The 2026 Asian Games in Japan drew to a close on October 4 following two weeks of competition between 45 countries and territories across 43 sports. Despite the official slogan “Imagine One Asia,” fragmented regional politics came to the fore as the event unfolded. Just days before the games officially began, tensions between Japan and […]
It was poor old Greece who drew the short straw. It chairs the UN Security Council this month and it’s fallen to them to chair the Council’s extra-sticky deliberations this coming Thursday on whether—as the United States is proposing—to extend the arms embargo on Sudan to the whole of the country.
If the current embargo, currently covering Darfur, is of any practical effect, that would be in favour the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF); their supply lines are easier. That would change under a countrywide embargo, and the regime led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan naturally argue that the proposed extension would deny a ‘sovereign government’ a right to defend its people, its borders, and its own existence.
But the issue isn’t whether Sudan has a right to exist or to protect civilians. It is whether the combatants who have made Sudan ungovernable should continue to receive external military support without meaningful restraints. The answer, say the United States, the United Kingdom and France, must be no. However, fortunately for Burhan, it’s a da from Russia and a semi-da and a raised eyebrow from China, neither of whom are especially squeamish about aggressive population control measures.
So if the pro-extensionists are to make any headway on a countrywide UN arms embargo, they are going to have to make, and carry the day on, some fine distinctions.
To begin with, a countrywide embargo would not settle the question of who represents Sudan at the United Nations. But it would recognise that neither the SAF nor the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) should enjoy an unlimited licence to import the means to continue a ruinous civil war.
There is an important distinction between a state’s standing in the UN and the rights claimed by those who temporarily wield power within that state. Sudan remains a member state. It has a seat in the General Assembly. Burhan and his minions continue turning up and claiming to speak in Sudan’s name.
None of that would necessarily change in the face of an arms embargo extending across the whole of Sudan. The Security Council would not be making a determination regarding Burhan’s or the SAF’s legitimacy. Recognition, credentials, representation—these are all distinct matters decided elsewhere and by other means.
The Council’s job is something else. It’s not dealing with constitutional niceties; it’s dealing with the life and death issues of international peace and security. If weapons are feeding a conflict and threatening civilians in a territory or state, it can restrict the transfer of arms to that state or territory without stripping it of its international legal personality. Sanctions are not derecognition. What they do recognise is that in some circumstances, stopping the bloodshed take precedence over any right to buy arms.
A nationwide embargo would establish at least this much: that the SAF and the RSF are both belligerents. The SAF may be commanded by General Burhan and presently in control of the state’s formal institutions; the RSF may be a paramilitary force with its own commercial interests, territorial ambitions and record of atrocities. But neither distinction entitles either side to decide Sudan’s future at gunpoint. According to the UN Charter we are not supposed to be living in a world where political legitimacy is determined by the military power at your disposal.
The SAF’s claim to sovereignty cannot mean an unconstrained right to acquire weapons while the country is being torn apart. The RSF’s local control, meanwhile, cannot be converted into international entitlement by force, atrocity or the occupation of territory. Both forces are armed parties to a conflict. Both draw sustenance from external supplies. Both have strong incentives to believe that, if they can secure the next shipment, the next drone or the next patron, a military decision remains possible.
It’s this kind of calculation that the Security Council has to disrupt.
All that said, an embargo alone can’t bring peace. Sudan needs a ceasefire now, with humanitarian access protected, credible monitoring of violations and a civilian-led political process that gives Sudanese people — not rival generals — the authority to determine their country’s future.
But if both sides believe more arms may tilt the balance then a ceasefire becomes harder to achieve. An embargo changes that calculation. It increases the cost and risk of resupply, makes foreign sponsors more visible, and tells commanders that time is no longer automatically on the side of whichever force can secure a fresh consignment.
That is why this measure matters. It’s nowhere near a magic bullet but it would at least narrow the military options of the SAF and RSF alike, improve the prospects for a ceasefire, and more create political space for civilians to reclaim their state.
Two merchant vessels have been attacked by aerial and maritime drones in Bulgaria’s exclusive economic zone in the Black Sea, sinking one ship and forcing the evacuation of another. The incident follows a deadly attack on a grain carrier off Romania a day earlier and has prompted concern over the growing risks to civilian shipping close to EU and NATO territory.
Two commercial vessels were struck by drones in Bulgaria’s exclusive economic zone early on Tuesday, 6 October, in the first known attack of its kind on merchant shipping in Bulgarian waters.
The Togo-flagged ALFA WATAN suffered severe structural damage and sank, while the Palau-flagged ABLE caught fire. Bulgarian Prime Minister Rumen Radev said the vessels were attacked at around 3am by both aerial and maritime drones about 70 nautical miles east of the coastal town of Byala. The Bulgarian government said a search-and-rescue operation was continuing for the crew of the ALFA WATAN, whose fate remained unknown.
All 18 people aboard the ABLE were rescued after abandoning the burning vessel. The Bulgarian-flagged passenger and freight ferry DIOSCURIA was diverted to the area and initially took the crew on board before Bulgarian Navy and Border Police vessels transferred them towards Varna.
The crew comprised 11 Turkish and seven Indian nationals. Two sailors were taken to hospital, including an Indian crew member suffering from burns and the Turkish captain, who sustained a head injury. Bulgarian public broadcaster BNT reported that the remaining 16 sailors subsequently arrived safely in Varna for medical checks.
The ABLE was reportedly carrying grain towards Istanbul. The cargo aboard the ALFA WATAN, which had been heading north towards Romania, has not been officially established.
Radev convened an emergency meeting involving the ministries of defence, interior, transport and environment, alongside the presidency and Bulgaria’s security services. He described the attack as an unacceptable violation of international and maritime law and warned of its effect on commercial navigation in the Black Sea.
Bulgarian authorities have not publicly identified who launched the drones. Investigations are examining both the weapons used and the circumstances surrounding the attack. One rescued Turkish sailor told Bulgarian television that he believed the ABLE had been hit by a Russian underwater drone, but that account has not been independently established and Sofia has made no formal attribution.
Foreign Minister Velislava Petrova said Bulgaria was in contact with its European and NATO partners and described Black Sea security as inseparable from wider European security. She said civilian crews and freedom of navigation must be protected and that Bulgaria would work with its allies to assess the wider consequences for maritime security.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen also condemned attacks against civilian shipping, saying the situation in the Black Sea was becoming increasingly concerning. She said commercial vessels and their crews were being targeted as investigations continued into the latest incidents.
Tuesday’s attack came less than 24 hours after another commercial vessel caught fire and sank in Romania’s exclusive economic zone. The Turkish-owned Royad Mammadov, sailing under the flag of Saint Kitts and Nevis, had left the Ukrainian Danube port of Izmail carrying corn for Ravenna in Italy.
Romanian authorities confirmed that two people died and 11 crew members were rescued. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said the vessel had been struck by two Russian drones, although Romanian authorities did not themselves publicly attribute the incident to Russia.
The distinction between territorial waters and an exclusive economic zone remains important. The attacks occurred outside Bulgaria’s territorial sea and therefore do not amount simply to an attack on Bulgarian territory. They nevertheless took place in an area where Bulgaria has internationally recognised economic rights and responsibilities, including search-and-rescue and environmental obligations.
The immediate concern for Sofia is the search for the missing crew of the ALFA WATAN and the possibility of pollution from the wreck. The wider concern for the EU is the increasingly exposed position of civilian shipping routes linking Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey.
With merchant ships now struck in the economic zones of both Romania and Bulgaria on consecutive days, Black Sea maritime security has moved further onto the agenda of EU and NATO governments along the western coast.
Gulf oil flows excluding Iran surged to over 81% of pre-war levels in September, data showed, led by a recovery in Saudi exports despite attacks on the kingdom's oil infrastructure and escalating Iranian attacks on regional shipping, while Iranian exports fell to zero due to a US blockade.
Iran’s economic adaptation over decades, marked by domestic production, regional trade and Asian partnerships, is on course to thwart Washington’s economic terrorism.
US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s prediction that Iran’s economy would soon collapse underscores the depth of delusion within the current American leadership.
“Iran is absolutely not sanctionable,” Deputy Economy Minister Mortaza Zamanian said this week as Tehran worked to keep trade flowing despite Washington’s latest sanctions campaign.
Zamanian cited Iran’s extensive borders, established commercial routes and longstanding trading relationships, saying that they make it impossible for external pressure simply to switch off the country’s economy.
His remarks came as Washington intensified its economic terrorism against Iranian oil, shipping, aviation, finance, technology and foreign companies supporting those sectors.
The new American campaign has been accompanied by extraordinary predictions from senior American officials, including Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s claim that Iran could have “nothing left to trade” within two weeks.
Speaking on September 27, Bessent claimed that Iran would probably make its final oil deliveries to China within two weeks, after which, he asserted, “they will have nothing.”
That prediction deserves comparison with history, because American administrations have imposed increasingly severe sanctions on Iran since 1979 while repeatedly expecting economic pressure eventually to produce collapse.
Yet the economy did not disappear, and Iran instead developed domestic industries, expanded regional commerce, strengthened trade with Asian powers and accumulated extensive experience operating outside Western financial channels.
The proposition that an economy which has absorbed American sanctions for almost half a century will suddenly disintegrate within two weeks therefore indicates the depth of delusion among the current US leadership.
Iran enters this confrontation possessing a large domestic market, extensive productive capacity, enormous energy resources and deeply established commercial relationships across Eurasia.
These are not temporary sanctions evasions assembled during the present crisis, but economic capabilities developed over decades through investment, industrial learning, regional integration and repeated adaptation to external restrictions.
The most important fact about Iran’s economic structure is its size, because a country with more than ninety million people possesses a domestic market capable of supporting extensive production independently of Western consumers.
The World Bank describes Iran as relatively diversified for an oil-exporting economy, with a substantial domestic market, a large workforce and significant activity across manufacturing, agriculture and services.
That domestic market sustains production across food, pharmaceuticals, construction materials, steel, petrochemicals, machinery, transportation, consumer goods and numerous intermediate industrial sectors serving Iranian households and companies.
Iran is therefore not an economy that must export continuously merely to keep its factories operating, because a substantial portion of its production already serves domestic consumption, investment and infrastructure.
That distinction becomes particularly important when external restrictions are designed around the assumption that cutting foreign trade will automatically paralyze domestic economic activity.
A country whose productive system is centered on domestic demand possesses an economic engine that continues operating even when international transactions become more complicated.
Iran has also spent decades building industrial capabilities specifically suited to its own resource base, population, infrastructure requirements and energy-intensive economy.
Steel production, petrochemicals, cement, refining, power generation, construction, food processing and pharmaceuticals represent substantial industrial ecosystems involving domestic engineering, manufacturing, logistics and skilled employment.
These capabilities have repeatedly expanded during periods when access to Western investment and technology was severely restricted, demonstrating that Iranian industrial development does not depend upon continuous Western participation.
Iran’s long exposure to sanctions has produced another asset that cannot be imposed or removed through a Treasury designation, namely a large body of accumulated technical and commercial experience.
When foreign manufacturers withdraw, Iranian companies have learned to redesign equipment, substitute components, develop domestic suppliers and work with companies from countries willing to maintain commercial relationships.
Academic research has documented this process in Iranian industries, including evidence that sanctions simultaneously restricted access to foreign technology while encouraging the development of domestic technological capabilities.
The resulting industrial knowledge extends beyond individual companies, because engineers, technicians, procurement specialists and managers have accumulated practical experience with restricted supply chains over successive decades.
A manufacturer that has operated under sanctions for years does not design its procurement system around the assumption that every international supplier will remain available indefinitely.
It develops alternatives as part of ordinary business planning, creating a commercial culture in which substitution, regional sourcing and domestic production are integrated into industrial decision-making.
This is one of the strongest reasons the prediction of sudden economic emptiness looks disconnected from Iran’s actual economic structure.
There is no single foreign supplier whose disappearance can remove Iran’s entire industrial capacity, because Iranian production is distributed across thousands of domestic enterprises and numerous regional supply relationships.
The system has been shaped by scarcity for so long that adaptation has become embedded within the operating methods of Iranian companies themselves.
Iran’s geographical position provides another form of economic strength that cannot be erased by financial sanctions, because the country physically connects several of the world’s most important commercial regions.
Iran borders Turkey, Iraq, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, while its southern coastline provides direct access to the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman.
Those borders connect Iranian commerce with the Caucasus, Central Asia, South Asia, the Persian Gulf, Turkey and Iraq, creating commercial possibilities extending in several directions simultaneously.
This geography gives Iran direct access to neighboring markets while also placing the country along important transportation corridors linking Russia, Central Asia and the Indian Ocean.
The significance of Zamanian’s argument is therefore practical rather than rhetorical, because no financial authority can relocate Iran away from its geographic position.
Goods can move through different borders, suppliers can be found in different countries and exporters can redirect shipments towards different markets when commercial conditions change.
Iran has consequently developed a regional trading system that does not depend upon one border, one port, one customer or one foreign economic relationship.
Its trade with Iraq, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Caucasus, Central Asia and China represents an extensive commercial geography developed through years of interaction.
The World Bank has documented precisely this shift, noting that Iranian trade has increasingly pivoted towards neighboring countries and China as sanctions have restricted conventional international economic relationships.
That transformation is now an established feature of Iran’s economy rather than an emergency measure invented after the latest American escalation.
China gives Iran’s economic system another dimension because it combines enormous industrial capacity with sustained demand for Iranian energy and other commodities.
In other words, Iran possesses access to a major global market even while facing comprehensive American restrictions on its oil industry.
China also supplies Iranian companies with machinery, manufactured products, electronics, industrial equipment and intermediate goods required across the domestic production system.
The relationship therefore operates in both directions, with Iran supplying commodities and China supplying industrial goods, creating a commercial relationship considerably broader than the simple sale of sanctioned oil.
Iran consequently does not need unrestricted access to every Western market when it possesses substantial trade relationships with China and numerous neighboring economies.
Iran’s energy resources provide perhaps the clearest demonstration of the country’s underlying economic strength.
It ranks second globally in proven natural-gas reserves and fourth in proven crude-oil reserves, giving the country extraordinary resource depth beneath its existing industrial economy.
These resources provide not merely potential export earnings but also abundant domestic energy and petrochemical feedstocks supporting Iran’s manufacturing, electricity generation, transportation and industrial production.
Iran has consequently developed an extensive downstream economy that converts hydrocarbons into refined products, petrochemicals and industrial inputs rather than relying exclusively upon crude-oil exports.
The World Bank has specifically noted that sanctions encouraged additional processing of crude oil and hydrocarbons into petrochemicals, illustrating how restrictions have contributed to changes within Iran’s economic structure.
The country’s resource base also gives it a durable position in Asian energy markets, where large industrial economies require reliable supplies of oil and petrochemical products.
That is why American attempts to eliminate Iranian oil revenue confront persistent commercial demand rather than an absence of buyers interested in Iranian resources.
The financial system represents another area where Iran has developed substantial independent capacity after decades of exclusion from conventional Western banking.
Iran’s economic ties span a broad network of foreign entities, reflecting its commercial reach across banking, shipping, logistics, commodities, and manufacturing.
Against this background, Bessent’s latest prediction appears less to be an independent economic forecast than an expectation based on what the American campaign is intended to achieve.
His claim that Iran will have nothing left to trade within two weeks assumes that removing one major source of oil revenue effectively removes the economic foundations supporting the entire Iranian system.
Iran’s actual economic structure is considerably broader, because oil exports represent one component of national economic activity alongside manufacturing, agriculture, services, domestic consumption and regional commerce.
The World Bank estimates that Iran’s economy contracted during the Iranian year ending March 2026, while simultaneously describing an economy that has adapted to sanctions through changing trade patterns and alternative payment mechanisms.
Those facts should not be confused with economic collapse, because contraction in a particular period is fundamentally different from the disappearance of productive capacity, markets and commercial institutions.
The historical record is even more significant, because American sanctions have been imposed repeatedly since 1979 and have been intensified dramatically during successive administrations.
The sanctions regime has targeted Iranian banking, oil exports, investment, technology, shipping and foreign companies, with especially severe measures introduced during the 2010s and after Washington abandoned the nuclear agreement.
Iran nevertheless retained its industrial base, rebuilt oil exports after earlier restrictions, expanded non-oil exports and redirected a growing share of trade towards neighboring countries and China.
The American expectation that economic pressure would eventually produce decisive Iranian economic capitulation has therefore been tested repeatedly against an economy that continued adapting.
Predicting that a strategy that failed to trigger economic collapse over half a century will suddenly achieve it within fourteen days merits no serious consideration, because it reveals the naivety of its proponents.
Washington now possesses powerful financial tools, but financial power does not eliminate Iran’s factories, oilfields, farms, engineers, consumers, borders, ports, regional markets or established commercial relationships.
Iran enters the current phase with an economic architecture extending from domestic manufacturing plants to Chinese refineries, from Persian Gulf shipping networks to northern Eurasian trade corridors.
Its domestic market provides magnitude and size, its industrial base provides production, its energy reserves provide commodities and its geography provides access to several major commercial regions.
In other words, Iran already possesses the domestic capabilities and international relationships required to keep its economy operating beyond the reach of any single American economic sabotage.
This story originally appeared in Common Dreams on Oct. 06, 2026.It is shared here under a Creative Commons (CC BY-NC-ND 3.0) license.
“Keep our city out of your reckless war talk,” said San Diego’s mayor, Todd Gloria, Monday night after President Donald Trump’s rambling speech at a rally in Nebraska included a particularly violent mention of the California city.
Gloria was among several Democratic political leaders who were incensed after Trump—moments after predicted the Republican Party would see a “tremendous victory” in the November 3 midterm elections—suggested that he would not object to an Iranian military or nuclear attack on San Diego and Los Angeles.
The president said that soaring prices for gas, groceries, and other essentials are a “small price to pay for keeping the world safe—keeping our country safe.”
Trump on Iran: Let 'em take out Los Angeles and San Diego, it's a small price to pay pic.twitter.com/Fc4BcjVDKj
He warned that Iran could “take out a city,” before adding that he would “let them” attack the two deep-blue cities—home to a collective 5.2 million people, with more than 20 million residents in the surrounding areas
“Let them take out Los Angeles. Let them take out San Diego,” Trump said at the rally in Grand Island. “This is a very small price to pay… It’s gonna be over very soon.”
The crowd responded to Trump’s comments with laughter and cheers. The president has frequently made Democratic strongholds like Los Angeles, Chicago, and his own hometown of New York City the targets of rhetorical attacks. He has also targeted those cities with the deployment of armed federal agents as part of his mass deportation agenda.
California Gov. Gavin Newsom, a Democrat whose name has been floated as a potential 2028 presidential candidate, condemned Trump’s remarks as “deranged and dangerous.”
“After sending the National Guard and Marines to occupy California, Donald Trump is now saying our foreign enemies should ‘take out’ Los Angeles and San Diego,” said Newsom, who later criticized Trump’s vice president and secretary of state for not speaking out against the comments.
Gloria added that San Diego, which is home to major military installations, “is not collateral damage. We are not expendable. And we are never a ‘small price to pay.’”
Los Angeles Mayor Karen Bass accused Trump of compromising the safety of the nation’s second-largest city.
“The role of a president is to protect the country, not to actively threaten it and encourage attacks on American lives,” said Bass. “In the face of irresponsible threats, as Angelenos, we know how to stand together and protect our city.”
Jim Desmond, a Republican running for Congress in California’s 48th District, which lies in San Diego, was also quick to distance himself from the president’s comments.
Some observers claimed the president had simply been speaking in an “especially confusing style,” as journalist Daniel Dale suggested, and did not intend to suggest that the two cities could be acceptable collateral damage.
“Of course you can say it’s inappropriate regardless for the president to casually float the possibility of a city being wiped out,” he added.
Trump’s comments came days after it was reported that the Pentagon is prepared to send thousands more troops and a third aircraft carrier to the Middle East, as talks between the US and Iran remain stalled. Gas prices remain elevated, at $4.36 per gallon on average, and nearly two-thirds of respondents to an Associated Press poll in June said they disapproved of how Trump had handled the war, which he joined Israel in starting in February without congressional approval.
Sen. Alex Padilla (D-Calif.) had a succinct response to Trump’s remarks, referring to the constitutional amendment that allows members of a president’s Cabinet to remove him from office on the ground that they cannot fulfill the duties of the president.
The US military will deploy an anti-ship missile system to Japan’s westernmost island of Yonaguni, which lies just 68 miles east of Taiwan, an unprecedented move that will ratchet up tensions with China. US Marines will deploy with the Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System, or NMESIS, as part of Keen Sword, the largest joint US-Japanese […]
The planning for the Oct 7 prison breakout was long in the making and met with “catastrophic success.” Tens of thousands of Gazans poured out into the lands that had been their families’ properties for generations...
Originally posted on October, 7, 2026 – updated on October, 8, 2026
As the tragic anniversary of October 7, 2023, approaches —the day Hamas terrorists massacred Israelis near the Gaza Strip border, triggering the genocide in Palestine perpetrated by Benjamin Netanyahu’s Zionist regime —we are publishing an exclusive intelligence analysis.
This video marks the launch of a new Gospa News series titled “TOP SECRET Interview” by Fabio G.C. Carisio—founder and director of Gospa News—which will also be republished on the long-standing American site VT UnCensored Foreign Policy (where Carisio hosts a column).
This features an interview with Antonio Evangelista, a top Italian police official and counter-terrorism expert who spent seven years as Interpol official in Jordan, and who is now an author of geopolitical essayes and novels concerning international intrigue.
He confirms that the recent attack in the Holy Land—like the September 11 attack on the Twin Towers in New York—was a horrific “false flag” operations…
A “false flag” operation is one carefully premeditated over a long period by a foreign intelligence entity to implicate an enemy nation and discredit it in the eyes of global public opinion. It is planned down to the finest detail, carrying the risk of causing actual casualties.
In fact, if unforeseen “collateral damage”—such as unexpected deaths beyond the planned injuries or killings—occurs during the operation, the orchestrators are even more pleased, as the resulting bloodshed lends greater credibility to the terrorist attack.
Historically, the CIA (US counter-intelligence) and Mossad (Israeli counter-intelligence) have been recognized masters of such plots, occasionally utilizing partners such as the secret services of other nations or terrorist groups.
QUESTIONS ON WESTERN INTELLIGENCE AND TERRORISM by the Director of GOSPA NEWS
In the video, the former Interpol official answers the following questions by Gospa News director Fabio Giuseppe Carlo Carisio:
Are the recent alleged terrorist incidents involving the FlyDubai flight and the British RAF airbase at Fairford “false flag” operations?
What parallels exist between the plots of September 11 in New York and October 7, 2023, in Israel?
What has been the historical strategy of Western intelligence agencies regarding terrorist actions by Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and Hamas?
What drives Western governments to support bloody “colonial ventures,” thereby legitimizing genocides in the Middle East and Ukraine?
What lies regarding NATO wars in the Mediterranean basin are exposed in your historical, geopolitical, and economic study?
Do US, Europe and Italy face a real risk of a world war?
No summary today. If you want to hear the answers, watch the video to the end.
Below the video, you will find links to the major investigations mentioned in the footage.
VIDEO INTERVIEW to ANTONIO EVANGELISTA – Former Interpol official in Jordan
Japan has raised the fee for permanent residency applications twentyfold and imposed stricter income, pension and language requirements on foreigners seeking to settle long-term, as Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s government moves to curb growth in the foreign resident population.
The move is being presented as a tool to protect public finances and social cohesion.
The fee for permanent residency rose from 10,000 yen to 200,000 yen (about $1,270) on Oct. 1, the Immigration Services Agency reported. Charges to change or extend other residence statuses, long fixed at 6,000 yen, now scale with the length of stay and reach 75,000 yen for permits of five years or more. Reduced rates remain available for applicants facing severe hardship who also qualify for humanitarian consideration.
The adjustments arrive after the foreign resident population reached a record 4.12 million at the end of 2025, up 9.5% in a single year. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has framed the tighter rules as a way to keep acceptance orderly.
“The government acknowledges that some citizens feel anxious or a sense of unfairness due to the rising number of foreign residents,” Takaichi wrote on X. The changes, she said, are meant to “ensure order” and allow “both citizens and foreign nationals to live safely and securely.”
Under the revised guidelines, permanent-residency applicants must show continuous household income at or above the average for Japanese households of similar size — 5.75 million yen (about $36,500) in 2024 official data.
They must also demonstrate projected pension benefits comparable to 30 years of contributions to the employees’ pension system, a shortfall that can be covered by assets. From April 2027, applicants will need Japanese proficiency at the level of an independent user and a working grasp of local social rules.
The standard residence period remains 10 years; marriage-based pathways were lengthened as well.
The approach is straightforward. Settlement becomes available to people who can support themselves, contribute to the pension system, and function in Japanese society, rather than to anyone who simply accumulates years of temporary status.
Extra fee revenue is earmarked in part for language education and for removing people who overstay or break the rules. A related fivefold rise in visa fees took effect in July, the first adjustment since 1978, which Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi described as a correction “to reflect inflation and exchange rate fluctuations.”
Meanwhile, European states face larger and faster inflows of migrants, strained housing and welfare systems, and repeated public backlash over irregular migration and failed integration. Japan’s harder line comes at a time when the country already has far fewer foreigners to deal with, especially from troubled Third World countries.
The radically different approaches to immigration are made clear through sheer numbers. In Germany, the former government cut the standard residency wait from eight years to five on June 27, 2024. The largest practical change is dual citizenship: applicants no longer have to renounce their existing nationality. Since the changes, Germany granted about 292,000 citizenships in 2024 and about 333,000 in 2025.
In Japan, authorities generally approve citizenship after ten years in most cases. On top of more rigorous standards, Japan does not recognize dual nationality for people who naturalize. Approvals are modest — about 11,500 in 2025, and roughly 7,000 to 10,000 a year before that — against a foreign resident population of 4.12 million. Formal applications that are filed are approved more than 90 percent of the time, but many people are screened out before they apply.
European countries that already struggle to enforce returns or to require newcomers to reach median earnings could adopt similar thresholds to dramatically reduce immigration.
Iran’s worsening medicine shortages are driving patients to a booming black market, where essential drugs can cost several times official prices. Cancer and chronic disease patients face soaring costs, while authorities struggle with imports, currency shortages, and supply disruptions.
British police on Tuesday arrested a man in London on suspicion of a terror offence over a security incident at a U.S.-run military base in the UK that has been linked to Iran.
British police on Tuesday arrested a man in London on suspicion of a terror offence over a security incident at a U.S.-run military base in the UK that has been linked to Iran.
Selon un rapport de la chambre régionale des comptes d’Occitanie rendu public le 28 septembre 2026, le centre hospitalier de Perpignan a vu ses séjours bondir de 18 % entre 2019 et 2024, quand ses urgences perdaient 7 % de leurs médecins. Dans le même temps, la direction annonce un centre de cancérologie à 31 millions d'euros pour 2028.
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Les soignants perpignanais ne manquent ni de courage ni de patients. Ils manquent de collègues. Et le rapport de la chambre régionale des comptes, qui couvre les années 2019 à 2024, éclaire une question que la puissance publique évite : où va l'argent quand l'activité explose ?
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Une activité qui augmente, des urgentistes qui diminuent
Dans son rapport rendu public le 28 septembre 2026, la chambre régionale des comptes d’Occitanie examine la situation du centre hospitalier de Perpignan sur la période 2019-2024. Le constat est clair : le nombre de séjours est passé de 46 335 à 54 830, soit 18 % de hausse, quand les effectifs médicaux n’ont progressé que de 10 %. La chambre relève ainsi une augmentation de la productivité médicale, autrement dit une charge supérieure supportée par les équipes.
Le cas des urgences est encore plus préoccupant. Leur fréquentation avoisine 59 000 passages annuels, tandis que les effectifs médicaux ont diminué de 7 % en cinq ans. Selon les calculs rapportés par la chambre, cette baisse représente environ 275 urgences supplémentaires par an pour chaque urgentiste à temps plein. Certaines périodes ont même connu des réductions d’effectifs proches de 40 %. La maison médicale de garde, située à proximité, a parallèlement vu sa fréquentation bondir de 47 %, de 38 274 à 56 322 patients.
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31 millions pour investir quand les marges sont limitées
L’hôpital a consacré 21 millions d’euros à l’achat de produits pharmaceutiques et ses charges hôtelières et générales ont progressé de 39 %, soit 9 millions d’euros supplémentaires. Sa trésorerie disponible plafonne à environ 10 millions d’euros. Pourtant, un projet de filière de cancérologie évalué à 31 millions d’euros est prévu pour 2028. Son financement devrait donc largement dépendre de ressources extérieures et, potentiellement, de l’emprunt. Le directeur assure que plusieurs indicateurs financiers se sont améliorés en 2025 et que le déficit diminue.
Il ne s’agit pas de mettre en cause les soignants, qui travaillent avec des moyens sous tension, mais les arbitrages opérés au sommet de l’institution. Reste une zone d'ombre : qui finance quoi, et selon quel calendrier ? Le financement du projet de cancérologie, ses sources et son impact sur les dépenses de fonctionnement mériteraient d'être publiés. Faute de transparence, le contribuable paie deux fois : par l'impôt qui alimente l'hôpital, puis par l'attente sur un brancard.
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Steve Rose investigates a catastrophic pollution incident at Furnace Brook, a fishing lake in East Sussex, where thousands of fish suddenly died and the local ecosystem collapsed. Neighbours suspect pollution from nearby Morgans Farm, and Rose examines whether their concerns are justified. In doing so, he uncovers broader national problems with water pollution, illegal waste dumping, and the limited power and resources councils and regulators have to tackle them.
He headed about half a mile up the valley to a tributary joining the stream from a neighbouring property named Morgans Farm. “You could clearly see the water upstream [of the tributary] was totally normal, a sandy colour with clay silt in it, and what was below it had gone a blue-black colour. You could see dead brook trout, wild eels, and there was a dead crow or raven, which may well have eaten something poisonous from the river.” In some places, he says, there was a thick layer of blue-grey scum on the water, which he later learned is sometimes called “bacterial cheese”. “There’s so much nutrient [sic] in the water that it allows for a bacterial colonisation explosion.” The bacteria take up all the oxygen, which causes most of the fish, especially the older, larger ones, to die.
The recently concluded trilateral “Orient Shield” exercises in Japan became the first three-way maneuvers involving Washington, Tokyo, and Canberra in which the “Typhon” medium-range missile system was employed. How are the United States and its allies pushing the world toward the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)? The Land of the Rising WMD Proliferation […]
The American withdrawal from Iraq is not an end but a strategic pivot, a calculated transition from direct occupation to remote containment. By pressuring Iraq to disarm its resistance groups, Washington aims to neutralize Iran’s forward defense line and clear the battlefield for a potential full-scale confrontation with Tehran. This gambit risks either delivering Iraq […]
The US blockade of Iran is keeping dozens of laden tankers bottled up along the nation’s coast, while others outside the Persian Gulf are holding off Sri Lanka, according to United Against Nuclear Iran.
EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas has warned that Russia is intensifying hybrid operations across Europe, citing sabotage attempts, airspace violations and Russian drones and missiles crossing into Moldovan territory.
Her intervention adds pressure for a more coordinated European response to hostile activity below the threshold of conventional warfare.
Russia is putting lives at risk across Europe through an expanding campaign of hybrid activity, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said on Monday, after another series of Russian drones and missiles entered Moldovan airspace.
Speaking in Brussels alongside Moldovan Prime Minister Vasile Tofan and Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos, Kallas said Europe had experienced an increase in sabotage attempts and airspace violations during recent weeks.
“Russian missiles and drones violated Moldovan airspace again over the weekend,” she said, describing the incidents as unacceptable.
According to the official EU record of the press conference, Kallas said the Kremlin was seeking to create fear and interfere with European decision-making, and argued that the response should include greater resilience and continued support for Ukraine.
Her remarks follow Russia’s renewed large-scale attacks against Ukraine’s energy system and continued reports of drones crossing borders beyond Ukrainian territory.
Moldova’s defence authorities reported that three drones entered Moldovan airspace during Russia’s 30 September attack on Ukraine. Moldova, which shares a long border with Ukraine and is seeking EU membership, has repeatedly accused Moscow of attempting to destabilise the country.
The latest incidents broaden a European debate that has been developing for months: how governments should respond to hostile operations that are deliberate and potentially dangerous but fall short of an overt military attack.
EU Today reported on 28 September that European governments were discussing an emergency security protocol intended to improve coordination when member states face sabotage and other hybrid threats.
That followed earlier warnings concerning suspected attacks on infrastructure, cyber operations, interference campaigns and airspace violations across several European countries.
The problem is partly one of attribution and partly one of thresholds.
A conventional armed attack on a NATO member may trigger consultation under Article 4 or, in sufficiently serious circumstances, collective defence provisions under Article 5. The European Union also has its own mutual assistance provision under Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union.
Hybrid activity is frequently designed to remain below those thresholds.
Cyberattacks, covert sabotage, GPS interference, disinformation, drones and operations conducted through intermediaries can impose costs without giving governments an obvious basis for a military response.
Kallas’s warning comes as Germany has also reported an increase in activity it attributes to Russia.
Chancellor Friedrich Merz has warned that Germany faces growing hybrid pressure involving drones and cyber operations. European security services have separately investigated suspected Russian involvement in sabotage and attacks on infrastructure in several countries.
Moscow has denied Western accusations that it is directing such operations.
The EU has already used sanctions against individuals and entities accused of Russian hybrid activity, while governments are considering faster systems for sharing intelligence and attributing incidents.
EU Today examined the debate in September as the European Parliament considered proposals for quicker attribution, stronger intelligence-sharing and improved protection of critical infrastructure.
Moldova occupies a particularly exposed position.
The EU has provided €317 million through the European Peace Facility for Moldovan defence modernisation, according to Kallas, including €120 million allocated in 2026 for air defence. Brussels is also supporting Moldova through its EU Partnership Mission, which provides assistance against hybrid and cyber threats.
Unlike Ukraine, Moldova is not a NATO member and has constitutional neutrality. Its ability to counter Russian missiles or drones entering its airspace is therefore closely connected to the development of its own detection and air-defence capabilities.
For the EU, repeated incidents involving Moldova, NATO airspace and European infrastructure are increasingly being considered as parts of the same security problem rather than isolated events.
Originally published by Pacific Forum, this article is republished with permission. While operational planners in the United States, the Republic of Korea and Japan have made historic strides institutionalizing trilateral security cooperation, the credibility of deterrence ultimately hinges on a more punishing variable: wartime sustainment. Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo have expanded joint exercises, real-time missile […]
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