Ukraine has unveiled a new domestically developed surface-to-air missile system designed to turn a diverse collection of air-to-air missiles into a flexible ground-based air defense capability. Called Shershen, Ukrainian for hornet, the system combines a locally-developed command-and-control architecture, a dedicated surveillance radar, and multiple launchers that can employ both Ukrainian and Western missiles.
The system was displayed at the MSPO defense exhibition in Kielce, Poland, by the National Association of Ukrainian Defense Industries (NAUDI). The example shown is reportedly the second operational prototype and is described as being close to its production configuration.
At the ongoing MSPO-2026 defense and industrial exhibition in Poland, the launcher of the Ukrainian Shershen air defense system, developed by Radionix, has been presented for the first time, along with the R-120K surface-to-air guided missile specially developed for it (second… pic.twitter.com/5RfZWHWuxl
The appearance of Shershen comes as Ukraine continues to develop an increasingly diverse family of indigenous air defense systems, while simultaneously adapting older missiles and foreign-supplied weapons to address a severe shortage of interceptors.
The Buk/Sea Sparrow FrankenSAM combines the Soviet-era Buk transporter-erector-launcher with U.S.-supplied RIM-7 Sea Sparrow missiles. Operational Command East
Shershen takes that philosophy a step further by making missile interchangeability a central feature of the system.
The Shershen battery consists of a Perun command-and-control vehicle, an Athena radar, and four Borei launchers.
A graphic shows a typical Shershen battery. via Oboronka
According to the developer, the system’s architecture is deliberately open. This allows it to use different missiles from different manufacturers and also permits the integration of third-party surveillance and guidance radars.
The company says Shershen can currently employ the R-27 (AA-10 Alamo), R-73 (AA-11 Archer), AIM-9 Sidewinder, and AIM-132 ASRAAM, while compatibility with the R-60 is also being explored. These weapons come with a mix of semi-active radar or infrared homing seeker heads.
One of the ASRAAM/Supacat air defense systems supplied to Ukraine. Ukrainian Armed Forces
Air-to-air missiles are already available in considerable variety across Ukraine’s arsenal and those of its foreign partners. Being able to employ several types from a common ground-based system provides much more flexibility than a conventional SAM designed around one dedicated interceptor.
It also offers a way to exploit missiles that were never originally intended to be fired from the ground. That means Shershen’s launcher and fire-control system are meant to be interceptor agnostic, at least to a certain degree.
Shershen’s Athena radar is reported to be capable of detecting targets at ranges of up to 85 kilometers (53 miles).
The Athena radar for the Shershen. NAUDI screencap
In terms of the engagement envelope, Shershen is claimed to be capable of engaging aircraft, cruise missiles, and drones at ranges of up to 25 kilometers (16 miles) and altitudes of up to 10,000 meters (32,800 feet). Clearly, these figures will vary widely depending on the type of interceptor.
When employing radar-guided missiles, the system’s engagement architecture can reportedly guide as many as six missiles simultaneously.
The advertised performance figures have not been independently verified, and it remains unclear what target types and engagement conditions were used to establish them.
Україна представила складові мультикаліберного зенітного ракетного комплексу «Шершень» на міжнародній виставці MSPO 2026 у польському місті Кельце.
Міжнародний консорціум компаній Shershen Group, який створює ЗРК в інтересах України представив, показав командний пункт,… pic.twitter.com/9wAS7ewxzg
The developer says the second prototype has completed initial testing, including successful interceptions at a test range.
One of the Borei launchers displayed at MSPO were armed with an R-120K, a new Ukrainian missile equipped with a radar seeker and is intended to be capable of both air-to-air and surface-to-air employment.
The R-120K remains under development, however. Work is reportedly continuing on its rocket motor, meaning that its eventual performance and production status remain uncertain. Still, having the option of including the R-120K on the Shershen system in the future is significant.
A test launcher used for the Shershen program, armed with a radar-homing (nearest camera) and an infrared-guided R-27 missile. The latest prototype features a cage-type container launcher. NAUDI screencap NAUDI screencap
Rather than relying indefinitely on stocks of Soviet and Western air-to-air missiles, Ukraine could eventually have a domestically produced interceptor specifically tailored to its growing family of ground-based air-defense systems. That will become increasingly important as stocks of legacy missiles are depleted. Earlier this year, it was reported that Ukrainian F-16s were running low on their air-to-air missiles, which include the same AIM-9s that are used in some FrankenSAM systems, as well as being compatible with Shershen. But even before that, it was clear that Western-supplied missile stocks in Ukraine across the board were diminishing, in some cases drastically, with critical interceptors like the AMRAAM and Patriot being badly affected.
A live AIM-9L/M Sidewinder launched from the wingtip rail of a Ukrainian F-16. Ukrainian Air Force screencap
Ukraine’s need for additional surface-to-air missiles has become increasingly acute during the full-scale war, especially as Russian drone and missile barrages have stepped up.
The shortage has encouraged Ukraine to pursue a combination of indigenous development and unconventional adaptations.
The FrankenSAM initiative, conducted with U.S. support, demonstrated how existing Ukrainian systems could be combined with foreign missiles to rapidly create additional air-defense capacity. Ukraine has also fielded modified Osa systems armed with R-73 air-to-air missiles rather than their original 9M33 interceptors. Other R-73-based concepts have even been demonstrated aboard Ukrainian uncrewed surface vessels.
An R-73 missile loaded on an Osa-AKM SHORADS vehicle. Come Back Alive
Shershen appears to reflect the next logical step in that evolution: rather than creating a one-off FrankenSAM combination, build an architecture from the outset that can accept multiple missiles. Additionally, with so many different ground-based air defense systems now being fielded, it comes with the significant advantage of a standardized launcher and control interface that can accommodate a range of interceptors.
At the same time, Ukraine is pursuing substantially more ambitious indigenous SAM projects.
Earlier this year, a previously secretive Ukrainian missile identified as the Koral made what appeared to be its first public appearance. The program dates back to at least 2021, when Ukraine’s Luch design bureau presented a concept for a medium-range surface-to-air missile.
A missile is launched from a Koral air defense system, based on a Czech Tatra truck chassis. Ukroboronprom
Koral is intended to provide a much longer-range capability, potentially filling some of the gap left by Ukraine’s aging Soviet systems and supplementing the Western-supplied Patriot and SAMP/T.
Shershen, by contrast, is clearly focused on the short-range layer.
Together, the programs illustrate the breadth of Ukraine’s emerging domestic air-defense effort: from relatively inexpensive systems built around repurposed air-to-air missiles to new, purpose-designed interceptors intended to replace or augment Soviet-era systems.
Ukraine’s experience with FrankenSAM has demonstrated the value of getting unconventional air defense combinations into service quickly.
Once fielded, Shershen, with its architecture capable of accepting different Soviet-origin and Western-made interceptors, and eventually a Ukrainian one, gives Ukraine another way to stretch its missile inventory and enhance its air defense capabilities.
Die DPA hat eine Meldung herausgegeben, bei der man sich nur die Augen reiben kann. Das Handelsblatt hat sie wortwörtlich veröffentlicht, sodass jeder sie hier nachlesen kann. Das Spiel mit Krieg und Frieden Am Donnerstag fand eine Sondersitzung des Innenausschusses des Bundestags statt, bei der die Opposition von der Bundesregierung gefordert hat, sie müsse ihre […]
Diesel prices are breaking records across Europe, and Poland is no exception, with prices for the essential fuel currently hitting record highs. Now, the conservative Polish opposition is pointing out that the situation may only get much worse.
“We will soon see increases in product prices as well,” warns Mariusz Błaszczak, the vice president of Law and Justice (PiS) and head of the PiS parliamentary club, in a new X post.
“Diesel the most expensive ever! This may be just the beginning,” he wrote. “All it took was for the government to scrap the fuel price reduction mechanism, and within a week prices shot up. The effect? Drivers, farmers, and carriers are paying for the government’s decisions today. And soon we’ll see hikes in product prices too.”
DIESEL NAJDROŻSZY W HISTORII!
8,75 zł za litr oleju napędowego – a na niektórych stacjach drożej. Pb95 dobija 8 zł. A to może być dopiero początek.
Wystarczyło, że rząd wygasił mechanizm obniżający ceny paliw, a w ciągu tygodnia ceny wystrzeliły w górę.
“PLN 8.75 per liter of diesel — and even more at some stations. 95-octane petrol is reaching PLN 8. And this may be just the beginning,” he added.
“The government should immediately reinstate the fuel-price reduction mechanism and keep it in place as long as the crisis in the Middle East continues. Poles cannot pay for the government’s inaction every time they fill up!” Błaszczak wrote.
According to the e-petrol.pl price report, on Wednesday, a liter of diesel cost an average of PLN 8.75 (€2.02) at Polish gas stations, PLN 0.36 more than a week earlier. A liter of 95-octane unleaded petrol rose by an average of PLN 0.26, to PLN 7.89, within a week. The average price of a liter of LPG, which cost PLN 2.95 on Wednesday, increased by PLN 0.06.
E-petrol analysts emphasize that the average diesel price recorded on Wednesday is the highest in the portal’s history. In their view, the unfavorable prices at stations are due both to the systematic rise in oil prices that has been underway since the end of August and to significant increases in wholesale fuel prices. They added that, in the case of LPG, higher bills are related to the more expensive supply of this fuel to stations.
On Sept. 1, the government ended the Fuel Price Reduction (CPN) package, which had been in place for the final weeks of the school holidays, from Aug. 17 to 31. Under the program, the VAT rate on certain fuels, in particular gas and diesel, was reduced from 23 percent to 8 percent. At the same time, maximum prices announced by the Minister of Energy were in force. Sales above the maximum price were punishable by a fine of up to PLN 1 million.
Neighboring Germany currently has higher diesel prices, at €2.32 a liter, also a record high. Only a few EU countries have a higher price, such as Denmark, which is currently at €2.60 a liter.
There are fears that rising diesel and natural gas prices across Europecould result in a major energy crisis over the coming months. European natural gas prices also rose to a three-year high of €80 per megawatt-hour (€/MWh) and many countries, such as Germany, are significantly behind on efforts to fill their reserves before the cold winter months arrive.
Around 1590 BCE — more than 800 years before Rome was founded, and before Tutankhamun was even born — a small number of people in what is now southeastern Poland started eating a cereal that had never grown in their fields. It wasn’t a local crop, and it didn’t belong to any plant known elsewhere […]
The EU welcomes Cambodia’s decision to join the Multi-party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA) for WTO members, contributing to efforts to uphold a rules-based multilateral trading system.
With Cambodia’s participation, the MPIA now covers 62 World Trade Organization (WTO) members and 60.4% of world trade.
The MPIA brings together participants from all continents and at different levels of development, united by a shared commitment to upholding the rules-based trading system.
The MPIA preserves the right to appeal in trade disputes among participating WTO members, at a time when the WTO’s Appellate Body remains non-functioning. It helps ensure that disputes can continue to be resolved in an orderly and binding manner, avoiding appeals 'into the void'.
“I welcome Cambodia to the MPIA. The arrangement plays an important role in upholding the rules-based trading system. Each new participant helps reinforce the predictability, stability and credibility of global trade rules. I encourage other WTO members to join the MPIA,” said EU Trade and Economic Security Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič.
Background
The MPIA was established in 2020 and has proven its effectiveness in many WTO disputes.
Under the MPIA, appeals are heard by arbitrators randomly selected from a pool of 10 standing appeal arbitrators set up by the participating WTO members. These arbitrators are persons of recognised authority, with demonstrated expertise in law, international trade and WTO agreements.
The MPIA is open to all WTO members as a practical tool for appeal arbitration, pending the restoration of a reformed and fully functioning WTO dispute settlement system.
As of 1 June 2025, the MPIA has anupdated pool of appeal arbitrators to ensure that appeals continue to be heard by independent arbitrators of the highest calibre.
At the WTO Ministerial Conference that took place earlier this year, MPIA ministers stressed the importance of the MPIA for the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system.
The current MPIA participants are Australia, Barbados, Benin, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, China, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, the European Union (and its Member States), Guatemala, Hong Kong (China), Iceland, Japan, Liechtenstein, Macao (China), Malaysia, Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Singapore, Switzerland, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, Uruguay and Vietnam.
Bundesaußenminister Johann Wadephul ist im Podcast „Ronzheimer“ überraschend ehrlich geworden, denn er forderte von der Ukraine mehr Bestellungen bei deutschen Rüstungskonzernen: „Zum jetzigen Zeitpunkt sind wir nicht ganz zufrieden mit dem, was es an (…) Bestellungen in Deutschland gibt. Und deswegen haben wir jetzt die ukrainische Regierung gebeten, das zu überprüfen und dafür zu sorgen, […]
In der TASS ist ein Artikel erschienen, der ein Thema behandelt, das auch ich auf der Liste hatte, über das ich aus Zeitgründen aber noch nicht geschrieben habe, nämlich den Folgen der Militarisierung Europas, die, wenn sich der politische Kurs der EU nicht ändert, zu einer Lage führen werden, die weitaus gefährlicher sein wird, als […]
On her visit to Nuuk, the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen announced a €200 million Global Gateway Partnership Package, to be invested in and with Greenland this year and the next. The EU, Greenland and Denmark have also reinforced their partnership with a new Joint Declaration, signed in Nuuk by the President, Premier of Greenland Jens-Frederik Nielsen and Prime Minister of Denmark Mette Frederiksen.
President von der Leyen said: “Greenland can count on the EU. That was my message during my last visit. Today, I am back to deliver the real results of our close cooperation. With a new EU-Greenland Partnership package, worth €200 million. This will create new opportunities and a strong and engaged EU in both Greenland and the Arctic. Because Greenland is a strategic ally and a trusted friend.”
The Declaration and the investment package deepen the EU-Greenland cooperation across the board – from traditional areas, such as education and fisheries, to better satellite and cable connectivity, hydropower and critical raw materials. The package also focuses on investments that improve everyday life in the country: better housing, sustainable tourism and stronger support for small businesses.
A renewed Joint Declaration between the EU, Greenland and Denmark
The EU, Greenland and Denmark co-signed a new Joint Declaration on relations between the EU and Greenland to strengthen the common investment agenda, political dialogue and people-to-people exchanges, reaffirming a partnership grounded in shared values and interests.
Building on the previous Declaration from 2015, the newJoint Declaration recognizes Greenland's growing strategic importance and further strengthens and expands the partnership in areas of mutual interest. These include, among others, education and training, infrastructure development, sustainable raw materials, clean energy production, digital connectivity, sustainable tourism, housing, research and innovation, civil protection, resilience and security, fisheries, environment and climate action.
A new Global Gateway Partnership Package
The EU is mobilising a partnership package of €200 million for investments in Greenland. It will create new economic opportunities for the local population, while contributing to a sustainable, prosperous and peaceful Arctic region. A first set of Global Gateway projects in several priority sectors have already been agreed with Greenland, and we are working together on exploring a number of new investments:
Digital connectivity
Through the Enhanced Satellite Connectivity project for Greenland, the EU is partnering with Tusass to support the expansion of satellite capacities across Greenland through European providers over the next five years. This will improve the reliability, speed and resilience of digital connections, benefiting remote settlements, schools and businesses.
This builds on the EU's ongoing support for the strengthening of digital connectivity on Greenland's west coast.
In parallel, the EU is supporting feasibility work to assess whether data centres could become a viable opportunity for Greenland as the necessary energy and digital infrastructure develops.
Sustainable raw materials
The EU and Greenland will advance sustainable mining projects with a link to the European industry. Support will be provided through technical analysis and investor matchmaking and will contribute to stronger and more integrated and resilient value chains. This will build up on successful existing investments, such as the one in the Malmbjerg mining project.
The GreenRoc's Amitsoq graphite project is another concrete example of this mutually beneficial partnership. As an EU Strategic Project under the Critical Raw Materials Act, it shows the potential for integrated Greenland–EU value chains, strengthening security of supply and supporting investment.
Sustainable energy
The EU will support a programme led by Greenland's national energy utility company, Nukissiorfiit, to modernise and decarbonise energy supply in remote settlements. Through the deployment of hybrid renewable energy systems in towns and settlements, the programme will strengthen the reliability of electricity supply while expanding the use of renewable energy.
The EU and Greenland are also exploring support for the expansion of the Buksefjord hydropower plant, Greenland's main hydropower facility, to respond to rising electricity demand in Nuuk.
Capacity building
The EU will support the Government of Greenland in strengthening its institutional capacity through the establishment of a Programme Management Unit, to ensure effective delivery of relevant policy priorities as well as EU-backed programmes under the EU-Greenland Partnership.
Jobs and quality of life
The EU and Greenland agreed to use the remaining funding to advance preparations for several additional programmes in priority areas, notably tourism and housing.
Sustainable tourism has been identified as one of the most immediate and promising opportunities for economic diversification, private sector development and job creation across Greenland.
Housing is also essential to address Greenland's ageing housing stock, improve public health and the conditions for sustainable growth.
Background
Greenland is the largest recipient of EU support per capita among the Overseas Countries and Territories. The EU has earmarked €225 million for the period 2021-2027, with 90% dedicated to education and 10% to green growth. The Commission has proposed €530 million for Greenland under the next Multiannual Financial Framework 2028-2034, more than doubling the current level of support.
The EU's partnership with Greenland is also underpinned by theSustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement. As a central pillar of Greenland's economy and a key area of cooperation, the EU provides €17.3 million to Greenland each year under the current fisheries protocol, including €3.2 million to support its national strategy for sustainable fisheries. The Agreement promotes the sustainable management of fish stocks, strengthens fisheries governance and contributes to economic stability in coastal communities. (will be available shortly)
Poland has unveiled a full-sized demonstrator of a new heavy infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) intended to put more armor and firepower between mechanized troops and the increasingly lethal threats of the modern battlefield. The unveiling comes as Poland undertakes a sweeping modernization of its armored forces, driven in large part by the threat posed by Russia.
The debut of the Ciężki Bojowy Wóz Piechoty (CBWP), or Heavy Infantry Fighting Vehicle, during the MSPO 34th International Defense Industry Exhibition at Targi Kielce, on September 8, 2026 in Kielce, Poland. Photo by Omar Marques/Getty Images
Huta Stalowa Wola, part of state-owned Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa, presented the Ciężki Bojowy Wóz Piechoty (CBWP), or Heavy Infantry Fighting Vehicle, at the MSPO defense exhibition in Kielce, Poland, today. The vehicle, commonly referred to as Ratel (honey badger), is the latest step in a Polish effort to develop a heavily protected tracked combat platform that can complement the lighter, amphibious Borsuk (badger) infantry fighting vehicle.
“The demonstrator presented today confirms that Polish companies possess the expertise to design and develop advanced combat platforms that meet the demands of the modern battlefield,” Adam Leszkiewicz, president of PGZ’s management board, said during the unveiling.
OTO ON. CIĘŻKI BOJOWY WÓZ PIECHOTY.
Po dniach odliczania i pokazywania tylko fragmentów odsłaniamy najważniejszą premierę PGZ na #MSPO2026.
CBWP to nowa ciężka platforma opracowana przez Hutę Stalowa Wola – z wysokim poziomem ochrony, dużą mobilnością i siłą ognia… pic.twitter.com/kazs4ciGMj
At approximately 40 tons, the CBWP is about 12 tons heavier than the roughly 28-ton Borsuk (and adds an axle, for seven road wheels on each side), the result of a fundamental difference in design philosophy.
A Borsuk operated by the 15th Mechanized Infantry Brigade of the Polish Army. U.S. Army National Guard photo by Staff Sgt. Matthew A. Foster
Borsuk was conceived as a relatively lightweight IFV able to operate alongside mechanized infantry while retaining the ability to swim. The CBWP instead prioritizes protection and battlefield survivability, placing it in the growing category of heavy IFVs being developed and operated by NATO countries and others.
The vehicle will have a three-person crew and carry up to eight infantrymen. Its primary role is to transport those troops safely into contested areas while providing direct fire support once they reach the objective.
The war in Ukraine has demonstrated how quickly armored vehicles can be exposed to anti-tank guided missiles, mines, artillery fragments, loitering munitions, and small drones. Even vehicles that survive direct attacks can be functionally disabled by damage to tracks, sensors, or external equipment.
A Ukrainian M2A2 Bradley engaging and damaging a Russian T-90M in a close-range fight. After a mission kill, the T-90M is subsequently finished by an FPV drone:
The Ukrainian Bradley IFV damaged the no-analogue russian T-90M "Breakthrough" in a close fight. Then an FPV drone finished this long-suffering tank.
Maybe, the T-90M tanks should be renamed into "Broken".
While Ukraine has shown that armor is increasingly easy to find and attack, and thus less relevant, Warsaw is far from convinced that armored vehicles are now irrelevant, with multiple acquisition projects underway. However, Ukraine does change what these vehicles need to be able to do and how they must be employed to have a chance of survival. In certain circumstances, when properly concealed, dispersed, and integrated with counter-drone capabilities, armor is still seen as important for protected mobility and firepower by militaries around the globe.
According to PGZ, the CBWP’s design therefore puts considerable emphasis on survivability. It incorporates advanced ballistic and mine protection designed to meet relevant STANAG standards. It also uses specialized mine-resistant seats intended to reduce the effects of explosions beneath the hull.
The protection architecture can be supplemented by an active protection system (APS). If integrated on a production vehicle, such a system could provide another layer of defense against incoming anti-tank weapons, and potentially small drones, although PGZ has described the APS as an optional component rather than specifying a particular production configuration.
For detecting threats, the vehicle can employ laser-warning equipment including the OBRA-3 system, integrated with smoke grenade launchers. A laser warning can provide the crew with an indication that the vehicle has been illuminated by a rangefinder or targeting system, potentially allowing it to react before an anti-tank weapon is launched.
A video showing a test of the OBRA-3 protection system on a Polish Rosomak wheeled armored fighting vehicle, with a smoke screen being generated to blind hostile optics. The view is from the driver’s compartment:
The CBWP will also carry an integrated nuclear, biological, and chemical protection system, allowing the crew and embarked infantry to operate in contaminated environments.
Firepower comes from the ZSSW-30 remotely operated turret, one of the most important locally developed systems in Poland’s current armored vehicle modernization effort.
The turret is equipped with a 30mm cannon armed with programmable ammunition, plus Rafael Spike anti-tank guided missiles. Together, the weapons are intended to give the CBWP the ability to engage armored vehicles, infantry, and other battlefield targets while also providing a degree of capability against aerial threats. In particular, the programmable ammunition provides greater flexibility against different target types — such as drones — by allowing the projectile’s effects to be tailored to the engagement.
A Polish Spike anti-tank guided missile is displayed during the official celebrations of the 6th Airborne Brigade Day at the Polish Aviation Museum in Krakow, Poland, on October 3, 2025. Photo by Klaudia Radecka/NurPhoto
The inclusion of Spike missiles gives the vehicle an extended-range anti-armor option beyond the effective range of its automatic cannon. Much more than a traditional anti-tank guided missile, Spike provides an indirect-fire capability including the option to loiter over a particular area and search for targets, among other attributes.
The ZSSW-30 also gives Poland a degree of commonality across its growing fleet of modern armored vehicles, with the system already being introduced on Borsuk and on some Rosomak wheeled armored fighting vehicles.
Polish soldiers assigned to the 15th Mechanized Infantry Brigade maneuver a Rosomak wheeled armored fighting vehicle into position during Amber Lynx, a combined live-fire exercise at Bemowo Piskie, Poland, in April 2023. U.S. Army National Guard photo by Sgt. Lianne M. Hirano
The CBWP reflects a trend for fighting vehicles that blur the boundaries between traditional IFV and infantry-support concepts. It is expected to carry a relatively large infantry squad while possessing the sensors and weapons necessary to remain directly involved in combat alongside those troops. At the same time, its high level of protection makes for a notably large vehicle.
The new vehicle is just one part of Poland’s broader military modernization.
Warsaw has embarked on one of NATO’s most ambitious efforts to expand and modernize its ground forces, with major acquisitions of two different types of main battle tank, artillery, rocket systems, and infantry fighting vehicles. Poland is simultaneously expanding domestic production capacity, seeking to ensure that at least part of the equipment needed for a larger army can be produced and sustained within the country.
The Borsuk program is central to that effort and is intended to replace Poland’s aging Soviet-designed BWP-1 (the Polish version of the BMP-1).
Polish soldiers from 10th Mechanized Battalion in a BWP-1 train during Exercise Noble Jump in Romania. Captain Katarzyna SAWICKA/Allied Joint Force Command Naples
The heavier CBWP offers even more capability, but its heavier weight comes with tradeoffs. It will be inherently less flexible than a lighter amphibious IFV, and more costly. In return, it will give Polish commanders another option for missions where survivability matters more than swimming capability or rapid deployment.
Such a vehicle would be particularly important for units operating in heavily contested areas, where the threat from mines, anti-tank weapons, and drones makes protection a higher priority. This provides some indication of what Polish planners expect a conflict with Russia on Europe’s eastern flank to look like. However, lessons from Ukraine show that, whatever its quality, an armored fighting vehicle will only be as survivable as the network and tactics around it.
An AH-64 Apache attack helicopter over a massive static line of Polish armor, including two M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks, two Rosomak wheeled armored fighting vehicles with ZSSW-30 turrets, and a Borsuk tracked IFV, during a combat presentation at the Land Forces Training Center in Nowa Deba, Poland, on September 7, 2026. Photo by Artur Widak/NurPhoto
Still, the CBWP remains some distance from operational service.
PGZ currently has one operational demonstrator, intended for factory trials. The company plans to subsequently construct two fully functional prototypes, with both expected to be ready in 2027.
Those vehicles will then undergo intensive testing with the Polish Armed Forces. The results could lead to changes in the protection architecture, turret integration, or other elements before a production configuration is finalized.
The CBWP demonstrator vehicle underway. Polish Ministry of Defense
PGZ has indicated that it could be ready for production as early as 2029, but that timeline is not yet a firm procurement schedule. It will depend on the results of testing, any modifications required during development, and negotiations with the customer.
Poland has been reported to be considering a requirement for up to 700 CBWP vehicles. In addition, Poland has so far contracted for 257 Borsuk IFVs, with another roughly 1,000 Borsuk-family combat and specialized vehicles envisioned under a broader framework agreement.
If the program succeeds, Poland will ultimately field a highly capable two-tier tracked IFV force in which the CBWP equips units expected to operate in the most dangerous portions of the battlefield.
Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said that only “idiots and traitors” could celebrate the recent historic victory of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) in Saxony-Anhalt, prompting a sharp backlash after his post on X.
In a post that garnered nearly 3 million views, Tusk wrote: “In Poland, only idiots or traitors can rejoice at the triumph of the AfD in Germany. Quite a few of them have gathered in Confederation and PiS.”
W Polsce tylko idioci albo zdrajcy mogą się cieszyć z tryumfu AfD w Niemczech. Trochę się ich nazbierało w Konfederacjach i PiS.
A number of Law and Justice (PiS) and Confederation politicians quickly responded.
“I understand that frustration. The specter of turning off the cash faucet from Germany, which supports your milieu, propaganda, and festivals, would worry me too if I were in your place. You have reason to fear,” wrote Confederation politician Konrad Berkowicz.
Some critics of Tusk’s statement took a more measured approach. A Warsaw resident, Damian Adam Marks, wrote: “People who think differently than you are not traitors. Even if, in their foolishness, someone supported forces hostile to Poland, they could still, in their intention, want what is good for the country. It simply doesn’t concern you. What matters exclusively is creating the boundary of us and them. You must point out the enemy.”
Some in the AfD are looking to assure the Polish right that
the AfD is a party they can work with. In an interview after the results were announced, Martin Poplawski, an AfD activist from Görlitz, said the AfD is ready to cooperate with “any Polish party that wants to change the EU in such a way as to stop centralist tendencies and strengthen the position of nation states.”
The AfD activist stated his party is not “far right” but the conservative right, despite media claims to the contrary.
“I can tell you what it looks like from my perspective. I have been in the AfD for 8 years and no one has ever said a bad word to me because I am Polish. What’s more, no one even looked at me askance,” said Poplawski.
Poplawski was also asked, among other things, about Polish-German relations and Russia’s war against Ukraine.
Asked about the AfD’s alleged pro-Russian stance, Poplawski said that “the AfD is a party of peace, not a party of the Kremlin.”
“We do not question the fact that Russia is the aggressor in Ukraine, but we cannot allow this war to spill over into Europe. We also advocate dialogue, including with Moscow. This war can only be ended at the negotiating table. The alternative is the annihilation of Europe,” he stated.
In a post-election interview, Dr. Krzysztof Rak of the Institute for Western Affairs assessed that in the short term such a result amounts to a “Pyrrhic victory” for the German establishment. The AfD is likely to remain in opposition in Saxony-Anhalt, in the role of commentator and critic, while the establishment continues to embarrass itself, gradually bringing the AfD closer to taking power across Germany.
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The U.S. Air Force is seeking an anti-aircraft gun system to help defend its air bases around the world from drones and cruise missiles. The Request for Information (RFI) about these systems, posted on the government’s contracting website on Thursday, is part of a larger Air Force effort to play a greater role in air base defense via ground-based air defenses (GBADs), a capacity traditionally performed by the Army. As a result, the Air Force currently has no such systems. Now it is interested in changing that.
The request comes as the war against Iran exposed gaps in how the U.S. can provide effective, sustained air defenses for its foreign installations and amid concerns about a future fight against a peer competitor like China or Russia.
“The Government is conducting market research to identify potential industry sources capable of providing solutions for a Ground-Based, Medium-Caliber Gun Weapon System that fires affordable munitions, enables defense against air and missile threats with an initial focus on subsonic cruise missiles (CM) and Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) to provide persistent defense in support of [the] United States Air Force,” the RFI notes.
The RFI doesn’t stipulate what it considers a medium-caliber round; however, according to the Army, the list includes 20mm, 25mm, 30x113mm, 30x173mm and 40mm shells.
“To effectively assess and compare air defense weapon system performance, there are 15 critical baseline operational and technical parameters that must be analyzed in unison,” the RFI explains.
(Air Force Request for Information)
“These key metrics begin with the system’s Salvo Probability of Kill (Pk) evaluated against both Cruise Missiles (CM) and Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Groups 1-5 at maximum range and altitude, ensuring robust lethality against diverse modern threats,” the RFI notes.
A salvo probability of kill measures how effectively a salvo, as opposed to a single shot, defeats a target.
The following chart displays the weight, normal operating altitude and speed of the five drone group classifications.
(Congressional Research Service chart of Group 1 through 5 drones)
The Air Force wants this system to be “rapidly deployable, maintaining a lightweight, modular, and transportable footprint that can be swiftly projected into austere theater environments to meet emergent threats.” The RFI does not provide further details of how the Air Force is looking to transport these systems; however, the service relies on its fleets of C-130 Hercules, C-17 Globemaster III and C-5 Galaxy transport aircraft to move equipment. The size and weight of the systems determines which kind of aircraft can transport it.
These systems could also be moved by truck or ship or on their own if self-propelled, but those options also incur a cost in terms of the timeliness of delivery, and can be impossible for rapid global deployments.
U.S. Army soldiers from the 1st Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery Regiment, 108th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, load equipment and trucks onto a C-17 Globemaster III with U.S. Air Force airmen assigned to the 21st Expeditionary Airlift Squadron at an undisclosed location in the CENTCOM Area of Operations, Dec. 31, 2023. Photo by Staff Sgt. Christopher Neu
A key point of evaluation will be the overall cost of the munitions. The Air Force wants to ensure that the shell’s velocity and terminal effects “are maximized without driving the cost-per-engagement to unsustainable levels or exceeding the physical constraints of the host platform,” the RFI states. We’ll discuss these factors in more detail later in this story.
The service is also looking for the integration of “the right mix of radar, electro-optical, infrared, or radio-frequency sensors—to ensure reliable target acquisition and tracking across varying weather conditions, environments, and countermeasure scenarios.”
As we noted at the top of this story, the Air Force is seeking to improve its organic ability to defend its bases. This has become “an increasingly high priority” for the service, Air Force Secretary Troy E. Meink told Congress on May 20.
“The Air Force is developing organic air and missile defense capabilities, including Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-sUAS) to defend our air bases in all theatres [sic],” Meink stated in his written testimony. “The fielding of the Air Base Air Defense Systems (ABADS) missile defense capability, including kinetic defenses, at overseas main operation bases contributes to joint layered defense but does not reduce the need for increased joint investment in air and missile defense. We will continue to work judiciously for the development and procurement of these critical defensive capabilities.”
(Written testimony of Air Force Secretary Troy E. Meink)
In its Fiscal Year 2027 budget request, the Air Force is seeking about $1.4 billion for a missile defense variant of the Air Base Air Defense Systems (ABADS), according to Air & Space Forces Magazine. In addition, the Air Force also requested $51.8 million in procurement funds for its Small Unmanned Air Defense Systems (SUADS) in Fiscal Year 2026, according to the Air Force Fiscal Year 2026 budget justification book.
The war against Iran and the Ukraine war have, in particular, illustrated the challenges of defending against drones and cruise missiles.
There are two facets to potential use of gun systems for base defense. The first is that in complex air defense environments, it provides an inner, last line of defense against incoming threats. If the outer layers fail to take down the target or that target is not considered a priority over others, a hard-kill gun system offers a predictable and relatively reliable fallback. The gun system would become even more important if interceptor stocks run low, even temporarily, and those weapons need to be rationed for higher-end threats. With the outer defensive rings collapsing, the inner becomes far more important.
For small drones, that interceptors would not be effective with anyway, the gun system can take them down in localized air defense scenarios. Then there is also defending bases in lower threat areas where there are not additional layers of SAM systems. A gun system can provide a core aerial defense against lower-end, lower-density drone and cruise missile threats without costing huge sums of money or requiring a huge logistical footprint.
Beyond that, there is a direct cost comparison argument, but again, that is in a vacuum and a gun system cannot take the place of a multi-layered air defense system without inviting huge risk. Still, the engagement cost comparison is worth mentioning.
High-end, expensive, difficult-to-manufacture air defense weapons, like Patriot PAC-3 MSE, are clearly inefficient against drones. For instance, a mass-produced Iranian Shahed-136 can cost about $35,000 to $50,000, while a Patriot PAC-3 can run about $5 million and takes years to procure. By comparison, the cost-per-engagement efficiency of gun-based air defense systems, designed to defend against drones and subsonic cruise missiles, is far greater. One example of how this plays out is the cost of firing the Army’s Centurion Counter-Rocket, Artillery, Mortar (C-RAM) system. It is a ground-based version of the Phalanx Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) used on various U.S. and foreign warships, and is armed with a six-barrel 20mm Vulcan Gatling-type cannon firing M940 rounds. Those self-destructing rounds currently have a price tag of $80.70, according to the Army’s Fiscal Year 2025 budget request. This means a two-second burst from a Centurion, at a rate of fire of 4,500 rounds per minute, would cost just over $12,100.
Again, this is not a strict apples-to-apples comparison, but it can become a bigger factor during prolonged conflicts when high-end weapons stocks begin to run short. It’s also worth noting that drone interceptors are a rapidly growing capability set that are a lower-cost option for swatting down one-way attack drones and even some cruise missiles. Systems like Coyote have been in service for years with the Pentagon and have been protecting bases overseas with strong results. Even cheaper systems are emerging out of lessons learned in Ukraine. All of these systems have their own advantages and disadvantages, but pairing them with a new gun system would likely have synergistic effects. Overall, deploying densely layered short-range air defenses is becoming increasingly important in its own right, at least in high-threat areas.
Ukraine has a great deal of experience with the costs and prioritization of air defense capabilities. The country faces daily attacks by Russian missiles and drones, which is causing mounting casualties and destruction. This ceaseless bombardment has almost completely depleted Ukraine’s supply of Patriot interceptors, leaving it largely defenseless against ballistic missiles. As we noted yesterday, Ukraine is also running short of air-to-air missiles its Air Force F-16s use to swat down drones.
However, Ukraine has also relied heavily on a wide array of gun-based air defense systems, including the German-made Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft guns (SPAAG). Based on the chassis of the Leopard 1 main battle tank, Gepards feature twin radar-aimed 35mm automatic cannons, mounted on a single turret. The German variant sports an S-band search radar and a Ku-band tracking radar. These radars are critical to the Gepard’s ability to locate, track, and engage targets at night and amid poor weather conditions.
The following video shows a Gepard blasting an Iranian-made Shahed-136 out of the sky.
A video reportedly showing two Russian Shahed-136 (Geran-2) loitering munitions being shot down by the Ukrainians with a German-delivered Flakpanzer Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft gun (SPAAG) during last night's attack in Odesa Oblast, southern Ukraine.… pic.twitter.com/OhH7vTultm
The Air Force force is also looking at directed energy weapons like lasers for force protection and especially for defending bases overseas. While gaining traction across the services due in large measure to the much lower cost of delivering effects, these systems are still works in progress. Gun-based air defenses, on the other hand, are mature and proven, and modern precision-guided, programmable ammunition makes them even more efficient and effective.
Beyond the cost, high-end air defense systems — including their component sensors — though portable, are generally fixed to a specific location. That makes them vulnerable to attack. This has been the case in both the war against Iran and Ukraine. The same concerns hold true of aircraft. Both conflicts have shown aircraft vulnerability to drones when parked out in the open. Ukraine’s Operation Spider Web attack on Russian strategic bombers last year in particular shed light on this issue, which we have been sounding the alarm on for a long time.
In addition to these challenges, the Air Force is also facing the headwinds of an overall lack of U.S. short-range air defense capabilities, a concern we have been highlighting for years. Currently, there are three gun-based SHORAD systems being fielded by the U.S. military. These include the aforementioned Centurion C-RAM systems.
The Army also uses the Sgt. Stout, an air defense system based on the 8×8 Stryker light armored vehicle. The Sgt. Stout has a turret that can be fitted with up to two four-round launchers for Stingers. Those launchers can also be swapped out for ones that can be loaded with a pair of millimeter-wave radar-guided AGM-114L Hellfire missiles. The turret also has a 30mm XM914 automatic cannon, which can fire proximity-fuzed airbursting rounds against drones and other aerial threats, and a 7.62x51mm M240B machine gun.
Soldiers assigned to 4th Battalion, 60th Air Defense Artillery Regiment conducted a live fire exercise with the SGT STOUT (Stryker A1 M-SHORAD) vehicle in Fort Sill, Oklahoma, Sep. 23, 2025. Photo by Cpl. Emaney Wilson
The Marine Air Defense Integrated System (MADIS) is armed with 30mm cannons and M240C coaxial machine guns in remote weapon stations (RWS). The RWS on one of the two vehicles is also configured to fire Stinger missiles for a spectrum of ground-based air defense scenarios.
U.S. Marines with 12th Littoral Anti-Air Battalion, 12th Marine Littoral Regiment, 3rd Marine Division, fire an XM914 30mm chain gun mounted on a Marine Air Defense Integrated System during a live-fire range at Camp Schwab, Okinawa, Japan, July 28, 2026. Photo by Lance Cpl. Skilah Sanchez
The Army may have additional gun-based systems on the way. In July, the service put out a request for information to companies that can provide a new gun-based air defense option, using a 50mm cannon system to track and defeat Group 1, 2 and 3 drones.
A few weeks later, Northrop Grumman introduced its Raid Hunter 50mm GBAD system, which it said “combines proven Chain Gun® technology, precision‑guided 50mm ammunition and a networked, interoperable system controller to deliver powerful protection against high-volume, mixed-threat aerial raids. It is designed to defeat a range of aerial threats including high‑priority cruise missile threats, unmanned aerial systems (UAS), and other advanced threats.”
We’re introducing Raid Hunter, our newly named 50mm gun-based air defense system designed to defeat mass, mixed aerial raids with cost-effective interceptors and deep magazine effectors which can be delivered to the warfighter at scale. Learn more: https://t.co/gnOzpo0RA3pic.twitter.com/oTqORTG9Q4
There are foreign options should the Air Force want to go that route. For instance, German arms maker Rheinmetall makes the popular Skyranger 35 gun system, which is a turret that can fit on a wide array of armor hulls.
The Skyranger 35 “is equipped with a KDG 35/1000 revolver cannon in 35 mm x 228 caliber with a firing rate of 1,000 rounds per minute,” according to Rheinmetall, which began delivering these to Ukraine in January. “It has an effective range of up to 4,000 meters and a high degree of commonality with the Oerlikon Revolver Gun Mk 3. Thanks to AHEAD technology, the Skyranger 35 is airburst-capable. In the future, it will also be possible to equip it with modern guided missiles.”
It seems that Ukraine's 1020th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment which belongs to the Ground Forces has taken delivery of the first Skyranger 35 SPAAGs mounted on a Leopard 1 chassis made by @RheinmetallAG.
Skyshield is the fixed placement cousin of this system and has been bought by a number of nations.
Skyshield (Rheinmetall)
This is just one example of a large number of potential offerings that could fit the USAF’s interests, from both domestic and foreign origins.
As we discussed earlier in this story, the U.S. is already facing a challenge defending against Iranian threats. A war with China would be more devastating and, when it comes to the Air Force protecting its bases, require far more robust defenses. At the same time, the Air Force is still very early in the process of taking on more responsibility for protecting its assets.
Parties have until 5 p.m. Oct. 9 to submit their proposals to the Air Force for a gun-based air defense system. With limited options and the service pushing to address its growing desire for organic air defenses, it will be interesting to see who comes forward and what systems they offer. We will provide more details about this effort when they become available.
Since receiving these tanks last year, the crews, serving with Ukraine’s 425th Separate Assault Regiment “Skala,” have used the Abrams in two combat operations in the fight for Pokrovsk, a key Ukrainian logistics hub and part of a defensive belt of towns in Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk region. They recounted their experiences to Hromadske, an independent media channel in Ukraine.
Fighting around Pokrovsk
The first major deployment described by the crews took place in December of last year, when Abrams tanks were used to support assault groups entering Pokrovsk.
The crewmember with the callsign Kent described moving into the city behind a mine-clearing tank and ahead of two infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) carrying assault troops, during a mission that was deliberately aggressive.
“Since a tank is a priority target — my task was to draw their attention, while our infantry dismounted and moved in successfully.”
The Abrams was also assigned three target points to engage along the route.
“We went right in there, poured it on, and drove back out,” he recalled.
A video showing the 425th Separate Assault Regiment in action in August 2025, soon after receiving the Abrams:
The second operation, on March 31, involved an attempt to enter and hold an industrial area near Pokrovsk to help block Russian movement toward Hryshyne, a contested village in the district.
The operation was prepared for more than two weeks. Ukrainian forces conducted reconnaissance flights, examined difficult sections of the planned routes, and provided crews with extensive video and imagery.
“They knew every meter of the route,” another of the unit’s commanders, with the callsign Kubik, said.
Weather was considered essential. The Ukrainians waited for fog and rain, hoping to limit the effectiveness of Russian drones.
“Without the right weather we wouldn’t have been able to pull off operations like that,” Kubik said.
The operation nevertheless resulted in the destruction of four out of five armored vehicles, some of which are seen in the video embedded below.
Russia's Rubicon Drone Center FPV drones destroyed a Ukrainian assault group near Pokrovsk, hitting an M1A1 Abrams tank, M1117 APC and BMP-2 as the unit tried to advance near Hryshyne under fog cover. #Ukrainepic.twitter.com/ZzE52qAYxp
The commander acknowledged that the Russian side may have had advance knowledge of the operation.
“I can’t rule out the possibility that the enemy knew our plan,” he said.
His Abrams was not immediately destroyed. According to the crew, it completed its task and the assault troops dismounted before the weather changed.
“Once the fog lifted, they started working on it with an FPV drone,” the commander said.
Why use tanks at all?
The losses prompted criticism from Ukrainian military commentators, particularly after footage of the destroyed vehicles was published.
However, the crews defend the decision to use armored vehicles for the missions. According to the men of the Skala interviewed, the alternative was often to send infantry over several miles on foot while carrying weapons, ammunition, water, and other supplies.
“That takes more time,” Kubik explained. “And the enemy isn’t standing still — the enemy is moving toward them.”
Australia-supplied M1A1 Abrams AIM main battle tank in service of the Ukrainian 425th Separate Assault Regiment "Skala."
The argument that infantry could simply move more stealthily on foot also has limitations.
“Every day the Mavic drones are flying, the fixed-wing drones are flying,” he said. “No fog, guys are visible.”
Combined with IFVs, the Abrams can provide the ability to rapidly move troops while simultaneously delivering heavy direct fire against enemy positions and offering substantial protection to its crew.
The crews argue that this capability remains worthwhile even when the tank itself may eventually be lost.
One commander was asked whether deploying a roughly $5-million tank makes sense if a single sortie can result in its destruction.
“Yes, of course it makes sense to deploy it,” he replied.
“First and foremost — it saves the lives of the crew inside it.”
Russian forces captured a relatively lightly damaged M1A1SA Abrams main battle tank operated by the 47th Separate Mechanized Brigade in the Pokrovsk direction.
He pointed to fairly basic modifications including rubber strips and a foldable wire cage mounted on the turret, as additional layers of protection against drone attacks.
“A drone doesn’t hit the actual penetrating element directly — it just can’t reach it,” he explained. “It hits the rubber, and then the blast wave travels from there.”
Even with their tanks festooned with explosive reactive armor (ERA) bricks, the crews acknowledge that such protection has limits.
A head-on view of an M1A1 of the 425th Separate Assault Regiment shows the ERA bricks installed around the turret and in front of the hull. Ukrainian Armed Forces
US-supplied M1A1 Abrams tank in service of the Armed Forces of Ukraine with added Kontakt-1 ERA on the frontal hull and standard ARAT ERA on the sides. pic.twitter.com/PC2kDfxefO
— Status-6 (War & Military News) (@Archer83Able) May 21, 2024
“They also protect very well. An effective thing,” he said.
A Russian tank with the ‘hedgehog’-type protective covering. Russian state media
For now, the drone threat has led the regiment to keep its Abrams out of combat, as we will return to later.
The Abrams as a machine
The crews’ assessment of the Abrams included praise for its mobility, roomy interior, gun, and fire-control system.
Kubik said he had personally driven an Abrams to 50 miles per hour cross-country.
“The engine is an absolute beast,” he added.
The tank can also rapidly perform a pivot turn, which the crews consider particularly useful when maneuvering in confined spaces. Despite its prodiguous weight, it only rarely becomes bogged down after the kind of very heavy snow-melt that effects all vehicles on the battlefield.
Loading a 120mm M1028 canister cartridge into an M1A1 AIM Abrams main battle tank of the tank battalion of the 425th Assault Regiment. pic.twitter.com/tMd8QcROQe
— 𝔗𝔥𝔢 𝕯𝔢𝔞𝔡 𝕯𝔦𝔰𝔱𝔯𝔦𝔠𝔱 (@TheDeadDistrict) June 21, 2026
Its disadvantages include its demanding maintenance requirements. The running gear was described as particularly sensitive, with crews inspecting, lubricating, and replacing components after every sortie.
Fuel consumption is another major burden. The crew cited roughly 400 to 700 liters (106 to 185 gallons) per 100 kilometers (62 miles) depending on terrain and operating conditions.
“On asphalt it burns about 400 liters,” one said. In boggy terrain, consumption can reach “700 liters or more.”
The Abrams thirsty gas turbine engine and extreme logistical demands have always been a criticism of the platform.
An M1A1 of the 425th Separate Assault Regiment fording a river. Ukrainian Armed Forces
The crews said the vehicle’s ability to operate on different fuels is useful, although diesel provides the best engine-hour performance in their experience. Prior to delivery, the gas turbine engines of the tanks were reconfigured to use diesel fuel instead of the standard JP-8 aviation kerosene, according to earlier reports.
They also praised the Abrams’ protected ammunition storage and crew space compared with Soviet-designed tanks.
The version operated by the Ukrainians is an M1A1 rather than the latest Abrams configuration, with less sophisticated electronics than newer variants. It also lacks the classified armor found on its U.S. Army counterpart.
“For me — as a tanker — this configuration, what we have right now, is more than enough,” Kubik said. “The sight is absolutely excellent. The gun is also great.”
The interview ultimately presents a more complicated picture than the declaration that tanks are obsolete on the Ukrainian battlefield.
At the time of writing, at least 25 Abrams have been confirmed visually to have been destroyed, damaged, or abandoned in Ukrainian service. This is from a total of 31 provided by the United States and 49 from Australia.
“For now, we’re not using them further — there’s no way to,” Kubik said. “The enemy has developed their drone component very heavily, and for now we don’t have the means to counter that.”
While tanks remain exceptionally powerful direct-fire and protected mobility platforms, the proliferation of inexpensive uncrewed aircraft has made operating them increasingly difficult.
M1A1 AIM Abrams tanks of the 425th Assault Regiment . The reinforced upper glacis and turret roofs are clearly visible. pic.twitter.com/Sn9h8OWZ9P
— 𝔗𝔥𝔢 𝕯𝔢𝔞𝔡 𝕯𝔦𝔰𝔱𝔯𝔦𝔠𝔱 (@TheDeadDistrict) June 21, 2026
“If someone had told me, as a tanker, back in 2022: ‘Take this — we’re giving you an Abrams, we’ll give you time to train and you’ll fight in it,’” Kubik said, “I would never have climbed out of it.”
“I’d only be saying: ‘Bring me shells. I’ll drive non-stop wherever needed, arrive and work.’”
An M1A1 of the 425th Separate Assault Regiment firing its main gun. Ukrainian Armed Forces
As it stands, reconnaissance drones can find the Abrams, FPV drones can attack it, and persistent surveillance makes concealment difficult. Experience has shown that without more effective counter-drone capabilities, even a heavily protected tank can eventually be overwhelmed.
But Kubik believes that will change.
“The day will come when one of our bright minds figures out some excellent solution against drones — and we’ll start using them again.”
Asked whether the era of tanks is over, his answer was unequivocal.
“It’s not over … They’re just waiting it out for now, biding their time. Writing off tanks — in my opinion — is still too early.”
Bronisław Kawęcki (pictured), a Polish anti-communist activist who devoted much of his life to preserving the memory of the workers’ uprising in Radom in 1976, died on 29 August 2026, aged 72.
For many, his name was inseparable from Radom and from one of the defining chapters in Poland’s long struggle against communist rule. But Kawęcki’s legacy extends beyond one Polish city. His life was a reminder of the role that ordinary citizens played in the political transformation that eventually brought democracy to Poland and helped reshape Europe.
Born in Sandomierz on April 29, 1954, Kawęcki moved to Radom as a young man. He initially worked as a carer at a state children’s home before joining the medical supply company Cezal. It was there that he became increasingly involved in the civic and political ferment that would define his life.
The turning point came with the events of June 1976.
Workers in Radom took to the streets following sharp government-announced increases in food prices. The demonstrations were brutally suppressed by the communist authorities. Hundreds of workers were dismissed, prosecuted or subjected to beatings by security forces. The protests in Radom and nearby Ursus would later be recognized as an important precursor to the emergence of the Solidarity movement.
Kawęcki understood early that the struggle was not only about what had happened, but about whether Poland would remember it.
He began collecting the testimonies of workers who had been beaten, dismissed or persecuted. What started as an effort to document the events of 1976 became a mission that would occupy him for decades.
When Solidarity emerged in 1980, Kawęcki joined the movement and helped establish its organization at Cezal. He subsequently became involved in the regional leadership of Solidarity and, in 1981, was selected as a delegate representing the Radom region at the union’s first national congress in Gdańsk.
He was also at the center of an effort to build a monument to the victims of the 1976 protests. A foundation stone was laid in 1981, but the monument itself was never completed.
Then came martial law.
On December 13, 1981, the communist authorities banned Solidarity and launched a nationwide crackdown on its activists. Kawęcki was arrested and interned. He was moved between detention facilities and a prison hospital before being released in July 1982. He lost his job almost immediately afterward.
Yet imprisonment and repression did not end his activism.
During the 1980s, Kawęcki participated in the distribution of underground publications, including the clandestine newspaper Wolny Robotnik, which he later helped edit. He remained under surveillance by the communist security services while continuing to work within the opposition movement.
The foundation stone of the unrealized Radom monument acquired a significance of its own. It became a place of remembrance, where laying flowers could itself be treated by the authorities as a political act.
For Kawęcki, memory was never simply historical.
It was political, civic and ultimately European.
When communism began to collapse in 1989, he helped establish the Citizens’ Committee of the Radom region and participated in the first free electoral campaigns. But unlike many activists who subsequently moved into formal political life, Kawęcki continued to concentrate on documenting and preserving the history of those who had challenged the communist system.
He worked as a consultant and assistant director on documentaries about the 1976 protests and the life and death of Father Roman Kotlarz, whose death was widely associated with his alleged beating by the security services. He also became one of the central figures in the documentary Kamień (The Stone), which explored the history of the unfinished monument and Kawęcki’s own role in preserving the memory of Radom’s workers.
His contribution was eventually formally recognized by the Polish state. In 2018, he received the Cross of Freedom and Solidarity for his opposition activities and contribution to Poland’s independence. He was also awarded the Officer’s Cross of the Order of Polonia Restituta.
But perhaps the most fitting description of his achievement was one that required no official decoration: he became a custodian of memory.
The importance of that role is particularly clear from a European perspective.
The democratic Europe that exists today was not created solely through treaties, institutions and political leaders. It was also built by workers, dissidents, journalists, religious figures and civil society activists who challenged authoritarian systems long before the political structures of a free Europe could take shape.
Poland’s experience was central to that transformation. The protests of 1976, the emergence of Solidarity in 1980, the repression of martial law and the democratic breakthrough of 1989 formed part of the chain of events that ultimately helped bring an end to communist rule across Central and Eastern Europe.
Kawęcki was a participant in that history, but also one of its chroniclers.
He spent decades ensuring that the experiences of those who had suffered would not disappear from public memory. His work reflected a simple conviction: that political freedom has little meaning if societies forget the sacrifices through which it was achieved.
Late in his life, when asked whether the years of internment, professional reprisals and unpaid work devoted to preserving the memory of Radom’s June 1976 uprising had been worth it, his answer was characteristically direct.
“Yes. It was worth it.”
Bronisław Kawęcki’s death marks the passing of one of the generation that experienced Poland’s struggle for freedom firsthand. His legacy, however, belongs to a much larger European story.
It is the story of how democracy is defended before it becomes inevitable, and how the preservation of memory can itself become an act of resistance.
Kawęcki spent his life making sure that Poland remembered.
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(@TheDeadDistrict) September 9, 2026
