Zelenskyy’s urgent discussion with the US Secretary of State suggests that Washington cannot pursue accommodation with Moscow without confronting opposition in Congress, the requirements of American national security and Ukraine’s continuing dependence on US military support.
The telephone conversation between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Tuesday, 20 October, has exposed an increasingly uncomfortable contradiction in American policy towards Russia. While President Donald Trump is easing economic pressure on Moscow and attempting to restrain Ukrainian attacks on Russian energy infrastructure, senior members of his administration are having to address the consequences for Ukraine’s defence.
Zelenskyy raised three immediate concerns: the availability of Patriot interceptor missiles, interruptions to American early-warning intelligence concerning Russian ballistic attacks, and restrictions affecting Starlink and Starshield satellite communications. He described the discussion as constructive, expressing appreciation for Rubio’s willingness to help.
The significance lies less in the diplomatic language than in the circumstances surrounding the call. Washington is attempting to obtain concessions from Moscow while several of its own decisions have weakened confidence in the security arrangements on which Kyiv depends. Rubio’s involvement suggests that these difficulties cannot simply be left unresolved while Trump’s envoys pursue another round of negotiations.
The political cost of concessions to Moscow
Trump’s recent decisions concerning Russian energy exports have brought an existing disagreement over Ukraine into American domestic politics.
The administration has facilitated Russian diesel exports and waived new sanctions under the Graham Act, legislation intended to increase pressure on Russia and its principal energy customers. Rubio has said the president will use a 60-day period to assess the economic consequences of implementing the measures.
For Trump, the immediate attraction is apparent. Rising fuel prices have become a political liability ahead of the 3 November congressional midterm elections. Increasing supplies on international markets offers the administration a potential means of relieving pressure on American consumers.
The difficulty is that concessions to Vladimir Putin carry their own electoral consequences. Moscow remains deeply unpopular among substantial sections of the American political establishment, including Republicans who regard support for Ukraine as a matter of American strategic interest.
That opposition is no longer confined to public criticism. Republican senators have joined Democrats in challenging decisions affecting Ukraine’s military capabilities, creating an additional problem for an administration already facing a difficult electoral environment.
Trump can justify Russian energy concessions as an attempt to protect American consumers. Explaining why Ukraine should simultaneously experience interruptions to critical defence systems is considerably more difficult.
Rubio and the machinery of American foreign policy
Rubio’s position within the administration is particularly important. As both Secretary of State and National Security Adviser, he occupies two offices central to the formulation and execution of American foreign policy.
His conversation with Zelenskyy took place during a diplomatic tour of Uzbekistan and India, demonstrating that the deterioration in relations with Kyiv required attention even while the administration was pursuing other international priorities.
It would be premature to interpret Rubio’s intervention as evidence of an independent foreign policy. There is no indication that he is acting against Trump’s instructions. The more plausible interpretation is that the administration recognises a need to contain the consequences of its recent decisions without requiring the president publicly to reverse his position.
The controversy surrounding Starshield is particularly revealing. Reuters reported that instructions to restrict the satellite service used by Ukrainian forces originated inside the White House. The officials cited did not identify who authorised the order, while the administration has denied Trump’s personal involvement.
Separately, Zelenskyy has reported failures to receive advance warnings of Russian ballistic attacks. The cause of those interruptions remains disputed.
These developments have already attracted congressional scrutiny. Republican Senator Thom Tillis and Democratic Senator Jeanne Shaheen led a bipartisan request for an investigation, warning that failures in communications and intelligence-sharing may have endangered American personnel in Ukraine.
Congress cannot directly manage the administration’s foreign policy. Nevertheless, its powers over expenditure, legislation and oversight make sustained opposition politically consequential, particularly when members of the president’s own party are involved.
Ukraine needs military assistance, not diplomatic promises
The immediate requirements in Kyiv are considerably more specific than the objectives being discussed in Washington’s diplomatic negotiations.
Ukraine needs reliable satellite communications, uninterrupted intelligence concerning incoming missiles and sufficient Patriot interceptors to defend its cities and critical infrastructure. Delays in any of these areas have consequences that cannot be addressed through declarations about a future peace settlement.
The shortage of Patriot missiles is particularly serious. Zelenskyy has complained that American authorisation is delaying deliveries under arrangements financed by European governments. Washington’s commitments elsewhere, including the Middle East, add further pressure to American air-defence inventories.
Meanwhile, preparations for new negotiations in Oslo involving American envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner continue. The involvement of European leaders may broaden the diplomatic discussion, but it does not resolve the central obstacle: Putin has offered no convincing indication that he is prepared to end the invasion on terms acceptable to Ukraine.
Proposals concerning Ukrainian elections, NATO membership or alternative negotiating arrangements remain subordinate to that problem. Without a ceasefire that can be enforced, even an agreement on the political framework for peace would leave fundamental questions of security unanswered.
The limits of presidential power
Trump retains substantial authority over American sanctions, military assistance and diplomatic engagement. Yet his ability to offer Moscow meaningful concessions is constrained by several factors beyond his immediate control.
Congress can challenge further attempts to weaken sanctions or restrict assistance. European governments maintain their own sanctions regimes and are not obliged to follow Washington’s approach. Ukraine retains considerable military capacity, including the ability to attack Russian energy facilities that contribute to financing the war.
Nor can the American president compel Putin to accept a settlement. If Russia calculates that continuing military operations offers greater advantages than negotiations, additional concessions from Washington may encourage Moscow to prolong the conflict rather than end it.
Rubio’s conversation with Zelenskyy therefore suggests that the administration is being forced to confront the practical consequences of its policy. An American president may seek improved relations with Moscow, but the institutional interests of the United States do not necessarily change with his personal diplomatic priorities.
For Kyiv, the question is whether those interests will translate into the continued supply of weapons, intelligence and communications support. Russia’s attacks will continue irrespective of the timetable established for American diplomatic initiatives.
Rep. Max Miller (R-Ohio) on Monday said he opposes President Trump’s waiver on Russian sanctions after striking a deal with the Kremlin to permit diesel into the U.S. and global marketplace amid the energy shortage brought on by the Iran war. “The Administration should not waive sanctions passed by Congress to punish Russia for its…
Rep. Max Miller (R-Ohio) on Monday said he opposes President Trump’s waiver on Russian sanctions after striking a deal with the Kremlin to permit diesel into the U.S. and global marketplace amid the energy shortage brought on by the Iran war. “The Administration should not waive sanctions passed by Congress to punish Russia for its…
US President Donald Trump wrote in a Truth Social post on 18 October that he did not want to “drive, foolishly, Russia away from the bargaining table.” He also wrote: “Signing that document at this time will do that, and I can sign it later, or any time that I want!”
Trump was referring to sanctions and tariffs under the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, which he waived in an executive order on 16 October, days before the measures were due to take effect. The waiver suspends additional economic penalties intended to pressure Moscow over its war against Ukraine, while leaving earlier US sanctions in place. The decision came weeks before the 3 November midterms, in which Republicans are defending slim majorities in both chambers, and analysts said the penalties could have pushed up oil prices for Americans already paying more, largely because of the US-Israeli war with Iran, Reuters reported.
Trump says Zelenskyy could have made a better deal two years ago
A week before the waiver, Trump had announced a deal for Russia to increase diesel supplies to global markets. The Treasury also issued a license, valid until 7 April 2027, permitting certain transactions in Russian-origin diesel.
In the Truth Social post, Trump accused Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy of targeting Russian diesel refineries, saying the strikes were “seriously hurting the world diesel markets, including those in the United States.” Kyiv had paused its refinery strikes for three days at Washington’s request after Trump declared an energy ceasefire on 11 October, which Russia never confirmed, then resumed them. Since then, Russia has struck Ukraine’s energy sector 76 times, Zelenskyy said on 18 October.
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Kyiv gets no warning of the first of two Russian ballistic waves, hours after Zelenskyy said US alerts were back
Trump wrote that Zelenskyy “doesn’t want to end this war, and probably never did,” and that he “could have made a better deal two years ago than he can now.”
“His country is in shambles, a large portion of his land is lost, his oceans and seas are gone, and his male population is low, wounded, and/or dead,” Trump added.
He also said Russia was “doing very little, if anything, to help” Iran and that he wanted to keep it that way.
A day earlier, Trump said he had not made a final decision
On 17 October, Trump told reporters at Mar-a-Lago that he had not announced his final decision. “A lot of you don’t know what my decision is yet, but we’ll figure it out, and you’ll figure it out,” he said, Reuters reported.
“I think the president wants to take the 60-day period of time to sort of analyze what imposing both sanctions and tariffs will mean to the global economy and even to the US economy,” US Secretary of State Marco Rubio told reporters before departing for Uzbekistan the same day.
Zelenskyy calls the waiver a pity as Republicans split
Zelenskyy called it a “pity” that Trump had waived sanctions under a law named for the late Senator Lindsey Graham, who “really believed in Ukraine.” He said he hoped Trump would change his decisions, NBC News reported.
Discussing the diesel deal on NBC’s Meet the Press, Zelenskyy said US oil prices had risen because shipping through the Strait of Hormuz was blocked, not because of Ukraine.
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A month before the diesel waiver, Trump’s envoys had already pitched Kyiv on Russian gas, NYT says
On 17 October, Zelenskyy told journalists that “the decision to undo all of this, to block all of it, seems wrong to me” and that it “definitely helps only the Russians.” His remarks appeared in Ukrainian on his official Telegram channel.
“Sanctions relief will continue. I think the diesel deal and the move regarding the Lindsey Graham Act are not the end of it. Unfortunately,” Zelenskyy said.
On 19 October, Zelenskyy wrote that partners had again given no warning of Russia’s overnight ballistic attack and that blocking missiles for Ukraine’s air defense while Russia gets sanctions eased or postponed amounts to partners denying reality.
Republican Senator James Lankford defended Trump’s decision on NBC’s Meet the Press, saying the president was “choosing the American people first.”
Senator Darline Graham, Lindsey Graham’s sister, whom Trump has endorsed for a full term, said at a campaign stop on 17 October that she would “choose to keep the pressure on Russia.”
“I don’t trust Putin and I don’t trust Russia,” Darline Graham said.
She did not directly criticize Trump but said she would not have made that choice, Reuters reported.
Lawmakers from both parties blasted the executive order late Friday, the latest in a series of steps that the Republican president has taken drawing the United States closer to Russia's Vladimir Putin.
US President Donald Trump has suspended the tariffs and sanctions on the biggest buyers of Russian oil set by the Lindsey Graham Act, the law he signed himself in September. He says the move serves US national interests, according to an executive order published on the White House site.
The act required the president, within 30 days, to impose 100% tariffs on all goods from the five biggest buyers of Russian oil, to sanction a range of Russian entities and to put 500% tariffs on all Russian energy imports to the US. The deadline for those measures fell on 18 October.
Trump has used the president’s power under Section 115 of the Graham Act, which allows him to waive sanctions, restrictions, and duties by certifying to Congress in writing that doing so serves US national interests and submitting a report explaining why. The act does not, however, allow him to cancel sanctions that have already been announced.
Moscow calls it historic, Kyiv calls it a gift to Putin
The two capitals read the same order in opposite ways. Kirill Dmitriev, an envoy for Russian leader Vladimir Putin, called it “an important and truly historic moment” on X, claiming the sanctions had mainly harmed the US economy and world markets.
“Economic cooperation between Russia and the US serves the interests of both nations, contributes to global economic stability and lays the foundation for building trust and achieving lasting peace,” Dmitriev writes.
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy answered from under fire. Russia struck Ukraine’s energy system on 17 October, and at that very moment Washington chose “to completely ignore the Lindsey Graham law, which was supposed to impose real, effective pressure on Russia to end this war,” he says.
A law its own backers say is being gutted
The waiver lands amid a bipartisan revolt in Congress. Seven Republican and Democratic senators had already warned on 11 October that Trump’s move to allow Russian diesel imports had broken the law Congress passed after the full-scale invasion, urging the administration to reverse it so US money would not help finance Russia’s war.
Meanwhile, Zelenskyy argued the law can still work if Washington lets it.
“This law could, and still can, help a great deal. But the law has actually to work, and every vote for it matters,” he said, warning that the step only pushes Moscow to strike harder.
The world must not give up ground and must try to end the war, Zelenskyy added.
“To end it, and not give Putin every reason to continue it indefinitely,” he stressed, thanking everyone who “is truly fighting for peace and helping Ukraine," he stated.
The word from the Ukrainian opposition
The Ukrainian opposition also commented on Trump’s decision. Iryna Herashchenko, co-chair of the European Solidarity parliamentary faction, said that “the most cynical and stupid decisions are usually made by rulers on Saturday night,” when public attention is scattered, and people are preparing for the weekend.
“Rehabilitating Putin harms not only Ukraine but also the US itself, strengthens the axis of authoritarian regimes, and undermines international security,” she claimed.
U.S. President Donald Trump signed an executive order Friday temporarily suspending the application of a broad package of sanctions against Russia, arguing before Congress that the measure responds to the national interest.
The decision affects a law named after the late Republican senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, which seeks to toughen sanctions against the Russian economy and limit the flow of financial resources.
Trump had enacted that legislation on September 18 but has now temporarily exempted the application of several of its provisions, according to the order.
The order exempts sanctions against persons and entities linked to the Russian government; financial and trade restrictions and tariffs planned for Russian products, and those from certain countries that buy Russian hydrocarbons, according to the order.
The decision does not eliminate the sanctions the United States had already imposed on Russia through previous executive orders.
The exemptions from the new law will remain in force until Trump or the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the U.S. Trade Representative,
BIG: Trump waived sanctions targeting Russian fossil fuel sales just days before they were due to take effect.
The measures would have imposed tariffs of up to 100% on goods from major importers of Russian oil and gas.
The decision comes after Washington temporarily authorized commercial operations with Russian-origin diesel until April 7, 2027, including its import into the United States, despite the sanctions in force against Moscow.
Trump announced on October 9 that he had agreed with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, on the supply of diesel to international markets, with the aim of easing energy and fuel prices.
The Republican president said Russia would initially deliver more than 300,000 tons of fuel and would later supply additional quantities, conditioned in part on the state of its refineries, he said.
The agreement has drawn criticism from lawmakers of both parties, who question its possible effects on economic pressure against Moscow and its compatibility with U.S. legislation, according to the critics.
Detractors warn that revenue from the sale of Russian fuel could help finance the war against Ukraine, while the Administration defends the need to contain energy costs, according to the critics and the Administration.
President Donald Trump has waived sweeping sanctions and tariffs targeting Russia’s energy revenues, invoking national interest provisions in legislation passed only last month. The decision follows his controversial diesel agreement with Vladimir Putin and threatens to deepen divisions with Congress and European allies over economic pressure on Moscow.
President Donald Trump has suspended the implementation of sweeping American sanctions against Russia, using presidential waiver powers to prevent penalties approved by Congress from taking effect just weeks after he signed them into law.
The executive order issued by the White House on Friday, 16 October, suspends tariffs of up to 500 per cent on Russian imports, alongside penalties targeting major purchasers of Russian oil and gas. It also waives numerous financial and commercial restrictions intended to reduce Moscow’s ability to finance its war against Ukraine.
The decision comes two days before the 18 October deadline for implementing key provisions of the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, which Trump signed on 18 September. The legislation was named after the late Republican senator Lindsey Graham, who had championed tougher economic measures against Russia.
Sanctions established but immediately suspended
The presidential order formally establishes the tariff increases required by the legislation while simultaneously suspending their application.
Under the law, Russian imports into the United States would face additional duties of 500 per cent. A separate provision would impose 100 per cent tariffs on goods imported from the five largest purchasers of Russian crude oil and natural gas if those countries knowingly made new purchases from 18 October, subject to specified conditions and exemptions.
Another provision targets countries identified as leading facilitators of Russian oil sanctions evasion, potentially exposing their exports to similar American penalties.
Trump invoked Section 115 of the legislation, which permits the president to waive sanctions and tariffs after certifying to Congress that doing so serves the national interests of the United States.
The order confirms that the certification and an accompanying explanatory report have been submitted to Congress. However, the publicly released document provides no detailed justification for suspending the measures.
The waivers will remain in effect until the president or designated senior officials decide that further action is appropriate. Existing sanctions imposed under earlier executive orders are explicitly preserved, meaning the decision does not remove all American restrictions against Russia.
Nevertheless, the order prevents the new legislation’s principal economic penalties from operating at a time when Congress had sought to intensify pressure on Moscow.
Diesel agreement shapes Washington’s decision
The suspension follows Trump’s agreement with Putin to facilitate renewed Russian diesel exports, announced on 9 October as part of an effort to reduce international fuel prices.
As EU Today previously reported, the agreement envisages an immediate release of more than 300,000 tonnes of Russian diesel, followed by additional shipments in November and subsequent months. Washington also authorised certain transactions involving Russian diesel until April 2027.
The arrangement has raised questions about the relationship between the administration’s energy policy and sanctions intended to constrain Russia’s war economy.
Diesel prices have become an increasingly important domestic political issue ahead of the American congressional elections on 3 November. The war involving Iran and disruptions to international energy supplies have contributed to exceptionally high fuel costs, creating additional pressure on the administration.
The White House hopes additional Russian supplies will relieve pressure on international markets. However, energy analysts have questioned whether the quantities involved will materially affect American prices, particularly before the elections.
The latest waiver also removes the immediate threat of punitive tariffs against major Russian energy customers, including China and India, which had objected to the proposed measures.
Congressional opposition and European concerns
The decision is likely to intensify opposition within Congress, where the sanctions legislation attracted substantial bipartisan support.
Earlier this week, 12 senators, including six Republicans, called on Trump to reverse his diesel agreement, arguing that allowing Russian fuel back onto international markets would provide Moscow with additional revenue for its military operations.
Democratic Senator Richard Blumenthal, who helped develop the sanctions legislation, criticised the diesel arrangement as contrary to Congress’s intention to strengthen economic pressure on Russia.
The decision also exposes a widening divergence between Washington and Brussels.
Costa declared that the present circumstances required increased pressure on Moscow rather than a relaxation of existing restrictions. The European Union is also preparing a 22nd sanctions package while considering additional financial support for Kyiv.
For Ukraine, the decision means that Russia will continue to benefit from energy exports and the international trade that helps finance its war. Instead of tightening restrictions on these revenues, Washington has suspended measures specifically intended to cut them.
The timing is particularly significant. While Trump is pressing Kyiv to halt attacks on Russian oil refineries and other energy facilities, Moscow continues its strikes against Ukrainian cities and civilian infrastructure. Zelenskyy has argued that Ukraine cannot be expected to stop targeting Russia’s energy sector while Russian attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure continue.
Although Trump can reinstate the sanctions, his decision removes the immediate threat of additional penalties against Russia and its principal energy customers. It also places Washington increasingly at odds with its European allies. Brussels remains committed to maintaining and expanding sanctions against Moscow, while the White House is now giving priority to reducing American fuel prices, even if that means easing economic pressure on Russia.
Ursula von der Leyen and António Costa said the EU would maintain pressure on Moscow, after the United States eased restrictions linked to Russian diesel exports. The statements came as Volodymyr Zelenskyy joined EU leaders in Brussels for talks on Ukraine.
The EU will not lift sanctions on Russia while its war against Ukraine continues, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa said on Friday. Their statements came ahead of discussions at the European Council, where leaders were due to consider further support for Ukraine and the needs of its critical infrastructure before winter. The assurances followed Washington’s move to ease sanctions pressure in connection with a deal involving Russian diesel supplies.
Von der Leyen said the EU had supported the energy truce announced by US President Donald Trump, but accused Russia of failing to observe it. “We have seen that Russia did not respect it. Not a single minute. Instead, Russia escalated. We have to increase the pressure on Russia,” she said. She added that the Commission was working on a 22nd sanctions package and that the bloc would not lift any sanctions unless Russia stopped the war.
Costa also rejected any reduction in pressure. “We will not cancel any sanctions until Russia stops the war,” he said, calling for stronger support for Ukraine and increased pressure on Moscow to secure a genuine ceasefire. The statements set out the position of the Commission and European Council presidents; they were not, in themselves, a new sanctions decision by EU member states.
The US and EU sanctions regimes are separate. Washington’s decision concerns US restrictions associated with Russian diesel exports, while EU measures are adopted by the member states. Moscow said it had resumed diesel exports under the arrangement with the Trump administration, a development that has prompted concern in Kyiv and European capitals. The reported resumption of Russian shipments has brought renewed attention to the effect of energy revenue on the Kremlin’s ability to finance its war.
The Commission describes EU sanctions as a means of reducing Russia’s capacity to fund the war, imposing costs on its political leadership and weakening its economic base. The measures cover energy, trade and finance, alongside listings of individuals, companies and organisations. The EU’s sanctions framework against Russia has been expanded through successive packages since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
The leaders’ statements came as Ukraine prepared for another winter of Russian attacks on energy infrastructure. The European Council meeting agenda included continued support for Ukraine and the operational needs of its critical infrastructure. Von der Leyen said the EU would continue to support Ukraine through the winter. She also referred to progress on Ukraine’s accession process, saying the remaining negotiation clusters should be opened by the end of the year.
The EU has recently added measures targeting Russia’s military-industrial sector. In October, it adopted a package of listings aimed at companies and individuals connected to the country’s war effort, as covered in EU Today’s report on the latest sanctions. The diesel arrangement has also followed earlier tensions over the use of sanctions and energy policy, including the US deal with Moscow.
The EU’s stated position is that its sanctions will remain in place until Russia ends the war. The Commission is preparing further measures, while any new package will require agreement among member states. Friday’s statements did not change the existing regime, but made clear that the US decision on Russian diesel would not, by itself, prompt Brussels to ease EU restrictions.
Zelensky insists only Ukrainians decide and offers a 60-day ceasefire for elections
Diplomatic and political relations between the United States and Ukraine have reached an interesting juncture. The reported rift between U.S. President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy reveals cracks in the coalition.
Since before 2022, Western leaders have supported Kyiv as a way of defending democracy and sovereignty on a global scale. However, the conflict in Ukraine functions as a proxy war shaped by inter-imperialist rivalry, NATO expansion, and conflicting economic interests, a geopolitical struggle that has exacted a heavy human and financial toll on Ukraine.
Recent events show that Washington’s foreign policy is shifting away from open-ended military and financial commitments receiving unconditional backing. Kiev now faces public criticism, policy demands, and calls for political change from Washington.
Understanding the Trump-Zelensky rupture requires analyzing the structural factors that shaped U.S. influence over Ukraine long before the current war began.
U.S. Imperial Influence and Post-Soviet Interventionism
The foundation of U.S. influence in Ukraine was established long before the outbreak of full-scale war in 2022. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States worked to integrate former Soviet republics into global capitalist frameworks.
Through international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, Ukraine received loans tied to economic structural adjustments. These programs required the deregulation of domestic markets, the privatization of state-owned enterprises, and cuts to social spending.
Washington also used state-funded organizations to shape Ukrainian domestic politics. Between 1991 and 2014, the U.S. government provided over $5 billion in assistance to Ukraine, as publicly confirmed by former Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland. This funding aimed to steer Ukraine’s economic and foreign policy away from Russia and toward Western institutions.
The political transition of 2014 marked a major turning point in U.S.-Ukraine relations. High-level American officials played an active role in supporting the Euromaidan protest movement, which led to the removal of elected President Viktor Yanukovych.
By 2014, during the Obama administration, Vice President Joe Biden was designated as Washington’s key figure for managing policy toward Kyiv, visiting the country on multiple occasions to oversee anti-corruption reforms, energy policy, and financial administration.
After 2014, Ukraine’s economic orientation toward European Union moved away from historical trade ties with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Transition that caused Ukranian severe economic disruption.
Ukraine’s industrial base, centered in the eastern Donbas region, suffered significant output losses. Between 2014 and 2016, Ukraine’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) shrank by nearly half in dollar terms, falling from approximately $183 billion in 2013 to under $93 billion in 2015, according to World Bank figures. Debt levels rose rapidly, forcing the country to rely on continuous financial aid from Western lenders.
Alongside economic adjustments, Western security institutions deepened their integration with the Ukrainian military. Between 2014 and 2021, the U.S. provided over $2.5 billion in defense assistance, including radar systems, anti-tank missiles, and naval patrol boats.
Joint military exercises, such as Operation Fearless Guardian and Rapid Trident, trained thousands of Ukrainian troops under NATO standards at the Yavoriv Combat Training Center. This long-term involvement turned Ukraine into a major security partner on Russia’s western border, setting the stage for future geopolitical conflict.
Zelensky on Trump:
If you're in the middle, you have to stay in the middle, not on the wrong side.
I think Trump's advisers are wrong. I don't know who is pushing him to the wrong side.
Following the end of the Cold War, successive U.S. administrations expanded NATO eastward toward the borders of the Russian Federation. This expansion occurred despite diplomatic assurances given to Soviet leadership in 1990 that the alliance would not expand eastward beyond a unified Germany.
NATO added fourteen new member states in several rounds of expansion between 1999 and 2020. At the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, NATO declared that Ukraine and Georgia would eventually become members of the alliance.
Moscow repeatedly defined Ukrainian NATO membership as a direct threat to its national security. Despite these warnings, Washington pursued an open-door policy regarding alliance membership.
Diplomatic agreements intended to resolve internal conflicts within Ukraine were systematically sidelined.
Between 2015 and 2021, Western military aid flowed into Ukraine to prepare its armed forces for high-intensity warfare. Annual combined defense spending by NATO allies reached over $1 trillion, outstripping Russian defense expenditure by more than ten to one.
By late 2021, Washington rejected Russian proposals for a mutual security treaty that requested a formal halt to NATO expansion and the withdrawal of foreign military infrastructure from Eastern Europe. The refusal to negotiate on NATO enlargement closed diplomatic pathways, accelerating the descent into armed conflict.
President Trump on Ukraine war: "Zelensky could've settled it many times, but he chose not to." pic.twitter.com/mTn4uboLZY
Trump’s Pragmatic Realism and Criticism of Zelensky
The return in 2025 of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency brought a shift in Washington’s foreign policy approach toward Ukraine. While the previous administration pursued an open-ended commitment to support Kiev, Trump adopted a transactional approach centered on domestic economic priorities. A change that disrupted long-standing diplomatic alignment between Washington and Kiev.
Tensions surfaced between Trump and Zelensky during their February 2025 Oval Office meeting. Trump criticized Ukraine’s strategic management of the conflict and questioned the scale of U.S. financial support.
Trump emphasized that American assistance would no longer be an unlimited resource, telling Zelensky that Kiev needed to negotiate a settlement or risk losing U.S. security backing.
Trump also criticized the economic war costs and their impact on global commodity markets. By mid-2026, military casualties on both sides reached an estimated two million, with millions of Ukrainians displaced internally and across Europe.
Trump pointed to these statistics to argue that continued fighting was unsustainable and detrimental to Western economic stability.
A major friction emerged over Ukraine’s military strategy of targeting Russian energy infrastructure. Since July 2026, Ukrainian drone attacks have hit several Russian oil refineries and technology hubs in regions such as Saratov, Ryazan, and Leningrad, as well as in Tatarstan.
Trump publicly condemned these strikes, stating that attacks on Russian fuel production exacerbated global energy shortages and drove up U.S. domestic diesel prices.
The U.S. Treasury Department subsequently issued temporary sanctions exemptions permitting Russian diesel exports to stabilize global supply.
When Zelensky criticized the exemptions as weakness, Trump warned that continued Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil infrastructure could result in a suspension of U.S. intelligence-sharing with Kiev.
Demands for Leadership Change and Diplomatic Strains
The diplomatic rift between Washington and Kyiv widened further following public disputes over regional energy policy. By October 2026, U.S. officials had negotiated temporary exemptions for Russian diesel exports in an effort to curb rising domestic fuel prices and alleviate the global diesel shortage.
Zelenskyy publicly rejected these exemptions, characterizing the agreements with Moscow on energy trade as a violation of Western policy.
In response to Kiev’s objections, Donald Trump publicly called for leadership changes in Ukraine. Speaking to reporters, Trump stated that Ukraine should select a new leader capable of negotiating a diplomatic resolution to end the conflict.
Trump argued that Zelensky had missed previous opportunities to secure a negotiated settlement with Russia, resulting in continued loss of territory and economic disruption.
Zelensky stated that leadership decisions in Ukraine belong solely to the Ukrainian electorate. However, Zelensky noted that organizing national elections during active military operations presents significant legal and logistical obstacles under current martial law provisions.
Zelensky proposed a condition for holding vote proceedings, stating that Washington and international partners must secure a total 60-day ceasefire from Moscow to guarantee security for voters and civilian infrastructure.
⚡️BREAKING: Zelensky Criticizes President Trump for Blaming him for the Rise in Diesel Prices
"They're increasing because of the war in the Middle East, the blocking of the Strait of Hormuz. People have to hear reality. Don't play games with people" pic.twitter.com/MBc8WHoiPf
Implications for the War and Global Power Dynamics
The political alliance established after 2014 between the U.S. and Ukraine was built on mutual strategic interests: Washington sought to project power eastward and contain Russian influence, while Kiev relied on Western capital and security aid to modernize its institutions and military forces.
However, the human and material costs of prolonged warfare have strained this arrangement. With military casualties exceeding two million and Western defense stocks under pressure, Washington has adjusted its political priorities.
The friction between Trump and Zelensky shows how peripheral security partners can become vulnerable when strategic or economic calculations of the power change.
A leadership transition in Kiev, whether through scheduled elections under a temporary ceasefire or political restructuring, would significantly impact the Ukrainian – Russian war.
A change in government could negotiate a formal cease-fire, but it also carries risks of internal political instability and reduced military coordination along the front line.
Sources: Xinhua – Al Jazeera – Al Mayadeen – Anadolu Agency – TRT World – RT – Brasil de Fato – Press TV – TASS – CGTN – BBC – DW – France 24 – EFE – TeleSUR
Washington is pressing the victim, not the aggressor, a Ukrainian diplomat says. President Donald Trump is using the threat of cutting military aid and intelligence as a tool to pressure Ukraine, while failing to apply enough pressure on Russia to stop the war, says Oleksandr Khara, executive director of the Center for Defense Strategies, Espreso reports.
Ukraine’s drones and air defense still lean on US satellite intelligence and weapons, which gives Trump room to squeeze Kyiv rather than Moscow. Khara argues Trump wants to end the war on Ukraine’s and Europe’s account to restore normal relations with Russian ruler Vladimir Putin, treating Ukraine as the weak link to be pushed.
“Trump wants to use restrictions, levers of influence on Ukraine to achieve his goal. To end or stop this war at any cost, at the expense of Ukraine and Europe, to restore normal relations with Putin,” Khara said.
Using American aid as leverage over Kyiv is not new for Trump, the diplomat noted, recalling earlier instances in which support was blocked or suspended.
The pressure points Trump picks, and the ones he leaves alone
Trump wants a visible success in ending the war, Khara says, partly against the backdrop of US domestic politics. He has economic tools to press Moscow but is in no hurry to use them, and his administration is instead gradually loosening sanctions on Russia.
“He doesn’t want to pressure Russia. He thinks Ukraine is the weak link and that it needs to be pushed,” Khara stressed.
Ukraine’s dependence on US support has fallen thanks to European partners, he added, so Kyiv has more room to keep fighting even as European states keep buying American weapons for it.
The one trade Kyiv might accept, and the pressure until then
An energy ceasefire is possible only on strict terms, Khara believes. Kyiv could agree to stop striking Russian refineries only if Moscow halts attacks on Ukraine’s power generation and transmission, heating, and the Black Sea ports and the ships heading to them.
Until such a deal exists, Ukraine must hit harder, he argued, because steadily draining Russia’s economic resources is what could force the Kremlin to reconsider.
“As long as there is no such agreement, and no desire from Russia, we must increase this pressure and destroy as much of their energy infrastructure as possible,” Khara said.
Ukraine will seek to have Russian businessmen Alisher Usmanov and Mikhail Fridman restored to European sanctions lists after the EU removed both men as part of an agreement that secured a three-year renewal of its wider individual sanctions regime against Russia.
Ukraine is preparing a new sanctions initiative targeting more than 20 Russian businessmen and intends to press for Alisher Usmanov and Mikhail Fridman to be placed back under restrictions, Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha said on Thursday.
Sybiha, speaking to journalists in Kyiv on 1 October, said the Ukrainian government regarded the European Union’s decision to remove the two men from its sanctions list as unacceptable and had tried to prevent it through both public and diplomatic channels.
“Our response will be asymmetric. You removed two oligarchs, and we will add another twenty,” Sybiha said.
He said Kyiv had prepared a list containing more than 20 Russian businessmen for possible sanctions and was also working to restore restrictions against Usmanov and Fridman.
The minister did not specify which EU legal mechanism Kyiv expects to use. Ukraine cannot itself add individuals to the bloc’s restrictive-measures list, meaning any renewed designation would require action by EU member states.
The EU formally removed Usmanov and Fridman from its sanctions list on 22 September. Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/2160 deleted the entries for Usmanov, Fridman and Russian businessman Andrey Falaleev, as well as Redbird Corporate Services Ltd.
At the same time, EU governments extended the remaining individual sanctions for another 36 months, until 22 September 2029. The regime covers more than 3,000 individuals and entities and provides for asset freezes, travel restrictions and a prohibition on EU citizens and companies making funds or economic resources available to those listed.
The agreement marked a significant change to the previous system under which individual sanctions were renewed every six months.
Kyiv is now seeking to compensate for that decision through national sanctions regimes while pursuing their possible return to the EU list.
Sybiha said President Volodymyr Zelenskyy had approved the Ukrainian approach and that Kyiv was working with partner governments to ensure that restrictions against Usmanov and Fridman remained in force outside the EU framework.
According to the foreign minister, Canada has indicated that it intends to retain its restrictions. Sybiha also pointed to Britain, Japan and Australia as jurisdictions where sanctions remain in place and said Ukraine would seek similar measures elsewhere.
Britain continues to maintain a separate national Russia sanctions regime. The UK government’s current Russia sanctions framework records designations, amendments and removals independently of decisions made by the European Union.
Several EU member states have meanwhile taken or begun preparing national measures following the September decision.
The dispute has exposed one of the structural features of EU sanctions policy: decisions on restrictive measures require agreement among member states, allowing individual listings to become part of wider negotiations over the continuation of an entire sanctions regime.
Moving from six-month to three-year renewals reduces the frequency with which the broader Russia sanctions list has to return to the negotiating table.
It does not, however, prevent individual names from being added again during that period. Kyiv’s new initiative is therefore likely to focus both on persuading individual governments to introduce national restrictions and on building sufficient support inside the EU for Usmanov and Fridman to be designated again.
Swiss voters have rejected an initiative to write a stricter definition of neutrality into the country’s constitution. The proposal was defeated by 70.2 per cent of voters, and every canton voted against it, according to the official referendum results.
The initiative would have narrowed the Swiss government’s freedom to decide how neutrality should be applied. It sought to limit sanctions against countries at war and restrict security co-operation with military alliances. Its defeat leaves the existing framework in place.
The vote was not a choice between neutrality and abandoning it. Switzerland’s neutrality has been recognised internationally since 1815 and is referred to in the constitution. The question was whether to add detailed rules governing what neutrality should prevent the government from doing.
Backed by the Swiss People’s Party and the campaign group Pro Switzerland, the initiative proposed defining neutrality as “perpetual and armed”. Its proposed constitutional provisions would have barred Switzerland from joining a military or defence alliance, or co-operating with one, except if the country had been attacked or an attack was being prepared. Switzerland would also have been prohibited from taking part in conflicts between third countries.
The proposal addressed economic sanctions directly. Switzerland would have been able to impose sanctions on a belligerent state only if the United Nations had authorised them. Measures to prevent sanctions evasion would still have been possible. The initiative also called on Switzerland to use its neutrality more actively in mediation.
The sanctions clause was the most immediate concern for the European Union. After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Switzerland adopted a large part of the EU’s sanctions. Under the initiative, Bern could not have followed European measures against a country at war unless they had UN approval. Russia’s permanent seat on the Security Council gives it the power to veto such resolutions.
The rejection leaves Switzerland free to continue aligning with EU sanctions where its government considers that appropriate. It does not oblige Bern to adopt every measure introduced by Brussels or bind Switzerland to the EU’s foreign policy. Decisions will remain with the Swiss authorities under the existing legal framework.
Switzerland is outside the EU, but its financial sector, companies and trading relationships are closely connected to the bloc. Swiss action can support the reach of European sanctions, including restrictions on financial services and efforts to stop controlled goods reaching Russia through third countries. A constitutional requirement for UN authorisation would have sharply limited Bern’s ability to act when the Security Council was blocked.
The initiative would also have curtailed military co-operation. Switzerland is not a NATO member, but it works with the alliance in areas including training. The government argued that the proposed restrictions would apply during peacetime, when military co-operation and planning take place. Foreign Minister Ignazio Cassis said before the vote that waiting until an attack was imminent would leave too little time to prepare.
Supporters said the existing approach had weakened Switzerland’s credibility as a neutral state. They pointed to sanctions against Russia and closer security links with Western countries as evidence that the government had moved away from traditional neutrality. They argued that firmer constitutional limits would protect Switzerland from being drawn into foreign conflicts and strengthen its role as a mediator.
The Federal Council and Parliament recommended a no vote. Their position was that the country could remain neutral without fixing a narrow definition in the constitution. The government’s stated policy is to preserve the established practice of neutrality while retaining room to respond to changes in the security environment.
The result settles the fate of the initiative, but not the broader argument over Swiss neutrality. The country remains neutral; the rejected measure would have set stricter limits on how that status could shape foreign and security policy. Bern retains the power to decide whether to adopt EU sanctions and how far to co-operate with foreign militaries.
EU Today outlined the initiative’s implications for sanctions and security co-operation in its report before the vote. Voters have now rejected the proposed restrictions by a wide margin, preserving the government’s existing discretion.
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