Ukraine now builds far more weapons than it can afford to buy. A year ago, it promised to sell the surplus abroad and turn the proceeds back into its own army. However, 12 months later, that promise has barely materialized: a state fee of up to 30% is pricing Ukrainian arms out of foreign markets, and no one can say how much the army has actually gained, said Ihor Fedirko, executive director of the Ukrainian Council of Armorers.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced the resumption of controlled weapons exports in October 2025, resting it on four promises: 1) sell what Ukraine makes beyond its own needs, 2) channel part of the proceeds into a special fund for the army, 3) open export offices in Europe and the US, and 4) establish joint ventures abroad.

The surplus is real: Ukraine's defense output is projected to reach $55 billion in 2026, far beyond what the state can finance. A year on, Fedirko checked each promise in turn.

1) Export of surpluses: rules that strangle businesses

On 1 July 2026, the government approved rules for controlled arms exports. They shortened the maximum application review period from 90 to 30 days, but also introduced an export fee: 20% for finished products and technologies, and 30% for components. For finished products exported under the special procedure, the contract value must be at least $334,000.

In September, the Ukrainian Council of Armorers, together with other associations, proposed a zero rate, no advance collection of the fee, refunds for deals that fall through, and simplified test shipments. The industry was promised that its amendments would be taken into account and that the resolution would be rewritten.

Even in early October, however, the rules still needed work. According to Fedirko, the new mechanism has effectively not started working. Whether it can bring in additional funds for defense depends on how acceptable the export terms are to manufacturers.

Fedirko says, though, that judging by current decisions, the state intends to keep the export fee.

“The industry is ready to discuss its contribution to defense financing. But the rate must be economically justified,” he says.

2) Procurement for the Ukrainian military: balance is only being established

He adds that the Ukrainian Council of Armorers intends to push for a rate significantly lower than 20%, one that would let companies fulfill contracts and invest in production.

With such high rates, Fedirko says, the competitiveness of Ukrainian weapons on foreign markets is in question, as is the ability to send even small test batches to potential buyers.

“The fundamental requirement is post-payment: after the contract has actually been fulfilled and the manufacturer has been paid. A company should not pay the state in advance a share of income it has not yet received,” he says.

He added that, given all this, the real export figures remain unclear, as does how much exports have actually brought the military.

“The military and manufacturers must feel the benefit of exports. I sincerely hope that next year will bring much better results,” he says.

In addition, on 12 October, the Ukrainian Parliament passed bill No. 15400 in the first reading. It provides for crediting the export fee to a special fund directed to the Ministry of Defense: 50% for the procurement, modernization, and repair of weapons and equipment, and 50% for the pay of Armed Forces personnel.

The bill has not yet been adopted, but Fedirko says he expects “final adoption and launch of the mechanism.”

3) Export offices: offices in Germany and Denmark

On 3 November, the Ukrainian government named the first cities for export offices: Berlin and Copenhagen. On 15 December, it again spoke of preparing an office in Berlin. In reality, Fedirko says he does not know the office’s status, and it likewise remains unclear how companies can apply to it and how many contracts it has helped close.

4) Joint ventures abroad: There are concrete results in this area

According to Fedirko, eight joint ventures have been created, five of which are already supplying products to Ukraine. He stresses that this is the result of work by Ukrainian companies, foreign partners and the state, and that it deserves recognition.

As early as February 2026, the authorities spoke of plans to create ten joint ventures in Europe within a year. At the same time, they announced Quantum Frontline Industries in Germany, with a planned annual capacity of 10,000 drones for Kyiv.

Beyond the number of ventures and deliveries, however, it is important to understand how other manufacturers can join the Build with Ukraine program.

“Who accepts applications, by what criteria are decisions made, and what support does a company receive?” Fedirko asks.

In other words, joint ventures are already delivering results, but the rules of participation and the state support mechanism must be clear to companies that want to develop production abroad.

QatarEnergy has signed two long-term agreements to purchase up to 4 million tonnes of U.S. liquefied natural gas annually from Cheniere Energy through 2054, as the Gulf producer continues to...

Investors who buy idle sanctioned tankers and refit them could put the ships back into legal oil trade, US Energy Secretary Chris Wright said on 19 October, Bloomberg reported. He laid out the plan five days after a US official described it to Reuters.

That official said the aim was to cut record tanker freight rates. The Energy Department added that any relief would not help Russia move its oil. The plan comes weeks before the 3 November midterms, with voters worried about fuel costs after gasoline and diesel prices surged in the Mideast conflict. Yet the shadow fleet is also how Russia sells oil past sanctions, and those sales fund its war against Ukraine. In December 2025, Ukraine’s foreign intelligence counted more than 1,100 tankers serving Russia alone, 226 of them under US sanctions.

An approval process Wright didn’t detail

Many sanctioned tankers sit idle, Wright told Bloomberg’s Annmarie Hordern, and buyers keep approaching the administration offering to fix them up and carry only legal oil.

“We’re going to move some of the ships from what I call the ‘bad-guy fleet’ to the ‘good-guy fleet,’” he said. “They will not carry sanctioned oil anymore.”

The ships must go through an approval process, Wright said, but he gave no criteria. He insisted “there is no removing of sanctions.”

He put the global dark fleet at about 1,600 ships, a count covering vessels that hauled Venezuelan, Iranian, and Russian oil. Dozens or even hundreds could turn legitimate, he said. The ships are no longer needed for Venezuelan oil, Wright said, and no Iranian oil is moving. Russian oil exports, he added, “are certainly not growing.”

Diesel, a waiver, and the tankers

Earlier, on 9 October, the Treasury issued General License 135, allowing some deals in Russian diesel until 7 April 2027. On 16 October, US President Donald Trump waived sanctions and tariffs under the Graham Act, leaving earlier sanctions intact. That law had directed him to review and sanction shadow-fleet vessels. Trump defended the waiver as a way to keep Moscow at the negotiating table.

House Speaker Mike Johnson told Fox News host Larry Kudlow on 18 October that he had asked the White House team to “carefully consider the unintended consequences,” The Hill reported. He added that he thought “the right decision will be made” in the end.

A tanker loaded with Russian diesel will sail for the US on Thursday as Moscow starts to implement a fuel supply deal struck by Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump, according to Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak.

Russian diesel shipments are returning to Türkiye and Brazil after Moscow lifted its export ban and the US temporarily suspended sanctions on Russian fuel supplies, Reuters reported on 20 October, citing shipping data from Kpler and LSEG.

The resumption of exports gives Russia another source of revenue to support its war against Ukraine, allowing Moscow to profit from fuel sales despite the domestic shortages that prompted its export ban. The US sanctions relief is helping Russia restore access to international buyers while its full-scale invasion continues.

According to Reuters, at least two tankers carrying Russian diesel have departed the Baltic port of Primorsk for Türkiye and Brazil in recent days. Each vessel is carrying around 300,000 barrels, according to Kpler data cited by Reuters. Morocco has also resumed importing Russian diesel since the export ban was lifted.

Russia ended its self-imposed diesel export ban on 9 October after reaching a deal with US President Donald Trump to resume fuel supplies to global markets. Moscow had introduced the ban to address domestic shortages triggered by Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian oil refineries.

Those supply problems have not been resolved, but the US temporarily lifted sanctions on Russian fuel supplies as part of the deal, allowing Moscow to prioritize export opportunities despite domestic shortages. EU and UK embargoes on Russian fuel imports remain in force.

Russian diesel exports remain below last year's levels

Russian diesel exports averaged around 345,000 barrels per day in 2026 so far, down 41% from the previous year, according to shipping data cited by Reuters. Exports had already fallen during the summer before Moscow imposed its ban.

Türkiye accounted for around 34% of Russian diesel loadings this year, followed by Brazil at 24% and Morocco at 10%, Kpler data showed.

Trump said Russia would initially export 300,000 metric tons of diesel, followed by 500,000 tons in November and 1 million tons afterward. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak said Moscow could raise exports to as much as 3.5 million metric tons per month by the end of the year.

US seeks to ease diesel prices

The deal comes as Trump seeks to present a picture of bringing down diesel prices ahead of the US midterm elections on 3 November. Fuel prices have risen amid disruptions to global energy supplies caused by Trump's war with Iran, which has shaken oil markets and raised concerns about supply routes.

Trump has blamed Ukraine's attacks on Russian oil infrastructure for driving up energy prices, despite the broader market disruption caused by his war with Iran. The Russian diesel deal offers a way to increase global fuel supplies, but also allows Moscow to earn revenue from exports while its war against Ukraine continues.

However, the volumes from Russia initially outlined by Trump would cover only a small share of the global supply shortfall. 

Defence City, Ukraine’s special support regime for arms makers, now has 63 member companies, the Defense Ministry said in a 19 October release. That is more than double the late-May count, and Euromaidan Press calculations show the newcomers are, on average, much smaller firms.

Ukraine already buys most of its weapons at home. More than 75% of its 2025 weapons procurement budget went to domestic manufacturers. Most new weapons models cleared for military use are Ukrainian too: 892 of the 1,000 authorized from the start of 2026 to mid-June. Defence City is meant to turn that demand into more production capacity, and our calculations suggest it is now reaching smaller producers too.

Who is joining

Each resident’s figure in the ministry’s count is its qualified income, meaning revenue from selling weapons and military equipment. Applicants file details of their defense contracts for the previous calendar year with their application, the ministry’s guide shows. So the combined total changes as members join. It does not track month-to-month sales.

The 63 current residents have a combined qualified income of nearly $2.47 billion. At the end of May, 31 residents had $2 billion, the ministry reported. By July, 45 residents had over $2.07 billion, it added.

By Euromaidan Press calculations, the 32 companies added since May bring about $15 million each on average. The first 31 averaged about $64 million each. The math assumes all 31 early members remain, with unchanged figures. If they do, the newcomers are smaller producers on average, because each figure reflects a firm’s own prior-year weapons sales.

What residents get

The profit-tax break comes with a condition. Residents choose where their untaxed profit goes, but it must go to purposes the tax code allows, the ministry explained. If the money goes elsewhere, the break does not apply.

Residents also get customs incentives and state support to relocate plants and better protect production sites. They can rent state property without an auction. They can also ask to restrict access to sensitive information about them in public registries. Some defense export procedures are simplified too.

Resident status also makes a company eligible to be designated critically important to the defense industry. That lets it defer up to 100% of its staff liable for military service from the draft, the ministry noted.

To join, a company must confirm it meets the legal requirements and file an application with supporting documents. By law, the ministry has 10 working days to decide. If approved, a ministerial order grants the status, and the company enters the Defence City register.

Russia's oil exports through its Northern Sea Route (NSR) in 2026 have already exceeded last year's by nearly 50%, with some 20 million barrels shipped to Asia from the start of navigation in July to mid-October, traders said and data showed.

ANKARA, Oct 18 (Reuters) – Turkey will take some of the diesel Russia is supplying to global markets under its agreement with US President Donald Trump, Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar said on...

Ukrainian drones struck St. Petersburg’s oil terminal, a fuel depot, an Ozon distribution center, and a VK data center overnight, setting off fires across the city, monitoring channels reported. Russian outlet Meduza called it apparently the largest attack on the city and Leningrad Oblast since the war began. Russian officials acknowledged fires, damaged homes and substations, and power cuts.

Russia keeps fighting along the front while bombarding Ukrainian cities and the grid behind it. Ukraine’s long-range drones, in turn, target the oil exports and logistics that fund and supply that war, and Russia’s Baltic oil ports have been hit repeatedly this year. St. Petersburg is a symbolic place: Russia’s so-called second capital and Putin’s hometown.

Oil terminal and fuel depot on fire

Ukrainian forces struck the Petersburg Oil Terminal with FP-1 drones, starting a fire, Ukrainian drone maker Fire Point said. The company described the terminal as one of the region’s largest, handling 12.5 million tonnes of petroleum products a year, including for export.

Piter port and oil facility in one shot pic.twitter.com/KfptwkhsDS

— Exilenova+ (@Exilenova_plus) October 18, 2026

St. Petersburg Governor Aleksandr Beglov acknowledged fires at the terminal and in four city districts, adding that Pulkovo airport had restricted flights. By morning, firefighters were still battling blazes at the terminal, the Ruchyi oil depot, and industrial warehouses in the Kolpinsky district, he wrote. He claimed one person was killed and five injured. Ukrainian monitoring channel Exilenova+ reported that the Ruchyi depot had been burning since the night.

Ozon hub, VK data center, and a bridge

An Ozon distribution center in Kolpinsky district caught fire after the attack, the company said, Russian independent outlet Astra reported. Astra’s open-source intelligence analyst described it as one of Ozon’s busiest fulfillment centers in northwestern Russia, covering up to 79,000 m².

Ozon in St. Peterburg pic.twitter.com/tA9iwRJf7d

— Exilenova+ (@Exilenova_plus) October 18, 2026

FP-1 drones also hit a VK data center in Novosergiyevka, Leningrad Oblast, causing serious damage, Fire Point said. VK acknowledged a drone attack on the site but claimed its services were working normally. Leningrad Oblast Governor Aleksandr Drozdenko claimed air defenses downed 145 drones over the oblast alone. He acknowledged damage to the data center’s transformer equipment and warehouse complex, and minor damage to the Vostochnaya substation. Two other substations in Yanino went offline, cutting power to about 20,000 people, he said.

A drone also hit the cable-stayed bridge over the Korabelny fairway, part of a toll highway linking the city’s north and south, Exilenova+ reported, adding that the extent of the damage was still being clarified. The channel also reported a fire near a Russian Aerospace Forces radar company outside the village of Kaporskoye.

To reach St. Petersburg, Ukrainian drones had to cover 1,000 km across four Russian regions guarded by air defenses and electronic warfare, said Serhii Beskrestnov, adviser to Ukraine’s president on defense technology.

“And these are not cruise missiles with special systems, these are drones that fly at speeds of up to 200 km/h,” he wrote.

Strikes resume after a one-sided truce

The same night, Russia hit Ukraine’s grid again, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy counted 76 Russian strikes on energy since the ceasefire was announced. US President Donald Trump declared the truce on 11 October. Ukraine paused its refinery strikes for three days at Washington’s request, but Russia struck a Kharkiv power plant within hours and kept hitting the grid. Zelenskyy then said Ukraine was resuming strikes on Russian oil and would stop again only in exchange for more US interceptors for its Patriot systems. Trump called the renewed strikes “a disgrace” and said he found Zelenskyy “more difficult to deal with than Putin.”

Ukraine has hit the St. Petersburg area before. In July, drones set fire to Wildberries warehouses near the city. In August, Ukraine began striking Ozon hubs, starting in Samara Oblast. The hubs move dual-use goods such as electronics and drone components.

The White House’s artificial intelligence task force adopted its charter Thursday, opening a 120-day window to advise on how much of an oversight role Washington should take.

The post White House AI Task Force Adopts Charter, Starts 120-Day Clock appeared first on Breitbart.

By Milda Seputyte and Aaron Eglitis Oct 16, 2026 (Bloomberg) –Europe should block the transit of Russian grain through Baltic ports as that may force Moscow to seek ways to open...

Drone strikes against merchant vessels off Bulgaria have brought Russia’s war into waters bordering NATO and the European Union. With grain exports threatened, shipping costs rising and Sofia seeking allied protection, Moscow’s campaign against maritime trade risks becoming another instrument of economic and political pressure.

Russia’s expanding campaign against commercial shipping in the Black Sea is creating a security crisis that extends far beyond Ukraine. The latest drone attacks off Bulgaria’s coast have left 11 sailors missing, forced Sofia to seek assistance from NATO and the European Union, and raised concerns that Moscow is attempting to disrupt one of the world’s principal agricultural export routes.

On 13th October, the Guinea-Bissau-flagged HS Dignity sank after being struck by drones approximately 17 nautical miles east of the Bulgarian village of Krapets. Another vessel, the Ukrainian-owned, Maltese-flagged Chelsea 3, was attacked near Byala. All 15 crew members were rescued, although five sustained minor injuries. The incidents followed earlier attacks in Bulgaria’s exclusive economic zone on 6th October, when the ALFA WATAN sank and the grain-carrying ABLE was damaged.

The significance lies not simply in the destruction of merchant vessels but in the geographical expansion of the threat. Commercial routes previously regarded as comparatively safer alternatives to Ukraine’s exposed ports are now becoming operationally dangerous. Bulgaria and Romania, both NATO and EU members, face disruption to trade, maritime insurance and port operations as the conflict spreads across the western Black Sea.

Russia’s Campaign Against Maritime Trade

The latest attacks follow months of Russian strikes against Ukrainian ports, export terminals and civilian shipping. As EU Today previously reported, repeated attacks on Odesa have already reduced Ukraine’s grain-export capacity, while alternative routes through the Danube and neighbouring European countries cannot fully replace its major Black Sea terminals.

The extension of attacks towards Bulgaria changes the economic calculation. Ships carrying agricultural products, those approaching Danube ports and vessels operating between Black Sea countries now face greater uncertainty, regardless of whether they enter Ukrainian territorial waters.

Maritime security company Ambrey assessed the earlier October attacks as highly likely to have been conducted by Russian forces. Its assessment identified vessels associated with Ukrainian grain trade as the principal targets, rather than suggesting that every commercial ship was being attacked indiscriminately.

This distinction is important, but it offers little reassurance to international shipping companies. A campaign directed against Ukrainian trade can disrupt the wider maritime economy when insurers, shipowners and exporters cannot establish which routes remain safe.

The economic consequences are already becoming apparent. Shipowners must consider higher insurance premiums, additional security measures and the possibility of losing vessels and crews. Traders may redirect cargoes or withdraw from routes whose commercial returns no longer justify the risks.

Radev Confronts the Consequences of Moscow’s War

The attacks have also placed Bulgarian Prime Minister Rumen Radev in an increasingly difficult political position.

Radev has advocated renewed diplomatic engagement with Moscow and questioned the emphasis placed on military assistance to Ukraine. He has rejected accusations of being pro-Russian, presenting his approach as a pragmatic alternative to prolonged confrontation.

Yet the attacks have demonstrated the limitations of maintaining political distance from a war whose economic and security consequences are reaching Bulgarian waters.

After summoning Russian Ambassador Eleonora Mitrofanova on 13th October, Radev acknowledged that Bulgaria possessed no conclusive evidence establishing responsibility for the latest strikes. Nevertheless, he argued that their consequences benefited Russia and questioned why Ukraine would attack its own commercial vessels.

According to the Bulgarian News Agency’s account of the meeting, the prime minister also warned that higher insurance costs and shipping companies’ reluctance to serve Bulgarian ports were already damaging the national economy.

This is the fundamental change confronting Sofia. The conflict is no longer solely a question of Bulgaria’s position towards Ukraine or its diplomatic relationship with Russia. It is affecting the country’s commercial interests, energy supplies and responsibilities as a NATO member.

Radev’s response does not necessarily indicate a wholesale reversal of his previous political position. It demonstrates that the practical obligations of government can leave considerably less room for accommodation with Moscow than the arguments advanced from outside direct responsibility for national security.

Food Security Becomes Another Instrument of Pressure

The broader consequences may be felt most severely outside Europe.

Ukraine remains an important supplier of wheat, maize and vegetable oils to international markets, including countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. Interruptions to these exports affect more than Ukraine’s agricultural revenues. They can increase transport costs, delay deliveries and reduce the availability of competitively priced food in import-dependent countries.

Speaking at the Warsaw Security Forum on 12th October, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy warned of a possible agricultural crisis, arguing that Russian interference with Black Sea shipping could leave countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East facing serious supply difficulties within months.

The warning reflects a mechanism already familiar from the earlier stages of Russia’s invasion. Following Moscow’s withdrawal from the UN-brokered grain agreement in July 2023, Ukrainian agricultural exporters faced renewed attacks on port infrastructure and substantial uncertainty over maritime access.

The danger is not necessarily an immediate worldwide shortage of grain. Wheat prices remained relatively steady following the 13th October incidents. Rather, sustained disruption could progressively reduce available export capacity, increase costs and place vulnerable importing countries under greater pressure.

For Moscow, such disruption could serve several purposes simultaneously: weakening Ukraine’s economy, raising the costs of international support for Kyiv and creating additional pressures on governments concerned about food inflation and social stability.

Europe’s Black Sea Security Strategy Faces a Practical Test

The immediate challenge for Brussels and NATO is how to protect commercial navigation without allowing the conflict to expand into a direct military confrontation.

Bulgaria has requested stronger air and maritime surveillance and is seeking closer coordination with Romania and Turkey. Defence Minister Dimitar Stoyanov said on 14th October that Sofia expected to join a NATO counter-drone initiative by the end of the month.

The EU has already developed a framework for addressing precisely such threats. Its Black Sea strategy, announced in May 2025, proposed a maritime security hub integrating surveillance, intelligence-sharing, infrastructure protection and regional cooperation.

The attacks now expose the difference between developing a security framework and providing effective protection to merchant vessels. Better intelligence can identify threats, but preventing further sinkings requires detection systems, coordinated responses and sufficient defensive capabilities.

Turkey’s involvement is particularly important because of its control over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles and its established role in Black Sea maritime security. Any workable regional arrangement must therefore extend beyond cooperation between Bulgaria and Romania.

The incidents occurred outside Bulgaria’s 12-nautical-mile territorial sea, meaning they do not automatically constitute an armed attack on NATO territory under Article 5. Nevertheless, repeated strikes within the economic zones of alliance members pose a substantial challenge to maritime security.

Russia’s campaign against Ukrainian exports is increasingly imposing costs on neighbouring European states and international trading partners. The question facing the EU is whether it can secure the commercial routes on which both Ukraine’s economy and the food supplies of millions beyond Europe depend.

President Donald Trump’s deal for Russian diesel exposed the US to legal questions, opened a rift with his Republican allies and European leaders and heightened tensions with Ukraine — all in exchange for an outcome that experts suggest is unlikely to succeed.

A drone strike on 10 October put more than half of the large fuel tanks out of action at an oil-loading terminal in Russia’s Rostov-on-Don, Russian news Telegram channel Astra found. The terminal loads fuel onto river and sea tankers for export, and it burned for two days while a local channel wrote that reeds might be on fire. Neither Kyiv nor Moscow has officially acknowledged the hit. It came hours after US President Donald Trump announced a diesel deal with Russian leader Vladimir Putin.

Russia has spent the autumn hammering Ukraine’s power grid ahead of winter. Ukraine’s long-range drones keep hitting the refineries, depots, and terminals that fuel Russia’s army and earn it export revenue. Every burned tank turns that revenue into repair bills, while Moscow is already subsidizing its own fuel pumps. A refinery-only truce of the kind the White House described a day after the strike would shield the Russian plants that feed terminals like this one.

Seven of 12 tanks out of action

Astra’s analysts concluded from eyewitness footage that at least seven of the terminal’s 12 large tanks had been knocked out. Ukrainian monitoring channel Supernova+ counted seven burned-out tanks and one more scorched by the fire.

The fire was still burning in the early hours of 12 October. Local channel Rostov Glavny posted video of the burning tank farm, passing on rumors that reeds were on fire and noting the city’s second day under smoke, The Moscow Times reported. Footage filmed in the daytime on 12 October showed no more open flames, only gray smoke, according to Astra.

A terminal that loads fuel for export

The site is the oil-loading terminal of the Novoshakhtinsk Oil Products Plant, formerly known as Yug Rusi, in Rostov-on-Don’s Zheleznodorozhny District. It receives, stores, and transships fuel onto river and sea tankers, including for export, Ukrainian monitoring channel Exilenova+ said.

The terminal also supplies fuel to the Russian army and earns Moscow hard currency, ZN reported. The Moscow Times put its loading capacity at 3.5 million tons a year and its tank farm at about 60,000 cubic meters, roughly 16 million gallons.

The refinery itself stands in the town of Novoshakhtinsk near the border with Russian-occupied Luhansk Oblast. The terminal sits on the Don River with access to the Sea of Azov, Ukrainian military outlet Militarnyi noted. Ukraine hit the refinery in June, and Ukraine’s General Staff reported striking the Yug Rusi terminal on 9 July, placing it in Bataysk.

A night of drones over the region

Exilenova+ posted images of the burning terminal in the early hours of 10 October. It presented them as the site after Trump’s phone call with Putin. The channel later shared NASA satellite fire data showing the blaze.

Rostov Oblast Governor Yuri Slyusar claimed the attack injured six people. Slyusar further stated air defenses downed more than 100 drones over the region. Radio Liberty’s Russian Service noted that neither side had officially confirmed the hit on the terminal.

Hours after the US-Russia diesel deal

The strike came hours after Trump announced on 9 October that Russia had agreed to supply diesel to US and global markets. The US Treasury then cleared the trade with a sanctions license.

On 11 October, Trump declared an “energy ceasefire” between Russia and Ukraine. Under it, he expects Ukraine to stop striking Russian refineries, a White House official told Axios.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that evening that Ukraine’s armed forces had received all relevant orders. Neither Ukrainian monitoring channels nor Russian officials have reported a new strike on a Russian oil facility since. On 13 October, Zelenskyy said Ukraine was ready to guarantee an energy ceasefire if Russia took matching steps.

Ukrainian drones have helped push Russia into its worst fuel crisis since the Soviet Union fell, The Washington Post (WaPo) reported on 11 October.

Diesel is where this war reaches American drivers. US President Donald Trump blames rising diesel prices mostly on Russia’s war in Ukraine, while experts blame mainly the US war with Iran. Some of his allies now accuse Kyiv of trying to sway the US midterms.

Drones go for the first stage of refining

The Washington Post looked at dozens of strikes between 1 April and 31 August. Three refinery experts then examined satellite images of 54 strikes with visible damage. In over half, the damage seems to be to the desalting and distillation units, known by the Russian acronym ELOU-AVT. These units clean the crude of water and salt, then split it into separate compounds, the first steps toward gasoline and diesel. More than a third appear to have hit secondary units, which turn those compounds into jet fuel, gasoline, and liquefied petroleum gas.

From April through August, drones struck two-thirds or more of the 36 big Russian refineries that S&P Global Energy tracks, a strike every third day. Some took as many as five hits. On 16 June, drones set the Moscow refinery’s distillation towers on fire. That strike and a second one days later kept the plant offline into September, WaPo reported, citing data firm Kpler. Ukraine targeted the refinery again on 20 September.

“We don’t need to hit the entire plant,” a Ukrainian drone battalion commander with the call sign Tango told The Washington Post. Ukraine knows where to strike so that a refinery stops and stays down, he said. His unit, Ukraine’s 1st Separate Center of Unmanned Systems, runs long-range strikes deep inside Russia.

Sanctions slow the repairs

The EU banned exports of oil-refining equipment to Russia the day after the 2022 invasion, and the US followed days later. WaPo reported that the bans cover the distillation and secondary processing units Ukraine keeps hitting. The bans make spare parts hard to get, Alexander Kolyandr of Eurasia Group told the paper, and the strikes come faster than repairs.

Since last year, Ukraine has doubled the size of each wave, decoys included, a person involved in the strike campaign told WaPo. The decoys are unarmed and draw Russian fire, wasting air-defense ammunition, WaPo explained. Without them, the person said, Ukraine would simply lose expensive systems. András Rácz of the German Council on Foreign Relations told WaPo that even if only 2–3% of drones get through, the damage is significant.

Dense heavy crude, which oil refiners around the world favor for its typically low cost, is piling up in the Americas as soaring freight rates have stifled exports and US refiners have been running close to their limits. 

By Jan Wolfe Oct 11 (Reuters) – Republican US Senator Thom Tillis on Sunday said President Donald Trump’s diesel supply deal with Russia may be illegal and will put American lives at risk, adding to bipartisan...

Ukrainian forces have attacked one of Russia’s most important oil transport and blending facilities for the third time this month. The Samara hub handles crude from several major producing regions and plays a central role in preparing Russia’s Urals export blend, making it a target of considerably greater strategic significance than an ordinary oil depot.

Ukraine has intensified its campaign against Russia’s oil industry with another drone strike on the Samara linear production and dispatch station, a major facility in the pipeline network operated by state-controlled Transneft. The latest attack, during the night of 9–10 October, followed earlier strikes on 2 and 7 October, which Ukrainian military authorities say caused extensive damage to storage tanks and associated infrastructure.

The significance of Samara extends well beyond the destruction of stored oil. Situated near the settlement of Prosvet in Russia’s Samara region, the installation is a junction where crude oil arriving from Western Siberia, Tatarstan and the Volga-Urals producing regions is received, stored, blended and redistributed. Its role makes it an important link between Russian oil production, domestic refining and export markets.

According to the Ukrainian General Staff’s operational report, Samara is responsible for blending crude with different sulphur contents to produce Urals, Russia’s principal export grade. Ukraine’s military says the facility also contributes to supplying the Russian armed forces.

Why Samara matters to Russia’s oil exports

Unlike an oil refinery, where crude is processed into petrol, diesel and other fuels, the Samara installation performs a function earlier in the supply chain. It is one of the points where different grades of Russian crude are brought together to produce a commercially standardised export mixture.

Western Siberian crude generally has different characteristics from oil extracted in the Volga-Urals basin, including variations in sulphur content and density. Blending these streams is essential to maintaining the specifications of Urals crude, which is supplied to refineries and sold on international markets.

Samara’s importance also reflects the sheer scale of the infrastructure concentrated at the site. Ukrainian Special Operations Forces describe a facility where four major oil pipelines converge, supported by 71 storage tanks with a combined capacity exceeding 1.6 million cubic metres.

The site’s central role is not simply a Ukrainian assessment. Transneft-Privoĺga’s management previously described the Samara installation as having Europe’s largest oil storage tank farm and identified its blending station and associated pumping installations as part of a major modernisation programme.

Approximately 140 million tonnes of oil passes through the Samara complex annually. That figure would make the installation an important concentration point within the wider Russian pipeline system.

The consequences of sustained disruption could therefore extend beyond the immediate loss of storage capacity. Damage to blending operations, connecting pipelines or loading equipment could interfere with the movement of crude towards refineries and export routes. The precise effect would depend on the functioning of alternative facilities, available spare capacity and the speed of repairs.

Three attacks in nine days

The first strike, on 2 October, reportedly damaged 11 storage tanks with capacities of 20,000 cubic metres each, three larger tanks of 50,000 cubic metres, sections of pipeline and an automated loading station. The Security Service of Ukraine confirmed that its personnel had participated in the operation alongside other branches of the armed forces.

A further strike on 7 October destroyed four large storage tanks and caused a substantial fire, according to Ukraine’s General Staff. Ukrainian Special Operations Forces subsequently confirmed another attack on 10 October, although the damage from that operation remains under assessment. The reported destruction and damage have not been independently verified in full.

The repeated attacks indicate an effort to produce cumulative disruption rather than rely on a single operation to disable an extensive industrial complex.

This approach is consistent with Ukraine’s broader campaign against Russia’s refining industry. As EU Today examined in August, repeated strikes on processing facilities can create difficulties that extend beyond the immediate damage, particularly when specialist equipment requires lengthy repairs.

From refinery attacks to the wider oil network

The campaign against Samara represents a significant extension of that strategy. Refineries remain important targets because they produce the fuels required by Russia’s armed forces and domestic economy. Transport and blending facilities, however, determine whether crude reaches those refineries in the required quantities and specifications.

Continuous attacks are essential because much of the damage inflicted by drones is repairable. Individual installations may return to service within days or weeks, meaning the cumulative effect depends heavily on whether further disruption occurs before repairs and production have fully resumed.

Russia’s refining industry remains heavily dependent on specialist equipment and technologies historically supplied by Western manufacturers. Sanctions have restricted access to replacement components, while domestically manufactured equipment and Chinese alternatives are not always technically compatible with existing installations. These constraints complicate repairs, prolong shutdowns and limit Russia’s ability to restore damaged refining capacity.

Samara presents a somewhat different vulnerability. Its importance rests on the concentration of pipeline connections, storage and blending operations at one location. A sustained interruption could affect several parts of the oil supply chain simultaneously, although the available evidence does not yet establish that the wider network has suffered a prolonged shutdown.

Ukraine has already demonstrated its willingness to strike other logistical installations. A recent attack on the Volodarskaya petroleum-products station near Moscow targeted another important part of Russia’s fuel distribution system.

Implications for Russia’s war economy

Oil remains central to Russia’s export earnings and federal finances, while the availability of refined petroleum products influences military logistics, transport and industrial activity.

The immediate economic significance of the Samara attacks will depend on how much operational capacity has been lost, whether crude can be redirected through alternative infrastructure and how quickly Transneft can restore the damaged facilities.

There is an important distinction between destroying storage tanks and preventing oil from moving through a network. The former reduces available capacity; the latter can impose broader restrictions on production, refining and exports. Establishing the extent to which the latest strikes have achieved either effect will require further operational evidence.

Nevertheless, the decision to return repeatedly to Samara illustrates a development in Ukraine’s campaign against Russia’s energy sector. Rather than concentrating exclusively on the refineries that convert crude into fuel, Kyiv is also attacking infrastructure that connects oil production to its commercial and military end users.

For Moscow, the vulnerability of Samara is particularly consequential because the installation occupies a central position in the movement and preparation of Urals crude. Any sustained loss of its blending, storage or distribution functions would introduce additional pressure into an oil system already facing repeated attacks on its refineries and export infrastructure.

The latest operation therefore raises a question extending beyond the damage to one industrial site: whether Russia can maintain reliable oil flows when several interconnected stages of its energy supply chain are subjected to recurring disruption.

Ukraine, which long kept its weapons at home, is now clearing its arms makers to sell abroad. Its Commission on Export Control has granted 18 Ukrainian companies permission to send their finished weapons abroad and has processed more than 400 export applications, with over 90% approved, the National Security and Defense Council says, citing commission head Davyd Aloian.

Ukraine now produces far more weapons than it can afford, with defense production growing from about $1 billion a year at the start of the invasion to a projected $55 billion in 2026.

The exports are reportedly conducted under the Drone Deals framework that President Volodymyr Zelenskyy unveiled in April, which allows controlled sales of surplus weapons to partner countries while the Defense Ministry and General Staff retain first claim to everything the front needs. Some categories already run up to 50% beyond what Ukraine can use or finance.

From a stalled commission to 18 approvals

The commission’s work had been halting. It resumed in February after an eight-month freeze and issued the first permits then, and its updated membership has been working since, Aloian notes.

Building partnerships abroad

Aloian framed the goal as scaling Ukrainian technology rather than one-off deals. The state wants domestic producers to expand abroad while partners get working solutions, he says, and is open to dialogue with the defense industry to fix problems as they arise.

Earlier, an industry group that represents more than 400 companies warned in September that the mechanism was choking. A new 20-to-30% fee on export permits priced Ukrainian goods out of the market, it said, and a joint-production program had stalled with hundreds of foreign bids pending.

Euromaidan Press cannot verify whether the Commission on Export Control has taken the issue into consideration.

The council recently met a UK Defense Ministry delegation to discuss closer cooperation, including a Drone Deal, an anti-ballistic coalition, and joint production, Aloian adds. Reaching foreign markets enables producers to attract new orders and investment, scale up, and build long-term partnerships.

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