The European Commission has now declared enlargement a “geopolitical imperative” – with important implications.
The bloc has just presented a package of reforms designed to prepare the Union for new members – with Ukraine and Moldova at the center of the effort, alongside Albania and Montenegro.
Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated that “Europe’s future depends on the choices we make today,” framing expansion as essential to making the bloc “more resilient” and better able to shape its own destiny.
Candidate countries are already advancing: Ukraine and Moldova opened their first negotiating cluster in June 2026, and in July, opened Cluster 6 on external relations, foreign policy, security and, importantly, defense. In the words of Vessela Cherneva: “Currently, EU membership is the only way to integrate Ukraine’s and Europe’s security systems.”
The Commission plans “indicative roadmaps” for these four frontrunners (Ukraine, Moldova, Montenegro, and Albania) in its 2026 Enlargement Package, provided reform momentum continues. Gradual integration into strategic sectors such as energy, transport, digital networks and defense is explicitly on the table
This is no longer presented as a purely technical or economic process. Again, Brussels itself now describes enlargement as a “geopolitical” tool linked to European safety, prosperity and security. One may recall that earlier enlargement rounds were often framed in terms of shared values and market access.
Political scientist John Mearsheimer has long argued that the West’s “triple package” of policies – NATO enlargement, EU expansion and Western-style democracy promotion – added fuel to a fire waiting to ignite – meaning the Ukrainian crisis since 2014.
Actually, in his view, the trouble over Ukraine began in earnest at NATO’s 2008 Bucharest summit, when the alliance announced that Ukraine and Georgia “will become members”.
Russian leaders treated this as an existential threat. Washington ignored the red line and continued to push Ukraine toward Western institutions, including closer ties with the EU.
Back in his 2014 analysis Mearsheimer noted that the Union’s eastward march and the Eastern Partnership initiative were viewed in Moscow as hostile enough. “In the eyes of Russian leaders, EU expansion is a stalking horse for NATO expansion,” he wrote.
In this framework, the West’s efforts to promote “democracy” and “peel Ukraine away” from Russia completed the package. When Yanukovych rejected an EU deal in 2013, the “spark”, as Mearsheimer puts it, came. The result was crisis, then war. If one applies that framework consistently today, the resulting picture is quite straightforward.
To be clear, EU membership is not identical to NATO membership. Yet from a Russian great-power perspective the distinction becomes less meaningful when the two institutions are moving in the same geographical direction.
EU accession after all entails progressive alignment on law, foreign-policy positions, sanctions, energy, borders and increasingly elements of security and defense cooperation. The point is that an EU-member Ukraine would be economically, legally, institutionally and politically embedded in a Western bloc – and the same applies to the other Eastern European states. That, in broad terms, is precisely the structural transformation process Mearsheimer argued helped fuel the 2014 and then the 2022 crisis.
Ukraine remains the clearest case in point: before 2014 it functioned as a contested buffer. Mearsheimer (as well as specialists of the caliber of Henry Kissinger and Stephen Walt) argued a neutral Ukraine would be preferable, from a Western perspective – akin to Austria during the Cold War. In any case, the trajectory now points toward full Western institutional integration.
Moldova is arguably just as sensitive: it has a Russian military presence in Transnistria, occupies a strategic position between Ukraine and Romania – and is accelerating toward EU membership while deepening practical cooperation with Western militaries.
The recent Independence Day parade in Chișinău illustrated the point (without Soviet symbology, for the first time), as I’ve commented: Moldovan troops marched with Western weapons and vehicles; contingents from the Ukraine and eight NATO members, including the US, took part. NATO’s Political Committee had visited just days earlier, describing intensified cooperation.
Moldova for its part remains formally neutral, yet it is simultaneously negotiating EU accession – including the cluster on external relations and defense policy – and publicly displaying Euro-Atlantic partnerships.The Western center of gravity (post-USAID) in Moldova is shifting toward Brussels, which has stepped in with a large Reform and Growth Facility.
From Moscow’s point of view, the cumulative process looks like progressive incorporation of its western strategic environment into a Western political-security system.
Historically, great powers care intensely about the direction of strategic change in their immediate neighborhood. They typically do not wait until the process is complete before reacting – as seen in 2022.
In any case, the EU now frames enlargement itself as a geopolitical and security instrument. This language reinforces the very security dilemma Mearsheimer identified over a decade ago. The buffer zone between Russia and the Western institutional order continues to shrink. The risks of further escalation keep rising eastwards – adding to the tensions farther north, in the Baltic.
Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.
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Iran’s economic adaptation over decades, marked by domestic production, regional trade and Asian partnerships, is on course to thwart Washington’s economic terrorism.
US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s prediction that Iran’s economy would soon collapse underscores the depth of delusion within the current American leadership.
“Iran is absolutely not sanctionable,” Deputy Economy Minister Mortaza Zamanian said this week as Tehran worked to keep trade flowing despite Washington’s latest sanctions campaign.
Zamanian cited Iran’s extensive borders, established commercial routes and longstanding trading relationships, saying that they make it impossible for external pressure simply to switch off the country’s economy.
His remarks came as Washington intensified its economic terrorism against Iranian oil, shipping, aviation, finance, technology and foreign companies supporting those sectors.
The new American campaign has been accompanied by extraordinary predictions from senior American officials, including Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s claim that Iran could have “nothing left to trade” within two weeks.
Speaking on September 27, Bessent claimed that Iran would probably make its final oil deliveries to China within two weeks, after which, he asserted, “they will have nothing.”
That prediction deserves comparison with history, because American administrations have imposed increasingly severe sanctions on Iran since 1979 while repeatedly expecting economic pressure eventually to produce collapse.
Yet the economy did not disappear, and Iran instead developed domestic industries, expanded regional commerce, strengthened trade with Asian powers and accumulated extensive experience operating outside Western financial channels.
The proposition that an economy which has absorbed American sanctions for almost half a century will suddenly disintegrate within two weeks therefore indicates the depth of delusion among the current US leadership.
Iran enters this confrontation possessing a large domestic market, extensive productive capacity, enormous energy resources and deeply established commercial relationships across Eurasia.
These are not temporary sanctions evasions assembled during the present crisis, but economic capabilities developed over decades through investment, industrial learning, regional integration and repeated adaptation to external restrictions.
The most important fact about Iran’s economic structure is its size, because a country with more than ninety million people possesses a domestic market capable of supporting extensive production independently of Western consumers.
The World Bank describes Iran as relatively diversified for an oil-exporting economy, with a substantial domestic market, a large workforce and significant activity across manufacturing, agriculture and services.
That domestic market sustains production across food, pharmaceuticals, construction materials, steel, petrochemicals, machinery, transportation, consumer goods and numerous intermediate industrial sectors serving Iranian households and companies.
Iran is therefore not an economy that must export continuously merely to keep its factories operating, because a substantial portion of its production already serves domestic consumption, investment and infrastructure.
That distinction becomes particularly important when external restrictions are designed around the assumption that cutting foreign trade will automatically paralyze domestic economic activity.
A country whose productive system is centered on domestic demand possesses an economic engine that continues operating even when international transactions become more complicated.
Iran has also spent decades building industrial capabilities specifically suited to its own resource base, population, infrastructure requirements and energy-intensive economy.
Steel production, petrochemicals, cement, refining, power generation, construction, food processing and pharmaceuticals represent substantial industrial ecosystems involving domestic engineering, manufacturing, logistics and skilled employment.
These capabilities have repeatedly expanded during periods when access to Western investment and technology was severely restricted, demonstrating that Iranian industrial development does not depend upon continuous Western participation.
Iran’s long exposure to sanctions has produced another asset that cannot be imposed or removed through a Treasury designation, namely a large body of accumulated technical and commercial experience.
When foreign manufacturers withdraw, Iranian companies have learned to redesign equipment, substitute components, develop domestic suppliers and work with companies from countries willing to maintain commercial relationships.
Academic research has documented this process in Iranian industries, including evidence that sanctions simultaneously restricted access to foreign technology while encouraging the development of domestic technological capabilities.
The resulting industrial knowledge extends beyond individual companies, because engineers, technicians, procurement specialists and managers have accumulated practical experience with restricted supply chains over successive decades.
A manufacturer that has operated under sanctions for years does not design its procurement system around the assumption that every international supplier will remain available indefinitely.
It develops alternatives as part of ordinary business planning, creating a commercial culture in which substitution, regional sourcing and domestic production are integrated into industrial decision-making.
This is one of the strongest reasons the prediction of sudden economic emptiness looks disconnected from Iran’s actual economic structure.
There is no single foreign supplier whose disappearance can remove Iran’s entire industrial capacity, because Iranian production is distributed across thousands of domestic enterprises and numerous regional supply relationships.
The system has been shaped by scarcity for so long that adaptation has become embedded within the operating methods of Iranian companies themselves.
Iran’s geographical position provides another form of economic strength that cannot be erased by financial sanctions, because the country physically connects several of the world’s most important commercial regions.
Iran borders Turkey, Iraq, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, while its southern coastline provides direct access to the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman.
Those borders connect Iranian commerce with the Caucasus, Central Asia, South Asia, the Persian Gulf, Turkey and Iraq, creating commercial possibilities extending in several directions simultaneously.
This geography gives Iran direct access to neighboring markets while also placing the country along important transportation corridors linking Russia, Central Asia and the Indian Ocean.
The significance of Zamanian’s argument is therefore practical rather than rhetorical, because no financial authority can relocate Iran away from its geographic position.
Goods can move through different borders, suppliers can be found in different countries and exporters can redirect shipments towards different markets when commercial conditions change.
Iran has consequently developed a regional trading system that does not depend upon one border, one port, one customer or one foreign economic relationship.
Its trade with Iraq, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Caucasus, Central Asia and China represents an extensive commercial geography developed through years of interaction.
The World Bank has documented precisely this shift, noting that Iranian trade has increasingly pivoted towards neighboring countries and China as sanctions have restricted conventional international economic relationships.
That transformation is now an established feature of Iran’s economy rather than an emergency measure invented after the latest American escalation.
China gives Iran’s economic system another dimension because it combines enormous industrial capacity with sustained demand for Iranian energy and other commodities.
In other words, Iran possesses access to a major global market even while facing comprehensive American restrictions on its oil industry.
China also supplies Iranian companies with machinery, manufactured products, electronics, industrial equipment and intermediate goods required across the domestic production system.
The relationship therefore operates in both directions, with Iran supplying commodities and China supplying industrial goods, creating a commercial relationship considerably broader than the simple sale of sanctioned oil.
Iran consequently does not need unrestricted access to every Western market when it possesses substantial trade relationships with China and numerous neighboring economies.
Iran’s energy resources provide perhaps the clearest demonstration of the country’s underlying economic strength.
It ranks second globally in proven natural-gas reserves and fourth in proven crude-oil reserves, giving the country extraordinary resource depth beneath its existing industrial economy.
These resources provide not merely potential export earnings but also abundant domestic energy and petrochemical feedstocks supporting Iran’s manufacturing, electricity generation, transportation and industrial production.
Iran has consequently developed an extensive downstream economy that converts hydrocarbons into refined products, petrochemicals and industrial inputs rather than relying exclusively upon crude-oil exports.
The World Bank has specifically noted that sanctions encouraged additional processing of crude oil and hydrocarbons into petrochemicals, illustrating how restrictions have contributed to changes within Iran’s economic structure.
The country’s resource base also gives it a durable position in Asian energy markets, where large industrial economies require reliable supplies of oil and petrochemical products.
That is why American attempts to eliminate Iranian oil revenue confront persistent commercial demand rather than an absence of buyers interested in Iranian resources.
The financial system represents another area where Iran has developed substantial independent capacity after decades of exclusion from conventional Western banking.
Iran’s economic ties span a broad network of foreign entities, reflecting its commercial reach across banking, shipping, logistics, commodities, and manufacturing.
Against this background, Bessent’s latest prediction appears less to be an independent economic forecast than an expectation based on what the American campaign is intended to achieve.
His claim that Iran will have nothing left to trade within two weeks assumes that removing one major source of oil revenue effectively removes the economic foundations supporting the entire Iranian system.
Iran’s actual economic structure is considerably broader, because oil exports represent one component of national economic activity alongside manufacturing, agriculture, services, domestic consumption and regional commerce.
The World Bank estimates that Iran’s economy contracted during the Iranian year ending March 2026, while simultaneously describing an economy that has adapted to sanctions through changing trade patterns and alternative payment mechanisms.
Those facts should not be confused with economic collapse, because contraction in a particular period is fundamentally different from the disappearance of productive capacity, markets and commercial institutions.
The historical record is even more significant, because American sanctions have been imposed repeatedly since 1979 and have been intensified dramatically during successive administrations.
The sanctions regime has targeted Iranian banking, oil exports, investment, technology, shipping and foreign companies, with especially severe measures introduced during the 2010s and after Washington abandoned the nuclear agreement.
Iran nevertheless retained its industrial base, rebuilt oil exports after earlier restrictions, expanded non-oil exports and redirected a growing share of trade towards neighboring countries and China.
The American expectation that economic pressure would eventually produce decisive Iranian economic capitulation has therefore been tested repeatedly against an economy that continued adapting.
Predicting that a strategy that failed to trigger economic collapse over half a century will suddenly achieve it within fourteen days merits no serious consideration, because it reveals the naivety of its proponents.
Washington now possesses powerful financial tools, but financial power does not eliminate Iran’s factories, oilfields, farms, engineers, consumers, borders, ports, regional markets or established commercial relationships.
Iran enters the current phase with an economic architecture extending from domestic manufacturing plants to Chinese refineries, from Persian Gulf shipping networks to northern Eurasian trade corridors.
Its domestic market provides magnitude and size, its industrial base provides production, its energy reserves provide commodities and its geography provides access to several major commercial regions.
In other words, Iran already possesses the domestic capabilities and international relationships required to keep its economy operating beyond the reach of any single American economic sabotage.
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Once again Karl W. Miller has put numbers to a problem that most of the commentariat still treats as a temporary price spike. His latest forward outlook, “The Five-Year Global Energy Crisis,” dated October 3, makes an argument that should alarm every finance ministry from Berlin to Jakarta. The war’s damage to Gulf energy infrastructure is not a disruption that ends when the shooting stops. It is a reconstruction problem measured in years and trillions of dollars, and while it is solved, the world will be short of the fuels that run its economy.
A ceasefire is not a repair crew
Miller’s central insight is simple. A ceasefire can reopen a shipping lane overnight. It cannot manufacture a compressor, mobilize commissioning engineers, or pay a contractor. The next phase of this crisis, he writes, is a competition for cash, equipment, qualified contractors and finished fuel.
His cost model is sobering. In his aggressive case, rebuilding the damaged Gulf energy system requires $1.16 trillion in total program funding. Under prolonged stress, with scarce equipment, rising prices and delays, the bill reaches $2.53 trillion. Even his most favorable case runs to nearly half a trillion dollars. He is careful to say these are model outputs, not contractor quotes, and that the true extent of the damage is the largest unknown. An April assessment put energy-related repair costs at only $34-58 billion. But the direction of his argument doesn’t depend on the exact figure. Every month of delay makes the same repair more expensive, because the global market for specialized equipment and crews is already stretched by LNG expansions, refinery maintenance and power projects elsewhere.
The timeline is just as stark. Weighted by cost, the rebuild averages almost five years from today. Only 60% of the work finishes by 2031, and the longest-lead packages run to seven years.
The money problem comes first
The most original part of Miller’s analysis is about cash. A damaged refinery may be worth rebuilding and technically repairable, and still sit idle because the government that owns it has to pay for food imports, salaries, electricity and water first. Lost export revenue doesn’t stop those bills. When a state borrows to keep paying them, that money can’t also pay an engineering contractor.
Iraq shows the problem in practice. In July, it faced a monthly public salary obligation of about $5.96 billion with a funding shortfall of $2.52 billion. A government in that position rebuilds nothing. It pays its people, and the export capacity that would restore its revenue waits. Miller’s warning is that this trap can stop reconstruction before it starts: without engineering funds and vendor deposits, factory slots go to other customers and delivery dates slip.
The fuel gap is the global transmission belt
For the rest of the world, the damage arrives through diesel and jet fuel. The figures Miller cites are already severe. Gulf diesel net exports in August were just over a quarter of prewar levels. Combined Gulf and Russian diesel exports were 1.6 million barrels a day below February. Global oil stocks had fallen 507 million barrels since February, and global refinery throughput in August was 4.2 million barrels a day below a year earlier.
Looking forward, Miller’s severe case assumes a shortfall of at least 3 million barrels a day of diesel and jet fuel, every year for five years. That’s about 1.1 billion barrels a year and 5.5 billion barrels over the period. He is explicit that this is a deliberate stress test, not a forecast, and that a faster-recovery path closes the gap by the fourth year. But the stress case is a plausible one. Restored capacity can be absorbed by refinery outages, deferred maintenance, recovering demand and delivery bottlenecks. Damaged refineries don’t come back at full capacity on the first day.
Inventories cannot fill a gap of that size for that long. Five and a half billion barrels is far beyond any country’s emergency stocks, which is why drawing down Europe’s reserves now, under pressure from Washington, only buys weeks. Without enough new supply, the balance can close in only one way: by using less fuel.
How the shortage reprices everything
The economic damage extends well beyond the missing barrels. When supply falls short, buyers bid for the marginal cargo, and that bid sets the price for all the fuel still being bought. Miller’s illustration: a $40-a-barrel premium across 10 million barrels a day of purchases adds $146 billion a year to fuel bills. Applied only to the 3 million missing barrels, it would add $43.8 billion and badly understate the real cost.
Scarcity also reprices credit. At $150 a barrel, a buyer purchasing 1 million barrels a day needs $2.25 billion to hold 15 extra days of inventory, and $3 billion at $200. Longer voyages tie up more fuel and more money in transit. A supplier can have the barrels while its customer can’t get a letter of credit. And a cargo that wins a bidding war for one country leaves another short. Competition redistributes the shortage before it eliminates it.
Who absorbs the shock
Diesel carries the crisis into the real economy. It runs road freight, farm machinery, mines, construction fleets and backup generators, none of which can switch fuels quickly. Higher diesel costs pass straight into freight rates and food prices, and when diesel isn’t available at any price, activity simply stops. Jet fuel carries the shock into aviation: higher fares, fewer routes and higher air cargo surcharges. Kerosene hits the households with the least room to adjust, in countries where it is still used for heating, cooking and lighting.
Miller’s regional assessment follows the money:
Europe competes for replacement diesel and jet cargoes while running its refineries close to their limits.
South and Southeast Asia face higher import bills, currency pressure and greater need for trade credit.
Africa and smaller importers are the most vulnerable. Tenders fail, credit lines run out, and small cargoes become uneconomic long before global stocks are exhausted.
The United States and other Atlantic suppliers face export demand competing with their own diesel needs, with refineries running so hard they have little tolerance for outages.
The ultimate balancing mechanism is demand destruction: freight deferred, low-margin factories idled, flights cancelled, and poorer importers losing every bidding contest. Miller warns against mistaking that for recovery. Lower consumption caused by rationing through price or credit is not a repaired energy system.
Case study: Europe
Europe shows what Miller’s framework looks like in practice. The continent burns about 5 million barrels of diesel a day, fuel for the trucks that move its goods, the tractors that plant its crops and, as winter approaches, the boilers that heat millions of homes.
How much does Europe produce, and how much does it import? Running flat out, EU refineries can produce roughly 4.5 to 5 million barrels a day of diesel and gasoil, and they are already operating close to their maximum. That leaves Europe roughly 85-90% self-sufficient at best. The remaining 10-15% comes from imports, and that margin sets the price for the entire market. Kepler puts the EU’s diesel imports from outside the bloc at about 580,000 barrels a day this year. Britain, which lost much of its refining capacity over the past two decades, is far more exposed: it imports more than half the diesel it uses.
The origin of those imports has changed dramatically. Russia was long Europe’s largest outside supplier until the EU embargoed Russian diesel in 2023. The Gulf filled much of the gap, until the war cut it off. Since March, the United States has supplied more than half of Europe’s diesel imports, and more than two-thirds in August and September. Europe has traded dependence on Moscow for dependence on Washington, and Washington has just shown it is willing to use that leverage, threatening an export ban unless Europe released its emergency stocks.
Europe’s diesel depends on imported crude as well. Its refineries run almost entirely on foreign oil: the EU imports about 97% of the crude it consumes. But the Gulf was never Europe’s main crude supplier. In 2025, Gulf Cooperation Council states supplied only about 7% of EU crude imports, Iraq another 5.8%. Europe’s crude now comes chiefly from the United States, Norway and Kazakhstan, which together supplied nearly half of EU petroleum imports in the second quarter of 2026. The volume has held steady; the bill rose 56%. But the crude isn’t the crude Europe’s refineries were built for. Much of Europe’s refining capacity was designed around medium sour crudes such as Russia’s Urals, with conversion units that turn the heavier part of the barrel into diesel. American shale crude is light and sweet. It refines readily into gasoline and naphtha, but it yields proportionally less diesel and jet fuel, the very products Europe is short of. As Miller notes, sour crude isn’t uniquely required to make diesel; the replacement barrels work, but not at the same yield or cost. The Gulf supply Europe really lost was finished diesel from Gulf refineries, and that is what the United States has replaced. The result is a double dependence: Washington is now Europe’s largest supplier of both the crude its refineries run and the diesel they can’t make. Even the non-American barrels carry risk. Most Kazakh crude reaches Europe through a Black Sea terminal at Novorossiysk, on Russian soil, a route that has already been hit by Ukrainian drones.
How long can Europe store diesel? This is where Europe’s apparent cushion turns out to be thinner than it looks. Unlike crude oil, which can sit in salt caverns for decades, diesel degrades. Under ideal conditions, conventional ultra-low-sulfur diesel can typically be stored for six to twelve months. With stabilizers, biocides and well-managed tanks, that can be extended to 18 to 24 months. Oxidation forms gums and sediment, water collects, and microbes grow in the fuel.
European diesel has an added problem. The EU standard, EN 590, allows up to 7% biodiesel in road diesel, and biodiesel oxidizes faster than petroleum diesel. Concawe, the European refiners’ research association, recommends a maximum storage time of six months for biodiesel and current blends containing it. Strategic stockholders can extend that by holding biodiesel-free product, but even then the reserve has to be rotated, sold into the market and replaced with fresh fuel on a cycle of a year or two.
That changes what Europe’s reserve really is. EU countries and Britain held about 52 million tonnes of gasoil and diesel in June, including nearly 38 million tonnes of emergency reserves, roughly two months of consumption. But a diesel reserve is not a stockpile Europe can fill once and forget. It is a stock that must be continually turned over, which means continually bought, and bought in the same tight market Miller describes. Every barrel released now to satisfy Washington has to be replaced later, at a higher price, from suppliers who are already short. And because diesel degrades, Europe can’t solve the problem by buying extra while it’s cheap and holding it for years. A reserve with a shelf life of a year or two cannot cover a structural deficit that Miller’s severe case puts at five years.
The conclusion for Europe is stark. It produces most of its own diesel but has no spare refining capacity. It depends on imports for the margin that sets prices, and those imports now come mostly from a single supplier that has shown it will use them as leverage. And its emergency reserve is both perishable and finite. In Miller’s terms, Europe is one of the buyers most exposed to the marginal cargo, and the least able to wait out a five-year shortage.
The implications for the global economy
Put together, Miller’s analysis describes a world economy facing a prolonged supply shock, not a temporary one. Fuel costs feed into nearly everything, so central banks fighting the inflation this crisis has already produced will face pressure for longer than they expect. Emerging-market importers face a combination of high fuel bills, weak currencies and tighter credit that has historically produced debt crises and unrest. And the reconstruction itself will absorb capital, equipment and specialist labor that would otherwise build new energy supply elsewhere, so the shortage may delay the investment needed to end it.
Miller’s strategic conclusion is the one policymakers least want to hear. Ending the conflict removes one source of disruption. It does not repair the energy system, which requires a separate sequence of financing, engineering, manufacturing, construction and commissioning that will take years. Until that is done, reliable fuel and the cash to buy it will determine which economies absorb the burden. Neither will be distributed evenly.
The Trump administration and its supporters – including the Wall Street Journal editorial page – are working overtime these days to spin the news around the Iran war to make it appear that the US is winning and Tehran had better submit to Washington’s demands before it is wrecked, maybe even “annihilated.” Indeed, Trump is preparing the option of bringing the military hammer down on Iran after the midterm elections if Tehran has not surrendered by then.
In effect, Trump and his supporters are waging a “maximum pressure campaign” against Iran in the mainstream media.
This campaign is sure to fail. If anything, it reflects the Trump administration’s desperation. The president started a war the United States was bound to lose, and there is little he can do now to change that basic fact.
Trump’s propaganda campaign has two dimensions – one economic and the other military.
First, the administration argues that Iran is being economically strangled by the US naval blockade coupled with Operation Economic Outcast, the strategy announced by Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent on 24 August 2026. At the same time, it maintains that oil is once again flowing out of the Gulf at rates not far below those that prevailed on 27 February 2026. The implications are obvious: the economic punishment being inflicted on Iran will force it to capitulate soon, while the US economy – and the international community more generally – is well on its way to recovery.
Second, the US is now building up its military forces for a massive military strike after the mid-term elections, when Trump will be free of electoral constraints. This growing threat of a devastating US attack, coupled with the economic pain being inflicted on Iran, is designed to get Tehran to quit now, before its situation becomes even worse.
There are huge problems with this strategy. It sounds persuasive when the mainstream media dutifully purveys it, but it falls apart when one looks closely at what is actually happening.
Consider the military dimension. The headlines say the US is sending 10,000 additional troops and a third aircraft carrier – the USS Theodore Roosevelt – to the Persian Gulf region, creating the impression that Iran will soon be confronting three American carriers. Moreover, the additional troops – on top of the roughly 50,000 US troops already in the region – are portrayed as evidence that Trump is seriously considering putting boots on the ground.
The aircraft carrier story, however, is quite different from what the headlines suggest. The Roosevelt is reportedly being sent to replace the USS George Washington, while the supposed third carrier, the USS George H.W. Bush, has already left the Middle East and is now in Thailand. Thus, there is presently only one carrier in the region. Indeed, this is the first time during the war that the US has only one carrier in the Middle East, and it is difficult to imagine that there will be more than two – if even that many – after the midterm elections.
The larger problem is that the Iran war is severely straining the US Navy. Its senior leaders warn that the current operational tempo is not sustainable indefinitely. Carriers and other warships are being rotated through extremely long deployments, which cause significant maintenance and readiness problems that will have to be addressed at some point. This problem is compounded by the fact that US ships have lost access to nearby logistics facilities and increasingly depend on a supply chain that reaches back to Diego Garcia, which is about 2,500 miles from the Persian Gulf.
But even if three carriers are available to strike Iran, what could they accomplish in a renewed air campaign that the US and Israel could not accomplish together during the failed 40-day bombing campaign between 28 February and 8 April 2026? Some might argue that the US could finally destroy Iran’s oil infrastructure. The problem, however, is that Iran retains a second-strike capability and could retaliate by wreaking havoc on the oil infrastructure of the GCC states. One shudders to think what the consequences would be for the international economy.
On top of all this, the US faces a serious shortage of high-end weaponry, which is one of the main reasons it ended the 40-day bombing campaign and has shied away in recent weeks from engaging in tit-for-tat bombing exchanges with Iran. One would think that the shortage of critical munitions – both for striking Iran and defending against Iranian retaliation – would limit the scope and intensity of any renewed strategic bombing campaign, thereby reducing its chances of success.
Regarding ground forces, simply counting the number of U.S. military personnel in the Middle East is misleading when assessing the possibility of putting boots on the ground. What matters most in a ground war is the number of troops in actual ground-combat formations. I estimate that, of the roughly 50,000 U.S. military personnel already stationed in the region, about 5,000 belong to such formations: roughly 2,200 Marines and sailors in the 11th MEU, 2,000 soldiers from the 82nd Airborne, and possibly another 800 Army personnel in Kuwait associated with Task Force Spartan. Of the roughly 10,000 additional personnel now being sent to the region, another 2,200 belong to the 13th MEU. Most of the remainder are sailors assigned to the Theodore Roosevelt carrier and its supporting warships. Thus, given present deployment plans, I estimate that by late November the United States will have just under 7,500 personnel in ground-combat formations in the Gulf region—roughly 4,400 in the two MEUs and 2,800 Army personnel.
There is no way a ground force that small provides a promising option against a country with Iran’s population and geography. Even tripling that number to roughly 23,000—which is highly unlikely—would not fundamentally alter the problem. Retired Army General Barry McCaffrey estimates that securing the Strait of Hormuz would require roughly 150,000 troops and three to six months of fighting. For comparison, Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022 with roughly 190,000 military personnel, and that force proved insufficient to hold much of the territory Russia initially captured. Iran has more than twice the population Ukraine had at the beginning of the Russian invasion, and its geography is considerably more forbidding for an invading army.
Simply put, the United States has not assembled anything remotely resembling the ground force required for a large-scale invasion of Iran. Indeed, from Tehran’s perspective, an American decision to launch such an offensive with anything resembling the forces presently available would present Iran with an opportunity to fight the United States under exceptionally favorable circumstances.
At the risk of beating a dead horse, two further points are in order. First, given how unpopular the Iran war is with the American public, there would almost certainly be a huge uproar if large numbers of US soldiers began coming home in body bags. Second, how are the Marines, who are aboard amphibious assault ships, supposed to land on Iranian territory if the missile and drone threat from Iran is forcing the US Navy to keep those large and vulnerable ships far from the Iranian coast?
Let’s turn to the economic dimension. There is no question that the US is doing great damage to Iran’s economy and inflicting enormous hardship on the Iranian people. But that has been true for a long time. The key question is whether that punishment can coerce Iran into surrendering to American demands.
There is no evidence that Iran is caving in to American pressure, and there are three reasons to doubt that it will. First, it is exceedingly difficult to find a case in the historical record in which an economic blockade by itself caused the target state to surrender. Second, Iran sees the US and Israel as existential threats to Iran – hardly surprising given the genocidal language Trump has used when talking about Iran – and states that believe their survival is at stake are exceptionally difficult to coerce. Third, Iran has a formidable escalation option if the economic pain becomes too great: it can attack the oil and gas infrastructure of the Gulf states and Israel, as well as their highly vulnerable desalination plants.
In short, it is difficult to see economic pressure alone forcing Iran to accept Trump’s terms. That is probably one reason the United States is once again talking about using military force. But, as I argued above, that option holds little promise of producing a favorable outcome.
Finally, there is no question that more oil is flowing out of the Gulf today than was the case in early September. But both Iran and the Houthis are working hard to reverse that trend. Iran is attacking US-escorted tankers on a daily basis, while the Houthis are targeting vital oil infrastructure inside Saudi Arabia. Moreover, despite the increased flow of oil out of the Gulf, gasoline prices remain very high, and a host of other economic problems show no signs of easing anytime soon, including high diesel prices, persistent inflation, elevated mortgage rates, and dangerously high bond yields across much of the West.
All of this is to say that the Trump administration has powerful economic incentives to shut this war down as soon as possible. Indeed, it would hardly be surprising if there were a growing sense of desperation behind closed doors among Trump and his advisers.
This, of course, helps explain why the Trump administration and its allies are waging a media campaign designed to persuade Iran that its days are numbered and that it had better concede to American demands before it is too late. The facts, however, tell a different story. The success of this strategy therefore depends on Trump being able to bamboozle the Iranians into believing that Godzilla is closing in on them. There is little reason to think Tehran will be hoodwinked.
Poland and Romania have refused to help Kiev move millions of tons of grain – which got stuck in Ukraine following Vladimir Zelensky’s war on exports – into the EU, Politico reports, citing officials in Warsaw and Bucharest. Zelensky’s 40-day campaign resulted in Russia implementing a de facto blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports, with the wider consequences of the strikes estimated at 1.5% of the country’s collapsing GDP.
Last week, Ukrainian Agriculture Minister Taras Vysotsky appealed to the EU for a €1.1 billion ($1.23 billion) allocation to improve transit capacity, which would help free large quantities of grain – Ukraine’s key source of income – trapped in the country.
The request came after Zelensky’s 40-day PR ‘pressure campaign’ on Russia, which involved long-range strikes on oil refineries and civilian infrastructure. The effort backfired, as Russia ramped up strikes on Ukraine’s military-related logistics, including the key hub of Odessa, accounting for an overwhelming majority of Kiev’s agricultural exports.
Speaking to Politico, Vysotsky described the situation as “very, very critical,” after his ministry reported the export of 2.4 million tons of agricultural products in September, just 46% of what Kiev considers the required volume.
He added that export restrictions leave Ukrainian farmers without cash needed to plant seeds now for next year’s harvest. “If the situation stays like this till spring, it could mean the decrease of even 35-40% of the planted area,” he warned.
Last month, Ukrainian officials estimated damage to infrastructure from Russian strikes at nearly $10 billion, with wider consequences amounting to around 1.5% of GDP.
While the EU as a whole is yet to give a definitive answer to the €1.1 billion request, Poland and Romania – which are crucial to facilitating Ukraine’s exports – ruled out any significant assistance.
Romanian Agriculture Minister Barna Tanczos rejected the prospect of substantially expanding capacity, telling Politico that “the interest for our own farmers remains a priority.”
Ukrainian cargo and low Danube water levels are already straining Romanian ports, he said, adding: “Everybody knows we cannot double the number of trains, we cannot double the roads, railways and port capacity. It is what it is.”
The Polish Infrastructure Ministry spokesperson said, as cited by Politico, that Poland “has no plans to introduce any changes aimed at increasing the transit of Ukrainian agricultural products.”
Before the €1.1 billion plea, Ukraine requested €220 million from the EU in grants to support farmers affected by disrupted exports, but the bloc effectively turned it down, pointing instead to existing EU mechanisms.
Agricultural trade has long been a source of friction between Ukraine and its EU neighbors. After the escalation of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022, Brussels suspended duties and quotas on Ukrainian exports, which triggered massive protests from European farmers over what they saw as unfair competition. As a result, the EU introduced an ‘emergency brake’ system in 2024, allowing tariff quotas to return for sensitive products if imports exceed set thresholds.
In addition, many of Ukraine’s neighbors, including Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia, maintain significant restrictions on Ukrainian imports at the national level.
Donald Trump tried to use America’s economic weight to force China to bend, only to discover that Beijing has built an economic weapon of its own that Washington cannot tackle. China Finds America’s Chokepoint For years, the central assumption underlying Washington’s economic confrontation with Beijing was that interdependence gave the United States more leverage than […]
Saudi oil tankers are loading again at Yanbu, less than three weeks after drone strikes shut down the East–West Pipeline that supplies the Red Sea port. On 24 September, crude was reported to be flowing west again, although no ship had yet loaded a cargo.
By 29 September, trade sources and shipping data showed that loadings had resumed. The interruption and recovery have offered a costly demonstration of what an oil route around the Strait of Hormuz can, and cannot, do.
Yanbu, Ceyhan and Baniyas sit at three very different points on that spectrum.
Yanbu has a 1,200-kilometer pipeline in operation and an established export terminal. Ceyhan is already loading Iraqi crude, though current Iraqi flows are measured in hundreds of thousands–not millions–of barrels a day. Baniyas could eventually give Iraq a major Mediterranean outlet, but for now it remains a project that depends on new infrastructure and financing, political agreements, and protection across two fragile states.
The comparison begins with the oil that reaches ships during a crisis. Pipeline capacity matters only as much as the pumps, terminals, and security along the route allow.
Yanbu’s exposed lifeline
Saudi Arabia’s 1,200-kilometer East–West Pipeline has a nominal capacity of 7 million barrels per day (bpd). Before the September strikes, reported flows through the system were already below that capacity. Three pumping stations were damaged, and the shutdown halted crude loadings at Yanbu. Riyadh blamed Iraqi resistance factions; the Islamic Resistance in Iraq denied responsibility for the strike. Baghdad condemned the strike and opened an investigation.
Restarting the line on 22 September did not immediately restore exports. Crude had to reach Yanbu and replenish stocks before tankers could load. Two vessels scheduled for 23 September left without cargo, according to shipping data cited by Reuters. Loadings resumed days later, after a strike on pumping stations hundreds of kilometers inland had kept the port idle.
Yanbu was moving between 2 million and 2.65 million bpd when tankers returned. Traders expected flows to rise to 3 million to 4 million bpd, but a return to the pre-attack level of roughly 5.5 million bpd could take another month.
The voyage has become more expensive, too. Quoted war-risk premiums for Saudi-linked tankers calling at Yanbu have risen to around 3 percent of vessel value, up from below 1 percent in early July. For a $100 million tanker carrying two million barrels, a 3 percent premium adds roughly $1.50 to the cost of each barrel, before fuel or freight. Yanbu may bypass Hormuz, but insurers are charging heavily for the detour.
Yanbu still leaves Asia-bound cargoes exposed to the southern Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab. Attacks and warnings by Yemen’s Ansarallah-aligned army have made passage through those waters more costly and uncertain. Heidmar Maritime Holdings chief executive Pankaj Khanna has highlighted another problem for shipowners: the Red Sea lacks the US naval protection sometimes available around Hormuz.
Saudi Arabia has escaped one strait only to send its oil toward another. Cargoes bound for Europe can head north through the Red Sea, but Asian customers require the southern passage. That split limits how freely Riyadh can reroute shipments when risks around Bab al-Mandab rise.
Ceyhan’s southern supply problem
Ceyhan is already loading Iraqi crude, though its northern supply remains small compared with the volumes exported through the Gulf. Flows stood at roughly 200,000 bpd in mid-September, down from about 250,000 bpd before the war. Baghdad’s challenge is getting oil from its vast southern fields into that northern export system.
Iraq has begun moving southern oil north by road. A September trial sent 209 tanker trucks carrying about 38,000 barrels to Kirkuk over two days. Basra Oil Company later said around 250,000 bpd was being transported north for onward export through Ceyhan.
Truck convoys are useful during a crisis, but they cannot replace a high-capacity pipeline. The first trial averaged about 182 barrels per truck. Moving 250,000 barrels at that rate would require roughly 1,370 loaded truck trips, with vehicles returning south for the next run. Road conditions and loading points impose additional constraints. Expanding Ceyhan therefore depends less on the Turkish terminal than on a reliable south-to-north connection within Iraq.
Energy analyst Richard Bronze of Energy Aspects has warned against treating bypass infrastructure as a substitute for Hormuz altogether. “The idea that the strait will stop mattering or become worthless is pure rhetoric,” he told Arab News. For Iraq, the road to Ceyhan provides an outlet. It cannot yet carry southern crude at a scale that would loosen Baghdad’s reliance on the Gulf.
Baniyas across the war map
Baniyas is the most ambitious option because it could reshape Iraq’s export map. Iraq has approved preliminary studies comparing routes including Basra–Haditha–Kirkuk–Ceyhan and Basra–Haditha–Baniyas, with a consortium that includes Chevron, TI Capital, and Qatar’s UCC. Chatham House estimates the wider Iraq–Syria network at around $15 billion, with a proposed initial capacity of roughly 2 million bpd and construction potentially taking about four years.
Syrian officials have given a somewhat shorter timeframe. Syrian Petroleum Company chief Youssef Qablawi said in August that the Haditha–Baniyas project could take around 30 months to three years after final agreements and engineering work. Even the shorter timetable places Baniyas beyond the present shipping crisis, assuming agreements and funding are secured.
The route’s security problem is also more complex than a line drawn on a map. A pipeline from Haditha toward Syria would traverse western Iraq, including areas where ISIS cells remain a concern, before entering eastern Syria, where state authority remains uneven and armed groups continue to operate.
Chatham House noted in September that armed actors, including ISIS, have attacked oil wells and tanker trucks in eastern Syria, while Iraq’s fragmented security system leaves multiple actors capable of obstructing or extracting rents from infrastructure.
Israel’s strikes and military presence in Syria would loom over any pipeline to Baniyas. There is no evidence that Israel plans to attack the project, but a route through Syrian territory would depend on security guarantees Damascus cannot yet provide.
Baniyas itself is more functional than the word “reconstruction” sometimes suggests. Iraqi-origin fuel oil has already been trucked through Syria and handled at the terminal, demonstrating that a commercial logistics chain can operate.
The existing trade gives the project a foothold, but handling trucked fuel oil is far removed from loading 1–2 million bpd of pipeline crude. Storage, pumping systems, berths and terminal reliability would have to be scaled accordingly.
The old Kirkuk–Baniyas line was badly damaged, and the planned network may take a different route. Existing truck traffic therefore offers little indication of the cost or the construction work required to handle sustained crude flows.
Sanctions are another constraint, though less severe than under Bashar al-Assad. The EU lifted its broad economic sanctions on Syria in 2025 while retaining security-based and targeted measures, and the US rescinded Syria’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in August 2026. That lowers, but does not eliminate, banking, insurance, due-diligence and counterparty risk for a multi-billion-dollar project.
Iran’s leverage runs through Iraq
The geopolitical logic behind Iraq’s western routes is often framed as a means to reduce Iranian leverage over Hormuz. Iran’s influence in Iraq also extends through energy trade, political networks, and armed factions embedded in Iraq’s fragmented security order.
At the same time, Tehran does not treat Iraq exactly as it treats other Gulf states. Mostafa Khoshcheshm, a political commentator on Iranian television, toldAl Jazeera in August that Iran viewed Iraq as a “friendly state” and had allowed some Iraqi oil tankers to pass Hormuz.
He said Baghdad had “always stood up to the United States.” His view is one Iranian reading of Baghdad’s position. An Iraqi move toward Gulf- and US-backed western export corridors would also alter the economic leverage surrounding it.
An expansion through Baniyas or Ceyhan would give Baghdad more room to negotiate export terms without severing its ties to Iran. Gulf investment would bring new transit partners and sources of capital, though it would not automatically shift Iraq’s political alignment.
The security question cuts both ways. Iran-aligned resistance factions could be a source of vulnerability if they viewed a corridor as threatening their strategic interests. ISIS remnants and local power brokers could also obstruct it, while transit-state disputes might halt flows without an attack. Yanbu’s damaged pumps are a warning about the vulnerability of a land corridor.
Iraq’s other proposed exits face obstacles of their own. Reviving the dormant Iraq Pipeline through Saudi Arabia (IPSA) would require Riyadh’s agreement and extensive repairs. The Basra–Aqaba route would have to be built across western Iraq and Jordan.
Egypt’s SUMED pipeline is already operating, but Baghdad has no direct way to feed Iraqi crude into it. For now, the southern Gulf terminals remain Iraq’s only outlet capable of handling exports at scale.
What reaches the tanker?
As of early October, Yanbu can move the largest potential volume because the pipeline and port already exist, but its 7 million bpd nameplate figure overstates the immediately exportable capacity, while Red Sea shipping costs and the Bab al-Mandab remain concerns.
Ceyhan can now load Iraqi crude, but expansion depends on resolving Iraq’s internal north–south logistics. Baniyas offers the largest geopolitical transformation, but it remains years, billions of dollars, and security agreements away from moving crude at scale.
Hormuz remains central to the region’s oil trade even as states invest in alternatives. Yanbu, Ceyhan and Baniyas each shift some exposure from the strait to pumping stations, desert corridors, insurers or transit governments. Their value will be measured by the barrels reaching ships when the Gulf route is under threat, not by the capacity listed in a project plan.
The European Union has begun assessing contingency scenarios in case German Chancellor Friedrich Merz leaves office or becomes increasingly focused on domestic political difficulties, Politico Europe reported Friday, citing diplomats and European officials.
According to the report, governments in two European countries have held internal discussions on how a possible end to Merz’s chancellorship could affect EU policymaking.
The discussions reportedly reflect growing concern in Brussels over political instability in Germany following major electoral setbacks for Merz’s governing conservatives and renewed tensions within the coalition.
Recent regional elections have weakened Merz politically. Reuters reported that the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) suffered its worst-ever result in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania in September, failing to clear the threshold to enter the state parliament, while the Alternative for Germany (AfD) made further gains.
Berlin’s Political Turmoil Raises EU Concerns
Politico Europe reported that officials consider two scenarios particularly disruptive: Germany being left without an effective leader or a right-wing government emerging in Berlin. However, the report said both scenarios are viewed as unlikely in the short term.
Under Germany’s constitutional system, a chancellor cannot simply be replaced by a successor appointed by the governing party. The Bundestag elects the chancellor, meaning any leadership change would require the necessary parliamentary majority.
For Brussels, the political uncertainty matters because Germany remains the EU’s largest economy and a central actor in negotiations over major bloc-wide policies.
Reuters reported Thursday that Merz is facing growing domestic pressure, while speculation about possible successors has emerged within the CDU. Merz has nevertheless rejected calls to step aside and continues to pursue his government’s policy agenda.
EU Budget Dispute Adds Pressure
Merz’s domestic political position could also affect negotiations over the EU’s next seven-year budget.
According to Politico Europe, Germany is part of a group of member states, including the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, and Finland, seeking substantial reductions to the proposed long-term EU budget. The report said officials believe domestic political pressure could encourage Berlin to take a tougher negotiating position in Brussels.
The budget dispute comes as EU governments debate competing priorities, including defense, industrial investment, infrastructure, and support for Ukraine.
Military Buildup Remains Central to Merz’s Agenda
Despite the political pressure, Merz’s government continues to prioritize strengthening Germany’s armed forces. Reuters reported that Berlin’s debt-financed investment drive is supporting both infrastructure and military expansion, while the government has committed hundreds of billions of euros to rebuilding the armed forces.
Any change in Berlin’s political leadership would therefore carry implications beyond Germany, potentially affecting EU budget negotiations, defense policy, relations with Russia, and the bloc’s wider strategic direction.
G7 states will release up to 100 million barrels of emergency oil and diesel stocks over the next four months, French President Emmanuel Macron announced on 2 October, bowing to US pressure to tame diesel prices driven to record highs by the war on Iran.
The release will be coordinated by the International Energy Agency (IEA), and comes the same day as European Commission spokesperson Anna-Kaisa Itkonen said the EU “fully” rejected US threats to halt diesel exports unless Europe drew down more of its reserves.
“We fully reject any ban on diesel. A ban would not be beneficial to anyone. It would undermine our trust in the United States as a reliable partner,” she said.
She added that the EU Oil Coordination Group, due to meet on 15 October, could convene sooner if necessary.
Macron, who currently chairs the G7, had also spoken out against any export ban in a call with US President Donald Trump earlier that day, with his office saying he urged G7 states to act together “without export restrictions.”
The diplomatic scramble followed a push a day earlier from US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, who urged European states to speed up delivery on their existing reserve commitments.
“American farmers, truckers, and businesses should not be left carrying the burden of a global diesel shortage,” he wrote on social media.
Trump threatened the diesel export ban earlier this week, a move EU trade chief Maros Sefcovic warned would have “dramatic consequences for our economic performance.”
The US has threatened to starve France and Germany of diesel unless they release their emergency diesel stocks, with a European source saying Washington is pressing the EU to hand over 120 million barrels within six months.
China has also suspended refined fuel exports for October to rebuild its own depleted reserves, according to Reuters, further tightening a global market already strained by the US war on Iran.
Europe’s reliance on US fuel, which deepened after it banned Russian imports and the US-Israeli war on Iran cut supplies from West Asia, has cost the bloc more than $113 billion in extra energy payments this year, without it receiving “one extra molecule of gas or oil,” according to European Energy Commissioner Dan Jorgensen.
Meanwhile, Washington is also lending energy companies another 40 million barrels from its Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR).
The reserve has already fallen to its lowest level since 1982, and releasing the full amount would drag it below the minimum set under federal law.
Since the start of the latest made-for-Israel war, Donald Trump and his surrogates have repeatedly promised Americans that it would be a few weeks and oil prices would soon crash below prewar levels. Instead, it was every promise that crashed. When those promises failed to materialize, the message shifted: the war is worth the price to stop Iran from becoming a nuclear power.
But what if Iran did become a nuclear power? How would that pose a greater threat to the U.S. than North Korea or Russia already do? Or is the real concern not a risk to America, but a challenge to the regional hegemony of a foreign nuclear power, Israel?
For more than thirty years, according to Israel’s fiction, Iran was on the verge of becoming a nuclear-armed state. That fictitious deadline has come and gone repeatedly, yet Benjamin Netanyahu has been recycling the same lie since 1992. The Israeli lies and deceit persisted even though, unlike Israel, Iran’s nuclear program was subject to strict international monitoring.
Still, Trump, at Netanyahu’s urging, walked away from an agreement that imposed some of the most stringent and verifiable restrictions ever placed on a country’s nuclear program. Now Americans are being asked to pay in blood and billions of dollars for abandoning a diplomatic agreement that had kept Iran’s nuclear program under unprecedented international scrutiny and helped contain the very threat now being used to justify the war.
The hypocrisy is impossible to overlook. Iran has been subjected to relentless demands for transparency and inspections, while Israel’s own nuclear arsenal, built in part with materials stolen from the U.S., remains shielded from any international inspection.
Yet somehow Iran’s ambitious know-how is the existential nuclear threat, not Israel’s nuclear bombs.
American consumers have long been the victims of a disinformation campaign, and now they are being forced to pay the price for a war sold to them on false pretenses. The most recent misinformation claiming the Strait of Hormuz is open and oil is flowing. The president said it on Fox, and the outgoing White House press secretary told Fox & Friends that the U.S. is essentially controlling the strait and that it remains open. These claims leave only two possibilities: either the statements are outright lies, or oil companies are gouging the consumer.
The UK Maritime Trade Operations Centre reported that commercial traffic through the strait remains about 75 percent below pre-conflict levels. It also tallied dozens of projectile strikes on vessels in just the past two months.
Three quarters less traffic is not a sign of an open strait. Shipowners and insurers know this, so do traders and so the climbing numbers at the gas pump.
The market has already made its judgment, and every American who fills a tank can see it. It is past time for Washington to stop lying.
For the average consumer, the pump is where it felt. Regular gasoline was below $3 a gallon before the U.S. was dragged into another one of made-for-Israeli wars. Families are paying more to get to work, truckers are paying more to move goods, and those costs show up in the price of groceries.
Meanwhile, American oil companies are pumping at record levels. Exxon and Chevron are producing record volumes from oil fields on American soil, thousands of miles from the Strait of Hormuz. Their production costs have not changed. What has changed is Israel’s war surcharge consumers are being forced to pay.
Chevron reported the largest quarterly net profit in its history, $12.1 billion. Exxon made $14.5 billion in the same quarter, about $160 million a day. Refining has become more lucrative. Gross refining margins more than doubled, soaring from a typical $20 crack spread to as much as $60.
Meanwhile, Trump dangles a pie-in-the-sky deal with Venezuela as a distraction from consumers’ mounting anxiety, while his administration stands by as oil companies exploit overseas crises for record profits. These companies have no reason to lower prices when war has handed them a windfall. This is what a war of choice looks like on the ground: American consumers are forced to pay the price, while oil executives in Texas turn a crisis into a lucrative business opportunity.
American consumers deserve more than false promises. If the Strait is open, then oil prices should be coming down. If it is not, then stop treating consumers as an audience whose emotions must be managed rather than citizens entitled to hear the truth. Since the war started, every week, like millions of Americans, I fill my gas tank, and the Israeli war tax is higher than it was the week before.
No, Mr. President, that is not “worth the price” to pay for a war fabricated in Israel, a repeat of the made-for-Israel war in Iraq 23 years ago.
This is not a war to end Iran’s fictitious nuclear power. It is a war paid for by taxpayers’ money and American blood to ensure that Israel remains the only absolute nuclear power in the Middle East.
No one would claim that the Iran War has been a political godsend for President Donald Trump and the Republican Party. But some Israel-First conservatives are willing to say—and lately have been incessantly saying—that the Iran War hasn’t been a political scourge.
Those Israel-First conservatives are wrong, even if the devil is, at least partly, hidden in the details. The Iran War has damaged Trump’s approval ratings, consumed his presidency, and darkened the GOP’s prospects in the upcoming midterm elections.
A chief proponent of the argument that Trump hasn’t suffered all that much from the Iran War is Ben Shapiro of the Daily Wire. Shapiro’s political analysis is plainly motivated by the fact that he was a loud and influential proponent of the war who promised—falsely, as it turned out—that Iran couldn’t close the Strait of Hormuz, a chokepoint for the global energy trade.
“There’s an op right now to pretend that the real reason for President Trump’s unpopularity is foreign policy, but that is not true, by the polling data, it is not true,” said Shapiro on a recent episode of his podcast. “The reality is that Americans have affordability concerns, President Trump came into office saying he was going to alleviate the affordability concerns. He has not in fact alleviated the affordability concerns, and therefore, his polling numbers have consistently slid since Liberation Day.”
This is a bit like me saying my wife isn’t mad at me because of the drinking, but because I drunkenly crashed the car.
The Iran War, as everyone now knows, has driven up prices at the pump—prices which, unfortunately for Trump, are prominently displayed on every major street across the country. On the eve of the war, regular gasoline averaged $2.98 per gallon. Today, at the time of writing, the average price is $4.48. Americans are notoriously averse to high gasoline prices and tend to punish presidents over the issue, sometimes even when the president can’t justifiably be blamed.
But make no mistake: Virtually every sentient adult understands that 1) oil comes from the Middle East, 2) Trump started a big war in the region, and 3) gas prices shot up right afterwards. And again, even if Americans didn’t grok the connection between the war and the gas-price spike, the latter would still have hurt Trump politically, and it would still be a knock-on effect of the former.
It’s not just prices at the pump that have gone up because of the war. Groceries and other consumer goods travel across this vast land on tractor-trailers that run on diesel and get a lot fewer miles per gallon than even your Uncle Larry’s F-350. Diesel prices have smashed records and now sit at around $6.50, up from $3.76 before the war.
No wonder truckers are furious, prompting rumors of an imminent strike.
And no wonder the Iran War has contributed to general inflation in America. Anyone who has been reading the official economic reports knows the war is responsible for more than a third of recent inflation.
Before the war, inflation was trending down, only a couple ticks away from the Federal Reserve’s target of 2 percent. It seems likely that Trump, if he hadn’t started his dumb war in the Middle East, would have garnered praise for presiding over declining inflation and that the Fed would have cut interest rates, juicing economic growth. Instead, inflation now sits at 3.4 percent.
(As an aside, this weekend I traveled to Istanbul, where many Middle Easterners of various nationalities complained to me that Americans only oppose the war because of the gas prices. That’s simply not true. The war has been unpopular since day one, when all that Americans knew was the American-Israeli strikes had killed Iranian leaders including the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.)
Shapiro, ever the neoconservative, insinuated in the quote above that the decline in Trump’s approval rating owes more to his tariffs than to his war. The data doesn’t back that up, as the conservative commentator and election analyst Ryan Girdusky noted on X in response to new survey data. “The most eye opening part of this poll is that Trump’s approval rating and the strength of the economy went up right after Liberation Day,” Girdusky said. “Fell slightly afterward and then plummeted at the start of the Iran War.”
Shapiro has unwittingly helped uncover another, subtler, way in which the Iran War has indirectly damaged Trump’s approval ratings and, by extension, the Republican Party brand. Shapiro recently went on Fox News to commiserate with the host Mark Levin—another Israel-Firster and warmonger—over all those dastardly antiwar conservatives blaming the Iran War for everything.
“Iran is a 4-percent issue with the American people,” Levin said, as Shapiro nodded in agreement. Levin was referring to Fox News polling that shows not many Americans name the Iran War as their top issue. “So, whatever happens in the midterms, it doesn’t appear that Iran’s going to drive anything one way or another.”
“I think that’s exactly right,” Shapiro replied.
Part of the problem with Levin’s analysis has already been covered above. In the Fox poll, a plurality of Americans—34 percent—named the cost of living as the most important issue, and the Iran War has made living costlier.
But the subtler problem is perhaps even more illuminating. Simply put, Americans believe Trump is too focused on foreign policy at the expense of the problem they really care about, which, in fact, his Iran War has exacerbated. This is a PR disaster for the Trump administration and the GOP. Americans don’t prioritize the war that has dominated the headlines and distracted the White House, even as Trump claims to have boldly prevented Iran from unleashing nuclear apocalypse.
It may be grotesque to find silver linings in this dumb and deadly war, but here’s one: Americans no longer buy the war narratives. That is certainly not, however, a silver lining for Republican candidates in this year’s election, no matter how cynically they try to distance themselves from the war. In fact, it’s a good bet they’ll do much worse than if Trump hadn’t launched this unnecessary war, despite what Shapiro and his ilk may tell you.
US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s prediction that Iran’s economy would soon collapse underscores the depth of delusion within the current American leadership.
“Iran is absolutely not sanctionable,” Deputy Economy Minister Mortaza Zamanian said this week as Tehran worked to keep trade flowing despite Washington’s latest sanctions campaign.
Zamanian cited Iran’s extensive borders, established commercial routes and longstanding trading relationships, saying that they make it impossible for external pressure simply to switch off the country’s economy.
His remarks came as Washington intensified its economic terrorism against Iranian oil, shipping, aviation, finance, technology and foreign companies supporting those sectors.
US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said that Iran would probably make its final oil deliveries to China within two weeks, after which, he asserted, “they will have nothing.”
That prediction deserves comparison with history, because American administrations have imposed increasingly severe sanctions since 1979 while repeatedly expecting economic pressure eventually to produce decisive Iranian economic collapse.
The economy did not disappear under those campaigns; instead, Iran developed domestic industries, expanded regional commerce, strengthened Asian trade and accumulated extensive experience operating outside Western financial systems.
The proposition that an economy which has absorbed American sanctions for almost half a century will suddenly become economically empty within two weeks therefore indicates the depth of delusion among the current US leadership.
Iran enters the current confrontation with a large domestic market, substantial productive capacity, enormous energy resources and deeply established commercial relationships extending across neighboring countries and wider Eurasian markets.
The World Bank describes Iran as relatively diversified for an oil-exporting economy, with substantial manufacturing, agricultural and service activity supported by a large population and significant domestic consumption.
That domestic market sustains production across food, pharmaceuticals, construction materials, steel, petrochemicals, machinery and consumer goods, meaning Iranian production does not depend entirely upon continuous access to Western consumers.
Iran has also developed major industrial capabilities suited to its own resources and infrastructure, including steel, refining, petrochemicals, cement, power generation, construction, food processing and pharmaceutical manufacturing.
These capabilities have continued developing despite restrictions on Western investment and technology, demonstrating that Iranian industrial activity does not depend upon permanent participation by Western companies.
Iran’s prolonged exposure to sanctions has produced accumulated technical and commercial knowledge, giving Iranian companies decades of experience managing restricted supply chains and unreliable access to foreign suppliers.
When foreign manufacturers withdraw, Iranian companies have learned to redesign equipment, substitute components, develop domestic suppliers and cooperate with businesses from countries willing to maintain commercial relationships.
Academic research has documented this process, showing that sanctions can simultaneously restrict foreign technology while encouraging domestic technological development and adaptation within affected Iranian industrial sectors.
The resulting knowledge extends beyond individual companies, because engineers, technicians, procurement specialists and managers have accumulated practical experience managing shortages, substitution and alternative sourcing.
Iranian manufacturers therefore do not design procurement systems around the assumption that every international supplier will remain available indefinitely, making adaptation part of ordinary commercial planning.
Iran’s geography provides another economic advantage, because the country borders Turkey, Iraq, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan while possessing coastlines reaching the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman.
Those borders connect Iranian commerce with the Caucasus, Central Asia, South Asia, the Persian Gulf, Turkey and Iraq, while transportation corridors also connect Iran with Russia and wider Eurasian markets.
Financial sanctions can make transactions more difficult, but they cannot physically relocate Iran or eliminate its access to neighboring markets, suppliers, transportation routes and established regional trading relationships.
Iran has consequently developed commercial links involving Iraq, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Caucasus, Central Asia and China through years of sustained economic interaction.
The World Bank has documented Iran’s increasing trade orientation toward neighboring countries and China as sanctions restricted conventional international relationships, making this regional pivot an established economic feature.
China adds another dimension because it combines enormous industrial capacity with sustained demand for Iranian energy while supplying machinery, manufactured products and industrial inputs required throughout Iran’s domestic economy.
The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission identifies China as Iran’s largest trading partner and estimates that China imported approximately 1.4 million barrels of Iranian crude daily during 2025.
Chinese independent refiners have continued purchasing Iranian crude through commercial arrangements designed to reduce their exposure to American financial restrictions and sanctions enforcement.
That relationship demonstrates why Iran does not require unrestricted access to every Western market when Chinese demand and extensive regional commerce provide alternative markets for Iranian commodities.
Iran’s energy resources provide enormous economic depth, with the World Bank ranking the country second globally in proven natural-gas reserves and fourth globally in proven crude-oil reserves.
Those resources provide export potential while also supplying abundant domestic energy and petrochemical feedstocks supporting manufacturing, electricity generation, transportation and numerous energy-intensive industrial activities.
Iran has consequently developed a substantial downstream economy converting hydrocarbons into refined products, petrochemicals and industrial inputs rather than depending exclusively upon crude-oil exports.
The World Bank has noted that sanctions encouraged additional processing of hydrocarbons into petrochemicals, illustrating how restrictions contributed to changes within Iran’s export structure.
Iran has also developed financial mechanisms outside conventional Western banking, including bilateral currency arrangements, exchange houses, barter, intermediary companies and indirect settlement channels supporting international commercial activity.
The World Bank has documented growing use of bilateral currency exchange, barter and indirect payment mechanisms as Iranian trade shifted increasingly toward neighboring countries and China.
These arrangements provide alternative methods for exchanging value when conventional dollar-based transactions become unavailable or prohibitively difficult.
Their existence helps explain why Washington increasingly targets third-country banks, intermediaries and commercial facilitators, because Iranian commerce extends through extensive international networks beyond domestic financial institutions.
Against this background, Bessent’s prediction assumes that eliminating a major source of oil revenue would effectively remove the broader economic foundations supporting Iran’s productive system and commercial institutions.
Iran’s economic structure is considerably broader, because oil exports represent one component of national activity alongside manufacturing, agriculture, services, domestic consumption and regional commerce.
The World Bank estimates that Iran’s economy contracted during the Iranian year ending March 2026, while simultaneously describing adaptation through changing trade patterns and alternative payment mechanisms.
Economic contraction, however, is fundamentally different from the disappearance of productive capacity, infrastructure, commercial institutions and domestic relationships sustaining millions of Iranian consumers and businesses.
American sanctions have repeatedly targeted Iranian banking, oil exports, investment, technology, shipping and foreign companies, yet Iran has retained its industrial base and redirected substantial trade toward neighboring countries.
Washington possesses powerful financial tools, but financial restrictions cannot physically eliminate Iran’s factories, oilfields, farms, engineers, consumers, ports, borders or commercial relationships accumulated over decades.
The central question is therefore whether American pressure can erase the productive, geographical, resource and commercial foundations Iran has accumulated across nearly half a century of economic adaptation.
Nothing in Iran’s economic history demonstrates that those foundations can disappear within two weeks, particularly while the country retains domestic production, regional markets, energy resources and established commercial relationships.
Iran therefore enters the present confrontation with domestic capabilities, energy resources, industrial capacity, geographic advantages and international relationships capable of keeping its economy operating despite intensified American terrorism.
Iraq’s government has declared September 30 the final date for ending the US-led coalition’s military mission. Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s office says October 1 will find the country “free of any foreign military presence,” closing a deployment that once reached about 170,000 US troops.
But withdrawal leaves intact much of the damage inflicted by the invasion and the 13 years of sanctions that preceded it, along with the financial arrangements through which Washington continues to exert influence.
The US left Iraq’s productive economy devastated, its institutions dismantled and reshaped, and its workforce left increasingly dependent on a state funded by oil. Access to that income remains vulnerable to US pressure.
The question after the troops leave is how much control Iraq will have over the economy they leave behind.
Thirteen years of sanctions
The erosion of Iraq’s economy began long before March 2003. The UN Security Council imposed sweeping sanctions after Saddam Hussein’s regime invaded Kuwait in 1990. Drawing on internal UN records, Joy Gordon’s Invisible War describes one of the most comprehensive and devastating sanctions regimes ever imposed.
The embargo quickly collapsed incomes. Reconstructed World Bank estimates showed GDP per capita collapsing to a third in a single year, going from about $3,527 in 1990 to $1,255 in 1991.
Public employees who had earned $150 to $200 a month before sanctions were earning $3 to $5 by 1996, according to a 1997 assessment. By 2000, the International Committee of the Red Cross reported salaries as low as $2 a month and unemployment around 50 percent.
Factories, power stations, and water plants could not recover without imported equipment and spare parts. Yet any member of the sanctions committee could hold an entire contract indefinitely, even over a single disputed item. Gordon documents Washington’s use of the “dual-use” designation to restrict goods as basic as water pipes. By August 2002, the UN counted 2,058 contracts worth about $5.2 billion that had been placed on hold, including $745 million in oil industry equipment.
The restrictions also placed Iraq’s oil income beyond Baghdad’s direct control. Under the Oil-for-Food program, buyers paid into a UN-administered escrow account. After deductions for compensation, administration, and weapons inspections, the proceeds could finance only approved purchases. Iraq exported roughly $65 billion in oil under the program but could not use that money as ordinary budget revenue for wages, maintenance, or local services.
The collapse pushed skilled workers out of their professions. A UN humanitarian survey of 1,157 degree holders employed by aid organizations found 725 in general-service or menial jobs, including doctors, engineers, and scientists working as drivers, clerks, and guards.
By the time US troops arrived, Iraq had endured years of falling wages, industrial decline, and lost expertise. The occupation’s first decisions deepened that damage.
Dismantling the state, contracting out reconstruction
On May 16, 2003, the occupation authority issued Order 1, barring senior Baath Party members from public employment and requiring the screening of senior staff in ministries, hospitals, and universities. A week later, Order 2 dissolved the Defense Ministry, army, Republican Guard, and intelligence bodies.
The International Center for Transitional Justice estimates that Order 2 alone left about 400,000 conscripts, officers, and officials without jobs. The World Bank counted more than 2 million unemployed Iraqis, nearly 30 percent of the labor force, around 2003–2004. Meanwhile, Iraq’s health minister estimated that roughly half the country’s prewar doctors had fled as kidnapping and assassination made their work increasingly dangerous.
The occupation then opened the weakened economy to foreign competition. Order 39 allowed wholly foreign-owned companies and guaranteed investors treatment no less favorable than Iraqi businesses, while excluding natural resource extraction. Other orders suspended tariffs, later replaced by a flat 5 percent levy, and capped income tax at 15 percent from 2004. The World Bank warned that rapid opening would cost jobs in a country whose private sector was too weak to employ displaced workers.
Reconstruction brought billions of dollars, but much of the spending flowed through foreign contractors. The United States spent more than $60 billion over roughly a decade, according to the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR). More than $25 billion went to training and equipping security forces after the occupation had dissolved Iraq’s existing military institutions.
SIGIR found that reconstruction began without adequate security, consultation with Iraqi ministries, or planning for long-term maintenance. Its final report estimated waste at $3 billion to $5 billion from the main reconstruction fund and as much as $8 billion overall. The largest early infrastructure contracts went mainly to US firms. A $1.8 billion award to Bechtel in January 2004 was open only to American bidders.
Iraq’s own money followed a similar path. UN Security Council Resolution 1483 established the Development Fund for Iraq to receive oil revenue, with the occupation authority directing spending until June 2004.
An Iraq Revenue Watch analysis of contracts paid from Iraqi funds found that US companies received 74 percent of their value. US and British companies together received 85 percent, while Iraqi firms received 2 percent. Audits found that 73 percent of the value of Development Fund contracts above $5 million had been awarded without competitive bidding.
Oversight was inadequate even to establish how some of that money had been used. A 2010 SIGIR audit found that the Defense Department had failed to establish required accounting controls for about $8.7 billion of the $9.1 billion it received from the fund. It could not document spending of about $2.6 billion.
The result was a reconstruction process that directed vast sums abroad while leaving Iraq with damaged services, limited productive capacity, and institutions struggling to rebuild.
An oil-funded system of patronage
With factories closed or looted and no private industry to replace them, the state became the place where Iraqis look for work. An assessment by the International Fund for Agricultural Development, using World Bank data, says public employment accounts for nearly all formal jobs and 40 percent of all jobs. Salaries and pensions took about 90 trillion dinars, roughly $69 billion, more than 40 percent of the 2024 budget, and the World Bank says another half a million government jobs were added during the spending expansion that preceded 2025.
The private sector has not filled the gap. Estimates put imports at more than 90 percent of the goods in Iraqi shops, while manufacturing makes up only around 2 percent of GDP. The World Bank says nearly 29 percent of the population is aged 15 to 29, and that this large group is entering the labor market amid limited job creation, a preference for public-sector work, and a private sector too small to absorb them. Youth unemployment is about 32 percent, and only around 11 percent of women take part in the labor force.
The IMF’s 2025 assessment describes the same pattern, citing high unemployment, an excessive state footprint, corruption, a weak banking system, and an inefficient electricity sector, and it called the wage trajectory fiscally unsustainable. Analysts describe a cycle in which secure public wages raise the pay that educated workers expect, private firms struggle with unreliable power and weak finance, and young graduates keep turning to the state for jobs, which raises the demand for more public hiring.
Oil pays for all of it. The World Bank estimates that oil supplied about 88 percent of government revenue and 91 percent of exports in 2025.
The financial levers Washington keeps
Iraq’s oil income has passed through outside hands since 1996, first a UN escrow, then the occupation authority’s fund, and now the New York Fed.
The Development Fund’s accounts were opened at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, where Iraqi oil revenue still flows. Buyers pay dollars into a Ministry of Finance account, and the Central Bank of Iraq converts part of the income into dinars for government spending. US jurisdiction over dollar clearing, correspondent banking, and physical cash shipments gives Washington substantial influence over Iraq’s access to its money.
In January 2020, after Iraq’s parliament called for foreign troops to leave, the Trump administration threatened to block access to the account. Iraqi officials said it then held about $35 billion and warned that losing access would disrupt salary payments and the exchange rate.
US restrictions introduced in November 2022 forced banks seeking dollars for international transfers to disclose the final beneficiaries and purposes of transactions through an electronic platform, with requests screened by the New York Fed. US and Iraqi accounts linked the measures to concerns about transfers to sanctioned Iranian actors.
Consequently, more than 80 percent of daily wire requests were initially blocked or returned. Transfers fell from $224.4 million on October 17, 2022, to $22.9 million on January 17, 2023. Demand shifted to the parallel market, where the dinar traded at about 1,588 to the dollar in February against a newly set official rate of 1,300. In a country dependent on imported food and consumer goods, restricted dollar access raised costs for ordinary households.
In April 2026, Washington applied pressure through physical cash, halting a shipment of about $500 million and suspending parts of security cooperation. Iraqi officials said the halt affected banknotes used for travel, medical treatment, education, and retail exchange, while electronic transfers for imports continued. Some shipments resumed in July. On September 26, Baghdad announced that Washington had agreed to continue them.
US sanctions have also reshaped access to Iraq’s oil fields. Russia’s Lukoil left West Qurna 2 after sanctions, and Chevron signed agreements to take over its development. During al-Zaidi’s July visit to Washington, Iraq signed dozens of agreements with companies including ExxonMobil, KBR, Halliburton, and Shell. US Energy Secretary Chris Wright cited more than $60 billion in commercial agreements, while al-Zaidi told The National that US companies would receive top priority. According to the Atlantic Council, Donald Trump framed the deals as American oil companies taking the place of US forces.
As US forces prepare to leave Iraq, they leave behind a trail of devastation. Decades of sanctions and occupation have weakened its productive economy, dismantled state institutions, and left livelihoods dependent on an oil-funded system of patronage. The consequences will endure long after the troops depart.
Washington retains substantial power over Iraq through its influence over dollar access and the financial channels that sustain the state. The withdrawal ends a military mission, while leaving Baghdad to contend with both the damage of US intervention and the control Washington continues to exercise.
Imperialism, considered by public intellectuals to be a thing of the past, has been resurrected; this time, the actions of the American President Donald Trump clearly reflect that. Defined as the raw exercise of power in order to conquer territories and appropriate resources for the establishment of an empire, imperialism has had a long and […]
Euronews claims climate change has evolved into a “meta-crisis” threatening food security, energy supplies, economies, water resources, and international security. This is misleading because the article largely substitutes predictions and assertions for measurements of what is actually happening. The data show global crop production and yields reaching record levels, deaths from extreme weather collapsing over the long term, and many of today’s energy and economic problems arising from political choices and geopolitical conflicts rather than changes in climate.
Euronews builds its case primarily around an interview with Emmanuella Doussis, UNESCO Chair on Climate Diplomacy at the University of Athens. Doussis declares climate change an economic, social, political, and geopolitical problem, linking it to competition for resources, migration, water shortages, food insecurity, and the energy transition.
Those are sweeping claims. Curiously, Euronews provides remarkably little observational evidence demonstrating that climate change is actually causing the worldwide “meta-crisis” its headline announces.
Perhaps the most obvious contradiction concerns food.
Doussis predicts, “We will face a very large, serious problem with food security.” But predictions about what might happen cannot erase what is happening.
Climate at a Glance: Crop Production summarizes data from the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization showing that global crop production and yields have risen dramatically during the period of modern warming. Its latest summary reports that the 2023 and 2024 global crop years produced the two highest global crop yields per acre on record.
Climate Realism has documented the same trend repeatedly. Global production of staple crops has increased substantially, and yields have repeatedly set records during recent decades. Even where individual crops suffer poor regional seasons because of drought, floods, pests, or other causes, that is not evidence of a deteriorating global food supply.
None of this means weather cannot damage crops. It always has. It means that portraying climate change as presently creating a global food-security crisis conflicts with the direction of observed agricultural production.
The article’s treatment of energy is equally peculiar.
Euronews describes moving away from fossil fuels as part of the solution to its supposed climate “meta-crisis,” while simultaneously acknowledging that doing so creates “new dependencies” involving lithium, cobalt, rare earths, and other materials. It concedes that fossil-fuel-producing nations could be economically weakened and that entirely new geopolitical dependencies would emerge.
That sounds less like a crisis caused by climate change than economic disruption caused by policies adopted in response to climate change.
Europe provides an obvious example. Energy prices do not rise because a thermometer records a slightly higher average temperature. Prices respond to fuel availability, generating capacity, taxes, regulations, subsidies, transmission costs, geopolitical disruptions, and government decisions about which power plants may operate.
Climate Realism has repeatedly documented how wind and solar cost comparisons can omit the expense of backup generation, transmission, storage, subsidies, and other system costs necessary to accommodate intermittent generation.
There is an important distinction here that Euronews blurs: costs created by climate policy are not costs created by climate change.
The same problem occurs when the article moves from energy to economics. Weather can certainly cause economic losses. Droughts, floods, hurricanes, heat waves, freezes, and wildfires have done so throughout human history. But declaring climate change responsible for a generalized economic crisis requires evidence that those hazards are worsening in ways attributable to climate change.
Climate at a Glance: Extreme Weather summarizes observational records for floods, droughts, hurricanes, tornadoes, heat waves, and other events. The picture is considerably more complicated than the simple worsening-disaster narrative presented by much of the media.
More importantly, human vulnerability to weather has declined spectacularly.
Climate at a Glance: Deaths from Extreme Weather reports that global deaths from weather-related disasters have fallen by more than 99 percent during the past century, using international disaster data.
That is a remarkable accomplishment. Wealth, infrastructure, fossil-fueled transportation, modern agriculture, heating, air conditioning, weather forecasting, communications, engineering, and emergency management have made human beings vastly more resilient to nature.
Ironically, Doussis herself provides perhaps the most sensible sentence in the entire Euronews article: “Climate change is not always to blame.”
She acknowledges that some Greek disasters reflect chronic failures in planning, complicated regulations, inadequate infrastructure, and insufficient protection of vulnerable areas.
Exactly. That caveat deserves far more attention than Euronews gives it.
A flood becomes catastrophic when people build in floodplains, drainage systems are inadequate, warning systems fail, or infrastructure is poorly maintained. Drought becomes a water crisis when reservoirs, irrigation systems, groundwater resources, and water policy are poorly managed. A heat wave becomes more dangerous when electricity is expensive or unreliable and vulnerable people cannot afford air conditioning.
Labeling all these interconnected problems a climate “meta-crisis” does not explain them. It can actually obscure their real causes.
The Euronews article commits an increasingly common journalistic error. It begins with climate change, attaches virtually every economic, geopolitical, agricultural, and social problem to it, and then presents the resulting web of associations as evidence that climate change caused the problems in the first place.
That is not how causation works.
Climate changes. Weather varies. Individual regions will experience damaging droughts, floods, fires, freezes, and heat waves, just as they always have. Sensible governments should prepare for them.
But the real-world record does not resemble the spiraling “meta-crisis” Euronews describes. Farmers are producing more food. Crop yields continue reaching records. Humanity has become dramatically less vulnerable to extreme weather. And some of Europe’s most painful energy problems have resulted from decisions about energy production rather than changes in the weather.
Euronews could have investigated those inconvenient facts. Instead, it took a collection of predictions about food, water, migration, geopolitics, and energy, wrapped them together under the fashionable label “meta-crisis,” and called it climate journalism.
That’s not evidence. It’s a narrative looking for a crisis.
The U.S.-Canada relationship is entering a period of strategic change as economic tensions, U.S. pressure and Canada’s push for diversification challenge the foundations of their traditional partnership. From Closest Partners to Strategic Friction The Trump administration imposed 50% tariffs on Canadian goods, in response to which Ottawa has imposed retaliatory 15%- 50% tariffs on the […]
There have been many tipping points in history; to name just a few examples:
The Peace of Westphalia in 1648
The French Revolution of 1789
The Congress of Vienna in 1815
World War I in 1918
World War II in 1945
Many of these turning points led to shifts in power in Europe. These were merely transfers of power within the world we now call the “Collective” West. Examples include the collapse of the German Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and the Russian Tsarist Empire at the end of World War I.
These shifts in power were significant, yet what is happening now cannot be compared to past turning points, as they encompass the entire globe. The reins of power are not being handed over within the West; rather, there will be a shift in power toward the East and the “Global South.”
From Tipping Point to Entropy
The scale, the number of nations involved, the geographic scope, and the speed at which the current geopolitical crises are unfolding are truly astonishing.
Ukraine as a War Platform for the U.S., NATO, the EU, and Russia
Russia Will Prevail Militarily
Looking at the military reports from the front lines, it becomes clear to any observer that Russia will achieve its military objectives. While Russia might have relinquished the Donbas, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia had a peace agreement been successfully concluded in the spring of 2022, such an agreement is unrealistic under the current circumstances, as Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson have been part of the Russian Federation since September 2022. It is currently unclear how far the Russian military advance will go. I have commented on this in my article “The Summer Peace Died,” to which I refer. For the situation on the front lines, I once again refer to Military Summary; I have been following this channel for nearly five years, and it provides objective reporting.
Catastrophic Mobilization Situation in Ukraine
There are thousands of videos showing young men being hunted down like animals on the streets throughout Ukraine in order to forcibly recruit them. Recently, however, videos have also been circulating that show some of those forcibly recruited being transported to the front lines without uniforms and even in handcuffs, like criminals—to prevent them from escaping. I’ll leave it to the readers to ponder the combat effectiveness of these men against battle-hardened and motivated Russian soldiers.
Armed guards transport mobilized Ukrainian men to frontline in order to prevent them from deserting. This is described as normal by the Ukrainian officer. Videos also show them in handcuffs. Zelensky & Western politicians call this freedom & democracy. pic.twitter.com/f6AGyuMpRX
The latest move by the Ukrainian military leadership is to forcibly conscript women. Given this situation, it’s no surprise that Scott Ritter stated that the Ukrainians are losing 30 times more soldiers than Russia. We hear nothing in the West about this inhumane treatment of their own soldiers in Ukraine.
Ukrainian volunteers, who later disappeared without a trace, are said to have used drones and artificial intelligence to count the number of soldiers’ graves throughout Ukraine. They counted 2,000,054 graves. Added to this are the dead buried by their own people in mass graves and the wounded—the Ukrainians’ losses do indeed appear to be astronomical. Nevertheless, Zelenskyy claims that only 50,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed. A few weeks ago, I attended a funeral in Russia. The soldiers’ graves are easily identifiable by the Russian flag and the flag of the fallen soldier’s unit. There were soldiers’ graves, but no sea of flags like in Ukraine.
Ukrainian volunteers, who later disappeared without a trace, reportedly used drones and artificial intelligence to count military graves across Ukraine. Their estimate was 2,000,054 graves. Yet Zelensky claims that only 50,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed. Does that mean pic.twitter.com/LeplE4H3n6
Military Victory Does Not Solve Russia’s Geopolitical Problem
Whatever needs to be achieved militarily, Russia will achieve it; however, this does not resolve Russia’s geopolitical problem on its western border, because the goal is not new territories, but peace in the West—a goal that Russia has literally been striving for centuries and has never been able to achieve. Time and again, Russia has been attacked from the West and has regularly paid a high price in blood, money, and industrial capacity—resources diverted to military spending rather than civilian purposes. As a result, Russia’s social development has been repeatedly set back.
If Russia wants to keep pace with the major powers in terms of its civilian economy in a sustainable manner, reliably securing its western border is an absolute prerequisite. Although Russia is the only industrialized nation in the world that is self-sufficient and thus capable of waging a war lasting decades, such a confrontation would massively hinder the country from achieving its actual development goals.
The U.S.’s Lack of Credibility in Negotiations with Russia
The U.S.’s lack of credibility in the eyes of Russia is multifaceted. On September 15, Foreign Minister Lavrov said, verbatim:
“If the Americans hadn’t backed away from the Anchorage agreements, if Europe hadn’t pulled them away from those agreements, we would have been living without war for a year now.” – Sergey Lavrov, September 15, 2026
Under this agreement, Russia would have made major concessions. Russia would have retained the Donbas, frozen the conflict in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, and relinquished further territories. Objectively speaking, this was a bad deal for Russia, but it demonstrated the Russians’ considerable willingness to compromise. The Russians assumed that this verbal agreement was binding as a gentlemen’s agreement. However, gentlemen’s agreements should only be made with gentlemen. The Americans taught the Russians otherwise. The Russians are dismayed about this incident and have had to admit that no agreements are possible with the U.S. government. Personally, I’m surprised by the fact that this realization came so late. Even written agreements with the U.S. government are not to be trusted. This was evident in the breach of the Memorandum of Understanding that the Americans signed with Iran in June. Thus, one must conclude that this conflict—or any conflict in which the U.S. is directly or indirectly involved—must be fought to the bitter end. A bitter lesson for every contractual partner of the U.S.
The Risk of Escalation is Significant
Ukraine is desperately trying to officially draw NATO into this military conflict. It is astonishing that European countries—above all Germany and the United Kingdom—are not only signaling their willingness to do so, but are actually doing everything they can to prepare their people for a war with Russia.
Instead of naming many people, we’ll use Sir Jacob Rees-Mogg—former cabinet minister and Member of Parliament for North East Somerset—as an example. In this excerpt from an interview, he compares the situation with Russia—without naming it—to the situations during World War I and World War II:
European leaders are currently pivoting from “this is not our war” to “it’s your duty to die in a war with Russia.” pic.twitter.com/h2M0CBpk0g
Young people are thus being called to arms to prepare for war against Russia. In Germany, such efforts have failed miserably. Of the more than 300,000 young Germans surveyed, only 0.17% volunteered to serve in the Bundeswehr. Furthermore, it came to light a few days ago that the Bundeswehr itself could not even find 5,000 volunteers for a battalion in Latvia.
It is incomprehensible what these European countries are up to besides spreading propaganda. Even combined, the European countries do not possess military forces that would give them even the slightest chance of standing up to the Russian armed forces. The Russians are by no means impressed by this farce in Europe—they are disgusted by it. I assume that this war propaganda in Europe serves only to perpetuate the anti-Russian narrative.
Both President Putin and Foreign Minister Lavrov have repeatedly emphasized that they have no interest in attacking NATO targets outside Ukraine. However, if European countries are foolish enough to send even small European military contingents to Ukraine, the situation could change abruptly.
The greatest risk of escalation at the moment is that the Europeans, presumably in collaboration with the Americans, are planning a false flag attack in Europe in order to somehow trigger Article 5 of the NATO Charter. According to geopolitical analyst Warren Thornton, preparations for false flag attacks are in full swing. He writes on X:
THE FALSE FLAG
These are the areas that are the targets. The Mallorca airport in Spain. The Sorrento Continental Hotel in Italy. The Promenade De Anglais, Nice. The area to be launched from west of Sardinia. The agencies involved CIA, French Naval Intelligence Services and the… pic.twitter.com/ThDYyuZBOz
I can’t say whether this theory is correct, but it’s by no means far-fetched that the Europeans would attempt something so outrageous.
U.S. Military Campaigns in the Middle East Beginning in 2001
Looking back over the past 25 years, the U.S. has sought to reshape the Middle East according to the Wolfowitz Doctrine since 2001. None of the wars the U.S. launched during this period (Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, etc.) were successful. In fact, it was already evident back then that the hegemon lacked the resources, military strategy, strength, and credibility needed to act successfully. However, if one’s view is that the actual intent was destabilization and chaos, then they were extremely successful. Nevertheless, they returned to the plan in collaboration with Israel, apparently after Israel had succeeded in completely undermining American policy.
Israel: Genocide and Greater Israel
The immediate starting signal for the “Genocide” and “Greater Israel” projects was given on October 7, 2023, when a military operation by Hamas was turned into a false flagattack to justify the genocide against women, children, and other civilians in Gaza and, later, in the West Bank and Lebanon. This, in turn, served as the starting signal for the continuation of the Greater Israel project; initially, Syria and Lebanon were attacked. Although the Western press not only downplays Israel’s genocidal and imperialist actions but also fully supports and fuels them—including through the media of “neutral” Switzerland—Israel is viewed with increasing criticism by the general public in the Western world. According to Pew Research, 60% of Americans view Israel negatively. The Western media thus conveys an image that finds no resonance among the general public.
When Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu took the podium to address the plenary session on Thursday, delegates to the UN General Assembly left the hall in droves.
NEW
UN General Assembly delegates stage a mass walkout as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu takes the podium to address the hall pic.twitter.com/EcTpBBvjjM
It is important to me to continually remind my Western readers of what is actually happening in Gaza right before our eyes—eyes that many choose to close.
Major Escalation in the Middle East—Loss of Control
Starting in February 2026, events began to accelerate even further. Since then, everything has gone wrong for the West and Israel in the Middle East. The Global South has already wrested the initiative from the West. While Iran initially limited itself to responding to American-Israeli aggression, it is now the Iranians and the Yemeni Ansar Allah movement who are setting the pace.
Ansar Allah managed to bring the entire western coast of Yemen under its control in a very short time and thus controls not only the Bab al-Mandab Strait but also the island of Perim Mayyun off the coast. With virtually no Western media coverage, the advance continues, and it is quite possible that Aden will soon be captured.
Furthermore, the Saudis’ East-West pipeline was paralyzed and targets near Riyadh were attacked. So far, the Saudis have been unable to mount a serious military response to this large-scale attack, as they do not seem capable of doing so on their own, and repeated calls for help to Trump and others have been in vain. The Mecca Alliance, which unites Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey in a military alliance, also appears to be a thing of the past, as even these “friends” refused to provide assistance.
President Macron’s grand announcement that he will send troops to Saudi Arabia won’t change any of that. “Arabia” is called Saudi Arabia because this country is ruled by a family—a tribe—the Sauds. A tribe that is protected by the Americans. However, there are approximately 100 other tribes within Saudi Arabia. It’s very possible that they could join forces with Ansar Allah and overthrow the House of Saud. The House of Saud no longer has any income and seems unable to continue buying off—as it has done until now—all those who could pose a threat to them. There’s a chance that the Saud house of cards will collapse, and if that happens, I wouldn’t give a penny for the remaining Gulf states.
Alastair Crooke also pointed out on several occasions that this dynamic could spill over into Iraq, another millennia-old civilization alongside Iran. If that happens, Kuwait will likely fall as well. Another smoldering conflict can also be detected in Jordan. It is therefore quite possible that the entire structure in the Middle East established by the British a good 100 years ago could collapse within a few months, without the Americans being able to stop this tsunami in any way. Arabia to the Arabs, Persia to the Persians, and the Americans out for good. If this happens, Israel will go from perpetrator to target; one certainly cannot speak of it as a victim in this context. How the emerging great powers of the Middle East will deal with the genocidal Zionists should be left to those who have suffered the greatest losses, for Palestinians are Arabs.
Europe
Chaos is once again rearing its head in Europe. Germany is the first country—once the world’s leading exporter and the major power in the EU—that is in danger of becoming politically ungovernable. The Alternative for Germany (AfD), which has been labeled as far-right and Hitler-like by the previously dominant parties and excluded from government participation by a so-called firewall, not only won landslide victories in two state elections in eastern Germany but also leads the CDU by a clear margin in national polls (30% to 20%). Chancellor Merz’s approval rating stands at 10 percent—a barometer that reveals the people’s dissatisfaction and would have driven any truly democratic chancellor to resign. Whether the Germans, in light of this political situation, will clench their fists and do nothing, as they have in the past, remains uncertain. The chancellor’s downfall would be good for Germany. The AfD is the only major party seeking dialogue and peace with Russia, which is not only desperately needed by this once-thriving industrial nation but is also a prerequisite without which it cannot survive economically. The alternative to real and fundamental political change in Germany is the war against Russia sought by Chancellor Merz and the ruling political elites. The last time Germany went to war against Russia in 1941, Adolf Hitler sent 3.7 million soldiers eastward and failed, despite the Germans’ genocidal behavior, which cost the lives of approximately 17 million civilians. As already explained above, the Federal Republic of Germany today finds itself unable to assemble a brigade of 5,000 volunteer soldiers for the Baltic states. This does not seem to concern the chancellor, which is a clear sign of the madness that has taken hold of him. This is strong evidence that he is acting in the interests of a power located outside Germany. One would be a naughty person to believe that this has anything to do with his BlackRock past. Those who managed to install him as chancellor can pat themselves on the back, as they’ve snagged a puppet at the bargain price of a few million.
The following clip shows how the new leadership in Berlin is presenting itself—the Left has taken over. No words needed:
The situation in the rest of Europe is no more encouraging. The presidential election in France will take place in April 2027. Macron is no longer eligible to run, and Marine Le Pen has a significant lead over the other candidates. The situation is thus similar to that in Germany: a party that is denounced as far-right by the parties currently in power, yet is the most popular among the people. Le Pen’s position on peace with Russia is unclear—she seems to be speaking with a forked tongue: on the one hand, she wants a negotiated peace, but at the same time supports the training of Ukrainian troops. A seasoned politician who positions herself to capture as many votes as possible. France’s financial situation is grim, with no silver lining. The rise in the interest rate on 10-year French bonds over the past twelve months has been even steeper than in any other European country.
Trump
President Trump’s policies only seem difficult to understand at first glance. His constant flip-flopping on Ukraine, Iran, and Israel is counterproductive and damaging to the U.S.’s reputation on the world stage. The reason behind Trump’s current actions is the midterm elections in November. Trump is struggling with the high oil prices he himself has caused, which he can prevent from spiraling out of control by manipulating the futures markets. However, actual market prices are 30% to 50% higher than the manipulated, fantasy futures prices. The fact that futures prices are indeed manipulated is evident, for example, in diesel prices at gas stations, which are moving in only one direction and have reached unprecedented levels worldwide. Diesel is the lifeblood of the American economy, and high prices are one of the biggest drivers of inflation, since virtually all goods are transported by trucks, agriculture depends on it, and large parts of industry rely on diesel. Trump’s latest farce: He’s blaming Zelenskyy for the high diesel prices because Ukraine is attacking Russian refineries; he’s doing this solely to divert attention from the biggest price drivers—the blockades of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab.
Somehow, Trump wants to turn things around, but it seems that he will lose the midterm elections coming up in about six weeks. According to Polymarket, an American online prediction market where users bet on the outcomes of future events—with market prices reflecting collective probability estimates—the probability that the Republicans will lose their majorities in the House of Representatives and the Senate stands at 66%. Should this come to pass, Trump will likely face impeachment proceedings. He then runs the risk of going from a lame duck to a dead duck and being replaced by his turncoat vice president, Vance—not a promising outlook for the United States.
Trump’s latest appearance this week before the UN General Assembly was a testament to his psychopathic nature: He announced—nota bene after the election—that he would either make Iran a rich country or obliterate it completely.
Trump is every bit as bad as Adolf Hitler. In his speech at the Berlin Sportpalast on September 4, 1940, Hitler said, “We will wipe out their cities.” Trump wants to wipe out a 5,000-year-old civilization—without any legal basis, of course—acting like a god. In doing so, Trump is publicly calling for the genocide of an entire civilization. One might wonder whether he belongs in prison or in a psychiatric hospital, but the fact that he can make such statements before a global audience with impunity shows the depths to which Western civilization has sunk. I refer to a speech I gave in Switzerland on September 3.
The Financial Markets
I have made numerous comments on the instability of the financial markets. Now my dire predictions seem to be coming true. In addition to the overvaluations in the stock markets, I have repeatedly pointed out the unsustainable situation in the bond markets. Among the more astute market participants, fear is beginning to set in. Mr. Bessent has lost control of interest rates. On August 28, 2026, I looked at the average interest rate the U.S. had to pay on its debt; at that time, it stood at 3.35% (May), resulting in an annual interest burden of 1,340 billion. Today, this average interest rate stands at 3.49% (August); the debt mountain currently stands at 40,070 billion, meaning it has already increased by another 70 billion. Annual interest payments have thus risen by 56 billion to 1,396 billion per year in this short period of time.
Over the past 28 days, the yield on the 10-year U.S. Treasury bond has risen from 4.722% to 5.185%, an increase of 0.46%. It does not appear that this trend will change. If this pace continues, not only will the government bond market collapse, but so will the towering mountains of debt in the AI sector. The same picture is emerging in Europe and Japan as well. The question isn’t whether the collapse will happen, but when—and who the U.S. will let go first: the Japanese or the Europeans. That is my personal opinion. When it comes to timing, I’m regularly wrong, which has taught me not to be active in these markets. I have the great privilege of meeting regularly with one of the world’s most successful investors. At our last meeting, he agreed with me in principle but remarked that I couldn’t possibly imagine what tricks and means the Americans still have at their disposal to delay the inevitable.
The scale of this crisis will dwarf anything humanity has ever seen. Compared to today, the 2008 crisis was a stroll through a sunny park with a delicious picnic. Such a collapse in the West will also affect the countries concerned’s geopolitical freedom of action; suddenly, everyone will be very preoccupied with their own problems. No one knows whether this will lead to an escalation in the geopolitical arena. What is certain, however, is that the “experts”—who are still driving the markets forward with their jubilant cheers—will solemnly declare that this simply could not have been foreseen—as always.
Entropy
All of these individual tectonic shifts lead to what can be described as entropy, a term from thermodynamics. Applied to geopolitics, I describe the situation as a massive, irreversible state of disorder and uncertainty within the various international systems. Existing power structures, rules, institutions, and hierarchies are losing their cohesive power, and a new order that would promise stability is not in sight.
For the collective West, which until recently held the reins firmly in its hands, is unwilling to make compromises so as not to jeopardize its position as a hegemon.
The Global South, taken by surprise by the rapid pace of events, has not yet devised a coherent, unified, and effective policy to wrest power from the West.
It appears that the Global South, under the military dominance of Russia, China, and—most recently, Iran as the fourth major military power—is in the process of adapting to the new circumstances and coordinating its efforts, which will ultimately lead to its victory.
How long this will take, however, and whether the West will use nuclear weapons to maintain its hegemony remains to be seen—though I would like to express my doubts on this point. So far, only Adolf Hitler believed that Germany should go down with him. Let’s hope that cooler heads are in control of the apocalyptic buttons.
Xi Jinping left Washington on Friday, September 25, bid farewell by a 21-gun salute and the administration’s top officials lined up at the airport. A three-day state visit organized with a level of attention to detail that the White House rarely reserves for a systemic rival: the welcome at the foot of the aircraft stairs, a three-hour meeting in the Oval Office, the state dinner, tea with the spouses, and a visit to the National Archives. A Schramsberg was chosen for dinner – the same winery that provided the wine for the 1972 toast between Nixon and Zhou Enlai. At the table sat half of the American business community: Musk, Jensen Huang, Zuckerberg, Tim Cook, Bezos, Pichai, Dimon, Fink, as well as three Supreme Court justices, the Federal Reserve chair, and half the Cabinet.
Then there is the real conversation, which must be read between the lines. Beijing immediately released its own account of the talks. On the American side, in the early hours, there was no official statement: only remarks from officials and a president who chose not to answer questions on the substance of the matter. This asymmetry in documentation alone reveals who wanted to set the terms of the meeting in writing.
On the Iran issue, administration sources presented an alignment on three points as “significant progress”: Iran must never acquire nuclear weapons; the Strait of Hormuz must remain open; and there must be no tolls in the strait. Taken one by one, these three points coincide with positions that Beijing had been advocating even before boarding the plane. China holds a permanent seat on the Security Council and is a signatory to the 2015 JCPOA: Iranian nonproliferation has been its official policy for over a decade. An open Strait of Hormuz is in China’s interest even more than it is in America’s, because East Asia consumes the largest share of the crude oil passing through the strait, and China pays more than anyone else for Brent crude that remains above $100 per barrel. As for tolls, a transit fee imposed by Tehran would hit oil tankers bound for Chinese ports first and foremost.
Washington has thus secured Xi’s signature on three statements that Beijing would have endorsed in any forum. The actual gain is more limited, but it exists. China’s distancing itself from Iran’s demand for tolls weakens a card that Tehran is playing in the New York negotiations, where discussions center on a phased exit from the crisis (reopening of the strait, simultaneous lifting of the U.S. naval blockade, followed by the unfreezing of frozen assets), and where the Iranian delegation is reportedly aiming to transfer the issue of transit rights to a separate annex.
Independent accounts fill in what the American version leaves out. Xi asked Trump for an immediate return to the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding and the resumption of negotiations “as soon as possible,” leading to a comprehensive agreement that includes the nuclear issue. Trump did not say yes. Rather than being resolved at the summit, the Iranian issue was kept off the summit agenda.
Tehran and Taiwan
Regarding Chinese support for Iran, the officials themselves admit that the picture is incomplete: “There has been indirect support, we believe, but no direct evidence.” The United States says it is “very concerned” but is unable to prove it. Trump reportedly told Xi in person, however, that any aid to Tehran – “whether direct or indirect, in the form of intelligence, components, or military equipment” – is “totally unacceptable.”
A warning is only as strong as the tool that backs it up, and here the tool is nowhere to be seen. During the same period, flight tracking data recorded a Mahan Air flight landing as scheduled in Guangzhou, and no measures were taken against Chinese airports or operators: the no-fly zone around Iran has failed precisely where it matters most. The term “indirect,” moreover, remains deliberately vague. If it included the purchase of Iranian crude oil, it would strike at the heart of Sino-Iranian trade; if it does not include it, it is reduced to military supplies that Washington, by its own admission, cannot substantiate. The ambiguity serves both sides: the Americans to keep the threat hanging in the air, and the Chinese to continue operating in the gray zone. My assessment is that action by the Treasury against Chinese entities linked to Iran is unlikely before the trade agreement is finalized, with a moderate degree of confidence.
Washington insists that pressure on Iran is a separate issue, unrelated to arms supplies to Taiwan or any other negotiations. This separation has its own domestic logic. With less than six weeks until the November 3 midterm elections, the administration cannot risk being accused of trading Taipei for Chinese cooperation in the Gulf.
The point is that this separation is unilateral. In the Chinese account, Xi described Beijing’s position on reunification and territorial integrity as clear-cut; he called on the United States to oppose Taiwan’s independence and to handle the issue with caution, noting that doing so would lay a solid foundation for strategic cooperation between the two countries. Taiwan is not just another issue among many; it is the condition underpinning them all, including Iran. Beijing will be watching to see how Washington translates its statements into concrete actions, and that response will remain the primary indicator of American seriousness. The result is a clear asymmetry: the United States is giving up using Taiwan as leverage, while China retains it as a precondition.
What about the option of a trade truce?
On the economic front, the summit resulted in the extension of the trade truce until January 10 – which averts an immediate return to much higher tariffs – and the announcement of a managed trade agreement, the details of which are expected on Monday following weeks of negotiations. No breakthrough on tariffs, rare earths, or technology controls. The very term echoes the “Phase One” model from January 2020: quantified purchase commitments – that is, managing the symptoms of a rivalry whose structural causes remain unchanged.
On artificial intelligence, the positions remained distinct. Xi proposed dialogue on risks, human oversight of technologies, and cooperation against abuses, inviting both sides to build on their respective strengths rather than monitor one another. Trump acknowledged that AI concerns the future of humanity, but made it clear that he prefers the current status quo to remain largely unchanged. No common rules, no mechanisms. The two capitals limited themselves to confirming mutual support for the APEC summit and the G20 summit they will host this year, thereby setting the schedule for upcoming meetings.
Taken together, the U.S. outcome consists of a declarative convergence on three already-shared principles, a verbal warning, and a trade agreement yet to be reviewed. Beijing takes home more: a truce until January, no new technological restrictions, Taiwan reaffirmed as the foundation of the relationship, and, above all, the U.S. adoption of the Chinese formula for a “constructive relationship of strategic stability,” agreed upon in May and now revived. Robert Lawrence Kuhn provided the most honest summary: the summit’s main outcome is a longer planning horizon. For a power convinced that time is on its side, that longer horizon is the reward.
There is one objection that must be taken seriously. Xi’s public distancing from the concessions isolates Tehran just as an internal front is opening up in Iran, with an impeachment motion filed in parliament against Foreign Minister Araghchi, accused of negotiating with the Americans without the green light from the Supreme National Security Council. But this very situation highlights the limitations of that gain. The question in Tehran is no longer just what to offer, but who has the authority to offer it; and on this point, Chinese pressure regarding the tolls changes nothing.
There are few but concrete indicators to watch in the coming weeks. The text of Monday’s agreement will reveal whether the trade deal extends to rare earths or is limited to agricultural and energy purchases. The New York channel will indicate whether the phased exchange – involving shipping through the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for the lifting of the blockade – becomes operational. The six ballistic missiles launched by Ansarallah toward Yanbu and Taif – targeting the terminal of the only major Saudi route bypassing the strait – demonstrate just how narrow the margin is before the price of crude oil pushes Trump, on the eve of the election, toward military options. Finally, a potential designation of Chinese entities by the Treasury would lend real weight to the warning from the Oval Office.
As long as none of these signals change, we can say that the summit has stabilized Sino-American relations without stabilizing the Gulf – and regarding the Gulf, Beijing has offered words, not leverage.
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