specialised anti-corruption system intended to make investigations of senior political figures less vulnerable to interference from the conventional prosecutorial hierarchy.

NABU conducts investigations. SAPO provides specialised prosecution. The High Anti-Corruption Court hears the cases.

The system has never been free from political controversy, nor has its performance been beyond criticism. But its independence became an important part of Ukraine’s relationship with the EU and other international partners.

Then, in July 2025, parliament passed legislation placing NABU and SAPO under substantially greater authority of the politically appointed Prosecutor General. Zelenskyy signed it.

The decision produced an unusually sharp reaction inside Ukraine. Demonstrators took to the streets despite martial law, while European partners made clear that the legislation threatened reforms regarded as fundamental to the country’s European integration.

As EU Today reported during the crisis, the dispute went far beyond the technical division of powers between prosecutors and investigators.

Kyiv reversed course within days. Parliament restored the independence of the two bodies.

The reversal demonstrated that Ukraine’s political system still contained powerful corrective forces. Civil society mobilised, public opposition was visible and international pressure had an effect.

Yet the episode also established that the independence of institutions created specifically to investigate high-level corruption could still become the subject of direct political intervention.

That changed the context in which subsequent reform commitments are being judged.

The European Commission’s 2025 report on Ukraine recorded both sides of the episode. It acknowledged the restoration of NABU and SAPO independence, while warning that undue pressure on anti-corruption agencies remained a concern.

The Commission also identified practical weaknesses. NABU still required better access to timely and impartial forensic examinations, while SAPO needed stronger powers in cases involving members of parliament.

This is why simply retaining NABU and SAPO is no longer sufficient evidence that this part of the reform process is secure. Brussels is looking at whether they can operate when investigations become politically difficult.

Follow the institutions

The same issue appears elsewhere.

Ukraine agreed to review the procedure for appointing and dismissing the Prosecutor General, drawing on European standards and the Venice Commission. It also committed itself to transparent and competitive recruitment for senior positions throughout the prosecution service.

The significance is obvious. The Prosecutor General occupies a pivotal position in the Ukrainian criminal-justice system. The method by which that office is filled — and the circumstances in which its occupant can be removed — affect the credibility of every politically sensitive prosecution beneath it.

Progress has been slow.

There is a similar problem with the State Bureau of Investigation, which handles cases involving senior officials and law-enforcement personnel. Kyiv agreed to an independent assessment of the bureau followed by reform of its legal and institutional framework.

Again, the issue is not administrative tidiness. An agency responsible for investigating state officials has little value as a check on government if its own leadership or investigative decisions are susceptible to political influence.

Criminal procedure provides another example.

Ukraine committed itself to changing provisions under which corruption proceedings can eventually be closed because deadlines for pre-trial investigations have expired, as well as addressing limitation periods for corruption offences.

Draft legislation has appeared. Bills No. 15333 and 15334 were registered in parliament, and NABU and the Ministry of Justice have worked on amendments.

But the process has taken months.

For a simple criminal case, procedural deadlines may appear an obscure legal question. Top-level corruption investigations are different. They can involve offshore structures, large quantities of financial evidence, foreign jurisdictions and prolonged litigation. If the clock eventually disposes of a case that investigators and prosecutors cannot bring to judgment quickly enough, the anti-corruption architecture fails at the point where it is supposed to produce results.

The same pattern is visible in judicial reform and the new Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2026–2030. Work is taking place, legislation is being prepared and institutions are consulting one another. Some changes have been completed.

Others remain somewhere between agreement and implementation.

This is precisely the stage of accession at which that distinction begins to count.

When Ukraine and Moldova moved further into the EU accession process, the significance of the Fundamentals cluster was that progress would increasingly depend on the functioning of institutions rather than declarations of political intent.

Ukraine has no shortage of declarations of European intent. What the Commission needs to establish is whether the machinery beneath them works.

The limits of the wartime argument

Any assessment that ignores Russia’s war would be unserious.

Full-scale aggression has inevitably changed the Ukrainian state. Decisions that might take months in peacetime sometimes have to be taken within days. Military information cannot be handled according to ordinary transparency rules. Elections cannot proceed under normal conditions. The executive carries responsibilities that no Ukrainian government faced before 2022.

Reform is also competing for administrative capacity with mobilisation, defence procurement, reconstruction, energy emergencies and the daily consequences of Russian attacks.

This has to be taken into account when Brussels sets timetables and assesses progress.

It is less convincing when applied indiscriminately.

Competitive recruitment of prosecutors does not interfere with the defence of Ukraine. Neither does an independent procedure for selecting the Prosecutor General. NABU’s ability to investigate senior officials does not prevent the armed forces from conducting operations, while closing procedural loopholes in corruption cases has no obvious adverse effect on wartime decision-making.

There is therefore a boundary between powers required to fight Russia and powers that are simply easier for government to retain during wartime.

Finding that boundary is becoming one of the more difficult questions in Ukraine’s relationship with the EU.

This does not support the sweeping claim that every important Ukrainian institution has been placed under political control. The evidence does not justify it.

It does show why Brussels is concentrating increasingly on institutional independence.

The problem with wartime centralisation is rarely that it begins without justification. Governments fighting wars need authority. The longer an emergency lasts, however, the more important it becomes to distinguish measures required by national security from arrangements that have become politically convenient.

Ukraine has now lived under full-scale war for more than four years. Institutions created for the post-war European state are being shaped while the wartime state still exists.

That makes the current reform period unusually consequential.

Conditionality becomes Brussels’ leverage

The EU has one powerful instrument with which to influence the outcome: money.

The Commission is already using it.

The almost €3 billion approved in September followed the completion of agreed Ukraine Plan milestones. The next payments depend on further commitments being met.

As EU Today reported when the Ukraine Plan was amended, additional financing has come with additional rule-of-law and anti-corruption requirements.

There is a limit to how far Brussels can push this. Ukraine is fighting a Russian war of aggression that also poses a direct security threat to Europe. Destabilising the Ukrainian budget in order to demonstrate the rigour of EU conditionality would make little strategic sense.

Kyiv is well aware of that.

But Brussels cannot simply waive the conditions either. Doing so would weaken reformers inside Ukraine, reduce EU influence over the accession process and make it more difficult to explain enormous long-term transfers to European taxpayers.

The result is already visible: continued financial support accompanied by increasingly detailed scrutiny of how reforms are implemented.

That approach is likely to become tougher as accession advances.

There is another reason for it.

Ukraine will eventually have to manage reconstruction on a scale Europe has not seen for decades. European governments, international financial institutions and private investors will be asked to commit hundreds of billions of euros. Confidence in prosecutors, courts, public procurement and anti-corruption agencies will affect how much money arrives and on what terms.

Strong institutions are therefore not a concession Ukraine makes to Brussels in exchange for membership.

They are part of the infrastructure required for Ukraine’s recovery.

The same applies to the war itself. Corruption in defence procurement, reconstruction or public administration gives Russia opportunities to damage confidence in the Ukrainian state and strain relations between Kyiv and its partners. Moscow has every interest in amplifying genuine scandals alongside fabricated ones.

The most effective answer is not tighter political management of damaging information. It is institutions capable of investigating misconduct credibly.

That is also why the role of Ukrainian civil society deserves attention.

The organisations producing critical assessments of Kyiv’s reforms are operating in a country under attack. Many have supported Ukraine’s European integration for years. Their reports can be disputed and their scoring methodologies examined, but criticism of government performance is not evidence of disloyalty.

The ability to produce such criticism is itself one of the features separating the Ukrainian political system from the authoritarian model Russia represents.

Ukraine’s reform record consequently looks neither like the failure portrayed by some critics nor the uninterrupted success sometimes presented by its defenders.

The broader record is impressive. Completing 84 of 95 Ukraine Plan milestones while fighting a major war is not a trivial achievement, and the EU would not have continued releasing billions of euros if the reform programme existed only on paper.

The difficulty appears further down, where institutional reform begins to affect the ability of political authorities to influence prosecutors, investigators and judicial appointments.

The NABU-SAPO confrontation made that problem impossible to ignore. The subsequent reversal showed that Ukraine also possesses the political and civic capacity to correct course.

What happens next will matter more than either episode.

Bills that have remained in parliament will have to become law. Reviews of the SBI and prosecution service will have to produce institutional changes. Competitive appointment procedures will have to work when the preferred candidate of those in power does not win. Anti-corruption bodies will have to be allowed to pursue cases when their targets are politically connected.

These are less visible achievements than opening accession negotiations or announcing another EU funding package.

They are also much closer to what EU membership ultimately requires.

Russia has forced Ukraine to build an exceptionally powerful wartime state. European integration requires Kyiv to ensure that some of that power can eventually be constrained by institutions that do not depend on whoever occupies the presidential administration.

The figures that currently look contradictory — 84 out of 95 and 15 out of 100 — are therefore telling different parts of the same story.

Ukraine has shown that it can reform during the war.

The harder test is whether it can complete reforms precisely where doing so reduces political discretion.

Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis has ruled out an agreement requiring Athens to recognise British Museum ownership of the Parthenon Sculptures, using a landmark exchange of cultural objects with Bulgaria to restate Greece’s position.

Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis has said Greece will not “borrow” the Parthenon Sculptures under an arrangement requiring Athens to recognise British Museum ownership, as Greece and Bulgaria completed an exchange of historic remains and religious artefacts following decades of negotiations.

Mitsotakis made the remarks on Saturday, 3 October, during a ceremony at the Museum of Byzantine Culture in Thessaloniki attended by Bulgarian Prime Minister Rumen Radev.

Under the agreement, Greece transferred to Bulgaria human remains identified as those of medieval Bulgarian ruler Tsar Samuel, together with material recovered from four sarcophagi at the Basilica of Saint Achilleios in the Prespa region.

Bulgaria returned 48 ecclesiastical objects removed from northern Greece during the First World War.

The Greek prime minister’s office said the returned objects include icons, crosses, vestments, reliquaries and an episcopal throne. They were removed in 1917 from religious institutions in the Serres region.

The artefacts will initially be displayed at the Museum of Byzantine Culture before being returned to the monasteries and church authorities from which they originated. The Greek government said the 48 objects will remain on display until 5 November.

The remains handed to Bulgaria were discovered during archaeological excavations at Saint Achilleios in the 1960s and later identified as belonging to Samuel, who ruled the First Bulgarian Empire between 997 and 1014.

Bulgaria organised a state ceremony following their return. The Bulgarian government described the transfer as the return of one of the country’s most significant medieval rulers.

The exchange concludes negotiations stretching back decades, although both governments have agreed to continue discussions about other objects of mutual historical interest.

Mitsotakis used the Thessaloniki ceremony to link the agreement to another, far more prominent dispute over cultural property: the Parthenon Sculptures held in London.

He said cultural diplomacy had demonstrated that disputes over objects removed during earlier periods of conflict could be addressed through negotiation, referring also to previous arrangements involving fragments of the Parthenon returned from Sicily.

The Greek government continues to seek the reunification in Athens of the surviving Parthenon Sculptures.

The central obstacle remains ownership.

The British Museum states that Lord Elgin removed the sculptures between 1801 and 1805 with the permission of the Ottoman authorities then governing Athens. His actions were examined by a parliamentary committee before the collection was acquired for the museum in 1816.

Greece disputes the legitimacy of their removal and argues that surviving elements of the monument should be reunited at the Acropolis Museum.

That difference has direct consequences for any proposal based on loans.

Under the British Museum trustees’ published position, the museum is prepared to consider lending objects from its collection, including the Parthenon Sculptures, but requires a borrowing institution to acknowledge the museum’s ownership.

Successive Greek governments have refused to meet that condition.

Mitsotakis reiterated that position on Saturday, arguing that Greece cannot borrow an object which it considers its own.

The dispute has continued despite negotiations between Athens and the British Museum.

In February, the UK government told Parliament that the chairman of the British Museum remained in discussions with the Greek government over a possible partnership involving reciprocal loans.

The British government has maintained that operational decisions concerning the sculptures belong to the museum’s trustees.

EU Today has followed the dispute for several years. In 2023, then British prime minister Rishi Sunak cancelled a scheduled meeting with Mitsotakis after the Greek leader publicly raised the return of the sculptures.

The dispute subsequently produced an unusual diplomatic argument between two NATO allies, although discussions between Greek representatives and the British Museum continued.

The Greece-Bulgaria agreement concluded on Saturday differs substantially from the Parthenon case in both its legal history and the circumstances under which the objects were removed.

Athens nevertheless sees the exchange as evidence that governments can settle disputes over cultural property without abandoning their respective interpretations of history.

For Bulgaria, the return of Samuel’s remains has considerable national significance. For Greece, the recovery of the ecclesiastical objects resolves a century-old question concerning material removed during the First World War.

The Parthenon Sculptures remain considerably more complicated.

Talks continue, but the fundamental disagreement identified again by Mitsotakis in Thessaloniki has not changed: London considers the sculptures legally owned by the British Museum, while Athens considers them parts of a Greek monument which should be permanently reunited.

As long as that difference remains, a conventional loan arrangement offers no straightforward solution.

Beijing has opened an anti-dumping investigation into a chemical imported from the European Union days before EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič travels to China for talks covering trade imbalances, market access and strategic raw materials.

China has opened a new anti-dumping investigation into imports from the European Union less than a week before EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič is due in Beijing for talks on the increasingly difficult trade relationship between the two sides.

China’s Ministry of Commerce announced on Saturday, 3 October, that it was beginning an investigation into p-nitrotoluene, also known as 4-nitrotoluene, imported from the EU.

According to the official notice opening the investigation, the case follows an application submitted on 14 September by Chinese producers Jiangsu Huaihe Chemical and Hubei Dongfang Chemical. The investigation will examine alleged dumping between 1 July 2025 and 30 June 2026, while the assessment of possible damage to Chinese industry will cover January 2022 to June 2026.

P-nitrotoluene is used in the production of dyes, pharmaceuticals, pesticides, pigments and other chemical products.

In isolation, the investigation concerns a relatively specialised industrial product. Its timing, however, places it inside a much wider argument over the future of EU-China trade.

Šefčovič is expected in China on 8 and 9 October for the second high-level meeting under the EU-China trade and investment consultation mechanism established earlier this year.

The European Commission confirmed in September that the meeting would address Chinese exports to the EU, European access to the Chinese market and restrictions affecting rare-earth supplies. Brussels said it expected the October talks to produce the first concrete results from work undertaken since the mechanism was established. The Commission outlined the agenda following a September call between Šefčovič and Chinese Commerce Minister Wang Wentao.

EU Today reported in September that Šefčovič had warned China that the EU could consider tougher measures if the negotiations failed to produce tangible progress by October.

The deadline followed talks between Šefčovič and Wang in Brussels in June. At the time, the two sides agreed to establish working groups dealing with trade and investment balances, export controls, intellectual property and World Trade Organisation reform.

EU Today examined those negotiations in detail as Brussels sought progress on rare earths, market access and the widening trade imbalance.

The numbers remain a central part of the European argument.

According to Eurostat’s figures for EU-China trade in 2025, the EU imported €559.4 billion in goods from China while exporting €199.6 billion, leaving a trade deficit of €359.8 billion. EU exports to China fell by 6.5 per cent compared with 2024, while imports increased by 6.4 per cent.

Brussels argues that the imbalance cannot be viewed separately from questions of industrial subsidies, excess manufacturing capacity and barriers encountered by European companies seeking access to the Chinese market.

Beijing rejects the suggestion that the growth of Chinese exports is principally the result of unfair state support and has criticised the EU’s expanding use of trade-defence instruments.

The confrontation now covers a growing range of industries.

The EU has imposed additional duties on Chinese electric vehicles following an anti-subsidy investigation, while disputes have extended to medical devices, public procurement and agricultural products. China, meanwhile, has launched investigations affecting European products including brandy, pork, dairy goods and chemicals.

Rare earths have become particularly important.

European industry remains heavily dependent on Chinese supplies and processing capacity for materials used in permanent magnets, electric vehicles, wind turbines, electronics and defence equipment.

Eurostat reported in June that China supplied 46.8 per cent of EU rare-earth imports by weight in 2025. The concentration is greater in some processing stages and manufactured components.

EU Today has followed the issue closely, including the Commission’s preparations for possible renewed Chinese rare-earth restrictions and the EU Today Research Desk’s assessment of Europe’s exposure to Chinese rare-earth supply chains.

Following the June negotiations, Šefčovič said China had given assurances that export controls on rare earths and permanent magnets should not interrupt European supply chains. He nevertheless sought improvements to the licensing system faced by EU companies. The Commissioner said at the time that Beijing would be expected to demonstrate tangible progress by October.

That point has now arrived.

Neither Brussels nor Beijing has indicated that the broader commercial relationship is heading towards disengagement. China remains the EU’s largest source of imported goods and the European market remains commercially important to Chinese exporters.

But both sides are increasingly prepared to use trade-defence measures when negotiations fail to resolve disputes.

Saturday’s anti-dumping investigation consequently adds another issue to Šefčovič’s agenda days before he arrives in Beijing — and provides an early indication of the atmosphere surrounding the October talks.

Tens of thousands of people have demonstrated across Spain after parliament rejected two government housing decrees, bringing the country’s dispute over rents, evictions and housing supply back onto the streets.

Tens of thousands of people marched across Spain on Saturday, 3rd October, demanding action over rising rents, evictions and access to housing, a day after parliament rejected two government measures intended to strengthen protections for tenants.

In Madrid, the government delegation estimated attendance at around 70,000, while organisers put the figure considerably higher. Demonstrations were organised in more than 50 cities. In Valencia, clashes broke out near a property investment conference at the City of Arts and Sciences, while protests elsewhere were largely peaceful. The nationwide demonstrations followed several days of mobilisation by Spanish tenants’ organisations.

The immediate political trigger came on Friday, when the Congress of Deputies rejected two housing decrees proposed by Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez’s minority government.

The government had approved a package of emergency housing measures including stronger protection against evictions for vulnerable households, changes affecting property investment companies and measures intended to increase the availability of affordable rental accommodation. A second decree included provisions for the automatic renewal of some rental contracts.

The measures were defeated after the Popular Party, Vox and Junts opposed them. Junts argued that the proposals would not resolve the underlying shortage of housing and risked discouraging property owners from putting homes onto the market.

Housing has become one of Spain’s most politically sensitive domestic issues, particularly in Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia and other cities where rising demand has coincided with limited supply, strong tourism and a large short-term rental market.

The protests have also been shaped by the eviction of 87-year-old Maricarmen Abascal from the Madrid flat where she had lived for decades. The case attracted national attention and became a focal point for campaigners demanding stronger protection for tenants.

Spain has already taken measures against short-term tourist accommodation. EU Today reported last year on Spain’s move to block more than 65,000 Airbnb listings that the authorities said did not comply with regulatory requirements.

Barcelona has gone further, announcing plans to end approximately 10,000 tourist-apartment licences by 2028 as the city seeks to return properties to the long-term residential market.

The argument, however, extends beyond holiday rentals.

Spain faces a structural shortage of housing in areas experiencing strong population and employment growth. Tenant organisations favour stronger rent controls, longer contracts and greater restrictions on institutional investors. Property organisations and political opponents of tighter controls argue that excessive intervention can reduce rental supply and discourage construction.

The same debate is increasingly visible across Europe.

Figures published by Eurostat on 1 October showed EU house prices rising by 4.7 per cent in the second quarter of 2026 compared with the same period last year. Rents increased by 3 per cent. Compared with the first quarter, house prices rose by 1.2 per cent and rents by 0.7 per cent.

EU Today recently examined how Berlin’s housing shortage and rapidly rising rents became a central issue in the city’s election campaign, illustrating how affordability has moved up the political agenda across several European capitals.

Brussels has also become more involved. The European Commission’s first European Affordable Housing Plan, presented in December 2025, focuses on increasing supply, mobilising investment, accelerating construction and giving authorities additional scope to address short-term rentals in areas experiencing housing pressure.

EU Today reported when the plan was launched that it included proposals for new action on short-term rentals and housing investment. The Commission has since begun building a European Housing Alliance bringing together governments, cities, regions and housing organisations.

The Commission estimates that house prices across the EU have risen by more than 60 per cent since 2013, while average rents have increased by around 20 per cent. It has nevertheless stressed that most housing policy remains under national, regional and local authority.

Spain therefore represents one of the more acute versions of a wider European problem: how to increase supply while deciding how far governments should regulate rents, tourist accommodation and investment in residential property.

Saturday’s demonstrations show that the issue is no longer confined to housing policy.

For Sánchez, the defeat of the two decrees has exposed once again the difficulty of securing parliamentary majorities for major legislation. For Spain’s opposition parties, the dispute centres increasingly on whether government intervention is helping to expand housing supply or restricting it.

For tenants facing higher rents, the immediate question is whether any new legislation can materially increase the number of homes they can afford.

Two Iranian nationals have been charged with terrorism offences over an alleged plot targeting the Jewish community in Manchester, with investigators accusing them of researching potential targets and obtaining instructions and materials for an improvised explosive device.

Rahman Salehi, of Salford, and Salam Ahmadyan, 36, of Liverpool, were charged on Friday, 2 October, with engaging in conduct in preparation for terrorist acts, contrary to Section 5 of the Terrorism Act 2006.

According to the Metropolitan Police announcement detailing the charges, both men are Iranian nationals and were arrested in Manchester on Sunday, 20 September.

They have been remanded in custody and are due to appear at Westminster Magistrates’ Court on Saturday, 3 October.

The arrests followed what police described as a long-running counter-terrorism investigation into a suspected plot directed against the Jewish community in the Manchester area.

Police allege that the two men were communicating with a third person overseas who may have been in Iran. No allegation has been made in the charges released so far that the Iranian government directed the suspected plot.

The particulars published by Counter Terrorism Policing allege that Salehi and Ahmadyan used encrypted communications and obtained material containing instructions for manufacturing an explosive device.

Investigators say the men acquired instructions relating to a device using powdered chlorine and vehicle brake fluid, along with video material concerning the manufacture or assembly of an improvised explosive device.

They are further accused of acquiring liquids, components and equipment, researching potential targets, obtaining images, maps and plans, and carrying out reconnaissance at locations considered as possible targets.

The Crown Prosecution Service confirmed that prosecutors had authorised charges after reviewing evidence gathered during the investigation.

Frank Ferguson, Chief Crown Prosecutor for the CPS Special Crime and Counter Terrorism Division, said prosecutors had concluded that there was sufficient evidence for the case to be put before a court.

The CPS stressed that the proceedings are now active and that both men have the right to a fair trial. The charges are allegations and no finding of guilt has been made.

Arrests during Jewish High Holy Days

The arrests took place shortly before Yom Kippur, the holiest day in the Jewish calendar, and came amid heightened security surrounding Jewish institutions in Britain.

Deputy Assistant Commissioner Vicki Evans, Senior National Coordinator for Counter Terrorism Policing, said the investigation had disrupted what police believed to be a plot targeting Manchester’s Jewish community.

The timing is particularly sensitive because it comes one year after the terrorist attack at the Heaton Park Hebrew Congregation synagogue in Manchester on 2 October 2025.

Two worshippers were killed in that attack, which took place on Yom Kippur. EU Today reported at the time on the Manchester synagogue attack and the security concerns facing Britain’s Jewish population.

The latest case also comes against the background of a series of alleged Iranian-linked threats and attacks involving Jewish and Israeli targets in Britain.

British security agencies have repeatedly warned about Iranian activity on UK territory. The government said earlier this year that more than 20 potentially lethal Iran-backed plots had been tracked by British security agencies over the preceding year.

Concerns intensified following attacks on Jewish-linked premises during 2026. In July, the government imposed sanctions on an Iran-linked organisation that had claimed responsibility for attacks on Jewish and Israeli-linked locations.

The group, the Islamic Movement of Companions of the Right, was subsequently designated under Britain’s new state-threat legislation alongside Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

EU Today has previously examined Iran-linked security threats in Britain following counter-terrorism arrests involving Iranian nationals, as well as alleged Iranian-linked plots targeting Jewish institutions elsewhere in Europe and North America.

Britain expands protection for Jewish communities

The Manchester case comes as the British government increases security around synagogues, Jewish schools and community centres.

In July, ministers announced more than £250 million in additional funding over three years to strengthen protection for Jewish communities.

The package includes funding for more than 500 additional police officers across England and Wales, including around 80 officers in Greater Manchester, as well as additional resources for Counter Terrorism Policing.

The UK’s national terrorism threat level was raised to severe in April, meaning that an attack is considered highly likely. The government said the decision reflected both an increased threat from Islamist and extreme-right terrorism and a wider background of state-linked physical threats against the Jewish community.

EU Today has also reported on the government’s £250 million programme to strengthen Jewish community security and the broader increase in antisemitic incidents and violence affecting Jewish communities across Britain.

The allegations against Salehi and Ahmadyan will now be considered by the courts. Prosecutors have warned against publishing material that could prejudice the proceedings.

Nearly half of voters in the United Kingdom support rejoining the European Union, according to a survey released as Prime Minister Andy Burnham reviews the country’s options for its long-term relationship with the bloc.

The Messina Group polled 11,461 people between 12 and 24 September. It found that 49 per cent supported EU membership and 28.5 per cent opposed it. The findings were weighted by respondents’ votes in the 2016 referendum, according to the survey results.

Several other options for closer cooperation also received more support than opposition. Retaining the current relationship while removing as many trade barriers as possible was backed by 48.2 per cent, with 20.9 per cent against. A customs union was supported by 47.1 per cent and opposed by 20.7 per cent.

Joining the single market was supported by 45.1 per cent, while 45.5 per cent backed associate membership. The existing relationship without further changes received 42 per cent support. Moving further away from the EU was the least popular option tested: 27.9 per cent supported it and 41.2 per cent opposed it.

The figures show support for a range of possible arrangements, but do not establish agreement on what Britain should seek or on the terms it should accept.

On timing, 25.9 per cent said the UK should rejoin immediately, 22.9 per cent favoured doing so within three years and 8.4 per cent within the next decade. A further 23 per cent said they did not want closer relations with the EU.

Respondents were also asked whether leaving the bloc had been the right decision. Some 52.4 per cent said it was wrong, compared with 29.7 per cent who said it was right; 17.9 per cent were undecided. Asked whether Brexit had been a success or failure, 54.9 per cent called it a failure and 12.2 per cent a success. Nearly a quarter, 23.2 per cent, said neither, while 9.7 per cent did not know.

The poll tested the possible electoral effects of different Labour positions on Europe. It found that scenarios involving closer ties could increase the party’s vote share by between 4.3 and 7.4 percentage points. The largest potential rise was linked to a proposal for a referendum in which Burnham campaigned for Britain to rejoin.

Burnham has said Labour will review the choices available, including keeping current arrangements, joining a customs union, returning to the single market or seeking EU membership. He plans to set out the options around the next UK-EU summit, expected in November. In recent remarks, he said the government would assess “what is doable” and the “pros and cons” of each option.

The review marks a shift from Labour’s 2024 election manifesto, which ruled out rejoining the EU, single market or customs union. Burnham has not proposed an immediate application or referendum. A UK bid for membership would require negotiations with the EU and unanimous agreement from member states.

The question of whether a referendum should come first also remains open. Almost a third of respondents said a vote would be needed before rejoining. More than one in six thought a general-election mandate would be sufficient, with a similar proportion saying Parliament could make the decision.

French President Emmanuel Macron and Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez have said the EU would welcome a British return. Their comments followed Burnham’s call for a review of Britain’s options, as EU Today reported this week. Earlier EU Today coverage also examined British and EU public support for a possible return.

A 2,500-seat stadium in suburban Nagoya has become the unlikely setting for one of sport’s most combustible rivalries — and a glimpse of cricket’s growing reach beyond its traditional heartlands.

There are few sporting rivalries capable of transporting an entire stadium thousands of miles away from home. On Saturday, India and Pakistan managed precisely that — turning a modest Japanese baseball facility into an arena charged with all the anticipation, colour and emotion normally associated with the great cricket grounds of South Asia.

The setting could hardly have been more incongruous. The Asian Games final was being staged at Korogi Athletic Park in Nisshin, near Nagoya, a purpose-built cricket venue with capacity for only about 2,500 spectators. Beyond the boundary stood the unmistakable features of a Japanese baseball ground, including a pitcher’s mound.

Yet for those inside, this was no novelty fixture.

Hours before the first ball, Indian and Pakistani supporters were queuing to enter. Flags were draped over shoulders, shirts provided the national colours and tickets had become sufficiently scarce to generate reports of inflated resale prices. For many members of the South Asian communities living in Japan, the occasion represented a rare chance to see the two countries meet in person.

That matters because India-Pakistan cricket is not simply another international sporting contest. Political tensions mean that the teams generally encounter each other only in major tournaments, making every meeting an event in its own right. Their February T20 World Cup encounter in Sri Lanka was played before a sell-out crowd of 35,000; television audiences in the two countries routinely run into the hundreds of millions.

Japan therefore found itself hosting one of cricket’s most valuable commodities: scarcity.

For Japanese spectators, meanwhile, the spectacle offered an introduction to a sport that remains distinctly niche in the country. Some had attended earlier matches simply out of curiosity. Teachers from nearby Gifu admitted that they knew virtually nothing about cricket, but found themselves enjoying the experience after reading explanatory material and watching the action.

The comparison with baseball is inevitable. Japan possesses one of the world’s great baseball cultures, while cricket remains a relative outsider. But the recent arrival of India has provided an intriguing bridge between the two.

Last week, Japan played India in its first-ever T20 international against a full-member cricket nation. The hosts came within two runs of a remarkable victory in a rain-shortened five-over contest, giving Japanese cricket precisely the sort of exposure its administrators could scarcely have manufactured themselves.

The significance extends beyond the scoreboard.

India’s appearance in Japan was linked to the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the countries, while the Asian Games have provided an unusually prominent platform for cricket. The sport is already established among expatriate communities, but encounters involving India’s global stars can introduce it to an entirely new audience.

That is perhaps the most interesting aspect of Saturday’s extraordinary scene. Cricket did not need to conquer Japan overnight. It merely needed to persuade a few thousand people to come and watch.

And India versus Pakistan is perhaps the ultimate sales pitch.

The match was always going to generate passion. What nobody could have guaranteed was that the passion would survive the journey from the packed stadiums of Colombo and Mumbai to a small baseball field outside Nagoya.

It did.

The geography changed. The rivalry did not.

Main Image: By 運動会プロテインパワー – Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=112511600

Latvians are voting for a new parliament on Saturday after an election campaign dominated by security, repeated drone incidents, support for Ukraine and mounting pressure on household finances.

Latvians went to the polls on Saturday, 3 October, to elect the country’s 100-seat Saeima in an election taking place against an unusually tense security backdrop on NATO’s eastern frontier.

Fourteen parties and electoral alliances are contesting the election, with 1,428 candidates seeking seats in parliament, according to Latvia’s Central Election Commission. Voting takes place across five constituencies — Riga, Vidzeme, Latgale, Kurzeme and Zemgale — with polling stations open until 20:00 local time.

Security has occupied a prominent place in the campaign after a series of drone incidents brought the consequences of Russia’s war against Ukraine directly into Latvian airspace.

Prime Minister Andris Kulbergs, who took office in May after the previous coalition collapsed during a political crisis over the handling of drone incursions, is seeking a new mandate for his centrist United List. EU Today reported at the time that Prime Minister Evika Siliņa resigned after her coalition fractured amid criticism of Latvia’s response to repeated unmanned aircraft incidents along the Russian border. The collapse followed a succession of drone-related security incidents.

Kulbergs has campaigned on continued support for Ukraine and stronger Latvian defences, including additional counter-drone capabilities. His party entered election day ahead in the opinion polls, although the fragmented political landscape means coalition negotiations are likely to determine the eventual composition of the government.

An SKDS poll conducted between 4 and 16 September put United List on 14.4 per cent. Sovereign Power/Alliance of Young Latvians followed on 9.4 per cent, while Latvia First stood on 9.2 per cent. The Progressives recorded 6.2 per cent and the National Alliance 5.6 per cent. When only voters who had decided how they intended to vote were counted, seven political forces were projected to cross the 5 per cent threshold for representation in parliament.

The survey also showed a substantial pool of undecided or disengaged voters shortly before polling day, leaving considerable uncertainty around the final distribution of seats.

Russia and the war in neighbouring Ukraine have also produced sharper divisions between the competing parties.

Kulbergs has maintained Latvia’s strong support for Kyiv, while Sovereign Power has opposed military assistance to Ukraine and called for greater emphasis on negotiations. Latvia First has also sought votes among parts of the country’s Russian-speaking population, particularly in eastern Latvia, where questions surrounding language policy, relations with Moscow and the economic consequences of the war remain politically sensitive.

Latvia’s geographical position gives those arguments a significance extending beyond domestic politics. The country shares a border with Russia and Belarus and hosts allied troops as part of NATO’s reinforced eastern presence.

Earlier this year, drones crossed into Latvia from Russian territory, including incidents that exposed weaknesses in detecting and intercepting relatively small unmanned aircraft. EU Today reported in March that Latvia’s defence minister cut short a visit to Kyiv after another drone crossed the border from Russia. Further incidents followed in May.

Latvian intelligence has meanwhile warned about the changing nature of Moscow’s approach towards the country. In January, the Constitution Protection Bureau said Russia’s perception of Latvia was becoming increasingly similar to its view of Ukraine before the full-scale invasion, while stressing that it did not assess Russia as posing an immediate direct military threat at that stage. The warning was examined by EU Today earlier this year.

Riga has responded with one of NATO’s highest levels of defence expenditure.

Latvia’s Ministry of Defence says the country will spend about €2.16 billion on defence in 2026, equivalent to approximately 4.7 per cent of GDP under its updated calculation, as it moves towards a target of 5 per cent. Priorities include strengthening the armed forces, developing military infrastructure and improving defences along the eastern border. The Latvian defence ministry’s budget programme places additional emphasis on domestic defence production and military innovation.

Security is not the only issue facing voters. The cost of living, pensions, public services and regional economic disparities have also featured heavily during the campaign, particularly outside Riga.

The security debate, however, has given this election a wider European dimension. Latvia’s next government will take office while Russia’s war against Ukraine continues immediately beyond NATO’s eastern frontier and while the Baltic states are investing heavily in air defence, border protection and military readiness.

The official result will determine the composition of the 15th Saeima for the next four years. With several parties competing around the parliamentary threshold and no single force close to a majority, the subsequent coalition negotiations are likely to be almost as consequential as Saturday’s vote itself.

France has seen plenty of street protests. What is striking about the latest unrest is not that French students have discovered the barricade, but that a dispute over school conditions has spread with extraordinary speed, drawing hundreds of schools into a confrontation between teenagers, teachers, police and the government.

About 400 schools and other educational establishments were expected to remain closed on Friday, while more than 560 schools were reported to have experienced protests or disruption. The movement, which began in the Paris region, has spread across the country. What started as complaints about overcrowded classrooms, teacher shortages and dilapidated buildings has now included fires, property damage, clashes with police and thousands of arrests.

There is a temptation, particularly in Paris, to treat every eruption of street anger as another instalment in France’s long tradition of protest politics. But there is something more revealing here. These are not principally pensioners defending their retirement age or trade unionists protecting established privileges. Many of the demonstrators are teenagers complaining that the institutions preparing them for adulthood are failing to provide the basics.

That complaint is not entirely without evidence. France’s education system has faced persistent staffing difficulties. During the 2024-25 school year, almost 10 per cent of teaching hours in public secondary schools went untaught, according to education ministry data cited by Time. Roughly 7.5 per cent of those lost hours resulted from difficulties finding replacement teachers.

The students’ demands consequently deserve to be distinguished from the violence that has accompanied some of the demonstrations. A teenager asking why there are 35 pupils in a classroom is making a fundamentally different argument from someone setting fire to a school entrance.

That distinction is becoming increasingly important as the authorities attempt to regain control. Education Minister Édouard Geffray has said the original grievances were legitimate but argued that violent groups have taken the movement hostage. The government has also alleged that politicians from the hard-left La France Insoumise helped initiate or politicise the protests. LFI figures have rejected that accusation.

The evidence therefore needs to be treated with care. France clearly has genuine educational grievances, but it is also clear that organised political actors are seeking to influence the atmosphere around the demonstrations. Those two propositions are not mutually exclusive.

Nor is the police response a simple story of heroes and villains. Riot police have been deployed amid reports of fires, attacks and damage, but students and rights organisations have accused officers of excessive force. More than 300 police officers, gendarmes and firefighters were reported injured on Thursday, while scores of students and education staff have also been injured.

This creates precisely the sort of vicious circle that governments find difficult to escape. Violence demands a security response; a heavy security response can generate further anger; that anger can then be used as evidence that the original security response was necessary.

The danger for the government is that the school gates become another national political battlefield.

France is already wrestling with severe fiscal pressures. The proposed 2027 budget has become politically contentious, while the education ministry is simultaneously facing demands for greater investment. Reuters reported that the planned education-budget increase is only 1.7 per cent, below the rate of inflation, while debt-servicing costs are expected to become the largest item in the national budget.

That makes the students’ complaints politically awkward. Governments can promise more teachers, better buildings and improved facilities. Delivering them costs money. And money is precisely what the French state increasingly lacks.

The approaching presidential election adds another layer. President Emmanuel Macron cannot seek a third consecutive term, and parties on both the left and right are already positioning themselves around the unrest. A movement involving large numbers of teenagers therefore risks becoming a proxy battle for France’s much wider argument about the direction of the country.

The immediate priority is consequently straightforward: keep pupils and staff safe, protect schools from damage, preserve the right to peaceful protest and establish whether the educational grievances can be addressed within the financial constraints facing the state.

France has considerable experience of protest. It has less experience of resolving the underlying problems once protest becomes the political system’s principal language.

The teenagers now filling French streets are demanding to know whether their country is investing in their future. The government’s answer cannot ultimately be delivered through tear gas or barricades. Nor can it be financed by promises detached from France’s deteriorating public finances.

That is the uncomfortable equation confronting Paris: a generation demanding better schools, a state struggling to pay for them, and a protest movement increasingly escaping the boundaries of the classroom.

Paris Attack: Europe Must Not Allow Ideological Violence to Become the New Normal

Seventeen EU governments have joined forces to defend agricultural and regional funding in the bloc’s next seven-year budget, setting up a confrontation with Germany and five other countries demanding substantial reductions to the European Commission’s proposed €2 trillion spending plan.

Seventeen European Union countries have called for agriculture and cohesion funding to be protected from further cuts as negotiations over the bloc’s 2028–2034 budget enter a decisive phase.

In a letter dated 2 October to Irish Taoiseach Micheál Martin, whose government currently holds the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU, the countries said the overall financing of Cohesion Policy and the Common Agricultural Policy should be maintained in the next Multiannual Financial Framework.

The signatories are Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain.

The initiative follows months of coordination by the so-called Friends of Cohesion. In an earlier joint position published by the Spanish government, members argued that cohesion, agriculture and fisheries remained central EU policies and called for new EU revenue sources to be “genuine, fair, simple and non-regressive”.

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and Romanian President Nicușor Dan have been coordinating the group at leaders’ level. They are expected to convene another informal meeting alongside the European Council on 15–16 October. The two leaders previously brought the group together ahead of the June European Council as governments sought to coordinate their positions on the budget.

The intervention places the group in direct opposition to Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland and Sweden.

Those six governments have argued that the Commission’s near-€2 trillion proposal should be reduced by several hundred billion euros. In their joint statement on the 2028–2034 budget, they said national governments were already undertaking fiscal consolidation and that the EU budget could not be exempt from similar pressure. They called for reductions across all spending headings while giving greater weight to security, defence, competitiveness, migration and sovereignty.

EU Today previously reported on the growing pressure from net-contributor countries for deep reductions to the Commission proposal as negotiations moved towards the Irish presidency’s attempt to secure an agreement before the end of the year.

The Commission’s original proposal for the 2028–2034 Multiannual Financial Framework amounts to almost €2 trillion in current prices, equivalent to 1.26 per cent of the EU’s average gross national income over the seven-year period. It substantially restructures the budget, bringing agriculture, cohesion, fisheries, migration and internal security into national and regional partnership plans while allocating more money to competitiveness, research, defence and other emerging priorities.

Agriculture and regional development have consequently become two of the most sensitive parts of the negotiations.

The Council has already backed the principle of the new national and regional plans, but financial allocations remain unresolved. Its negotiating position specifically leaves the money to be settled as part of the overall MFF talks.

EU Today has followed the dispute since the Cyprus presidency produced a negotiating framework in June that proposed reducing the Commission’s plan by about €32.8bn. The disagreement has since widened as governments attempt to reconcile traditional spending on farmers and poorer regions with growing demands for defence, industrial competitiveness and security.

Revenue is another source of disagreement.

The Commission has proposed five new EU own resources, including revenue connected to the Emissions Trading System and Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, a contribution based on uncollected electronic waste, a tobacco excise resource and a contribution from large companies operating in the EU. The proposals are intended partly to reduce reliance on national contributions and help finance repayment of pandemic-era borrowing.

EU Today previously examined the dispute over new sources of EU revenue after leaders asked the Irish presidency to develop financing options alongside negotiations over expenditure.

The Friends of Cohesion have also called for a more gradual repayment schedule for NextGenerationEU borrowing and oppose retaining contribution rebates for wealthier member states. Under the Commission proposal, repayments of principal and interest would amount to a fixed €24bn annually between 2028 and 2034, or €168bn across the seven-year budget period.

Ireland now faces the task of narrowing the gap.

The Council’s timetable for the negotiations envisages the Irish presidency advancing the next negotiating framework ahead of the October European Council, with governments seeking a political agreement before the end of 2026. That would leave 2027 for adoption of the legislation required before the new budget takes effect on 1 January 2028.

An agreement among governments will require unanimity. The European Parliament must then give its consent, while the separate decision governing the EU’s own resources also requires unanimous approval by member states and ratification according to their national constitutional procedures.

With 17 governments now explicitly defending agriculture and cohesion spending and six major contributors demanding substantial reductions, the October summit will bring the central budget dispute directly before EU leaders.