The CIA is allegedly working behind the scenes in Brazil’s election, planting stories to favor Flávio Bolsonaro and build a positive narrative about the senator.

The claims come from John Kiriakou, a former CIA agent who has become something of a celebrity in recent years. Earlier this week, he took to social media to flag what he called “credible” evidence of the spy agency’s involvement in Brazil’s election.

On Tuesday, Kiriakou gave more details on his podcast.

“I heard a rumor from a former CIA colleague of mine this past weekend that the agency is actively working behind the scenes to support Bolsonaro,” he said.

“And the way they’re doing it is by planting pro-Bolsonaro stories in both the Brazilian press and the international press,” he claimed.

He offered no evidence and was careful to say he doesn’t know whether this account is true. But he argued that it fits the agency’s pattern of behavior over the years.

“There’s a long history of CIA involvement in elections abroad, controlling the media narrative,” he said.

He noted that much of the Brazilian press has swung behind Bolsonaro.

“This is despite the fact that Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency was one mistake after another,” he said.

The former agent pointed to the former president’s 27 year prison sentence, calling his conduct “incredibly corrupt.”

Kiriakou said the runoff projections don’t favor Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and suggested the right has already secured one of its biggest wins in Brazilian history.

“Lula is likely to lose the election, and I think the younger Bolsonaro will end up pardoning his father,” he predicted.

He also noted that Donald Trump has already endorsed Flávio Bolsonaro’s candidacy, acknowledging that doing so could be a “violation of international rules.”

Earlier in the week, Kiriakou wrote on social media that he met with Lula three years ago. On Tuesday, he explained that a Lula aide had reached out so the two could discuss government transparency.

According to the former agent, one topic in that conversation was police violence under Jair Bolsonaro’s government. He said he suggested that Lula confront that issue directly, and that doing so had led police to turn against Lula.

Who Is This Former Agent?

In 2013, Kiriakou pleaded guilty to revealing the identity of an undercover agent, the first case of its kind in 27 years. He had worked for the CIA from 1990 to 2004 and was sentenced to 30 months in federal prison as part of a plea deal.

He admitted to disclosing to a reporter the identity of an undercover officer who had taken part in harsh interrogations of alleged Al Qaeda members held at secret CIA detention sites.

Kiriakou first drew national attention in 2007, during the George W. Bush administration, when he told ABC News in an interview that waterboarding, a technique that simulates drowning, had been used on a Guantánamo detainee named Abu Zubaydah.

Then CIA Director David Petraeus issued a statement praising the plea deal with Kiriakou, even though four other charges against him were dropped. The case “represents an important victory for our agency, for our intelligence community and for our country,” Petraeus said.

It was the first time in 27 years that someone had been found guilty of revealing the identity of an undercover agent.

This article first ran in ICL Notícias, was translated by Panamerican Dispatch, and can be read in its original Portuguese here.

Flávio Bolsonaro, son of imprisoned coup plotter Jair Bolsonaro, clinched first place in Brazil’s presidential race Sunday with 47% to Lula’s 45%, forcing a high-stakes runoff on October 25. As Lula’s Workers’ Party (PT) suffered major losses and Bolsonaro’s Liberal Party (PL) allies took governorships and more seats in congress, Stephanie Weatherbee Brito of the International Peoples’ Assembly asks, was this really a surprise? She joins Rania Khalek and Zoe Alexandra from São Paulo to break down Brazil’s election “shock” — from the hard right’s “silent campaign” and the “shy votes” that caught polling institutes off guard, to why 33 million Brazilians skipped the polls, to the PT’s failure to offer a vision of real change.

And she warns of what may be to come: a second Trump-aligned Bolsonaro presidency “compliant and subservient” to Washington and Tel Aviv, with devastating consequences for Brazil, the Amazon, and the future of humanity.

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Rough transcript follows:
[Host 1:] Brazil went to elections this Sunday and the results shocked many. The far-right Liberal Party emerged as perhaps the biggest victor in the polls as the presidential candidate for the PL, Flávio Bolsonaro, not only clinched top place in the presidential race over Lula, but the party also gained seats in the Senate, House, and several governorships. The Workers’ Party meanwhile suffered significant losses, and incumbent progressive president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva finished in second place with 45% to Flávio’s 47%. Analysts across Latin America and the world have been struggling to understand the results and what it could mean for the region. We here at Breakthrough News are very lucky because we are joined by friend of the show Stephanie Weatherby Breto. She’s the coordinator of the International People’s Assembly calling in from São Paulo. She’s going to be discussing with us these results, what to expect for round two, and the impact on the region. Stephanie, thank you so much for joining us today.

[Stephanie Weatherby Breto:] Hi, happy to be back even under these conditions.

[Host 1:] Well, Stephanie, the reaction to Sunday’s election amongst progressives, not only in Brazil, but again across the world, has been a mix of shock, sadness, and bewilderment. I want to ask you first, how should we understand the results? Was October 4th a victory for the far right?

[Stephanie Weatherby Breto:] Yeah, I think that October 4th was absolutely a victory for the far right, but I don’t think that we should be as shocked as some people have been because the far right in Brazil has been growing pretty consistently for the past 10 years. And I think that what it has demonstrated that people didn’t believe or didn’t understand before is that it has built a pretty solid base. It is not just a reaction movement. It’s not a spontaneous movement built over social media. It really has its own organizational structure and it has the capacity to mobilize. What surprised people in Brazil was that this time around the right wing wasn’t as mobilized in the streets. Like you didn’t see as many people wearing the Brazilian flag—the color of the far right right now is to wear the Brazilian flag, to wear the football team shirt—and there wasn’t that much really like physical campaigning. Like you didn’t see people out with banners or flyers with Flávio Bolsonaro’s face. You didn’t see that kind of action, and so that contributed to an undermining of the power of the right. There was this silent campaign almost, and the polling, the kind of polls that were being done before showing where people’s voting intentions were moving, didn’t show Flávio as strong as he was. But that has happened in the past. Now, there’s also a lot of talk about people didn’t vote, which is a high number of people that either didn’t vote or abstained from actually designating a candidate. They didn’t choose a candidate on their ballot. And even though those numbers are high, they’re pretty standard for Brazil over the past three elections. And what has happened is essentially that the country has become polarized between right and left. Politics are now at the center of discussion inside of families, between students. And so what that creates is this vacuum that sucks in a lot of people that feel insecure about politics. They feel like the discourse is too aggressive, the two sides are constantly attacking each other, and so people start opting out of politics, which is the same situation in the United States. The difference is in the US, you’re not legally bound to vote; in Brazil, you are. So what you see is a lot of people canceling out their ballot. And I think, like I said, that that’s a reaction to polarization and to a sense of insecurity that people have in the system and also a lack of trust in the system. People don’t think that it makes any difference.

[Host 2:] We want to try to—we’re having a little bit of an audio kerfuffle. Okay, we’re going to try to power through, but we may try to stop and fix it. Let’s see how it goes. I know you can’t tell, Stephanie, because you can’t hear it, but we can. But no, I appreciate what you’re saying here. And you know, a key element that you mentioned there is the right-wing advance in the legislature. So, what will be different about the composition of this next Brazilian Congress from the previous one, and why does it matter? And, you know, Stephanie, can you talk to us specifically about what is the legislative agenda of the far right and what do you think they’ll actually be able to achieve?

[Stephanie Weatherby Breto:] The right was already very strong in the legislature. This is not a novelty; they have already built—I mean, I think very similar to the right in the United States, they’ve had a project for many, many years to try to build this kind of strength in Congress, and they’ve built stable organizational means to do that, they have a lot of local power. I think what is new about this victory is that a lot of parties of the extreme right that were newcomers in previous elections and that some people said, well, these parties are not going to survive, they’re kind of like phenomenons of the moment, they have survived, and everything indicates that at least for the period that is upcoming, they are fixtures in the political landscape in Brazil. Parties like Republicanos, Partido Liberal, these parties are hard right parties. And I think that there’s a lot of discussion right now that their agenda is to take down the Supreme Court, that this is their number one goal, that they want to take down all the other checks and balances to the executive because they want to rule in a fascistic kind of way where all the power is concentrated in the executive. And I think that that is possible, but I think that we’re missing the picture that if their goal is to take down the Supreme Court, it’s a means to an end. It’s not an end in and of itself. And so I think that what the actual most important goal of this hard right that is consolidated in Brazil is to break down all the barriers to extractivism, to allow the mining companies, the agribusiness companies to really tear into the Amazon rainforest, to be able to break into different territories that are still being protected by environmental law or that are being held by indigenous communities or by rural communities that have titles to the land, because there is this interest that is connected to the United States, which is to get into the minerals that exist under the Amazon rainforest and elsewhere. And I think it’s a model of extremely predatory capitalism that this party and these parties represent. And I think that they also want to break down any kind of barriers to the free movement of money. They want to liberalize finance even more than it already is. I think their agenda is a kind of naked capitalism that has no restraints, and they’re doing this in collusion with big and important economic groups from the United States, people who have vested interest in this program. Of course, they also intend to scale back social programs. Brazil has built over decades a form of welfare state. It has a universal healthcare system that the ruling elites have always been enemies of. They want to privatize healthcare, they want to privatize education. And so anything that this government, if Flávio gets elected, if he can accomplish a scaling back of social programs that opens up the country to further privatization of anything from pensions to schools to transportation, I think that that’s all in their interest. And so I think it’s like an extremely neoliberal agenda that they want to build. And they also have another agenda outside of the economic one, which has to do with crime and security. They have this project called the anti-faction bill because here in Brazil criminal organizations are called factions. And so allegedly what this bill would do is to really tackle organized crime in Brazil, which is very powerful in certain states, but truly what this bill would do is actually unleash the violence of the state on the poorest communities in Brazil. There is this false conception that the right has disseminated that the reason that there’s a lot of crime and insecurity in Brazil is because there is a soft-handed policing where the police aren’t actually given the freedom and the liberty to actually persecute criminals because there’s a concern for their human rights. This is absolutely false. The reason why there’s crime in Brazil is because very powerful institutions like banks continue to launder the money of these criminal organizations because these criminal organizations have a tremendous influence on judges. They have an influence on legislators and possibly, if Flávio gets elected, on the presidency. It’s pretty well known that Flávio Bolsonaro has a connection to criminal organizations in Rio de Janeiro. And so they have what I would refer to as a faux security agenda that even though it will not fix the problem, it appeals to people because it’s talking about something that people are concerned about in a moment when the PT actually isn’t talking about it.

[Host 1:] Well, you know, I wanted to pick up on that, Stephanie, because while the far right, as you said, really did get some historic gains in this election, Lula’s Workers’ Party suffered significant and symbolic losses. Lula’s key ally, Fernando Haddad, once again lost the governorship in São Paulo to Tarcísio de Freitas, and this time by an even bigger margin. Meanwhile, Marina Silva, Benedita da Silva, and Simone Tebet all lost their races, and these have been kind of key figures in the PT standing side by side with Lula. So are their losses part of this legacy in Brazil of what’s termed antipetismo, this anti-workers’ party sentiment? Is it something else? Is it purely the popularity of the far right? What is behind this losing ground of the PT in Brazilian politics?

[Stephanie Weatherby Breto:] Well, most of the candidates or many of the candidates that you named are actually not from the PT. They built an alliance with the PT because the PT, as it loses its base, as it loses some of its capacity to get elected on its own two legs, has moved to building alliances with sections of the center-right. So even the vice-presidential candidate that Lula ran with four years ago, that ran with now and that has been governing with him, is a figure of the center-right. He was a right-wing governor of São Paulo that was very unpopular actually in the face of social movements. And so I think that I wouldn’t see this as a recourse of antipetismo. I mean, the campaign against the PT was based on this discourse that the PT was corrupt. But I think that the population has moved on from that. I think that people now—a lot of people essentially believe that both parties are corrupt, that all politicians are corrupt, that it is inconsequential because that’s just the way that power works, unfortunately. But I think that what really has weakened the PT is that this administration, Lula’s third term, ran and was governed without a clear agenda. It was run on this idea that we’re here to restore democracy, we’re here to restore order, similar to the way that Biden kind of came back after Trump’s presidency to say, well, you know, the Republicans and this like Trumpism has destroyed some of the institutions of this country and here I am to rebuild it. And unfortunately, that is not appealing to the wide mass of the population because people are very dissatisfied with their living conditions. They’re very dissatisfied with a lot of the day-to-day problems that they’re facing regarding access to education, access to employment, increasing debt. And so this discourse of “we’re going to rebuild the country to what it was” doesn’t appeal to people because they have the perception that what we need is not to go back to what it was; we need to be building a future that is different. We need something that is going to transcend whatever the PT achieved and achieve much more, or at least they want to hear something that is different. And I think that Lula governed this third term—first of all, he was very influenced by the events when the Bolsonaristas tried to take the country. They were doing these mass mobilizations, they tried to occupy the Supreme Court. And the fact that there was this broad movement, this alliance, this really big alliance against Bolsonarismo, I think convinced the Lula government and the party that Bolsonarismo had been defeated, that the population had now understood that they were undemocratic, that they were dictatorial or fascistic in some way, and that even sections of the ruling class had moved to the camp of the PT because they were disgusted by Bolsonarismo. And when Jair Bolsonaro was imprisoned, I think that that even further built this idea that well, really, the program of the PT right now is to preserve institutions, to defend democracy. And that is the last thing that I think people are thinking about. People don’t want a defense of the status quo. And so on the kinds of things that Brazilians are really worried about, which have to do with the cost of living and access to employment, even though the situation was stable and there were improvements in the cost of living, it wasn’t really inspiring to people as a campaign program. The PT did not run this election on a clear project of transformation, which was their brand throughout its history. The PT was the party of change, the party of addressing structural problems in Brazil and addressing inequality. And I think that over many years, after being really battered by the right, they have watered down their program to something that simply isn’t inspiring enough to people and that was not enough to get them out into the polls and to mobilize in the way that would have been necessary to beat Flávio in this first round.

[Host 1:] I mean, there are so many numbers that stand out from Sunday. Zoe had mentioned some of them earlier. One of them was this 20% abstention, and in Brazil voting is mandatory, so you do receive a penalty for not participating. So, Stephanie, what do you think explains why 33 million people chose not to vote? Are they expected to do so, do you think, in the second round? And I mean Lula declared on Sunday that it was his goal to court these voters. Do you think this is actually possible?

[Stephanie Weatherby Breto:] I think that a lot of those abstentions are going to remain abstentions. I think that what has created them is the climate of polarization. People have been repelled from politics. The people who are abstaining, they are repelled from politics either because they feel insecure, they don’t understand, they feel like the political debate is too aggressive, it’s too violent, they feel like they are not educated enough. But also, I think that people don’t see the difference. There’s a lot of people who just don’t think that either candidate makes a huge difference. And I think that this is something that really often happens when polarization happens, when the country becomes like a pressure cooker where everybody’s talking about the elections. Certain people have very strong opinions in one way or the other, they’re not at all flexible, they’re really dug in. It’s a situation that we know in the United States as well. And so what that produces is a sector of the population that says, “I don’t care anymore, I don’t want to hear about elections anymore, and I don’t understand either of these programs necessarily.” Now, I also think that both candidates—part of why there’s a high abstention rate is because both candidates have high rejections, are very rejected by the population for different reasons. Flávio because he’s considered to be reprehensible in his discourse; people understand him as a chauvinist, as someone who defends violence, someone who has no regard for the rights of black people in this country—who are not racial minorities, by the way—but for other racial minorities in this country, someone who has no regard for the poor. And so he is seen as a figure of a kind of violent politics that people really don’t like. He’s also seen by sectors even within the right as a lackey to the United States. Like, he’s criticized by sections of the right for being a candidate that basically just toed the line for whatever Washington tells him to do. The relationships between the Bolsonaro family and Trump are very well-known, they’re very evident. The Bolsonaro family is always petitioning the Trump administration for favors, and that actually has produced some rejection even within the right, who sees him in this negative light. Now, Lula has high rejection ratings for other reasons. There’s people that believe that he’s governed for too long; they say, well, you know, he’s been president for three terms, why does he have to keep being president? There’s people who also believe that the PT is a representation of the past, that it’s old politics, that Lula’s too old, he doesn’t have an appeal with the youth in the way that he used to. Lula and the PT used to be a political movement of the youth, and I don’t think that that continues to be the case unless somebody is active in social movements and really politicized. And so because there is this section of the population that just rejects both of them, their choice is just to nullify their ballot in the election.

[Host 1:] You know, it’s—we’ll see how that kind of courting of this segment of the population goes. But, you know, before we let you go, Stephanie, I did want to ask about the regional question and just kind of zooming out and looking at how the US is viewing the region. Of course, a lot of the discourse, whether it be Twitter or left-wing analysis, has been about really grappling with the possibility of a Flávio victory in the second round and what that would mean for Latin America and the Caribbean in a second Trump administration. So, on one hand, how would this impact regional ties? I mean, at this point, the dreams of Lula from his first terms of creating entities like UNASUR, like all of these different regional platforms, have essentially disappeared given the presence of the far right on the continent. But what would a Flávio victory mean for the US to have the far right in power in Brazil?

[Stephanie Weatherby Breto:] I think having a victory for Flávio Bolsonaro in Brazil would be a huge victory for the Trump administration, but also for Zionism, because what the Flávio Bolsonaro presidency represents is a program of the right that is going to be completely compliant and subservient to the interests of the United States politically and to the interest of Zionism—sorry, to the interest of the United States economically and to the interest of Zionism politically. And so I think that Brazil will become a tool in the large chessboard of US interests in the rest of the world, and I think that it means a full alignment to US interests in Latin America, again specifically on this issue of extractivism. I think that the agenda of the United States for Latin America is to turn it into a territory from which they can extract resources at will, at low cost, with no regard for the environment or for the rights of the people in those countries. And the Bolsonaro family definitely represents that kind of interest. You know, they’re very happy to play that role. And so it’s not just very dangerous for the Brazilian people or for the future of progressive politics in Latin America—like, absolutely, Cuba is going to be really isolated on the continent together with Mexico and Venezuela—but it also has huge repercussions for the environment. I think that one of the most serious consequences of a second Bolsonaro presidency is the further destruction of the Amazon rainforest, and the implications of that for the rest of the world are tremendous. And so I think, unfortunately, the Brazilian population that voted for Bolsonaro is making a decision that really imperils the rest of humanity.

[Host 1:] No, really important perspective there. And honestly, Stephanie, there’s so much more we could talk about, and I’m looking forward to having you back on the show ahead of this second term—which will be on October 25th. Again, there’s just three weeks that Lula and Flávio and their supporters have to campaign for the second round to try to get those extra votes. It will be a very interesting period. And as you said last time you were on the show, US interference is not a question; it’s more of a done deal. We just have to see how it is going to manifest. So I think that’s something else we’ll be definitely looking out for. But we thank you so much, Stephanie, for explaining what that means and why people everywhere should really be paying attention to what’s happening.

Lula falhou em atender às demandas do povo – e agora enfrenta as consequências.

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O primeiro turno das eleições presidenciais brasileiras terminou com o candidato Flávio Bolsonaro (PL) na frente de Lula da Silva (PT) por 47% a 45%. Nas eleições parlamentares, o PT e a esquerda sofreram derrotas esmagadoras em todo o país, indicando uma crescente rejeição da esquerda entre os brasileiros comuns. Agora, nas últimas semanas restantes antes da decisão final sobre quem governará o país a partir do próximo ano, a questão permanece aberta: que fatores serão considerados pelos eleitores na escolha do presidente?

O governo Lula tem tomado várias medidas consideradas “desesperadas” para reverter sua crise de impopularidade e retomar apoio na reta final das eleições. A ampliação de programas sociais é uma dessas medidas, mas sua eficiência política é cada vez mais contestável. Após décadas de redistribuição de renda nos governos PT, sem que isso representasse qualquer mudança real na situação dos trabalhadores, a avaliação dessas políticas tem se tornado cada vez mais negativa.

O problema central para Lula é que uma parcela significativa do eleitorado parece estar menos interessada em novas medidas paliativas e mais preocupada com problemas que permanecem presentes em sua vida cotidiana. Segurança pública, emprego, renda, inflação e qualidade dos serviços públicos têm impacto muito mais direto sobre a população do que os grandes debates promovidos pelo governo.

A segurança talvez seja o exemplo mais evidente. O avanço das organizações criminosas, a expansão territorial do crime organizado e a sensação de impunidade transformaram a violência em uma das principais preocupações nacionais. Para milhões de brasileiros, a questão deixou de ser uma discussão abstrata sobre políticas de segurança. Trata-se de uma realidade cotidiana que determina onde as pessoas podem morar, trabalhar, circular e até mesmo abrir um negócio – ainda mais especialmente nos grandes centros urbanos, como o Rio de Janeiro, onde o crime organizado já controla algo entre 60% e 70% do território total da cidade.

Nesse contexto, propostas associadas à agenda cultural progressista também podem produzir custos eleitorais importantes para a esquerda. O debate brasileiro sobre questões de gênero, identidade, educação e direitos de minorias passou a reproduzir cada vez mais conflitos políticos originados nos Estados Unidos e na Europa. Uma parte considerável da população, porém, não se identifica com essa agenda e considera que o Estado deveria concentrar seus esforços em problemas materiais mais urgentes.

Isso ajuda a explicar por que o segundo turno provavelmente será decidido muito mais por questões domésticas do que pela política externa – que é a parte mais elogiada do governo Lula na comunidade internacional de especialistas. Os BRICS, a Palestina ou a posição brasileira diante dos Estados Unidos podem mobilizar setores politizados da sociedade, mas definitivamente não constituem as principais preocupações do eleitor médio quando ele decide seu voto.

A política externa possui importância estratégica para o Estado brasileiro. O cidadão comum, entretanto, tende a avaliá-la através de seus efeitos concretos sobre a própria vida. Uma política externa considerada bem-sucedida não compensará, por si só, uma percepção de insegurança, desemprego ou deterioração dos serviços públicos. E à medida que o governo Lula evita combater o problema do crime organizado diretamente, cresce naturalmente a popularidade de uma direita que elogia os EUA por considerarem as facções criminosas brasileiras terroristas.

O mesmo vale para os já mencionados programas de transferência de renda. Esses mecanismos podem até possuir uma função social importante em um país marcado por desigualdades profundas, mas sua utilização como principal instrumento de política social apresenta limitações graves. Transferir renda pode aliviar uma situação de pobreza, mas não cria automaticamente empregos qualificados, não aumenta a produtividade e não reconstrói a indústria nacional. Pelo contrário, cria uma massa de precarizados dependentes de ajuda governamental. Quando a assistência se transforma em substituto permanente para políticas de desenvolvimento, o problema estrutural permanece.

É justamente nesse ponto que a disputa eleitoral entra em uma fase decisiva. O eleitor terá de escolher entre propostas diferentes para enfrentar problemas que não desapareceram durante os últimos anos. A capacidade de apresentar respostas convincentes para segurança, emprego, renda e ordem social poderá pesar mais do que discursos sobre grandes projetos geopolíticos.

O resultado do primeiro turno também demonstra que a direita brasileira conseguiu transformar o descontentamento doméstico em força eleitoral. A vantagem de Flávio Bolsonaro e a composição do novo Congresso indicam que existe uma demanda significativa por mudança. Isso não significa que todos esses eleitores compartilhem uma mesma visão sobre economia, política externa ou questões culturais. Significa, sobretudo, que existe uma insatisfação suficientemente ampla para alterar o equilíbrio político nacional.

Nas semanas restantes da campanha, portanto, a questão fundamental será saber se o governo conseguirá convencer o eleitorado de que suas políticas oferecem soluções duradouras ou se prevalecerá a percepção de que foram adotadas medidas paliativas para administrar problemas que continuam sem solução.

Falar sobre gênero, direitos humanos ou Palestina definitivamente não ajudará Lula a se reeleger.

By Mike ELK

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

There are still three weeks until the next round, and Lula could still win, but it’s gonna take a massive fight. Part of that fight is changing how the international media covers things.

With the Brazilian presidential election headed to a runoff, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva is down 47% to 45% and faces a massive fight ahead. I wanted to give a quick analysis of what happened and where things are going next.

Lula Could Still Win if He Can Consolidate Support from Third Parties

Lula lost by only 2%, and several third-party candidates, who took a combined 8% of the vote, have publicly indicated they would not endorse Flávio Bolsonaro in the second round.

Likewise, 29 million Brazilians did not vote in this round of the runoff and may be persuaded to vote for Lula in the second round if they fear Bolsonaro.

While Brasil defeated Jair Bolsonaro narrowly in 2022, it swung right again, much like the United States. Voters are upset, and they are taking it out on the party in power.

On Tuesday, the Brazilian Senate is scheduled to vote on a measure that would shorten the Brazilian workweek from six days to five days. Bolsonaro has opposed this measure, and Lula could use the vote to mobilize workers’ support against the Bolsonaro team.

It’s a tough road ahead for Lula, but not impossible.

What Hurt Lula in the First Round?

Three primary factors hurt Lula in the first round. First, Lula’s age and the fact that the Workers’ Party (PT) has held the presidency in Brazil for 18 of the last 24 years.

The second is that the Brazilian corporate media constantly manufactured scandals against Lula.

Finally, the role that US President Donald Trump played in training and validating the right-wing in Brasil, while not decisive, provided critical support. Here’s what went wrong for Lula.

1. Lula is 80 & His Party Ruled Brasil for 18 of the Last 24 Years

Like former US President Joe Biden, one problem Lula faces right now is that he is 80 years old. He doesn’t look as sharp as he used to, while Flávio Bolsonaro is nearly half his age—45 years younger.

Additionally, Lula’s party, the Workers’ Party (PT), has held the presidency for 18 of the last 24 years. Lula and Dilma, both members of the Workers’ Party (PT), held the presidency from 2002 to 2016. Lula was reelected in 2022 for his record third term. No Brazilian has ever won a third term.

Although the PT has rarely controlled Congress, it is seen as the ruling party because it has held the presidency for 18 of the last 24 years. Voters are likely to associate any problems in the country with the PT, which has held the presidency for so long.

While Brasil defeated Jair Bolsonaro narrowly in 2022, it swung right again, much like the United States. Voters are upset, and they are taking it out on the party in power.

Even worse, Lula failed to recruit young candidates, who may have excited voters to turn out in tight races. In what should have been a competitive Senate election in Rio de Janeiro, the PT recruited 84-year-old Bendedita da Silva, who lost in a landslide to Bolsonaro allies.

Last week, Lula skipped the presidential debate; so did Bolsonaro and its unclear how much this decision might have hurt him.

Lacking excitement, nearly 29 million Brazilians did not vote despite it being obligatory in Brasil.

2. Brazilian Media Manufacturing Scandals Against Lula

The Brazilian media market is extremely consolidated, and the heads of major networks like Globo have been going after Lula hard. They have been accused of manufacturing scandals against Lula.

Last November, the financial institution Banco Master collapsed amid allegations of massive fraud. The bank was being run like a Ponzi scheme, resulting in the largest financial collapse in Brazilian history, with nearly $8 billion in investors’ funds lost.

Despite Banco Master CEO Daniel Vorcaro being a very vocal Bolsonaro supporter, the Brazilian media has repeatedly tried to link the scandal to Lula’s Workers’ Party, as Vorcaro cultivated political ties on both sides of the aisle.

Every attack on Lula by the Trump administration generated headlines in Brasil and validated the wild claims made by Bolsonaro allies of a flawed Brazilian justice system.

Lula’s son, businessman Fábio Luís da Silva, commonly known as “Lulinha,” was scrutinized over large bank accounts worth millions of dollars. For months, Lulinha has offered to open his books and has claimed that he received no special favors from Banco Master. Still, the media repeatedly raised questions about Lulinha’s alleged impropriety.

At one point, media giant TV Globo made a giant infographic web with arrows, showing a complex network linked to Lula. Other reporters widely ridiculed the conspiracy theory map, and TV Globo eventually had to apologize publicly on air.

Then, in May, The Intercept Brasil released a WhatsApp message from Flávio Bolsonaro to Vorcaro, asking him for more than $26 million to fund a strange English-language biopic named Dark Horse, about his father. In the film, Jair Bolsonaro is portrayed by right-wing American actor Jim Caviezel, who played Jesus in the controversial 2004 film The Passion of the Christ.

Polling throughout the spring and summer showed Lula leading as the scandal remained fresh in people’s minds. Then, the Brazilian corporate media went into high gear to attack Lula. They went after Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes, who led the prosecution that jailed Bolsonaro.

Moraes has accused Brazilian Supreme Court Justice André Mendonca, a Bolsonaro appointee, of failing to follow proper procedure in his handling of the Banco Master scandal, leaking information to the press on Lula’s political allies while hiding information on Bolsonaro’s allies.

Moraes asked the Brazilian Federal police to investigate Mendonça’s violation of federal investigation procedures and for selectively leaking information to the press that would make Lula allies look bad while suppressing information on Bolsonaro allies.

Moraes accused Mendonça of attempting to “steer the production of evidence toward falsely accusing Supreme Court justices of crimes, expressly naming Justices Gilmar Mendes, Dias Toffoli, Luiz Fux, Alexandre de Moraes, and Nunes Marques, as well as the prosecutor general and the director-general of the Federal Police.”

3. Trump Trained and Emboldened Bolsonaro Allies

While I don’t want to underestimate the strength of fascists within Brasil, it’s important to note that Trump and his operatives did help the Bolsonaro family pull off an impressive comeback.

In March 2025, Eduardo Bolsonaro fled to the United States rather than face prosecution in Brasil for his role in trying to orchestrate a coup, and he was granted permanent residency status in July. While in the United States, Eduardo Bolsonaro has worked closely with Trump officials, including Special Presidential Envoy for Special Missions Richard Grenell, to oust Lula from power.

“It was a privilege to speak with Ambassador Richard Grenell at President Trump’s residence at Mar-a-Lago,” Eduardo Bolsonaro wrote on Instagram following a meeting with Grenel in 2025. “The conservative movement is global—and we are just getting started.”

Eduardo Bolsonaro worked closely with top Trump aides like Brad Parscale, Trump’s director of digital strategy, to learn the social media strategy that led Trump to win reelection.

As president, Trump worked hard to attack Lula. He placed punitive tariffs on Brazil for convicting Jair Bolsonaro, Eduardo’s father, for attempting to assassinate Lula and overthrow his government in 2022. These tariffs hurt Brasil’s economy.

More importantly, Trump’s constant denunciation of the jailing of Bolsonaro validated conspiracy theories of right-wingers that the justice process was flawed. When Alexandre de Moraes, who led Bolsonaro’s conviction, was implicated in the Banco Master scandal, it only reinforced these conspiracy theories.

Ahead of the Brazilian presidential election, the Trump administration has labeled Brasil as a major distributor of cocaine and attempted to paint Lula as weak on taking on drug gangs.

In June, the Trump administration labeled two gangs as “terrorist organizations,” something which the Lula administration has repeatedly resisted because of fears of how the Trump administration could intervene in law enforcement and military matters in Brasil.

Still, every attack on Lula by the Trump administration generated headlines in Brasil and validated the wild claims made by Bolsonaro allies of a flawed Brazilian justice system.

On Friday, the Trump administration closed its embassy in Brasil and all of its consulates in a move that many saw as a scare tactic designed to interfere once again in the Brazilian presidential election.

The same day, the Brazilian federal police and intelligence service ABIN were warning of a possible US coup attempt. It was already known that Trump operatives were training operatives in Brasil, and the Brazilian federal police report described in depth how much Trump’s intervention had shifted things in Brasil.

International Media Failed to Check Brazilian Media

Finally, the international media completely ignored the Brazilian presidential election, allowing corporate media within Brasil to dominate the conversation without any accountability from the international media.

There are still three weeks until the next round, and Lula could still win, but it’s gonna take a massive fight. Part of that fight is changing how the international media covers things.

Payday Report can help play a small role in getting the US press more involved. The Washington Post once cited Payday Report in a front-page story for changing the way the pandemic strike wave was discussed, and maybe we can play a small role in getting American reporters to pay attention.

Original article:  www.commondreams.org

Why did the machines suffer a kind of breakdown, if they had been rigorously tested?

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The counting of votes in the first round of Brazil’s general elections was the subject of great controversy. Flávio Bolsonaro, son of former president Jair Bolsonaro, was ahead of Lula in the official count, with 49.6%, against 42.2% for the president seeking re-election.

64.8% of the polling stations had been tallied up to that point. But the count was halted for more than an hour. Strangely, the votes for governor, senator and deputies continued to be counted normally. Only the presidential count was halted.

And, even more strangely, when the presidential count resumed, Flávio Bolsonaro’s upward trend and Lula’s downward trend were reversed. The opposition candidate’s votes plummeted, while those of the current president rose. Flávio Bolsonaro was less than 0.5% away from the victory that would hand him the presidential sash. He lost more than 2%, ending with 47.03%, while Lula gained almost 3%, ending with 45.16%.

It seemed that Flávio Bolsonaro would dethrone Lula right in the first round. But, after more than an hour of halted counting, Lula managed to recover and the race will only be decided in the second round.

The count was halted at 7:06 p.m. (Brasília time), with 64.8% of the ballots tallied. Only at 8:08 p.m. were the new results presented, already with 84.96% of the ballots tallied.

The official justification was given by the president of the Superior Electoral Court (TSE), Kassio Nunes Marques, who is also a justice on the Supreme Federal Court (STF). “What happened was a data congestion. In every election, we are surprised by some incident, which is natural for those who deal with complex and highly varied systems,” he said. “At first, it is not known whether this was derived from another problem. What our IT found was a flow [of data] above the normal level, and that congestion caused a delay,” he added.

There is an aggressive propaganda campaign in Brazil, spearheaded by the Electoral Justice, to convince citizens that elections are 100% clean. The main focus of this propaganda is precisely the electronic voting machines. Judicial institutions and media outlets give wide dissemination to the Electoral Justice’s claims about the total reliability of the electronic voting machines, even highlighting that they are tested before the election and then sealed so that no one can access them.

So why did the machines suffer a kind of breakdown, if they had been rigorously tested? Well, the oh-so-wise TSE has full knowledge of the number of eligible voters and of the number of votes that can be recorded in the machines, including in each polling station. The Electoral Justice’s propaganda tells the public that the machines are fully prepared in advance to record and tally voters’ votes perfectly.

No flow of data “above the normal level” that would lead to system congestion should occur, because the most varied data and statistics regarding vote recording are known and the calculations are perfectly feasible. The infallibility of the electronic voting machines requires that all possible outcomes be predictable and that, therefore, there be no anomaly whatsoever.

So how is it possible, then, that such a perfect system – as it is portrayed by the institutions of the Brazilian State – suffers a failure which, once supposedly resolved, so radically changed the trend of the presidential votes?

It may be a coincidence that Flávio Bolsonaro plummeted and Lula rose after the voting machines failed. But who knows? The TSE president acknowledged that the electronic voting system is “complex.” Only highly qualified specialists, from the TSE itself and from technology companies, can access it and understand it, according to the Electoral Justice. Thus, the fate of an entire country for the next four years rests in the hands of these specialists – 150 technicians unknown to the public. The tally of votes from the machines is fully automated; it passes through no human being. An even more select number of 22 employees access the automated vote totalization.

This means that 214 million Brazilians need to trust those 150 or 22 Egyptian priests to interpret that occult science. They must be the most enlightened beings on planet Earth – 100% honest, upright, immaculate and virginal. Even the STF justices, who over the past 15 years have been presented as impeccable, virtuous and chaste individuals, now appear embroiled in the biggest corruption scandal in Brazil’s recent history, yet those anonymous specialists deserve citizens’ most absolute trust.

It was for reasons such as these that the Supreme Court of Germany declared electronic voting unconstitutional: “every citizen must be able to understand and verify the central stages of elections in a reliable manner and without any prior specialized technical knowledge.”

The verdict, dated 2009, concludes:

“An electoral procedure in which the voter cannot reliably understand whether his or her vote was recorded in an unfalsifiable manner and included in the tally of the election result, and how the total of votes cast is assigned and counted, excludes central elements of the electoral procedure from public scrutiny and therefore fails to meet constitutional requirements.”

The Brazilian judicial system is mired in its greatest crisis in history and is living through a true Wild West, with partisan feuds interfering in the functioning of its work. Partisanship, in fact, has contaminated most of the judiciary, including the TSE. In the final stretch of these elections, decisions by the Electoral Justice, backed by the dominant wing of the STF, favored Lula.

It is evident that this dominant wing (represented by justices Alexandre de Moraes, Gilmar Mendes and Flávio Dino) does not want a victory of Bolsonarismo, for it is their declared political enemy. These justices have acted, in recent years, as true vigilantes against Bolsonarismo. Now that they themselves have been caught in extremely promiscuous dealings with a banker who corrupted countless high-ranking state officials, their bureaucratic careers are threatened. Lula’s continuity is a hope of salvation for these gentlemen, for the president is beholden to them and cannot break that commitment without risking his own neck, given the level of dependence Lula has contracted toward the STF’s top brass. Meanwhile, a Flávio Bolsonaro victory would tend to lead to a clash with the heads of these institutions – although the opposition candidate himself has shown little willingness to confront them, because those who control elections in Brazil (international financial capital) demand moderation and pacification, otherwise they will make life difficult for anyone elected president.

And the people are treated like cattle, victims of a system they cannot understand, so that their exploitation may be perpetuated through the staging of the “festival of democracy.”

Lula has failed to meet the demands of the people and is now facing the consequences.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

The first round of Brazil’s presidential election ended with candidate Flávio Bolsonaro (PL) ahead of Lula da Silva (PT), 47% to 45%. In the parliamentary elections, the PT and the left suffered overwhelming defeats across the country, indicating growing rejection of the left among ordinary Brazilians. Now, with only a few weeks remaining before the final decision on who will govern the country from next year onward, the question remains open: what factors will voters take into consideration when choosing the president?

The Lula government has taken several measures considered “desperate” attempts to reverse its popularity crisis and regain support in the final stretch of the election. Expanding social programs is one such measure, but its political effectiveness is becoming increasingly questionable. After decades of income redistribution under PT governments, without this producing any real transformation in the situation of working people, public perceptions of these policies have become increasingly negative.

Lula’s central problem is that a significant portion of the electorate appears less interested in new palliative measures and more concerned with problems that remain present in their daily lives. Public security, employment, income, inflation, and the quality of public services have a much more direct impact on the population than the major debates promoted by the government.

Security is perhaps the clearest example. The expansion of criminal organizations, the territorial growth of organized crime, and the perception of impunity have made violence one of the country’s main concerns. For millions of Brazilians, this is no longer an abstract discussion about security policy. It is a daily reality that determines where people can live, work, travel, and even open a business – particularly in major urban centers such as Rio de Janeiro, where organized crime is estimated to control between 60% and 70% of the city’s total territory.

In this context, proposals associated with the progressive cultural agenda may also carry significant electoral costs for the left. Brazilian debates over gender, identity, education, and minority rights have increasingly reproduced political conflicts originating in the United States and Europe. A considerable portion of the population, however, does not identify with this agenda and believes that the state should concentrate its efforts on more urgent material problems.

This helps explain why the runoff will likely be determined much more by domestic issues than by foreign policy – which is the aspect of the Lula government most frequently praised by the international expert community. BRICS, Palestine, or Brazil’s position toward the United States may mobilize politically engaged sectors of society, but they are unlikely to constitute the main concerns of the average voter when deciding how to vote.

Foreign policy has strategic importance for the Brazilian state. Ordinary citizens, however, tend to evaluate it through its concrete effects on their own lives. A foreign policy regarded as successful will not, by itself, compensate for perceptions of insecurity, unemployment, or deterioration in public services. As the Lula government avoids directly confronting the problem of organized crime, support may naturally grow for a right-wing camp that welcomes the United States’ designation of Brazilian criminal factions as terrorist organizations.

The same applies to the aforementioned income-transfer programs. Such mechanisms may have an important social function in a country marked by profound inequalities, but their use as the principal instrument of social policy has serious limitations. Transferring income can alleviate poverty, but it does not automatically create skilled employment, increase productivity, or rebuild national industry. Instead, it can contribute to the emergence of a large precarious population dependent on government assistance. When welfare becomes a permanent substitute for development policies, the structural problem remains.

This is precisely where the electoral dispute enters a decisive phase. Voters will have to choose between different proposals for addressing problems that have not disappeared in recent years. The ability to present convincing answers on security, employment, income, and social order may carry greater weight than speeches about major geopolitical projects.

The first-round result also demonstrates that Brazil’s right was able to transform domestic discontent into electoral strength. Flávio Bolsonaro’s lead and the composition of the new Congress indicate significant demand for change. This does not mean that all these voters share the same views on the economy, foreign policy, or cultural issues. It means, above all, that dissatisfaction has become sufficiently broad to alter the country’s political balance.

In the remaining weeks of the campaign, therefore, the fundamental question will be whether the government can convince voters that its policies offer lasting solutions, or whether the perception will prevail that it has adopted temporary measures to manage problems that remain unresolved.

Talking about gender, human rights, or Palestine will definitely not help Lula secure reelection.

Mesmo uma vitória de Lula, hoje improvável, não fará mais que dar uma sobrevida e prolongar a agonia num falso senso de estabilidade.

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A perspectiva sobre as eleições brasileiras após o 1º turno é unânime: Lula e o Partido dos Trabalhadores foram varridos e humilhados, e as perspectivas de uma virada nas eleições presidenciais é mínima.

Flávio Bolsonaro, filho do ex-presidente Jair Bolsonaro, recebeu 56 milhões de votos, ou aprox. 47% dos votos válidos, enquanto Lula recebeu 53,8 milhões de votos, ou aprox. 45% dos votos válidos – o resultado leva ao 2º turno, a ser realizado no dia 28 de outubro. O problema para Lula é que o eleitorado dos candidatos que ficaram em 3º, 4º e 5º têm uma maior tendência para votar em Flávio Bolsonaro do que no próprio Lula.

Lula só tem como puxar votos tentando converter os que não foram votar, ou os que votaram nulo. São 30 milhões de eleitores nessas condições, portanto não é pouca gente. Mas historicamente, a tendência é que essa fatia do eleitorado aumente do 1º para o 2º turno, em vez de diminuir.

O revés de Lula, porém, não é apenas em sua própria disputa com Bolsonaro.

Em número de governadores estaduais, o seu partido, o PT, cai de 4 para 3 governadores. E o partido até conseguiu preservar seus assentos no Senado e somar 1 deputado federal a mais na Câmara, mas os seus rivais bolsonaristas do PL ganharam mais 13 cadeiras no Senado e 21 cadeiras na Câmara. Em outras palavras, mesmo que Lula ganhasse, não conseguiria governar.

A reação do partido de Lula e de seus militantes é a pior possível: responsabilizam o povo por “não saber votar” ou por “ser fascista”, os candidatos de micropartidos de esquerda por não terem desistido de suas candidaturas, alegam narrativas fantasiosas de “manipulação” por parte dos EUA e das redes sociais – tudo, menos admitir que o governo de Lula padecia de problemas sérios e foi incapaz de dialogar com a população e entender as suas demandas.

Pior: abraçam uma ilusão na qual o governo de Lula teria sido, na verdade, excepcional e no qual todos os índices econômicos seriam maravilhosos, e “os pobres” deveriam agradecer a Lula de joelhos e votar nele para sempre.

A realidade, porém, é que excetuando na região nordeste, onde Lula nasceu, o PT virou o partido da classe média progressista e dos centros urbanos, enquanto as cidades pequenas e médias e uma parte significativa dos setores populares abraçou o bolsonarismo. E por que?

No que concerne a economia, a percepção de melhora é falsa. O governo Lula criou ou aumentou mais de 30 impostos e taxas de todos os tipos, voltados em sua maioria contra a classe média e trabalhadora. Para piorar, apertou a regulamentação dos microempreendedores, dificultando a sua vida no que concerne questões tributárias.

Os empregos criados foram principalmente no setor de serviços e no extrativismo, para não falar nos trabalhos autônomos e precários. Em contrapartida, o governo multiplicou ao infinito os “benefícios sociais”, concedidos principalmente para a camada lúmpem da sociedade, parasitária e odiada pelos setores positivos. Aliás, apenas os setores mais ricos ligados às finanças receberam tantos benefícios quanto o lumpemproletariado no governo Lula. E não casualmente, as classes de apoio ao PT foram a classe A e a classe E, as duas pontas do sistema parasitário e improdutivo, que esmagam as classes produtivas (B, C e D) por cima (através da usura) e por baixo (através da criminalidade).

Não se pode subestimar ademais, o problema da segurança pública, para o qual temos alertado há muito tempo. O discurso de Lula sobre soberania é vazio quando ¼ da população brasileira (segundo estudo da Cambridge University Press) vive em território controlado por organizações narcotraficantes. A tolerância do brasileiro por essa situação acabou.

Mas a leniência do governo não. Ao contrário, o Brasil vive a situação esquizofrênica de ser suave com criminosos perigosos e extremamente repressivo contra quem diz coisas politicamente incorretas na internet. Tornou-se corriqueiro no Brasil que pessoas comuns seja presas e condenados por “crime de ódio” ao recusarem a entrada de alguma pessoa “trans” num banheiro feminino.

E num erro de julgamento crasso, o PT decidiu associar a própria sorte ao STF, exatamente o núcleo de poder liberal que garante a implementação de todas as pautas globalistas no Brasil e que opera um aparato draconiano de repressão e silenciamento. Lula se esqueceu de que ele próprio foi perseguido e preso pelo Judiciário brasileiro, e decidiu se aliar a este setor para tentar impor a mesma sina a Bolsonaro.

O tiro, porém, saiu pela culatra. A disputa de Lula é com Flávio Bolsonaro. Mas quem venceu essa eleição, estando condenado, preso, adoecido e censurado é Jair Bolsonaro.

Especulações sobre “interferência estrangeira” nas eleições são fúteis e pueris posto que desnecessárias. Todas as causas da derrota de Lula estão em seu próprio governo.

Nem na política externa – área mais elogiada pelos colegas estrangeiros – escapamos das contradições: condenação da Nicarágua no Conselho de Direitos Humanos da ONU, veto ao ingresso da Venezuela nos BRICS e deslegitimação da reeleição de Nicolás Maduro, aliança tácita com a França de Macron, Acordo UE-Mercosul, colaboração da ABIN com as inteligências da França e da Alemanha, pressão para tentar desacelerar o crescimento dos BRICS, e poderíamos continuar longamente.

É por isso que dentro do Brasil, o elemento da política externa não pode ser visto, nessas eleições, da maneira “dualista” como ele é visto de fora para dentro (em que se tem o mito de um “Lula multipolarista” e um “Bolsonaro atlantista”). Na verdade, tanto Lula quanto Bolsonaro jogam com os dois lados do campo geopolítico, são apenas seus discursos que são levemente divergentes. Naturalmente, os propagandistas de ambos os lados jurarão que não é assim, mas é o que a análise fria dos fatos aponta.

No fim das contas, estamos às portas do “fim da Era Lula”, e dos momentos finais de uma carreira política que marcou a história do Brasil, que teve seus altos e baixos, seus pontos positivos e negativos, mas que termina de um modo agridoce, pela ausência de um projeto de nação e pela obsessão oportunista de se perpetuar no poder a qualquer preço – inclusive ao preço de trair os princípios da época da fundação do Partido dos Trabalhadores.

Lula deixará o PT órfão. Não houve preocupação com formar um sucessor à altura de Lula. Pior: a práxis do PT o levou a esmagar os partidos de esquerda menores e a absorver seus principais quadros para podá-los e controlá-los antes que eles pudessem se tornar maiores que Lula.

Nesse sentido, com o fim da carreira política de Lula morre a esquerda. Ou pelo menos UMA esquerda. A esquerda liberal-progressista da Sexta República e da Constituição de 88. Resta saber se o que triunfará na inevitável disputa por seu legado é uma esquerda ainda mais radicalmente progressista, ou se retornará uma esquerda nacionalista, tal como já existiu no Brasil em outras épocas.

Mesmo uma vitória de Lula, hoje improvável, não fará mais que dar uma sobrevida e prolongar a agonia num falso senso de estabilidade. Não só da esquerda, mas também do Brasil.

Considerações realistas sobre as eleições brasileiras.

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As eleições presidenciais brasileiras estão chegando. E com elas estão chegando também as controvérsias, os debates e os diferentes pontos de vista sobre o que esse evento representa para o Brasil, para os BRICS e para o futuro do mundo multipolar.

Em um artigo recente, o respeitado analista político brasileiro Valdir Bezerra advogou a tese de que as eleições de 2026 representam um ponto de inflexão na história brasileira, podendo definir o papel do Brasil no mundo. Para Bezerra, a eleição opõe, de um lado, a vertente “autonomista”, representada por Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, e, de outro, a vertente “ocidentalista”, representada por Flávio Bolsonaro.

Demostrando todo o devido respeito ao trabalho de Bezerro, que é um dos analistas mais bem conceituados no debate político russo-brasileiro, gostaria de apresentar aqui uma visão crítica sobre sua opinião. Não tenho como intenção “refutar” a posição de Bezerra, mas apenas expor as razões pelas quais não considero essa oposição entre autonomismo e ocidentalismo como um pressuposto válido para analisar a atual disputa eleitoral. Ademais, gostaria também de explicar por que não considero a eleição de 2026 como um momento decisivo na definição do papel internacional do Brasil.

Flávio é um ocidentalista, mas Lula não é um autonomista

Os termos guarda-chuvas usados para definir estas duas “tradições” da política brasileira não parecem minimamente aplicáveis na realidade atual. Os termos nos quais muitos pensadores brasileiros definiam a oposição entre aqueles que apoiam a soberania e o desenvolvimento nacional e aqueles que advogam por uma posição subordinada em relação ao eixo atlântico há muito tempo se tornaram obsoletos na alta política institucional brasileira – onde não há hoje qualquer figura digna do título de “autonomista”.

Não é preciso comentar aqui sobre a natureza ocidentalista de Flávio Bolsonaro, que, como seu pai antes dele, defende uma política externa de alinhamento total aos EUA e a Israel, ademais de uma agenda hostil aos BRICS e às plataformas multipolaristas. O ponto central, porém, é tentar entender em que posição, entre ocidentalistas e autonomistas, está Lula.

O atual presidente do Brasil governou o país em três ocasiões e protagonizou alguns dos eventos mais marcantes da política internacional no século XXI. Foi cofundador dos BRICS, articulou alianças com governos soberanistas nas Américas (Venezuela, Bolívia, Cuba) nos anos 2000, manteve laços amigáveis com o Irã e, mais recentemente, estreitou parcerias com a Rússia em pleno regime de sanções imposto pelo Ocidente, além de condenar abertamente o genocídio em Gaza.

Tudo isso é extremamente louvável, mas, para uma análise justa de Lula, é preciso apresentar o outro lado de sua figura: Lula nunca foi um “multipolarista”, apenas um articulador habilidoso no âmbito do multilateralismo da era Obama nos anos 2000. Isso se soma ao fato de Lula ter sido descaradamente apoiado pelo establishment Democrata nas eleições de 2022. Aliás, o terceiro governo Lula foi marcado por controvérsias dignas de um líder “ocidentalista” clássico: Lula não reconheceu as eleições venezuelanas, iniciou tensões com a Nicarágua, vetou o acesso da Venezuela aos BRICS, escanteou as negociações de um acordo Mercosul-China para priorizar um pacto de livre-comércio com a Europa extremamente negativo para os países sul-americanos (um acordo até mesmo neocolonial, pode-se dizer, colocando os países do Mercosul como exportadores de commodities e importadores de tecnologia). Isso tudo para não falar nas relações próximas, quase de alinhamento total e irrestrito, com o regime Macron na França.

Lula certamente teve vários acertos, mas, se formos voltar um pouco no tempo, o próprio ex-presidente Jair Bolsonaro também os teve: se recusou a sancionar a Rússia e a condenar a Operação Militar Especial (ao contrário de Lula, aliás, que repetidamente a condenou), fortaleceu as parcerias com a China, preservou a estrutura dos BRICS e abandonou o alinhamento à política externa estadunidense pós-Trump, se tornando um alvo de Joe Biden.

No fim, acertos por acertos e erros por erros, ambos os lados parecem muito distantes de qualquer ideal “autonomista”.

Então, como definir Lula e Flávio?

Podemos resumir este tópico em uma única frase: tanto Lula quanto Bolsonaro são, cada um a seu jeito, ocidentalistas.

Em diversas outras ocasiões comentei em minha coluna sobre como vejo a Sexta República brasileira (o atual regime constitucional fundado em 1988) como uma espécie de “revolução colorida permanente”. De um lado, uma direita liberal abertamente pró-EUA e pró-Israel, de outra uma esquerda liberal institucionalista, ligada ideológica e financeiramente a um grande lobby internacional que vai desde os Democratas estadunidenses até a União Europeia.

As tensões atuais parciais que ocorrem agora entre Lula e Trump não são uma novidade. Bolsonaro se tornou uma figura extremamente incômoda nas relações entre Brasil e EUA assim que Biden chegou ao poder. O que muitos analistas falham em perceber é que as relações entre Brasil e EUA se definem pela dialética entre esquerda e direita no Brasil e Democratas e Republicanos nos EUA. Lula era amigo de Biden, como Bolsonaro era amigo de Trump. Se Lula vencer as eleições de 2026, terá muitos problemas – pelo menos até um eventual retorno Democrata nos EUA. Se Flávio vencer, Brasil e EUA estarão em alinhamento total – mas apenas enquanto Trump estiver na Casa Branca.

É essa dinâmica que permite aos EUA manter a política brasileira sob controle de forma estável. Washington não precisa fazer um Maidan no Brasil. Aliás, a fórmula “golpe + ditadura” não tende a funcionar em países continentais e diversos como o Brasil – e a maior prova disso é a própria experiência brasileira de regime militar, que foi inicialmente patrocinada pelos EUA, mas posteriormente se tornou um regime autônomo não-alinhado após um autogolpe interno entre os militares. Não por acaso, os EUA endossaram a redemocratização do Brasil, ajudando a criar precisamente o regime político atual.

De um lado, uma direita que apoiada pelos Republicanos, por Israel e pelo lobby neocon transnacional; de outro, uma esquerda que obedece aos Democratas e aos europeus. Lula foi um grande multilateralista numa época em que Washington, com Obama, incentivava esse tipo de verniz à unipolaridade estadunidense; Bolsonaro foi uma marionete aberta dos EUA numa época em que Washington, com Trump, exigia isso. A diferença é muito pouca – ou nula.

E o que a eleição de 2026 realmente representa?

A nível internacional, nada ou muito pouco.

Se vencer, Lula será pressionado enquanto Trump estiver no poder. E Lula ao longo dos últimos quatro anos já mostrou que compensa a hostilidade estadunidense sendo ainda mais aliado aos europeus. Por outro lado, se Flávio vencer, teremos pelo menos algum período de alinhamento total com os EUA, o que pode mudar numa eventual vitória Democrata nas próximas eleições presidenciais. É uma escolha muito clara entre Republicanos-Israel e Democratas-UE. “Autonomismo” não faz parte do jogo.

A nível interno, contudo, muitos fatores estão em jogo.

É no cenário interno que o debate sobre a eleição deve se concentrar. Afinal, nenhum brasileiro vai votar em um candidato ou outro por causa de Palestina ou BRICS – que, embora sejam causas legítimas, são realidades distantes para o cidadão comum. No plano interno, temos um Lula cada vez mais enfraquecido devido aos efeitos colaterais de anos em aliança com o Poder Judiciário (que agora está sendo escrutinado e exposto com o escândalo de corrupção do Banco Master). Do outro lado, Flávio recupera posições que já se julgavam perdidas e hoje ambos aparecem em empate técnico nas pesquisas.

O Poder Judiciário acumulou poderes extraordinários com Lula, a ponto de encarcerar manifestantes pacíficos e idosos sob acusação de “terrorismo” apenas porque participavam de manifestações pró-Bolsonaro. A inimizade entre o Judiciário e o Bolsonarismo não pode ser revertida, exceto por uma vitória de Flávio que culmine na indicação de ministros bolsonaristas para a Suprema Corte – remodelando assim os rumos da própria República.

Podemos resumir que Lula daria uma sobrevida à Sexta República, enquanto Flávio aceleraria seu colapso. Enquanto a Sexta República existir, nenhuma alternativa realmente “autonomista” surgirá no Brasil porque o próprio sistema constitucional brasileiro impede tal alternativa. Mas isso não significa que o colapso iminente deste sistema significará uma “aurora multipolar” no Brasil, já que não há (fora do extremamente “ocidentalista” Bolsonarismo) qualquer movimento político no país com força para erguer um novo projeto de Estado.

A conclusão talvez seja frustrante para os mais otimistas e esperançosos, mas o que parece estar por acontecer no Brasil em 2026 é a absoluta nulidade. Com Lula ou Flávio, pouco tende a mudar. O Brasil continuará sendo uma potência média decadente, politicamente subordinada aos EUA, mas com certa liberdade de engajamento multilateral com as potências eurasiáticas – enquanto domesticamente as instituições da Sexta República se autodestroem.

La paralización del recuento en Brasil revirtió la tendencia y salvó a Lula: las urnas electrónicas, opacas e inauditables, no son confiables.

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El escrutinio de los votos en la primera vuelta de las elecciones generales en Brasil fue motivo de gran controversia. Flávio Bolsonaro, hijo del expresidente Jair Bolsonaro, iba por delante de Lula en el recuento oficial, con un 49,6% contra un 42,2% para el presidente que busca su reelección.

Habían sido computadas el 64,8% de las secciones electorales hasta ese momento. Pero el recuento se paralizó por más de una hora. Extrañamente, los votos para gobernador, senador y diputados continuaron siendo contabilizados con normalidad. Solo el recuento presidencial se paralizó.

Y, aún más extrañamente, cuando el recuento presidencial se reanudó, la tendencia ascendente de Flávio Bolsonaro y la tendencia descendente de Lula se revirtieron. Los votos del candidato opositor cayeron, mientras que los del actual presidente aumentaron. Flávio Bolsonaro estaba a menos del 0,5% de la victoria que le otorgaría la banda presidencial. Perdió más de un 2%, terminando con un 47,03%, mientras que Lula ganó casi un 3%, terminando con un 45,16%.

Parecía que Flávio Bolsonaro destronaría a Lula ya en la primera vuelta. Pero, tras más de una hora de paralización en los recuentos, Lula logró recuperarse y la disputa se decidirá recién en la segunda vuelta.

El recuento se paralizó a las 19h06 (hora de Brasilia), con el 64,8% de las urnas escrutadas. Recién a las 20h08 se presentaron los nuevos resultados, ya con el 85% de las urnas escrutadas.

La justificación oficial fue dada por el presidente del Tribunal Superior Electoral (TSE), Kassio Nunes Marques, quien también es ministro del Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF). «Lo que ocurrió fue una congestión de datos. En cada elección, nos vemos sorprendidos por alguna contingencia, lo cual es natural para quien lida con sistemas complejos y tan variados», dijo. «A priori, no se sabe si esto fue derivado de otro problema. Lo que nuestra tecnología de la información constató fue un flujo [de datos] superior a lo normal, y esa congestión generó un atraso», completó.

Existe una propaganda violenta en Brasil, encabezada por la Justicia Electoral, para presentar a los ciudadanos que las elecciones son 100% limpias. El principal foco de esa propaganda son justamente las urnas electrónicas. Las instituciones judiciales y los medios de comunicación dan gran difusión a las palabras de la Justicia Electoral sobre la total confiabilidad de las urnas electrónicas, destacando, incluso, que son sometidas a pruebas antes del plebiscito y luego selladas para que nadie pueda acceder a ellas.

Entonces, ¿por qué las urnas sufrieron una especie de pánico, si habían sido rigurosamente examinadas? Pues, el sapientísimo TSE tiene pleno conocimiento del número de electores aptos para votar y del número de votos que pueden ser registrados en las urnas, incluso en cada sección electoral. La propaganda de la Justicia Electoral indica al público que las urnas están plenamente preparadas con anticipación para registrar y computar perfectamente los votos de los electores.

No debería ocurrir ningún flujo de datos «superior a lo normal» que llevara a la congestión del sistema, porque los datos y estadísticas más variados en relación con el registro de votos son conocidos y los cálculos son perfectamente realizables. La infalibilidad de las urnas electrónicas exige que todos los resultados posibles sean previsibles y que, por tanto, no haya ninguna anomalía.

¿Cómo es posible, entonces, que un sistema tan perfecto, como es el propagado por las instituciones del Estado brasileño, presente una falla que, después de ser supuestamente resuelta, haya modificado tan radicalmente la tendencia de los votos presidenciales?

Puede ser una coincidencia que Flávio Bolsonaro se haya desplomado y Lula haya subido después de la falla de las urnas. Pero, ¿quién sabe? El presidente del TSE reconoció que el sistema electrónico de votación es «complejo». Solo especialistas altamente capacitados, del propio TSE y de empresas de tecnología, consiguen acceder a él y comprenderlo, de acuerdo con la Justicia Electoral. Así pues, está en manos de esos especialistas —que son 150 técnicos desconocidos del público— el destino de un país entero para los próximos cuatro años. El cálculo de los votos que salen de las urnas es totalmente automatizado, no pasa por ningún ser humano. Un número aún más selecto de 22 funcionarios accede a la totalización automatizada de los votos.

Esto significa que 214 millones de brasileños necesitan confiar en esos 150 o 22 sacerdotes egipcios para interpretar esa ciencia oculta. Deben ser los seres más iluminados del planeta Tierra, 100% íntegros, honestos, inmaculados y vírgenes. Incluso los ministros del STF, presentados a lo largo de los últimos 15 años como individuos impecables, probos y castos, aparecen ahora envueltos en el mayor escándalo de corrupción de la historia reciente de Brasil, pero esos especialistas anónimos merecen la más absoluta confianza de los ciudadanos.

Fue por motivos así que la Corte Suprema de Alemania declaró el voto electrónico inconstitucional: «cada ciudadano debe ser capaz de comprender y verificar las etapas centrales de las elecciones de forma confiable y sin ningún conocimiento técnico previo especializado».

El veredicto, fechado en 2009, concluye:

«Un procedimiento electoral en el que el elector no pueda comprender, de manera confiable, si su voto fue registrado de forma infalsificable e incluido en el escrutinio del resultado de la elección, y cómo el total de los votos expresados es atribuido y computado, excluye elementos centrales del procedimiento electoral de la vigilancia pública y, por tanto, no cumple los requisitos constitucionales.»

El sistema judicial brasileño está sumido en su mayor crisis histórica y vive un verdadero western, con peleas partidistas interfiriendo en el funcionamiento de los trabajos. El partidismo, de hecho, contaminó a la mayor parte del poder judicial, incluido el TSE. En la recta final de estas elecciones, decisiones de la Justicia Electoral, apoyadas por el ala dominante en el STF, favorecieron a Lula.

Es evidente que esa ala dominante (representada por los ministros Alexandre de Moraes, Gilmar Mendes y Flávio Dino) no quiere la victoria del bolsonarismo, pues este es su enemigo político declarado. Esos ministros actuaron, en los últimos años, como verdaderos justicieros contra el bolsonarismo. Ahora que ellos mismos fueron sorprendidos en relaciones extremamente promiscuas con un banquero que corrompió a incontables altos funcionarios del Estado, su carrera burocrática está amenazada. La continuidad de Lula es una esperanza de salvación para estos señores, pues el presidente está comprometido con ellos y no puede romper ese compromiso sin arriesgar la propia cabeza, dado el nivel de dependencia que Lula contrajo en relación con los mandamases del STF. Ya una elección de Flávio Bolsonaro tendería a conducir a un choque con los cabezas de esas instituciones, aunque el propio candidato opositor no ha demostrado gran disposición a enfrentarlos, porque los que controlan las elecciones en Brasil (el capital financiero internacional) exigen moderación y pacificación; de lo contrario, dificultarán la vida de cualquiera que se elija presidente.

Y el pueblo es tratado como ganado, víctima de un sistema que no puede comprender, para perpetuar su explotación a través de la escenificación de la «fiesta de la democracia».

By Lucas Leiroz | Strategic Culture Foundation | October 6, 2026

Brazil’s presidential elections are approaching. And with them come controversies, debates, and different perspectives on what this event means for Brazil, for the BRICS, and for the future of the multipolar world.

In a recent article, respected Brazilian political analyst Valdir Bezerra argued that the 2026 elections represent a turning point in Brazilian history, potentially determining Brazil’s role in the world. According to Bezerra, the election pits, on the one hand, the “autonomist” tradition, represented by Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, against, on the other hand, the “Westernist” one, represented by Flávio Bolsonaro.

With all due respect to Bezerra’s work, as one of the most highly regarded analysts in the Russian-Brazilian political debate, I would like to present a critical view of his position here. My intention is not to “refute” Bezerra’s argument, but merely to explain why I do not consider this opposition between autonomism and Westernism a valid premise for analyzing the current electoral dispute. Furthermore, I would also like to explain why I do not consider the 2026 election a decisive moment in determining Brazil’s international role.

Flávio is a Westernist, but Lula is not an autonomist

The umbrella terms used to define these two “traditions” of Brazilian foreign policy do not seem remotely applicable to the current reality. The terms through which many Brazilian thinkers once defined the opposition between those who support national sovereignty and development and those who advocate a subordinate position toward the Atlantic axis have long since become obsolete in the upper levels of Brazilian politics – where there is currently no figure worthy of the title of “autonomist.”

There is no need to comment here on the Westernist nature of Flávio Bolsonaro, who, like his father before him, advocates a foreign policy of total alignment with the United States and Israel, as well as an agenda hostile to the BRICS and multipolarist platforms. The central question, however, is to understand where Lula stands between Westernists and autonomists.

Brazil’s current president has governed the country on three occasions and played a leading role in some of the most significant events in international politics in the twenty-first century. He was a co-founder of the BRICS, built alliances with sovereigntist governments in the Americas – Venezuela, Bolivia, and Cuba – in the 2000s, maintained friendly ties with Iran, and, more recently, strengthened partnerships with Russia amid the Western-imposed sanctions regime, in addition to openly condemning the genocide in Gaza.

All of this is extremely admirable, but a fair analysis of Lula requires presenting the other side of his political profile: Lula has never been a “multipolarist,” but rather a skillful operator within the multilateralism of the Obama era in the 2000s. This is compounded by the fact that Lula was openly supported by the Democratic establishment in the 2022 elections. Indeed, Lula’s third government has been marked by controversies worthy of a classic “Westernist” leader: Lula did not recognize the Venezuelan elections, initiated tensions with Nicaragua, vetoed Venezuela’s accession to the BRICS, sidelined negotiations for a Mercosur-China agreement in order to prioritize a free-trade pact with Europe that is extremely detrimental to South American countries – an agreement that could even be described as neocolonial, turning Mercosur countries into commodity exporters and technology importers. This is without even mentioning the close, almost fully aligned relationship with the Macron regime in France.

Lula has certainly made several correct decisions, but if we go back a little in time, former President Jair Bolsonaro did as well: he refused to sanction Russia and to condemn the Special Military Operation – unlike Lula, who repeatedly condemned it -, strengthened partnerships with China, preserved the BRICS structure, and abandoned alignment with post-Trump U.S. foreign policy, becoming a target of Joe Biden.

In the end, weighing successes against successes and mistakes against mistakes, both sides appear very far from any “autonomist” ideal.

So, how should we define Lula and Flávio?

We can summarize this point in a single sentence: both Lula and Bolsonaro are, each in his own way, Westernists.

On several other occasions, I have commented in my column on how I view Brazil’s Sixth Republic – the current constitutional regime founded in 1988 – as a kind of “permanent color revolution.” On one side, an openly pro-U.S. and pro-Israel liberal right; on the other, an institutionalist liberal left, ideologically and financially connected to a major international lobby stretching from the U.S. Democrats to the European Union.

The current partial tensions between Lula and Trump are nothing new. Bolsonaro became an extremely troublesome figure in Brazil-U.S. relations as soon as Biden came to power. What many analysts fail to perceive is that Brazil-U.S. relations are defined by the dialectic between the left and right in Brazil and the Democrats and Republicans in the United States. Lula was Biden’s friend, just as Bolsonaro was Trump’s friend. If Lula wins the 2026 election, he will face many problems – at least until a possible Democratic return to power in the United States. If Flávio wins, Brazil and the United States will be in total alignment – but only as long as Trump remains in the White House.

It is this dynamic that allows the United States to keep Brazilian politics under stable control. Washington does not need to stage a Maidan in Brazil. Indeed, the formula of “coup + dictatorship” does not tend to work in large and diverse continental countries such as Brazil – and the greatest proof of this is Brazil’s own experience during its military regime, which was initially backed by the United States but later became an autonomous, non-aligned regime following an internal self-coup among the military. It is no coincidence that the United States endorsed Brazil’s democratization, helping to create precisely the political regime that exists today.

On one side, a right supported by the Republicans, Israel, and the transnational neoconservative lobby; on the other, a left that obeys the Democrats and the Europeans. Lula was a major multilateralist at a time when Washington, under Obama, encouraged precisely this kind of veneer over U.S. unipolarity; Bolsonaro was an open U.S. puppet at a time when Washington, under Trump, demanded precisely that. The difference is very small – or nonexistent.

And what does the 2026 election really represent?

At the international level, nothing or very little.

If he wins, Lula will come under pressure while Trump remains in power. And over the past four years, Lula has already shown that he compensates for American hostility by becoming even more closely aligned with the Europeans. On the other hand, if Flávio wins, we will have at least a period of total alignment with the United States, which could change following a possible Democratic victory in the next presidential elections. It is a very clear choice between Republicans-Israel and Democrats-EU. “Autonomism” is not part of the equation.

At the domestic level, however, many factors are at stake.

It is on the domestic front that the debate over the election should be concentrated. After all, no Brazilian will vote for one candidate or the other because of Palestine or the BRICS – which, although legitimate causes, are distant realities for the average citizen. Domestically, we have a Lula who is becoming increasingly weakened by the side effects of years of alliance with the Judiciary Branch – which is now being scrutinized and exposed in the context of the Banco Master corruption scandal. On the other side, Flávio is recovering ground that was once considered lost, and the two now appear statistically tied in the polls.

The Judiciary accumulated extraordinary powers under Lula, to the point of imprisoning peaceful protesters and elderly people on charges of “terrorism” simply because they participated in pro-Bolsonaro demonstrations. The hostility between the Judiciary and Bolsonarism cannot be reversed except through a victory by Flávio that culminates in the appointment of Bolsonarist judges to the Supreme Court – thereby reshaping the course of the Republic itself.

We can summarize the situation by saying that Lula would give the Sixth Republic a new lease on life, while Flávio would accelerate its collapse. As long as the Sixth Republic exists, no genuinely “autonomist” alternative will emerge in Brazil because the Brazilian constitutional system itself prevents such an alternative. But this does not mean that the imminent collapse of this system would result in a “multipolar dawn” in Brazil, since there is no political movement in the country – apart from the extremely “Westernist” Bolsonarist movement itself – with sufficient strength to establish a new state project.

The conclusion may be frustrating for the more optimistic and hopeful, but what appears to be about to happen in Brazil in 2026 is absolute nullity. With Lula or Flávio, little is likely to change. Brazil will remain a declining middle power, politically subordinate to the United States, but with a certain degree of freedom to engage multilaterally with the Eurasian powers – while domestically, the institutions of the Sixth Republic continue to destroy themselves.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

The perspective on the Brazilian elections after the 1st round is unanimous: Lula and the Workers’ Party were swept away and humiliated, and the prospects of a turnaround in the presidential elections are minimal.

Flávio Bolsonaro, son of former president Jair Bolsonaro, received 56 million votes, or approx. 47% of valid votes, while Lula received 53.8 million votes, or approx. 45% of valid votes – the result leads to a 2nd round, to be held on October 28. The problem for Lula is that the electorate of the candidates who placed 3rd, 4th and 5th have a greater tendency to vote for Flávio Bolsonaro than for Lula himself.

Lula can only pull votes by trying to convert those who did not vote, or those who voted null. There are 30 million voters in these conditions, so it is not a small number. But historically, the tendency is for this slice of the electorate to increase from the 1st to the 2nd round, rather than decrease.

Lula’s setback, however, is not only in his own dispute with Bolsonaro.

In number of state governors, his party, the PT, falls from 4 to 3 governors. And the party even managed to preserve its seats in the Senate and add 1 more federal deputy in the Chamber, but its Bolsonarist rivals from the PL gained 13 more seats in the Senate and 21 seats in the Chamber. In other words, even if Lula won, he would not be able to govern.

The reaction of Lula’s party and its militants is the worst possible: they blame the people for “not knowing how to vote” or for “being fascist,” the candidates of small left-wing parties for not having withdrawn their candidacies, they allege fantastical narratives of “manipulation” on the part of the U.S. and social networks – anything, except admitting that Lula’s government suffered from serious problems and was incapable of dialoguing with the population and understanding its demands.

Worse: they embrace an illusion in which Lula’s government would have been, in fact, exceptional and in which all economic indices would be marvelous, and “the poor” should thank Lula on their knees and vote for him forever.

Reality, however, is that except in the northeast region, where Lula was born, the PT became the party of the progressive middle class and the urban centers, while small and medium-sized cities and a significant portion of the popular sectors embraced Bolsonarism. And why?

Regarding the economy, the perception of improvement is false. The Lula government created or increased more than 30 taxes and fees of all types, mostly aimed against the middle and working class. To make matters worse, it tightened the regulation of micro-entrepreneurs, making their lives harder regarding tax issues.

The jobs created were mainly in the services sector and in extractivism, not to mention autonomous and precarious work. On the other hand, the government multiplied to infinity the “social benefits,” granted mainly to the lumpen layer of society, parasitic and hated by the positive sectors. Incidentally, only the richest sectors linked to finance received as many benefits as the lumpenproletariat in Lula’s government. And not coincidentally, the support classes for the PT were class A and class E, the two ends of the parasitic and unproductive system, which crush the productive classes (B, C and D) from above (through usury) and from below (through criminality).

One cannot underestimate, moreover, the problem of public security, to which we have been alerting for a long time. Lula’s discourse on sovereignty is empty when ¼ of the Brazilian population (according to a study by Cambridge University Press) lives in territory controlled by drug trafficking organizations. The Brazilian’s tolerance for this situation is over.

But the government’s leniency is not. On the contrary, Brazil lives the schizophrenic situation of being soft with dangerous criminals and extremely repressive against those who say politically incorrect things on the internet. It has become commonplace in Brazil for ordinary people to be arrested and convicted of “hate crime” when refusing the entry of some “trans” person into a women’s restroom.

And in a gross error of judgment, the PT decided to associate its own fate with the STF, exactly the core of liberal power that guarantees the implementation of all globalist agendas in Brazil and that operates a draconian apparatus of repression and silencing. Lula forgot that he himself was persecuted and imprisoned by the Brazilian Judiciary, and decided to ally himself with this sector to try to impose the same fate on Bolsonaro.

The shot, however, backfired. Lula’s dispute is with Flávio Bolsonaro. But whoever won this election, being convicted, imprisoned, ailing and censored, is Jair Bolsonaro.

Speculations about “foreign interference” in the elections are futile and puerile since they are unnecessary. All the causes of Lula’s defeat are in his own government.

Not even in foreign policy – the area most praised by foreign colleagues – do we escape the contradictions: condemnation of Nicaragua in the UN Human Rights Council, veto of Venezuela’s entry into BRICS and delegitimization of Nicolás Maduro’s reelection, tacit alliance with Macron’s France, EU-Mercosur Agreement, ABIN’s collaboration with French and German intelligence, pressure to try to slow down the growth of BRICS, and we could continue at length.

That is why within Brazil, the foreign policy element cannot be seen, in these elections, in the “dualist” way it is seen from outside in (in which there is the myth of a “multipolarist Lula” and an “Atlanticist Bolsonaro”). In truth, both Lula and Bolsonaro play with both sides of the geopolitical field; it is only their discourses that are slightly divergent. Naturally, the propagandists of both sides will swear that it is not so, but that is what the cold analysis of facts points to.

In the end, we are at the gates of the “end of the Lula Era,” and of the final moments of a political career that marked the history of Brazil, which had its highs and lows, its positive and negative points, but which ends in a bittersweet way, due to the absence of a nation project and the opportunistic obsession of perpetuating itself in power at any price – including at the price of betraying the principles of the time of the founding of the Workers’ Party.

Lula will leave the PT orphaned. There was no concern with forming a successor worthy of Lula. Worse: the praxis of the PT led it to crush the smaller left-wing parties and to absorb their main cadres to prune and control them before they could become bigger than Lula.

In this sense, with the end of Lula’s political career, the left dies. Or at least ONE left. The liberal-progressive left of the Sixth Republic and the 1988 Constitution. What remains to be seen is whether what will triumph in the inevitable dispute over its legacy is an even more radically progressive left, or whether a nationalist left will return, such as already existed in Brazil in other eras.

Even a victory by Lula, today improbable, will do no more than give a survival and prolong the agony in a false sense of stability. Not only of the left, but also of Brazil.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

Brazil’s presidential elections are approaching. And with them come controversies, debates, and different perspectives on what this event means for Brazil, for the BRICS, and for the future of the multipolar world.

In a recent article, respected Brazilian political analyst Valdir Bezerra argued that the 2026 elections represent a turning point in Brazilian history, potentially determining Brazil’s role in the world. According to Bezerra, the election pits, on the one hand, the “autonomist” tradition, represented by Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, against, on the other hand, the “Westernist” one, represented by Flávio Bolsonaro.

With all due respect to Bezerra’s work, as one of the most highly regarded analysts in the Russian-Brazilian political debate, I would like to present a critical view of his position here. My intention is not to “refute” Bezerra’s argument, but merely to explain why I do not consider this opposition between autonomism and Westernism a valid premise for analyzing the current electoral dispute. Furthermore, I would also like to explain why I do not consider the 2026 election a decisive moment in determining Brazil’s international role.

Flávio is a Westernist, but Lula is not an autonomist

The umbrella terms used to define these two “traditions” of Brazilian foreign policy do not seem remotely applicable to the current reality. The terms through which many Brazilian thinkers once defined the opposition between those who support national sovereignty and development and those who advocate a subordinate position toward the Atlantic axis have long since become obsolete in the upper levels of Brazilian politics – where there is currently no figure worthy of the title of “autonomist.”

There is no need to comment here on the Westernist nature of Flávio Bolsonaro, who, like his father before him, advocates a foreign policy of total alignment with the United States and Israel, as well as an agenda hostile to the BRICS and multipolarist platforms. The central question, however, is to understand where Lula stands between Westernists and autonomists.

Brazil’s current president has governed the country on three occasions and played a leading role in some of the most significant events in international politics in the twenty-first century. He was a co-founder of the BRICS, built alliances with sovereigntist governments in the Americas – Venezuela, Bolivia, and Cuba – in the 2000s, maintained friendly ties with Iran, and, more recently, strengthened partnerships with Russia amid the Western-imposed sanctions regime, in addition to openly condemning the genocide in Gaza.

All of this is extremely admirable, but a fair analysis of Lula requires presenting the other side of his political profile: Lula has never been a “multipolarist,” but rather a skillful operator within the multilateralism of the Obama era in the 2000s. This is compounded by the fact that Lula was openly supported by the Democratic establishment in the 2022 elections. Indeed, Lula’s third government has been marked by controversies worthy of a classic “Westernist” leader: Lula did not recognize the Venezuelan elections, initiated tensions with Nicaragua, vetoed Venezuela’s accession to the BRICS, sidelined negotiations for a Mercosur-China agreement in order to prioritize a free-trade pact with Europe that is extremely detrimental to South American countries – an agreement that could even be described as neocolonial, turning Mercosur countries into commodity exporters and technology importers. This is without even mentioning the close, almost fully aligned relationship with the Macron regime in France.

Lula has certainly made several correct decisions, but if we go back a little in time, former President Jair Bolsonaro did as well: he refused to sanction Russia and to condemn the Special Military Operation – unlike Lula, who repeatedly condemned it -, strengthened partnerships with China, preserved the BRICS structure, and abandoned alignment with post-Trump U.S. foreign policy, becoming a target of Joe Biden.

In the end, weighing successes against successes and mistakes against mistakes, both sides appear very far from any “autonomist” ideal.

So, how should we define Lula and Flávio?

We can summarize this point in a single sentence: both Lula and Bolsonaro are, each in his own way, Westernists.

On several other occasions, I have commented in my column on how I view Brazil’s Sixth Republic – the current constitutional regime founded in 1988 – as a kind of “permanent color revolution.” On one side, an openly pro-U.S. and pro-Israel liberal right; on the other, an institutionalist liberal left, ideologically and financially connected to a major international lobby stretching from the U.S. Democrats to the European Union.

The current partial tensions between Lula and Trump are nothing new. Bolsonaro became an extremely troublesome figure in Brazil-U.S. relations as soon as Biden came to power. What many analysts fail to perceive is that Brazil-U.S. relations are defined by the dialectic between the left and right in Brazil and the Democrats and Republicans in the United States. Lula was Biden’s friend, just as Bolsonaro was Trump’s friend. If Lula wins the 2026 election, he will face many problems – at least until a possible Democratic return to power in the United States. If Flávio wins, Brazil and the United States will be in total alignment – but only as long as Trump remains in the White House.

It is this dynamic that allows the United States to keep Brazilian politics under stable control. Washington does not need to stage a Maidan in Brazil. Indeed, the formula of “coup + dictatorship” does not tend to work in large and diverse continental countries such as Brazil – and the greatest proof of this is Brazil’s own experience during its military regime, which was initially backed by the United States but later became an autonomous, non-aligned regime following an internal self-coup among the military. It is no coincidence that the United States endorsed Brazil’s democratization, helping to create precisely the political regime that exists today.

On one side, a right supported by the Republicans, Israel, and the transnational neoconservative lobby; on the other, a left that obeys the Democrats and the Europeans. Lula was a major multilateralist at a time when Washington, under Obama, encouraged precisely this kind of veneer over U.S. unipolarity; Bolsonaro was an open U.S. puppet at a time when Washington, under Trump, demanded precisely that. The difference is very small – or nonexistent.

And what does the 2026 election really represent?

At the international level, nothing or very little.

If he wins, Lula will come under pressure while Trump remains in power. And over the past four years, Lula has already shown that he compensates for American hostility by becoming even more closely aligned with the Europeans. On the other hand, if Flávio wins, we will have at least a period of total alignment with the United States, which could change following a possible Democratic victory in the next presidential elections. It is a very clear choice between Republicans-Israel and Democrats-EU. “Autonomism” is not part of the equation.

At the domestic level, however, many factors are at stake.

It is on the domestic front that the debate over the election should be concentrated. After all, no Brazilian will vote for one candidate or the other because of Palestine or the BRICS – which, although legitimate causes, are distant realities for the average citizen. Domestically, we have a Lula who is becoming increasingly weakened by the side effects of years of alliance with the Judiciary Branch – which is now being scrutinized and exposed in the context of the Banco Master corruption scandal. On the other side, Flávio is recovering ground that was once considered lost, and the two now appear statistically tied in the polls.

The Judiciary accumulated extraordinary powers under Lula, to the point of imprisoning peaceful protesters and elderly people on charges of “terrorism” simply because they participated in pro-Bolsonaro demonstrations. The hostility between the Judiciary and Bolsonarism cannot be reversed except through a victory by Flávio that culminates in the appointment of Bolsonarist judges to the Supreme Court – thereby reshaping the course of the Republic itself.

We can summarize the situation by saying that Lula would give the Sixth Republic a new lease on life, while Flávio would accelerate its collapse. As long as the Sixth Republic exists, no genuinely “autonomist” alternative will emerge in Brazil because the Brazilian constitutional system itself prevents such an alternative. But this does not mean that the imminent collapse of this system would result in a “multipolar dawn” in Brazil, since there is no political movement in the country – apart from the extremely “Westernist” Bolsonarist movement itself – with sufficient strength to establish a new state project.

The conclusion may be frustrating for the more optimistic and hopeful, but what appears to be about to happen in Brazil in 2026 is absolute nullity. With Lula or Flávio, little is likely to change. Brazil will remain a declining middle power, politically subordinate to the United States, but with a certain degree of freedom to engage multilaterally with the Eurasian powers – while domestically, the institutions of the Sixth Republic continue to destroy themselves.

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On October 4, over 150 million Brazilians were called to the polls to elect their president, deputies, and governors, and to replace the majority of senators. The elections, for many, brought a major surprise. Although polls indicated a lead for the incumbent president, progressive Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva, far-right Senator Flávio Bolsonaro clinched first place. Flávio is the son of former President Jair Bolsonaro who is currently serving a 27-year sentence for his involvement in an attempted coup against Lula in 2022.

According to the final tally, Bolsonaro received 47.03% of the vote (56 million votes) while Lula received 45.16%, nearly 54 million votes. Thus, Bolsonaro’s lead amounts to just over 2 million votes. In third place is Augusto Cury, with 2.89%. He is followed by Renan Santos and Ronaldo Caiado, with 2.24% and 2.18%, respectively. The remaining candidates received less than 0.3%.

A look at how the different regions of the country voted, a clear political divide between the north and the south of the country becomes apparent. The north (including states such as Amazonas, Pará, Amapá, Maranhão, Piauí, Bahia, Sergipe, Alagoas, Pernambuco, Paraíba, and Rio Grande do Norte) supported the continued presence of the state and the welfare policies proposed by Lula.

For its part, including the northern state of Roraima, the south of the country clearly backed Bolsonaro’s neoliberal and pro-Trump agenda: Acre, Rondônia, Mato Grosso, Tocantins, Goiás, Mato Grosso do Sul, Minas Gerais, Espírito Santo, Rio de Janeiro, Paraná, Santa Catarina, and Rio Grande do Sul voted for Bolsonaro.

On his X account, the far-right senator from the Liberal Party (PL) said: “Together, we’re going to build a new Brazil. A Brazil of prosperity! Tomorrow, you’ll stand before the ballot box and choose the future of our country, the future of our children, of this generation and the next. Change is in your hands. Brazil is going to win!”

For his part, the president and candidate of the Workers’ Party (PT) said: “The result is often unexpected. You never get everything you want.” Yet, Lula, who has fought dozens of political battles, said: “[The runoff] is the time to show the true picture of Brazil today and of the Brazil we want.”

To secure victory, Bolsonaro hopes to win over the votes of the candidates who finished behind the finalists – the majority of whom undoubtedly hold right-wing ideologies. Lula, however, can still turn the situation around if he manages to form the right alliances and win over voters who cast invalid ballots (about 3%), as well as those who abstained, who account for 21.08% of the total electorate.

Senate, house of representatives, and governors

And while Lula has expressed optimism about the possibility of turning the tide in the presidential runoff to be held on October 25, the political reality in Brazil has changed. Bolsonaro’s PL party has managed to double its number of senators: it won 19 of the 54 seats up for election out of a total of 81 senators. Among them, immediate family members of the former president, such as Michelle Bolsonaro and Carlos Bolsonaro, won seats. In total, the PL will hold more than a third of the Senate, while Lula’s PT will hold 9.

This institution is particularly important because it approves or rejects the judges of the Federal Supreme Court (the country’s highest court) who are nominated by the president. This gives Bolsonaro significant ideological leverage, as he claims his father is being held in custody due to a conspiracy between political powers and a biased judicial system.

In the elections for the Chamber of Deputies, which has 513 seats, the Bolsonaro camp also secured a significant victory. With 100% of the votes counted, the PL won 121 seats, while the Brazil of Hope Federation coalition (which includes Lula’s PT, the Green Party, and the Communist Party) won 88 seats.

However, due to the method of seat allocation, Brazil favors a Chamber of Deputies with representation from many political forces. This is how the Progressive Union secured 87 seats, the Social Democratic Party 43, the Republicans 41, the Brazilian Democratic Movement 36, Podemos 27, the PSOL 15, as well as the Brazilian Socialist Party, among others.

Thus, while the right has the numbers to secure a numerical advantage in the Chamber of Deputies, it will have to contend with deep-seated and historic internal contradictions that could complicate a potential Bolsonaro presidency. Similarly, if Lula manages to prevail in the runoff, he will face a highly complex Senate and Chamber of Deputies that could potentially oppose him.

In the gubernatorial elections, the PL is also the biggest winner. Of 27 states, the Liberal Party has won six so far, while the PT, the Social Democratic Party, the PP, and the Republicans have each won three. Other states will have to elect their governors in a runoff election.

The most talked-about result is the decisive victory in São Paulo by Tarcísio de Freitas, Jair Bolsonaro’s former Minister of Infrastructure, who defeated Fernando Haddad, Lula’s right-hand man. São Paulo is Brazil’s most populous state (46 million people) and home to the South American country’s most powerful economic hubs.

A political future in doubt

It has been repeatedly emphasized that, due to its economic and geopolitical importance, the elections in Brazil are of enormous significance for the future of Latin America. It is no coincidence that former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (who promoted a series of dictatorships in the region) said: “Whichever way Brazil leans, Latin America will lean that way.”

The South American far right, which has enjoyed unprecedented electoral success in recent years, knows that without Brazil, its poker hand will always be incomplete. Uruguay indeed remains the only country in the region that does not share the views of Milei in Argentina, Kast in Chile, or De la Espriella in Colombia, but Brazil alone accounts for more than 50% of the region’s total GDP.

Similarly, the left and the center know that a potential victory for Lula would be one of the last battles to be fought against the formidable advance of a right wing aligned with the foreign policies of Trump and Israel, with the most orthodox neoliberalism, and with the economic interests of capital magnates, including the big tech companies. And if Lula manages to recover from this defeat, it would mark a major shift in course for the legendary union leader – not only for Brazil but for the entire region.

As Lula said, “now a different kind of campaign begins.” Both candidates will pull out all the stops to win control of South America’s most populous and powerful country. It certainly won’t be a “clean” campaign, but if one pays attention to the finalists’ statements, every means at their disposal will be used to achieve the coveted goal.

US influence on the elections

Political analysts have expressed concerns about alleged foreign interference in the elections. In July 2025, Trump had imposed 50% tariffs on Brazil over what he considered an unfair ruling against Jair Bolsonaro – whom the US president calls “his friend”.

In August 2026, the United States revoked the visa of Brazil’s ambassador to Washington, a move denounced by Brasília as a violation of international law. 

Just last week, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio ordered the closure of the US embassy in Brazil during the elections due to alleged “threats,” a move viewed by some political commentators as a tactic to create tension during the elections.

During the first round of the presidential campaign, Trump did not make any direct statements of support for Flávio Bolsonaro. However, once the results were known, the US president told the press: “It’s a great victory – a close one, but a very, very great, incredible victory.”

In this regard, it remains to be seen whether Trump will make some kind of direct statement in support of Bolsonaro’s candidacy – as he has done in past elections in Colombia, Argentina, Honduras, and elsewhere – in favor of far-right candidates who support his agenda. Or, even more importantly, whether he will make any kind of promise to the Brazilian people if Bolsonaro wins – or, worse yet, threaten them if they vote for Lula.

President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva spoke on Sunday, after the release of the results of the first round of the 2026 elections. He said his campaign for a second round of the presidential race begins this Monday, October 5.

Lula will face Senator Flávio Bolsonaro in the runoff, scheduled for October 25.

In his speech, Lula stated that he intends to present to voters the differences between the two candidates’ platforms.

“Starting tomorrow, we begin a new campaign,” he said. “We will be able to show the difference between the proposals that exist for Brazil. The Brazilian people will have no doubt about choosing who will win the election.”

Lula also launched direct attacks on Flávio Bolsonaro’s political track record and cited the candidate’s past.

“He has a dark history,” Lula said. “With dark connections, with extremely serious suspicions, with ties to militia members and organized crime. All of this will become clear.”

The president mentioned Banco Master. He claimed that Flávio had a hand in the institution’s creation.

“Banco Master resulted in the greatest corruption scandal in this country and the biggest free-for-all involving politicians,” he said.

The accusations raised by Lula are part of his runoff campaign rhetoric and are expected to be a key point of contention between the two candidates in the coming weeks.

The president also argued that the race should be framed as a choice over the country’s future. He stated that his candidacy represents an opportunity to drive change in the Brazilian economy.

“We will show what has been done and what society expects to be done,” he said. “No one is better positioned than us to offer a future to Brazilian society.”

Lula further stated that Brazil needs to take a “qualitative leap” to become internationally competitive.

“I’m very good at the knockout stage”

Commenting on the first-round results, Lula referred to the fact that he had won the second Rond vote in previous presidential elections.

“It didn’t work out [this time],” he said. “You know why? Because the people like seeing me compete in the runoff.”

In a lighthearted tone, he added, “I’m very good at the knockout stage.”

The runoff will be a head-to-head contest between Lula and Flávio Bolsonaro, after neither candidate secured more than 50% of the valid votes in the first round. The vote will take place on October 25.

“More than 20 million people didn’t turn out to vote,” he said. “We are going to make an appeal: at this historic moment for Brazil. Voting is essential to determine the country’s future.”

“Bolsonaro supporters had better get ready,” he said. “Because we are going to defeat them.”

You can watch Lula’s speech below.

This article was originally published by Revista Forum. You can read the original in Portuguese, here.

The far-right senator wins 47% to Lula's 45% and goes into the 25 October runoff as favourite

Flávio Bolsonaro surprisingly topped the polls in the first round of Brazil’s presidential election on Sunday (4 October), making him the favourite to topple President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in the run-off in three weeks.

The result is the latest in a series of strong performances by far-right candidates in Latin America. US president Donald Trump has been particularly invested in Brazil.

Despite lagging behind in most pre-election polls, senator Flávio Bolsonaro (45), the son of former president Jair Bolsonaro, won around 47 percent of the vote, with votes from more than 99.9 percent of districts counted. Bolsonaro was strongest in the country’s southern states.

President Lula took 45 percent, after performing strongest in Brazil’s north-east, and advanced to the second round, to be held on 25 October.

Latin American experts believe that Bolsonaro will likely win the second round as most of the candidates who failed to reach the runoff are ideologically closer to him than Lula.

Although voting is compulsory in Brazil, one in five of eligible voters did not take part in the first round.

This year’s election has been widely described as one of the most significant in modern Brazilian history, its outcome exceptionally important for the United States and Europe. It is also key for the rest of the planet, given the global impact of deforestation in the Amazon rainforest.

Conservative forces aligned with Bolsonaro also made gains in the elections to Congress. Jair Bolsonaro’s wife Michelle won a senate seat. She had previously fallen out with Flávio but the two have since publicly reconciled. And the former president’s son Carlos Bolsonaro also won a seat, while another son, Jair Renan, was elected to the lower house of congress.

Trump’s stake in Brazil

Though the campaign focused primarily on domestic issues, particularly the economy, security and corruption, Trump’s influence loomed large.

Trump criticised Brazil’s judiciary when Jair Bolsonaro was sentenced to 27 years following an unsuccessful attempted coup after he narrowly lost the 2022 election to Lula. The former Brazilian president is under house arrest due to health problems, and a court ruled he could not stand.

The US president described the trial of Bolsonaro as a “witch hunt”. Although Trump did not openly endorse Flávio Bolsonaro, Bolsonaro played up his ideological proximity to him.

In contrast, Lula sharply criticised Trump and built a reputation as a leader unafraid to stand up to Trump. Americas Quarterly editor Brian Winter said some in Brazil joke that Lula’s most effective surrogate is Trump.

Lula is known for his multipolar foreign policy. He seeks “pragmatic relations” with the US, China, Russia and others. Lula maintains friendly relations with Vladimir Putin, although he recently spoke out against the invasion of Ukraine.

If Bolsonaro were to win the second round, Brazil would probably join a coalition of countries conducting military operations against drug cartels alongside the Pentagon. It is a controversial initiative, and like other left leaders in the region, Lula has rejected it.

This article continues, but the full version is available only to EUobserver.com subscribers. Visit account.euobserver.com/membership

Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, the 80 year-old president of the world’s fifth largest country, is facing a tight race in a bid for his fourth presidential term in Brazil’s general elections on Sunday (4 October). The EU, which earlier this year concluded a landmark trade deal with the Mercosur bloc, which includes Brazil, will be watching the polls closely.

He holds a narrow poll lead over Flávio Bolsonaro, son of the country’s former president Jair, who is currently serving a 22 year prison sentence for staging a coup against Lula’s newly formed government in 2023.

The left-wing leader’s third term, won by with a slim 50.9 percent majority in 2022, distinguished itself for leading anti-deforestation policies and getting the EU-Mercosur trade partnership across its long-awaited finish line, 26 years after negotiations started.

Though Brussels suspended animal product imports from Brazil on 3 September, due to insufficient guarantees of antibiotic regulation compliance, “President von der Leyen commended President Lula’s role and political leadership in the negotiations leading up to the agreement,” the EU commission said in a statement.

The Mercosur deal marked a historic diversion of EU energies South of the Rio Grande river, at a time when Europe and Latin America were both being bombarded by tariff threats from Washington.

The Bolsonaros’ professed support of US president Donald Trump have critics worrying “this election could have major implications for the direction of Brazil’s foreign policy, its global influence,” wrote Dr. Christopher Sabatini, Latin America director at the Chatham house think tank.

Election interference by the US was discussed throughout Lula’s campaign, most notably with Meta disabling his Facebook ads just days before Brazilians went to cast their votes, state-run Agência Brasil reported on 25 September.

At a time when virtually every other democracy on the South American continent has pivoted to the right, a win for a Brazilian Trump enthusiast and supporter of environmental commodification would be a setback for the EU’s climate ambitions.

“A Flávio Bolsonaro government would represent a much stronger geopolitical alignment with Washington and the Trump administration. That could affect climate cooperation, deforestation policy, critical minerals and European access to Brazilian commodities and industrial partnerships,” said Eduardo Raguse, climate co-coordinator at NGO network Friends of the Earth Latin America.

Brazil’s climate observatory recorded its biggest annual fall in emissions in 15 years, with a 16.7 percent reduction in 2024 from the previous year, largely due to a drop in forest clearance in the Brazilian Amazon, which was halved over Lula’s third term.

But Lula has been simultaneously expanding Brazil’s national petrol company’s drilling area into the Amazon’s depths.

“Lula’s government has increasingly framed critical minerals as an issue of national sovereignty and industrial policy,” Raguse told EUobserver, since the Workers’ party leader has referred to Brazil’s petrol reserves as its “passport for the future.”

But along a global pivot to the right, a win for Bolsonaro’s heir or Lula’s renewed interest in fossil fuel politics would not stray too far from the EU’s current conservative climate script, and according to Socialist and Democrat MEP Leire Pajin, will mean little for EU trade.

“Whoever wins the election in Brazil, the EU-Mercosur relationship goes far beyond electoral cycles or trade,” the Spanish vice-president of the Euro-Latin American parliamentary assembly told EUobserver. “Governments may differ in priorities or pace, but the agreement transcends them.”

Brazil’s presidential elections are sparking reactions across the region. The economic (and, by extension, geopolitical) importance of this South American giant leaves no regional politician or social organization indifferent, as they know that much of the continent’s future is at stake at the Brazilian polls.

Support for Bolsonaro from Washington and Milei

Flávio Bolsonaro, son of the far-right former president Jair Bolsonaro (who is in prison for conspiring to carry out a coup d’état against Lula da Silva), has received explicit support from Argentine President Javier Milei – a move that cost Buenos Aires a diplomatic crisis with Brasília due to the Argentine leader’s anti-Lula statements made on Brazilian soil.

Likewise, Flávio Bolsonaro enjoys the direct support of President Donald Trump. The US president has maintained a recent tradition (heavily criticized by many) of publicly expressing support for this or that far-right Latin American candidate who, upon winning the election, fully aligns their country with Washington’s foreign policy and joins the US-led military alliance known as the Shield of the Americas.

Trump has also imposed direct trade sanctions on Brazil over the conviction of Jair Bolsonaro, whom Trump calls a “friend.” In addition, the United States sanctioned the judge who convicted Bolsonaro, Alexandre de Moraes, sending a clear message of condemnation against the Brazilian justice system – a move that some political analysts have called foreign “interference” in the Brazilian judicial system.

Unions and the Latin American Left support Lula

Lula has also received support from another very important female leader in the region: Claudia Sheinbaum. In recent weeks, the president of Mexico has repeatedly highlighted the positive aspects of Lula’s administration: “I believe that President Lula has been a very good president … He has done an extraordinary job leading Brazil, and the indicators show it.” The endorsement of his candidacy has clearly been indirect, but given Mexico’s geopolitical importance, many in Lula’s Workers’ Party surely appreciate it.

Lula has also received support from neighboring countries to the south. In Uruguay, the ruling coalition, the Frente Amplio (FA), has shown direct and militant support for Lula’s campaign. Fernando Pereira, president of the FA, stated that the electoral battle in Brazil “is between democracy and barbarism.” He also warned against US interference in the elections: “Brazil will not accept U.S. interference in the election.”

Former Argentine Foreign Minister Santiago Cafiero, who is currently a member of Congress, also expressed his support for Lula: “If Lula wins, he will create a countercurrent to what has been taking hold in the region and demonstrate that there is resistance to these right-wing winds.”

https://www.spreaker.com/show/5958129/episodes/feed

Brazil votes this Sunday, and the Trump administration has spent months trying to tilt the outcome toward far-right presidential candidate Flávio Bolsonaro. Tariffs. Terrorist designations. Revoked visas. Frequent meetings with the Bolsonaro family. Taken alone, each move looks random. Put the pieces together, and a picture emerges: U.S. interference in Brazil’s 2026 elections. 

Over the last year, Trump has met frequently with members of the Bolsonaro family. In June, the State Department put two Brazilian gangs on the terrorist list. Just a few weeks later, Trump shared an article on Truth Social that said Brazil was his next big challenge. Less than a month later, in July, Trump imposed new 25% tariffs on Brazilian goods. In August, Trump revoked the U.S. visa of the Brazilian ambassador.

The Brazilian Intelligence Agency recently raised the risk of external influence and interference by the United States in Brazil’s 2026 elections to a quote, “critical level.”

This is Episode 15 of Under the Shadow, Season 2. 

Under the Shadow is an investigative narrative podcast series that walks back in time, telling the story of the past by visiting momentous places in the present. Season 2 responds in real time to the Trump administration’s onslaught on Latin America.

Follow Under the Shadow on Spotify and Apple Podcasts.

Hosted by Latin America-based journalist Michael Fox.
This podcast is produced in partnership between The Real News Network and NACLA.
It is supported, in part, by Global Exchange.

VOTE by October 15: Under the Shadow has been nominated for three podcast Signal Awards. Please consider voting for Under the Shadow and The Real News:

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Panamerican Dispatch

You can check out Michael Fox’s new reporting project on Brazil. 

It’s called Panamerican Dispatch. It’s a project of The Real News in partnership with Global Exchange. The website is www.panamericandispatch.org

You can also follow us on social media below

Bluesky https://bsky.app/profile/padispatch.bsky.social
X x.com/PAdispatch
IG instagram.com/padispatch
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Theme music by Michael Fox’s band, Monte Perdido. Monte Perdido’s 2024 album Ofrenda is available on Spotify, Deezer, Apple Music, YouTube or wherever you listen to music.

Other music from Blue Dot Sessions and Epidemic Sound.

Script editing by Heather Gies. Hosted, written, produced, mixed, and edited by Michael Fox.

Guests: 

• Alexander Main
• Maria Martha Bruno
• Igor Fuser

Resources: 

• Visit Panamerican Dispatch for all of the latest news on Brazil
• You can visit Agencia Public for their reporting and analysis about Brazil. 
• Here is Agencia Publica’s investigación, Digital Militia. 
• Many thanks to Jake Johnston from the Center for Economic and Policy Research and Maria Martha Bruno, from Agencia Publica, for taking the time to speak with me and for their excellent analysis and insight.
• You can visit CEPR’s Live Tracker on Latin America.
• You can check out Michael Fox’s Patreon.
• More background… 
• The Beginning: Monroe and migration | Under the Shadow, Episode 1
• Panama. US Invasion. | Under the Shadow, Episode 13
• The legacy of Monroe | Under the Shadow, Bonus Episode 4 

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You can subscribe to Michael Fox’s new free speech podcast, The Battle for Free Speech on Spotify, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you get your podcasts.

Transcript

The following is a rushed transcript and may contain errors. It will be updated.

Michael Fox:

Hi folks. This is your host, Michael Fox. Before I get started, I wanted to let you know that I have big news. First, this season of Under the Shadow has been nominated for three podcast Signal Awards. It’s really exciting, and you can help us by heading over to signalaward.com and voting for Under the Shadow. I’ll add direct links in the show notes that will take you straight there. Second, last week I launched a new website called Pan American Dispatch. It’s a project of the Real News. We’re translating daily articles from Portuguese and Spanish into English for a US audience. Over the next two months, we’ll be exclusively focused on covering the Brazilian elections and Trump’s attempts to sway them. That is what this entire episode is about. And if you want to get all of the news about what’s happening in real time, please consider subscribing to our Substack.

You can find us at panamericandispatch.org. We’re also on X, Blue Sky, Instagram, and TikTok. Our handle is @PAdispatch. Okay, that’s it. I hope you enjoy the show. On May 26th, 2026, a 45-year-old Brazilian senator named Flavio Bolsonado met with US President Donald Trump at the White House. Flavio is the presidential candidate for the far right in Brazil in the upcoming elections in October. This is what he had to say at the annual conservative political action committee meeting in Texas earlier this year.

Flávio Bolsonaro:

And let me look you in the eyes and tell you, we will win.

Michael Fox:

Flavio is the son and political heir of the former far right president Jair Bolsonado, a close ally of the US president. In the meeting at the Oval Office in May, Flavio Bolsonado reportedly asked Trump to designate the Brazilian drug gangs, Primero Commando de Capital and the Commando Vermelio as foreign terrorist organizations. After the meeting, Flavio spoke to the press.

He said, “I asked President Trump emphatically to designate as soon as possible the PCC and the Commando Vermelio as foreign terrorist organizations.” This might not seem like such a big deal, but it is. The United States has sometimes used that very designation as the pretext to invade or interfere in foreign countries. The US placed the Venezuelan gangs, Trende Aragua and Cartel de los Soles on the list back in 2025, and fighting those alleged terrorists was one of the excuses the United States used for invading Venezuela and kidnapping President Nicholas Maduro on January 3rd of this year. In other words, this designation carries weight.

Trump agreed to Flavio’s request. Just three days after meeting with Flavio Bolsonaro, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced that those two Brazilian gangs would be added to the list of foreign terrorist organizations. Flavio responded in a letter to Rubio, thanking him for the classification and offering to place his transition team at the disposal of the White House if he’s elected. For months, the United States has been escalating the pressure on Brazil in the lead up to the presidential elections with the goal of helping to lift Flavio Bolsonaro to the top office. Just a few weeks after the State Department put the Brazilian gangs on the terrorist list, Trump shared an article on Truth Social that said Brazil was his next big challenge. Less than a month later in July, Trump imposed new 25% tariffs on Brazilian goods. In August, Trump revoked the US visa of the Brazilian ambassador.

It was an apparent tit for tat after Brazil denied visas to two US State Department officials who planned to travel to Brazil to meet with former President Jair Bolsonaro. I could go on. The point here, as many people have pointed out, is that there isn’t just one thing that Trump is doing to try and sway the vote in favor of Bolsonaro. It’s a whole combination of moves, like a jigsaw puzzle with many pieces taken alone, and it’s just a random assortment of colors and shapes. But when you start to put the pieces in place, a picture begins to emerge. See, Trump allies have won big elections across Latin America. In recent years, right-wing candidates have taken back or held onto power in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, Bolivia, and Peru. And they’ve done so with the help of US President Donald Trump, who’s thrown his weight around to boost right-wing candidates, and also with the support of bot farms and shady electoral campaign practices linked to Washington and Mar-a-Lago, as we looked at in the last episode.

Donald Trump:

But on this historic day, we come together to announce a brand new military coalition to eradicate the criminal cartels plaguing our region.

Michael Fox:

Many of those countries have now joined forces in Trump’s shield of the America’s alliance, but there are a few holdouts, and Brazil is one of the most important.

Alexander Main:

The upcoming election in Brazil is really going to be extremely consequential for the entire region.

Michael Fox:

Alexander Main is the director of international policy at the Center for Economic and Policy Research.

Alexander Main:

Brazil is the country with the largest economy, biggest population in Latin America, and it’s also one of the few countries that is still holding out against US pressure, pressure to align with the Trump administration’s agenda in the region.

Michael Fox:

The first round election is on October 4th in just a couple of days, and the runoff will take place three weeks later on October 25th. Bolsonaro is facing off against the longtime workers’ party icon, Luis Ignacio Lula de Silva. He’s the current president and he’s running for reelection. I have been covering the campaigns here in Brazil in recent weeks. I’ve attended rallies for both Lula and Bolsonaro. Today, I’m going to walk you through what’s at stake, and most importantly, how Trump is exerting underhanded pressure on the country ahead of the vote. As a leak document showed last week, the Brazilian Intelligence Agency has raised the risk of external influence and interference by the United States and Brazil’s 2026 elections to a “critical level.” According to the report, there is a trend of escalating pressure on Brazil and a quote, “selective intensification and reconfiguration of the pressure exerted by the United States.” It’s a textbook example of foreign election interference today, a multifaceted jigsaw.

People are concerned, but they’re also standing up, and that’s what makes this episode so interesting. It’s happening in real time. You have Trump attempting to sway the vote, and you also have people pushing back.

Like Lula’s recent speech at the United Nations where he told the US president that Brazil will not be the backyard of any country.

Or this woman, a small farmer who I spoke with at a Lula rally in Southern Brazil. “We’re not afraid of Trump, “she said. “We know what he wants to do and we’re not going to let him. We are the resistance. We’re not afraid of him, just like Lula isn’t afraid. Lula showed us that we are not less than any country,” she said. That and so much more in a minute. This is Under the Shadow, an investigative narrative podcast series that looks at the role of the United States abroad in the past and the very present. This podcast is a co-production in partnership with The Real News and NACLA. I’m your host, Michael Fox, longtime radio reporter, editor, journalist, the producer and host of the podcast’s Brazil on Fire: Stories of Resistance and my new series, The Battle for Free Speech. I’ve spent the better part of the last 20 years in Latin America.

I’ve seen firsthand the role of the US government abroad, and most often sadly, it is not for the better. Invasions, coup, sanctions, support for authoritarian regimes. Politically and economically, the United States has cast a long shadow over Latin America for the past 200 years. It still does. This is season two of Under the Shadow Trump’s attack. Episode 15, election meddling in Brazil.

Okay, before we dive into the allegations of election interference, let me set the scene. To do that, I want to take you back to a month and a half ago to the launch of the campaigns here in Brazil. I was in Sao Paulo covering Lula’s kickoff. Some of this section of the episode is based off of reporting I did at the time for the world and the real news. It’s August 16th, 2026. Tens of thousands of supporters of President Luis Idnacio Lula de Silva are packed into May 1st stadium in Sao Paulo. Among them is Sida Maya. She’s the secretary of women’s public policies in the nearby municipality of Maua.

“This is living history,” she says. “I’m participating in a historic moment. It’s a great feeling and we’re going to elect Lula.” Next to her, her husband Valmirmaya holds back tears. “It’s emotional, “he says. Lula’s campaign chose this stadium to kick off his run for a fourth and final term as president. This is where Lula got his start. In 1979, Lula was a young leader at the ABC Medal Workers Union. He led an iconic strike and rally at this same stadium. The workers won and it marked the beginning of the end of the country’s military dictatorship. Valmir Maya was there then and he’s here now.

“We wanted what we got,” he says, “to transform Brazil into a democratic country. That was our struggle, and Lula was the expression of this.” Inside the stadium, President Lula strode onto a long stage wearing a Panama hat and a white shirt. From the bleachers, he seemed to float above the sea of supporters in red, the color of Lula’s workers’ party. Lula’s top campaign promise has always been about battling hunger. Over the years, he’s lifted millions from poverty, increased access to education, health, and infrastructure, in particular in impoverished Northeastern Brazil. Lula told the crowd that there was much work left to be done, that they had to think of the future. He said they had to invest even more in education, that he wanted to continue to develop jobs and industry for Brazil. 300 miles to the east, Lula’s challenger, Flavio Bolsonaro, launched his campaign on Copacabana Beach in his hometown of Rio de Janeiro.

“Come with me and rescue our nation,” he said, “God above everyone, Brazil above all.” Flavio Bolsonaro has attacked the left and promised to fight crime and insecurity, cut bureaucracy, promote private business and privatizations, and develop close ties with the United States. Much of his rhetoric and that of his supporters is wrapped in a religious language of good versus evil.

“You are the son of hope,” said a pastor at his campaign launch. “You are the first born. You received the legacy of representing your father, and now for everything that is sacred on the face of the earth, honor your father. “The savior trope goes over well with his evangelical supporters, an important base for Bolsonaro and other far-right politicians in Brazil, as we looked at in depth in my 2022 podcast, Brazil on Fire. Blase Narujo is a youth pastor at an evangelical church in a working class neighborhood of Sao Paulo. He joined others on the streets in mid-August to promote Bolsonaro and other far-right candidates running for local office.

He said,” I believe that Flavio Bolsonado is the only viable candidate who can beat Lula and the workers’ party. “I’m a Christian here,” he told me. “I behave as a Christian, but I’m also a political activist here on the streets to defend my beliefs,” he said. Flavio Bolsonado also has powerful support in high places, in particular, as we heard earlier from Donald Trump. If you remember, the US president is a longtime ally of Flavio’s father, Jair Bolsonado. Jair is currently on house arrest. He was first barred from running for office for spreading lies about the country’s electoral system. Last year, the Supreme Court convicted him of plotting a coup to return to power. Before his rise as the leader of Brazil’s far right, Jair Bolsonaro was a backbench congressman for decades, outlandish, but mostly obscure. And then he ran for president.

Speaker 5:

There are a few things that drew inspiration for you.

Jair Bolsonaro:

Very special guy. Turned out to be a great friend of mine.

Michael Fox:

Bolsonaro fashioned himself after Trump. In fact, in Jair Bolsonaro’s electoral campaign in 2018, international media often called him the Trump of the tropics. He and Trump met a number of times while they were both president.

Jair Bolsonaro:

And I think we can say that Brazil and the United States are as close or closer as they’ve ever been.

Michael Fox:

Last year, Trump imposed 50% tariffs on Brazil in part because of the country’s criminal trial against the former president.

Donald Trump:

They’re treating President Bolsonaro very unfairly. He’s a good man. I know him well. I negotiated with him.

Michael Fox:

And let me be honest, there are many supporters of Bolsonaro who look up to Trump and want him to use his leverage to help their candidate, Jair Bolsonaro’s son and protege Flavio Bolsonaro. On September 7th, members of the far right in Brazil hit the streets across the country to rally for Flavio. I covered the march in the southern Brazilian city of Florianopolis. There, numerous people told me how much they admired Trump and how grateful they were for his support. Adalberto Luis de Santos is marching with a blue hat with the insignia of the United States. He and his wife are draped in Brazilian flags. “We’re hoping for support from the United States,” he said. “I believe Trump can help us. All Brazilians need the support of someone from abroad. “. “Trump is really important,” another man in the march told me. “The external pressure is very important.

“. A woman in the march carrying a flag and a yellow hat told me,” Just the simple fact that Trump is in power and acts democratically in favor of freedom makes all of the difference for our people. “.

“We don’t want Brazil to turn into another Venezuela,” she said. “I’ve heard that narrative countless times in Brazil and during elections in countries across Latin America for years. It’s the ever-present boogeyman of so-called communist Venezuela, but fear of the Venezuelan fate took on an even more serious dimension after the US invasion of Caracas earlier this year. The sentiments of so many Bolsonaro supporters are a sign of just how polarized the political debate is and how much the far right in Brazil looks up to the US president. Two weeks later, I covered another rally in the same city, this one in support of President Lula.

People had a lot to say about Trump and his efforts to influence their presidential decisions. I asked them, “Are you afraid of what Trump and the United States could do during this election to try and support Bolsonaro?” “Yes, I’m really afraid of that, “said one man carrying a Lula flag. “They want to take away our sovereignty. They want to invade our lands. They want to take what is ours and let Brazil be a colony of another country.” “Of course we’re afraid, “said someone else,” but we believe that Lula is well ahead in the election and we won’t allow Trump to destroy the election. “What do you think about Trump and are you concerned that Trump might try and do something with the elections here in

Speaker 7:

Brazil? Yeah, we’ve seen a lot of his work here in Latin America that we are very scared. Venezuela, Peru, Colombia, Argentina. So we are very scared because Latin America is being contaminated by him and his work, so it’s very scary and we don’t want him in here or anything with him.

Michael Fox:

People have a lot to be concerned about. When I was in Sao Paulo in August, I sat down with Igor Fusser at a cafe near Palista Avenue. We’ve known each other for years. He’s a professor of foreign relations at Brazil’s ABC Federal University. I asked him how he sees the US actions against Brazil at this moment.

He said, “This is not just about the United States trying to remove the government of a left-wing party, the workers’ party, or a left-wing leader, which is Lula. It’s about subjecting Brazil to the policies of the United States, and Brazil being the largest country in Latin America is precisely the biggest obstacle to the American project of global dominance of the Western hemisphere,” he said. Remember, over the last year, as we’ve looked at throughout this podcast, Trump has pushed the United States into a new era of dominance over Latin America, the likes of which the region has not seen in decades. Boat strikes in the Caribbean, the US invasion of Venezuela, and the kidnapping of President Nicolas Maduro, the oil blockade on Cuba, and Trump throwing his weight around and meddling in elections across Latin America. It’s all justified by a renewed Monroe doctrine. Here’s Secretary of War, Pete Hegseth, underlining that point.

Pete Hegseth:

President Trump has established the Trump corollary of the Monroe Doctrine, the Don Roe doctrine, and the war department is implementing it as fast as we can.

Michael Fox:

Brazil is the latest battleground. It’s playing out in the open and behind the scenes. It’s early August. The Brazilian Association of Investigative Journalism is meeting in Sao Paulo. At the meeting circulating in the crowd are staff from the US Consulate in Sao Paulo, their mission to woo Brazilian journalists into conversations about the country’s electoral process and the state of “freedom of expression” in the country. This was reported by several independent journalists at the conference and then published by independent journalist Leandro DeMori, the former executive editor of The Intercept Brazil. According to Demorti, three journalists at the event confirmed the actions of the consular officials. Two journalists said they were offered assistance with US visas if they needed them, even though the meetings with the officials about the country’s elections were to be held in Sao Paulo.

Washington has leaned on two key narratives to demonize Brazil in recent years. One, that freedom of expression is under attack in Brazil because of its attempts to reign in social media disinformation, and two, that the country’s electoral system is faulty and prone to errors. Both of those claims are false. Brazil has long held certified free and fair elections, and freedom of speech is alive and well, although Brazil embraces a more inclusive harmonious definition of how the freedom of speech fits into the country’s other laws. Episode 12 of this series goes deeper into those claims and their fallout. DiMorti’s reporting about the recent journalism forum brings up more questions than answers. What were the consular officials trying to achieve? Did some journalists take the bait? If so, how will this be weaponized? We don’t have answers, but it’s another piece of the scrambled jigsaw puzzle.

Here’s another, and it’s just one example of how the meddling campaign has been building. In mid-September, less than two weeks ago, Flavio Bolsonaro’s brother, Eduardo, met with President Donald Trump at the White House. As we looked at in the last episode, Eduardo is a former congressional representative who now lives in the United States. The Brazilian Supreme Court sentenced him earlier this year to four years in prison for his actions in the US, lobbying the Trump administration to intimidate the Brazilian judiciary amid the trial against his father. According to reports, Eduardo traveled to Washington to ask Trump to impose sanctions on members of the Lula government and the Supreme Court, including Justice Alexandre Morais. If you’ve been following Brazil or my reporting, you might remember that Morais was the justice that led the trials against the dissemination of fake news in the country and also against Jair Bolsonaro.

Jair Bolsonaro:

Also developing this morning, the Trump administration placing sanctions on a Brazilian Supreme Court justice over concerns of human rights violations and politicized prosecutions.

Michael Fox:

Last year, the US sanctioned Mordice for supposedly carrying out human rights abuse, including arbitrary detention. Those sanctions were lifted four months later, but they were a thinly veiled retaliation for the trial against Bolsonaro and also Morais’s fight with ex-owner Elon Musk, which we looked at in depth in episode 12. There is no question the battle over Brazil right now is also taking place online and Silicon Valley is playing its part.

On Wednesday, September 23rd, Meta, the parent company of Facebook and Instagram, took down President Lula’s Facebook page and blocked his campaign from running political ads. The platform gave no justification for the move. Lula’s workers’ party and his electoral coalition demanded answers. Lula’s campaign asked for the immediate return of the account. The campaign’s lawyers told the platform that the restriction “poses a serious risk to the candidate’s level playing field in the election.” The head of the Workers’ Party national communications team, Eden Valadaris, said they hadn’t ruled out taking the case to the superior electoral court. He wrote on X, “Brazil’s electoral contest, its campaigns, and its vote cannot be left to the mercy of the political preferences of the big tech companies whose supposed programming errors only hit and harm one campaign and one candidate.” One candidate, meaning Lula. By the next morning, the page was back up, but Lula’s electoral coalition said Meta’s actions harm the presidential campaign.

Remember that Meta was founded and is run by Mark Zuckerberg. He’s a close ally of President Donald Trump.

Jair Bolsonaro:

Thank you very, very much.

Michael Fox:

In fact, he was at Trump’s inauguration for his second term alongside the heads of Apple, Google, Amazon, and of course, Tesla and ex – CEO, Elon Musk. I want to talk about something important today because it’s time to get back to our roots around free expression on Facebook and Instagram. Zuckerberg got rid of fact-checking at Meta in early 2025, just before Trump came into power last year, and that’s important because there are now fewer constraints on the spread of fake news or misinformation on the platform. In late August, Amnesty International tested this lack of guardrails in Brazil. It sent 15 different AI-generated election-related political disinformation ads to Facebook to see if the platform could discern between truth and falsehood. Meta failed to block most of them. A similar test run by the eco movement in Brazil in mid-September showed that nearly 90% of the disinformation ads it attempted to run on Meta were approved, including “AI ads depicting execution style threats against lawmakers and calling for a stop the steal style coup.” And I want to say one more thing about the role of Silicon Valley’s big tech platforms.

They are paying attention to what’s happening in Brazil. Here’s just one example. Last year, lawmakers and a congressional committee in Brazilia were discussing a bill on AI regulation. According to the fact-checking agency, Ausfatos, big tech lobbyists visited committee members more than 80 times over a five-month period. The tech company that met with members in Brazilia the most was Meta, which made more than a third of those visits.

There’s another layer to all of this, another puzzle piece if you like. In the last episode of this podcast, I took an in-depth look at the work of the Argentine political strategist, Fernando Cerimedo. Remember, Serimedo has led right-wing digital campaigns across Latin America, and he did so with the help of Washington and Trump’s former campaign manager and digital strategist, Brad Parscali. This is what he had to say earlier this year in Mar-a-Lago when he was presented an award for best Hispanic Political Consultant of the Year.

Jair Bolsonaro:

I want to say something in English. Thank you to Brad Parscale for believing me all the time and give me your technology and Tim Don for the fighting in Latin America against socialism. Thank you, Brad.

Michael Fox:

Serimedo is now in prison on charges that he tried to kill his girlfriend. According to her, he hired the hitman to silence her. Serimedo also faces charges of illicit enrichment and other crimes, but his digital campaigning and the bot farms that he’s deployed in elections up and down the hemisphere haven’t necessarily gone away, nor have his deep ties to the right in the region. Remember who presented that award to Cerimedo? It was Eduardo Bolsonaro, the brother of Flavio Bolsonaro. They reportedly have known each other for more than 15 years. Now, just this week, Washington sanctioned Bolivian Attorney General Roher Mariaka, who is prosecuting the Serimero case,

He defended his country sovereignty and vowed to continue the investigation despite the apparent attempt to intimidate him. I mention all of this to say that just because Serimedo is now in jail, it doesn’t mean that these types of digital influence campaigns heavily fueled by an inter International far right aren’t happening. As I mentioned last time, Serimedo is just one piece in a puzzle, a cog and a wheel, albeit one very important cog. But actions pushing disinformation online are still happening. We just don’t necessarily know from who or where. Here’s one example. About a week ago, the Brazilian journalistic outlet Ajencia Publica reported in conjunction with Aos Fatos that AI farms were fueling the far right agenda in the lead up to the elections. The bots had created 255 profiles and made over a thousand posts. Agencia Publica reported that the network had “achieved 58 million views, expanding the reach of posts supporting the Bolsonaro family and attacking the Supreme Court.” It’s a strategy known as astroturfing, using artificial engagement to give the impression of a real surge in grassroots support.

All of this happened over one month between August and September. According to the investigation, one of the main nodes of this AI campaign was linked to the Instagram account Leo Indio Bolsonaro. That is managed by Leonardo Rodriguez de Jesus. He is Flavio and Eduardo Bolsonaro’s cousin. He was investigated by Brazilian officials for his role in the 2023 attempted coup. A warrant for his arrest was ordered in 2025. He fled the country. He’s reportedly now in Argentina. The point is this, these campaigns are happening. We often just don’t hear about them until after the fact.

Maria Marta Bruno:

Well, I’ve been voting since 1998 and I have never seen such level of interference of foreign interference in Brazilian elections.

Michael Fox:

Maria Marta Bruno is a journalist with Agencia Publica, the outlet I mentioned earlier. If you remember, I spoke with her in the last episode as well about Serimedo.

Maria Marta Bruno:

It reminds me a lot of what I have read in history books and what I have learned on the Brazilian dictatorship and the very clear role that the US developed from 1964 to 1985 when the military dictatorship in Brazil took place. There was never since the end of the dictatorship such open intervention.

Michael Fox:

Maria says there have been a lot of headlines lately mentioning diplomatic tension between Brazil and the United States, but she says what we’re seeing goes far beyond that.

Maria Marta Bruno:

Because given the gravity and the timing of the recent facts, I would say that it constitutes a clear interference in our process.

Michael Fox:

She highlights Trump’s tariffs on Brazil both last year and this year, which she says are wrapped into defending former President Jair Bolsonaro. She points to the numerous meetings between Flavio and Eduardo Bolsonaro with top officials in Washington over the last year, the US sanctions against Supreme Court Justice Alexandre Morais and so much more. And she says there are two other big reasons why the United States is so interested in Brazil. The first is China.

Maria Marta Bruno:

The US intentions to reduce China influence in Latin America. We all know that China, it’s a key partner for Brazil and for other countries in the region.

Michael Fox:

The second is rare earth minerals, stuff like neodymium, dysprosium, or terbium. Yeah, I don’t know what they look like either, but they’re used in EV motors, green energy technologies, military equipment, and other industries. Brazil is home to somewhere between a fifth and a quarter of the total rare earth reserves in the world. It’s second only to China. In April, a US company bought up the Brazilian firm Ceja Vergi, which mines rare earth minerals in Brazil. After his meeting with Trump in May, Flavio Bolshinaro promised to work with the United States on mineral extraction. “We are the only real alternative to China for a free world,” Flavio Bolsonaro said. “Under my government, there will be long-term strategic partnership with the United States in this sector with protected investment and shared reindustrialization between the two countries. Flavio also promised that if he is elected in his first month, Brazil would join President Trump’s Shield of the America’s regional coalition.

Brazil will join the shield of the Americas together with the United States, “he said,” and countries across the region, forming a great hemispheric alliance against terrorism and organized and transnational crime. “This is Brazil’s place. It is the protagonist of the security of the Americas side by side with free and sovereign nations, he said.

Maria Marta Bruno:

And we know that the US is very interested in what we have and the reserves that we have. So it’s very significant, it’s very important, and we know that the US is following closely the development of the presidential elections here because they will certainly determine what will be the future of the diplomatic relation between US and Brazil in the upcoming years.

Michael Fox:

In the face of all of this, Brazilians are responding none louder than President Luis Idnacio Lula de Silva.

Jair Bolsonaro:

The assembly will now hear and address by his excellency, Luis Inacio Lula Da Silva, president of the Federated Republic of Brazil.

Michael Fox:

The day is September 22nd, 2026, New York City. Brazilian President Luis Idnacio Lula de Silva walks to the podium at the United Nations to kick off the 81st General Assembly meeting. Without mentioning him, Lula speaks directly to US President Donald Trump. “Brazil does not fit into anyone’s backyard,” he says. Lula denounces Trump for attacking democracy, interfering in elections and using military force to acquire material resources across Latin America. He closes his speech with a nod to the upcoming high stakes elections in Brazil. On October 4th, he says, “Millions of Brazilians go to the polls to decide their future. They will not just elect the president of the republic, state governors, and representatives of the legislative power. They will decide between democracy and denialism, between if Brazil is going to move toward a future of more opportunities or return to a past of exclusion.”. He says Brazil will have free and transparent elections as it always has with broad freedom of speech.

He denounces the spread of disinformation online, in particular coming from outside the country, which he says is an attempt to “disrupt the debate.”.

“We have a modern and robust electoral system,” he says. “We have a plural citizenship and a free press. We will not allow the enemies of democracy, both internal and external, to attack the popular will. Brazilian democracy belongs to Brazilians. Brazil will continue to be a sovereign country. No one, no one will take us away from this path, “he says. It’s Lula’s response to Trump and the world as the country faces incredibly important elections, elections that Trump and the United States have been attempting to influence. Brazilians have been vocal online and in the streets against Washington’s pressure, and recently they actually got some support from a group of lawmakers on Capitol Hill. On September 24th, just last week, Senator Bernie Sanders and 30 Democratic members of the US House of Representatives sent a letter to Secretary of State Marco Rubio. They accused the Trump administration of waging a pressure campaign against Brazil ahead of the first round vote.

Illinois Congresswoman Delia Ramirez led the congressional effort. They write, “We are writing to express our grave concern regarding the administration’s coordinated effort to threaten our strategic alliance with Brazil and undermine the Western Hemisphere’s second largest democracy ahead of its upcoming presidential election in October 2026. Over the course of President Trump’s second term,” they write, “We have seen US officials engage in a sustained multifaceted campaign of interference and destabilization in Brazil. They point to the shocking 50% tariffs Trump levied on the country last year amid the country’s trial against Jair Bolsonaro. They also underscored Trump’s appointment last year of Darren Beattie as a senior advisor on Brazil issues in the State Department. Beattie, a noted far-right extremist and white supremacist,” they write, “came into this post with a clear record of public statements signaling an overt ideological commitment to undermining Brazil’s democratic institutions.” The congressional representative singled out Trump’s current tariffs, his meeting with Flavio Bolsonaro at the White House, and his designation of the Brazilian drug gangs as foreign terrorist organizations.

They write, “Given the Trump administration’s repeated military strikes in the region, justified in part by alleged foreign terrorist organization threats to US security, the designation has also fueled fears of potential US military intervention.” They recall comments from White House Press Secretary Caroline Levitt last year that threatened Brazil could potentially face the United States’ military might.

US military action in Brazil isn’t likely, but it’s not out of the question. Nothing is under Trump’s Dunro doctrine. The lawmakers highlight that Brazil is just the latest in a quote, deeply troubling pattern of interference by the United States in foreign elections, including in Argentina, Honduras, and Columbia. Rather than helping defend democracy, they write, the United States is acting as an agent of interference and destabilization using diplomatic economic and political pressure in ways that risk weakening the country’s democratic institutions, undermining confidence in Brazil’s electoral process and inflicting further damage on our relationship with a strategic US ally and trading partner. They demand that Washington commit to recognizing the certified election results. Here’s the thing, the stakes are high. Remember Igor Fusser? He’s the professor I met at the Sao Paulo Cafe. He told me, “It’s clear that the United States is doing everything and will do everything possible to prevent the reelection of Lula in the next elections.” And Igor told me there was a reason for that, because if Flavio Bolsonaro wins, he will bow to Trump and the United States.

Igor says, “Brazil will become a country under the tutelage of the United States, a colony or almost a colony of the US as already happened with Argentina, Columbia, Venezuela, and many others. And if Lula is victorious in these elections, we will live a very intense period of confrontation between the two countries,” he says. And Igor has a really interesting analysis here. He says, “The US dominance over Latin America imposed by Trump is analogous to the control of the Soviet Union over the Eastern block countries during the Cold War under a Russian foreign policy imposed by Soviet leader Leonid Brezniv in 1968.” He says, “Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, all of those countries were formally independent nations with their own government, their own laws, their own representation in the United Nations, but these countries were not autonomous. They didn’t have sovereignty. Any movement that they made that clashed with the interests of the Soviet Union was repressed.

Some of them were even invaded,” he says. “So we’re living in Latin America, a Breznev doctrine, capitalist, imperialist, dictated by Donald Trump. “That is why this election is so important. Brazil is the outlier, the counterweight to the United States and the region, and the US is fighting hard to bring it to heel.

We’re going to see this all unfold not in a couple of months or weeks, but in just a few days. The first round of the election is on October 4th. Brazilians are voting for their president and vice president. They’re also voting for all of the country state governors, all 513 members of the Chamber of Deputies, two-thirds of senators, and more than a thousand state assembly seats. Lula is ahead in the race, but he appears shy of the 50% needed to win outright. If no presidential candidate wins more than half of the vote, it’ll go to a second round. There, polls show the margin between Lula and Bolsonaro even tighter, and it will undoubtedly be a tough campaign. The second round, if it’s needed, is on October 25th.

That is all for this episode of Under the Shadow. Things are going to get intense in the coming days. Please consider following our new website, Pan-American Dispatch and our social media accounts for ongoing reporting on Brazil and these elections. Some of the reporting in this episode was based off of stories I produced recently for the world and The Real News. Many thanks to those outlets for all that they do. Let me remind you that if you’re craving even more backstory here, you can always go back and listen to episode 12 of the second season of Under the Shadow about Brazil’s fight against fake news in the country and the US attempt to roll it back. And please also consider checking out my 2022 podcast about Brazil under Bolsonaro. It’s called Brazil on Fire. It’s still totally relevant today. You can find that wherever you listen.

As always, you can find me at patreon.com/mfox.

There you can also support my work, become a monthly sustainer, or sign up to stay abreast of all the latest on this podcast and my other reporting across Latin America. You can find a ton of content there exclusively also for my supporters. If you’re looking for more information, news and reporting on Trump’s onslaught, both in communities within the United States and abroad, please check out The Real News and NACLA. Both of them are publishing daily indispensable reporting. The theme music is by my band, Monte Perdido. You can find us on Spotify or wherever you stream music. This closing song playing right now is off our 2024 album, Ofrenda. I hope you check it out. Under the shadows of co-production of The Real News and NACLA, it’s produced in partnership with Global Exchange. This episode was written, researched, reported, and produced by me, Michael Fox. The script was edited by Heather Geis.

Thanks for listening. See you next time.