Swedish and German forces are conducting what appears to be the first joint rehearsal of their rapid-reinforcement plans for the Baltic island of Gotland. The exercise is another step in Sweden’s defense planning for an island whose position in the middle of the Baltic gives it an outsized strategic importance for controlling access, protecting the Baltic states, and maintaining NATO’s freedom of movement in a region where Russian military activity remains a persistent concern.

The exercise, Silver Wotan 2026, running between September 14-23, brings together Swedish and German forces across the land, maritime, and air domains. The scenario is built around a Swedish request for allied assistance, with German forces moving personnel and equipment across the Baltic before integrating with Swedish units already defending the island. The operation is testing the entire process of getting allied combat power to Gotland, protecting it during the movement to Visby, and rapidly incorporating it into the island’s existing defensive network.

A video shows troops coming ashore on Swedish CB90 fast assault craft, a type that German soldiers are also trained to operate:

A rapid deployment of German and Swedish forces to Gotland island is being carried out today. Units from and are rehearsing the swift reinforcement of the strategic island in order to ensure the security of the Baltic Sea.#SilverWotan#NATO pic.twitter.com/A0r3LF8XUP

— Försvarsmakten (@Forsvarsmakten) September 18, 2026

The strategic importance of Gotland has grown considerably following Sweden’s accession to NATO in March 2024, which was a direct response to the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Located approximately halfway between mainland Sweden and the Baltic states, the island occupies a central position in the Baltic Sea, close to the maritime approaches to the Gulf of Finland and within reach of the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. Its location gives forces operating from Gotland a potentially significant position from which to conduct surveillance, air defense, and maritime operations, while also making the island an important part of the wider network connecting NATO’s northern and eastern members.

At the same time, Gotland sits within an extremely complex littoral environment, where shallow waters, islands, narrow maritime approaches, and the proximity of multiple states can make both offensive operations and defensive planning more difficult. The region has also been shaped by longstanding Swedish concerns about Russian clandestine activity, including intelligence gathering and other forms of covert or deniable activity. The complexity of the Baltic operating environment can make such activities harder to detect and attribute, adding another layer of uncertainty alongside the more conventional military challenges facing the region.

Geography has long made Gotland important to Swedish defense planning, but its significance has taken on a broader dimension since Sweden joined the alliance. NATO has described the island as strategically important to its freedom of maneuver in the Baltic, while Swedish officials have highlighted its potential role as a hub for military operations and logistics in the region.

The current exercise is designed around the practical difficulties of reinforcing such a position.

Military equipment is being transported by sea to Visby, Gotland’s principal port, including by commercial ferry. In Visby, Swedish and German personnel are securing the harbor and conducting the reception of the arriving force. Among the equipment being moved are air defense systems, while Swedish forces are also operating coastal defense systems armed with anti-ship missiles.

Meanwhile, publicly available flight-tracking data showed German Luftwaffe transport aircraft, including at least one Airbus A400M airlifter, apparently involved in the effort. The commercial airport at Visby has long also been used for military activities related to Gotland and the wider Baltic region.

”A rapid deployment of German and Swedish forces to Gotland island is being carried out today” https://t.co/z6oLs1LCT4 pic.twitter.com/n18MdST6r1

— Jamming (@balticjam) September 18, 2026

The movement is supported by Swedish and German naval forces and other aircraft, creating a scenario in which the maritime transit, protection of the port, air operations, and subsequent movement of troops and equipment ashore all form part of the same military problem. Once ashore, the arriving forces have to be moved into position and integrated with Swedish units already responsible for defending the island.

The Swedish Gotland Regiment, P 18, provides the core of the island’s permanent military presence. The regiment, Sweden’s youngest and smallest, has been rebuilding its capabilities since Sweden began expanding its military presence on Gotland. Its forces form the basis of the ground-defense structure into which allied reinforcements would be incorporated.

Swedish coastal defense capabilities are another important element of the drill. Land-based anti-ship missiles provide the island with a means of threatening hostile surface vessels operating in the surrounding waters, giving the defense of Gotland a direct connection to the wider maritime battle for the Baltic. During Silver Wotan, Swedish and German forces are also conducting anti-surface warfare activities alongside the broader reinforcement operation.

Germany is contributing more than 500 troops to the exercise, part of approximately 2,000 Bundeswehr personnel involved, including elements from the army, navy, and air force. The German Luftwaffe has deployed Panavia Tornado aircraft for surveillance, while German naval forces are participating in the maritime component, and German ground personnel are involved in the reinforcement and security activities on Gotland.

The exercise scenario is particularly relevant against the backdrop of Russia’s continuing military presence in the Baltic region.

Russia maintains major military infrastructure in Kaliningrad, including naval, air, missile, and air defense capabilities, while the Russian Baltic Fleet operates from bases in the region. Kaliningrad’s position between Poland and Lithuania gives Moscow a significant military foothold inside the NATO area, while Russian forces and military infrastructure elsewhere along the Baltic add to the complexity of operating and reinforcing allied territory in the region.

The security environment around the Baltic has also deteriorated considerably since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. NATO has increased its surveillance and military activity in the region, including the launch of Baltic Sentry in January 2025 following a series of incidents involving critical undersea infrastructure. The alliance has subsequently expanded efforts to monitor maritime activity and protect infrastructure and sea lines of communication.

Swedish authorities have stressed that Silver Wotan was planned in advance and is not being conducted in response to a specific imminent Russian threat. The exercise nonetheless reflects the operational environment in which Swedish and NATO planners now have to consider the possibility that maritime and air movements across the Baltic could be monitored, disrupted, or contested.

The exercise also builds on a series of increasingly large Swedish-led activities designed to test the reception of allied forces on Swedish territory. During Aurora 26 earlier this year, more than 18,000 troops from 13 countries participated in operations across Sweden, including the deployment of allied forces to Gotland alongside the Gotland Regiment and Swedish Home Guard. NATO described that activity as an emergency deployment intended to test the reinforcement of the island.

Silver Wotan places a more concentrated emphasis on the Swedish-German relationship and on the movement of an allied force into the island’s existing defensive structure.

Germany’s participation is also consistent with its growing military role in the Baltic and along NATO’s northeastern flank. Berlin is already providing forces for NATO’s forward defense in Lithuania and has increasingly emphasized the ability to move German forces rapidly across northern Europe in support of allied operations.

For Sweden, meanwhile, Gotland has become one of the clearest examples of how NATO membership has changed the country’s defense planning. The island remains a Swedish responsibility, but its location means that what happens there has consequences well beyond Sweden’s territorial defense.

A defended and adequately supplied Gotland provides NATO with a strategically positioned base for surveillance and defensive operations in the Baltic, while the ability to reinforce it demonstrates that the alliance can maintain access to the island even as the surrounding maritime and air environment becomes more contested.

The exercise comes as European allies are being forced to plan for a NATO in which the United States may provide less of the conventional military weight it has supplied for decades. The Pentagon is reviewing the size and posture of U.S. forces in Europe, including the forces and capabilities Washington would make available in a European crisis, while NATO’s top commander has said further U.S. troop withdrawals should be expected as European allies build up their own conventional capabilities.

At the same time, the alliance now describes Russia as its most significant and direct security threat, citing military activity alongside airspace violations, sabotage, cyber operations, and other forms of hybrid pressure. There are also growing concerns that Russia could try something in the Baltics, while it continues to step up its gray-zone activities regardless. NATO officials have warned that Russia could rebuild enough military capacity to pose a more serious conventional challenge to the alliance before the end of the decade.

There are escalating warnings from Poland that Russia is preparing to widen its war against Ukraine, with "accidental" missile and drone strikes on NATO territory.

Such a move – Russia falsely claiming air strikes that hit NATO allies happened by accident – would be designed to…

— Deborah Haynes (@haynesdeborah) September 18, 2026

For Sweden and Germany, the Silver Wotan exercise is a practical test of how quickly European forces can reinforce and defend one of the Baltic’s most strategically important positions. As the security environment grows more contested and Europe prepares for a future in which U.S. forces may not be as readily available, the ability to move allied combat power across the region and integrate it into existing defenses is becoming an increasingly important part of NATO’s deterrence.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post German Forces Surge Onto Baltic Island In First-Of-Its-Kind NATO Drill appeared first on TWZ.

Japan has said it is keeping the door open to acquiring nuclear-powered submarines, a potentially major shift for a country whose submarine force has historically relied exclusively on conventional propulsion. Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi confirmed recently that Tokyo is not ruling out nuclear-powered submarines as it considers the future requirements of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF).

Should Japan ultimately pursue the capability, it would join an exclusive group of nations operating nuclear-powered submarines. China, France, India, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States are currently the only countries with nuclear-powered submarines in active service. Brazil is already working to join the club, while Australian and South Korean nuclear-powered submarine plans are somewhat longer-term.

Japan’s submarine fleet is already regarded as among the most capable conventionally powered forces, and is very much at the forefront of advanced naval propulsion technologies. Even with that considerable expertise, however, developing and sustaining a nuclear propulsion capability would represent a huge challenge, requiring expertise and infrastructure far beyond those needed to build Japan’s existing conventionally powered submarines.

Koizumi’s comments do not represent a decision to acquire nuclear-powered submarines, nor do they indicate that Japan has begun a procurement program. They do, however, mark a significant evolution in the country’s public debate over submarine propulsion and point to a growing willingness within the Japanese defense establishment to consider capabilities that were previously largely outside the mainstream of defense planning.

Currently, Japan operates one of the world’s most capable conventional submarine fleets, centered on increasingly sophisticated diesel-electric boats equipped with air-independent propulsion and advanced lithium-ion batteries. These submarines are well suited to operations around Japan and the country’s surrounding waters.

The JMSDF currently operates 22 conventionally powered submarines, maintaining the force structure established in the 2010s while progressively replacing older boats with the more capable Taigei class. Five Taigei class submarines are now in JMSDF service, with additional boats in the pipeline.

Nuclear propulsion, however, would offer substantially greater endurance and sustained underwater speed, allowing Japanese submarines to conduct longer-range operations across the broader Western Pacific with minimal support. This is a requirement that is becoming increasingly relevant as Tokyo’s strategic focus expands beyond its immediate maritime approaches.

China’s rapidly expanding naval force, including its growing submarine fleet and increasingly distant maritime operations, is forcing Tokyo to consider how it would monitor and potentially counter Chinese forces farther from the Japanese archipelago. A nuclear-powered attack submarine could remain submerged for extended periods without the endurance limitations imposed by conventional propulsion, making it particularly useful for long-range surveillance, tracking, and sea-denial missions.

Japan’s debate is also unfolding alongside a significant development in neighboring South Korea. Seoul has confirmed plans to develop a new class of nuclear-powered submarines, a move that could add further momentum to an emerging undersea competition in Northeast Asia. South Korea’s decision is particularly relevant to Tokyo because it demonstrates that nuclear propulsion is no longer merely a theoretical capability for U.S. allies in the region. While the missions and strategic priorities of the Japanese and South Korean navies are different, both countries face the challenge of operating in waters increasingly contested by China and North Korea.

The development could also create new opportunities for Japan to work more closely with Australia and the other AUKUS partners. Australia is in the process of acquiring its own conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability under AUKUS Pillar I, with U.S. and U.K. nuclear-powered submarines also scheduled to operate from Australia. Japan has separately been identified as a potential partner for AUKUS Pillar II, which covers advanced capabilities and technology cooperation.

A Japanese decision to pursue SSNs could eventually create a much deeper basis for cooperation with Australia, including submarine interoperability, undersea warfare, workforce and technical expertise, infrastructure, sustainment, and potentially aspects of the industrial base. Analysts have already examined how Japan could fit into the wider AUKUS submarine ecosystem as Australia’s nuclear-submarine program develops.

A Japanese nuclear-powered submarine with a robust capacity to launch land attack cruise missiles would also be a powerful component in the country’s emerging “counterstrike” posture, which is increasingly centered on acquiring the ability to strike targets at longer ranges.

Japan has already begun deploying domestically developed long-range missile systems, including the Upgraded Type 12 surface-to-ship missile, while also acquiring the U.S.-made Tomahawk cruise missile.

An SSN would potentially add a highly survivable, mobile platform to this emerging strike architecture, allowing Japan to position long-range weapons farther from its home territory and complicating an adversary’s efforts to locate and neutralize them. That could be particularly valuable in a conflict in which Japanese air bases, missile batteries, and other fixed infrastructure were under attack.

The potential SSN requirement also fits with Japan’s expanding expeditionary ambitions. As the JMSDF converts its Izumo class helicopter destroyers to operate F-35B fighters, giving Japan a more credible carrier aviation capability, nuclear-powered attack submarines could provide a valuable escort for these increasingly important surface groups. Their speed, endurance, and ability to remain submerged for extended periods makes SSNs particularly well suited to accompanying carrier forces on longer-range deployments and supporting contingencies farther from Japanese waters.

Looking at the bigger picture, it is highly significant that nuclear propulsion was effectively excluded from Japan’s conventional defense debate for decades. More recently, however, Japanese defense officials and policymakers have begun examining whether future submarines will require a different propulsion system. The issue is now one that can be discussed openly at the ministerial level.

Nevertheless, pursuing a nuclear-powered submarine program would come with huge challenges.

Building and operating nuclear-powered submarines would require Japan to establish an entirely different industrial, regulatory, and training infrastructure. The vessels would also be considerably more expensive and complex to build and operate than Japan’s existing conventionally powered submarines. Tokyo would have to resolve questions involving nuclear regulation, reactor technology, maintenance facilities, crew training, and the handling of nuclear material.

There would also be a significant political dimension. Although naval nuclear propulsion is fundamentally different from possessing nuclear weapons, any move in that direction would inevitably receive scrutiny in a country whose postwar security policy has been shaped by its experience with nuclear weapons and its longstanding non-nuclear principles.

For those reasons, Koizumi’s statement should be viewed less as an announcement of a Japanese nuclear-submarine program than as evidence that the political barrier to discussing such a program is falling.

The next question is whether the Japanese government will move from keeping the option open to actually studying a nuclear-powered submarine design, propulsion technology, and acquisition pathway in detail.

If it does, the consequences could extend well beyond Japan’s submarine fleet. A Japanese nuclear-powered submarine capability would represent a major enhancement of Tokyo’s ability to operate across the Western Pacific and could alter the undersea balance between Japan, China, and the United States’ other regional allies. At the very least, the idea is one that is now part of wider discussions at the highest levels.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Japan Opens The Door To Acquiring Nuclear-Powered Submarines appeared first on TWZ.

Lockheed Martin and the U.S. Air Force are once again discussing new-build F-16s. The development comes as the service grapples with a fighter fleet that is simultaneously aging, shrinking, ballooning in sustainment cost and being called upon to do more. This also comes at a time when the Air Force is now investing heavily in the F-15EX, another fourth-generation type it hadn’t bought for many years after committing to an all stealth future fighter fleet in the 2000s.

According to Aviation Week, the company has proposed an aircraft called the F-16G, an enhanced derivative of the F-16 Block 70. The proposed configuration reportedly incorporates conformal fuel tanks, 600-gallon wing tanks, an infrared search-and-track (IRST) system, a Sniper targeting pod, and a drag chute. All of these features have appeared on previous F-16s in one form or another. Lockheed is positioning the new version as a potential replacement for USAF F-16 units whose existing aircraft are approaching the end of their useful lives.

The Air Force, for its part, says that it has not yet settled on either the requirements or the options for addressing the problem. As it stands, the service has not committed to buying any new F-16s. The proposal is nevertheless notable because it follows an earlier round of discussions in which the Air Force was already examining whether a new-build F-16 could help address the growing fighter gap.

In December 2025, Inside Defense reported that the Air Force had reached out to Lockheed Martin about pricing for Block 70 F-16s — the current export standard. The conversations were described as exploratory, with no firm procurement plan, but the reporting established that the idea had moved beyond a purely theoretical discussion. One congressional aide told the publication that officials were looking at ways to “plug their holes” as part of their future force-structure planning.

A new Viper variant based on the Block 70 would be cheaper than replacing an aging F-16 with an F-35, while allowing the Air Force to retain much of the infrastructure, training, and experience associated with the existing aircraft. This is a major advantage as the F-35’s unique infrastructure and support requirements are a costly addition to the aircraft’s base price tag. An even bigger factor is unrelated to acquisition and bed-down costs: a Block 70 is far cheaper to sustain and operate over its service life than an F-35, a difference that compounds significantly across a fleet. 

The idea of a new Viper buy had already reached the highest levels of Air Force leadership several months earlier.

In May 2025, Sen. Tom Cotton asked then-Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. David Allvin about the possibility of buying a U.S.-configured “Block 80” F-16 if Congress provided additional funding. Allvin did not endorse the proposal, but he did not dismiss it either, saying he needed to examine the time required to adapt the Block 70 design, where a U.S. aircraft could fit into Lockheed Martin’s production line, and what the industrial base could support. He also noted that the existing Block 70/72 line was already heavily occupied by foreign military sales.

At the same hearing, Allvin acknowledged the broader force-structure logic, saying the Air Force needed both the high-end capabilities required for an Indo-Pacific fight and other fighters that “may not need to be as sophisticated as our fifth-generation, sixth-generation.” He also emphasized that the first increment of Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) was intended to augment rather than replace crewed fighters like the F-16.

Taken together, the developments show that the concept has remained alive through the Air Force’s evolving force-structure debate.

The Numbers Game

At first glance, the idea of buying new F-16s for the Air Force in the late 2020s might seem puzzling. The F-16 entered U.S. service in the 1970s, and the Air Force stopped buying new examples for itself more than 20 years ago. The established plan has been to replace the legacy F-16 fleet with the F-35A. For a long time, the service’s stated ambition was ultimately an all-stealth tactical fighter force — but that vision has already largely melted away as budget, operational and industrial-capacity realities have set in.

Today, the fighter fleet is still far older on average than it needs to be and legacy fourth generation types, minus a handful of new F-15EXs, are now well over 20-years old at the youngest. The oldest of these aircraft are increasingly challenging and costly to support. Meanwhile, the F-35 has had its fair share of successes and challenges, but replacing all of the USAF’s oldest fighters with JSFs in a timely and efficient manner, and operating those aircraft over future decades, looks increasingly problematic. The F-47 is also on the horizon, but that aircraft fits a different capability set more aligned with the F-22 than the F-16 and will come at a much higher cost than any fighter currently being procured.

Above all else, the problem is that the Air Force’s fighter challenge is one of numbers.

The service’s 2025 long-term fighter force-structure assessment concluded that it needed 1,558 combat-coded manned fighters by 2035 to reach what it considers a low-risk operational posture. The Air Force had only 1,098 fighters in its inventory as of May 2026, below the statutory minimum of 1,145.

At the same time, the service is trying to retire old aircraft, expand F-35A procurement, introduce the F-47, acquire additional F-15EXs, and field large numbers of CCAs. Those programs address different requirements, but they all compete for money, industrial capacity, personnel, and infrastructure.

For the Air Force, the question has not simply been whether the F-16 remains militarily useful, but also whether the aircraft provides a possible answer to a capacity shortfall, while also dealing with delays in F-35 deliveries, and the retirement of the A-10, blowing another hole in the inventory. Meanwhile, some older F-16s that had been expected to leave the fleet are instead receiving upgrades, including a new radar and electronic warfare suite, to keep them flying longer.

That creates a difficult transition period. The Air Force wants to retire aging fighters, but it also needs to keep enough aircraft available while their replacements arrive. The F-16 keeps reappearing because it offers a way of addressing at least part of that problem with a very well known commodity and without requiring every legacy fighter to be replaced by an F-35 or F-15EX.

The Production Line Matters

There is another reason the F-16 procurement idea refuses to disappear: Lockheed Martin already has an F-16 production line operating in the United States.

The Greenville, South Carolina, facility was established to produce Block 70/72 aircraft for foreign customers and is now the world’s only F-16 production facility. The Air Force helped establish the line as part of its broader effort to sustain the F-16 industrial base through foreign military sales. The line moved there after the massive Lockheed Martin plant at Fort Worth, Texas — where the F-16 had been built for decades — transitioned fully over to F-35 production.

So, buying new F-16s would not require reviving a dormant production line or spinning up an entirely new aircraft program. The basic manufacturing infrastructure already exists, and the additional work required for a U.S.-specific aircraft may end up being minimal — potentially amounting to little more than taking an existing Block 70 and tweaking it, rather than a large-scale new engineering, testing, and weapons-integration effort.

The Air Force has been aware of that possibility for years. In 2021, then-Air Force Assistant Secretary for Acquisition Will Roper argued that the service should consider the new F-16 production line as part of its capacity solution. Roper specifically pointed to the upgraded capabilities available from the South Carolina production line.

However, Greenville is not an empty production line waiting for a U.S. customer. Lockheed Martin’s F-16 facility already has a substantial Block 70/72 backlog for foreign operators, with the company reporting more than 100 aircraft in the queue and continued potential for additional international orders. It’s also unclear how much the facility could realistically be expanded, since it was designed around a relatively more modest foreign military sales production volume rather than the kind of surge a large U.S. order could require. Still, the USAF could step in and buy up open slots, which would also ensure the line stays open for the foreseeable future, which has major strategic and industrial protection benefits.

That brings us back to Gen. Allvin’s question in May 2025 about where a U.S. aircraft could fit on the production line. Even if the Air Force decided to buy the jets, it would have to compete for production capacity with an established international order book while developing whatever U.S.-specific configuration, testing, and integration work it requires.

This Is Not Your Dad’s F-16

The proposed F-16G is also significant because it is not simply another upgraded F-16C/D like the USAF already has.

Lockheed’s proposed configuration reportedly would add conformal fuel tanks and 600-gallon wing tanks, along with an IRST, and the latest Sniper targeting pod, as well as a drag chute. All of these systems are already fielded and available today rather than requiring new development.

Those additions point toward an aircraft intended to provide even more basing flexibility, range, persistence, weapons and sensing capability than the current F-16, which had already grown into a medium-weight fighter years ago. That is relevant to how such an aircraft might actually fit into the future Air Force.

A contemporary F-16 is already a very different proposition from the aircraft that entered U.S. service decades ago. Modern AESA radars, electronic warfare systems, digital architecture, datalinks, advanced cockpit interfaces and weapons have substantially expanded its capabilities. The proposed F-16G would push that evolution further, but, like the F-15EX, it would still occupy a different part of the spectrum from the F-35 and whatever eventually emerges from the F-47 program.

That distinction could be useful in a larger force. An F-35 provides capabilities, particularly its combination of stealth and advanced sensor fusion, that an F-16 can never reproduce. But the Air Force does not conduct every mission in the most heavily defended portion of an adversary’s airspace. Homeland defense, training, defensive counter-air, a range of strike missions, and operations in permissive or partially contested environments don’t necessarily require the same characteristics as a penetration mission against an integrated air defense network. In a major conflict, no fighter will fight alone, either. Far from it. Operation Midnight Hammer, the B-2 strikes against Iran’s nuclear program, provides a salient example here, with F-16s flying deep into the country along with F-22s and F-35s, to clear the way for the B-2 strike force. By now, the Air Force is well-versed in leveraging the total-force fourth-and-fifth-generation mix, and it has discovered that they complement each other in unique ways that can be an advantage, not just compensation for lack of capability.

As far as the drag chute, that is a highly relevant addition to the USAF’s F-16 capability set. The chute would allow for the F-16 to better execute Agile Combat Employment (ACE), which includes operating from austere airfields within the enemy’s weapons engagement zone. The F-16 can get off the runway pretty quick, but landing is a different story. The chute can help greatly in this regard.

There is no question that an F-16 is not a replacement for an F-35. But it could help the Air Force better allocate its limited inventory of increasingly expensive fifth-generation and future sixth-generation aircraft while also maintaining a much larger overall fighter fleet.

CCA Changes the Calculus for Fourth-Gen Jets

One factor that is easy to overlook is Collaborative Combat Aircraft. CCAs are not just a complement to fifth- and sixth-generation fighters, they can also breathe new relevance into fourth-generation types like the F-16. Pairing stealthy, and even optionally expendable CCAs with a fighter like the F-16G could substantially boost its survivability and lethality by pushing sensing, shooting, and some of the risk forward onto uncrewed platforms, extending the F-16’s combat relevance even into higher-end scenarios where it would otherwise be at a disadvantage. In that sense, CCA may end up being arguably as relevant to fourth-generation aircraft as it is to fifth-generation ones.

In other words, CCAs are a positive factor in the F-16G’s business case.

While the F-22 and F-35 are slated to get CCAs first, the F-16G can be built ready to interoperate with them, which could be a massive force multiplier to what would be the most affordable crewed tactical asset in the inventory. CCAs can eventually be used to also help augment F-16Gs operating in a homeland defense mission and other more mundane roles as well.

The Guard Argument

New Block 70s could make particular sense for the Air National Guard.

The Guard continues to operate F-16s in large numbers, meaning that its personnel, facilities, simulators, and maintenance infrastructure are already built around the aircraft. A new-build F-16 could therefore replace an aging F-16 without requiring the same organizational transition associated with converting a unit to an entirely different fighter, and especially a highly complex fifth-generation type with all its unique support requirements.

That has financial implications beyond the aircraft itself. Replacing an existing F-16 squadron with Block 70s would reduce construction costs and training requirements because much of the existing infrastructure and expertise could be retained.

The Air Force would still have to pay for the aircraft and sustainment, but it would not be starting from scratch in terms of operating infrastructure, while the modernized fourth-generation capabilities of an F-16G would still mark a step forward for the Guard over its older F-16s.

It’s worth noting there has also been discussion of replacing more aging F-16s with additional F-15EXs instead. That path, however, is more expensive on both the acquisition and operating-cost side, and it would still require units to convert to a different airframe rather than simply recapitalizing in place.

Viper Refreshed

A new F-16 offers a fresh and highly mature airframe — one with a full service-life ahead of it, on the order of 12,000 flight hours without the need for structural upgrades — double that of the original F-16. This is compared to existing F-16s in the inventory with the decades of wear and fatigue already accumulated on them, with structural upgrades keeping them in the air. That difference in remaining structural life is arguably the single biggest advantage a new-build aircraft has compared with extending an existing one.

Dumping more money into existing F-16s is becoming questionable. Service life extensions and technical upgrades can only go so far and supporting these jets is becoming harder as parts dry up and suppliers who made them are long gone. A new airframe would give the Guard many decades of highly efficient service and the piece of mind for future force planning that goes with it.

Also, just like F-15EX, the development of the Block 70 F-16 has already been paid for largely by foreign customers over many years. It is as off-the-shelf of a solution as it gets and that is a very attractive proposition to an air arm trying to balance its books.

Above all, F-16 sustainment and operating costs run far below the F-35’s — a gap that already holds true even with older F-16s, and one that would widen further with new-build jets.

The Argument Against Simply Buying More F-35s

One seemingly obvious alternative would be to accelerate F-35A procurement. But the F-35 is not simply another fighter that can be substituted one-for-one whenever an F-16 reaches the end of its service life. That would also be difficult to do in practice. F-35A production is effectively capped and there are dense order books, and the well-documented troubles with the Block 4 upgrade are a huge factor pushing the Air Force to look at alternatives like the F-16G in the first place.

The Air Force’s current force-structure plans call for significantly more fighters overall, while the service is simultaneously pursuing F-35As, F-15EXs, and the F-47.

Among the reasons why a modernized F-16 might be considered alongside those programs are concerns not only about the cost of those aircraft, but also about the timing of F-35 deliveries, something that has been disrupted by well-publicized problems with Joint Strike Fighter upgrades. At the same time, keeping older F-16s active through upgrades is an increasingly unattractive way of managing the shortfall.

The issue is therefore less about choosing the F-16 instead of the F-35 than about deciding whether the Air Force should use both aircraft for different portions of the force structure.

The service is already doing something along these lines with the F-15EX. It has accepted that a modernized fourth-generation aircraft can have a role alongside the F-35 and the F-22, rather than requiring every new fighter to be stealthy.

A new F-16 would extend that logic to a lower-cost segment of the fleet, potentially allowing the Air Force to use F-35s where their particular capabilities are most valuable while maintaining additional capacity with a less expensive aircraft.

What Could Happen Next?

Even if Air Force leaders conclude that the F-16G makes operational sense, Congress would still have to decide whether it is worth funding.

The December 2025 reporting identified the central problem: lawmakers would want the service to demonstrate that buying new aircraft is preferable to continuing to upgrade the F-16s it already owns. They would also have to weigh the proposal against the F-35 and CCA programs.

If an existing F-16 can be kept operational with a relatively inexpensive upgrade, a new aircraft has to justify its acquisition cost and the additional long-term sustainment burden. But if maintaining an increasingly old F-16 fleet doesn’t save large sums of money over the long haul, the new Block 70 variant begins to look more compelling.

There remains a substantial gap between Lockheed Martin pitching the F-16G and the Air Force actually buying it. The service told TWZ that it is “in the initial phases of analyzing options for the next Future Years Defense Program.” The Air Force spokesperson added: “At this stage, we have neither defined the precise mission requirements nor the spectrum of options that could fill it.”

That is consistent with the status described by Inside Defense nine months earlier. At the time, the Air Force had no plans to procure Block 70s, and the discussions with Lockheed were described as exploratory. Even if senior officials ultimately favored the aircraft, Inside Defense reported that the program could not appear in the Future Years Defense Program until at least fiscal 2028 because the FY2027 budget process was already too far along.

The F-16G therefore remains a proposal rather than a program. But the persistence of the idea is itself significant. It should be noted that the F-15EX buy emerged out of very similar machinations, with the benefits proving to be undeniable.

The new proposal would let some Guard and Reserve units swap their F-16s for vastly improved F-16s — the same logic that drove the F-15EX buy — while also keeping the Greenville line hot, which is a significant benefit in its own right. And it accomplishes both in the most efficient way possible: not just in acquisition cost, but in sustainment cost, which is really the more problematic burden of the two. In the end, this points to another glaring reality check for the all-stealth-force concept, a vision the Air Force has effectively already abandoned.

The Air Force has spent years describing the F-35 as the replacement for its F-16 fleet, yet it now has to contend with aging F-16s, delayed or constrained fighter production, a larger stated requirement for total fighter capacity, and the lengthy transition toward the F-47 and uncrewed combat aircraft. In that environment, a new-build F-16 provides an option that sits between extending legacy aircraft and buying the most sophisticated — and expensive — fighters available.

Regardless, there are so many priorities facing the force right now, buying new F-16s will be a challenge at every turn, but that doesn’t mean it won’t become too compelling of a proposition to accept. Still, many will argue that every dollar should be invested in higher-end fighter and uncrewed platforms that are more survivable against America’s primary pacing threat, China. That country is rapidly evolving its own air arm with stealth fighters and advanced uncrewed aircraft. Stepping back to the F-16 while facing down such a threat can appear to be counterproductive when taken at face value. At the same time, the F-16 is already slated to stay in the inventory by the hundreds for decades to come, which does take some of the bite out of that argument.

In the end, it is remarkable that the F-16 was supposed to have left the U.S. fighter equation years ago. Instead, every time the Air Force looks closely at the gap between the fighter force it has and the force it says it needs, the aircraft somehow finds a way back into the conversation.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post New-Build F-16s For The USAF Is An Idea That Won’t Go Away, For Good Reason appeared first on TWZ.

Senior U.S. Air Force leaders in Europe say NATO allies are increasingly looking to participate in the development and employment of collaborative combat aircraft (CCAs), even as several of those same countries pursue their own indigenous fighter and drone programs. American commanders say they are looking forward to CCAs expanding the alliance’s overall capacity, and are already pushing for such systems to work together from the outset.

Speaking yesterday at the Air & Space Forces Air, Space and Cyber Symposium that TWZ is attending, Lt. Gen. Jason T. Hinds, commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe, U.S. Air Forces Africa, and NATO’s Allied Air Command, and Chief Master Sgt. Joshua J. Wiener, USAFE-AFAFRICA’s command chief, discussed how the command is preparing for an eventual European role in the U.S. Air Force’s planned fleet of hundreds of CCAs.

The issue is particularly significant for USAFE, which operates a fraction of the fighter force it maintained in Europe during the Cold War, even as many of its NATO allies contend with shrinking fleets of crewed combat aircraft. This comes against a backdrop of deepening tensions with Russia and the emergence of new kinds of threats. Autonomous aircraft that can augment crewed fighters could provide the alliance with additional combat mass without requiring a corresponding increase in the number of crewed aircraft and personnel permanently based in Europe.

“I’m excited about what CCAs have in store for the Air Force,” Hinds said, pointing to recent comments from the Secretary of the Air Force Troy Meink, including the aim of having at least 500 CCAs in service by 2032.

He added that European interest in these kinds of platforms is already growing.

“I think you’re going to see a lot more interest from other nations inside Europe about what is America doing with CCAs and how they can join this party, if you will,” Hinds said.

Germany is “heavily involved,” he said, while Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands are also showing interest.

In the case of Germany, we have previously explored how that country is looking to procure CCAs by 2029. Sweden, too, recently unveiled a concept for a high-end, stealthy CCA-type drone, while the Dutch are looking to become more closely alligned with U.S. Air Force CCA efforts.

USAFE is currently using two broad operational scenarios to explain to allies how CCAs could fit into NATO’s force structure.

The first is defensive. A CCA could operate as part of an integrated air and missile defense network, potentially engaging one-way attack drones or cruise missiles without the need for expensive crewed fighters.

The second is offensive. In that scenario, autonomous aircraft could help suppress or destroy integrated air defense systems and potentially attack fielded forces during an effort to repel a hostile incursion into NATO territory.

Allies are interested in both missions, Hinds said, and want the ability to incorporate CCAs into their own force designs. Interestingly, only yesterday, Anduril shared photos of its YFQ-44A Fury configured with air-to-ground weapons, underscoring the fact that the CCA could take on an air-to-ground role in the future in addition to its current air-to-air focus.

That kind of interest has already prompted work at the NATO level. Hinds pointed to a study by the Joint Air Power Competence Center, the alliance’s airpower think tank based in Kalkar, Germany, examining how NATO members could employ CCAs in a modular fashion, including issues such as sustainment, training, and exercises.

“It was a pretty long paper, but the nations wanted it,” Hinds said.

Initial experimentation is expected to take place in the United States, but European experimentation could follow, including by Sweden and potentially other NATO members.

At the same time, European countries are not simply waiting for an American CCA to arrive.

The United Kingdom has launched its own Storm Fighter CCA program. Germany is pursuing a separate loyal-wingman effort, while the United Kingdom, Italy, and Japan are meanwhile jointly embarked on the Global Combat Air Program, or GCAP, which is intended to produce the Tempest next-generation crewed fighter and associated uncrewed systems.

The proliferation of national programs raises an obvious question: How does NATO prevent a growing fleet of autonomous aircraft from becoming a collection of incompatible national systems?

Hinds said the answer starts with commonality.

“The first and foremost thing is we want to strive for commonality,” he said. “Commonality means we don’t even have to worry about interoperability.”

Where common equipment is not possible, however, USAFE wants interoperability built into national systems from the beginning.

“Interoperability by design” is the preferred approach, Hinds said, with NATO data standards and other requirements incorporated before a system enters service rather than retrofitted later.

The good news for USAFE is that NATO already has extensive experience establishing common standards for interoperability, covering everything from tactics and procedures to communications, datalinks, weapons employment, and other technologies. That existing framework gives the alliance a foundation for integrating increasingly diverse national systems without requiring every member to field identical equipment.

Hinds did warn that some countries have previously acquired equipment that was not compatible with NATO systems, leaving them with the choice of paying to modify their own equipment or forcing the alliance to adapt its systems around it.

That problem becomes particularly important as autonomous aircraft are connected to increasingly complex sensor and weapons networks. Even more important is the requirement for a baseline command-and-control network for CCAs themselves, allowing different platforms to manage them seamlessly.

The ability to share and control CCAs across a complex battlespace is already emerging as both a major opportunity and a significant integration challenge. The U.S. Air Force and Navy, for example, have made clear that their respective CCAs are being developed with the ability to be controlled seamlessly across services, pointing toward a future in which autonomous aircraft need not remain tied to the service or platform that launched them.

Hinds described a potential kill chain in which an F-35 detects a target, passes the information to another node in the network, and a ground-based system operated by another NATO country ultimately launches the weapon.

In such an architecture, the aircraft, sensor, command-and-control network, and weapon do not necessarily have to belong to the same country.

As an example, Dutch F-35s, operating in Europe, have used a data-exchange system to transmit targeting coordinates to Israeli-made PULS (Precise and Universal Launch System) rocket artillery. The system, developed by Lockheed Martin is known as Keystone, and you can read more about it here.

USAFE is making “significant advances” in areas including cross-servicing, cross-loading, and cross-flying allied aircraft, Hinds said, all of which are intended to make multinational operations more seamless.

The same philosophy applies to weapons.

“We want to have all the fires, right? Whether it’s U.S. built or built inside European nations,” Hinds said.

That could prove increasingly important as European countries expand domestic production of missiles, drones, and other weapons alongside their aircraft programs.

The growth of GCAP and other European defense programs comes amid broader debate over how much Europe should depend on U.S. military equipment.

But Hinds rejected the idea that allies developing indigenous aircraft and autonomous systems necessarily signals a move away from American equipment.

“No, I don’t,” he said when asked whether allies were moving away from U.S. systems.

Instead, Hinds characterized the trend as an expansion of the transatlantic defense-industrial base.

Sweden was one example he cited. The country, which recently joined NATO, continues to produce new military equipment, including Gripen fighters, while those aircraft are already being operated by NATO members.

Swedish Gripens are currently leased to Hungary, and other countries are considering the aircraft, Hinds said.

The broader trend toward co-manufacturing and co-production is also something he welcomed.

“I’m seeing a lot of discussions about co-manufacturing and co-production, and I welcome those discussions as well,” Hinds said.

That approach could become increasingly important as NATO tries to expand its available combat power without relying exclusively on additional U.S.-built platforms.

For USAFE, the objective is to ensure that whatever aircraft NATO countries develop or purchase can plug into a common architecture, sharing data, receiving targeting information, drawing on common logistics networks, and contributing weapons effects across national boundaries.

For a U.S. Air Force command that has spent decades trying to cover Europe with far fewer fighters than it once had, hundreds of autonomous wingmen, whether American-built or allied, could provide a significant way to generate additional combat mass.

Senior U.S. Air Force officials are now working to ensure that the networking, weapons integration, logistics, and command-and-control architecture will be in place once those aircraft start to come online.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post How The USAF Is Preparing For European Allies To Join The Collaborative Combat Aircraft Club appeared first on TWZ.

Yemen’s Houthi movement, formally known as Ansar Allah, has released imagery that it says shows the downing of a Royal Saudi Air Force F-15 fighter over Marib governorate. The material includes photos of the wreckage of an F-15 on the ground. At this stage, the fate of the two crew members is unclear. The incident comes amid a major escalation in fighting between Saudi Arabia and the Iran-aligned Houthi movement.

A video of what Ansar Allah says is the successful shootdown of the F-15 shows the typical ground-based forward-looking infrared (FLIR) systems we have seen in use by air defenses in Yemen previously, and, more recently, in Iran.

Onboard footage of a Houthi SAM system shooting down a Saudi F-15 overnight over Yemen’s Marib province. pic.twitter.com/6mh23B2Ovu

— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) September 16, 2026

After a period of relative calm following the 2022 truce, fighting has intensified in recent weeks, with Houthi forces making significant advances against Saudi-backed Yemeni government positions, including around the strategically important coastal areas of Marib and Taiz. The group has also stepped up missile and drone attacks against southern Saudi Arabia, targeting military and energy infrastructure while strangling the kingdom’s ability to move oil through the Red Sea. The Houthis have further declared the Bab el-Mandeb closed to Saudi oil traffic, directly challenging one of Riyadh’s key energy-export routes.

Prior to the release of imagery, earlier today the Houthi military spokesman Brig. Gen. Yahya Saree claimed that Houthi forces had shot down a Saudi F-15 while it was conducting operations in support of Saudi-backed forces in Marib. Saree said the aircraft was engaged by a locally manufactured surface-to-air missile, although he did not identify the weapon. Reuters likewise reported that the Houthis had claimed the shootdown but that the claim had not been independently verified.

Saree also claimed that Houthi air defenses subsequently engaged formations of Saudi F-15s and Eurofighter Typhoons that entered the area while attempting to locate the downed aircraft. According to the Houthi account, those aircraft were forced to withdraw. That portion of the claim has likewise not been independently verified.

Saudi Arabia has not, at the time of writing, publicly acknowledged the loss of an F-15. Reuters reported that the Saudi-led campaign had intensified considerably in recent days, with Saudi aircraft striking targets across Yemen while the Houthis have launched missiles and drones toward Saudi territory.

The aircraft appears to be an F-15SA, the most advanced variant of the Eagle operated by the Royal Saudi Air Force. Specifically, it appears to be tail number 5539, assigned to the 55th Squadron based at King Khalid Air Base.

The Royal Saudi Air Force received 84 of the new-build F-15SA. Meanwhile, the 68-strong fleet of earlier F-15S aircraft has been upgraded locally to a similar standard, also known as F-15SR (for Saudi Retrofit). Aircraft 5539 is understood to be among the latter.

The reported shootdown highlights the continuing threat posed by Houthi air defenses, which have proven considerably more capable and difficult to suppress than their improvised appearance might suggest.

As TWZ has previously detailed, the Houthi air-defense network includes mobile surface-to-air missile systems, repurposed infrared-guided R-73 and R-27 air-to-air missiles, and Iranian-derived systems such as the Saqr/358.

Of particular concern is the group’s use of passive infrared sensors for detection, tracking, and missile cueing. Unlike conventional fire-control radars, these sensors do not provide an aircraft’s electronic-warfare systems with an early warning that it has been detected or targeted. TWZ has noted that this combination of mobility and passive sensing can create a difficult problem even for highly sophisticated combat aircraft, with the Houthis having previously demonstrated the ability to threaten U.S. crewed and uncrewed aircraft.

That capability does not mean that Houthi air defenses constitute a conventional, integrated air defense network comparable to those operated by major state militaries. However, they can still be effective through a combination of concealment, mobility, passive detection, unconventional employment of missiles, and the difficult operating environment over Yemen.

Previous Saudi aircraft losses attributed to Houthi air defenses during the Yemen war from 2015 to 2022 include several helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, and drones. Total Saudi losses to all causes in the conflict amount to around a dozen helicopters, five jets, and as many as 30 drones. A Saudi F-15 crashed in the Red Sea at the start of the war in 2015 and Eagles were also reportedly engaged and damaged by Houthi surface-to-air missiles in 2018, although they returned safely.

Video footage that emerged in 2021 shows Saudi troops on the ground watching an F-15 swoop in a relatively low level to knock down a Houthi Qasef-series suicide drone:

In the past, Houthi forces have come close to engaging U.S. F-35s and have repeatedly demonstrated an ability to bring down MQ-9 Reaper drones. If the Saudi F-15 loss is ultimately confirmed, determining precisely how the aircraft was detected, tracked, engaged, and hit could therefore provide valuable insight into how this unusual air defense architecture is being employed against Saudi and other combat aircraft.

As we discussed at the time, the clear risk posed by Houthi air defenses is likely the main factor behind Saudi employment of a Chinese-made short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) in the current fighting with Yemen.

العثور على بقايا صاروخ صيني من طراز DF-15A في اليمن. pic.twitter.com/af9mGNNxiA

— إيران بالعربية (@iraninarabic_ir) September 14, 2026

The timing of the reported shootdown is also notable. It comes amid a sharp escalation in the conflict, with Saudi Arabia conducting air operations against Houthi positions in Yemen and Ansar Allah launching missiles and drones toward targets inside Saudi Arabia. Reuters reported that the Houthis had attacked the Saudi Red Sea port of Yanbu and a southern airbase at Khamis Mushait, while Riyadh has reported intercepting Houthi drones.

The F-15 incident also follows a separate confrontation over an alleged Houthi drone attack near Mecca. Saudi authorities said their air defenses intercepted and destroyed a Houthi drone south of Mecca before it entered the restricted airspace over the city. The Houthis denied targeting the holy city.

Meanwhile, there are reports that U.S. officials met representatives of the Houthis in Oman over the weekend, with the Houthis apparently telling the U.S. officials that they had no intention of attacking American vessels and that they remained committed to the 2025 ceasefire with ​the United States unless they stepped in on behalf of Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom reportedly requested exactly this in recent weeks but was denied.

For the moment, the most that can be established from the available imagery is that a Saudi F-15 was destroyed, with Ansar Allah claiming responsibility.

This is a developing story and will be updated as additional imagery, official statements, or other independently verifiable information becomes available.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Houthis Claim Saudi F-15 Kill Over Yemen appeared first on TWZ.

Israel’s Rafael and Lockheed Martin are working to accelerate integration of the 1,000-pound-class SPICE standoff weapon with the Israeli Air Force’s F-35I Adir. The development could potentially open the door for the precision-guided munition to be offered to other Joint Strike Fighter operators.

Rafael Advanced Defense Systems announced the effort September 15 during the Air & Space Forces Air, Space and Cyber Symposium that TWZ is attending. The work is being conducted as a joint project with Lockheed Martin at the U.S. contractor’s facilities in the United States and is expected to take several months.

AFA 2026: For the first time, Rafael's SPICE 1000 is being integrated on the F-35

Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Ltd. is integrating its SPICE 1000 air-to-surface munition on the F-35 Adir fighter aircraft.

SPICE 1000 is an advanced air-to-surface munition capable of striking… pic.twitter.com/QOeNISGKFE

— Rafael Advanced Defense Systems (@RAFAELdefense) September 15, 2026

Rafael says the effort could eventually make the weapon available to other F-35 operators. “At a later stage, F-35 operators worldwide will be able to field SPICE 1000,” the company said.

The effort was previously referenced in U.S. government documentation before Rafael’s announcement. Published in August, the Pentagon F-35 Modernized Selected Acquisition Report identified the weapon as the “Israel-unique Smart, Precise Impact, Cost-Effective 1000B,” or SPICE 1000B, and said its integration was progressing “with a strategy to accelerate the implementation via a SPICE Lite process.”

The report does not explain what the “SPICE Lite” process entails.

SPICE — which stands for Smart, Precise Impact, and Cost-Effective — is a family of electro-optically guided standoff weapons developed by Rafael. The family includes SPICE 2000, SPICE 1000, and SPICE 250, with the numbers corresponding broadly to the weight class of the underlying warheads.

Based around a 1,000-pound-class bomb, SPICE 1000 uses pop-out wings to achieve a manufacturer-stated range of approximately 125 kilometers, or 78 miles. Rafael gives the weapon a claimed circular error probable of around three meters.

The glide bomb combines inertial and satellite-aided navigation with an electro-optical seeker. During the terminal phase, its seeker can compare the observed target area with stored imagery using scene-matching algorithms, allowing the weapon to continue its attack without relying exclusively on GPS. That feature allows it to engage targets autonomously, offering the launch aircraft a true ‘fire and forget’ capability, and provides resilience in GPS-denied or GPS-degraded environments.

SPICE can also be programmed to approach a target from a particular azimuth and impact angle. This provides flexibility in selecting the terminal attack geometry and can support steep attack profiles against targets where penetration from above is desirable.

SPICE 1000 is not a new Israeli capability. It has been operational with the Israel Air Force since 2017 and is already integrated with Israeli F-16I Sufa, F-16C/D Barak, F-15I Ra’am, and F-15 Baz fighters.

“SPICE 1000 has been sold to several countries and is in operational service with a number of air forces worldwide,” Rafael said. “It has served as a primary munition of the Israeli Air Force for several years, including extensive use in recent long-range operations flown from F-15 and F-16 aircraft.”

The Israeli Air Force has released footage showing SPICE weapons being used during recent operations, including imagery from the weapon’s own perspective during its terminal attack.

Israeli Air Force F-15 Bazs preparing for a strike on Iran, each carrying a pair of Spice 1000 glide bombs.

Notably, one of the F-15s, tail no. 450, took part in Operation Wooden Leg exactly 40 years ago, striking PLO targets in Tunisia. pic.twitter.com/FEy6PiDkdU

— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) June 15, 2025

Combat validated.
The stand-off strike capability air forces are asking about. SPICE 250 at Farnborough.
Pinpoint accuracy against high-value targets. Real operational results.

Full details in our exhibition press release: https://t.co/FWYYvcM0Vw pic.twitter.com/lQV8sw32zN

— Rafael Advanced Defense Systems (@RAFAELdefense) July 22, 2026

Israel’s F-35I is already unusual within the international Joint Strike Fighter fleet. The IDF has developed and demonstrated an external Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) carriage capability, and said in March 2025 that the Israeli Adir was the only F-35 to have conducted operational strikes with an external weapons configuration. You can read more about that here.

However, according to The Jerusalem Post, the SPICE weapon is expected to be carried internally by F-35Is equipped with Technology Refresh 3, or TR-3, hardware, which would maintain its low-observable configuration. Neither Rafael nor Lockheed Martin has publicly detailed the specific carriage configuration, aircraft modifications or software associated with the current integration effort.

The long-delayed TR-3 is a major upgrade to the F-35’s computing architecture and provides the processing infrastructure required for subsequent Block 4 capabilities. Israel received its first three F-35Is equipped with TR-3 hardware in January of this year.

Lockheed Martin describes Block 4 as the F-35 program’s “most significant evolution of F-35 capabilities to date,” encompassing more than 70 major upgrades, including increased weapons capacity, advanced electronic warfare capabilities, and improved target recognition.

It remains unclear if the SPICE 1000 integration itself requires the full Block 4 configuration.

The potential significance of the Israeli integration extends beyond the Israel Air Force. If SPICE 1000 ultimately becomes available to other F-35 operators, the completed Israeli integration could provide those countries with another pathway toward fielding a precision standoff weapon rather than requiring them to begin an integration effort entirely from scratch.

Integrating national weapons onto the F-35 can be a lengthy process. It involves not only the weapon itself, but aircraft software, interfaces, weapons-bay compatibility, flight testing, mission-system integration and certification within the U.S.-led F-35 program.

The United Kingdom’s experience with MBDA’s SPEAR 3 provides a good example of the challenges.

In 2022, the U.K. Ministry of Defence said that scheduled delivery dates for SPEAR 3 had been delayed because of “prioritisation in the overall F-35 development programme,” which is managed by the U.S.-led F-35 Joint Program Office.

The program has continued to progress, including F-35B integration work and flight testing. But in June 2026, the U.K. government said that completion of mission-systems integration and jettison trials remained part of a wider weapons-integration program and that SPEAR 3 integration and subsequent release to service would occur in the early 2030s.

The United Kingdom has consequently approved the acquisition of the GBU-53/B Small Diameter Bomb II as an interim standoff weapon for the F-35B until SPEAR 3 enters service.

Nevertheless, another F-35 operator would not be able to adopt the Israeli SPICE integration without additional work. National configurations, software baselines, certification requirements, weapons procurement, and export approvals would still have to be addressed.

Already, however, aided by its uniquely configured test jet, Israel has demonstrated an unusual ability to integrate nationally developed capabilities onto its F-35I. This has been aided by privileged access to the Joint Strike Fighter’s closely guarded software codes.

A U.K. parliamentary report noted delays in integrating British weapons onto the F-35B while contrasting that with Israel’s ability to integrate domestic electronic warfare systems, sensors, and communications technology onto its Adir.

Meanwhile, Rafael and Lockheed Martin already have experience working together on the SPICE family.

The companies signed a teaming agreement in 2019 covering the joint development, marketing and manufacture of SPICE guidance kits for the U.S. market. In 2021, they expanded the agreement to include SPICE 250, including development for potential sales to the United States and Poland. With some unque capabilities, SPICE could be of particular interest to the U.S. military, especially as it seeks to leverage multiple sources of precision munitions.

The SPICE family also extends beyond the 1,000-pound-class weapon now being integrated with the F-35.

At the other end of the family is SPICE 250, a much smaller weapon designed around a 250-pound-class payload. It incorporates a man-in-the-loop capability that allows an operator to redirect the weapon during its flight and abort the attack if necessary.

Its smaller dimensions also allow substantially greater weapon carriage. Rafael has marketed configurations in which a fighter can carry as many as 16 SPICE 250 weapons.

SPICE 1000, by comparison, is a substantially heavier weapon intended to provide longer-range precision attack capability with a larger warhead.

The SPICE effort is taking place alongside several other Israeli initiatives aimed at extending the F-35I’s range and weapons capabilities.

The Pentagon’s F-35 documentation has referenced ongoing work on extended-range fuel tanks and electronic warfare pods for the Israeli Air Force, although it did not provide fielding dates.

In May 2026, Israel’s defense ministry awarded an extended-range capability development contract for the F-35I to Elbit Systems subsidiary Cyclone. The capability is intended to increase the aircraft’s radius of action and reduce its reliance on aerial refueling during long-range missions.

Israel has also announced a major expansion of its F-35I fleet, with plans to increase the number of aircraft from 50 to 100. The country is simultaneously expanding its forthcoming F-15IA fleet from 25 to 50 aircraft.

For the F-35I, SPICE 1000 adds a long-range strike option that pairs the aircraft’s low observability with substantial standoff range and a relatively heavy warhead. This offers a survivability advantage in increasingly contested environments, allowing attacks from farther outside capable air defense systems and under heavy electronic warfare conditions. This factor will only become more important as integrated air defense systems become more capable and the F-35 more detectable.

Exactly how the weapon will be integrated remains undisclosed. Rafael and Lockheed Martin have not announced the final carriage configuration, aircraft software requirements, flight-test schedule, or expected date for operational clearance.

At the same time, Rafael is explicitly positioning the effort as a potential pathway for SPICE 1000 to become available to the wider F-35 community. This would conceivably give other operators another option at a time when integrating a new standoff weapon onto the fighter can take years.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Israel Is Bringing SPICE 1000 Standoff Weapon To The F-35 appeared first on TWZ.

Lockheed Martin has unveiled a modular airframe concept for its stealthy and combat-proven AGM-158 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) family that could support multiple configurations, launch methods, and sensor packages while making use of the existing JASSM and Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) production infrastructure. Highly survivable, the missiles are an incredibly important and staple weapon for the U.S. military, and for select export customers.

Called AGM-158 FLEX, the new concept is centered on a common airframe with interchangeable components. Lockheed Martin says it has invested more than $35 million of its funds in the effort so far, including airframe design, testing, prototype production, subsystem qualification, and work with suppliers.

The company says the FLEX design will use removable nose sections that can accommodate sensor suites associated with the AGM-158 family. A removable boat tail would allow the same basic airframe to be configured for different launch methods, including air, surface, and subsurface launch. That would open the AGM-158 architecture up to ground-, ship-, and submarine-launched applications, although Lockheed Martin has not provided details on the specific launchers, platforms, or configurations envisioned. It’s worth noting the LRASM has been tested in vertical launch configuration for vessels equipped with the Mk 41 launch system.

In addition to the Navy vertical launch tests, the idea of moving the JASSM family beyond its traditional combat aircraft launch platforms is not new. The Air Force’s Palletized JASSM concept, better known as Rapid Dragon, has demonstrated the ability to deploy JASSM-ER from palletized launchers carried inside cargo aircraft, using an expendable airdrop system. FLEX takes a different approach by building those kinds of launch options into the airframe architecture itself, with modularity supporting various launch configurations for the same basic weapon.

For aircraft-launched weapons, Lockheed Martin says FLEX will retain compatibility with current and future JASSM and LRASM launch platforms.

The company is also proposing multiple airframe lengths. A 206-inch configuration is associated with the supersized JASSM-XR, while a 168-inch version is consistent with the dimensions of JASSM-ER. Lockheed Martin says JASSM-XR will be the first configuration of the FLEX airframe.

The AGM-158 family has already grown well beyond the original JASSM. The AGM-158A is the baseline stealthy air-launched land-attack missile, with a publicly reported range of roughly 230-330 miles, while the AGM-158B JASSM-ER uses a more efficient engine and additional fuel to roughly double that reach, to around 575 miles or more.

Alongside the land-attack variants is the AGM-158C LRASM, which uses the JASSM airframe but substitutes a sophisticated imaging infrared anti-ship seeker, electronic support measures, datalink, and other capabilities, for operations against heavily defended surface combatants.

Finally, the much larger JASSM-XR is being developed with a substantially stretched fuselage to carry more fuel and a larger 1,000-pound-class warhead, with a range expected to approach or exceed 1,000 miles. This would give it a similar striking capability as the Tomahawk cruise missile, although in a stealthier package.

Beyond range and launch options, the company is pitching its new FLEX concept as a way to simplify future upgrades. Components could be replaced as they become obsolete or new capabilities become available without necessarily requiring a completely new missile design.

That approach could have an industrial-base advantage, particularly as the United States seeks to increase production of long-range weapons. Lockheed Martin says FLEX would use the existing JASSM/LRASM production line, supply chain, mission-planning infrastructure, and software ecosystem rather than establishing an entirely new manufacturing and support architecture.

The company says its JASSM/LRASM production infrastructure includes a 225,000-square-foot facility opened in 2022 with increased automation and a robotic paint line.

Notable, however, is the fact that FLEX is being proposed at a time when the U.S. Air Force is pursuing affordable mass as a key priority.

For example, as part of a slew of low-cost cruise missile offerings, the service has been moving ahead with the Extended Range Attack Munition, or ERAM, a new air-launched missile explicitly intended to provide a relatively low-cost, rapidly producible standoff weapon. The Air Force conducted a live-warhead ERAM test in January of last year, less than 16 months after the program received its initial contract, and described the weapon as a means of generating mass against fixed targets. ERAM is understood to have a range of between 150 and 280 miles, putting it below the reach of the baseline JASSM, let alone the JASSM-ER or XR.

However, the emerging class of lower-cost weapons are intended very much more to complement than compete with JASSM. While the Air Force plans to buy thousands of the cheaper missile, the JASSM will still be needed to take up the higher end of the cost and capability list.

Lockheed Martin mentions that FLEX should “unlock future cost savings,” but this sounds more about giving customers the ability to swap out components and upgrade capabilities on existing missile rounds, to avoid obsolescence, rather than facilitate mass production.

As it stands, JASSM has evolved into a family of increasingly capable and longer-range weapons, but those capabilities necessarily come with a different set of cost and production considerations than a weapon designed from the outset around large-scale production. Lockheed Martin’s announcement does not disclose a target unit cost for FLEX, nor does it explain how the eventual cost of a FLEX-derived weapon would compare with a baseline JASSM or LRASM. The unit price of the latest subvariants of the JASSM-ER is around $1.2 and $1.5 million, according to official budget documents.

The new weapon is a way of getting more variants and launch options out of the established JASSM/LRASM architecture, potentially with less development work than creating entirely new weapons. Whether that translates into enough savings or production capacity to satisfy the military’s growing demand for large numbers of standoff weapons remains to be seen.

For Lockheed Martin, the proposal also offers a way to extend the relevance of the AGM-158 family as the company and the Pentagon pursue additional range, new launch platforms, and potentially new launch methods.

The flexibility of the missile could be particularly relevant to the Agile Combat Employment concept, and the wider U.S. military in the Indo-Pacific, where forces are expected to operate from a larger number of dispersed and potentially austere locations. A common missile architecture that can be adapted to different launch platforms and different target sets could allow weapons to be positioned and employed across a distributed force rather than tying particular missile variants to particular launchers.

The original JASSM/LRASM has also become a significant export weapon, with Australia, Finland, Poland and several other U.S. allies cleared to acquire variants of the missile. While the advanced capabilities of the weapon have seen its export opportunities carefully controlled, FLEX could potentially open up the market to more customers, including less-advanced, ‘sanitized’ versions.

Lockheed Martin’s announcement provides few details on FLEX’s eventual cost, production rate, schedule, or specific performance beyond the stated airframe dimensions. For now, the concept demonstrates that the company is seeking to create a more adaptable architecture around an established missile family, one that has played a critical role in numerous operations since its introduction.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Lockheed Flexes To Modular AGM-158 JASSM Missile Concept appeared first on TWZ.

New imagery shared with TWZ by Anduril shows its YFQ-44A Fury Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) configured with air-to-ground weapons, underscoring the fact that the CCA could take on an air-to-ground role in the future in addition to its current air-to-air focus. Yesterday, Anduril executives revealed that the company had begun integration and fit checks for a range of air-to-ground weapons, although they confirmed to us that those weapons had not yet been flight-tested aboard Fury.

The YFQ-44A is one of two aircraft selected by the Air Force for its CCA Increment 1 program, alongside General Atomics’ YFQ-42A Vengeance. The service’s stated priority for the initial aircraft is air dominance, and Anduril says the production FQ-44 will have four external hardpoints capable of carrying four AIM-120 AMRAAM air-to-air missiles. The YFQ-44A, which currently has two underwing pylons for two AMRAAMs, has already conducted a live AIM-120 firing as part of testing with the Air Force’s Experimental Operations Unit.

The new imagery, however, points toward a substantially broader weapons envelope, with the aircraft shown carrying different air-to-ground stores on its two external stations. The weapons are shown fitted to the aircraft during a ground-based fit check, an important step in the integration process before captive-carry and, ultimately, live-release testing, if Anduril and the USAF choose to go down that route.

During a recent roundtable with reporters yesterday at the Air & Space Forces Air, Space and Cyber Symposium that TWZ is attending, Anduril’s Jason Levin, senior vice president for Air Dominance and Strike, and Erin Simpson, vice president for Strategy for Air Dominance and Strike, said the company had already begun integration and fit checks of 500-pound Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM), 250-pound Small Diameter Bombs (SDB), and low-cost cruise missiles. Pods for 2.75-inch guided or unguided rockets are also seen fitted to the aircraft. In each case, the stores are mounted on a twin adaptor rack.

Furthermore, Anduril’s plans extend to testing the Fury with other air-to-air weapons and targeting pods.

Importantly, the diversity of weapons will give Fury a range of potential missions beyond high-end air-to-air combat, including counter-UAS, counter-cruise-missile, and air-to-ground or air-to-surface strike missions.

“We’ve begun integration and fit checks of a lot of other munitions,” an Anduril executive said. “We’ve done 500-pound guided bombs. We’ve done Small Diameter Bombs.”

The company said it had also begun engineering work to integrate its Barracuda 500 offering for the Air Force’s emerging low-cost cruise-missile effort.

It should be noted that giving the YFQ-44— or YFQ-42A — the ability to deliver a JDAM or SDB against a predetermined fixed target is not particularly complex. This type of austere air-to-ground capability should be relatively straightforward to add, providing a useful secondary strike function without requiring the aircraft to take on the far more demanding requirements associated with dynamic targeting or more sophisticated air-to-ground missions. This could also allow for these increment one CCAs to be used independently as air-to-ground ‘weapons trucks’ if their air-to-air assistance isn’t needed.

When the production FQ-44 arrives, it will have four hardpoints, compared with the two currently fitted to the YFQ-44A. Anduril says loading all four stations with AIM-120s for the Air Force’s air-dominance mission would reduce the range of the aircraft but would not require a larger engine or otherwise push the aircraft outside its basic takeoff, landing, climb, and flight-envelope requirements.

While the Air Force’s initial CCA requirement is heavily focused on air dominance, the same aircraft could potentially be configured for different missions by changing its external stores and sensors. Anduril is already positioning Fury as something more than a single-purpose “missile truck.”

That flexibility could become increasingly important as the Air Force considers how CCAs will be employed alongside crewed fighters. During a July Experimental Operations Unit (EOU) exercise at Creech Air Force Base, Fury flew in the same airspace as crewed fighters and other CCAs while Air Force personnel operated its Mission Autonomy system. Anduril says the aircraft has also flown in formation alongside F-35s, although the fighters were not yet controlling Fury.

The company is now working toward what it calls “quarterback integration,” in which a crewed aircraft will direct autonomous aircraft as part of a larger combat formation. Anduril says that work has already progressed through hardware- and software-in-the-loop environments and onto the aircraft itself, with live testing expected in the near term.

A Fury operating under the direction of an F-35 could potentially carry air-to-air missiles for counter-air missions, while other aircraft in the formation could be configured for strike or other effects. Alternatively, the same autonomous aircraft could be reconfigured for a different mission before being dispersed to another operating location. Having four pylons would also give the production Fury greater scope to undertake “swing-role” missions, flexing between prosecuting air and surface targets as required.

The July EOU exercise also demonstrated a rapid “hot reload” capability, with two Air Force personnel replacing an AIM-120 on a running Fury and reducing the turnaround between sorties to single-digit minutes. The demonstration was intended to show how CCAs could be rearmed and returned to the fight without the large maintenance and ground-support footprint associated with traditional combat aircraft. This will be vital as the Air Force integrates CCAs into its Agile Combat Employment concept, in which the drones can be dispersed across multiple operating locations rather than relying on a single large ground footprint.

Also speaking yesterday at the Air & Space Forces’ Air, Space and Cyber Symposium was Air Force Chief of Staff Kenneth Wilsbach, who confirmed that the service hasn’t necessarily made any decisions on Increment 2 of the CCA program yet, but it could include air-to-ground capabilities.

“We’re going through some thought processes about what Increment 2 should be able to do. Increment 1 is air-to-air, so do we want air-to-ground? Maybe, maybe not. Do we want it to have more sensors? Do we want it to be a lot cheaper? Do we want it to be more attritable or expendable, or do we want it to be more exquisite? Do we want shorter range or longer range? Do we want something that can be dropped from another platform, or does it take off and land by itself?”

“These are all considerations,” Wilsbach continued. “It’s still a bit early to make any definitive decisions on that, especially before we really get our hands on the current Increment 1 aircraft and learn from them.”

It’s also important to note that export customers for Fury may demand an air-to-ground capability set, especially if they will only be buying a limited number of CCA types. Having this option ready to go is relevant to prospects beyond the U.S., which are certainly growing.

Fury’s air-to-ground weapons work is part of a broader effort to make the aircraft a flexible combat system rather than simply an uncrewed air-defense adjunct for crewed fighters. The Air Force’s immediate priority may be air dominance, but the weapons integration underway suggests that the same four hardpoints could eventually support a much wider range of missions. This weapons flexibility could ultimately be central to the broader CCA concept, especially as the Air Force works out what it wants Increment 2 to deliver.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post YFQ-44A Fury Has Been Fit Checked With Air-To-Ground Munitions appeared first on TWZ.

Anduril’s YFQ-44A Fury Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) has already flown in formation alongside F-35 fighters during U.S. Air Force testing, company executives have revealed, offering the clearest indication yet that live manned-unmanned teaming work with the fifth-generation fighter is underway.

The disclosure came during a briefing by Anduril executives Jason Levin, senior vice president for Air Dominance and Strike, and Erin Simpson, vice president for Strategy for Air Dominance and Strike, at the Air & Space Forces Air, Space and Cyber Symposium that TWZ is attending. The executives said the Fury flew alongside F-35s during a July exercise conducted with the Air Force’s Experimental Operations Unit (EOU) at Creech Air Force Base, Nevada. You can read more about that event in our past reporting here.

“We’ve already started flying in formation alongside crewed. I can even say fifth-gen fighters. F-35,” Levin said.

The testing is an important step toward the Air Force’s broader vision for its Collaborative Combat Aircraft program, in which relatively inexpensive autonomous aircraft are intended to operate alongside and support crewed fighters in contested airspace.

The executives stressed, however, that the F-35 was not yet controlling the Fury during those flights.

“But they’re not controlling it from the crewed fighter yet,” Levin said. “Not yet.”

Instead, the July testing involved Fury operating under its Mission Autonomy system while sharing airspace with crewed fighters, other CCAs, and other aircraft. Anduril says Air Force personnel were able to operate the autonomy system without Anduril personnel directly running the aircraft, although company personnel remained on site in a supporting role.

The company described the progression toward direct manned-unmanned teaming as a “crawl, run, build-up” process.

Anduril says it has already begun work on what it calls “quarterback integration,” referring to the ability for a crewed aircraft to direct or task autonomous aircraft. That work has been conducted in hardware-in-the-loop and software-in-the-loop environments as well as on the Fury itself.

“Most of those events will be coming up here in a matter of weeks or months,” Levin said when asked about the timeline for the first quarterback integration with Fury.

Asked whether those events would involve live flying, the answer was unequivocal: “Yes.”

Exactly how an F-35 would control Fury remains part of that ongoing development effort. The executives pointed to work involving integration of the appropriate human-machine interfaces, primarily including tablet-based control from the crewed fighter, at least at first.

The distinction between flying alongside an F-35 and being controlled by an F-35 is important. The former demonstrates that Fury’s aircraft and autonomy systems can operate safely in the same battlespace as a fifth-generation fighter. The latter would represent a much more significant demonstration of the operational concept behind CCAs: allowing a single crewed fighter to employ and manage additional autonomous aircraft as part of a larger force.

Anduril’s July testing went beyond simple formation flying. The company said Fury was conducting Mission Autonomy flights using live sensor data and was operating in airspace shared with crewed fighters and other CCAs. Air Force operators reportedly conducted both relatively basic route and pattern work and more representative tactical scenarios.

The Fury’s work with the Air Force’s Experimental Operations Unit has progressed through two increasingly ambitious phases. During the first exercise in April at Edwards Air Force Base, Air Force personnel were trained to operate the aircraft and were able to launch and recover it using Anduril’s compact Menace-T setup, essentially a pair of ruggedized cases and a laptop rather than a conventional ground-control station.

By the second exercise, conducted at Creech in July, the Air Force had reduced the manpower and infrastructure required further. A single EOU operator could launch and recover the aircraft after only hours of training, while Air Force personnel independently operated Fury’s Mission Autonomy. The aircraft also flew in airspace shared with other CCAs, while the exercise demonstrated disaggregated operations and a rapid “hot reload” in which two operators replaced an AIM-120 AMRAAM with the engine running, reducing the turnaround between sorties to single-digit minutes.

The July exercise also included a live weapons demonstration that Anduril characterized as a complete end-to-end kill chain rather than simply a captive-carry or basic weapons-release test. The Fury launched from Edwards with a single operator and received a track generated by an external source over a beyond-line-of-sight connection. That track was ingested by Anduril’s Lattice AI-infused autonomy software system, after which the operator tasked the aircraft to engage. Fury then launched an AIM-120 AMRAAM and guided the weapon to the target. Anduril described the test as demonstrating the complete kill chain from offboard targeting information, through the aircraft’s mission systems and operator tasking, to an actual air-to-air weapons engagement.

New test footage: first missile shot from YFQ-44A.

YFQ-44A executed an end-to-end, beyond-line-of-sight strike against a simulated target.

The test, executed out of @EdwardsAFB, represents an important step in turning CCA into an operational capability. pic.twitter.com/70cRIs6uXJ

— Anduril Industries (@anduriltech) July 15, 2026

On the weapons side, the production FQ-44 is being designed around four external hardpoints, allowing it to carry four AIM-120 AMRAAMs for the Air Force’s primary air-to-air mission set. Currently, the demonstration aircraft can carry two. Regardless, the company is also pursuing a much broader weapons portfolio for Fury. Executives said they have already begun integration and fit checks for 500-pound guided bombs, Small Diameter Bombs, low-cost cruise missiles — including Anduril’s Barracuda 500 offering — other air-to-air weapons, rocket pods and targeting pods. Those integrations are intended to give Fury options beyond air-to-air combat, including counter-drone, counter-cruise-missile and air-to-ground/air-surface strike missions. Anduril stressed that these are currently integration and engineering efforts rather than claims that all of those weapons have been flight-tested from Fury. The company also said additional sensors, such as a targeting pod, could be added for some of those missions.

The executives acknowledged that some of the more advanced tactical capabilities remain under development and are being explored extensively in simulation. Those efforts include areas such as sensor fusion, track discrimination and tactical engagements.

The ultimate objective is an aircraft that does not require a large ground-control infrastructure or a dedicated operator for every individual sortie. As previously noted, during the July exercise, Anduril says a single Air Force operator was able to launch and recover a Fury after only hours of training, while other Air Force personnel operated the aircraft’s Mission Autonomy functions.

That same exercise also demonstrated what Anduril described as “disaggregated operations,” with personnel at multiple locations able to operate the same aircraft. The concept is intended to support an Agile Combat Employment-style approach in which CCAs can be dispersed across multiple operating locations rather than relying on a single large ground footprint.

The company has since delivered a Fury aircraft to the Air Force’s EOU at Creech, making it the first CCA to be permanently delivered to the unit, according to Anduril. The service is now flying the aircraft multiple times a day with what the company said is a very limited Anduril presence.

Meanwhile, Anduril says assembly of Fury airframes has already begun at its Arsenal facility, with production aircraft expected to begin coming off the line early next year. The company says it has built the facility and supply chain around a potential production rate of 150 aircraft per year, although that figure is a planned capacity rather than an existing Air Force order. Anduril executives said the company has already advanced procurement of long-lead items and worked with its Tier 1, 2 and 3 suppliers to support that rate, while also examining additional production lines. They emphasized that the current Air Force pricing is based on a substantially lower annual buy than 150 aircraft, but said the Fury’s unit cost is well below $20 million at the quantities currently contemplated. The company also says the production line is designed for relatively rapid reconfiguration, allowing capacity to be shifted between products in weeks rather than the months or years associated with more traditional aircraft production facilities.

Earlier this year, the Air Force awarded contracts for the production of FQ-44A Fury and General Atomics FQ-42A Dark Merlin drones — the latter has now been formally named Vengeance. This sets the service up to operate a split initial fleet of CCAs. As you can read about here, the Air Force is now aiming to have at least 500 CCA in service by 2032, a substantial step up from earlier plans, with the USAF having previously talked about acquiring “over” 150 of these drones by the end of the decade. The 500 target will likely include upcoming increment two CCAs, as well, the requirements of which the Air Force is still working on.

For Anduril, the next major milestone should go far beyond simply putting a Fury and an F-35 in the same formation, demonstrating that a crewed fifth-generation fighter can actually command and employ the autonomous aircraft as part of a live mission.

If Anduril’s timeline holds, that testing could begin relatively soon.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Anduril’s YFQ-44A Fury CCA Has Flown Alongside F-35s appeared first on TWZ.

Debris from a Chinese-made ballistic missile found in Yemen could have inadvertently revealed a previously undisclosed addition to Saudi Arabia’s secretive ballistic missile arsenal. Imagery circulating online appears to show the wreckage of a Chinese DF-15A short-range ballistic missile (SRBM), potentially marking the first known Saudi combat use of a weapon in this class, although both the identification and ownership remain unconfirmed.

The booster stage of a Chinese-made DF-15A (Dong Feng-15A) ballistic missile operated by Saudi Arabia fell in Raghwan District, Marib Governorate, northern Yemen. pic.twitter.com/dfSXMOiCzQ

— OSINTWarfare (@OSINTWarfare) September 14, 2026

It is also unclear what happened to the missile itself. The debris suggests a stage separation or the missile broke apart or crashed before reaching its target. The Houthis are not known to possess any weapons that could have intercepted it.

The development comes amid a sharp escalation in the long-running Saudi-Houthi conflict. After years of relative de-escalation following the 2022 truce, fighting has intensified in recent weeks as Houthi forces have dramatically overrun Saudi-backed Yemeni government positions, including around strategically important Marib and Taiz. The Houthis have also escalated missile and drone attacks against southern Saudi Arabia, targeting military and energy infrastructure while threatening the kingdom’s ability to move oil through the Red Sea. The group has declared the Bab el-Mandeb closed to Saudi oil traffic, adding a direct threat to one of Riyadh’s critical energy-export routes.

You can catch up with our latest coverage of the fighting here.

As for the DF-15, also known by its NATO designation CSS-6, this is a road-mobile, solid-fueled SRBM developed by China during the 1980s. The system formed part of Beijing’s effort to develop a new generation of conventionally armed mobile ballistic missiles, including systems primarily intended for export.

العثور على بقايا صاروخ صيني من طراز DF-15A في اليمن. pic.twitter.com/af9mGNNxiA

— إيران بالعربية (@iraninarabic_ir) September 14, 2026

As you can read about here, the DF-15 family has evolved through several variants, although open-source information concerning their capabilities remains inconsistent.

The DF-15A reportedly entered Chinese service in the mid-1990s. Estimates of these missiles’ maximum range vary substantially, from roughly 600 kilometers (373 miles) for the original DF-15 to as much as 900 kilometers (559 miles) for later versions.

China is the only confirmed operator of the DF-15 family. There have been longstanding reports of Chinese transfers of the DF-15 or the related M-9 export version to Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, and Syria, but in each case, the export record is heavily disputed, with some reports likely conflating the DF-15 with the broadly similar DF-11.

While Saudi Arabia has never publicly acknowledged operating the DF-15 family, it has a well-established history of acquiring Chinese ballistic missiles.

In 2013, Prince Fahd bin Abdullah bin Mohammed, Deputy Minister of Defense, visited the Strategic Missile Forces of Saudi Arabia, and was given this model. YEARS of speculation on the smaller missiles (The large is DF-3). Now we know – they are DF-15 and DF-15A. pic.twitter.com/oOn8qiCgye

— Tal Inbar (@inbarspace) September 14, 2026

Saudi Arabia imported Chinese ballistic missiles to expand its long-range strike options. Its desire for a land-based strategic deterrent was initially driven by concerns over Iran, regional missile proliferation, and nuclear hedging. More recently, however, it shifted toward fielding more accurate, mobile systems with greater conventional military utility.

Riyadh secretly obtained DF-3A missiles from China beginning in the late 1980s, establishing a strategic ballistic-missile capability that remained largely outside public view.

The kingdom has also subsequently been linked to the DF-21 family. Satellite imagery and other open-source intelligence have provided evidence of Chinese-designed ballistic-missile infrastructure in Saudi Arabia.

While the Houthis have their own ballistic-missile arsenal, this is principally associated with Iranian technology, captured Yemeni systems, and locally produced or modified weapons.

Saudi employment of an SRBM in the current fighting would represent a notable expansion of the kingdom’s response options. If Saudi Arabia did indeed do this, its main advantage would be speed and responsiveness. A solid-fueled ballistic missile could reach targets deep inside Yemen within minutes while keeping Saudi aircraft and crews out of the immediate engagement area, providing Riyadh with a rapid strike option against fixed Houthi targets. That could be particularly valuable as the conflict expands and Saudi forces face pressure to respond quickly to Houthi attacks on military and energy infrastructure.

Previous losses at the hands of Houthi ground-based air defenses could also dissuade Riyadh from relying on crewed aircraft to strike targets on the ground deep inside Yemen. Houthi air defenses, while pathed together in many ways, are capable enough to give even U.S. airpower a serious run for their money.

At the same time, a conventional SRBM like the DF-15A can deliver a large warhead at very high speed, imparting significant kinetic energy, making it particularly useful against fixed, high-value, or hardened targets.

Use of an SRBM would also be in line with the current pattern of escalation, with the Houthis conducting missile and drone attacks against Saudi military and energy targets while Saudi-backed Yemeni forces are engaged in renewed ground fighting. Riyadh’s demonstration of an SRBM capability in this campaign would also signal that it is is willing to draw more heavily on its strategic missile inventory as the conflict intensifies, potentially further raising the stakes of the confrontation.

Such a move would carry a message beyond Yemen. Using a previously unacknowledged ballistic missile capability in combat would signal to Iran that Riyadh is now willing to employ this arsenal, after decades of keeping it very much in the shadows.

If the evidence ultimately points to a Saudi DF-15A launch, the discovery would offer a rare look at the operational use of an extremely secretive part of the kingdom’s arsenal, and add a significant new dimension to the rapidly escalating Saudi-Houthi war.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Saudi Arabia Appears To Have Used Its Secretive Stash Of Ballistic Missiles For The First Time appeared first on TWZ.

France is accelerating work on the Rafale F5 standard, bringing forward development of a major new configuration of its combat aircraft at a time when the country’s planned next-generation fighter with Germany has effectively collapsed in its original form. The contracts cover the equipment judged to have the highest technical risk, ahead of the overall development contract for the F5 standard, expected for the end of this year.

The French defense procurement agency, the Direction générale de l’armement (DGA), ordered the first upstream development work for F5 from Dassault Aviation, Thales, MBDA, and Safran. The contracts cover key areas including navigation, datalinks, radar, electronic warfare, and propulsion, laying the groundwork for the next configuration of the Rafale, which is planned to enter service with the French Air and Space Force and the French Navy starting around 2033.

#Commande | Rafale F5

La DGA commande les 1ers travaux en amont du prochain lancement en réalisation du standard F5 du Rafale

Ils concernent notamment :
la centrale inertielle
le moteur
le radar
la suite d’autoprotection de l’avion
pic.twitter.com/n3uhBYqIvi

— Direction générale de l'armement (@DGA) September 9, 2026

The most extensive modernization of the Rafale yet, the F5 standard was originally part of a longer transition toward France’s next-generation combat-air capability. But with the Franco-German New Generation Fighter (NGF) effort now effectively dead in its original configuration, the accelerated F5 program is taking on a much larger strategic role.

Rather than simply keeping the Rafale relevant until NGF arrives, France is now developing a version of the aircraft that is set to carry much of the country’s high-end combat-air capability well into the 2030s and potentially beyond.

The increasingly capable F5 could, in turn, reduce the urgency of finding a replacement for the Rafale — while potentially adding to the fighter’s export appeal. After a slow start, Dassault has recorded export sales of 299 new-build Rafales to eight nations.

The DGA’s contracts engage four of France’s principal combat-aircraft industrial players. Dassault Aviation remains responsible for the aircraft and its overall integration; Thales is involved in major sensor, electronic warfare, and communications capabilities; MBDA is responsible for much of the weapons system; and Safran is responsible for propulsion.

Previous Rafale standards have largely consisted of incremental upgrades, focusing on software and other improvements to the existing aircraft configuration. F5 is notably more extensive, addressing many of the critical systems that determine how the aircraft senses the battlespace, communicates with other platforms, conducts electronic warfare, and generates the power needed to operate increasingly demanding equipment.

The DGA has specifically identified the Thales RBE2-XG radar as one of the major technological advances associated with F5.

The RBE2-XG is expected to feature gallium nitride (GaN) semiconductors. Compared with previous technology, GaN generates less heat and has the capacity to operate at higher voltages, meaning that output power can be increased, while component size can be reduced. Overall, using GaN should help to get more power out of the radar without increasing its size.

According to the DGA, “This new radar will benefit from a substantial increase in power, and consequently in detection range, as well as improvements in the identification of targets with an extremely low radar cross-section (RCS). Its computing capabilities will also be enhanced to facilitate the integration of artificial intelligence.”

The RBE2-XG will also be “designed with collaborative combat in mind, featuring sensors capable of working together without the need for pilot intervention.” It is also planned to have enhanced resilience, including against cyber threats.

France is already working on the concept of a combat drone to accompany the Rafale, with the future F5 standard providing the crewed aircraft around which those systems can operate.

The new radar will be combined with more capable electronic warfare equipment, improved communications and datalinks, expanded processing capacity, and a more capable propulsion system.

To be developed by MBDA and Thales, the forthcoming F5 version of the SPECTRA self-protection suite is intended to significantly improve detection and jamming capabilities, the DGA says, “through a fully digital approach, enabling a complete overhaul of the core electronic warfare system to counter the increasing density and broadening of the threat spectrum, as well as the growing complexity of threat waveforms, expected by 2035.”

Thales will also be responsible for the new Inter-Vehicle Data Link (IVDL) system, described as a “stealthy and resilient datalink.” The DGA says the new datalink will expand connectivity “thanks to a new high-speed, discreet, and jamming-resistant waveform. IVDL will allow the Rafale to penetrate hostile areas where jammers are widespread, while maintaining optimal quality of communication and dialogue between aircraft.”

Safran will begin preliminary design work on the M88 T-Rex engine, which is planned to increase the turbofan’s thrust from around 16,500 pounds to nearly 19,850 pounds, an increase of roughly 20 percent.

In terms of armament, the contract announcement mentions the ASN4G missile, set to be introduced to service by 2035, which will allow the Rafale F5 to continue to serve as the airborne nuclear component. The munition remains in the early stages of development, but it will be capable of hypersonic speeds — defined as speeds greater than Mach 5 — with a range in excess of 1,000 kilometers (621 miles).

Other likely new missiles include a beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile to succeed the current Meteor. As you can read about here, France’s Comet program, apparently led by the French side of MBDA, is already looking into this requirement, with an apparent plan to introduce the weapon around 2030.

An older video from MBDA showing some of the company’s weapons integrated on earlier versions of the Rafale:

For France, the original logic behind the pan-European FCAS program was that Rafale would eventually give way to the NGF as its principal crewed combat aircraft, operating from land bases and aircraft carriers.

With the collapse of the Franco-German effort, France cannot simply wait for a next-generation fighter program whose industrial and political future is uncertain. Instead, the Rafale has to remain capable against rapidly evolving threats throughout the 2030s and beyond.

With the F5 standard, however, France is looking to incorporate some of the concepts envisaged for NGF. These include distributed architectures in which crewed fighters, uncrewed aircraft, remote carriers, missiles, and offboard sensors cooperate across a battlespace.

A highly upgraded Rafale operating as the crewed controller of uncrewed combat aircraft and remote weapons could perform some of the missions that France originally expected from NGF.

For now, F5 also sidesteps the central problem in the now-defunct Franco-German effort: whether the two countries could agree on the requirements, industrial structure, and workshare behind a new-generation combat aircraft.

Despite its advances, the F5 airframe remains derived from a design dating back to the 1980s, which first entered French service in the early 2000s. In particular, it falls well short of fifth-generation designs — let alone sixth-generation ones — in terms of low observability. This is one area where collaborative drones could potentially help compensate for the Rafale’s inherent limitations.

France has therefore bought itself some time with the F5 program. But it may eventually decide that it needs a future high-end crewed fighter to provide capabilities that an upgraded fourth-generation airframe cannot fully replicate, particularly in terms of survivability against advanced integrated air-defense systems, signature reduction, internal weapons carriage, and operations deep inside heavily contested airspace.

On an industrial level, F5 is also significant because it brings together the same French industrial heavyweights that would have formed the backbone of its FCAS effort. Dassault Aviation, Thales, Safran, and MBDA are now well-positioned to work together on whatever comes after F5, whether that is a crewed combat aircraft, uncrewed CCA-type platforms, or a combination of both. Based on its experience with the nEUROn program, France would be well placed to develop a UCAV that can work cooperatively as well as independently, taking over the deeper-penetrating fighter mission set, and potentially skipping a sixth-generation fighter altogether.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=frNsu7g7r94

Meanwhile, success with F5 — and, in particular, with the wider combat ecosystem planned around it — could put France in an even stronger position when it comes to any future European fighter project.

For the time being, Britain, Italy, and Japan are pursuing the GCAP/Tempest pathway toward a new combat aircraft. Germany and Spain remain tied to the wider FCAS architecture, even as the original Franco-German NGF arrangement has fractured. Sweden’s position is less clear, with indications that it could collaborate with either France or Germany.

France, for its part, is now investing heavily in an increasingly sophisticated Rafale architecture while maintaining its own sovereign industrial base.

In terms of acqusition, France is expected to pursue a mixed approach, buying new-build Rafales while upgrading suitable aircraft already in service to the F5 standard. The oldest jets are unlikely to receive the full F5 treatment, however.

The irony is that the failure of the NGF effort may ultimately make Rafale F5 more important — and potentially more capable — than it was ever expected to be.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post France Accelerates Rafale F5 Upgrade After Collapse Of FCAS Next-Gen Fighter Project appeared first on TWZ.

Ukraine has unveiled a new domestically developed surface-to-air missile system designed to turn a diverse collection of air-to-air missiles into a flexible ground-based air defense capability. Called Shershen, Ukrainian for hornet, the system combines a locally-developed command-and-control architecture, a dedicated surveillance radar, and multiple launchers that can employ both Ukrainian and Western missiles.

The system was displayed at the MSPO defense exhibition in Kielce, Poland, by the National Association of Ukrainian Defense Industries (NAUDI). The example shown is reportedly the second operational prototype and is described as being close to its production configuration.

At the ongoing MSPO-2026 defense and industrial exhibition in Poland, the launcher of the Ukrainian Shershen air defense system, developed by Radionix, has been presented for the first time, along with the R-120K surface-to-air guided missile specially developed for it (second… pic.twitter.com/5RfZWHWuxl

— 𝔗𝔥𝔢 𝕯𝔢𝔞𝔡 𝕯𝔦𝔰𝔱𝔯𝔦𝔠𝔱 (@TheDeadDistrict) September 9, 2026

The appearance of Shershen comes as Ukraine continues to develop an increasingly diverse family of indigenous air defense systems, while simultaneously adapting older missiles and foreign-supplied weapons to address a severe shortage of interceptors.

That effort has produced some distinctly unconventional combinations. Ukraine’s so-called FrankenSAM programs have paired existing Soviet-era launchers and radars with Western missiles, while other systems have adapted Soviet R-73 air-to-air missiles for ground launch. The United Kingdom and Denmark have also worked with Ukraine on the containerized Gravehawk system, another concept built around repurposed air-to-air missiles.

Shershen takes that philosophy a step further by making missile interchangeability a central feature of the system.

The Shershen battery consists of a Perun command-and-control vehicle, an Athena radar, and four Borei launchers.

According to the developer, the system’s architecture is deliberately open. This allows it to use different missiles from different manufacturers and also permits the integration of third-party surveillance and guidance radars.

The company says Shershen can currently employ the R-27 (AA-10 Alamo), R-73 (AA-11 Archer), AIM-9 Sidewinder, and AIM-132 ASRAAM, while compatibility with the R-60 is also being explored. These weapons come with a mix of semi-active radar or infrared homing seeker heads.

Air-to-air missiles are already available in considerable variety across Ukraine’s arsenal and those of its foreign partners. Being able to employ several types from a common ground-based system provides much more flexibility than a conventional SAM designed around one dedicated interceptor.

It also offers a way to exploit missiles that were never originally intended to be fired from the ground. That means Shershen’s launcher and fire-control system are meant to be interceptor agnostic, at least to a certain degree.

Shershen’s Athena radar is reported to be capable of detecting targets at ranges of up to 85 kilometers (53 miles).

In terms of the engagement envelope, Shershen is claimed to be capable of engaging aircraft, cruise missiles, and drones at ranges of up to 25 kilometers (16 miles) and altitudes of up to 10,000 meters (32,800 feet). Clearly, these figures will vary widely depending on the type of interceptor.

When employing radar-guided missiles, the system’s engagement architecture can reportedly guide as many as six missiles simultaneously.

The advertised performance figures have not been independently verified, and it remains unclear what target types and engagement conditions were used to establish them.

Україна представила складові мультикаліберного зенітного ракетного комплексу «Шершень» на міжнародній виставці MSPO 2026 у польському місті Кельце.

Міжнародний консорціум компаній Shershen Group, який створює ЗРК в інтересах України представив, показав командний пункт,… pic.twitter.com/9wAS7ewxzg

— Мілітарний (@mil_in_ua) September 10, 2026

The developer says the second prototype has completed initial testing, including successful interceptions at a test range.

One of the Borei launchers displayed at MSPO were armed with an R-120K, a new Ukrainian missile equipped with a radar seeker and is intended to be capable of both air-to-air and surface-to-air employment.

The R-120K remains under development, however. Work is reportedly continuing on its rocket motor, meaning that its eventual performance and production status remain uncertain. Still, having the option of including the R-120K on the Shershen system in the future is significant.

Rather than relying indefinitely on stocks of Soviet and Western air-to-air missiles, Ukraine could eventually have a domestically produced interceptor specifically tailored to its growing family of ground-based air-defense systems. That will become increasingly important as stocks of legacy missiles are depleted. Earlier this year, it was reported that Ukrainian F-16s were running low on their air-to-air missiles, which include the same AIM-9s that are used in some FrankenSAM systems, as well as being compatible with Shershen. But even before that, it was clear that Western-supplied missile stocks in Ukraine across the board were diminishing, in some cases drastically, with critical interceptors like the AMRAAM and Patriot being badly affected.

Ukraine’s need for additional surface-to-air missiles has become increasingly acute during the full-scale war, especially as Russian drone and missile barrages have stepped up.

The shortage has encouraged Ukraine to pursue a combination of indigenous development and unconventional adaptations.

The FrankenSAM initiative, conducted with U.S. support, demonstrated how existing Ukrainian systems could be combined with foreign missiles to rapidly create additional air-defense capacity. Ukraine has also fielded modified Osa systems armed with R-73 air-to-air missiles rather than their original 9M33 interceptors. Other R-73-based concepts have even been demonstrated aboard Ukrainian uncrewed surface vessels.

Shershen appears to reflect the next logical step in that evolution: rather than creating a one-off FrankenSAM combination, build an architecture from the outset that can accept multiple missiles. Additionally, with so many different ground-based air defense systems now being fielded, it comes with the significant advantage of a standardized launcher and control interface that can accommodate a range of interceptors.

At the same time, Ukraine is pursuing substantially more ambitious indigenous SAM projects.

Earlier this year, a previously secretive Ukrainian missile identified as the Koral made what appeared to be its first public appearance. The program dates back to at least 2021, when Ukraine’s Luch design bureau presented a concept for a medium-range surface-to-air missile.

Koral is intended to provide a much longer-range capability, potentially filling some of the gap left by Ukraine’s aging Soviet systems and supplementing the Western-supplied Patriot and SAMP/T.

Shershen, by contrast, is clearly focused on the short-range layer.

Together, the programs illustrate the breadth of Ukraine’s emerging domestic air-defense effort: from relatively inexpensive systems built around repurposed air-to-air missiles to new, purpose-designed interceptors intended to replace or augment Soviet-era systems.

Ukraine’s experience with FrankenSAM has demonstrated the value of getting unconventional air defense combinations into service quickly.

Once fielded, Shershen, with its architecture capable of accepting different Soviet-origin and Western-made interceptors, and eventually a Ukrainian one, gives Ukraine another way to stretch its missile inventory and enhance its air defense capabilities.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Ukraine’s New Shershen SAM Can Fire A Wild Mix Of Adapted Air-To-Air Missiles appeared first on TWZ.

The Oregon Air National Guard’s 142nd Wing has taken another significant step toward turning the F-15EX Eagle II into a true multirole fighter, conducting the first live-bomb drops from operational F-15EXs during training at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada. The milestone came during a roughly three-week deployment to Nellis in late August and early September in support of the U.S. Air Force’s Weapons Instructor Course (WIC).

Photographs released by the Air National Guard yesterday show F-15EXs from the 142nd Wing carrying live bombs on the flight line and departing Nellis with the weapons loaded. Official imagery shows the jets armed with a single 500-pound Mk 82 freefall bomb on the fuselage centerline, while spotters also captured F-15EXs carrying a 2,000-pound Mk 84 freefall bomb in the same position.

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The 142nd’s F-15EXs are only now acquiring a capability that was deliberately absent from the wing’s previous F-15C fleet. The Portland, Oregon-based unit was an air-superiority organization when it operated the F-15C, while the F-15EX is ultimately derived from the F-15E Strike Eagle and has considerably more inherent multirole potential.

As we reported in July, the wing had already begun laying the groundwork for this transition. In May, 142nd personnel traveled to Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho, where they loaded and dropped inert BDU-50 and BDU-56 training bombs from their F-15EXs. Those weapons replicate the size and weight of 500-pound-class Mk 82-series and 2,000-pound-class Mk 84-series bombs. Over 10 missions, the crews dropped 24 BDU-50s and 12 BDU-56s.

While the F-15EX had already been tested in an air-to-ground role by the Air Force’s test community, the Mountain Home deployment was the first time an operational Eagle II unit had loaded and dropped bombs. The next step, the wing said at the time, would be live weapons employment at Nellis.

The Air Force has emphasized that the F-15EX’s primary mission remains defensive and offensive counter-air, particularly in the homeland-defense role. At the same time, the service’s plans call for the aircraft to provide combatant commanders with strike packages capable of operating in contested environments.

The F-15EX is inherently well suited to such a mission. Derived from the Strike Eagle lineage, it combines that aircraft’s large payload capacity and long range with substantially modernized avionics and electronic warfare systems. The aircraft’s design leaves considerable room for additional weapons and mission equipment, making an expansion into air-to-ground operations relatively straightforward compared with trying to add that capability to the F-15C.

The 142nd has been building the institutional knowledge required to make that transition. Three of its pilots underwent a nine-month course covering the science, tactics, and procedures associated with air-to-ground weapons employment before returning to help establish the wing’s training program. Weapons personnel also traveled to Nellis earlier this year to work with F-15Es assigned to the 59th Test and Evaluation Squadron and become certified in bomb loading procedures.

As well as teaching pilots how to release a weapon, the wing had to develop an entirely new air-to-ground training pipeline for pilots, maintainers, and weapons personnel at a unit that had not previously operated an aircraft with an operational bombing mission.

Nellis is home to the Air Force’s Weapons School and is central to the Weapons Instructor Course, making it one of the most important locations in the service for developing and evaluating advanced tactics. The 142nd’s participation therefore places its emerging F-15EX air-to-ground capability in an environment specifically focused on integrating advanced weapons, tactics, and mission planning.

The wing’s new live bomb-dropping capability also comes as the Air Force continues to explore how broadly the Eagle II can be employed.

Test and evaluation units have already demonstrated that the aircraft can accommodate sophisticated air-to-ground weapons. Earlier this year, an F-15EX from the 85th Test and Evaluation Squadron participated in a munitions-load training event at Kadena Air Base in Japan, where Air Force personnel practiced loading live GBU-53/B Small Diameter Bomb IIs onto the aircraft.

The F-15EX is also capable of carrying the conformal fuel tanks used by the F-15E, which can provide additional fuel as well as additional weapons stations. The operational F-15EXs delivered to the 142nd have so far been seen without CFTs, however, and the status of the plan to equip the Oregon aircraft with them remains unclear.

CFTs could become increasingly important if the Air Force moves toward more demanding air-to-ground missions for the Eagle II, particularly those requiring substantial weapons loads and long-range operations.

Another unresolved question is how the Air Force will ultimately crew F-15EXs when they are performing more complex multirole missions.

The Eagle II retains the F-15E family’s two-seat cockpit, although the Air Force’s initial operational concept has generally involved flying the aircraft with a single pilot. That leaves an unused cockpit that could potentially become an important asset as the mission set expands.

Former 142nd Wing commander Col. Michael Kosderka previously told TWZ that the addition of a weapons systems officer or other specialist in the rear cockpit could open the door to more air-to-ground capabilities.

“We can start talking about putting all kinds of air-to-ground capabilities into the airplane, potentially putting WSOs or other experts in the backseat as well to have us do any number of multi-role capabilities that it’s just physically not possible to in the C model,” Kosderka told TWZ in an interview back in 2024. “So the X has tremendous growth capability. It’s really exciting.”

Two crew would be particularly relevant to complex strike missions, where managing sensors, weapons, communications, electronic warfare, and other mission systems can place substantial demands on a single pilot. As we have discussed in the past, a back-seater would also be highly beneficial for the emerging drone controller role.

The Weapons School has also been associated with developing two-seat F-15EX operations, indicating that the second cockpit’s utility is already being considered at the tactical-development level.

For now, it would be premature to characterize the F-15EX as an operational replacement for the F-15E Strike Eagle in the air-to-ground role. The 142nd’s newly demonstrated bombing capability remains part of an ongoing training and development process.

Meanwhile, the Air Force is preparing to field substantially larger numbers of F-15EXs. Beyond the 142nd, additional Guard units are planned to receive the type, in California and Louisiana, as well as Michigan.

The Air Force has announced plans to base F-15EXs at Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, North Carolina, where they will eventually replace older F-15Es, which, in turn, are slated to move to Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, as part of a broader realignment of the Eagle fleet.

Another two active-duty F-15EX squadrons are slated to replace the former F-15C force at Kadena. The first F-15EX for permanent assignment at Kadena recently departed Boeing’s St. Louis, Missouri, facility for the 142nd Wing, where it will undergo final preparations before its eventual deployment to sprawling Okinawa.

The operational implications of the air-to-ground training therefore extend well beyond Portland.

The Eagle II’s generous weapons payload, long range, modern sensors and electronic warfare systems, and ability to carry both air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons give the Air Force a platform that can potentially perform several missions without sacrificing the characteristics that make the F-15 attractive for homeland defense and counter-air operations. The same characteristics are also extremely relevant to any export operator, which would expect to operate the Eagle II in a multirole capacity.

As well as a weapons-training milestone, the first live-bomb drops by the 142nd Wing provide more evidence that the F-15EX’s mission is continuing to evolve.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Operational F-15EXs Drop Live Bombs For The First Time appeared first on TWZ.

Hermeus is developing an expendable ramjet-powered aircraft, Ramjet-X, which will be air-launched from its reusable, F-16-sized Quarterhorse high-speed drone. The result aims to create a two-vehicle architecture intended to make high-speed flight testing less dependent on expensive, single-use test platforms. That would give Hermeus and potential customers a way to conduct repeated high-Mach flight tests without expending a large booster on every mission.

America didn’t lose ground in high-speed flight because of a lack of ideas. We slowed down because flight tests became too expensive, too rare, and too cautious.

Meet Ramjet-X. Air-launched from the Quarterhorse program, it’s a low-cost, repeatable test vehicle built to fly and… pic.twitter.com/rMed6NhcvD

— Zach Shore (@Zsshore) September 9, 2026

The company unveiled the concept today. Hermeus says the Ramjet-X will be carried beneath Quarterhorse and released at a speed of around Mach 3, at which its ramjet can begin operating. The smaller vehicle will then accelerate, climbing to around 100,000 feet, and a speed in the region of Mach 4. Quarterhorse will then return to base and be available for another mission.

Imagery released by Hermeus shows a Quarterhorse carrying a Ramjet-X mounted on a pylon under each wing, indicating that two different high-speed tests can be carried out in a single sortie. Intriguingly, the Quarterhorse is shown with no fewer than six underwing hardpoints in all, suggesting that other kinds of external payloads are envisaged.

Hermeus has not released detailed performance specifications for Ramjet-X, including its range, payload capacity, or the critical expected cost per flight. We have reached out to the company for more information.

Images released by the company show a relatively compact, missile-like vehicle with delta wings incorporating prominent dihedral. There are no horizontal tail surfaces, but a conventional vertical fin is complemented by a ventral fin. Axios reports that Ramjet-X is approximately 22 feet long and 7 feet wide.

In terms of appearance, and also thanks to its ramjet propulsion system, the vehicle is outwardly very reminiscent of the Lockheed’s D-21 Tagboard supersonic spy drone. However, at more than 40 feet long and with a wingspan of 20 feet, the D-21 was significantly bigger. Overall, the entire concept recalls the Cold War-era D-21 and its M-21 mothership, on a smaller scale.

The basic concept aims to address a longstanding problem with ramjet flight testing. Unlike a conventional jet engine, a ramjet cannot provide useful thrust from a standstill. The vehicle therefore has to be accelerated to a sufficiently high speed before the ramjet can take over.

That acceleration can traditionally require another propulsion system, including an expendable rocket booster. Hermeus is proposing to substitute a reusable aircraft for that initial boost. It is unclear if the Ramjet-X vehicles are similarly recoverable, but we have asked Hermeus for more details here, too.

As it stands, flight-test programs of this kind are often constrained not only by the cost and availability of test infrastructure, but also by the limited availability of suitable airspace and range access. A reusable carrier aircraft could help address both challenges, allowing multiple Ramjet-X vehicles to be deployed from airports near a designated test range as required and launched only once the vehicle is within the approved test area. That flexibility could reduce the need for a new large booster for every experiment while also making it easier to conduct tests, including at shorter notice, within increasingly constrained airspace.

Hermeus says Ramjet-X is being designed not just for its own development work but as a potential test platform for outside customers. The company is calling the concept “Flight Test as a Service,” with customers able to fly payloads including sensors, communications equipment, computing and autonomy systems, materials, and propulsion hardware.

The program reflects a broader push toward increasing the availability of commercial high-speed flight testing that has attracted U.S. government interest.

Hermeus was also selected by the Defense Innovation Unit for work under its Hypersonic and High-Cadence Airborne Testing, or HyCAT, effort. That program is intended to use commercial flight-test capabilities to expand the government’s access to relevant high-speed environments.

The company is also pursuing its own increasingly ambitious Quarterhorse aircraft. Its Quarterhorse Mk 2.1 completed an uncrewed supersonic flight earlier this year, reaching Mach 1.21 on its third test flight. The company’s roadmap calls for subsequent Quarterhorse variants to progressively increase speed and address the thermal and propulsion challenges associated with high-Mach flight.

Supersonic. Mach 1.21.

Quarterhorse Mk 2.1 is now the world’s first privately developed, unmanned supersonic jet and the fastest unmanned aircraft flying today.

This flight makes Hermeus the fastest company in aviation history to go from founding to supersonic flight – exactly… pic.twitter.com/wjoIcdiEOj

— Hermeus (@hermeuscorp) May 26, 2026

The imagery released for Ramjet-X shows a different Quarterhorse configuration than the 2.1 version, including beefed-up landing gear with twin nosewheels. The requirement for release of the Ramjet-X at Mach 3 suggests that its launch platform will be the Quarterhorse Mk 2.3, which will be the first to reach this kind of speed. This summer, Hermeus confirmed that its second supersonic aircraft, the Quarterhorse Mk 2.2, and the Mach 3-capable Mk 2.3 aircraft were under construction.

For its future Quarterhorse Mk 3, Hermeus has been developing Chimera, a turbine-based combined-cycle propulsion system. This is intended to transition from turbine operation to ramjet operation as speed increases.

Ramjet-X effectively separates part of that problem into another aircraft and the system could also be useful for experiments that do not require an entire hypersonic aircraft.

For example, an organization developing a high-temperature material might need to know how it behaves in an actual high-speed flight environment, rather than only in a ground test. The same could apply to weapons, sensors, communications systems, guidance hardware, onboard computers, or other components intended for high-speed vehicles.

So far, however, it’s not clear what kind of flight profiles Ramjet-X will provide. Hermeus has mentioned a cruise phase lasting “tens of minutes.”

But a short-duration dash through a high-Mach regime is not equivalent to sustained flight at those speeds. The duration available to an experiment, thermal loads, acceleration, vibration, available electrical power, telemetry, maneuverability, and payload mass will all determine what can actually be tested.

The company says it is already testing the Ramjet-X propulsion system at its High Enthalpy Air-Breathing Test facility in Jacksonville, Florida. High-temperature structures are also under development at its El Segundo, California, headquarters. Integrated vehicle testing is currently planned for 2027.

The HEAT facility itself is part of Hermeus’ effort to establish high-speed propulsion test infrastructure. The company says the facility is being developed to eventually provide continuous high-Mach airflow for more flight-like ground testing.

Ramjet-X has yet to fly, but if it performs as intended, it could help lower one of the major barriers to obtaining real-world flight data at high Mach numbers. At the same time, the company is entering a market that is attracting growing interest from other aerospace firms, which are also expanding their high-speed flight-test capabilities, especially to capitalize on the broader hypersonics boom, including Stratolaunch.

There is fairly clear potential weaponization of this concept, for strike and surveillance missions, as well, although there has been no indication of that being in the works at this time.

The planned 2027 integrated testing should provide the first meaningful indication of whether the concept can progress to become a practical high-speed test capability.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Hermeus Unveils Air-Launched Ramjet Test Vehicle for High-Speed Experiments appeared first on TWZ.

Covenant, a previously little-known defense startup, has emerged with a new long-range strike weapon, named Anthem, which it says is intended to provide a cheaper, more readily producible alternative to existing cruise missiles. Already in testing with the U.S. Army, the missile reflects the growing focus on weapons in this class that can be manufactured quickly in very large numbers, even if they sacrifice a significant degree of individual-weapon capability compared to more ‘exquisite’ and costly alternatives.

Covenant, a U.S.-Israeli company founded in 2024, unveiled its Anthem weapon system today along with plans for production in the United States, Germany, and Israel. The company says it has already conducted more than 200 test flights of the weapon and has secured roughly $150 million in orders.

The announcement comes as the United States and its allies are increasingly focused on the availability of long-range precision weapons, particularly the ability to replenish inventories during a major conflict. Covenant’s central pitch is that existing weapons in this category are too expensive and difficult to manufacture in sufficient numbers for a prolonged war, a reality that has been recognized by a bewildering number of new and established industry players.

Anthem is being positioned accordingly as a high-volume weapon rather than a one-for-one replacement for larger, more expensive cruise missiles. In its initial form, it is ground-launched, although it is unclear exactly how this is achieved. Imagery of the weapon during Pentagon trials show it being handled on the ground using tricycle undercarriage, pointing to the use of a runway for launch.

Covenant has not publicly disclosed the weapon’s range, although unconfirmed reports put it at roughly 1,200 kilometers — over 740 miles. The company is also being somewhat deliberate about how it describes Anthem, referring to it as a “deep precision-strike munition” rather than consistently classifying it as a cruise missile.

On the other hand, Reuters reports Covenant executives saying that the missile was developed ‌with an ⁠eye toward future conflicts in the Pacific. “We were designed for the China fight,” said Covenant President Abby Denburg. That would also seem to point toward significant range.

However, more concrete details of its performance, as well as guidance type and projected level of survivability, remain undisclosed.

The company says Anthem can carry a warhead weighing more than 200 kilograms (441 pounds). That is substantially less than the roughly 1,000-pound-class warhead associated with the Tomahawk cruise missile, which can hit targets at over 1,000 miles depending on the exact configuration. Covenant argues that lower cost and much higher production rates would make it possible to employ larger numbers of their weapons against a given target set.

Anthem uses a solid rocket motor for launch and a heavy-fuel jet engine, underslung below the missile body, for cruise flight. Covenant says the system was designed from the outset around readily available components and a supply chain that would avoid dependence on individual suppliers. The company states that it has, for example, multiple solid-rocket-motor suppliers and long-term agreements covering thousands of jet engines.

Overall, the production ambitions are significant. Covenant’s new Grand Prairie, Texas, facility covers approximately 105,000 square feet and is expected to begin serial production during the first quarter of 2027, eventually reaching a stated capacity of 5,000 Anthems per year. Its facility in Saxony, Germany, is intended to reach a similar production rate, while the smaller Israeli site is planned to produce as many as 2,000 weapons annually.

“Germany possesses an exceptionally strong industrial foundation,” Denburg told Bloomberg News. “While its automotive sector is currently undergoing a structural transformation, decades of manufacturing excellence have created precisely the expertise we require.”

That would put the company’s eventual combined production target at up to 12,000 weapons per year, assuming all three facilities reach their planned capacities.

Covenant’s U.S. facility is intended primarily to support American customers, while the German operation is being established around a European supply chain, responding to growing demand for long-range strike weapons across that continent. The company says an unidentified international customer is expected to begin receiving German-built weapons before the end of this year. Meanwhile, U.S. Army deliveries are expected in 2027, under an accelerated qualification contract.

The weapon has already been subjected to U.S.-linked testing. In August, an unnamed defense-industry partner conducted a live-fire demonstration at the Africa Multidomain Training and Experimentation Center in Morocco. The U.S. military’s public material about that event did not identify the weapon or company, but subsequent reporting identified the missile as Covenant’s Anthem.

Covenant now says the system has flown more than 200 times over the past year, including testing involving U.S. government organizations. The company also says Anthem participated in the Army’s Project Convergence Capstone 6 experiments and that its August test helped demonstrate a new framework for allowing industry to use the Moroccan test infrastructure.

Beyond the ground-launched version, Covenant is working on a naval derivative. The company says it has a roughly $70-million contract with the Navy’s Rapid Capabilities Office to adapt Anthem into what it calls Maritime Anthem. The effort includes Defense Exportability Features intended to make the weapon easier to provide to U.S. allies and partners.

The emergence of Anthem also illustrates how the defense industry’s current emphasis on mass production is extending into the long-range strike arena.

The United States already fields weapons such as Tomahawk and JASSM-ER, but those systems are expensive, and production capacity is limited. Covenant is betting that a weapon available in much larger quantities can provide commanders with another layer of long-range strike capacity, even if the destructive power of a single round falls well below that of a Tomahawk. Reuters reports that Covenant expects the weapon to eventually cost in the mid-six-figure range, although the company has not provided a final unit price. Compared to other competitors in the field, Covenant appears to be the crudest design we have seen so far, underscored by its apparent launch method, in which it takes off from an airstrip under power of its booster.

Recent combat operations have increased concerns about the rate at which more traditional precision weapons can actually be manufactured. Once stockpiles begin to reduce, long-range missiles have proven among the most difficult munitions to replace. That would only become more problematic during a major conflict.

Covenant has attracted venture-capital backing to pursue that problem. The company says it has raised more than $250 million from investors including Andreessen Horowitz, Founders Fund, Lux Capital, 8VC, Aleph, and Lightspeed. Its stated focus, however, is now shifting from development to production.

The key question will be whether Covenant can turn the promised production numbers into sustained deliveries. Building thousands of long-range weapons per year requires not only an assembly plant, but also a resilient supply chain, reliable propulsion production, testing capacity, quality control, and the ability to integrate those elements at scale. It will also rely on securing more contracts from domestic and allied customers.

For now, however, Anthem represents an intriguing entrant into a crowded but increasingly important segment of the weapons market.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Army Now Testing Anthem Long-Range Strike Weapon Built for Mass Production appeared first on TWZ.

Poland has unveiled a full-sized demonstrator of a new heavy infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) intended to put more armor and firepower between mechanized troops and the increasingly lethal threats of the modern battlefield. The unveiling comes as Poland undertakes a sweeping modernization of its armored forces, driven in large part by the threat posed by Russia.

Huta Stalowa Wola, part of state-owned Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa, presented the Ciężki Bojowy Wóz Piechoty (CBWP), or Heavy Infantry Fighting Vehicle, at the MSPO defense exhibition in Kielce, Poland, today. The vehicle, commonly referred to as Ratel (honey badger), is the latest step in a Polish effort to develop a heavily protected tracked combat platform that can complement the lighter, amphibious Borsuk (badger) infantry fighting vehicle.

“The demonstrator presented today confirms that Polish companies possess the expertise to design and develop advanced combat platforms that meet the demands of the modern battlefield,” Adam Leszkiewicz, president of PGZ’s management board, said during the unveiling.

OTO ON. CIĘŻKI BOJOWY WÓZ PIECHOTY.

Po dniach odliczania i pokazywania tylko fragmentów odsłaniamy najważniejszą premierę PGZ na #MSPO2026.

CBWP to nowa ciężka platforma opracowana przez Hutę Stalowa Wola – z wysokim poziomem ochrony, dużą mobilnością i siłą ognia… pic.twitter.com/kazs4ciGMj

— Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa (@PGZ_pl) September 8, 2026

At approximately 40 tons, the CBWP is about 12 tons heavier than the roughly 28-ton Borsuk (and adds an axle, for seven road wheels on each side), the result of a fundamental difference in design philosophy.

Borsuk was conceived as a relatively lightweight IFV able to operate alongside mechanized infantry while retaining the ability to swim. The CBWP instead prioritizes protection and battlefield survivability, placing it in the growing category of heavy IFVs being developed and operated by NATO countries and others.

The vehicle will have a three-person crew and carry up to eight infantrymen. Its primary role is to transport those troops safely into contested areas while providing direct fire support once they reach the objective.

The war in Ukraine has demonstrated how quickly armored vehicles can be exposed to anti-tank guided missiles, mines, artillery fragments, loitering munitions, and small drones. Even vehicles that survive direct attacks can be functionally disabled by damage to tracks, sensors, or external equipment.

A Ukrainian M2A2 Bradley engaging and damaging a Russian T-90M in a close-range fight. After a mission kill, the T-90M is subsequently finished by an FPV drone:

The Ukrainian Bradley IFV damaged the no-analogue russian T-90M "Breakthrough" in a close fight. Then an FPV drone finished this long-suffering tank.

Maybe, the T-90M tanks should be renamed into "Broken".

: 47th Mechanized Brigade pic.twitter.com/b3ShfqbTd9

— Defense of Ukraine (@DefenceU) January 13, 2024

While Ukraine has shown that armor is increasingly easy to find and attack, and thus less relevant, Warsaw is far from convinced that armored vehicles are now irrelevant, with multiple acquisition projects underway. However, Ukraine does change what these vehicles need to be able to do and how they must be employed to have a chance of survival. In certain circumstances, when properly concealed, dispersed, and integrated with counter-drone capabilities, armor is still seen as important for protected mobility and firepower by militaries around the globe.

According to PGZ, the CBWP’s design therefore puts considerable emphasis on survivability. It incorporates advanced ballistic and mine protection designed to meet relevant STANAG standards. It also uses specialized mine-resistant seats intended to reduce the effects of explosions beneath the hull.

The protection architecture can be supplemented by an active protection system (APS). If integrated on a production vehicle, such a system could provide another layer of defense against incoming anti-tank weapons, and potentially small drones, although PGZ has described the APS as an optional component rather than specifying a particular production configuration.

For detecting threats, the vehicle can employ laser-warning equipment including the OBRA-3 system, integrated with smoke grenade launchers. A laser warning can provide the crew with an indication that the vehicle has been illuminated by a rangefinder or targeting system, potentially allowing it to react before an anti-tank weapon is launched.

A video showing a test of the OBRA-3 protection system on a Polish Rosomak wheeled armored fighting vehicle, with a smoke screen being generated to blind hostile optics. The view is from the driver’s compartment:

The CBWP will also carry an integrated nuclear, biological, and chemical protection system, allowing the crew and embarked infantry to operate in contaminated environments.

Firepower comes from the ZSSW-30 remotely operated turret, one of the most important locally developed systems in Poland’s current armored vehicle modernization effort.

The turret is equipped with a 30mm cannon armed with programmable ammunition, plus Rafael Spike anti-tank guided missiles. Together, the weapons are intended to give the CBWP the ability to engage armored vehicles, infantry, and other battlefield targets while also providing a degree of capability against aerial threats. In particular, the programmable ammunition provides greater flexibility against different target types — such as drones — by allowing the projectile’s effects to be tailored to the engagement.

The inclusion of Spike missiles gives the vehicle an extended-range anti-armor option beyond the effective range of its automatic cannon. Much more than a traditional anti-tank guided missile, Spike provides an indirect-fire capability including the option to loiter over a particular area and search for targets, among other attributes.

The ZSSW-30 also gives Poland a degree of commonality across its growing fleet of modern armored vehicles, with the system already being introduced on Borsuk and on some Rosomak wheeled armored fighting vehicles.

The CBWP reflects a trend for fighting vehicles that blur the boundaries between traditional IFV and infantry-support concepts. It is expected to carry a relatively large infantry squad while possessing the sensors and weapons necessary to remain directly involved in combat alongside those troops. At the same time, its high level of protection makes for a notably large vehicle.

The new vehicle is just one part of Poland’s broader military modernization.

Warsaw has embarked on one of NATO’s most ambitious efforts to expand and modernize its ground forces, with major acquisitions of two different types of main battle tank, artillery, rocket systems, and infantry fighting vehicles. Poland is simultaneously expanding domestic production capacity, seeking to ensure that at least part of the equipment needed for a larger army can be produced and sustained within the country.

The Borsuk program is central to that effort and is intended to replace Poland’s aging Soviet-designed BWP-1 (the Polish version of the BMP-1).

The heavier CBWP offers even more capability, but its heavier weight comes with tradeoffs. It will be inherently less flexible than a lighter amphibious IFV, and more costly. In return, it will give Polish commanders another option for missions where survivability matters more than swimming capability or rapid deployment.

Such a vehicle would be particularly important for units operating in heavily contested areas, where the threat from mines, anti-tank weapons, and drones makes protection a higher priority. This provides some indication of what Polish planners expect a conflict with Russia on Europe’s eastern flank to look like. However, lessons from Ukraine show that, whatever its quality, an armored fighting vehicle will only be as survivable as the network and tactics around it.

Still, the CBWP remains some distance from operational service.

PGZ currently has one operational demonstrator, intended for factory trials. The company plans to subsequently construct two fully functional prototypes, with both expected to be ready in 2027.

Those vehicles will then undergo intensive testing with the Polish Armed Forces. The results could lead to changes in the protection architecture, turret integration, or other elements before a production configuration is finalized.

PGZ has indicated that it could be ready for production as early as 2029, but that timeline is not yet a firm procurement schedule. It will depend on the results of testing, any modifications required during development, and negotiations with the customer.

Poland has been reported to be considering a requirement for up to 700 CBWP vehicles. In addition, Poland has so far contracted for 257 Borsuk IFVs, with another roughly 1,000 Borsuk-family combat and specialized vehicles envisioned under a broader framework agreement.

If the program succeeds, Poland will ultimately field a highly capable two-tier tracked IFV force in which the CBWP equips units expected to operate in the most dangerous portions of the battlefield.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post This Is Poland’s New Heavy Infantry Fighting Vehicle appeared first on TWZ.

Russia is displaying some of its newest air-launched precision weapons in public for the first time at the El Alamein International Airshow in Egypt this week. The S-71K Kovyor and related S-71M Monokhrom, and the S8000 Banderol, reflect Russia’s effort to field larger numbers of relatively inexpensive standoff weapons alongside its more sophisticated and costly missile types. As such, their development and early employment are closely tied to the war in Ukraine, but they also reflect wider global interest in these kinds of weapons.

The weapons, seen in the tweet embedded below, comprise, clockwise from top left: S-71K Kovyor, an unknown smaller guided munition, S8000 Banderol, and S-71M Monokhrom:

Novel munitions for the Russian aircraft, on an expo. pic.twitter.com/L1UPTb8qhX

— krakek (@krakek1) September 6, 2026

For Russia, the requirement has become increasingly important as the war in Ukraine has evolved into a prolonged contest in which industrial capacity is as critical as technology. Russia has expended huge numbers of cruise and ballistic missiles against Ukrainian targets while also developing an enormous strike-drone campaign. At the same time, Ukrainian air defenses have become progressively more capable, forcing Moscow to use combinations of missiles, drones, decoys, and different flight profiles to penetrate or saturate the defensive network. One lesson is the fact that a weapon does not necessarily have to be as capable as a high-end cruise missile if it can be manufactured in much greater numbers and still present a credible threat to the target.

The S-71M, which TWZ previously reported on in detail after Ukrainian intelligence obtained an example, is a compact, turbojet-powered weapon with a distinctly angular airframe intended to reduce its radar signature. Imagery from Egypt gives a better look at its front end, including a faceted nose flowing into a broad central fuselage. The nose has at least one optically flat transparency for an infrared or TV seeker. Its wings are sharply swept and fold against the belly of the weapon for carriage, while the rear of the weapon terminates in an inverted-V tail arrangement. The overall shape is notably different from Russia’s more conventional cruise missiles of the past.

Ukrainian analysis found that the S-71M incorporates an OFAB-250-270 high-explosive fragmentation bomb as its warhead and relies primarily on inertial guidance, rather than carrying a sophisticated terminal seeker, although the seeker window raises questions about that.

Ukrainian intelligence also described its construction as being relatively straightforward, with fiberglass composite material making up much of the outer structure and no evidence identified of specialized radar-absorbing coatings.

As we noted previously, the weapon appears intended as a less expensive, but still survivable standoff weapon option that can be produced in significant numbers.

The S-71M has been tested from the Su-57 Felon fighter, also present at El Alamein. In a press release, the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC), responsible for the Su-57, said that the S-71M and the S-71K displayed alongside it “were designed for fifth-generation fighters,” although there is no reason why they couldn’t be launched from a wide variety of platforms.

A Su-57 performing at El Alamein, with one of its main internal weapons bays apparently loaded with Kh-69 standoff missiles:

T-50-9 in El-Alamein, opening both main weapon bays. Two, presumably, Kh-69 can be seen in the front one.

Source: @ T汪汪T pic.twitter.com/f6csKc6Y9D

— George N. (@GeorgeN28581) September 8, 2026

Regardless of launch platform, the nature of the war in Ukraine makes the S-71M particularly useful. Russia has increasingly relied on extemporized glide bombs for attacks against targets relatively close to the front, but those weapons require the launching aircraft to operate within a certain distance of Ukrainian defenses. At least in their earlier iterations, such weapons were also crude and prone to failure. Longer-range cruise missiles offer considerably greater standoff but are more complex and expensive. The S-71M sits somewhere between those categories, providing an air-launched, powered weapon with a relatively large warhead and some degree of low observability without the cost and complexity of a full-size, truly stealthy cruise missile.

The S-71K appears to represent a more capable version of the basic concept. Public information remains limited, but the weapon has been associated with electro-optical guidance and greater onboard processing, potentially giving it a capability to deal with targets in a more flexible manner than the largely pre-programmed S-71M. Exactly how that capability is employed, and how autonomous the weapon actually is, remain less clear from the imagery and information released to date.

As displayed at El Alamein, the S-71K retains the overall faceted, low-observable appearance of the S-71M but has a visibly different airframe and wing arrangement. Its body is notably broad and compact relative to its length, with folding wings that are relatively thick, and a more refined inverted-V tail giving it more the appearance of a small uncrewed aircraft than a conventional air-to-surface missile.

Meanwhile, the Banderol represents a somewhat different path to the same general problem. Ukraine’s intelligence service previously obtained and analyzed an example of the small jet-powered cruise missile, which TWZ reported on last year. The weapon is considerably smaller than Russia’s principal cruise missiles and has been associated with launch from drones and helicopters. Its reported range of around 500 kilometers (311 miles) and relatively small warhead make it something of a complementary system intended to provide another, more economical way of putting a precision weapon onto a target from the air.

In terms of its appearance, the Banderol is more conventionally missile-like, with an ogival central fuselage, a pointed nose, and sharply swept folding wings. Its proportions underline just how small it is compared with Russia’s better-known air-launched cruise missiles.

The Banderol is particularly relevant in the context of the economics of the Ukraine conflict. Russian forces have increasingly used combinations of relatively inexpensive one-way attack drones and more expensive cruise and ballistic missiles. The drones can be produced in large numbers and used to complicate air-defense operations, while the more capable missiles provide greater speed, range, payload, or penetration capability. A small turbojet-powered weapon such as Banderol offers another point on that spectrum.

At least one image has recently emerged showing a Banderol carried by a Russian Mi-28NM Havoc attack helicopter. This would be in line with unconfirmed reports from Ukraine last month that Russia was using the Mi-28 as an additional launch platform for the weapon, including firing them from over the Sea of Azov to attack targets around Odesa.

An S8000 “Banderol” (“Dan-T”) small cruise missile mounted on a Russian Mi-28NM attack helicopter. pic.twitter.com/Xcx3MmFK3B

— OSINTWarfare (@OSINTWarfare) September 6, 2026

Its reported use also illustrates how the distinction between a cruise missile and a large one-way attack drone is becoming increasingly blurred. The Banderol incorporates a conventional missile-like airframe and jet propulsion but has been associated with drone operations and makes extensive use of commercially available components. TWZ’s earlier examination of the weapon also highlighted the extent to which modern Russian weapons programs can combine relatively simple airframes with foreign-sourced electronics and propulsion technology.

Russia has revealed an Orion (Inokhodets) UAV carrying the S8000 Banderol air-launched cruise missile, marking the clearest Russian footage yet of the weapon integrated with the drone. #Russia #Orion #CruiseMissile #Defense pic.twitter.com/yLHb7h1oW9

— Drone Wars (@Drone_Wars_) July 13, 2026

Likely Banderol loitering munition on the ground (perspective exaggerates it's size) and under Orion drone.

Banderol has been reported as one of the munition used in recent strikes and appears to use a jet engine and a FAB-100 warhead or similar. pic.twitter.com/j50DUsNuVe

— krakek (@krakek1) April 27, 2025

Seen together at El Alamein, the three weapons provide an unusually useful snapshot of where Russian air-launched strike development is heading. They are presented alongside a fourth, so-far unidentified munition. This unnamed weapon is notably short and fat, with a cruciform tail, and an optical window in the nose. Its overall size and shape suggest it may have been developed specifically to arm drones.

The appearance of the weapons at an arms fair underscores the fact that Russia is not the only country confronting the problem of producing and fielding sufficient precision weapons at an acceptable cost. The growing interest in lower-cost cruise missiles, loitering munitions, attritable aircraft, and other forms of expendable precision strike is now evident well beyond Russia.

Russia is also clearly trying to make these weapons harder to intercept, an increasingly important consideration as Ukrainian air defenses have demonstrated an ability to shoot down even glide bombs in some circumstances. The S-71K in particular incorporates unusually pronounced low-observable shaping, suggesting that survivability was also a central requirement from the outset.

There is, however, a significant complication to Russia’s attempt to turn its wartime experience into an export opportunity. Buying any kind of weapons from Moscow has become considerably more difficult because of sanctions, restrictions on access to foreign technology and financing, and the wider political risks associated with maintaining a Russian defense relationship. Those factors matter just as much to a prospective customer as the performance of the weapon itself.

Author’s note: earlier reporting on the S-71 family appears to have transposed the S-71K and S-71M versions. Most authoritative accounts now indicate that the more refined, more stealthy version is the S-71K Kovyor (meaning carpet), while the simpler weapon is the S-71M Monokhrom.

Update, September 9:

Rostec, the Russian state-owned defense conglomerate, has provided more details of the weapon identified at El Alamein as the Banderol. Rostec calls this weapon the ‘Dan-T’ loitering munition, which is an export designation for Banderol.

According to Rostec:

The ‘Dan-T’ munition operates on a ‘fire-and-forget’ principle and is adapted for launch from Russian and foreign aircraft and helicopters. The munition is equipped with a compact jet engine and can strike targets at a range of hundreds of kilometers. The ‘Dan-T’ features a special flight mode designed to evade enemy air defence systems.

Rostec adds that the Dan-T has been combat-tested in the war in Ukraine, where it claims there have been “hundreds of successful launches” against enemy targets in the Special Military Operation zone. “We expect this munition to attract widespread interest from foreign customers,” said Rostec.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Russia’s New Stealthy Lower-Cost Air-Launched Standoff Weapons On Display In Egypt appeared first on TWZ.

New imagery appearing out of China provides the best look yet at one of the country’s most enigmatic aircraft: the very large, low-observable, flying-wing drone widely referred to as the WZ-X. Seen previously primarily in satellite imagery, TWZ broke the story of the existence of this monster high-altitude, long-endurance drone. The new views that emerged today help clear up one of the most puzzling aspects of the aircraft’s appearance, namely the unusual shape of its enormous wings.

The aircraft was first identified in satellite imagery collected in May 2025 showing the People’s Liberation Army Air Force’s (PLAAF) sprawling test facility at Malan in Xinjiang. At the time, it was difficult to determine whether some of the apparent discontinuities in the wing planform were genuine features, visual countermeasures, or artifacts of the imagery.

The new photograph, seen at the top of the article and below, as well as a new satellite image, shows that the aircraft has a broader-chord inner wing section that transitions into a substantially narrower outer section. Rather than tapering continuously from the center section toward the tips, the wing effectively becomes much more slender over its outer portion in a ‘step down’-like fashion. The resulting planform gives the aircraft an exceptionally long, narrow outer wing. The wing arrangement differs from the B-2 and other stealthy flying wing designs because it has two outer wing sections, in addition to its diamond-like central fuselage, instead of just one.

We still can’t say for sure if this feature is just the way the aircraft’s wing was designed or if it also is due to some other exotic feature, such as wing folding or removable outboard sections. While a more novel explanation is possible, it is somewhat improbable at this point.

Seen from behind, the aircraft has a relatively shallow central fuselage section, with extremely long wings extending outward from it. The landing gear is extended, revealing large main undercarriage doors and substantial landing gear consistent with an aircraft of this size. Split rudders are visible toward the outer wing areas, broadly reminiscent of those used on the B-2.

As in previous imagery, the rear of the center section of the aircraft may also reveal slot-like exhaust openings, supporting the assessment that it is twin-engined.

For an aircraft intended to spend long periods operating at high altitude, a very long overall span combined with a relatively narrow outer wing could be advantageous. Such an arrangement would increase effective aspect ratio and reduce induced drag during efficient cruise, potentially improving endurance and high-altitude performance.

It may also allow the designers to concentrate structural mass and internal volume closer to the center of the aircraft while still achieving a very large span.

There is a potential low-observable tradeoff, however. A significant change in chord introduces additional planform geometry and potential edge-alignment discontinuities that must be reconciled with the requirements of a stealth aircraft. The transition will influence radar reflections depending on its precise shape, orientation, and relationship to the aircraft’s other edges and surfaces. This will also be highly dependent on the aspect the radar is viewing the aircraft from. Modern very low observable designs try to minimize these exact types of features, with large continuous structures being the most advantageous to radar signature. This philosophy can be seen in the design of the B-21’s planform, which was also how the B-2 was supposed to look originally. You can read all about this here.

Regardless, the WZ-X does indeed have a semi-sawtooth trailing edge due to this intriguing feature.

The overall scale of the aircraft is also becoming increasingly apparent. Our initial analysis of satellite imagery put its wingspan at approximately 170 feet, roughly comparable to the 172-foot span of the B-2. That would make it considerably larger than other Chinese flying-wing drones identified to date.

Andreas Rupprecht, an analyst specializing in Chinese military aviation and TWZ contributor, assesses that the WZ-X is likely a twin-engined design similar in configuration to the supposed U.S. RQ-180, but considerably larger.

Rupprecht estimates a length of approximately 46 feet. He also assesses the aircraft as having a relatively spacious central fuselage and a dorsal satellite communications antenna. His estimates of a range exceeding 12,000 miles and a normal cruising altitude of somewhere between 59,000 and 66,000 feet remain unconfirmed.

The WZ-X is notably different from China’s smaller flying-wing designs. The CH-7, for example, has a deeper and more curved center section and is substantially smaller. The WZ-X’s broad, relatively flattened center body and enormous span instead appear particularly compatible with high-altitude endurance.

Its apparent configuration also makes a long-duration surveillance mission plausible. The central body and inner wing section would provide substantial space for fuel, sensors, and communications systems, while the outer wing, combined with its lifting central body, could support highly efficient flight at high altitude.

A low-observable platform of this size could potentially conduct many types of wide-area surveillance and networking assistance while operating in or very near contested airspace where conventional high-altitude UAVs would face greater risks. A strike capability cannot be ruled out, particularly given China’s broader development of combat-capable flying-wing UCAVs, but the aircraft’s proportions appear especially well suited to persistence and reconnaissance.

While the location of the latest imagery is unconfirmed, Malan has developed into a massive center for Chinese drone testing, with satellite imagery showing extensive expansion of its infrastructure in recent years. The facility has been associated with multiple flying-wing designs, including the WZ-X and the similarly mysterious and also very large GJ-X. This substantially different flying-wing aircraft with a cranked-kite planform is also undergoing flight testing. That aircraft is estimated to have a wingspan of around 137 feet, underscoring the breadth of China’s experimentation with large low-observable uncrewed aircraft.

China is pursuing tailless/flying-wing designs across an increasingly wide range of sizes and missions, alongside larger crewed aircraft programs including the J-36 and J-XDS and, eventually, the H-20 stealth bomber.

The WZ-X appears to be part of a much broader effort to develop highly integrated, low-observable aircraft optimized for different combinations of range, endurance, payload, and survivability.

For now, its official designation, manufacturer, propulsion system, performance, and intended mission remain unknown.

However, its configuration appears well suited to the requirements of a very large high-altitude endurance aircraft, although the trade-off between its performance and its stealth characteristics remains equally mysterious.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post China’s Huge WZ-X Stealth Drone’s Strange Wing Configuration Confirmed appeared first on TWZ.

Ukrainian crews operating Australian-supplied M1A1 Abrams tanks say the battlefield has become so saturated with Russian drones that their tanks cannot currently be used in combat, but they reject the idea that main battle tanks have become forever obsolete.

Since receiving these tanks last year, the crews, serving with Ukraine’s 425th Separate Assault Regiment “Skala,” have used the Abrams in two combat operations in the fight for Pokrovsk, a key Ukrainian logistics hub and part of a defensive belt of towns in Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk region. They recounted their experiences to Hromadske, an independent media channel in Ukraine.

Fighting around Pokrovsk

The first major deployment described by the crews took place in December of last year, when Abrams tanks were used to support assault groups entering Pokrovsk.

The crewmember with the callsign Kent described moving into the city behind a mine-clearing tank and ahead of two infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) carrying assault troops, during a mission that was deliberately aggressive.

“Since a tank is a priority target — my task was to draw their attention, while our infantry dismounted and moved in successfully.”

The Abrams was also assigned three target points to engage along the route.

“We went right in there, poured it on, and drove back out,” he recalled.

A video showing the 425th Separate Assault Regiment in action in August 2025, soon after receiving the Abrams:

The second operation, on March 31, involved an attempt to enter and hold an industrial area near Pokrovsk to help block Russian movement toward Hryshyne, a contested village in the district.

The operation was prepared for more than two weeks. Ukrainian forces conducted reconnaissance flights, examined difficult sections of the planned routes, and provided crews with extensive video and imagery.

“They knew every meter of the route,” another of the unit’s commanders, with the callsign Kubik, said.

Weather was considered essential. The Ukrainians waited for fog and rain, hoping to limit the effectiveness of Russian drones.

“Without the right weather we wouldn’t have been able to pull off operations like that,” Kubik said.

The operation nevertheless resulted in the destruction of four out of five armored vehicles, some of which are seen in the video embedded below.

Russia's Rubicon Drone Center FPV drones destroyed a Ukrainian assault group near Pokrovsk, hitting an M1A1 Abrams tank, M1117 APC and BMP-2 as the unit tried to advance near Hryshyne under fog cover. #Ukraine pic.twitter.com/ZzE52qAYxp

— NOELREPORTS (@NOELreports) April 1, 2026

The commander acknowledged that the Russian side may have had advance knowledge of the operation.

“I can’t rule out the possibility that the enemy knew our plan,” he said.

His Abrams was not immediately destroyed. According to the crew, it completed its task and the assault troops dismounted before the weather changed.

“Once the fog lifted, they started working on it with an FPV drone,” the commander said.

Why use tanks at all?

The losses prompted criticism from Ukrainian military commentators, particularly after footage of the destroyed vehicles was published.

However, the crews defend the decision to use armored vehicles for the missions. According to the men of the Skala interviewed, the alternative was often to send infantry over several miles on foot while carrying weapons, ammunition, water, and other supplies.

“That takes more time,” Kubik explained. “And the enemy isn’t standing still — the enemy is moving toward them.”

Australia-supplied M1A1 Abrams AIM main battle tank in service of the Ukrainian 425th Separate Assault Regiment "Skala."

The tanks of such type recently saw combat in the area of Pokrovsk. pic.twitter.com/qhjSyGbhH6

— Status-6 (War & Military News) (@Archer83Able) December 23, 2025

The argument that infantry could simply move more stealthily on foot also has limitations.

“Every day the Mavic drones are flying, the fixed-wing drones are flying,” he said. “No fog, guys are visible.”

Combined with IFVs, the Abrams can provide the ability to rapidly move troops while simultaneously delivering heavy direct fire against enemy positions and offering substantial protection to its crew.

The crews argue that this capability remains worthwhile even when the tank itself may eventually be lost.

One commander was asked whether deploying a roughly $5-million tank makes sense if a single sortie can result in its destruction.

“Yes, of course it makes sense to deploy it,” he replied.

“First and foremost — it saves the lives of the crew inside it.”

Russian forces captured a relatively lightly damaged M1A1SA Abrams main battle tank operated by the 47th Separate Mechanized Brigade in the Pokrovsk direction.

The tank is equipped with added cage armor, as well as Kontakt and ARAT ERA. pic.twitter.com/mHyKk1xNRY

— Status-6 (War & Military News) (@Archer83Able) October 27, 2024

A tank under attack by drones

The Ukrainian crews repeatedly highlighted the Abrams’ accuracy and survivability.

“What are the biggest advantages of the Abrams?” Kent was asked.

“Accuracy.”

Its biggest disadvantage, he said, is equally obvious on a modern battlefield: “It’s very tall — and very large — so it’s hard to conceal.”

A video showing a U.S.-supplied Abrams under attack from Russian FPV drones:

An Abrams tank withstands 9 FPV drones hits. Eventually, the tank was destroyed, but the tank crew successfully survived. pic.twitter.com/4NBKdg2zmW

— PS01 □ (@PStyle0ne1) July 7, 2024

Kent described surviving an engagement in which his tank was struck repeatedly while on the move.

“More than 20 drones hit me,” he said of one operation into Pokrovsk.

He attributed the Abrams’ survival to the combination of its armor and additional anti-drone protection fitted to the vehicle.

“All of it together is effective,” he said.

He pointed to fairly basic modifications including rubber strips and a foldable wire cage mounted on the turret, as additional layers of protection against drone attacks.

“A drone doesn’t hit the actual penetrating element directly — it just can’t reach it,” he explained. “It hits the rubber, and then the blast wave travels from there.”

Even with their tanks festooned with explosive reactive armor (ERA) bricks, the crews acknowledge that such protection has limits.

US-supplied M1A1 Abrams tank in service of the Armed Forces of Ukraine with added Kontakt-1 ERA on the frontal hull and standard ARAT ERA on the sides. pic.twitter.com/PC2kDfxefO

— Status-6 (War & Military News) (@Archer83Able) May 21, 2024

Kent also noted that the Abrams was still missing the ‘hedgehog’-type protective coverings that have been seen on Russian tanks.

“They also protect very well. An effective thing,” he said.

For now, the drone threat has led the regiment to keep its Abrams out of combat, as we will return to later.

The Abrams as a machine

The crews’ assessment of the Abrams included praise for its mobility, roomy interior, gun, and fire-control system.

Kubik said he had personally driven an Abrams to 50 miles per hour cross-country.

“The engine is an absolute beast,” he added.

The tank can also rapidly perform a pivot turn, which the crews consider particularly useful when maneuvering in confined spaces. Despite its prodiguous weight, it only rarely becomes bogged down after the kind of very heavy snow-melt that effects all vehicles on the battlefield.

Loading a 120mm M1028 canister cartridge into an M1A1 AIM Abrams main battle tank of the tank battalion of the 425th Assault Regiment. pic.twitter.com/tMd8QcROQe

— 𝔗𝔥𝔢 𝕯𝔢𝔞𝔡 𝕯𝔦𝔰𝔱𝔯𝔦𝔠𝔱 (@TheDeadDistrict) June 21, 2026

Its disadvantages include its demanding maintenance requirements. The running gear was described as particularly sensitive, with crews inspecting, lubricating, and replacing components after every sortie.

Fuel consumption is another major burden. The crew cited roughly 400 to 700 liters (106 to 185 gallons) per 100 kilometers (62 miles) depending on terrain and operating conditions.

“On asphalt it burns about 400 liters,” one said. In boggy terrain, consumption can reach “700 liters or more.”

The Abrams thirsty gas turbine engine and extreme logistical demands have always been a criticism of the platform.

The crews said the vehicle’s ability to operate on different fuels is useful, although diesel provides the best engine-hour performance in their experience. Prior to delivery, the gas turbine engines of the tanks were reconfigured to use diesel fuel instead of the standard JP-8 aviation kerosene, according to earlier reports.

They also praised the Abrams’ protected ammunition storage and crew space compared with Soviet-designed tanks.

The version operated by the Ukrainians is an M1A1 rather than the latest Abrams configuration, with less sophisticated electronics than newer variants. It also lacks the classified armor found on its U.S. Army counterpart.

“For me — as a tanker — this configuration, what we have right now, is more than enough,” Kubik said. “The sight is absolutely excellent. The gun is also great.”

Abrams destroys a house with Russian infantry in the Pokrovsk direction. pic.twitter.com/StUoZoMTO3

— MAKS 26 (@Maks_NAFO_FELLA) August 25, 2024

Waiting for a solution to the drone problem

The interview ultimately presents a more complicated picture than the declaration that tanks are obsolete on the Ukrainian battlefield.

At the time of writing, at least 25 Abrams have been confirmed visually to have been destroyed, damaged, or abandoned in Ukrainian service. This is from a total of 31 provided by the United States and 49 from Australia.

“For now, we’re not using them further — there’s no way to,” Kubik said. “The enemy has developed their drone component very heavily, and for now we don’t have the means to counter that.”

While tanks remain exceptionally powerful direct-fire and protected mobility platforms, the proliferation of inexpensive uncrewed aircraft has made operating them increasingly difficult.

M1A1 AIM Abrams tanks of the 425th Assault Regiment .
The reinforced upper glacis and turret roofs are clearly visible. pic.twitter.com/Sn9h8OWZ9P

— 𝔗𝔥𝔢 𝕯𝔢𝔞𝔡 𝕯𝔦𝔰𝔱𝔯𝔦𝔠𝔱 (@TheDeadDistrict) June 21, 2026

“If someone had told me, as a tanker, back in 2022: ‘Take this — we’re giving you an Abrams, we’ll give you time to train and you’ll fight in it,’” Kubik said, “I would never have climbed out of it.”

“I’d only be saying: ‘Bring me shells. I’ll drive non-stop wherever needed, arrive and work.’”

As it stands, reconnaissance drones can find the Abrams, FPV drones can attack it, and persistent surveillance makes concealment difficult. Experience has shown that without more effective counter-drone capabilities, even a heavily protected tank can eventually be overwhelmed.

But Kubik believes that will change.

“The day will come when one of our bright minds figures out some excellent solution against drones — and we’ll start using them again.”

Asked whether the era of tanks is over, his answer was unequivocal.

“It’s not over … They’re just waiting it out for now, biding their time. Writing off tanks — in my opinion — is still too early.”

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post How Russian Drones Forced Ukraine To Park Its M1 Abrams Tanks appeared first on TWZ.

The first F-15EX Eagle II destined for permanent assignment at Kadena Air Base in Okinawa departed Boeing’s St. Louis, Missouri, facility on August 28, 2026. The aircraft left St. Louis for the 142nd Wing at Portland Air National Guard Base, Oregon, where it will undergo final staging and integration preparations before its eventual deployment to the sprawling Okinawa installation it will call home. The Oregon unit is acting as a coordination and preperation unit for the 18th Wing, a function you can read more about in our interview with the wing’s commander.

This departure represents a critical, long-awaited milestone for the 18th Wing, which has been working toward the permanent stationing of the service’s most advanced Eagle variant to replace its now-withdrawn F-15C/D fleet. The arrival of the F-15EX in Japan, expected to begin in fiscal year 2027, which begins on October 1, 2026, will be a central pillar in the Air Force’s modernization of tactical airpower in the Indo-Pacific region.

EXciting progress for F-15EX!

We've delivered the 22nd F-15EX to the @usairforce. The aircraft will be the first F-15EX destined for @KadenaAirBase in Japan. pic.twitter.com/RlrTKuCCFl

— Boeing Defense (@BoeingDefense) September 3, 2026

“This is an important next step toward bringing the F-15EX home to Kadena,” said Brig. Gen. John Gallemore, 18th Wing commander, in an Air Force release. “Our team is ready to welcome the F-15EX, and this is another milestone that brings us closer to putting this capability in the hands of the airmen who will fly, maintain and employ it from Japan.”

The first F-15EX for Kadena’s 18th Wing, serial 22-0022, was noted flying test sorties from St. Louis in early August, initially in primer paint. By the middle of the month its was flying with its full livery, including the famous “ZZ” tail code.

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The F-15EX is a significant jump in capability over the legacy Eagles. With modernized avionics, flight controls, an expanded electronic warfare suite, and increased weapons carriage — as well as potentially new and longer-reaching weapons — the jet is well-suited to operating in the vast Western Pacific. As Kadena prepares for the permanent arrival, the 18th Wing plans to integrate the EX with regional allies, including the Japan Air Self-Defense Force, building upon existing bilateral training exercises.

Two active-duty squadrons of F-15EXs are set to be established at Kadena, taking the place of units previously based there that had flown F-15Cs. The Air Force has been deploying F-15Es, F-22s and other fighters to the base on a rotational basis to fill the gap in the meantime.

The F-15EX will give U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific a high-capacity platform that complements the fifth-generation F-22 and F-35. With its ability to carry large air-to-air and air-to-surface payloads, the Eagle II can serve as a long-range “missile truck,” extending the reach and firepower of stealth aircraft operating closer to contested airspace. Its open-architecture systems also allow it to incorporate new sensors, weapons, and electronic warfare capabilities more readily than the aging F-15C/D fleet.

The aircraft’s value is also tied to its role in networked operations. Exercises such as Valiant Shield have demonstrated how the F-15EX can work with uncrewed aircraft like the  MQ-28 Ghost Bat, pointing toward mixed formations in which crewed fighters provide weapons, sensing, and command-and-control capacity for autonomous wingmen. Operating from strategic locations such as Kadena, the Eagle II could help the Air Force generate more combat power across the vast Pacific while reducing the burden on its limited number of stealth fighters.

Kadena will become the second Air Force location with combat-coded F-15EX aircraft, following the Oregon Air National Guard’s 142nd Wing.

The Air Force has previously announced plans to stand up National Guard F-15EX squadrons in California, Louisiana, and Michigan. Most recently, the Air Force announced plans to put F-15EX fighters at Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, North Carolina, to replace older F-15E Strike Eagle jets that will move to Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri.

While the movement of this first Kadena-bound F-15EX is a positive step, the wider Eagle II program is currently navigating some issues. According to a new Pentagon selected acquisition report released in August, the Air Force’s decision to aggressively expand its F-15EX fleet from 129 to 267 jets — intended to recapitalize the older F-15E force — has introduced substantial cost and schedule uncertainties that officials are now scrambling to manage.

The report warns that the extended acquisition strategy, which shifted from eight production lots to 12, will require Boeing to execute a “major technical refresh” to combat diminishing manufacturing sources and material shortages. As systems like the radar, mission computer, and engines face potential obsolescence over the now-lengthened production timeline, the service faces what the report characterizes as a “significant redesign effort.” Program managers are planning to mitigate these risks by integrating upgrades through operational flight program releases scheduled between 2031 and 2035, a strategy they describe as a “structured, risk-reduced pathway” to avoid production line gaps.

Compounding these technical challenges are tangible production delays, largely stemming from a labor strike at the St. Louis plant from August to November 2025. The report notes that these are “unrecoverable delays,” forcing a cascading schedule slip. While Boeing was contracted to deliver all 12 jets from Lot 3 by early 2026, the company will only be able to field half of those by the end of the year. This has directly impacted the timeline for the Kadena deployment, which was originally envisioned for earlier in 2026, and has left the Air Force relying on “bridging strategies” and rotations to cover operational requirements until the Eagle IIs can fully stand up in Okinawa.

The Pentagon is now moving toward an aggressive production ramp-up, tasking Boeing to hit a rate of two jets per month. Keeping the F-15EX schedule on track will be a challenge, however, requiring successfully navigating ongoing parts shortages for critical systems, all while balancing the needs of foreign military sales customers who are also integrated into the supply chain.

For the 18th Wing, the arrival of the first F-15EX will bring a major advance in capabilities in a part of the world that needs them badly. At the same time, the program’s overall trajectory suggests that the wider transition to the new Eagle will come with some complex logistical and industrial challenges.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

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