© Inna Varenytsia/Reuters
Mainstream Polish journalist Dominika Długosz suggested that recent protests in France, Spain and Italy are being driven and influenced by Russia, a claim that was sharply rebuked by a number of Polish conservatives on X.
Długosz, a political reporter for Newsweek and Onet, wrote sarcastically on X on Oct. 18: “We’ll certainly be very surprised if in a year/two/five it turns out that the protests right now in Spain, France, Italy were influenced by Russia. We’ll be in shock.”
Bardzo się na pewno zdziwimy jak się za rok/dwa/pięć okaże, że protesty właśnie teraz w Hiszpanii, Francji, Włoszech były inspirowane z Rosji. W szoku będziemy.
— Dominika Długosz (@domi_dlugosz) October 18, 2026
Rafał A. Ziemkiewicz, a conservative writer and commentator, replied directly to Długosz: “Because it was Putin who let all those migrants in there and ran up those debts. Of course, Ms. Dominika.”
Bo to Putin tam wszystkich tych migrantów nawpuszczał i tych długów narobił. Wiadomix, pani Dominiusiu
— Rafał A. Ziemkiewicz (@R_A_Ziemkiewicz) October 18, 2026
Łukasz Warzecha, a journalist and commentator associated with the conservative weekly Do Rzeczy, posted a broader mockery: “What else in history did Russia influence? In my opinion, Putin was behind the extinction of the dinosaurs, the Tunguska meteorite impact, the murder of Leszek the White and the death of Vasco da Gama. What’s more, Putin personally infected da Gama with malaria by sending a trained mosquito after him.”
Co jeszcze w historii inspirowała Rosja? Moim zdaniem Putin stał za zagładą dinozaurów, uderzeniem meteorytu tunguskiego, zabójstwem Leszka Białego oraz śmiercią Vasco da Gamy. Przy czym da Gamę Putin osobiście zaraził malarią, nasyłając na niego wytresowanego komara.
— Łukasz Warzecha (@lkwarzecha) October 18, 2026
Długosz’s post did not present evidence of Russian involvement, and no independent verification of external direction of the protests has been reported by major international news agencies covering the events.
The posts came as France reeled from one of its most violent days of unrest in years. On Saturday, Oct. 17, demonstrations against rising living costs, fuel prices, declining public services and school conditions drew between 550,000 and 800,000 people nationwide, according to Interior Minister Laurent Núñez and the CGT union. Violence erupted during the protests in numerous cities including Paris, Marseille, Bordeaux, Lyon, Limoges and Strasbourg.
— Remix News & Views (@RMXnews) October 19, 2026
The Great Replacement is driving the French riots, says right-wing politician Éric Zemmour. "I believe that what we saw yesterday is the true face of the Great Replacement. It has an appearance: hordes of North African and African barbarians who ransack cities." Follow: @RMXnews
The exchange, highlighted by the conservative outlet Do Rzeczy, reflects a recurring Polish and broader European debate over whether external actors, particularly Russia, are driving social unrest. For years, the left has claimed Russian influence campaigns were responsible for everything to the election of Donald Trump to the popularity of the Alternative for Germany (AfD). While Russian influence campaigns are active and ongoing, their reach is extremely limited, and even more so now that major media actors like RT have been banned in Europe.
In France itself, right-wing politician Éric Zemmour said the violent protests and looting were “the true face of the Great Replacement,” citing Palestinian, Algerian and Moroccan flags among demonstrators and alleging ties to antifascist groups and left-wing lawmakers.
“What we saw yesterday is the true face of the Great Replacement. It has an appearance: hordes of North African and African barbarians who rampage through cities,” he said.
Authorities reported roughly 1,800 to more than 2,400 arrests during the riots, thousands of shops looted or damaged, and significant injuries among police, firefighters and others. A historic town hall in Limoges was largely destroyed by arson. In Marseille, protesters breached city hall.
President Emmanuel Macron, in a televised address, distinguished between “legitimate demands” of protesters and those who “destroyed, smashed and looted.” He said those responsible “must pay,” blamed “seditious elements from far-left factions, joined by numerous delinquents,” and asked, “How can French people do this to France?”
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Two Romanian F-16s shot down two jet-powered Russian Geran attack drones over Romania’s territorial waters near Sulina on the evening of 17 October, Romania’s Defense Ministry said. The ministry released cockpit images of the mission the next day, as NATO allies prepare to discuss Black Sea security at a special session Romania requested.
This comes as Moscow continues its air attacks on Ukraine, while the US is trying to make deals with Russia over its diesel and lift sanctions. Russia keeps striking Ukraine’s energy system and cities, while its drones and suspected saboteurs keep turning up inside NATO, from tankers hit off Romania to a foiled arson attempt at a Starlink site in Lithuania.
The F-16s took off from the 86th Air Base at Borcea at 17:43 after radar detected a group of air targets about 120 km east of Zmiinyi (Snake) Island, flying southwest, Ukrainian military outlet Militarnyi reported, citing the ministry. The first drone entered Romanian airspace at 17:59 and was shot down at 18:01 southeast of Sulina. The second entered at 18:01 and was downed at 18:05 east of Sulina.
Both were jet-powered attack drones of the Geran family, the ministry said. The Geran is Russia’s version of the Iranian-designed Shahed. When first detected, the drones were about 65 km from the coast of Russian-occupied Crimea and 140 km from the Ukrainian-held shore, and their southwest course may point to Russian origin, Militarnyi calculated.
The ministry posted the cockpit images on 18 October, showing a missile launch and a fireball over the sea. “Targets spotted, identified, engaged and neutralized!” it wrote.
A special session of the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s top decision-making body, will discuss defense and deterrence in the Black Sea on 20 October at Romania’s request. Romanian President Nicușor Dan has confirmed that the two tankers that caught fire near Sulina last week were hit by drones, and a NATO military source told Reuters they were Russian.
Romanian radar has logged 54 drone intrusions into the country’s air and sea space since Russia’s full-scale invasion, 35 of them this year, and the military has shot down six such targets in 2026, Defense Ministry data show.
Within hours, Poland’s Operational Command said it was checking a possible airspace violation by an unknown object overnight into 18 October. Troops, police, and military police searched for a possible crash site south of Lublin after residents reported the loud sound of a flying object around 02:00, Militarnyi reported.
On the morning of 18 October, an unknown drone entered Lithuania’s airspace and triggered air raid alerts, the country’s crisis management center said. NATO jets accompanied it but could not shoot it down because of bad weather, Defense Minister Robertas Kaunas said. Debris preliminarily identified as drone parts was later found in the village of Juodžioniai in Pasvalys district, and the army said the drone may have entered from the direction of Poland.
Romania moved from escorting Russia’s stray drones to firing on them in July, when its F-16s downed three in 72 hours.
Someone tried to set fire overnight to a Lithuanian company that stores Starlink communication equipment, but tipped-off guards foiled the attempt, Lithuanian Prime Minister Mindaugas Sinkevičius said. He linked the attack to Russia’s hybrid war against Europe. It is the third suspected sabotage of Starlink infrastructure in Europe in under a month.
Russia keeps attacking Ukraine at the front and from the air while running a sabotage campaign behind the lines in Europe, which ISW has linked into one pattern. Starlink keeps Ukraine’s drone units and front-line troops connected, and Poland pays for much of that service.
The attack came just after midnight, the prime minister wrote. Security services had warned the company about possible attacks, security was stepped up, and the attempt failed.
The company provides connectivity through nine Starlink satellite antennas used by Ukraine, Sinkevičius told Lithuanian public radio LRT. At almost 2 a.m., intruders tried to burn the antennas and their control unit, leaving behind incendiary liquid in canisters of 3 to 10 liters.
“It is obvious that this is part of Russia’s hybrid war with elements of sabotage,” he said, adding that the client was likely “the Russian side.”
He said he believes the people involved, and how many there were, are known, but gave no details, citing the investigation.
Police Commissioner General Arūnas Paulauskas said no suspects had been detained, any damage was minimal, and the company kept working. A pretrial investigation is under way.
Hours later, an object that apparently entered from Poland crossed northern Lithuania, and NATO jets failed to identify it, Defense Minister Robertas Kaunas said. Possible fragments were found in the Pasvalys district near the Latvian border. Latvia’s military said the object may have blown itself up on a course toward Latvia.
Sinkevičius said the sabotage version had to be checked for the drone too. He called the National Security Commission for Monday, 19 October, to examine both incidents and consider giving services more powers to neutralize drones.
In September, a fire destroyed the distribution panel at a Starlink ground station in Wola Krobowska, Poland. Germany detained two Turkish nationals on 12 October, and Warsaw blamed Russian intelligence. In Bulgaria, masked intruders burned 11 of 17 Starlink antennas near Sofia.
Russia has started fitting its enlarged Gerbera-2 drones with a 10-kg warhead and an extra bag of incendiary mixture, Ukrainian military outlet Militarnyi reported on 18 October. The setup is designed to start a fire where the drone hits and is probably meant for attacks on critical infrastructure and warehouses, the outlet said.
Russia’s industry makes about 3,000 jet-powered Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones a month, Ukraine’s military intelligence has said, and Russian strikes have destroyed 2.1 million m² of Ukraine’s modern warehouse space since the full-scale invasion began. A cheap drone that carries fire adds one more threat for air defenses that already let nearly half of Russia’s jet-powered Shaheds through.
Ukrainian Telegram channel Polkovnyk HSh posted photos of the payload on 17 October. Gerbera-2 strike and reconnaissance drones had begun to appear with a 10-kg high-explosive fragmentation-incendiary warhead and an extra package of incendiary mixture, the channel wrote. They navigate with Kometa-M12, a 12-element antenna array designed to resist jamming, it added.
In the photos, the incendiary mixture sits in a separate soft plastic tank behind the main warhead, Militarnyi said. Gerbera-2s have been seen with warheads of 4 to 10 kg depending on range, while strike versions of the original Gerbera usually carried up to 5 kg, the outlet noted.
Russia has mainly fielded the Gerbera, a cheap drone shaped like a Shahed, as a decoy and reconnaissance platform flying alongside Shahed-type strike drones. It has also used bigger Gerberas to drop FPV drones.
Serhii Beskrestnov, now an adviser to Ukraine’s president, flagged a much bigger Gerbera in Ukraine’s skies on 7 August. The Gerbera-2 has a larger airframe, a reshaped wing, and a bigger tail fin, Militarnyi said. In August, the outlet reported it had a stronger piston engine: half of the one in the Shahed-type Geran-2, at about 275 cm³. Production of these engines was set up at the Izhevsk Motorcycle Plant, according to preliminary information the outlet cited.
Earlier versions ran on a Chinese DLE60 model-aircraft engine of about 61 cm³. The switch was likely possible because Geran-2 engine output partly freed up as jet-powered Geran-4s took a growing share of Russia’s drones, Militarnyi said. The Gerbera-2’s fuel tank also holds up to 63 liters, against 10 liters on the original.
In September, a drone preliminarily identified as a Gerbera-2 was recovered from the Baltic Sea near Rusinowo, on Poland’s coast. It carried a high-explosive fragmentation warhead of about 4 kg, a Polish military prosecutor said.
Russia has kept striking Ukraine’s energy sector throughout the week since US President Donald Trump announced an energy ceasefire, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on 18 October. From overnight into Sunday, Russian drones and a ballistic missile hit substations, homes, and industrial sites from Odesa to Volyn. They killed civilians and left tens of thousands of families without power.
Russia fights along the front line while hitting cities and the grid behind it with drones, missiles, and glide bombs. Ukraine says Moscow plans up to 1,000 such munitions against 60 key infrastructure sites this winter, and jet-powered drones partly free it to concentrate missiles on fewer targets, the Institute for the Study of War assessed. With Graham Act penalties on hold and US sanctions on Russian diesel suspended, Russia faces no new US cost for its strikes on Ukraine’s grid. Protecting and restoring the grid falls to Ukraine’s air defenses and repair crews.
Zelenskyy counted 76 deliberate Russian strikes on energy and oil-and-gas facilities since Trump’s announcement. Overnight, Russia hit substations in Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, and Odesa oblasts, he said. In the past week, Russia fired almost 2,700 attack drones, 1,700 aerial bombs, and 66 missiles, most of them ballistic, mainly to cause a blackout. His message was aimed at Washington.
“America must see that Russia is not taking steps in return for the lifting of sanctions or deals. On the contrary, they take every signal that they can make money as proof that their bet on war is working and they can keep fighting,” Zelenskyy wrote.
Overnight, Russia launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile and 180 Shahed-type drones, 26 of them jet-powered, the Air Force reported. Air defenses downed or suppressed 152 drones, but strikes hit 20 locations.
Strikes left about 24,000 consumers in Odesa Oblast without power, oblast head Oleh Kiper said. In Vinnytsia Oblast, the attack damaged critical infrastructure and forced emergency outages, oblast head Natalia Zabolotna wrote. Drones hit three energy facilities in Ternopil Oblast, one of them for the second time, and cut power to some consumers, oblast head Taras Pastukh said.
A Russian strike on Zaporizhzhia killed a 27-year-old woman and injured two others, including a 16-year-old, the State Emergency Service reported. In Poltava, an evening attack killed one person, injured four, and damaged 10 detached houses, city council secretary Kateryna Yamshchykova said.
A drone hit a high-rise in Odesa and set its roof on fire. A 13-year-old girl was hurt, city military administration head Serhii Lysak said, and Kiper put the number of injured at two.
In Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, Russian drones and artillery injured three people, oblast head Oleksandr Hanzha said. In Donetsk Oblast, Russian attacks killed seven civilians on Saturday, six of them in Sloviansk, oblast head Vadym Filashkin reported.
A morning drone strike set warehouse and production buildings ablaze at an enterprise in Manevychi, Volyn Oblast, oblast head Roman Romaniuk said. With heavy smoke blowing toward the town, Romaniuk urged residents to stay indoors, shut windows and doors, and switch off ventilation. A repeat strike set an enterprise in the district on fire again, the State Emergency Service said, adding that air tests found no dangerous concentrations outside the site. In Lviv Oblast, drone debris damaged a logistics warehouse and two houses, oblast head Maksym Kozytskyi said.
Polish military aircraft operated in Poland’s airspace twice during the attack, as the Government Security Centre warned residents of Lublin Voivodeship and later alerted Subcarpathian Voivodeship. In Lithuania, NATO jets failed to identify an object that apparently entered from Poland, Defense Minister Robertas Kaunas said.
Trump announced the energy ceasefire on 11 October, news that surprised Zelenskyy. A White House official said Russia was still weighing it. Hours later, Russia hit a Kharkiv power plant, and on 14 October it fired 39 ballistic missiles at the grid. Then Trump waived Graham Act penalties on buyers of Russian oil, and Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the administration wants 60 days to weigh the economic effects.
European Union leaders have resisted demands for another postponement of carbon pricing for road transport and building fuels, exposing deep disagreements over climate policy, industrial competitiveness and the burden of energy costs on European households.
At the European Council summit in Brussels on 15–16 October, the Visegrad countries — Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic — pressed for the second European Emissions Trading System, known as ETS2, to be delayed until 2030. Italy and Greece joined calls for greater flexibility over carbon costs, although Rome also sought a national exemption from aspects of the energy-price regime rather than simply a uniform delay. No further postponement was agreed.
The European Council conclusions call on the European Commission to update its assessment of ETS2, particularly its design and safeguards. Leaders also demanded action to reduce volatility in the existing carbon market and limit the effect of carbon prices on electricity costs.
The outcome stops short of the further postponement sought by several governments, but demonstrates how far energy affordability has moved towards the centre of European climate negotiations.
ETS2 is designed to extend the principle of carbon pricing to fuels used for heating buildings, road transport and certain smaller industrial activities. Unlike the existing Emissions Trading System, which covers large industrial installations and power generation, the new mechanism reaches sectors closely connected to everyday household expenditure.
Under the scheme, fuel suppliers must purchase allowances corresponding to the emissions associated with the fuels they sell. Households and motorists will not buy allowances themselves, but suppliers may pass those additional costs through to customers.
That distinction is fundamental. A policy designed to encourage investment in cleaner heating systems and vehicles may initially appear to consumers as an increase in petrol, diesel and domestic heating bills.
The current legislative timetable provides for ETS2 to become operational in 2028, following an earlier one-year postponement. The latest demands from several Central European governments would push that date back to 2030.
Their argument is that consumers and smaller businesses cannot reasonably be expected to absorb another source of energy-price pressure while European economies continue to contend with geopolitical uncertainty, expensive fuel and comparatively weak industrial competitiveness.
Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš has been particularly outspoken in his criticism, arguing that carbon pricing risks weakening Europe’s industrial base and making everyday life more expensive.
Italy has supported calls for greater flexibility, with Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni presenting the discussion as part of a wider attempt to restore competitiveness and make the transition more affordable.
The initiative encountered resistance from governments concerned that repeatedly postponing established climate legislation would weaken investment certainty and reduce confidence in European policy.
The Nordic member states have been particularly reluctant to reopen the timetable. Their position reflects a broader concern that businesses investing in clean technologies need credible long-term rules, rather than legislation liable to be revised whenever political opposition intensifies.
Carbon pricing is intended to change economic incentives gradually. Higher costs for carbon-intensive fuels are supposed to make alternatives such as better-insulated buildings, electric vehicles and cleaner heating more financially attractive.
Critics of further postponement argue that delaying implementation would also delay those incentives, potentially increasing the eventual cost of reaching the Union’s emissions-reduction targets.
Yet the opposition has exposed a weakness in that argument: consumers cannot always respond quickly to price signals. A household relying on an older heating system or a worker with no practical alternative to driving may face higher costs long before affordable low-carbon options become available.
That issue has been central to earlier discussions over ETS2. EU Today reported on stronger carbon-price safeguards in June, when European institutions moved to provide additional market intervention if allowance prices rose sharply.
Rather than endorsing a new delay, European leaders have asked the Commission to review ETS2’s economic impact and safeguards.
The summit also urged faster progress on adjustments to the Market Stability Reserve, the mechanism intended to help manage the supply of carbon allowances and prevent excessive price volatility.
Under the existing scheme, market interventions can increase or reduce allowance availability in response to defined conditions. For ETS2, safeguards are especially politically sensitive because the cost of carbon allowances may ultimately be reflected in household transport and heating expenditure.
The European Commission’s updated auction arrangements already envisage auctions of ETS2 allowances beginning in 2027, ahead of the system’s operational launch in 2028.
That timetable gives governments a relatively narrow window to settle the remaining political disputes and put protective measures into effect.
A central part of the response is the Social Climate Fund, intended to support vulnerable households, transport users and small businesses through investments in energy efficiency, cleaner heating, improved transport and temporary financial assistance.
EU Today previously examined the European Investment Bank’s €3 billion advance financing initiative, which aims to accelerate support for households before the new carbon market becomes fully operational.
The central practical question is whether such assistance reaches consumers quickly enough to offset rising costs, particularly in member states where incomes are lower and households remain heavily dependent on fossil fuels.
The ETS2 dispute is connected to a broader argument over Europe’s existing carbon market and its effects on energy-intensive industries.
Manufacturers already face substantial costs arising from electricity, fuel, regulatory requirements and international competition. Governments concerned about deindustrialisation argue that European climate policy must account more directly for these pressures.
The summit conclusions acknowledged those concerns by demanding a predictable carbon market that limits price volatility and protects industry against the relocation of production to jurisdictions with less demanding environmental rules.
At the same time, leaders reaffirmed the importance of maintaining carbon pricing as an incentive for investment and emissions reduction.
For the governments seeking a postponement, the Commission’s new assessment offers an opportunity to maintain pressure for further concessions. For governments defending the existing timetable, it provides an alternative to another politically damaging delay.
The immediate result is therefore a compromise over scrutiny rather than a change in law. ETS2 remains scheduled for 2028, while Brussels must demonstrate that its safeguards can withstand both market volatility and political opposition.
The next phase will be determined less by arguments about long-term emissions targets than by the ability of EU institutions and national governments to show households and businesses how the transition can be financed without placing disproportionate costs on those least able to adjust.
Ukraine has received undisclosed assistance from Poland as it struggles to defend against increasingly intense Russian drone and missile attacks, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy hinted during a meeting with Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk in Brussels on 15 October, Radio Svoboda reported.
Ukraine’s air defense needs are greater than at any point since 2022, as intensified Russian drone and missile attacks strain existing systems and expose shortages of interceptor missiles. With US support increasingly uncertain amid tensions between Kyiv and Washington, European military aid is becoming more critical to Ukraine’s ability to defend its cities and infrastructure.
Zelenskyy thanked Warsaw for its support, suggesting that some assistance had to remain confidential. He also specifically mentioned 20 mm ammunition, which Ukraine needs to defend its cities against Russian attacks.
“Sometimes this has to stay between the two of us,” Zelenskyy said, thanking Tusk for the aid.
Ukraine is facing mounting pressure on its air defenses as Russia increases the scale of its aerial attacks. Ukrainian forces are also struggling with shortages of interceptor missiles, particularly Patriot missiles needed to counter Russian ballistic strikes, leaving the country vulnerable to further attacks.
The need for additional support comes amid growing uncertainty over US assistance under President Donald Trump. Washington has taken steps that have strained ties with Kyiv, including easing some restrictions on Russian fuel and pressing for an energy ceasefire that Ukraine says Russia has continued to violate.
Recent disruptions to US-linked intelligence and satellite support have also raised concerns about Ukraine's ability to detect and counter Russian attacks.
As uncertainty over Washington's role grows, European military assistance is becoming increasingly important for Ukraine's defense.
Tusk reaffirmed Poland's commitment to supporting Ukraine, saying Kyiv could count on Poland and the European Union. He also opposed easing EU sanctions against Russia, arguing that Europe should not take steps that help Moscow finance its war.
The meeting also came amid strained relations between Kyiv and Warsaw over historical disputes. However, Poland's government has maintained that these disagreements should not undermine military support for Ukraine, whose ability to resist Russian aggression is closely tied to Poland's own security.
In September, a fire broke out at the Starlink satellite communications ground station in Wola Krobowska in Poland. The fire engulfed the power distribution unit housing and also damaged the generator. Firefighters extinguished the fire, and no one was injured in the incident.
On Friday, Internal Security Agency officers detained a Ukrainian citizen in Poland suspected of participating in the arson attack on the ground station. According to investigators, this is the third person involved in the incident, which occurred on Sept. 23. The man had previously observed the facility and checked its security before two Turkish citizens set it on fire.
According to the Internal Security Agency, the Ukrainian took photos and recordings, which he sent via a messaging app. After passing verification, he was tasked with reconnaissance of the station area and its security systems. The man has been charged and has been in custody since Sept. 30.
A few hours later, a Polish police patrol identified two Turkish citizens nearby who are now suspected of committing arson on behalf of foreign intelligence. The officers allowed them to leave because, at that point, there was no basis to consider the incident an act of sabotage.
Both Turks were later detained in Germany on the basis of a European arrest warrant issued by Poland. After being handed over to Poland, they are to be held accountable in court for sabotage activities on behalf of foreign intelligence.
A 24-year-old Turkish citizen who was supposed to bring the suspects to Poland, and another man suspected of helping them, were also detained in Germany.
Prime Minister Donald Tusk had previously commented on the arrests.
“At the request of Polish services, German police detained two Turkish citizens suspected of setting fire to the Starlink station in Mazovia. This is another act of hybrid warfare. The perpetrators of sabotage will be brought to justice before the Polish justice system,” the head of government wrote on social media.
Na zlecenie polskich służb niemiecka policja zatrzymała dwóch obywateli tureckich podejrzanych o podpalenie stacji Starlink na Mazowszu. To kolejny akt wojny hybrydowej. Sprawcy sabotażu odpowiedzą przed polskim wymiarem sprawiedliwości.
— Donald Tusk (@donaldtusk) October 12, 2026
“The actions of @PolskaPolicja and @ABW_GOV_PL in cooperation with the German services (BKA) led to the arrest in Germany of two Turkish citizens responsible for the arson attack on the Starlink station in Wola Krobowska. Charged with diversion and sabotage for the benefit of foreign intelligence,” added the Minister of Interior and Administration, Marcin Kierwiński, in a post on X.
The post ‘Hybrid warfare’ – Polish police arrests Ukrainian suspect after Starlink station arson attack, 2 Turks already in custody appeared first on Remix News.
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Written by Lucas Leiroz, member of the BRICS Journalists Association, researcher at the Center for Geostrategic Studies, military expert
The decline of the EU’s political, economic, and military capabilities is an increasing source of concern for its member states. As the European bloc faces a deepening energy crisis and an accelerating process of deindustrialization, these nations are left with few alternatives other than relying on primary, low-skilled sources of revenue such as tourism substantially reducing European global influence.
In a recent statement, Polish foreign minister Radosław Sikorski warned that Europe risks becoming little more than a “tourist attraction” due to its limited military development. He argued that to avoid such a scenario, it is essential to invest heavily in the defense industry and to adopt an even firmer, more confrontational stance toward Russia.
Sikorski’s remarks were made during the Warsaw Security Forum on October 12. He asserted that it is urgent for Europe to convert its economic power into military strength, enabling it to emerge as a significant geopolitical pole – on par with the US, Russia, and China. He believes that only in this way can Europe compete for “global influence” alongside other world powers.
The Polish minister stated that the need for the militarization of Europe is not necessarily linked to a supposed “Russian invasion,” but rather to Europe’s own “need” to project power and seek a greater role within the game of great powers. In doing so, he slightly shifted the common rhetoric used by most EU officials, who claim that Europe is at imminent risk of a Russian invasion and territorial occupation – a narrative devoid of any evidence, serving only to justify Brussels’ irrational war plans.
Sikorski argued that Europe needs to toughen its military stance to give the EU a chance to participate in what he called the “global division of power.” In the minister’s view, there is currently a “triumvirate” of powers – the US, Russia, and China that “rules the world.” Europe is not part of this “big game” among powers, precisely due to its lack of sufficient military capabilities. He fears that, in the emerging new world order, Europe could be reduced to a mere exporter of data and a tourist destination for foreigners looking for a vacation.
“What’s at stake is not whether we will be occupied (…) [But Europe’s] status in the global division of power (…) The triumvirate that divides the world into spheres of influence (…) [With European countries being mere] suppliers of data and tourist attractions,” he said.
Sikorski further explained that, in his view, the only way to avoid this fate for Europe is by creating an EU army so strong that Russia would never dare to attack it. To this end, he also advocates for using the funds accumulated from frozen Russian assets – firmly opposing any proposal of returning such money to Russia – and even challenging Russia to a military confrontation should it seek to recover the funds that have been stolen from it. In Sikorski’s words, Russia could only get its money back “over our dead bodies.”
Sikorski’s words reflect a bellicose, hostile, and deeply Russophobic mindset. Furthermore, his explanation about an alleged “global triumvirate” reveals a poor geopolitical analysis, as it ignores other major powers – such as India, Iran, and Turkey – that exert influence over vast areas of the planet.
Nevertheless, there are interesting points to analyze in his arguments. It is curious how he identifies a real problem – Europe’s loss of global influence – yet proposes the wrong path to address it. Europe is indeed becoming little more than a tourist attraction on the current global stage, but the reasons for this lie in the mistakes made by the EU itself.
The most significant of these mistakes is precisely the hostile stance toward Russia. Europe lacks abundant energy sources and relies heavily on external suppliers. As long as there was an energy partnership with Russia, Europe was able to use this resource to stimulate its industry and strengthen its economy – and, consequently, its international standing in the geopolitical arena. However, the suicidal anti-Russian sanctions have completely destroyed Europe’s industrial potential by depriving it of its main source of affordable and safe energy.
Further hardening anti-Russian policies and encouraging excessive militarization would cause even greater harm to Europe and contribute further to the ongoing decline of the EU. Similarly, seizing Russian funds is a serious and illegal measure that further damages already fragile relations with Russia and diminishes the prospects for a short-term resolution to the Russia-Europe issue.
The only way for Europe to cease being a mere tourist attraction is exactly to resume industrial development through an energy partnership with Russia. Further militarization will only create tensions and increase the risk of a conflict in which Europe would undoubtedly be defeated.
You can follow Lucas on X (formerly Twitter) and Telegram.
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Russia is pushing its drone war westward, into a Ukrainian region that borders NATO. Russian drones attacked Volyn Oblast through the night of 16 October, hitting civilian and critical infrastructure and leaving 370,000 subscribers without power, regional administration head Roman Romaniuk says. Volyn borders Poland, a NATO member, and Belarus, a Russian ally.
Russia’s jet-powered drones keep flying farther west, and now the strikes reach deeper into the center and the EU-facing frontier too. Moscow launched more than 850 Shahed drones at Ukraine in about a day and a half, including a record roughly 360 on the central Kirovohrad Oblast, precisely as a speed cap on Starlink degraded the interceptor drones Ukraine’s air defense relies on.
Moscow escalates its attacks after winning sanctions relief from the diesel deal of US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin and sensing pressure on Ukraine, exploiting the moment its defenses were artificially restricted.
“Russia takes advantage of every such moment and must be held accountable for what it does,” Zelenskyy says, noting the skies had not been clear for a single hour.
In Volyn Oblast, the damage was concrete and lethal. Debris fell on a power line in the central Lutsk community, cutting electricity and disrupting water supply, and the city lost power entirely with public transport halted, Lutsk council secretary Andrii Razumovskyi says.
The heaviest toll came in Manevychi, where a drone hit the private enterprise Agrofrukt LTD, killing one person and injuring eight. By 10:46 AM, the fire there was contained, and residents were asked to seal windows, doors, and vents due to the risk of an ammonia release from a damaged facility.
Throughout the day, Russia has struck Kyiv and its region, and the Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, Rivne, Kharkiv and Donetsk regions, along with Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi, Poltava and Ivano-Frankivsk.
By reaching western border regions at once, Russia is widening the pressure on civilians across the country and edging closer to the EU.
Europe is heading into an electoral moment without recent precedent. Four of its five most populous member states, Spain, France, Italy and Poland, are due to vote within the next 12 months – starting with Spain on 29 November.
If voters move further right, the combined effect could reshape the Union far more profoundly than any single national election.
Two shifts stand out. First, the firewall between the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP) and the hard-right is crumbling, even in Germany, its last bastion.
Hard-right parties sit in the governments of Italy, Czech Republic, Finland, Slovakia and Croatia, while Slovenia’s government relies on outside support from one.
Second, competition from the far-right is pushing established radical-right parties to harden their positions.
In Catalonia, Aliança Catalana is challenging Vox; in France, Éric Zemmour’s Reconquête, despite scoring single digits, is pressing on Marine Le Pen’s National Rally; in Italy, Roberto Vannacci’s National Future is challenging Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy; and in Poland, Grzegorz Braun’s Confederation of the Polish Crown is cannibalising the Confederation.
Under pressure, established conservatives tend to move towards these parties rather than hold the line, as Spain’s Partido Popular and France’s Les Républicains illustrate. Positions once on the margins become mainstream.
The implications go beyond immigration.
Le Pen and Vox leader Santiago Abascal advocate “national priority” in access to welfare and public services. Under pressure from the League and National Future, Meloni’s government has introduced a 30-percent cap on first-year classrooms for pupils without Italian citizenship, based on their birthplace or prior schooling.
A leaked AfD strategy paper reportedly goes further, proposing that national constitutions override EU law and reducing the Court of Justice to a forum for disputes between governments.
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The European Commission says asylum seekers arriving at EU borders are now being screened, but it makes no mention of the independent rights monitors that EU law requires to oversee those procedures, even as spending on border surveillance surges.
“Screening of people arriving illegally and the border procedures are being carried out,” said European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen, in a letter addressed to the 27 heads of state and government meeting at an EU summit in Brussels on Thursday (15 October).
An annex to her letter, obtained by EUobserver, highlights broad outstanding issues when it comes to implementing new EU-wide asylum laws that kicked into force this past June.
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Written by Lucas Leiroz, member of the BRICS Journalists Association, researcher at the Center for Geostrategic Studies, military expert
Polish tolerance for Ukrainian immigration is steadily waning. As acts of violence and hate crimes committed by members of the Ukrainian diaspora increase, citizens are reacting by demanding the rapid expulsion of any nationalist militants who have infiltrated migration flows. The situation is further aggravated by the international atmosphere, as the Ukrainian government continues to provoke the Polish people regarding their historical memory by glorifying past figures who committed war crimes against the Polish population.
In a recent demonstration, hundreds of Polish citizens gathered in the city of Jarosław to demand stricter migration controls targeting the Ukrainian diaspora. Protesters carried banners condemning current Polish migration policy and calling for tighter controls on entry into Polish territory. Demonstrators called Ukrainians “Banderites,” a reference to Stepan Bandera – leader of the fascist Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) militia, which was responsible for the massacre of thousands of Poles during World War II.
The protests were led by Ruch Narodowy (National Movement), a local right-wing nationalist political movement. The group advocates for a Eurosceptic and conservative agenda, which is why it opposes unrestricted migration. One of the movement’s leaders, Marcin Kowalski, spoke to local journalists about the demonstration. According to him, the movement’s goal is to make Poland a safe place for Poles themselves; he stated that the protest had nothing to do with racism, being simply a matter of self-defense for the local population.
“We want a safe Poland, and this is not racism. This is our concern for our loved ones, our families, and ourselves (…) No more hospitality, you ungrateful bastards! (…) Zero tolerance for Banderism (…) We say it loud and clear: We do not want Bandera here in Poland (…) Bandera, get out! Go beyond the Don,” the protesters’ leader said.
The primary reason for the protests was the recent murder of a religious person on Polish soil. Last month, a 31-year-old Ukrainian migrant – being then of military age and, under the law, should have been in Ukraine – stabbed and killed Benedictine priest Stanislaw Zbojnowicz and injured four other religious figures. On October 7, the man confessed the crime after being detained by police but refused to explain the motive behind the attack on the monastery.
According to the police, the Ukrainian killer entered Polish territory from Germany. Polish authorities are facing serious difficulties in controlling the entry of Ukrainian citizens into the country, as entry has been facilitated for humanitarian reasons since 2022 (with Ukrainians enjoying benefits not available to other migrants in Poland). Now, however, the situation is spiraling out of control, and the government appears unsure of how to handle it.
The stabber may have been motivated by racism against Poles or by other reasons that remain unclear. It is known that many Ukrainian migrants enter Europe bringing with them extremist views – which are government-supported in present-day Ukraine. Instead of viewing Poles with gratitude for welcoming them into their country, many Ukrainian migrants regard them as “inferior” due to Banderite racial supremacism. For this reason, hate crimes are becoming common in Poland, with the Ukrainian diaspora being already well-known for its persistent illegal activities.
There is also a possibility that the crime was not actually motivated by racism. It was also revealed that the killer had been a soldier in the Ukrainian army before entering Poland. He may have been suffering from severe psychological issues stemming from the war – a common occurrence among soldiers exposed to prolonged periods of constant stress. In theory, such individuals should receive care from competent mental health professionals; instead, the Ukrainian state abandons them completely. Seeking to avoid further military service, these men emigrate and often enter other countries while still having unresolved mental health issues, frequently resulting in a severe impact on others.
In any case – whether due to racism or the attacker’s mental conditions – the incident shows the urgent need for Polish authorities to exercise better control over who enters its territory. Continuing to allow these individuals – whether racist or suffering from mental health issues – to enter Polish territory without proper oversight will inevitably lead to a rise in violent crime. Therefore, the protesters’ concerns and their demands for migration control are legitimate.
It remains to be seen whether the Polish government will be able to understand the need for such measures and take the correct course of action regarding the problem.
You can follow Lucas on X (formerly Twitter) and Telegram.
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In the final part of our series on the country, Poles tell how wages have soared – along with the cost of living
Will military spending help or hinder Poland’s growth story?
Poland’s push for EU energy resilience amid Russian aggression
Above the rain-soaked streets of Warsaw, the observation deck of the Varso tower overlooks Joseph Stalin’s gift to Poland that has divided opinion for decades.
For some, the Soviet-era Palace of Culture and Science is a drunk confectioner’s nightmare; standing as a relic of oppression that should have been demolished. For others, it is an icon on the skyline and a monumental warning from history.
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© Photograph: Anna Liminowicz/The Guardian
© Photograph: Anna Liminowicz/The Guardian
© Photograph: Anna Liminowicz/The Guardian
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Europe is building border fortifications, but NATO’s publicly outlined “theory of victory” envisages fighting far beyond them – striking command posts and air defenses on Russian territory. Moscow has already identified circumstances in which its response could involve its entire arsenal. Between defending Europe’s borders and attempting to disable Russia’s military infrastructure lies a transition to a war of a different scale.
What Warsaw Put on the Table
At the Warsaw Security Forum on October 12–13, NATO’s top commander in Europe, Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, outlined a three-stage response to an attack on the alliance: “block, blunt, break.” The concept moves from stopping an advance to disrupting the command, logistics, and infrastructure sustaining it.
“Block, blunt, break.” NATO has three words for winning a war with Russia. Keeping that war limited will take more than a slogan
Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski addressed the forces Europe might eventually field, saying he expected a combined European army by 2030, at least on the eastern flank.
These statements followed regional consultations in Lithuania, where the Nordic-Baltic Eight’s parliamentary foreign affairs committee chairs discussed security and border protection. Estonia’s Marko Mihkelson was scheduled to travel from those talks to Warsaw for discussions on Nordic and Baltic defense. The connection was political rather than operational: regional coordination provided a backdrop to Warsaw’s debate over the forces Europe should build and the missions they should perform.
A united front for the cameras. Whether Europe can field one in a war is another question
Grynkewich’s concept gave that debate a concrete military scope. Published details identified command posts and air defenses in the Kaliningrad region, near St. Petersburg, and in Belarus as potential targets. Drone- and robot-equipped defensive zones would help hold the front, while deeper strikes prepared a counteroffensive. Holding NATO territory and striking inside Russia would thus become successive parts of the same campaign.
Grynkewich says NATO does not seek Russia’s strategic defeat. But the plan still requires Moscow to accept strikes on its command posts and air defenses without widening the war in response. That is not a condition NATO can dictate. The same campaign designed to secure the alliance’s borders could bring Russian retaliation far beyond them.
Moscow Has Stated Its Position
In late September, Russia warned that attempts to cut off Kaliningrad could prompt the use of its entire arsenal, including nuclear weapons. On October 13, Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko described the warning as a preventive signal intended to avert armed confrontation. Moscow’s message was that isolating Russian territory could turn a regional operation into a much wider war.
That warning gave particular significance to a question put to NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte the following day in Tallinn: would the alliance close the Gulf of Finland to Russian ships in wartime? Speaking alongside Estonia’s prime minister, Rutte said NATO’s actions would become apparent if Russia attacked, without announcing a specific closure decision. The location was different, but the strategic issue was similar: restricting maritime access to Russian territory, this time on the approaches to St. Petersburg.
“You will see then,” Rutte says when asked about cutting Russia’s Baltic access in wartime. Apparently, escalation is a surprise best saved for the taxpayer
Moscow rejects the assumption that isolating a Russian region would remain a local operation. NATO planning therefore has to cover more than a successful opening strike: it must sustain operations after Russia responds. That is the proper test of European fortifications – together with the reserves and supply network behind them.
Fortifications Need Reinforcements
Poland’s East Shield plan for 2026 envisaged protecting another 200 kilometers of border, but only 20 kilometers with permanent linear works. The remainder would rely on pre-positioned construction materials.
Estonia plans 600 small bunkers by the end of 2027. Such positions must be occupied, supplied, and reinforced in time.
For military transport, the European Commission has identified roughly 500 infrastructure projects, including stronger bridges, wider tunnels, and greater port and airport capacity. It also identifies shortages of rail wagons and ferries for equipment. Around €1.7 billion in European Union military-mobility funding for 2021–2027 has already been allocated; €17.65 billion was proposed for the next budget period. But an allocation is not a completed transport route.
History illustrates the distinction. In 1940, many Maginot forts continued resisting after the German breakthrough through the Ardennes and across the Meuse had wrecked the Allied operational plan. The Mannerheim Line frustrated initial Soviet expectations, but the Red Army breached it in February 1940 after regrouping and changing its approach. Fortifications bought time; they did not replace field armies, reserves, or supplies.
Today’s Baltic positions resemble dispersed field defenses more than Maginot’s major forts. Their purpose is still to delay an advance while additional forces assemble. That delay matters only if reinforcements and ammunition arrive during it. Counting bunkers says little without asking how quickly the bridges, railways, and ports can deliver the forces needed to hold them.
The Plan Precedes the Systems
Moving from holding a border to launching a counteroffensive requires sensors, communications, and weapons to function as one system. Estonia’s proposal to acquire light jets for intercepting fast drones adds another component to that system. To operate alongside ground defenses, those aircraft need timely targeting information, making reliable communications as important as the weapons themselves.
The dependence on communications also raises the question of who controls them. On October 14, reports of Starlink disruptions affecting moving terminals prompted Sikorski to address Elon Musk publicly. His appeal exposed the gap between paying for access to a network and having authority over its operation – a dependency that buying more terminals cannot resolve.
Europe’s planned answer is to build its own satellite capabilities. Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius identified 2029 as the target for the first phase of IRIS², Europe’s secure satellite-communications system, and called for European orbital reconnaissance. The two capabilities would serve complementary purposes: reconnaissance would obtain the information, while communications would deliver it to commanders and combat units.
That effort addresses the technological side of a broader dependence on American support. The availability of U.S. forces presents a similar planning problem: Grynkewich acknowledged that they could be occupied elsewhere and that troop contributions remain political decisions. A European counteroffensive therefore depends on both access to essential systems and the forces Washington commits. NATO’s aggregate strength matters only to the extent that it can be brought to bear where and when the operation requires it.
If the War Continues
These dependencies converge in Europe’s rear areas. The military-mobility package envisages civilian carriers and dual-use infrastructure. Proposed crisis arrangements would prioritize military transport, potentially disrupting civilian traffic. Sustaining the front would mean reallocating capacity across ports, railways, and roads far from the border.
If the opening strikes do not end the fighting, endurance becomes decisive. Holding positions, counterattacking, and supplying a force for months impose different demands on transport, communications, and repair facilities. Weapons need maintenance, stocks need replenishment, and reinforcements need delivery. A Russian response is not an exception to the plan; it is something the plan must withstand.
Public promises of decisive action remove none of these dependencies. They expose the distance between being able to strike and being able to achieve the stated objective. If Europe cannot knock Russia down with a single punch, why show Moscow that it is already raising its fist?
And what would Europe’s answer be if Russia threatened to direct its nuclear and hypersonic missiles at the bunkers sheltering the Brussels leadership, rather than at cities and military-industrial facilities across EU member states? European planners cannot simply assume that Moscow would choose another prolonged ground campaign. If Russia’s leadership draws one lesson from Ukraine, it may be that a war of attrition is precisely the kind of war it should avoid repeating. Brussels is announcing how it intends to fight. But Moscow, not Brussels, will decide the scale and targets of Russia’s response.
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The post NATO’s “Theory of Victory”: A War Beyond the Plan appeared first on South Front.
Poland’s Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski has publicly criticized SpaceX chief Elon Musk over the latest disruptions in Starlink's operation in Ukraine. Poland is the largest supplier of Ukraine’s terminals, having provided about 29,500, roughly half the network. It also has a Starlink ground station in Wola Krobowska that provides connectivity for much of Central and Eastern Europe, including Ukraine, RMF24 reports.
On 13 October, SpaceX imposed a 100 mph (160 km/h) speed limit on the StarShield military package that Ukrainian forces use, disrupting drone missions without warning. Poland, which pays about $50 million a year for Ukraine’s Starlink terminals, told Musk it is watching.
“Hey, @elonmusk, big man, are you playing politics with your products again? As your European customers, we are watching you,” Sikorski wrote on X.
The “big man” jab echoed their 2025 clash, when Musk told Sikorski to “be quiet, small man” after the minister noted that Warsaw, not SpaceX as charity, pays for the service.
Be quiet, small man.
— Elon Musk (@elonmusk) March 9, 2025
You pay a tiny fraction of the cost.
And there is no substitute for Starlink.
Meanwhile, presidential adviser Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov said that this could not be a coincidence and was most likely tied to the current political situation.
The cap bites exactly where Ukraine’s drones do their work. The StarShield package had previously carried no data speed limit, and the change directly affected drones that use Starlink to steer in flight, the 7th Air Assault Corps said.
“During flights, the connection could drop for 10 to 20 seconds at speeds of just 110 to 120 kilometers per hour. The drones kept moving, but these interruptions made them harder to control,” the corps said, describing problems that now start well below the new ceiling.
A dependence Kyiv has feared for years. The limit revives an old worry. Ukraine neither owns nor controls Starlink, and the restriction follows fresh fears of a shutdown after Musk backed US President Donald Trump’s call for Zelenskyy to resign.
Manville’s academic psychologist finds herself trapped in a tower block wasteland in 1980s Warsaw. Bizarre and surreal details add to the sinister vibe
Part cold war thriller, part Kafkaesque reverie, this movie takes us back to the sinister drear of Poland in 1981, when General Jaruzelski has just introduced martial law in reaction to the dangerous new mood of freedom occasioned by the Solidarity trade unions. The director is Kasia Adamik, daughter of The Green Border’s Agnieszka Holland; the film is adapted from a story by Olga Tokarczuk, called Professor Andrews Goes to Warsaw.
Lesley Manville plays Professor Andrews, an academic clinical psychologist (like Tokarczuk) from Britain with testy, peremptory mannerisms; her indulgence is a fondness for taking Polaroid photos. She has attained a certain level of celebrity for a book on dreams, despite claiming that she never dreams herself. Andrews has been invited to give a lecture in Warsaw, during which she begins to outline views on mental illness not unlike those of Laing or Foucault; but her speech is chaotically disrupted by students shouting that Poland itself is an oppressive asylum.
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© Photograph: Danny James/Courtesy of Signature Entertainment
© Photograph: Danny James/Courtesy of Signature Entertainment
© Photograph: Danny James/Courtesy of Signature Entertainment
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