Daniel Davis / Deep Dive – October 7, 2026
By Salman Rafi Sheikh – New Eastern Outlook – October 7, 2026
On October 5, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan activated the Makkah Pact, taking their new alliance to war for the first time, and potentially revealing the future of American power in the Middle East: Washington provides the security umbrella while regional partners increasingly do the fighting.
From treaty to military alliance
Only two months after Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye signed the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, the new alliance has been activated. As representatives of the three countries met in Riyadh and Houthi missiles and drones targeted Saudi territory, Saudi-backed Yemeni forces launched a major counteroffensive around the strategically important Bab al-Mandeb Strait. Despite hundreds of strikes, the Saudi offensive has not been enough to push the Houthis back to their original position. In this context, the alliance’s Strategic-Political and Defense Committee agreed to move “immediately” toward implementing its collective-defence commitments and to provide agreed military forces and capabilities for rapid deployment in Saudi Arabia. The meeting also appointed retired Pakistani Lieutenant General Nauman Mahmood as the alliance’s first secretary-general.
The significance goes beyond additional military assistance for Riyadh. The Yemen war is transforming – and that, too, very rapidly – a remarkably young agreement into an operational military alliance. Signed on August 7, the Makkah Pact contains a collective-defence commitment under which an armed attack against one member is regarded as an attack against all three. Pakistan describes the agreement as defensive and grounded in the right to collective self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.
That inevitably invites comparisons with NATO. The analogy should not be exaggerated. NATO possesses 32 members, an integrated command structure and more than seven decades of institutional development. The Makkah Pact possesses none of that depth.
But its institutional development has been unusually rapid. On August 31, the three governments established mechanisms for political and military coordination, agreed to create a permanent secretariat in Saudi Arabia and committed themselves to joint activities, defence-industrial cooperation and joint technology development and production. Now comes the most important stage in the evolution of any military alliance: responding to an actual threat.
Pakistan and Türkiye were already assisting Saudi Arabia before formal activation. Reports show that Pakistan had supplied air-defence systems, drones, anti-drone equipment and light artillery, while Pakistani advisers were working with Saudi counterparts supporting Yemeni forces. Türkiye had supplied drones. The October 5 decision potentially integrates such capabilities into something larger: collective military action undertaken because one alliance member has come under attack.
The distinction between defensive and offensive action consequently becomes blurred. Defending Saudi airspace against Houthi missiles is clearly defensive. Destroying the launchers firing those missiles from Yemen would involve offensive operations undertaken for a defensive purpose. Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Asif has deliberately avoided ruling out that possibility, saying Pakistan would make “whatever means are available” at its disposal available to defend Saudi Arabia.
America stays, but its role changes
It would be tempting to interpret this development as evidence that Saudi Arabia is preparing for a post-American Middle East. That conclusion would be premature. The more interesting possibility is almost the opposite: the Makkah Pact may fit remarkably well into the kind of Middle Eastern security order the Trump administration itself wants to create. Trump welcomed the agreement shortly after it was signed. He called it’s a “big, bold and important first step” and argued that it demonstrated how regional countries could “defend themselves in a more meaningful way.” That language closely matches the administration’s formal defence strategy.
The 2026 National Defense Strategy says Washington wants regional allies and partners to assume “primary responsibility” for deterring and defending against Iran and its proxies, while the United States supports them and deepens cooperation with Gulf partners. The administration’s arms-transfer strategy similarly argues that allies should assume more responsibility for regional security while Washington equips them with advanced American military capabilities. Yemen now offers an unusually clear illustration of what this division of labour can look like.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman sought direct American military intervention against the Houthis in September. Trump declined to order US strikes. But Washington did not withdraw from the conflict. Instead, it offered intelligence and targeting assistance, while CENTCOM commander Admiral Brad Cooper travelled to Saudi Arabia for consultations. As the Saudi-backed offensive subsequently began, the same pattern continued. Saudi aircraft provided extensive air support to Yemeni government forces, while the United States supplied intelligence and targeting support. America therefore remains deeply involved. What has declined, at least for now, is direct participation in the fighting. This distinction matters.
The choice facing Washington is not simply between dominating Middle Eastern security and abandoning it. There is a third possibility: remaining the indispensable strategic enabler while shifting more of the immediate military burden onto regional states. That is precisely where the Makkah Pact becomes useful.
Saudi Arabia brings financial resources, geography and enormous investments in advanced weaponry. Türkiye contributes a large, NATO-trained military and a rapidly expanding defence industry. Pakistan brings substantial conventional forces, longstanding military relations with Saudi Arabia and extensive operational experience. Together, they can potentially perform missions that previously might have generated demands for more direct American intervention. The United States can remain above this architecture rather than outside it: supplying intelligence, weapons, logistical assistance, strategic deterrence and diplomatic backing while allies provide more of the personnel and firepower required to confront regional threats. Seen this way, the pact is not necessarily a rebellion against American primacy. It could become one mechanism through which that primacy is made less militarily expensive for the US.
A different kind of American order
This model also helps explain why describing the emerging Middle East as “post-American” can be misleading. American power has traditionally been measured partly through deployments, bases and direct military intervention. But primacy does not require Washington to fight every regional war itself. The Makkah Pact could push this transformation considerably further.
Its future significance will depend less on what its three members call the alliance than on what they build after Yemen, and whether their first experiment in collective defence proves sufficiently successful to encourage deeper cooperation. Regular military planning, interoperable forces, integrated air and missile defence, intelligence-sharing arrangements and joint weapons production would gradually give the agreement institutional substance.
Yet therein lies a paradox for Washington. The same burden-sharing that reduces America’s military responsibilities could eventually reduce its leverage. More capable allies are not necessarily more dependent allies. As regional powers acquire the institutions, experience and capabilities to conduct military operations with diminishing direct American involvement, they may also acquire greater freedom to pursue threats and strategic objectives that do not fully correspond with Washington’s preferences. An arrangement that initially reinforces the US security architecture could therefore gradually produce greater regional strategic autonomy.
The consequences could extend to military technology. Saudi Arabia’s armed forces remain heavily equipped with American weapons, but neither Pakistan nor Türkiye operates exclusively within a US defence ecosystem. Pakistan, for example, operates the JF-17 fighter aircraft jointly developed with China. In fact, Islamabad has deployed this jet in Saudi Arabia as part of the pact. While Türkiye has built an increasingly indigenous defence industry. A more deeply integrated Makkah alliance could therefore eventually combine American, Turkish, Pakistani and Chinese-origin military technologies rather than reproduce an exclusively US-centred weapons architecture.
That may prove more consequential for American primacy than the pact itself. If the Makkah alliance fades once the immediate Houthi threat recedes, it will remain another temporary regional alignment. But if Yemen produces permanent military integration, Washington could confront an unexpected consequence of its own burden-sharing strategy: the more successfully regional allies learn to defend the American-led order themselves, the less dependent that order may eventually become on America.
Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of international relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs
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NATO Edge 26 in Izmir merges civilian tech with war-fighting. AI, cloud, cybersecurity now serve the military-industrial complex.
Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su
The summit NATO held in Ankara in July continues to make its impact felt in our country — a summit marked by the lockdown of the city, red carpets rolled out for imperialist leaders, Janissary marches, the narrative of a “great Turkey” constructed around hosting the event, and arrests that continue to keep people behind bars.
As has often been pointed out, the July summit marked the beginning of a “new era” both internationally and for our country.
It looks like we will be discussing this important turning point for a long time to come. Meanwhile, NATO’s “work” in our country is not yet finished. Another critical NATO event is approaching, one that has received little attention in the mainstream media — and when it does, it will once again be framed through the narrative of “Turkey’s importance”: NATO Edge 26…
NATO Edge 26, which will be held in Izmir in November 2026, is being promoted using concepts such as “innovation,” “readiness,” and “the security of the future.” Or, to put it in plain language: the marketing and integration of military technologies, the defense industry, and war-fighting capacity…
The official promotional text of the event, organized by the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA), lays out its purpose quite clearly:
“NATO Edge 26 will focus on strengthening NATO’s readiness and war-fighting capacity through faster, smarter, and more scalable collaboration with industry.
…NCIA is excited to carry this legacy forward in Türkiye in 2026 and take the event a step further with a renewed format focused on delivering effective solutions and prioritizing industry partnerships.
Industry participation will be at the heart of the 2026 edition, providing more opportunities for direct engagement, focused information sessions, a more comprehensive understanding of NATO’s upcoming procurement requirements and priorities, as well as greater opportunities to showcase industry solutions to NATO decision-makers, end users, and potential partners.”
A military ecosystem operating according to market logic, with partnerships and participation at its core. Defense companies, states and military commands are expanding their cooperation in order to strengthen “war readiness”…
What exactly is NATO Edge?
NATO Edge is the flagship technology event of NATO’s technology and cybersecurity center, the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCI Agency).
“Edge” can be translated into Turkish as “edge,” “frontier,” “advantage,” “superiority,” or, depending on the context, “cutting-edge” or “advanced.”
It was first held in 2022 in Mons, Belgium. The event was created by merging two previously separate events: the NATO Information Assurance Symposium (NIAS) and an industry conference known as NITEC.
According to NATO’s official documents, NIAS focused on cybersecurity, while NITEC carried the technology-and-industry dimension. In other words, NATO Edge explicitly targets both the technology and industry/commercial spheres.
At the first event, held in Mons, Belgium, on October 25–27, 2022, more than 2,100 registered participants and over 100 companies took part in the exhibition area. The program included topics such as the use of artificial intelligence in military applications, cybersecurity, and digital transformation.
At the second event, held in Tampa, Florida, in the United States, on December 3–5, 2024, cloud technologies, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and the strategic use of resources were discussed. According to NCIA’s 2024 annual report, approximately 60 percent of participants came from industry, while 31 percent represented NATO, governments, and armed forces.
This picture is a clear indication that artificial intelligence technology — whose development in the United States has accelerated since the early 2000s and exploded in recent years — is being systematically taken up by the military-industrial complex.
Moreover, this system has been developed directly under NATO’s military leadership, in cooperation with civilian industry, using resources so vast that civilian initiatives seeking to use technology — particularly artificial intelligence — “for the benefit of humanity” cannot compete with them.
In the United States, for example, many companies unable to find investment have begun receiving funding from military institutions such as the CIA and NATO and developing technologies under their direction. The fact that the CIA has been the “first investor” in numerous technology startups is a striking example of this system.
In short, the path of technological development has largely been left at the mercy of military leadership and the American technology giants.
A similar picture will emerge at NATO Edge 26. Many small startups participating in the event will seek agreements with major players and attempt to secure financing from them. Naturally, this will come at the price of working for NATO’s military interests.
For the “domestic, national, and highly nationalist” technology companies whose numbers have grown tremendously in our country in recent years, the “justification” is equally clear: Turkey is now a country on the verge of a major breakthrough, hosting major international events, supposedly becoming not their subordinate but their master, and possessing qualities that make it indispensable to everyone… So why not devote all our strength and labor to the strategy drawn up by NATO? We will make money, and we will take yet another step forward in a world order in which we are already supposedly such an important player…
This is more or less the logic behind the seemingly contradictory and irrational rhetoric of the Turkish defense industry about “challenging the world” and its actions that ultimately amount to working for imperialist powers.
Put simply, NATO Edge is precisely the embodiment of this logic through events, sessions, and corporate exhibition stands.
Why is it being held in Izmir?
NCIA has not given a specific reason for choosing Izmir as the venue for NATO Edge 26. However, it is possible to understand why Izmir was chosen by looking at the institution’s own documents.
First, a NATO Industry Forum was held during the Ankara Summit on July 7–8, where new procurement decisions worth tens of billions of dollars were announced. The decisions taken by NATO in July are intended to translate the political and financial commitments made in Ankara into operational capacity, while in Izmir, NATO and industry are to work together to accelerate that capacity.
Second, the Ankara Summit adopted a new Strategy for Industry-NATO Cooperation (SYNC). This document moves the NATO-industry relationship to an earlier stage. Through this mechanism, companies will not merely submit bids for tenders that have already been announced; they will be brought into the process from the point at which future capacity requirements are identified.
Third, the Turkish Ministry of National Defense presented NATO Edge 26 as an event aimed at “the international promotion and increased visibility of the Turkish defense industry’s ‘high-tech’ capabilities.” NCIA also signed, during the Turkish Industry Day it organized in Türkiye, one of the first contracts of its history concerning the modernization of very-low-frequency air-surveillance equipment for Allied Maritime Command with ASELSAN.
In other words, Izmir should be viewed not merely as an “event venue,” but as a point of contact for tying Turkey more tightly into imperialism’s defense-technology supply chain.
This is also where NATO Edge 26 differs most significantly from previous meetings. NCIA is openly telling companies: “You can learn about NATO’s requirements before they become official tender specifications,” while offering more than €1 billion in upcoming “NATO procurement opportunities.”
NATO Edge 26 is creating an early-stage matching mechanism between NATO’s military requirements and the private sector’s product-development and investment decisions.
Who is taking part?
The official NATO Edge participant list is still being updated, and in its publicly visible format, not all of the more than 270 companies known to be participating appear simultaneously. Nevertheless, a number of notable companies can be confirmed either through the official list or through the companies’ own NATO Edge announcements. Names appearing on the official list include Airbus, AWS, Anduril, ASELSAN, ASFAT, BAE Systems Digital Intelligence, BlackBerry, Booz Allen Hamilton, Cisco, Cloudflare, Broadcom, Armis Federal/ServiceNow, Atos, and Barikat Cyber Security.
Among the industry speakers on the program are Helsing co-founder and CEO Gundbert Scherf, Planet Labs CEO Will Marshall, UiPath founder Daniel Dines, AWS Global Defense executive Christian Hoff, Leonardo technology executive Alessandro Massa, Thales cortAIx Factory executive Mickael Brossard, and BlackBerry Chief Security Advisor Christine Gadsby.
The danger of ‘dual-use’
One of the concepts that stands out particularly in NATO’s 2026 event materials is “dual-use” technology.
NATO Deputy Secretary General Jean-Charles Ellermann-Kingombe said that NATO Edge 26 would be particularly attractive to “companies that have a credible military application alongside their primary commercial business.” In other words, NATO is no longer targeting only traditional defense companies; it is also targeting technologies that can be transferred from the commercial market into the military sphere.
What this means is that a technology company no longer needs to be a “weapons company” from the outset. A company can operate in data analytics, satellite imagery, cloud systems, communications, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, automation, or computing, while simultaneously entering the NATO system and working for NATO.
This significantly broadens the scope of what has long been described as the “militarization of technology.”
The NATO Edge 26 participant profile makes this clear. On one side are defense giants such as Airbus, Anduril, ASELSAN, Leonardo, and Thales; on the other are civilian technology companies such as AWS, Cisco, Cloudflare, Broadcom, BlackBerry, UiPath, and Planet Labs.
In other words, military technology no longer means merely “producing military products for armies”; it increasingly means placing the products you create at the service of military interests.
How are the market and militarization being merged?
In this new system, in which the private sector is also being drawn into the defense industry, the formula is clear:
Public funding, NATO demand, corporate investment, technology development, military integration, public procurement, larger-scale production, new investment…
At this point, we need to make a brief detour. Combining private enterprise with military requirements, when military needs are given priority, means the emergence of new economic crises in capitalist societies. Because this entire chain of needs will ultimately be paid for at the expense of workers and their social needs, which are placed at the bottom of the priority list.
The competitive strength of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which has made its own breakthroughs in artificial intelligence, technology, and military technology, stems not only from those advances but also from the leadership of the Communist Party, which directs the public and private sectors from a single center. What provides China’s “speed,” as well as the threat it represents to the Atlantic alliance, is the Party’s control over and direction of the private sector.
This “threat” posed by China is pushing capitalism to take faster and harsher steps in new areas of civilian-military cooperation similar to Edge.
The ‘domestic and national industry’ is being tied to the NATO market
The enthusiasm of the “domestic and national industry” mentioned above is also being directly tied, under this new system, to the NATO market and its military requirements.
It is repeatedly argued that Turkey is expanding its own defense industry. But what kind of expansion is this?
The defense industry is being internationalized through NATO standards, NATO procurement mechanisms, NATO operational requirements, and access to the NATO market.
For this reason, “domestic production” and “NATO integration” do not necessarily have to be opposites. On the contrary, under today’s model, the two can take place simultaneously. The “domestic” character being referred to is, for a country whose entire military strategy has already been built for years in accordance with NATO interests, a very particular kind of domesticity.
Interestingly, a June 2026 announcement by the Aegean Region Chamber of Industry reveals that the quota initially allocated for 100 booths for Turkish defense-industry organizations at the event was reduced to 40 after fewer applications than expected were received from domestic companies.
This data is important in two respects.
First, the assumption that the Turkish defense industry is automatically and intensively turning toward the NATO market does not apply equally to every company. It is possible to guess which types of companies can afford to apply.
Second, it shows that presenting NATO Edge 26 simply as a “giant exhibition opening all of Turkey’s defense companies to the world” does not reflect reality.
What does the Ukraine connection show?
NATO Edge 26 also contains important signals regarding the war in Ukraine. Although our country has repeatedly sought to position itself as a mediator at every major turning point in the Russia-Ukraine war, it is quite clear that no one — NATO above all — has taken this intention seriously.
Among the Edge participants are Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense Innovation and Defense Technology Development Center and Brave1. Established in 2023, Brave1 is an official platform through which the Ukrainian government brings together defense-technology developers, the military, investors, and technology companies. Their participation also means that NATO will directly transfer the technological experience of the war in Ukraine into its own innovation ecosystem.
This, too, is no coincidence. Under the UNITE–Brave NATO program, NATO and Ukraine have already established a joint contract pool worth a total of €10 million, with plans to expand the program to as much as €50 million in subsequent stages.
Whose interests is technology serving?
Treating NATO Edge 26 in Izmir simply as an event where next-generation weapons, artificial intelligence applications, or digital defense systems are put on display would be a serious oversimplification. The “bigger picture” shows civilian and military capacities being merged into the same pool, with companies, states, military institutions, and technology developers jointly participating in the construction of a new war-fighting capacity under the name of “partnership.”
Thus, the scope of war ceases to be limited to weapons systems used on the battlefield; data, artificial intelligence, cloud systems, communications, satellite technologies, software, and logistics are all becoming components of war preparation and military planning.
From the perspective of our country, it is possible to say that Ankara’s “domestic and national” rhetoric points toward NATO’s requirements, standards, procurement mechanisms, and international defense-industry networks. The limits of the narrative that Turkey is an independent power capable of challenging the world through its own defense industry are ultimately being determined by the decisions taken at NATO events.
At the same time, events of this kind once again expose another reality that Marxists have repeatedly pointed out — and repeatedly demonstrated in practice: how conditional capitalism’s rhetoric of the “free market” really is.
When the issue is war and military requirements, the traditional claim that the market should be left to its own devices can suddenly be pushed into the background. Production capacity can be directed according to strategic priorities, and private capital can be encouraged to work for “security” needs.
In short, the “real question” posed by NATO Edge 26 is not which new technology is being developed, but according to whose needs, according to which political and economic priorities, and ultimately in whose service this technological capacity is being developed.
People involved in organized struggle used to be told: “Forget all this, get yourself a job first.” Now the phrase has changed: “Forget politics, we are living in the age of artificial intelligence — learn technology.”
And yet, although technological development and changing times transform the tools and needs at our disposal, they do not change the fact that the ruling classes use every instrument of “progress” to preserve their power.
From this perspective, the political purpose underlying the monopolization of artificial intelligence by military and economic giants is the same as the purpose underlying the control of machinery by the owners of capital in the early stages of the Industrial Revolution.
In our country, where changing times, tools, and needs are pregnant with major crises, these “devilish deals” to be made in Izmir will open the door to yet another new era.
Ultimately, NATO Edge 26 is a contemporary example not only of technological development itself, but of the organization of technology for “pre-war” purposes and the socialization of its costs — that is, the shifting of those costs onto the backs of working people.
Our political predecessors, who once observed what the giant machines in factories were actually being used for alongside production, also passed down to us what needed to be done in response.
What needs to be built today is the stick that will be thrust into the digital gears of our age.
Daniel Davis / Deep Dive – October 3, 2026
RT | October 2, 2026
Yemen’s Houthis have denied targeting a power station in the city of Medina. A Saudi-led coalition earlier accused the militant group of targeting the facility supplying power to the Prophet’s Mosque – one of the holiest sites in the Muslim world.
A senior Houthi official branded the accusation a “lie” aimed at tarnishing the group’s image and reinforcing similar claims made by the coalition in the past.
On Thursday, the Saudi coalition’s spokesman, Major General Turki al-Maliki, accused the Yemeni militants of striking the Taibah electricity distribution station in Medina earlier this week in what he called a “cowardly terrorist act” and a part of an alleged broader campaign by the Houthis to “target the Two Holy Mosques.”
In mid-September, Saudi Arabia accused the Houthis of launching a drone towards the holy city of Mecca. The unmanned aerial vehicle was intercepted and destroyed, it added. The Yemeni movement’s leader, Abdel-Malik al-Houthi, dismissed that claim as a “heinous lie” in a televised address at the time, claiming Riyadh was “weaponizing lies” to advance its own agenda.
The developments have sparked concerns in Türkiye and Pakistan, which signed a joint defense agreement with Saudi Arabia in August. Speaking to the United Nations General Assembly last week, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif called any “threat to the sanctity” of the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina a “red line that must never be crossed.”
Ankara denounced this week’s alleged Medina attack. “Any attack targeting the sanctity, peace, and security of the Two Holy Mosques is an unacceptable affront directed at the shared sensitivities of the entire Islamic world,” the Turkish government spokesman, Burhanettin Duran, said on X on Friday. He vowed that Türkiye “will continue to stand by Saudi Arabia.”
The developments come amid the continued escalation between the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition. Riyadh has backed Yemen’s internationally recognized government against the Houthis since intervening in the country’s civil war in 2015.
Large-scale fighting largely subsided after a UN-brokered truce in 2022, but the conflict erupted again this summer after an airport in the Houthi-controlled Yemeni capital of Sanaa was bombed to prevent a returning Houthi delegation that had flown to Iran from landing.
Il Patto della Mecca è un segno di solidarietà, non di guerra. La Turchia lo sa bene: lo Yemen è la “tomba dei turchi”.
Il Patto della Mecca è messo alla prova
Il 19 settembre 2026, ai microfoni dell’emittente turca NTV, il ministro degli Esteri Hakan Fidan ha pronunciato una frase insieme misurata e densa di conseguenze. L’Arabia Saudita, sotto il fuoco degli Houthi, «potrebbe avere alcune necessità militari, soprattutto su questioni tecniche», e la Turchia «non avrebbe problemi a soddisfarle». Nessuna dichiarazione di guerra, nessun contingente annunciato. Eppure, per la prima volta, il Patto della Mecca — l’alleanza difensiva che lega Riyadh, Ankara e Islamabad — veniva evocato come strumento operativo e non come architettura sulla carta. La domanda che circola nei commenti più mordaci è se Ankara stia per ripetere l’errore che due volte le costò carissimo: mettere piede negli altopiani dello Yemen. La risposta seria è più interessante della provocazione, e va nella direzione opposta.
L’accordo firmato alla Mecca il 7 agosto 2026 da Mohammed bin Salman, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan e Shehbaz Sharif è modellato sull’articolo 5 della NATO: un attacco armato contro uno dei tre è un attacco contro tutti. Il fronte che oggi lo sollecita è yemenita. Dal luglio 2026, dopo aver dichiarato il blocco dei porti sauditi e dello Stretto di Bab al-Mandab, gli Houthi hanno colpito ripetutamente il territorio del Regno, fino agli attacchi su Riyadh e sull’impianto Aramco di Yanbu. È il prolungamento, sul versante saudita, della guerra più ampia aperta dai raid statunitensi e israeliani sullo Yemen.
Il dato che conta, però, è la distanza fra il linguaggio del trattato e la postura reale dei suoi membri. Fidan offre sostegno «tecnico», non truppe. Islamabad precisa che nessuna reazione militare è in discussione e che agirà «quando sarà il momento». Washington, dal canto suo, ha respinto le richieste saudite di appoggio diretto. Tutti invocano la solidarietà; nessuno impegna forze sul terreno. Quella reticenza condivisa non è timidezza diplomatica: è il vero oggetto dell’analisi.
La lunga storia di vittorie yemenite contro la Turchia
Fra i tre firmatari, la Turchia è l’unico per cui lo Yemen non è un’astrazione strategica ma una ferita di archivio. Gli ottomani vi entrarono due volte, e due volte ne uscirono sconfitti. La prima occupazione data al 1538, dettata dalla necessità di proteggere le rotte del Mar Rosso dai portoghesi e di custodire l’accesso ai luoghi santi. Presero la Tihama e Sanaa, ma l’altopiano zaydita non fu mai domato per intero; dopo quasi un secolo di guerra intermittente, entro il 1635 gli imam qasimidi li avevano espulsi dal paese. Sul primo ciclo, ricordiamo la conquista del 1538, la rifondazione dell’imamato zaydita a opera di al-Mansur al-Qasim (1597) e la completa espulsione ottomana entro il 1635-1636 a opera degli imam qasimidi. La seconda occupazione si consuma tra l’occupazione della Tihama (1849), la presa di Sanaa (1872) e il ritiro definitivo dopo il 1918.
Il ritorno, a metà Ottocento, fu peggiore. L’occupazione della Tihama e la presa di Sanaa, incentivate dall’apertura del Canale di Suez nel 1869 e dal controllo del Mar Rosso, inaugurarono decenni di rivolta permanente. Le sollevazioni dell’imam Yahya resero l’altopiano ingovernabile con la forza, finché il Trattato di Daan del 9 ottobre 1911 ne riconobbe l’autorità sugli zayditi: la registrazione formale di uno stallo che nessuna spedizione riusciva a rompere. Il ritiro definitivo arrivò dopo il 1918. Il bilancio, lungo la seconda occupazione e la campagna della Grande Guerra, si conta in decine di migliaia di caduti; a ucciderli fu più la malattia che la battaglia. Non a caso lo Yemen entrò nel lessico ottomano come «tomba dei turchi», e il cimitero militare di Sanaa ne custodisce ancora l’inventario. Le perdite ottomane in Yemen lungo la seconda occupazione e la campagna dell’Arabia meridionale nella Grande Guerra si contano nell’ordine delle decine di migliaia complessive, con la malattia — non il combattimento — quale causa prevalente, in linea con la mortalità dell’esercito ottomano nel suo insieme. Il cimitero militare turco di Sanaa, restaurato nel 2011, ne conserva la memoria.
Ridurre tutto alla nostalgia neo-ottomana sarebbe però un errore di prospettiva, perché il problema non è ottomano: è geografico e sociale. Lo stesso terreno ha disfatto altri. L’Egitto nasseriano vi si impantanò tra il 1962 e il 1967, in quello che molti chiamarono il suo Vietnam; la coalizione a guida saudita, dal 2015, ha riversato sull’altopiano anni di potenza aerea e denaro senza mai sottometterlo. L’intervento egiziano nella guerra civile nord-yemenita (1962-1967), costato a Nasser un logoramento spesso paragonato a un «Vietnam» arabo, e la coalizione a guida saudita attiva dal 2015 confermano lo stesso esito: potenza di fuoco e risorse ingenti, altopiano mai sottomesso.
La ragione è strutturale. La verticalità del territorio, i villaggi-fortezza, una struttura tribale che assorbe e sopravvive all’occupante, e una tradizione religioso-politica — la dottrina zaydita del dovere di insorgere contro il sovrano ingiusto — che rigenera la resistenza a ogni generazione: sono i fattori che premiano il difensore e dissanguano chi proietta forza dall’esterno. Gli Houthi sono l’ultima incarnazione di questa costante, non un’anomalia. Ed è precisamente per questo che gli attori esterni scelgono il registro navale — il Mar Rosso, Bab al-Mandab, la forza marittima a guida saudita di cui si parla: perché li tiene lontani dalla terra.
Una memoria incancellabile
La provocazione da cui siamo partiti — la Turchia «impaziente» di rivivere la sua disfatta — capovolge dunque la logica dei fatti. La memoria dello Yemen non tenta Ankara: la disciplina. La Turchia di Erdoğan si è proiettata in molti teatri, dalla Siria alla Libia, dal Nord dell’Iraq al Caucaso attraverso l’Azerbaigian, ma sempre dove poteva applicare forza decisiva e circoscritta o agire per procura, mai dentro un’insurrezione d’altopiano priva di via d’uscita. Il fraseggio prudente di Fidan — bisogni «tecnici», patto che «non sostituisce le alleanze esistenti» e semmai «potrà allargarsi» — è il linguaggio di una potenza che vuole il dividendo politico della solidarietà senza la sua ipoteca militare.
Letto in chiave multipolare, il Patto della Mecca è un riallineamento sunnita sotto regia saudita-turco-pakistana, una copertura che matura mentre le garanzie statunitensi si mostrano condizionate, ma un trattato di difesa collettiva calibrato sull’articolo 5 incontra il suo limite proprio qui: quel modello risponde all’aggressione di uno Stato attraverso un confine, non possiede una dottrina contro un attore non statale che non si può conquistare e non si lascia dissuadere. È lo scarto tra la grammatica dell’alleanza e la natura dell’avversario.
Sul piano previsionale, e con un orizzonte di dodici mesi: è probabile che il sostegno turco resti tecnico — difesa aerea, sorveglianza, munizioni, consiglieri — anziché tradursi in dispiegamento combattente; è altamente improbabile che Ankara impegni truppe di terra in Yemen.
Gli indicatori che smentirebbero questa lettura sono netti e osservabili: l’arrivo di reparti da combattimento turchi o pakistani, un’attivazione formale della clausola di mutua difesa, il passaggio dall’interdizione navale nel Mar Rosso a operazioni terrestri sull’altopiano. Fino ad allora, il valore del patto sarà di segnale e di deterrenza per associazione, non di strumento contro gli Houthi.
Il cimitero degli imperi, del resto, non ha bisogno di essere riaperto per continuare a funzionare: gli basta essere ricordato.
Al Mayadeen | September 29, 2026
Head of the Political Council of the Iraqi Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, Sheikh Ali al-Asadi, criticized Baghdad’s decision to prevent Iranian aircraft from landing at Iraqi airports, stressing that it constitutes compliance with US pressure and warning that popular action could follow if the decision is not reversed.
Speaking to Al Mayadeen, al-Asadi said, “We regret the decision by the Iraqi authorities to prevent Iranian aircraft from landing in Iraq.” He described the decision as “submission to American bullying,” adding, “The Iraqi decision-maker must reconsider it; otherwise there will be popular pressure aimed at changing the decision.”
He said the issue extends beyond Iraqi airports, invoking longstanding ties between Iraq and Iran. “The issue goes beyond airports. There are close relations with Iran, and therefore we must not bow to an irresponsible decision by America,” he said. “Popular options will be the most pressing, and all possibilities are on the table.”
Sheikh al-Asadi attributed growing US influence in Iraq to weaknesses among domestic political actors. “The weakness of the domestic political actor has allowed the American occupation to impose its decisions in Iraq,” he said, adding, “The decision-maker can choose not to implement American decisions, as some countries do.”
He stressed that “the decision must be sovereign and independent politically, economically, and in terms of security,” defining sovereignty as “complete independence, with Iraq being the decision-maker in all aspects of life.
According to Sheikh al-Asadi, “There are personal and partisan interests behind the absence of independence in decision-making.” He also accused Iraq’s political class of adopting contradictory positions toward Washington, slamming duality in the political class: on the one hand, it agrees to American decisions, while on the other, it condemns them.
He added, “The Resistance’s positions have been clear from the beginning, while the Iraqi politicians have ambiguity and complications.”
Iraq’s main problem is corruption
Turning to the issue of weapons and the debate over their regulation, Sheikh al-Asadi said his movement had held discussions with the Coordination Framework and rejected the term “weapons confinement”. “We discussed the matter with the Coordination Framework and rejected the term ‘weapons confinement.’ We established that the term is harmful and changed it to ‘weapons regulation,’” he said. “Iraq’s biggest problem is corruption, not weapons,” he asserted.
“We are in favor of the Dawn Strike against corruption, but we want it to continue. There are clearly identified corrupt figures, and the law must be applied to them,” the Iraqi leader said. He also expressed deep distrust of Washington, saying, “We do not trust the Americans one iota, and they do not keep their word.” He added, “What happened with Iran is the biggest proof that the Americans do not keep their word. They struck Iran during negotiations, and this is proof of their treachery.”
US assassination unit, like Blackwater
Shikh al-Asadi said Iraq should remain free of US interference in its internal affairs. “Iraq must be free, and the American envoy must not interfere in economic, security, or political affairs,” he said. He added that his movement had information about US activities in Iraq, saying, “We have information about all the American movements and about the division they established, which includes Iraqis under their supervision.”
“We know where this division is located and what its duties will be in the coming phase, and all of this is being monitored,” Sheikh al-Asadi warned. He revealed that the goal behind the creation of this division is to carry out assassinations and create discord, saying, “It is like ‘Blackwater’ under another name.”
He added, “The American movement is suspicious, and they have security companies that entered to compensate for the American military withdrawal.”
Al-Nujaba rejects political participation under current system
Sheikh al-Asadi said Nujaba had no decision to participate in Iraq’s political process. “We in Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba have no decision to engage in the political process, and we are not convinced by the way it is being managed,” he said.
On the issue of weapons, he told Al Mayadeen, “The conditions for handing over weapons are ending the American occupation and all foreign presence, including the Turkish presence.”
He added that the Peshmerga should fall under the command of Iraq’s commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces and warned that “the separatist factions are one of Iraq’s problems, and whenever Resistance intervention is necessary, we will intervene in every inch of Iraqi territory.”
Sheikh al-Asadi further argued that the continuation of armed resistance was linked to the circumstances that justify it: “The resistance has its justifications for resistance, and when these justifications end, so does resistance,” reminding that the justifications do not end with the mere withdrawal of the remaining foreign troops in the country.
Iraq’s leadership must use its leverage
Al-Nujaba’s top official said Iraq’s political leadership must understand the country’s sources of strength and leverage and use them to advance its independence and sovereignty.
Speaking about Iraq’s leadership, Sheikh al-Asadi said he believed the current political figure in question “wants to serve the public interest and do the required work,” describing him as someone who is acting “based on his Shia identity, if I may put it that way.” However, he said the figure is “new to politics” and lacks advisors genuinely committed to helping him succeed.
“Unfortunately, he does not have advisors who are genuinely committed to making his experience successful. Rather, his advisors are concerned with making themselves successful,” Sheikh al-Asadi said.
He stressed that the advisors attempt to influence the political leadership based on what they receive from Washington, adding, “They do not want to help him become a successful figure who can lead during this stage and perhaps the next stage.”
“Whoever leads Iraq must understand what Iraq truly is and what the cards of strength and leverage in Iraq are,” he said. He questioned the interests of foreign powers in Iraq, asking, “Who needs Iraq? Does Europe not need Iraq? Does Turkey not need Iraq?”
Sheikh al-Asadi also pointed to the Development Road project, asking, “Doesn’t the Development Road that they are talking about need Iraq?”
“All of these are leverage cards a political actor can use to achieve what he wants,” he said. “He can even use the cards held by the Resistance factions as leverage. We are offering him this card and telling him: Use us for the sake of serving Iraq.”
Al-Asadi says US sought to persuade factions to give up weapons
According to Sheikh al-Asadi, several US allies had contacted his movement seeking a truce. “Many of America’s allies sent us messages asking for a truce, including the American chargé d’affaires who “tried to contact us through one of the politicians and asked to meet with us.”
He also said US officials had offered projects and incentives in exchange for abandoning strategic weapons. “The Americans offered projects and incentives on condition that we give up our strategic weapons that reach Israel, but we rejected them,” the Iraqi official said. He warned that US pressure would continue even if armed factions surrendered their weapons, saying, “American pressure does not stop at any point. Even if the factions hand over their weapons, they will move on to the Popular Mobilization Forces and then to the Defense Ministry.”
He concluded by highlighting that Washington had sought for years to alter the leadership of the Popular Mobilization Forces. “The main American project for years has sought to change the leadership of the Popular Mobilization Forces and dilute it, but the religious authority and some politicians rejected that,” Sheikh al-Asadi said.
Al Mayadeen | September 26, 2026
International flights from Iran to several destinations remain operational despite the expansion of US sanctions targeting the country’s aviation sector, according to Tehran’s Imam Khomeini International Airport.
The airport said Saturday that flights to Turkey, Malaysia, China, Pakistan, Vietnam, and Afghanistan were continuing according to their previously announced schedules.
The announcement comes as Washington escalates economic pressure on Iran and seeks to restrict the ability of Iranian airlines to maintain international operations.
Iranian flights continue despite sanctions
Imam Khomeini International Airport said that, aside from flights already canceled, no additional cancellations had been announced.
The canceled services include flights involving the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Oman, and Georgia.
The airport also said it was working to restore suspended air connections as soon as possible.
The continued operation of several international routes comes despite growing restrictions on Iranian aviation following a new round of US sanctions announced on September 8.
The measures have affected Iranian airlines as well as companies and intermediaries involved in providing services to the country’s aviation sector.
Recent reporting indicates that Iranian carriers have continued operating some international services despite the sanctions, including flights to China, Turkey, Thailand, and Afghanistan.
US measures target Iran’s aviation sector
The US Treasury Department announced sanctions on September 8 against 36 targets linked to Iran’s aviation sector, including 27 Iranian airlines. Washington described the measures as an effort to target what it considers Iran’s remaining unsanctioned carriers and the networks supporting them.
The sanctions form part of a broader US campaign to restrict Iran’s access to international financial and commercial networks.
The measures have also placed pressure on foreign companies providing Iranian carriers with fuel, ground handling, aircraft-related services, and other forms of support.
The consequences, however, have varied by country. While some governments and companies have restricted Iranian aviation connections, other countries have continued to facilitate flights.
Iraq restrictions trigger backlash
In Iraq, the suspension of Iranian flights, particularly through Najaf International Airport, has triggered criticism from official, political, factional, and religious quarters.
Several Iraqi parties and figures have called for the decision to be reversed and rejected what they described as US pressure on Baghdad.
The Iraqi government is also moving toward dialogue with Washington in an effort to secure an exemption that would allow air links with Iran to resume.
Ali Akbar Velayati, international affairs advisor to Iran’s Leader, said the restrictions on Iranian flights were part of an effort by Iran’s enemies to compensate for their battlefield defeat by attempting to dismantle the “unity of the fronts” from within.
The Iranian Ambassador to Iraq, Mohammad Kazem Al-Sadegh, further told Iran’s ISNA news agency that a new decision surrounding Iranian flights to Iraq is likely to be announced soon.
He added that Iran is in contact with Iraqi officials and proposals on the matter have been submitted.
Al-e Sadegh noted that roughly 12,000 to 13,000 people travel between Iraq and Iran via Iranian airlines.
China maintains air links with Iran
China has maintained its opposition to unilateral US sanctions and continued to receive Iranian flights.
Flight-tracking data cited in recent reports showed Iranian services continuing to operate to Chinese destinations after the latest US measures took effect.
The continued connections with China also reflect the broader geopolitical divide over Washington’s unilateral sanctions policy, with Beijing maintaining economic and diplomatic ties with Tehran despite US pressure.
Al Mayadeen | September 25, 2026
Turkey’s Parliament is expected to consider the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan next month, Parliament Speaker Numan Kurtulmus told reporters on Friday, as the three countries move to establish mechanisms for implementing the pact.
Kurtulmus said the agreement has not yet been submitted to Parliament for ratification and is expected to be formally presented once lawmakers return from recess next month. He added that international agreements require parliamentary approval to enter into force in Turkey, while meetings currently being held under the agreement remain preparatory.
Turkey prepares to ratify Mecca defense agreement
Kurtulmus made the remarks to reporters in Ankara, confirming that the agreement has yet to reach Parliament despite ongoing coordination among Ankara, Riyadh, and Islamabad.
The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement was signed on August 7 by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif in Mecca.
The agreement states that an armed attack against any one of the three countries would be regarded as an attack against all three, while providing for expanded defense cooperation and collective deterrence.
The pact is therefore moving from its initial political agreement toward institutional and legal implementation, with parliamentary approval constituting a key step for Turkey.
When asked about the claim that the Mecca agreement was against Iran, Kurtulmus denied the allegation and stated that the main source of the region’s problems was “Israel” and its aggressive policies.
He reminded parliamentarians that “Israel” launched multiple attacks on numerous nations without question as part of its hostile policies, and explained that the balance of power has completely changed following the US-Israeli war on Iran.
“We propose that the countries in the region increase their cooperation to establish and secure their own security,” he said. “We absolutely do not, and should never, view the Mecca Agreement as an agreement against Iran. The Mecca Agreement, and perhaps even its expansion to include Iran and other regional countries, should become an agreement that ensures the security of the regional countries and, more broadly, the Islamic world.”
Kurtulmus added that the agreement was not formed as a threat to any country as it’s an agreement for the promotion of unity, solidarity, and security of the region.
“It is still in its initial stages and is not yet fully formed,” he said. “We hope that with the participation of other regional countries, it will become a much stronger agreement.”
Saudi Arabia calls for military coordination
The development comes as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan prepare for an urgent meeting of their military chiefs, amid Saudi Arabia’s aggression on Yemen.
Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Ministry announced Friday that the chiefs of staff of the three countries would meet to discuss ways to support the Kingdom under the terms of the Mecca agreement.
The announcement followed a meeting in New York between Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar, and Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. The Saudi statement did not specify when the military chiefs would meet or what form potential support could take.
Pact moves toward institutionalization
The three countries have already begun establishing mechanisms to implement the agreement.
At a Strategic Political and Defense Committee meeting in Istanbul on August 31, the three sides agreed to establish a secretariat in Saudi Arabia, initially headed by a Pakistani secretary-general for three years.
They also agreed to strengthen military capabilities through joint activities, defense-industry cooperation, technology development, and production.
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said after the first session that work was underway on a roadmap for other countries.
The post Pakistan joins Türkiye, Saudi Arabia for inaugural defence pact meeting appeared first on BOL News.
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