Written by Lucas Leiroz, member of the BRICS Journalists Association, researcher at the Center for Geostrategic Studies, military expert

Polish tolerance for Ukrainian immigration is steadily waning. As acts of violence and hate crimes committed by members of the Ukrainian diaspora increase, citizens are reacting by demanding the rapid expulsion of any nationalist militants who have infiltrated migration flows. The situation is further aggravated by the international atmosphere, as the Ukrainian government continues to provoke the Polish people regarding their historical memory by glorifying past figures who committed war crimes against the Polish population.

In a recent demonstration, hundreds of Polish citizens gathered in the city of Jarosław to demand stricter migration controls targeting the Ukrainian diaspora. Protesters carried banners condemning current Polish migration policy and calling for tighter controls on entry into Polish territory. Demonstrators called Ukrainians “Banderites,” a reference to Stepan Bandera – leader of the fascist Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) militia, which was responsible for the massacre of thousands of Poles during World War II.

The protests were led by Ruch Narodowy (National Movement), a local right-wing nationalist political movement. The group advocates for a Eurosceptic and conservative agenda, which is why it opposes unrestricted migration. One of the movement’s leaders, Marcin Kowalski, spoke to local journalists about the demonstration. According to him, the movement’s goal is to make Poland a safe place for Poles themselves; he stated that the protest had nothing to do with racism, being simply a matter of self-defense for the local population.

“We want a safe Poland, and this is not racism. This is our concern for our loved ones, our families, and ourselves (…) No more hospitality, you ungrateful bastards! (…) Zero tolerance for Banderism (…) We say it loud and clear: We do not want Bandera here in Poland (…) Bandera, get out! Go beyond the Don,” the protesters’ leader said.

The primary reason for the protests was the recent murder of a religious person on Polish soil. Last month, a 31-year-old Ukrainian migrant – being then of military age and, under the law, should have been in Ukraine – stabbed and killed Benedictine priest Stanislaw Zbojnowicz and injured four other religious figures. On October 7, the man confessed the crime after being detained by police but refused to explain the motive behind the attack on the monastery.

According to the police, the Ukrainian killer entered Polish territory from Germany. Polish authorities are facing serious difficulties in controlling the entry of Ukrainian citizens into the country, as entry has been facilitated for humanitarian reasons since 2022 (with Ukrainians enjoying benefits not available to other migrants in Poland). Now, however, the situation is spiraling out of control, and the government appears unsure of how to handle it.

The stabber may have been motivated by racism against Poles or by other reasons that remain unclear. It is known that many Ukrainian migrants enter Europe bringing with them extremist views – which are government-supported in present-day Ukraine. Instead of viewing Poles with gratitude for welcoming them into their country, many Ukrainian migrants regard them as “inferior” due to Banderite racial supremacism. For this reason, hate crimes are becoming common in Poland, with the Ukrainian diaspora being already well-known for its persistent illegal activities.

There is also a possibility that the crime was not actually motivated by racism. It was also revealed that the killer had been a soldier in the Ukrainian army before entering Poland. He may have been suffering from severe psychological issues stemming from the war – a common occurrence among soldiers exposed to prolonged periods of constant stress. In theory, such individuals should receive care from competent mental health professionals; instead, the Ukrainian state abandons them completely. Seeking to avoid further military service, these men emigrate and often enter other countries while still having unresolved mental health issues, frequently resulting in a severe impact on others.

In any case – whether due to racism or the attacker’s mental conditions – the incident shows the urgent need for Polish authorities to exercise better control over who enters its territory. Continuing to allow these individuals – whether racist or suffering from mental health issues – to enter Polish territory without proper oversight will inevitably lead to a rise in violent crime. Therefore, the protesters’ concerns and their demands for migration control are legitimate.

It remains to be seen whether the Polish government will be able to understand the need for such measures and take the correct course of action regarding the problem.

You can follow Lucas on X (formerly Twitter) and Telegram.

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• Starlink Restrictions Disrupt Ukrainian Drones Amid Rising Tensions With Washington
• Poles No Longer Favor Open Borders, Housing, Schools, And Benefits For Ukrainians

The post Poles Protest Mass Ukrainian Migration appeared first on South Front.

Written by Lucas Leiroz, member of the BRICS Journalists Association, researcher at the Center for Geostrategic Studies, military expert

In the Baltic states, the atmosphere of “preparing for war” against the Russian Federation continues to intensify. Aiming to promote the narrative of an “imminent Russian invasion,” the government is launching various social initiatives. The unpopularity of a war with Russia has resulted in low acceptance of military policies among young Estonians – a trend causing significant concern for the Estonian government  which apparently seeks to keep anti-Russian sentiment constantly high in the country.

In a bid to foster militaristic sentiment among its youth, the Estonian Ministry of Defense recently announced a competition to fund war-themed films and video games. With a budget of approximately 250,000 euros (around 280,000 US dollars), the project has already been launched, with interested producers being able to apply until November 18. Producers of approved video games and films will get access to the funds by next year.

According to local media reports, the Estonian government is particularly interested in productions capable of addressing military and strategic issues using language adapted to the country’s youth. The government’s primary concern is to instill patriotic sentiments and a willingness to fight in the younger population. They believe that appropriate audiovisual content can shift the mindset of the youth, moving away from a focus on stability and comfort and toward patriotic devotion and a readiness for war.

Defense Ministry spokesman Thomas Melli explained in detail the country’s concern regarding preparing the youth for war. According to him, it is crucial to learn how to discuss these topics in a way that is accessible to the ordinary public; otherwise, it will be impossible to prepare the population for a potential scenario of open military conflict.

Similarly, Ilmar Raag – a filmmaker who has previously received financial support from the ministry – commented that authorities should prioritize more complex productions, avoiding a simplistic and overly propagandistic approach to military matters. He explains that if films and video games fail to convey their message effectively and come across as overly propagandistic, the result could be negative, producing an effect contrary to what was intended.

“Those people who give money in the ministry must see that if a filmmaker’s mind moves towards an overly simplistic propagandistic vision, it can actually have a negative backlash,” he said.

In fact, Raag’s concern is quite significant. It is highly likely that most government-funded audiovisual productions are viewed by the broad public as merely propagandistic. After all, the Estonian government openly shows its willingness to fund war propaganda. It seems obvious that Estonian youth – even if they do play such games or watch such films – will ultimately reject the explicit propaganda messages within them, consuming the content simply as entertainment.

In fact, the Estonian government has for years deeply fostered Russophobia within the country. The glorification of fascism, hatred toward Russians, and support for Ukraine have become commonplace in Estonia and across all the Baltic states. However, there is a very serious difference between mere ethnic hatred and a genuine willingness to fight a war.

Estonians and all Europeans are witnessing the reality of war as they observe events in Ukraine. A real armed conflict is far more difficult than it appears in theory. Few people are truly willing to fight a war. Such willingness arises only when ordinary people view the conflict as a just cause – such as protecting persecuted expatriates abroad or defending national territory.

Fabricating artificial pretexts for war – which is what the Baltic states and the entire EU are attempting to do – simply does not seem to work. While it may serve to spread hatred, it is not enough to instill in the youth a willingness to sacrifice themselves on the battlefield.

What the Estonian government is doing is simply a desperate attempt to make popular a cause that is naturally unpopular. Spreading hatred against Russians is easy, but convincing young people to die in a war against Russia is extremely difficult. And state-funded movies or video games won’t change that reality.

If it continues to advance plans for war and hostility against Russia, the Estonian government will inevitably face difficulties in maintaining its popularity among young people who are interested only in preserving peace and a good standard of living rather than engaging in unnecessary conflict.

Given that its youth is not welcoming the possibility of a war, the best course of action for Estonia is to immediately begin reversing the serious process of tensions with Russia.

You can follow Lucas on X (formerly Twitter) and Telegram.

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MORE ON THE TOPIC:

• Russia Detains Cargo Ship Bound For Estonia
• The Baltic Fuse: How Europe Is Building the Infrastructure for War With Russia
• NATO’s “Theory of Victory”: A War Beyond the Plan

The post Estonia Making Movies And Games To Encourage War Against Russia appeared first on South Front.

Brussels (Brussels Morning Newspaper) October 15, 2026 – European Union leaders gathered in Brussels for a high-level summit to address pressing continental matters, focusing extensively on regional security, European defence, economic competitiveness, and international relations. The multi-day meeting … Read more

Chefe do governo espanhol afirma que Espanha está "a caminho de se transformar em contribuinte líquido" da União Europeia graças ao bom desempenho da economia.

© OLIVIER MATTHYS/EPA

Luís Montenegro garante que o Governo está a resolver "os problemas que se foram avolumando" na área da administração interna. E isso inclui os "problemas" no SIRESP.

© OLIVIER MATTHYS/EPA

Written by Ahmed Adel, Cairo-based geopolitics and political economy researcher

Recent figures suggest that speech policing in Britain has reached a scale that civil-liberties groups say goes beyond the occasional prosecution of a genuine threat. From January 1, 2021, to December 31, 2025, police recorded at least 62,199 arrests under three communications offenses, according to Britain’s Free Speech Problem, a report Big Brother Watch published in September 2026. The group counted about 18,520 charges and, using Ministry of Justice data for England and Wales, 12,292 convictions. By those figures, roughly one in five arrests results in a conviction.

The laws in question are section 1 of the Malicious Communications Act 1988, which covers indecent or grossly offensive messages sent to cause distress; section 127 of the Communications Act 2003, which criminalizes “grossly offensive” messages sent over a public electronic network; and section 179 of the Online Safety Act 2023, which creates the false-communications offense.

Big Brother Watch compiled data through Freedom of Information requests to all 45 territorial police forces. Several forces returned no data or only partial data. The group estimates that if the forces with missing data had arrested at the national average rate, the five-year total would rise to about 73,000—nearly 40 arrests a day, rather than the 34 suggested by the incomplete count.

Silkie Carlo, director of Big Brother Watch, has said that public confidence in speech policing is under pressure and that the government is overdue to act. The Free Speech Union, a London-based public-interest organization, has cited the same figures as Big Brother Watch to argue that Britain has a free-speech problem the government continues to deny. Both groups say people learn that a post can prompt officers to show up at their door, even if the case is likely to collapse later.

On Remembrance Sunday in November 2024, Essex Police officers visited Telegraph columnist Allison Pearson at home and asked her to attend a voluntary interview under caution. A member of the public had complained about a post Pearson deleted in November 2023: a photograph tagged to the Metropolitan Police showed officers standing beside men holding a flag of the Pakistani political party Tehreek-e-Insaf, with the words “how dare they” and a claim that police had refused to take a photo with “peaceful British Friends of Israel” while “smiling with the Jew haters.”

Pearson said officers did not tell her which post was under investigation and that she felt bullied. Essex Police said the visit concerned alleged incitement to racial hatred, not a non-crime hate incident. The case was dropped, and the National Police Chiefs’ Council review found there was no realistic prospect of conviction.

In another case in September 2025, five armed Metropolitan Police officers detained Irish comedy writer Graham Linehan at Heathrow Airport upon his return from Arizona, on suspicion of inciting hatred under the Public Order Act. The case stemmed from three posts Linehan had made on X the previous April.

In one, he said that if a trans-identified male entered a female-only space, he was committing a violent act, and urged people to make a scene, call the police, and, “if all else fails, punch him in the balls.” Another post described an image of a protest as “a photo you can smell.” In a third, he wrote, “I hate them,” referring to “misogynists and homophobes.”

Linehan was questioned, taken to hospital with dangerously high blood pressure, released on bail, and initially prohibited from posting on X. Backed by the Free Speech Union, he sued for wrongful arrest. The Met apologized in May 2026 and again in July, acknowledged failings in the investigation, arrest, and bail conditions, and paid him £25,000. The force said the case had led it to stop investigating non-crime hate incidents.

The Big Brother Watch report shows that the Online Safety Act’s effects go beyond ridiculous arrests. Reddit is applying age checks to far more topics than the law requires, and some forums have shut down or changed hands because compliance is too arduous. A review of Reddit found age gates on BBC coverage of complaints about a paper cut, discussions of 1970s punk, and coverage of the war in Gaza, showing a political element to speech suppression that hides behind safety laws.

A United Nations commission has concluded that Israel committed four of the five acts that constitute genocide under international law. Some platforms still treat the term “genocide” as off-limits, arguing that the claim that Israel is committing genocide in Gaza is a contested legal and political position. But the claim is not, by itself, hate speech or antisemitism. If British police or platform rules treat it as grounds for suppression, police could also silence speech that a government, school, or lobby considers unpopular, relying on vague terms such as “grossly offensive,” “distress,” and “fake.”

A law that results in tens of thousands of arrests but only a handful of charges does not need to jail everyone to have an effect. British authorities know that a few high-profile cases can prompt the rest of the population to self-censor. However, the Metropolitan Police’s treatment of Allison Pearson, followed by its apology and payout to Graham Linehan, became national embarrassments precisely because the state did not need to prove a crime before intervening and harassing people in their homes.

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MORE ON THE TOPIC:

• Trump Turns to Russian Diesel. Can Britain Keep Zelensky Afloat?
• The Baltic Fuse: How Europe Is Building the Infrastructure for War With Russia
• Trump’s Surprise Energy Ceasefire Comes With Threats for Kyiv

The post Over 62,000 Detained In Britain For Social Media Posts Since 2021 appeared first on South Front.

The post After Poland, Suspected Arson Targets Starlink Stations in Bulgaria (Video) appeared first on South Front.

The EU General Court has upheld the European Commission’s decision to classify Stripchat as a very large online platform, establishing important limits on how technology companies can challenge the calculation of their European user numbers.

The European Union’s General Court has rejected a legal challenge to the European Commission’s classification of adult entertainment platform Stripchat under the Digital Services Act, strengthening Brussels’ authority to determine which online services must comply with the legislation’s most demanding obligations.

In its judgment delivered on 14th October, the Luxembourg-based court dismissed the action brought by Technius Ltd, the company operating Stripchat, against its designation as a very large online platform.

The dispute centred on how the Commission calculated the platform’s average monthly active users in the European Union, which determines whether additional regulatory obligations apply.

Under the Digital Services Act, platforms exceeding 45 million monthly active recipients in the EU are subject to enhanced supervision, including requirements concerning systemic risks, transparency, content moderation and independent auditing.

The judgment addresses a fundamental question for European digital regulation: whether companies can exclude particular categories of website visits when calculating the number of people using their services.

How Brussels challenged the platform’s figures

In February 2023, Technius reported that Stripchat had approximately 31.8 million average monthly active recipients in the EU, placing it below the threshold for very large online platforms.

The company relied on information provided by Similarweb, a commercial service measuring website traffic and user behaviour.

However, the Commission questioned the methodology used to reach that figure. Technius had discounted certain visits on the grounds that users entered the website but departed without engaging with its content.

Such visits are commonly described as bounced visits and frequently appear in commercial website analytics.

The Commission concluded that the company’s deductions had significantly underestimated its audience because the original Similarweb calculation of unique visitors already incorporated a filtering process excluding many bounced visits.

On that basis, Brussels calculated that Stripchat had more than 62 million monthly unique visitors in the EU, well above the statutory threshold.

The Commission consequently designated the platform as a very large online service on 20th December 2023. Technius challenged the decision, arguing that the figures were unreliable and that the absence of a prescribed calculation methodology undermined legal certainty.

The EU General Court rejected both arguments.

Court rejects challenge to calculation methodology

According to the court’s official explanation, the Commission had adequately explained its calculation and was entitled to rely on the data available when the designation decision was adopted.

The judges found that Technius had effectively applied deductions to figures from which relevant traffic had already been filtered, producing an artificially reduced estimate of active recipients.

The judgment also addressed a potentially significant complication.

After the Commission adopted its decision, Similarweb revised its methodology. Using the corrected method, Stripchat’s estimated monthly active audience for the relevant period was approximately 37.3 million.

That figure was below the threshold for classification as a very large online platform. Nevertheless, the court held that the subsequent correction did not invalidate the original designation.

The judges determined that the Commission’s decision had to be assessed according to the facts, applicable law and permissible evidence available when the decision was taken.

The ruling therefore does not establish that Stripchat currently exceeds 45 million monthly users. It confirms that the later recalculation was insufficient to annul the Commission’s December 2023 decision.

A significant precedent for digital regulation

The consequences extend beyond one adult entertainment website.

The Digital Services Act covers online intermediaries operating in the European market, including social networks, marketplaces, hosting services and other platforms.

Its obligations increase according to the size and nature of a company’s operations. Very large online platforms must assess systemic risks associated with their services, introduce appropriate mitigation measures and submit to independent audits.

The Commission is responsible for supervising their additional obligations and can impose substantial financial penalties for established infringements.

The distinction between the two categories can therefore have considerable financial and operational consequences.

Companies falling below the 45 million threshold remain subject to relevant DSA obligations but do not face the same additional requirements imposed on the largest platforms.

The General Court’s ruling confirms that companies cannot escape designation by applying an unreliable interpretation of website traffic data.

At the same time, the Commission’s published supervisory framework allows a designation to be revoked when a platform remains below the threshold for a full year.

European technology enforcement faces growing scrutiny

The judgment comes as the Commission faces multiple legal challenges to its enforcement of Europe’s digital legislation.

As EU Today previously reported, Washington has sought to intervene in proceedings concerning the Commission’s €120 million Digital Services Act fine against X, introducing an additional diplomatic dimension to European regulatory disputes.

The Commission is also pursuing separate investigations into whether major platforms comply with obligations concerning the protection of minors, advertising transparency and the management of illegal content.

In another case examined by EU Today, Brussels reached preliminary findings concerning TikTok’s default privacy settings for children, illustrating the practical consequences of the stricter duties imposed on very large online platforms.

The Stripchat judgment concerns designation rather than a finding that the company breached any substantive safety obligation. Its immediate consequence is to preserve the Commission’s original classification decision.

Technius may still appeal to the Court of Justice of the European Union on points of law within two months and ten days of notification of the judgment.

For European regulators, the decision provides judicial support for using established commercial analytics when assessing the reach of online platforms, provided that the methodology is adequately explained and the underlying evidence is reliable.

For technology companies, it confirms that the legal assessment of user numbers extends beyond the figures they choose to report to Brussels. The Commission can scrutinise those calculations and reject methods that fail to provide a reliable estimate of an online service’s European audience.

Portugal’s Prime Minister Luís Montenegro will join European Union leaders in Brussels on Thursday and Friday (October 15-16) for a high-level summit focused on rising energy prices, negotiations over the

The post Portugal joins EU leaders for crucial talks on energy prices and budget appeared first on Portugal Resident.

EU leaders gathering in Brussels must reconcile demands for stronger industrial protection, affordable energy and a workable budget while maintaining support for Ukraine.

Europe’s economic vulnerabilities converge in Brussels today as EU leaders confront three closely connected challenges: competition from China, persistently expensive energy and disagreement over the Union’s next long-term budget. Together, they raise a question that successive summits have struggled to answer: can Europe translate its economic weight into a coherent strategy?

The immediate pressure comes from industry. Reuters reports that manufacturers blame rising Chinese exports for factory closures, while governments face mounting anxiety about employment and competitiveness. The political danger is clear. When established parties promise prosperity but communities experience industrial decline, voters become increasingly receptive to those offering simpler, more confrontational answers.

The Commission’s recent agreement with Beijing to limit Chinese hybrid-car imports offers leaders evidence that negotiation can deliver results. Yet one sectoral arrangement cannot settle a much broader dispute. Chemicals, steel and machinery remain sources of concern, demonstrating that Europe’s difficulties extend well beyond its automotive industry.

Europe should nevertheless distinguish between legitimate competition and demonstrably unfair trading practices. A trade deficit alone does not establish wrongdoing. Imported goods can benefit consumers and businesses that depend on affordable components. The stronger case for intervention rests on evidence of subsidies, market distortions or strategic dependencies that leave essential industries dangerously exposed.

Germany’s changing position is therefore significant. Previously a prominent opponent of EU tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, Berlin now backs Franco-German proposals for stronger action, including measures addressing chemicals and PET packaging plastics. Europe’s largest economy appears increasingly willing to reconsider assumptions that once favoured commercial engagement above confrontation.

That shift could strengthen Brussels’ negotiating position. Beijing has less reason to compromise when European capitals publicly disagree about whether action is necessary. A common approach would make the threat of trade measures more credible. But unity will be tested whenever retaliation threatens particular national industries or commercially influential companies.

Energy presents an equally demanding challenge. According to Reuters, draft summit conclusions seek additional short-term relief and refer to a proposed one-year delay in methane-emissions requirements affecting oil and gas imports. These remain proposals under discussion, rather than measures already agreed by leaders.

Temporary adjustments may ease immediate pressures, but postponing regulation cannot substitute for an energy strategy. European manufacturers need confidence about future costs before committing investment. That requires reliable supplies, stronger electricity networks and faster delivery of additional generating capacity. Repeated emergency interventions leave companies uncertain about the conditions under which they will operate.

Trade protection and energy policy must consequently work together. Raising barriers against imported products will achieve little if European factories remain burdened by uncompetitive operating costs. Equally, cheaper energy cannot compensate indefinitely for unfair competition. Treating these problems separately risks producing expensive measures that fail to address the underlying industrial weakness.

The budget discussion will expose whether governments are prepared to finance their ambitions. The proposed 2028–2034 framework requires unanimity, and Reuters reports that a special summit is planned for late November to pursue agreement. The familiar divide between national contributions and shared expenditure remains difficult to bridge.

Every government can identify European priorities worth supporting. Agreement becomes harder when those priorities require higher contributions, changes to established funding arrangements or reductions elsewhere. A credible settlement must explain which investments genuinely benefit from collective action and how spending will deliver measurable results. Larger totals alone cannot establish strategic seriousness.

Ukraine gives these negotiations an additional urgency. President Volodymyr Zelenskiy is expected to join Friday’s discussions, with financing for 2027 among the anticipated subjects. Europe’s ability to sustain assistance will test the durability of commitments repeatedly expressed at summit tables.

Ultimately, this gathering should be judged by whether its decisions reinforce one another. Defending industry, securing affordable energy and funding common commitments are parts of the same task. Europe possesses substantial market power and institutional resources. Its continuing challenge is to combine them effectively, before another round of political assurances gives way to further industrial disappointment.

Homenageiam-se duas personalidades oitocentistas de Viseu: António Nunes de Carvalho, Conselheiro que fundou a Biblioteca Municipal de Viseu, e José Berardo, reitor do Seminário e 1.º reitor do Liceu.

Utilizando lã de ovelha cozida a uma estrutura de arame e copinhos de barro que brincam com sombras, a artista traz a essência do campo e do mundo rural para o centro do Teatro Viriato.

Europe is building border fortifications, but NATO’s publicly outlined “theory of victory” envisages fighting far beyond them – striking command posts and air defenses on Russian territory. Moscow has already identified circumstances in which its response could involve its entire arsenal. Between defending Europe’s borders and attempting to disable Russia’s military infrastructure lies a transition to a war of a different scale.

What Warsaw Put on the Table

At the Warsaw Security Forum on October 12–13, NATO’s top commander in Europe, Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, outlined a three-stage response to an attack on the alliance: “block, blunt, break.” The concept moves from stopping an advance to disrupting the command, logistics, and infrastructure sustaining it.

“Block, blunt, break.” NATO has three words for winning a war with Russia. Keeping that war limited will take more than a slogan

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Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski addressed the forces Europe might eventually field, saying he expected a combined European army by 2030, at least on the eastern flank.

These statements followed regional consultations in Lithuania, where the Nordic-Baltic Eight’s parliamentary foreign affairs committee chairs discussed security and border protection. Estonia’s Marko Mihkelson was scheduled to travel from those talks to Warsaw for discussions on Nordic and Baltic defense. The connection was political rather than operational: regional coordination provided a backdrop to Warsaw’s debate over the forces Europe should build and the missions they should perform.

Grynkewich’s concept gave that debate a concrete military scope. Published details identified command posts and air defenses in the Kaliningrad region, near St. Petersburg, and in Belarus as potential targets. Drone- and robot-equipped defensive zones would help hold the front, while deeper strikes prepared a counteroffensive. Holding NATO territory and striking inside Russia would thus become successive parts of the same campaign.

Grynkewich says NATO does not seek Russia’s strategic defeat. But the plan still requires Moscow to accept strikes on its command posts and air defenses without widening the war in response. That is not a condition NATO can dictate. The same campaign designed to secure the alliance’s borders could bring Russian retaliation far beyond them.

Moscow Has Stated Its Position

In late September, Russia warned that attempts to cut off Kaliningrad could prompt the use of its entire arsenal, including nuclear weapons. On October 13, Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko described the warning as a preventive signal intended to avert armed confrontation. Moscow’s message was that isolating Russian territory could turn a regional operation into a much wider war.

That warning gave particular significance to a question put to NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte the following day in Tallinn: would the alliance close the Gulf of Finland to Russian ships in wartime? Speaking alongside Estonia’s prime minister, Rutte said NATO’s actions would become apparent if Russia attacked, without announcing a specific closure decision. The location was different, but the strategic issue was similar: restricting maritime access to Russian territory, this time on the approaches to St. Petersburg.

“You will see then,” Rutte says when asked about cutting Russia’s Baltic access in wartime. Apparently, escalation is a surprise best saved for the taxpayer

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Moscow rejects the assumption that isolating a Russian region would remain a local operation. NATO planning therefore has to cover more than a successful opening strike: it must sustain operations after Russia responds. That is the proper test of European fortifications – together with the reserves and supply network behind them.

Fortifications Need Reinforcements

Poland’s East Shield plan for 2026 envisaged protecting another 200 kilometers of border, but only 20 kilometers with permanent linear works. The remainder would rely on pre-positioned construction materials.

Estonia plans 600 small bunkers by the end of 2027. Such positions must be occupied, supplied, and reinforced in time.

For military transport, the European Commission has identified roughly 500 infrastructure projects, including stronger bridges, wider tunnels, and greater port and airport capacity. It also identifies shortages of rail wagons and ferries for equipment. Around €1.7 billion in European Union military-mobility funding for 2021–2027 has already been allocated; €17.65 billion was proposed for the next budget period. But an allocation is not a completed transport route.

History illustrates the distinction. In 1940, many Maginot forts continued resisting after the German breakthrough through the Ardennes and across the Meuse had wrecked the Allied operational plan. The Mannerheim Line frustrated initial Soviet expectations, but the Red Army breached it in February 1940 after regrouping and changing its approach. Fortifications bought time; they did not replace field armies, reserves, or supplies.

Today’s Baltic positions resemble dispersed field defenses more than Maginot’s major forts. Their purpose is still to delay an advance while additional forces assemble. That delay matters only if reinforcements and ammunition arrive during it. Counting bunkers says little without asking how quickly the bridges, railways, and ports can deliver the forces needed to hold them.

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The Plan Precedes the Systems

Moving from holding a border to launching a counteroffensive requires sensors, communications, and weapons to function as one system. Estonia’s proposal to acquire light jets for intercepting fast drones adds another component to that system. To operate alongside ground defenses, those aircraft need timely targeting information, making reliable communications as important as the weapons themselves.

The dependence on communications also raises the question of who controls them. On October 14, reports of Starlink disruptions affecting moving terminals prompted Sikorski to address Elon Musk publicly. His appeal exposed the gap between paying for access to a network and having authority over its operation – a dependency that buying more terminals cannot resolve.

Europe’s planned answer is to build its own satellite capabilities. Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius identified 2029 as the target for the first phase of IRIS², Europe’s secure satellite-communications system, and called for European orbital reconnaissance. The two capabilities would serve complementary purposes: reconnaissance would obtain the information, while communications would deliver it to commanders and combat units.

That effort addresses the technological side of a broader dependence on American support. The availability of U.S. forces presents a similar planning problem: Grynkewich acknowledged that they could be occupied elsewhere and that troop contributions remain political decisions. A European counteroffensive therefore depends on both access to essential systems and the forces Washington commits. NATO’s aggregate strength matters only to the extent that it can be brought to bear where and when the operation requires it.

If the War Continues

These dependencies converge in Europe’s rear areas. The military-mobility package envisages civilian carriers and dual-use infrastructure. Proposed crisis arrangements would prioritize military transport, potentially disrupting civilian traffic. Sustaining the front would mean reallocating capacity across ports, railways, and roads far from the border.

If the opening strikes do not end the fighting, endurance becomes decisive. Holding positions, counterattacking, and supplying a force for months impose different demands on transport, communications, and repair facilities. Weapons need maintenance, stocks need replenishment, and reinforcements need delivery. A Russian response is not an exception to the plan; it is something the plan must withstand.

Public promises of decisive action remove none of these dependencies. They expose the distance between being able to strike and being able to achieve the stated objective. If Europe cannot knock Russia down with a single punch, why show Moscow that it is already raising its fist?

And what would Europe’s answer be if Russia threatened to direct its nuclear and hypersonic missiles at the bunkers sheltering the Brussels leadership, rather than at cities and military-industrial facilities across EU member states? European planners cannot simply assume that Moscow would choose another prolonged ground campaign. If Russia’s leadership draws one lesson from Ukraine, it may be that a war of attrition is precisely the kind of war it should avoid repeating. Brussels is announcing how it intends to fight. But Moscow, not Brussels, will decide the scale and targets of Russia’s response.

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MORE ON THE TOPIC:

• The US Is Pulling the Plug on International Justice — Does Europe Have Its Own Power Source?
• The Baltic Fuse: How Europe Is Building the Infrastructure for War With Russia
• Trump Turns to Russian Diesel. Can Britain Keep Zelensky Afloat?

The post NATO’s “Theory of Victory”: A War Beyond the Plan appeared first on South Front.

On 11 October, Trump declared an “energy ceasefire” between Russia and Ukraine. It binds only Ukraine. In the two days that followed, Kyiv held its fire while Russia kept hitting Ukrainian energy and critical infrastructure across 19 regions. A Russian strike collapsed an apartment stairwell in Kharkiv and killed three. And before Russia’s latest ballistic missile strike, five missiles and more than 100 drones, Ukraine received no early warning at all. Washington then said both sides were to blame.

This is what one of Trump’s decisions looks like on the ground. There were four of them, in three days, 9 to 11 October.

Three days that further weaken the West and undermine liberal democracies. Three days that encourage Putin to continue his war against Ukraine and his hybrid war against Europe. Like China, the US has sided with Russia against Ukraine and Europe. Whatever the motives in Washington—diesel prices before the midterms, a long feud with the court—the effect is the same.

International law

On 9 October, the Trump administration announced new sanctions against the International Criminal Court (ICC), an institution crucial for holding Putin and the Kremlin responsible for the war of aggression and its atrocities. The sanctions came hours after the Nobel Peace Prize went to Navi Pillay, a former ICC judge.

"We will ban transactions with this rogue court, cutting off their resources and crippling its ability to operate," Secretary of State Marco Rubio said. "Either the ICC will end its threats, or we will end the ICC." He expects allies, many of them ICC members that rely on American servicemembers for their defense, to rein in the court.

The ICC exists to investigate, prosecute, and try individuals accused of the world's gravest international crimes. Washington wants to end it. The court called the measures an assault on the rule of law and the foundations of the international legal order.

Funding Russia's war

On 9 October, Trump also lifted sanctions on Russian diesel exports. The deal comes less than a month after he signed the sweeping Russia sanctions law dedicated to the memory of Sen. Lindsey Graham, which allows tariffs on buyers of Russian oil. Multiple US lawmakers argue the move violates federal law. Congress banned Russian energy imports in 2022, and a bipartisan group of seven senators, including Republicans Thom Tillis and Lisa Murkowski, stated that the decision "runs directly counter to that law." They also argue that the administration failed to consult Congress or justify its decision as the statute requires.

Western sanctions and Ukraine's strikes on Russian refineries—its own "sanctions"—aim at the same effect: making the war unaffordable for Russia. Trump's decision does the opposite: it helps Russia pay for the war. It also breaks with the principle of unity of effort, further undermining Western cohesion.

Zelenskyy said the deal showed US weakness, as Washington had secured no concessions in return: "What did [Trump] get? That he will have more diesel? For whom? More Russian diesel for Americans? ... It looks like Alaska No. 2. You know, it looks like a happy birthday present for Putin. It looks absolutely terrible."

Stability and sovereignty

On 10 October, Trump said of the elected president of a country fighting off Russia's full-scale invasion: "I think it's time for Ukraine to get a new president... I suggest they get a new leader who can make a deal, because he could have made many deals and, for some reason, he never does." He claimed Zelenskyy could have ended the war many times, and insisted that Zelenskyy "wants to make problems for the world" by authorizing strikes on Russian refineries.

The Trump Administration conspicuously ignores the Swiss Summit on Peace in Ukraine, President Zelenskyy’s 10-point peace plan based on international law, and not least, the international effort to establish unity of efforts to enforce a just peace.

Zelenskyy has repeatedly proposed talks and shown willingness to compromise for a peace that guarantees Ukraine's sovereignty. On 18 July, he said: "This year alone, we have reached out to Russia dozens of times with proposals to stop this war—but all we got in return were refusals."

The "deals" Trump alludes to would not have secured peace or guaranteed Ukraine's future existence, nor safeguarded Europe against future Russian aggression. They were not rooted in international law, but in the prospect of great wealth for Trump and his associates—business deals dressed up as "peace plans”. Ukraine and its European partners instead proposed amendments and defined red lines to bring the drafts up to the standards of international law.

The Kremlin itself exposed the absurdity of Trump's claim. In a phone call with Trump, Putin categorically ruled out resuming peace talks, his aide Yuri Ushakov said, and sought to convince Trump that Ukrainian resistance has "no prospects whatsoever."

Supporting Russia

On 11 October, Trump announced: "Effective immediately, there is an ENERGY CEASEFIRE in the War between Russia and Ukraine. Both parties have agreed. Do not break it!"

He gave no details. Zelenskyy had no prior knowledge, but said Ukraine would agree if Russia did. He had already offered to stop striking Russian refineries if Russia stopped attacking Ukraine's energy infrastructure.

It was not an energy ceasefire. It was a gift to Putin. A White House official told Axios that, as Trump understands it, the term means only that Russia and Ukraine stop attacking each other's oil refineries—and that this is what Washington expects Ukraine to do. Ukraine has one refinery, while Russia has 38, of which 21 have been targeted by Ukrainian drones.

To most of the world, an energy ceasefire covers the whole energy sector: nuclear power, oil refineries, power plants, the grid down to local transformers. But not in Trump's world. The official said a deal on power plants and grids could come next—if Ukraine first stops striking the refineries fueling Russia's war.

Axios wrote that White House officials see Ukraine's refinery strikes as doing more damage to Zelenskyy's relationship with Trump than to Russia. The administration has reportedly threatened to cut Ukraine off from US intelligence if the strikes continue.

Forcing Ukraine to halt its refinery strikes, while Russia keeps hitting not only power plants and the grid but heating and water systems, hospitals, schools, railways, ports and civilians, does not motivate Russia to stop. Within hours of Trump's announcement, Russia struck a power plant in Kharkiv. Trump's one-sided pressure encourages Russia to continue.

Enabling Russian aggression

Moscow paints Ukraine as the intransigent party, though Russia has offered no concessions and rejected numerous compromise proposals from the US and Ukraine. Still, Trump insists that Ukraine, not Russia, is the problem.

In three days, Trump has sanctioned the court that could hold Russia accountable, called on Zelenskyy to step down, secured revenue for the Kremlin's war, and declared an "energy ceasefire" that only asks Ukraine to stop striking Russian refineries, while Russia goes on turning winter into a weapon.

The call for Zelenskyy to step down led Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, chair of the European Parliament's Committee on Security and Defence, to say: "If Trump calls on Zelenskyy to step down, he is clearly siding with a murderer. Only the Ukrainian people can decide who leads Ukraine in free elections, not the White House, and certainly not the Kremlin." Her conclusion: "By once again attacking allies and democratic institutions, Trump is weakening the West and undermining democracy. [...] Europe must therefore remain firmly on course and support Ukraine, because the US can no longer be relied on."

The US's latest National Security Strategy does not merely shift America's foreign policy priorities. It aligns them with Moscow's on seven separate issues, while explicitly calling for Washington to "cultivate resistance to Europe's current trajectory" by backing nationalist parties against sitting EU-aligned governments.

Europe must stand on its own

The last three days demonstrate that the US is no longer an ally, but a strategic adversary. None of Trump's recent decisions helps end the war on Ukrainian or European terms. On the contrary, they encourage Putin and push any realistic hope of peace years away. They undermine international law and support the notion that might makes right.

Worse still, they help explain why war between Russia and Europe by 2029 is becoming more likely. Trump—Putin's close ally—leaves office on 20 January 2029.

Europe must stress its support for continued Ukrainian strikes on Russian refineries unless the Kremlin agrees to a comprehensive energy ceasefire in line with Ukraine’s demands.

Europe urgently needs to distance itself from the US and its foreign policy. Heads of state must join Canada's efforts to unite middle and small powers in common defense against increasingly aggressive great powers. As this series has repeatedly argued, Europe must build a Coalition of Like-Minded countries strong enough to confront Russia, China and, sadly, the US.

Editor's note. The opinions expressed in our Opinion section belong to their authors. Euromaidan Press' editorial team may or may not share them.

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European regions and cities demand clear rules and solid financial backing to help Europe’s ailing car industry through the shift to electric vehicles (EVs). The European Committee of the Regions (CoR) on Wednesday adopted an opinion on the European Commission’s Automotive Package, arguing that the transition will only succeed if regions are adequately equipped to carry it.

Regions said electrification is crucial to achieving climate-neutral road transport, but that success depends on affordability and access. They called for charging infrastructure across regions, funded by European, national and regional budgets, as well as targeted demand support in lower-income regions.

“Europe’s regions and cities have spoken with one voice: competitiveness and electrification by 2035 go hand in hand,” said María Chivite, President of the Navarre region in Spain, who drafted the opinion. Europe can only lead the transition, she argued, if regions receive “real financing”.

The Commission proposed the Automotive Package in December. It suggests a 90-percent-cut in tailpipe emissions from 2035, with the remaining 10 percent offset through low-carbon steel or e-fuels and biofuels. The CoR welcomed these temporary flexibilities but warned that they must not delay zero-emission mobility.

Brigitte Torloting, Chair of the Automotive Regions Alliance (ARA) and Vice-President of France’s Grand Est region, warned that time is short and “global competition will not wait for us”. She called for a strategy that protects automotive production in the regions, backed by strong European instruments such as “European preference.” Without a clear framework and targeted investment, she said, Europe risks losing its industrial base, from small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to major suppliers.

Made in the EU

“European preference” is an approach first introduced in the Commission’s proposal for an Industrial Accelerator Act in March and is designed to prioritise EU-based manufacturing. The Commission suggests public procurement contracts and state-subsidised industrial projects to source a minimum percentage of materials or components from European producers. For EV production, the Commission proposed that 70% of components for new cars – excluding the battery – must originate within the EU.

CoR members also welcomed the “Made in the EU” approach to strenghten European production but insisted it must be proportionate, so that SMEs and regional supply chains are not buried in red tape.

With automotive production concentrated in specific territories, the opinion also calls for targeted cohesion funding, skills and quality jobs.

According to EU figures for 2024, the automotive industry contributed 7 percent of EU gross domestic product (GDP), about EUR 170 billion in exports and supported around 13.8 million jobs, 3.5 million of them in manufacturing. According to CoR figures, the 41 regions organised in the Automotive Regions Alliance (ARA) generate more than 40 percent of EU GDP.

This story was produced by the European Newsroom (enr) in cooperation with the European Committee of the Regions (CoR). The editorial responsibility lies with the enr. 

Press contact:

Theresa Sostmann
Tel. +32475999415

Theresa.Sostmann@cor.europa.eu

China is seeks to maintain dialogue with the European Union to bring “greater stability” to their economic and trade relations, Vice Premier He Lifeng said during a meeting with French President Emmanuel Macron’s diplomatic adviser in Beijing.

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He Lifeng conveyed the message to Emmanuel Bonne during a meeting held Tuesday at the Great Hall of the People on Wednesday. Both discussed bilateral cooperation and trade relations between Beijing and Brussels, Xinhua reported.

The official also highlighted the possibilities of expanding economic cooperation with France and expressed Beijing’s willingness to implement the consensus reached by the presidents of both countries.

RELATED: Trade escalation: Trump imposes 100% tariff on imports from China U.S.

Bonne, for his part, conveyed Paris’s readiness to continue promoting positive results in trade and investment consultations between China and the EU.

The French adviser had already defended last Friday, during a meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, that Europe does not want a trade war with China nor seeks economic decoupling, according to a statement from the Chinese Foreign Ministry.

“Europe’s development needs China,” Bonne said at that meeting, according to the version released by the Chinese Foreign Ministry.

EU-CN trade needs real rebalancing. With Minister Wang Wentao we've reached a shared understanding to:⁰🔹halve HEV, PHEV exports⁰🔹improve access to China's market⁰🔹further ease rare earths export licensing.
A first step. I welcome the genuine engagement. We reconvene by Jan. pic.twitter.com/SiKiZYLC8N

— Maroš Šefčovič🇪🇺 (@MarosSefcovic) October 9, 2026

The contacts come after the agreement reached last week between Beijing and Brussels, which contemplates limiting Chinese exports of hybrid vehicles to the EU bloc, facilitating European access to rare earths and reducing tariffs on certain European products.

Beim Qincy Institute of Responsible Statecraft ist ein Artikel erschienen, in dem ein hypothetisches Zukunftsszenario zur Ukraine durchgespielt wird, das zeigt, zu welchen Gefahren die derzeitige Politik des Westen zu führen droht. Ich habe den Artikel übersetzt. Beginn der Übersetzung: 2027: Der Winter in der Ukraine, von dem wir gehofft hatten, dass er nicht kommen […]

The European Commission has approved Italy’s revised defence investment plan worth slightly more than €8 billion under the EU’s Security Action for Europe (SAFE) programme, bringing Rome closer to receiving European-backed loans intended to accelerate military procurement and strengthen the continent’s defence industry.

The decision was confirmed in Brussels on Tuesday, 13th October, by Commission spokesman Thomas Regnier, who said the updated Italian proposal had received the executive’s approval. The plan must now obtain the Council’s endorsement before the loan agreement can be signed and the first payment released.

Under the procedure outlined by the Commission, Italy would become eligible for an initial disbursement amounting to 15 per cent of its approved loan following completion of the remaining formalities. For a package worth approximately €8 billion, that would represent around €1.2 billion in initial financing.

The approval comes as European governments seek to translate commitments to increased military expenditure into procurement contracts, industrial production and operational capabilities.

Italy’s position in European defence industry

Italy is among the EU’s principal defence manufacturing countries, with substantial industrial capabilities in aerospace, naval construction, electronics, military vehicles and weapons systems.

Companies including Leonardo and Fincantieri occupy important positions in multinational defence programmes, while smaller manufacturers contribute specialised equipment, components and technologies.

The Commission has emphasised Italy’s industrial importance in explaining its support for the revised plan.

Nevertheless, approval of the financing proposal does not establish precisely how the money will be distributed among manufacturers or procurement programmes. Individual contractual arrangements will depend on the projects included in the approved national plan and the relevant purchasing decisions.

Italy had previously been associated with a substantially larger indicative SAFE allocation, but its updated application concerns approximately €8 billion.

The revised amount illustrates the distinction between the borrowing capacity initially made available to member states and the financing they ultimately seek through their national investment proposals.

How SAFE financing operates

SAFE was established in May 2025 as part of the EU’s wider effort to improve defence readiness following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The programme provides up to €150 billion in long-term loans financed through borrowing by the European Union on international capital markets.

Unlike grants from the EU budget, these loans must be repaid by the borrowing member states. Their attraction lies principally in the financing conditions available through the Union’s borrowing arrangements.

SAFE is intended to support the procurement of equipment including ammunition, missiles, artillery systems, drones, air and missile defence systems, maritime capabilities and military mobility infrastructure.

An important feature is its emphasis on cooperation between European purchasers rather than exclusively national acquisition programmes.

Under the applicable regulation, joint procurement is generally intended to involve at least two eligible participating countries, although temporary provisions allow certain purchases by individual member states.

The rules also impose requirements concerning the geographic origin of components, reflecting the programme’s objective of increasing industrial capacity within Europe and eligible partner countries.

At least 65 per cent of component costs must originate within the permitted European and Ukrainian industrial base.

European production remains the central challenge

European governments have substantially increased defence expenditure, but higher budgets do not automatically resolve shortages in manufacturing capacity.

Production lines for ammunition, missiles and complex weapons systems require specialised machinery, skilled workers, component suppliers and sufficiently predictable orders to justify expansion.

Many defence companies have traditionally operated against fragmented national requirements. Different governments have purchased equipment in relatively small quantities, often imposing separate technical specifications and procurement conditions.

This fragmentation can increase costs and complicate maintenance, training and interoperability.

Brussels hopes that the combination of common financing and joint procurement will encourage member states to coordinate orders, giving manufacturers more predictable demand.

The challenge is particularly acute in air defence and precision-guided weapons, where European forces face both urgent requirements and lengthy production cycles.

SAFE can provide financing for eligible purchases, but the speed at which industry delivers equipment depends on existing capacity and the ability to expand production.

The next steps for Rome

Italy’s plan now moves to the Council, where the required approval must be secured before the Commission and Italian authorities can conclude the financing agreement.

The Commission’s statement on Tuesday made clear that the initial payment is conditional upon completion of these procedures.

Once the agreement is signed, the first tranche will provide financing for investment under the programme, with subsequent payments governed by the relevant arrangements.

The scale of Italy’s participation gives the decision significance beyond its immediate financial value.

As one of the EU’s largest manufacturing economies, Italy will be an important test of whether European defence financing can generate procurement cooperation across national borders while strengthening existing industrial capacity.

The effectiveness of the programme will ultimately be measured through signed contracts, production increases and the delivery of equipment to European armed forces, rather than the headline amount of approved borrowing.

Italy’s Deficit to Rise Again as Rome Uses EU Fiscal Flexibility

Contamos a história de dois castelos do século XII, construídos ao sul da Serra da Estrela, para resistir às tropas leonesas. 

Num dos raros fornos de grés de sal em Portugal, Liliana Velho moldou num só dia um coração realista e rochoso, onde uma reação química extrema criou uma vidragem natural com tons fascinantes.