The Houthis (Ansar Allah) released footage on October 7 showing their fighters driving Saudi-backed forces out of two districts in the southwestern Yemeni province of Taiz. Many of the Houthi fighters in the video appear to be fighting barefoot.
The footage was said to show operations in the al-Ma’afer and al-Mawasit districts, including the capture of the palace of Rashad al-Alimi, chairman of the Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council.
Earlier in the day, Yemen’s Saba news agency reported, citing a Houthi military official, that Saudi-backed forces had been completely expelled from the al-Salw district in southern Taiz and had handed over all of their weapons and positions to the group.
Beyond Taiz, Houthi military spokesman Brig. Gen. Yahya Saree said the group had repelled an attempt by Saudi-backed forces to advance toward its positions in the northern province of al-Jawf.
Saree said Houthi forces struck troop concentrations with ballistic missiles and drones, killing and wounding dozens of fighters and destroying several vehicles.
In a separate statement, Saree said Houthi forces had struck 11 Saudi-backed troop concentrations over the previous 24 hours in areas south of Bab al-Mandab and in al-Suqya, Ras al-Ara and al-Mudharibah. He said the attacks involved 11 ballistic missiles and caused dozens of deaths and injuries, including among commanders, while destroying a number of vehicles.
Saree said Houthi forces then tracked a company from the 13th Giants Brigade, accusing the unit of running over prisoners of war. The company was struck by a ballistic missile while its members were gathered, causing more than 30 casualties.
These latest developments show the Houthis still have the upper hand on all fronts in Yemen. In Taiz in particular, the situation is worsening for the besieged Saudi-backed forces. A collapse there can be expected within days, if not hours. The Houthis could take over the provincial capital before the end of the month.
Former CIA analyst Larry Johnson and Professor Mohammad Marandi said that Yemen holds the upper hand in its war with Saudi Arabia, and that neither Turkey nor Pakistan is likely to change that by sending forces to the kingdom’s aid.
Speaking on Al Mayadeen’s The Grand Standoff: Iran and the World on Tuesday, both guests also noted that Tehran is working on the assumption that the US will restart its war on Iran, while Johnson argued that Washington has less capacity to carry one out than its rhetoric suggests.
Yemen advances as Saudi-backed forces falter
Marandi said that the past weeks have shown a one-sided war. He stated that the Saudi camp’s claims that it could retake significant territory proved to be empty talk, as Yemeni forces, led by Ansar Allah and the Yemeni government, kept moving forward. “The liberation of Taiz is near,” he said.
Johnson stressed that Yemen “has every advantage in this war.” He put Saudi Arabia’s dependable fighting strength at about 75,000 soldiers, the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) at another 100,000, and the Yemeni Armed Forces’ at 350,000. He described the Saudi army as “basically a group of mercenaries,” while Yemeni fighters have the motivation of defending their own land.
Johnson highlighted that the PLC’s latest offensive showed a lack of military competence. “Successful military attacks are usually not announced in advance, they usually prefer not to give the opposing side a heads up about what you’re going to do,” he said, noting that this one was announced beforehand. He added that the PLC launched it “even without what’s called close air support.”
Saudi aircraft carried out a number of bombing runs along the front lines, Johnson said, “but they were not coordinated.” He explained that “normally you want somebody on the front lines who can actually be in communication with the pilots or with the air controllers, the combat air controllers, to identify specifically along the front lines where bombs need to be dropped.”
“What we’ve seen is that [the Yemeni Armed Forces] operate at a more sophisticated level,” he said. He rejected the Western line that this is Iran’s doing. “Contrary to Western propaganda that this is all just the work of Iran, this is not the work of Iran,” he said. “Anybody that’s had any dealings at all with the Houthis knows that they are quite independent.” He said the movement sees Iran as a friend, but “they don’t let Iran dictate its choices or what it does.”
Johnson added that he believes Saudi Arabia attacked Sanaa after the funeral of Sayyed Ali Khamenei because the US encouraged it. He explained that Washington wrongly saw Yemen as a paper tiger, and described its approach to West Asia as “a combination of ignorance and arrogance.”
Turkey, Pakistan face a logistical nightmare
Both guests dismissed the idea of a Turkish or Pakistani deployment. Johnson said the announcement that Turkey and Pakistan would effectively declare war on Yemen “was laughable.”
He clarified that air power would not solve the problem either. “Dropping bombs without effective ground controllers is just, it’s a waste of bombs,” Johnson said. “It’s just punching holes in landscape without accomplishing anything.” He called the announcement “more Western hype” that “speaks to the desperation of the Saudis,” adding, “I don’t see Turkey or Pakistan intervening in any significant way.”
Marandi said he does not know whether Riyadh, Ankara and Islamabad have even decided to send forces. “It’s possible,” he said. “But as Larry said, this would be a logistical nightmare, and the cost would be extraordinary. And even troop movements inside Saudi Arabia would not be easy.”
He stated that neither country has the capacity. “Pakistan, of course, its military is on the border with India, and they have very bad relations with the Taliban in Afghanistan,” Marandi said, adding that Turkey has difficult relations with almost all of its neighbors. “The armed forces of Pakistan and Turkey are not designed for such mass movements of troops.”
Marandi asserted that Turkey and Pakistan are also harming themselves by letting the narrative spread that they stand with Saudi Arabia. “Turkey and Pakistan are not doing themselves any favors by pushing or allowing this narrative to be pushed that they are on the side of Saudi Arabia,” he said. He pointed to their stance on Gaza, which he said made them popular across the region. “They’ve become heroes across the region,” he said, and “it’s clear that their sympathies lie with [Ansar Allah].”
Saudi Arabia exposed on oil, infrastructure
“The Saudis are in real trouble,” Johnson said. He said the East-West oil pipeline is down and that reports of oil getting through, including through the Strait of Hormuz, are false. “They have lots of infrastructure that can be targeted and is being targeted by Ansar Allah,” he noted, while “Ansar Allah doesn’t sit there with an abundance of infrastructure that can be targeted by the Saudis or the Western helpers.” His conclusion was that “Yemen holds the upper hand.”
Marandi pointed to the weight of the kingdom’s finances. “The Saudis have nothing but their oil exports and their oil industry to sustain themselves, and it is a country that has very high costs,” he stressed. “The government spends a lot of money, so the economy is doing very poorly.” He warned that “the longer this war lasts, the more Saudi infrastructure will be destroyed.”
Marandi argued that the way out is obvious. “The smart thing to do would be for Saudi Arabia to end this war, to do a deal with the people of Yemen, and to lift the siege, and to recognize the government, and stop interfering in Yemen’s internal affairs,” he said. “But Mohammed bin Salman is not the wisest of leaders, to say the least.” He compared the crown prince to Trump. “I think both are very arrogant, neither are wise, and the people around them are yes-men,” he asserted. “Otherwise the Saudis would have ended this by now.”
Johnson put the responsibility on Riyadh. “This is a fight that the Saudis chose to initiate,” he insisted, adding that Ansar Allah “was content to live side by side with the Saudis” and “abiding by the ceasefire” until the Saudis broke it. For Johnson, the kingdom now has a single option. “The choice is settle, make peace with Yemen, or risk the absolute destruction of the government and the country of Saudi Arabia.”
Tehran plans for a renewed US war on Iran
Marandi told the program that Tehran is planning around the assumption that Trump will restart the war. “I’m not saying that war is inevitable, but the working assumption is definitely that we’re going to have war,” he stated. Iran “has been preparing itself for a major confrontation, a very heavy war that would take perhaps weeks,” he noted, and it has warned US-aligned countries that helped Washington that “this time around the Iranian response will be much more devastating for them as well.”
He detailed upgrades to Iran’s missile and drone capabilities, improved air defenses, expanded underground bases and strengthened command and control meant to protect its leaders from targeted strikes. The remaining question, he argued, is timing. “Will there be conflict before Netanyahu’s election, or between the two elections, or after the US midterm elections? That is basically the real question.”
Marandi also pointed to deepening energy shortages. “Trump can pretend that the Strait of Hormuz is open and that more oil is getting through than ever before,” he said. “But the reality is that that’s not the case. The shortages are accumulating.”
Flows reached 11 to 12 million barrels a day for a couple of weeks, when Iran avoided escalation around President Masoud Pezeshkian’s planned US trip, but even then they fell short of demand. Shortages of diesel, gasoline, helium, sulfur and LNG are growing faster than the oil shortage, he explained.
He questioned why Trump keeps threatening to wipe out Iran if, as Trump has claimed for over seven months, the country is already defeated. “I don’t think anyone in Iran takes him seriously anymore,” Marandi added.
Johnson points to limits on US firepower
Johnson argued that Washington’s capacity is thinner than its threats suggest. “I wouldn’t characterize it as a wider escalation, because the United States is limited in what it can do to escalate,” he stated. He noted that the US lacks a robust supply of Tomahawk and JASSM cruise missiles and that its air defense stocks are depleted. “They’ve exhausted their air defense systems. Patriot missiles and THAAD missiles are, I mean, they’re out.”
He cited the evacuation of 12 B-1 bombers from RAF Fairford as evidence. Washington blamed a possible Iranian drone threat, but Johnson countered that “if they still had an adequate number of Patriot missiles, they wouldn’t have evacuated 12 B-1 bombers from the Fairford RAF airfield.” Even against drones, he added, the US does not have enough PAC-3 missiles.
Johnson dismissed press reports of 10,000 US troops being surged to the region, pointing out that 50 to 60 percent of them are the crews of aircraft carriers, escort destroyers and a Marine Expeditionary Unit. The USS Theodore Roosevelt is replacing the USS George H.W. Bush, which is docked in Phuket, Thailand, and due to depart on October 9. “So it doesn’t look like there’s a buildup on that front,” he observed, adding that it is unclear whether the Bush will return to waters off Iran.
Johnson believes the bomber withdrawal followed a secret meeting last Friday at Camp David involving J.D. Vance, Pete Hegseth and John Ratcliffe. In his view, they recognized that “the United States really is in a limited position to carry out any kind of effective or sustained strikes against Iran that are risk-free.” He expects Iran to act preemptively if it judges strikes are imminent, for example against aircraft deployed to al-Udeid.
For Washington, he concluded, “the United States stands to lose much, much more than they’ve already lost if they decide to renew conflict and war with Iran.”
On October 5, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan activated the Makkah Pact, taking their new alliance to war for the first time, and potentially revealing the future of American power in the Middle East: Washington provides the security umbrella while regional partners increasingly do the fighting.
From treaty to military alliance
Only two months after Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye signed the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, the new alliance has been activated. As representatives of the three countries met in Riyadh and Houthi missiles and drones targeted Saudi territory, Saudi-backed Yemeni forces launched a major counteroffensive around the strategically important Bab al-Mandeb Strait. Despite hundreds of strikes, the Saudi offensive has not been enough to push the Houthis back to their original position. In this context, the alliance’s Strategic-Political and Defense Committee agreed to move “immediately” toward implementing its collective-defence commitments and to provide agreed military forces and capabilities for rapid deployment in Saudi Arabia. The meeting also appointed retired Pakistani Lieutenant General Nauman Mahmood as the alliance’s first secretary-general.
The significance goes beyond additional military assistance for Riyadh. The Yemen war is transforming – and that, too, very rapidly – a remarkably young agreement into an operational military alliance. Signed on August 7, the Makkah Pact contains a collective-defence commitment under which an armed attack against one member is regarded as an attack against all three. Pakistan describes the agreement as defensive and grounded in the right to collective self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.
That inevitably invites comparisons with NATO. The analogy should not be exaggerated. NATO possesses 32 members, an integrated command structure and more than seven decades of institutional development. The Makkah Pact possesses none of that depth.
But its institutional development has been unusually rapid. On August 31, the three governments established mechanisms for political and military coordination, agreed to create a permanent secretariat in Saudi Arabia and committed themselves to joint activities, defence-industrial cooperation and joint technology development and production. Now comes the most important stage in the evolution of any military alliance: responding to an actual threat.
Pakistan and Türkiye were already assisting Saudi Arabia before formal activation. Reports show that Pakistan had supplied air-defence systems, drones, anti-drone equipment and light artillery, while Pakistani advisers were working with Saudi counterparts supporting Yemeni forces. Türkiye had supplied drones. The October 5 decision potentially integrates such capabilities into something larger: collective military action undertaken because one alliance member has come under attack.
The distinction between defensive and offensive action consequently becomes blurred. Defending Saudi airspace against Houthi missiles is clearly defensive. Destroying the launchers firing those missiles from Yemen would involve offensive operations undertaken for a defensive purpose. Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Asif has deliberately avoided ruling out that possibility, saying Pakistan would make “whatever means are available” at its disposal available to defend Saudi Arabia.
America stays, but its role changes
It would be tempting to interpret this development as evidence that Saudi Arabia is preparing for a post-American Middle East. That conclusion would be premature. The more interesting possibility is almost the opposite: the Makkah Pact may fit remarkably well into the kind of Middle Eastern security order the Trump administration itself wants to create. Trump welcomed the agreement shortly after it was signed. He called it’s a “big, bold and important first step” and argued that it demonstrated how regional countries could “defend themselves in a more meaningful way.” That language closely matches the administration’s formal defence strategy.
The 2026 National Defense Strategy says Washington wants regional allies and partners to assume “primary responsibility” for deterring and defending against Iran and its proxies, while the United States supports them and deepens cooperation with Gulf partners. The administration’s arms-transfer strategy similarly argues that allies should assume more responsibility for regional security while Washington equips them with advanced American military capabilities. Yemen now offers an unusually clear illustration of what this division of labour can look like.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman sought direct American military intervention against the Houthis in September. Trump declined to order US strikes. But Washington did not withdraw from the conflict. Instead, it offered intelligence and targeting assistance, while CENTCOM commander Admiral Brad Cooper travelled to Saudi Arabia for consultations. As the Saudi-backed offensive subsequently began, the same pattern continued. Saudi aircraft provided extensive air support to Yemeni government forces, while the United States supplied intelligence and targeting support. America therefore remains deeply involved. What has declined, at least for now, is direct participation in the fighting. This distinction matters.
The choice facing Washington is not simply between dominating Middle Eastern security and abandoning it. There is a third possibility: remaining the indispensable strategic enabler while shifting more of the immediate military burden onto regional states. That is precisely where the Makkah Pact becomes useful.
Saudi Arabia brings financial resources, geography and enormous investments in advanced weaponry. Türkiye contributes a large, NATO-trained military and a rapidly expanding defence industry. Pakistan brings substantial conventional forces, longstanding military relations with Saudi Arabia and extensive operational experience. Together, they can potentially perform missions that previously might have generated demands for more direct American intervention. The United States can remain above this architecture rather than outside it: supplying intelligence, weapons, logistical assistance, strategic deterrence and diplomatic backing while allies provide more of the personnel and firepower required to confront regional threats. Seen this way, the pact is not necessarily a rebellion against American primacy. It could become one mechanism through which that primacy is made less militarily expensive for the US.
A different kind of American order
This model also helps explain why describing the emerging Middle East as “post-American” can be misleading. American power has traditionally been measured partly through deployments, bases and direct military intervention. But primacy does not require Washington to fight every regional war itself. The Makkah Pact could push this transformation considerably further.
Its future significance will depend less on what its three members call the alliance than on what they build after Yemen, and whether their first experiment in collective defence proves sufficiently successful to encourage deeper cooperation. Regular military planning, interoperable forces, integrated air and missile defence, intelligence-sharing arrangements and joint weapons production would gradually give the agreement institutional substance.
Yet therein lies a paradox for Washington. The same burden-sharing that reduces America’s military responsibilities could eventually reduce its leverage. More capable allies are not necessarily more dependent allies. As regional powers acquire the institutions, experience and capabilities to conduct military operations with diminishing direct American involvement, they may also acquire greater freedom to pursue threats and strategic objectives that do not fully correspond with Washington’s preferences. An arrangement that initially reinforces the US security architecture could therefore gradually produce greater regional strategic autonomy.
The consequences could extend to military technology. Saudi Arabia’s armed forces remain heavily equipped with American weapons, but neither Pakistan nor Türkiye operates exclusively within a US defence ecosystem. Pakistan, for example, operates the JF-17 fighter aircraft jointly developed with China. In fact, Islamabad has deployed this jet in Saudi Arabia as part of the pact. While Türkiye has built an increasingly indigenous defence industry. A more deeply integrated Makkah alliance could therefore eventually combine American, Turkish, Pakistani and Chinese-origin military technologies rather than reproduce an exclusively US-centred weapons architecture.
That may prove more consequential for American primacy than the pact itself. If the Makkah alliance fades once the immediate Houthi threat recedes, it will remain another temporary regional alignment. But if Yemen produces permanent military integration, Washington could confront an unexpected consequence of its own burden-sharing strategy: the more successfully regional allies learn to defend the American-led order themselves, the less dependent that order may eventually become on America.
Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of international relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs
The Yemeni Army (Ansar Allah) reportedly struck al-Dagharir camp and al-Mawsim camp in Jizan, Aakifah camp in Asir, King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh, Abha International Airport, Khamis Mushait Air Base and Saudi military supplies at Badr camp near Aden International Airport;
Saudi-backed forces had been driven out of al-Salu district in Taiz province, with the forces surrendering their weapons and positions to Ansar Allah;
By October 7, the Saudi-backed counterattack near Bab al-Mandab had stalled, with Ansar Allah retaining control of the strategic waterway;
Reports on October 7 said Syria could join Saudi Arabia in the war against Ansar Allah in Yemen.
Yemen’s Houthis (Ansar Allah) on October 7 announced a series of drone and missile attacks on airports and military sites in Saudi Arabia as fighting intensified between the group and Yemeni government forces on several fronts.
Houthi military spokesman Brig. Gen. Yahya Saree said in a statement that the group targeted King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh with several drones in what he called a “precise” attack that disrupted air traffic. He added that the group separately targeted Abha International Airport and Khamis Mushait Air Base with ballistic missiles and drones, claiming the attacks disrupted flights and damaged the military base.
Saree said the Houthis had also launched ballistic missiles and drones at three military camps: Dagharir in Jizan, Aakifah in Asir and Al-Mawsim in Jizan.
The Saudi-led coalition, for its part, announced that it intercepted and destroyed a ballistic missile launched toward the Riyadh area.
Coalition spokesman Brig. Gen. Turki al-Maliki said on X the missile was intercepted north of the capital and described the attackers as the “terrorist Houthi militia.” He claimed that coalition forces had tracked the missile’s launch platform over Sanaa and vowed, “We are tracking the launch platform with the Coalition’s intelligence system in the skies over Sanaa, and we will destroy it.”
The escalation extended to southern Yemen, where the Houthis launched two missiles toward Aden International Airport early Wednesday, according to Yemeni authorities.
One missile landed near the runway shortly before a scheduled flight from Cairo was due to arrive, but the aircraft landed safely and there were no immediate reports of casualties.
The attacks came as ground fighting continued in southwestern Yemen. Clashes were reported around Dhubab, south of the Red Sea port of Mocha, and in the Waziayah district of Taiz province.
Government-aligned forces said Wednesday that they had launched an operation to retake Waziayah, while Houthi forces disputed claims that they were being pushed back.
In the al-Salw district of Taiz, Houthi forces said on October 7 that they had completed the expulsion of Saudi-backed forces and taken over their positions and weapons. Video footage posted to social media showed Saudi-backed forces withdrawing toward the port city of Aden in southern Yemen.
The latest clashes are part of a broader Saudi-backed campaign to reverse recent Houthi gains along Yemen’s western coast and around the Bab al-Mandab Strait, a critical Red Sea shipping route. The renewed offensive has so far failed to produce any results, while the Houthis have expanded missile and drone attacks against Saudi territory and government-held areas of Yemen.
On October 5, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan activated the Makkah Pact, taking their new alliance to war for the first time, and potentially revealing the future of American power in the Middle East: Washington provides the security umbrella while regional partners increasingly do the fighting. From treaty to military alliance Only two months after […]
The Middle East has seen many explosions of violence in recent years. But while the US-Iran war has grabbed the headlines this year, the rapidly escalating conflict between the Houthis and Yemen’s internationally recognized government and Saudi Arabia risks becoming just as consequential for the region. The complexity of Yemen’s internal conflict cannot be underestimated. […]
Syria is reportedly considering whether to join the war in Yemen on the side of Saudi Arabia, a potential expansion of the conflict that could expose Damascus to significant military and political risks.
Hiba Nasr, Washington bureau chief for Asharq Bloomberg, said in a post to X on October 7 that Syria could join the war, although no final decision had been made and the idea remained under discussion, citing multiple sources.
The report came a day after a surprise visit by Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa to Saudi Arabia. The state-run Syrian Arab News Agency said that discussions with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud focused on strengthening political and economic ties between the two countries.
The possibility of Syrian involvement comes as Saudi Arabia struggles to turn its renewed military intervention in Yemen into a decisive victory.
Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces have made very limited gains around the Bab al-Mandeb Strait in recent days, and have so far failed to reverse the Houthis’ recent territorial gains, particularly in Taiz and other mountainous areas in southwestern Yemen.
In addition, the Houthis have continued launching missiles and drones against Saudi Arabia, targeting energy facilities, airports and military sites.
The latest developments mark a sharp change from reporting last month. Türkiye Today reported on September 18 that Damascus had rejected a formal Saudi request to organize and send Syrian fighters to Yemen.
Syrian sources told the publication that the government did not want to enter the conflict as a third party while it was reorganizing its armed forces. Turkish and regional sources separately denied claims that Ankara was organizing the deployment of Syrian mercenaries in Yemen.
The new report about possible Syrian participation comes shortly after Turkey moved closer to direct military support for Saudi Arabia.
Middle East Eye reported on October 6 that Ankara was preparing to send additional personnel and defense equipment to Saudi Arabia under the Makkah defense pact. Turkish officials told the publication that Turkey already had technical teams, air defense systems and electronic warfare equipment in the kingdom and was preparing additional deployments, with some measures requiring parliamentary approval.
The timing of the latest report raises the possibility that Ankara may be encouraging Damascus to contribute to the Saudi war effort.
For Damascus, Saudi support could carry an important economic attraction. Syria remains heavily dependent on outside assistance after more than a decade of war. The World Bank estimates that rebuilding the country’s damaged infrastructure and buildings would cost about $216 billion.
During al-Sharaa’s visit to Saudi Arabia, Syrian officials said the two sides discussed reconstruction, infrastructure, investment and cooperation in energy, construction, agriculture and trade.
Saudi Arabia has already committed billions of dollars to investments in Syria, including projects involving airports and telecommunications, making Riyadh an important potential source of capital for Damascus.
Any Syrian deployment, however, would carry a substantial military risk. Syrian armed forces have extensive combat experience from the country’s long civil war, but that experience does not necessarily prepare them for Yemen’s rugged highland warfare, where the Houthis have a major geographic advantage and long familiarity with the terrain.
A recent United States-based conflict-monitoring assessment said government-aligned Yemeni forces face particular difficulties operating in the mountainous areas of Taiz, where air support is less effective and Houthi light infantry units are well adapted to the terrain.
Sudan’s experience in Yemen offers a warning. Sudan deployed troops as part of the Saudi-led intervention and suffered heavy casualties. It is reported that more than 4,000 Sudanese were killed fighting the Houthis, including more than 2,000 in Taiz and along the western coast where the fighting is currently taking place.
A Syrian intervention could also create risks well beyond the battlefield in Yemen. The Houthis have demonstrated the ability to launch long-range missiles and drones.
For Syria, taking part could therefore mean opening another front at a time when the country is still rebuilding. Houthi retaliation against Syrian territory or interests would be one possible consequence, while other Iran-aligned actors in Iraq — and potentially Iran itself — could have incentives to respond to a direct Syrian role in the Yemen war.
For now, the reported Syrian decision remains unresolved. But the shift from Damascus’ reported rejection last month of Saudi requests for Syrian participation to a reported discussion of direct involvement this week suggests that the widening Saudi-Turkish military response to the Houthi offensive may be changing the calculations in Damascus.
Yemen's Houthis attacked Aden's international airport with ballistic missiles and explosive-laden drones on Wednesday, the country's Transport Ministry said, as fighting between the Iran-aligned group and Saudi-backed government forces intensified.
Il 30 settembre, termine ultimo per una possibile mossa militare iraniana contro il blocco navale di Trump , è passato senza che l’Iran intervenisse. L’Iran ha mantenuto la sua posizione, senza però sferrare l’attacco decisivo contro la Marina statunitense (che è così lontana) impegnata nel blocco. Ma lo spettacolo deve continuare. Come piano B, abbiamo assistito a uno spettacolo in prima serata, in realtà una doppia farsa: la riedizione dell’11 settembre su FlyDubai.
Questa patetica trovata non è mai stata un “attacco terroristico”; si è trattato di una mediocre operazione psicologica del Mossad, confezionata in modo approssimativo e arricchita da una serie di comparse improbabili, tra cui un idraulico che ha preso i comandi dell’aereo perché lo aveva visto in televisione.
I manipolatori erano il culto della morte in Medio Oriente, gli stessi Emirati Arabi Uniti e Washington. La narrazione ufficiale è per persone con un QI inferiore a 50: un copilota “jihadista” – guarda caso proveniente dall’Oman, perché la demonizzazione lo richiede – tenta di far schiantare un aereo pieno di sionisti. I proverbiali passeggeri eroici – idraulico incluso – lo sopraffanno a mani nude.
Il culto della morte sta facendo di tutto per assolvere gli emiratini da ogni responsabilità. L’attenzione è puntata sul “terrorista” omanita.
Ecco la combinazione perfetta: i musulmani sono e saranno sempre terroristi; il culto della morte è sempre una vittima; e l’Arabia Saudita deve consegnare il “terrorista” al culto della morte.
Un gioco da ragazzi, quindi, per un copilota contrabbandare un coltello nell’aeroporto ultra-sorvegliato di Dubai, a bordo di una delle rotte più sorvegliate del pianeta. E che dire dell’aeronautica militare, fanatica della morte, che non è riuscita a impedire l’atterraggio dell’aereo a Tabuk?
Perché il piano è sempre stato quello di atterrare a Tabuk. Si tratta della più grande base aerea saudita nel nord-ovest, e la più vicina a Israele; la setta della morte ha cercato per anni di ottenerne l’accesso. Ora potrebbero finalmente ottenere tutto: accesso allo spazio aereo saudita, informazioni riservate e altro ancora, grazie alla pressione congiunta di Abu Dhabi e Washington.
Presso Transition Protocol abbiamo appurato che quando il leader della setta della morte si è recato “segretamente” ad Abu Dhabi per incontrare il capo degli Emirati Arabi Uniti, MbZ, in un incontro bilaterale, potrebbe aver incontrato anche persone provenienti da diverse nazioni arabe, tra cui Qatar, Oman, Libia e Marocco.
L’Arabia Saudita ha negato categoricamente di far parte del pacchetto. Lo stesso ha fatto la Giordania. L’Oman compare solo attraverso una fonte israeliana. Non vi è alcuna conferma ufficiale da parte di Qatar, Oman, Marocco o Libia.
Teheran ha comunque reagito con estrema irritazione, avvertendo di “conseguenze molto pericolose”. La determinazione iraniana è chiara: non permettere che quei chihuahua facciano deragliare il processo fondamentale di riduzione al massimo dell’influenza statunitense e israeliana in Medio Oriente.
Islamabad, dal canto suo, continua a perseguire l’impresa sisifea di avanzare a piccoli passi verso un progresso minimo, mediando sia tra Arabia Saudita e Ansarallah, sia tra Stati Uniti e Iran.
Martedì scorso a Doha, il Qatar ha effettivamente consegnato al ministro degli Esteri iraniano Abbas Araghchi la risposta degli Stati Uniti. Lo scontro sembra riguardare la sequenza degli accordi, piuttosto che i singoli elementi. Il testo, così com’è, è una sorta di versione migliorata del famigerato memorandum d’intesa fallimentare, noto anche come Accordo quadro di Islamabad. Nessuno scommette che il carro morto risorgerà, ancora una volta.
Russia, Iran, Yemen: diamo una lezione a quei bastardi senza pietà.
Ora veniamo al dunque: lo Yemen. E a quale livello di annientamento sono disposti a infliggere a Riyadh i duri di Sana’a. La distruzione degli impianti petroliferi è fin troppo facile: basta un’apertura graduale. Lo Yemen è in preda alla furia. E non si fermeranno davanti a nulla.
Possiamo già osservare una sorprendente convergenza tra la Casa dei Saud, la Marina statunitense al di fuori della Persia e la NATO nel Paese 404: vengono tutti martellati senza pietà. Russia e Iran non hanno ancora iniziato. E parliamo dello Yemen.
All’inizio di questa settimana, Sergey Karaganov lo ha ribadito pubblicamente: lo Stavka russo ha finalmente preso la fatidica decisione di porre fine alle sofferenze dei neonazisti di Kiev. E in una sessione informale di due ore al Valdai, alle porte di Mosca, il Gran Maestro Sergey Lavrov, in totale relax, ha ribadito ancora una volta che la Russia è pronta per la guerra in Europa. E sì, sarà rapida. Senza esclusione di colpi.
Ansarallah e le Forze Armate yemenite attendono che tre fattori si combinino: un’inevitabile Ora Zero che risuoni in tutta l’Asia occidentale; la crescente tensione e l’esplosività degli scontri interni alla famiglia reale e tra le tribù in Arabia Saudita; e il perfetto incastro di tutti i pezzi del puzzle per scatenare la prossima Tempesta Yemenita sull’Arabia Saudita.
Allo stato attuale, Riyadh non riconosce alcun attacco proveniente dallo Yemen, mentre Sana’a annuncia ogni giorno, con precisione svizzera, il numero di raid aerei sauditi sullo Yemen, che prendono di mira mercati, fattorie, case, ponti, infrastrutture idriche, reti di telecomunicazioni: il proverbiale manuale del sindacato Epstein.
L’Iran, dal canto suo, ha già alzato la posta in gioco, colpendo il giacimento di Bu Hasa della ADNOC, a sud-ovest di Abu Dhabi: si tratta di uno dei più grandi giacimenti di petrolio e gas onshore degli Emirati Arabi Uniti, che alimenta lo strategico oleodotto Habshan-Fujairah, l’unica via di esportazione degli Emirati Arabi Uniti che aggira lo Stretto di Hormuz.
Il gasdotto East-West, di proprietà dell’Arabia Saudita, è stato colpito tre settimane fa e bombardato nuovamente dallo Yemen all’inizio di questa settimana, ad Abqaiq.
Colpire ADNOC e Abqaiq quasi simultaneamente potrebbe comportare la perdita di ben 13 milioni di barili di petrolio al giorno dal mercato. Non si ripete mai abbastanza che Iran e Yemen sono un tutt’uno. È questo il tutt’uno che conta, e nessun misero attacco informatico dell’11 settembre potrà cambiare le cose.
The Houthis (Ansar Allah) reported new gains in Yemen’s Taiz province on October 6, claiming their forces had taken a strategic mountain, pushed Saudi-backed forces out of another district and repelled an attempt to advance.
A Houthi military source quoted by the Saba news agency said the group’s forces had taken control of Jabal Matran in al-Mawasit district and captured a large amount of military equipment, including vehicles and weapons. The advance tightened the siege on Saudi-backed forces in Taiz city.
The same source added that the group had driven Saudi-backed military concentrations from the entirety of al-Silw district.
Houthi military spokesman Brig. Gen. Yahya Saree separately said the group’s forces had repelled Saudi-backed forces attempting to advance toward Houthi positions southwest of al-Wazi’iyah in Taiz.
The attacking forces made no progress, while several vehicles and armored vehicles were destroyed and dozens of personnel were killed or wounded, according to the spokesman, who added that the Houthis fired ballistic missiles at concentrations of reinforcements that had been sent to support the stalled advance. Saree also said the group’s forces were continuing to pursue Saudi-backed forces in other parts of Taiz, describing their opponents as disorganized and saying some were fleeing.
Click to see full-size image.
Click to see full-size image.
Meanwhile, near Bab al-Mandab, the counterattack launched by Saudi-backed forces has stalled due to effective resistance from the Houthis.
Saree said that several advance attempts were thwarted near the strategic waterway, adding that dozens of “ballistic missiles” hit concentrations of Saudi-backed forces there, killing and wounding dozens of fighters and destroying a large number of vehicles.
The escalation has brought a sharp increase in Saudi air operations across Yemen. Saudi Arabia said Monday that its aircraft had struck hundreds of targets in support of the ground offensive, while Houthi-run media have reported strikes in multiple provinces as well as the capital, Sanaa.
The intensified bombing produced more civilian casualties. The Houthi-run Health Ministry said that a Saudi airstrike on a home in the village of Umm al-Dahi in Haradh district of Hajjah province killed six members of one family — a father, mother and four children between the ages of 3 and 8. It said a sixth child, a 6-year-old girl, was critically wounded and that some victims remained under the rubble.
The fighting now extends across two major axes, and the Houthis hold the upper hand in both. The battle of Taiz is the most critical as its outcome could determine whether Saudi-backed forces could mount an effective defense or continue to collapse.
Saudi Arabia has confirmed that Najran and Jizan airports were hit, causing damage and lightly injuring three people;
Ansar Allah broke the Saudi-backed counterattack toward the Bab al-Mandab Strait. Only an airstrip near Dhubab is still under the control of Yemeni government forces;
Ansar Allah released video footage showing strikes with “ballistic missiles” against Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces in Ras al-Ara to the east of Bab al-Mandab;
Ansar Allah said they had imposed control over the al-Maafir and al-Mawasat districts in Taiz.
A Saudi airstrike hit a home in Yemen’s northern Hajjah province on Tuesday, killing a family of six, including four young children, according to the Yemeni Health Ministry within the Ansar Allah-led government. The ministry said that the children were aged three to eight and that a six-year-old girl was also wounded in the strike. […]
The Houthis (Ansar Allah) released two videos on October 6 showing drone and missile strikes on government forces and military positions in Yemen, as fighting intensified after a Saudi-backed counterattack near the Bab al-Mandab Strait and continued Houthi advances around Taiz.
One video showed what the group described as strikes on concentrations of Saudi-backed forces on several fronts, carried out with locally made “Shoawaz” first-person view suicide drones. The strikes targeted troops, vehicles and equipment.
A second video showed what the Houthis said were ballistic missile attacks on troop concentrations and weapons depots belonging to Saudi-backed forces in the Ras al-Arah area east of Bab al-Mandab. The footage was filmed by a surveillance drone.
The Houthis did not say when either attack took place, and the footage suggests the strikes may date from the previous round of fighting in September.
The videos came as Saudi-backed forces sought to reverse major Houthi gains along the Red Sea coast and around the Bab al-Mandab Strait.
Government forces said a day earlier that they had retaken positions in the Dhubab area and captured Mocha with heavy Saudi air support. The Houthis denied they had been driven from their positions and presented evidence proving that most of the area near Bab al-Mandab remains under their control.
At the same time, the Houthis expanded their positions around Taiz, advancing onto mountain routes leading toward the city and de facto besieging Saudi-backed forces.
The competing advances have intensified fighting across southwestern Yemen. Despite Saudi air power backing government forces, the Houthis maintain the upper hand in both Bab al-Mandab and Taiz. The battle is far from over, however.
Following Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, analysts interpreted the move as an attempt by Netanyahu to establish a foothold against Yemen’s Ansar Allah and gain leverage in the Red Sea. However, the recognition of officials from this separatist enclave in the Horn of Africa indicates that Israel’s plans extend beyond countering the Houthis; Turkey also figures among the adversaries of the Israeli state.
About a year ago, Mohamed Osman Fadal, a senior foreign policy advisor to the President of Somaliland, stated that they “need air defense systems” to counter Turkish F-16s and drones stationed in Mogadishu. He further noted, “We want Israel to support us in the confrontation with Turkey.” About a year ago, Mohamed Osman Fadal, a senior foreign policy advisor to the President of Somaliland, stated that they “need air defense systems” to counter the Turkish F-16s and drones stationed in Mogadishu. He further noted, “We want Israel to support us in the confrontation with Turkey.”
This stance reflects the sentiments within Somaliland’s self-proclaimed administration and aligns with Netanyahu’s ambitions, as both parties seek to prepare as fully as possible for a clash with the de facto government of Somalia. The official Somali army already possesses special forces and a navy trained by Turkey, as well as T129 ATAK helicopters, the renowned Bayraktar UAV, and even M48 and M60 tanks.
Recently, Somali President Sheikh Hassan Mohamud stated that Israel plans to establish a naval base in the port city of Berbera—located in Somaliland—and utilize its airport. Mohamud made this statement in an interview with Al Jazeera, warning that Mogadishu would oppose any Israeli military presence in territory it considers part of Somalia. “Under no circumstances will we allow an Israeli presence in the country based on the way Israel treats Somaliland.”
Circumstances are compelling the parties to arm themselves, and it is quite likely that the Horn of Africa will become the first theater of open confrontation between Israel and Turkey.
If the battle against separatists in Somalia is supposedly the first frontline, then who is next? The Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean sea, where Greece is gradually being drawn into Israel’s sphere of influence.
According to media reports, in late August, Ankara redeployed the 51st Commando Brigade—comprising approximately 2,000 professional special forces troops—from Hozat in the country’s east to the Söke district in Aydın province, directly opposite the Greek island of Samos.
Earlier in the spring, Greece purchased weapons from Israel worth approximately 2.3 billion shekels. The arsenal includes the Elbit-developed PULS system, training missiles, precision-guided munitions, loitering munitions, and ten years of logistical support. This new acquisition is part of Greece’s plan to modernize its armed forces by 2030. Athens intends to spend around 28 billion euros by 2036 to establish an Israeli-style defense system—known in Greece as the “Achilles Shield”—and to purchase up to 40 F-35 fighter jets from the US, as well as frigates from France and Italy.
While many experts believe Greece took this step in response to threats arising from the US-Israeli conflict with Iran—particularly given Tehran’s strikes on US allies in the Persian Gulf—it is also clear that Greece is concerned about Turkey’s growing capabilities in the field of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). On top of all this, let us not forget that Greece is preparing to establish a “Mediterranean Quadrilateral Dialogue” with India, Israel, and Cyprus, serving as a counterweight to the “Mecca Pact” involving Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan.
The region is gradually entering a new level of conflict, with blocs now forming in anticipation of a future redistribution of spheres of influence. Israel, the primary proponent of the IMEC project, views Turkey as an adversary due to its strategically important position along the Silk Road. Consequently, Somaliland and Greece are poised to become key players in Israel’s strategy to curtail the influence of Turkey and its allies.
The Saudi-backed Yemeni counterattack toward the Bab al-Mandab Strait appeared to have stalled by October 6 after an initial advance, with the Houthis (Ansar Allah) retaining most of their positions around the strategic waterway.
The offensive began a day earlier with Saudi air support as allied Yemeni government forces advanced rapidly along the southern Red Sea coast. Within hours, Saudi-backed forces said they had captured Bab al-Mandab and Dhubab and had entered the port city of Mocha.
Houthi media, however, published material from the same areas. An Al-Masirah reporter released a photo from Bab al-Mandab, while several videos showed Houthi fighters in Dhubab and Mocha. Only an airstrip near Dhubab appears to be still under the control of Saudi-backed forces as of now.
Click to see full-size image. (X)
Brig. Gen. Yahya Saree, the Houthi military spokesman, later disputed reports of a government breakthrough in an official statement.
“The armed forces maintain control over all their battlefield gains, and what the enemy is promoting are imaginary victories to satisfy its masters,” Saree said.
The spokesman said Houthi forces had attacked Saudi-backed concentrations at Ras al-Ara and al-Saqiya, claiming more than 200 troops were killed or wounded there. He added that further strikes east of al-Jawf and Ragwan in Marib caused additional casualties and destroyed military vehicles, while Houthi forces continued pursuing Saudi-backed government forces in Taiz.
The Houthis expanded their missile and drone campaign against Saudi Arabia in response to the counterattack toward the Bab al-Mandab Strait.
In a statement issued late October 5, Saree said three operations targeted Saudi sites. He said one strike hit King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh, another targeted an Aramco refinery in Rabigh and caused a fire, and a third targeted Abha airport, Khamis Mushait military base, Akifah camp in Asir, and sites in Najran and Jizan.
The next day, Saree announced two more attacks, saying a ballistic missile hit the al-Daghareer military camp in Jizan and caused dozens of casualties. He added that another missile attack targeted Abha International Airport and disrupted air traffic.
Saree warned international airlines against continuing to operate through Saudi airspace, while excluding flights over Mecca and Medina.
Saudi Arabia acknowledged on October 6 that Jizan and Najran international airports were hit. The kingdom’s General Authority of Civil Aviation said three people suffered minor injuries.
All in all, the Houthis appear to have absorbed the Saudi-backed counterattack toward the Bab al-Mandab Strait. However, fighting there could still go on for days, or even weeks. The area is low and open, which makes it extremely difficult to defend.
Further advances by the Houthis in Taiz, where government forces are already under siege, could, however, lead to a catastrophic collapse in the Saudi-led camp along Yemen’s southern coast, all the way to the port city of Aden.
The Saudi-backed Yemeni forces battling the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels claim they have regained a large swath of territory in a new counteroffensive launched on Monday. This includes the recapture of the Red Sea port city of Mokha and other key positions near the highly-strategic Bab al-Mandeb Strait (BAM). As we reported last month, the Houthis had taken these areas during an offensive of their own.
“On Monday, the Nation Shield Forces, the Giants Brigades, and the Tihama Resistance—supported by the Popular Resistance—seized control of the city of Al-Mokha in western Taiz Governorate following fierce battles against the terrorist Houthi militias backed by the Iranian regime,” the official Yemeni Saba news outlet reported. “The forces, aided by air support, succeeded in capturing Al-Mokha after clashes with the terrorist Houthi militias, which had controlled the city since early last September. The battles, which took place at various locations surrounding Al-Mokha, involved the use of diverse weaponry and resulted in casualties among the terrorist Houthi militias, the capture of several of their members, and the flight of others.”
Dubbed Operation Yemen Dawn, the counteroffensive aims to “restore state institutions, liberate the capital Sana’a, and end the Houthi terrorist militia coup,” Rashad al-Alimi, president of the internationally recognized government of Yemen, stated Monday on X.
“With God’s aid, the will of our people, the valor of our armed forces and all military formations, and the support of our brothers and friends, Yemen will march toward a new dawn of freedom, peace, and stability,” al-Alimi added.
على بركة الله، انطلقت عملية "فجر اليمن" لاستعادة مؤسسات الدولة، وتحرير العاصمة صنعاء، وإنهاء انقلاب الميليشيات الحوثية الإرهابية. بعون الله، وإرادة شعبنا وبسالة قواتنا المسلحة وكافة التشكيلات العسكرية، ودعم أشقائنا وأصدقائنا، سيمضي اليمن نحو فجر جديد من الحرية والسلام والاستقرار. pic.twitter.com/bP1h9EVdu2
The claims about the recapture of Mokha follow statements made earlier on Monday that the National Shield Forces and Giants Brigades, “liberated Dhubab [also spelled Dhobab] District and strategic positions around the Bab al-Mandab Strait in western Taiz Governorate on Monday following clashes with Iran-backed Houthi militias,” Saba claimed. “The clashes left a number of Houthi fighters dead or wounded, while others fled under pressure from the military operation. Several military vehicles and pieces of equipment were also destroyed or disabled. The forces are continuing clearance and security operations in the liberated areas and cutting Houthi supply routes.”
In addition, the Kingdom’s Maj. Gen. Turki al-Maliki, spokesman for the Saudi-led coalition, stated that “100 fighter jets were providing support to the forces of Yemen’s internationally recognized government fighting against the Houthis,” according to The Associated Press. “He said the coalition has secured ‘air protection’ of the strategic Bab el-Mandeb Strait and destroyed hundreds of Houthi targets as part of the ongoing campaign.”
After Yemeni officials announced the new counteroffensive on Sunday, al-Maliki vowed “full operational support” to the Yemeni government forces, until the Houthis are “eliminated,” the AP added.
On Monday, the Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center (HOCC), an organization closely aligned with the Houthis, confirmed increased Saudi airstrikes and threatened a response. HOCC warned “all airlines operating in Saudi airspace that it is unsafe, with the exception of the airspace over ‘Mecca and Medina,'” the official Houthi Telegram channel reported.
HOCC did not elaborate on that warning.
While TWZ cannot verify these claims, independent Yemen analyst Mohammed al-Basha said it appears that the anti-Houthi forces have gained ground on the Red Sea coast.
The founder of the widely quoted Basha Report stated on X that he had “high confidence” that Yemeni government forces recaptured Dhobab Airport, “cutting off the Houthi supply route between Mocha and Bab al-Mandab.” He added that “Southern Giants Forces are now heading towards the city of Dhobab, Al-Omari Camp, and Bab al-Mandab.”
بثقة عالية الساعة العاشرة صباح الاثنين ٥ أكتوبر استعادة مطار ذوباب وقطع طريق إمداد الحوثي بين المخا وباب المندب قوات العمالقة الجنوبية الان تتجه نحو مدينة ذوباب ومعسكر العمري وباب المندب https://t.co/6eHYJ3cnza
Videos have emerged showing what appears to be Saudi-backed forces running over Houthi fighters. The Houthis have called this a war crime.
Several videos emerging of Saudi-backed government forces driving over and shooting fleeing Houthi fighters caught off guard by their offensive in southwestern Yemen.
Amid the spike in fighting, the State Department issued a new warning to Americans in Saudi Arabia.
“Due to the ongoing security situation in Saudi Arabia and the potential for aerial drone or missile attacks on Saudi Arabia, the U.S. Mission strongly encourages all U.S. citizens to remain vigilant and follow the guidance of national alerts released by Saudi Arabia’s Civil Defense,” the department stated on X.
Saudi Arabia: Due to the ongoing security situation in Saudi Arabia and the potential for aerial drone or missile attacks on Saudi Arabia, the U.S. Mission strongly encourages all U.S. citizens to remain vigilant and follow the guidance of national alerts released by Saudi… pic.twitter.com/QzVaER1WZ8
Yemen Dawn was launched in the wake of large-scale Houthi advances. As we noted earlier in this story, the rebel group captured the port of Mokha and two key islands in the Red Sea, increasing its control over the Bab al-Mandab Strait (BAM). That moved the front lines to the key city of Taiz, which sits astride a major roadway linking it to the port city of Aden. The Houthis recently captured strategic hilltops near Taiz, advancing on the last road between the city and Aden, which serves as the interim capital of the Yemeni government.
The conflict between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis grew out of a civil war in Yemen that erupted in 2014. It expanded a year later when a Saudi-led coalition joined forces with the government ousted by the Houthis and raged on until the parties reached a tenuous ceasefire in 2022. The Saudis held off on getting involved in the recent Red Sea conflict which saw the U.S. and coalition warships duking it out with the Houthis, and eventually led to a U.S.-led air campaign over Yemen. Tensions, however, reignited after that conflict ended when the Houthis joined the U.S.-Iran conflict on the side of their major supporter.
Earlier this year, the Houthis imposed a blockade on the BAM and began striking Saudi ships in the southern part of the Red Sea as well as targeting critical energy terminals on that body of water and Saudi refineries. Iranian proxies have also struck the vital East-West pipeline that carries oil to the Red Sea to bypass the Strait of Hormuz, where Iran has vastly curtailed shipping after the launch of Operation Epic Fury. That line has reportedly since reopened after being shut down following a long-range drone attack.
Bab al-Mandab Strait. (Google Earth)
On Monday, Turkey and Pakistan said they will undertake a “rapid deployment” of troops to Saudi Arabia under the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, a pact designed to assist the Kingdom’s fight against the Houthis, the Middle East Eye reported.
“The announcement on Monday came after representatives of the three countries held an emergency meeting in Riyadh where they condemned recent attacks on Saudi Arabia, in particular those targeting the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, without mentioning the Houthis by name,” the publication added.
Concern about maintaining the flow of energy resources from the region has spurred France and the U.K. to send additional forces to help the Saudis.
You can see Macron’s announcement in the following video.
Nous agissons pour protéger nos compatriotes des conséquences de la crise au Moyen-Orient. Objectifs : sécuriser les approvisionnements et faire baisser les prix à la pompe. pic.twitter.com/kvrgHcV4E4
The U.S. also appears to be increasing its assistance to Saudi Arabia. Though President Donald Trump turned down the Kingdom’s request to directly attack the Houthis, the U.S. is “providing aerial refueling for Saudi warplanes conducting defensive air patrols,” The New York Times reported on Sunday. That’s in addition to the previously known assistance to Riyadh provided by “more than 200 U.S. intelligence and military analysts working in Saudi command centers helping to analyze and select targets in support of its Yemeni allies,” the newspaper added.
The stark reality, especially facing European leaders like Macron, is that if Saudi oil infrastructure and transport nodes near the Red Sea are destroyed or the pipeline that feeds them is shut down for months, the last major oil lifeline from the region — and especially to Europe — will be closed off, sparking a deeper energy crisis.
Iran has already severely curtailed the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz since the U.S. and Israel attacked it on Feb. 28. The movement of oil has been further impeded by a U.S. blockade on Iranian ports. However, transits have been increasing as of late, thanks in large measure to U.S. military escorts that U.S. Central Command claims have allowed more than a billion barrels of crude to pass through the Strait of Hormuz.
Still, the price of Brent crude continues to hover over $100 per barrel due to a combination of factors that still make this a very dangerous region. This includes the ongoing threats from the Houthis in the BAM and the aforementioned spike in fighting between the Houthis and Saudi-backed forces. In addition, there are continuing Iranian attacks on shipping, including one today and three over the weekend, the skyrocketing cost of insuring vessels and the possibility Gulf countries may be paying Iran to allow their oil through. Such payments, essentially a toll, are “potentially handing Tehran a significant portion of the value of the cargo,” Al Jazeera noted.
Asked about the Saudi-backed counteroffensive, Trump said “It will all work out very well.”
Question: What's your view on the Saudi and Yemeni counter attack against the Houthis?
Meanwhile, talks between the U.S. and Iran to end hostilities between the countries remain at an impasse, though the two sides have not directly attacked each other in weeks. The U.S. rejected Iran’s conditions for reopening the Strait of Hormuz, and Tehran says it is preparing a reply to the U.S. counterproposal, CBS News reported Monday morning.
For his part, Trump continues to waver, suggesting the U.S. could “leave tomorrow” or resume striking Iran.
It is far too early to tell whether the new Saudi-backed counteroffensive in Yemen will have any lasting effect on the battlefield. The coalition arrayed against the Houthis isn’t known to be highly robust and the quality of its forces have been in question. Still, it has been clear that the Saudis and their allies had to act strongly, and this would be exactly that.
The US is refueling Saudi fighter jets as part of its support for Riyadh’s war in Yemen, a US official has told Al Jazeera, marking an escalation of US involvement in the conflict. The US refueling of Saudi warplanes was one of the most controversial aspects of US involvement in the war in Yemen after […]
Cheap drones, heavy bombs, disrupted shipping, and vulnerable supply routes are challenging the idea that technological superiority guarantees military success. The emerging contest is not simply over who builds the smartest weapon. It is over who can adapt, produce, and keep fighting after the enemy learns how to break it. Washington’s Project Meridian offers one answer. Recent battlefields suggest a much harder test.
The Battlefield Rewrites the Blueprint
The war in Ukraine shows that military innovation does not always mean more sophisticated weapons. Sometimes it means finding a simple way around an enemy’s defenses. Russian forces did that with drones guided through fiber-optic cables instead of radio signals, allowing them to operate despite radio jamming.
During the fighting to push Ukrainian troops out of Russia’s Kursk region, fiber-optic drones threatened the roads supplying Ukrainian positions. Sustained attacks on transport made those positions harder to supply, reinforce, and evacuate. Ground that remained defensible against a direct assault became increasingly difficult to hold as supply routes came under pressure.
Drones did not replace infantry or artillery. Their value came from linking reconnaissance and strikes to a broader effort to disrupt Ukrainian logistics. A relatively small change in drone guidance helped Russian forces put pressure on the supply lines sustaining the defense, rather than just individual vehicles or positions.
A separate example from eastern Ukraine shows how drone attacks can also threaten robotic supply vehicles
Nor did the advantage remain exclusive. Ukrainian units expanded their own fiber-optic capabilities, turning a Russian breakthrough into another round of adaptation. Cable guidance removes the vulnerable radio-control link, but introduces weight, handling, and physical constraints. It does not make the aircraft invisible or indestructible. A solution to one problem creates a different set of tradeoffs.
Russia’s glide bombs demonstrate another route to military innovation. Instead of replacing existing weapons entirely, guidance and wing kits give older bombs greater reach and precision. Their heavy payloads perform tasks that small drones cannot. Their use against Ukrainian positions illustrates why the future battlefield will contain both cheap electronics and large quantities of conventional explosives.
The broader lesson is uncomfortable for anyone selling a universal replacement for the old military. New systems do not arrive on an empty battlefield. They must work with existing aircraft, artillery, engineers, supply units, and command structures. Their value depends on how those parts fit together.
That also limits what strike videos can prove. A successful attack demonstrates an outcome, not the average success rate, the number of failed missions, or the effort required to repeat it. The decisive question is whether an army can turn occasional success into a dependable military capability.
The Cost of Keeping Routes Open
The Red Sea offers a different warning. An attacker does not necessarily have to defeat a navy to impose strategic costs.
Houthi attacks pushed shipping companies toward longer routes around Africa. By late summer 2026, traffic through the Suez Canal was recovering but remained well below pre-crisis levels. Houthi attacks had pushed shipping companies onto longer, more expensive routes, showing how a regional armed group could disrupt global trade without defeating a major navy.
An interception can therefore be a tactical success without restoring normal commercial activity. The defender must protect ships and sustain confidence over time. The attacker may only need to keep the risk credible. Counting destroyed drones does not answer whether the shipping route is functioning.
The familiar comparison between a cheap drone and an expensive interceptor captures only part of this problem. Saving a merchant ship or warship can justify an expensive defensive shot. The deeper question is whether sufficient interceptors, maintenance capacity, crews, and replacement stocks remain available throughout a prolonged campaign.
Ukraine presents a related problem on land. Russian glide bombs combine substantial destructive power with relatively inexpensive conversion kits. Defending against every incoming weapon with a costly missile is not necessarily sustainable. But abandoning high-end air defenses would leave other threats unanswered.
The likely response is a layered force rather than a single miracle weapon. Different threats demand different combinations of detection, electronic warfare, physical protection, and interception. An army also needs to keep operating when some threats get through.
Kursk and the Red Sea are not interchangeable battlefields. One concerns a contested land campaign, the other pressure on maritime commerce. What connects them is the importance of maintaining a function under repeated attack. Delivering supplies and keeping shipping moving matter more than producing an impressive interception tally.
Washington Looks Upward
Washington is approaching this problem through a different starting point: global networks, industrial scale, and institutional control.
On September 30, Pete Hegseth announced Project Meridian alongside a proposed Autonomous Warfare Command and the Fortress America initiative. Meridian would examine future military capabilities, while the new command would organize the expansion of autonomous and robotic systems. Fortress America would address the resilience of bases and supply chains. These are related initiatives, not a single approved war plan.
U.S. service members at the State of the Force address, Quantico, September 30, 2026
Meridian’s advisers include Elon Musk, Palmer Luckey, and Newt Gingrich, under Pentagon technology chief Emil Michael. The study has 120 days to report. Its significance is not that three men can invent the next war. It is that major technology suppliers are being invited to help define the military capabilities Washington should pursue.
The September 30 memorandum commissions a study of future warfare
The State of the Force event at Quantico, where Project Meridian was announced, September 30, 2026
Some of the supporting infrastructure already has funding. On May 26, Space Systems Command awarded SpaceX a $2.29 billion agreement for the Space Data Network Backbone. A fully operational prototype is due by the end of 2027. The intended function is to connect military sensors and weapons through a high-capacity orbital communications network.
That addresses a real military requirement. Information has limited value if it cannot reach the people or systems that need it. But a larger network does not automatically become a more dependable one. The test is whether useful connections survive disruption, and whether units can continue operating when they do not.
Heavy-lift rockets could support the deployment of larger satellite constellations, although these programs do not yet amount to a single publicly defined architecture. Starship Flight 14 reached orbit on September 28 and deployed 26 Starlink V3 satellites. That demonstrated payload delivery, not every capability promised for the rocket. Reaching orbit once and providing dependable, economical military infrastructure are different milestones.
Starship Flight 14 launches from Starbase, September 28, 2026, carrying 26 Starlink V3 satellites
Starship’s final descent, landing burn, and splashdown during Flight 14, September 28, 2026
Golden Dome extends the ambition to missile defense. In May, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that a notional system consistent with the administration’s stated objectives could cost about $1.2 trillion over 20 years. Crucially, this was not a price tag for the Pentagon’s approved design. The final architecture had not been publicly disclosed.
A notional national missile-defense architecture assessed by the Congressional Budget Office
Estimated costs of the Congressional Budget Office’s hypothetical system, expressed in 2026 dollars
The policy risk is not simply excessive ambition. It is defining military problems in ways that favor the products already offered by influential suppliers. That deserves scrutiny without assuming that commercial involvement makes every proposal useless. A contract is evidence of spending. It is not evidence of battlefield superiority.
Elon Musk, named a co-leader of Project Meridian
Machines Still Need Factories
The American approach emphasizes integrating ambitious systems through large institutions. The battlefield experience points toward an equally important requirement: changing ordinary systems quickly.
These approaches are not mutually exclusive. Satellites and inexpensive drones can support the same force. The tension lies in their development cycles. A major space program cannot be redesigned every few weeks. A frontline drone or its communications equipment may lose effectiveness if updates take years.
The industrial base must therefore support both continuity and rapid revision. Ukraine’s drone sector demonstrates the importance of close feedback between operators and developers, but also the vulnerability of assembly dependent on imported components. A domestically assembled aircraft is not necessarily an independently sustainable capability.
Russian developers are also discussing the problem in terms broader than individual weapons. In September, the Ushkuynik center presented a drone assembly line housed in a modified shipping container. The proposal illustrates an effort to distribute production rather than concentrate it in a single factory.
These are developer proposals, not independently demonstrated solutions at national scale. Nevertheless, they identify two important problems: distributing production and closing gaps between separate defensive systems.
A workshop, a repair team, and a reliable component supplier may therefore matter as much as another model advertised as revolutionary. Military adaptation requires people who can identify a failure, explain it to engineers, approve a modification, and return workable equipment to service.
Autonomous Warfare Command: new drones, familiar geometry. All that’s missing is the secret handshake
Autonomy does not remove these obligations. The meaningful question is which task a machine can perform reliably without continuous human input, under what conditions, and with what consequences when it fails. “Autonomous” should describe a tested function, not serve as a substitute for explaining one.
Fortress America recognizes another dependency. Hegseth’s stated aim is for military installations eventually to operate under their own power, alongside stronger protection and domestic supply chains. Yet independence from the civilian grid would not by itself eliminate the need for fuel, spare parts, communications, or skilled maintenance. Resilience must extend beyond the perimeter fence.
The same principle applies at the front. Engineering and logistics deserve attention alongside strike footage. They show how forces sustain movement and support combat units, rather than merely how they destroy a target.
From Remote Control to Robotic Forces
The next stage of warfare is unlikely to resemble an army of humanoid machines replacing soldiers. A more plausible future is a force in which people fight alongside growing numbers of specialized robots, from reconnaissance aircraft to ground vehicles carrying ammunition, evacuating casualties, and supporting assaults.
That transition is already underway. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces are using ground robots for logistics, evacuation, and other battlefield tasks. In September, Ukraine’s Defense Ministry reported that its ground systems had completed more than 25,000 supply and evacuation missions in August alone. The figure is an official claim, not an independently audited total, but it illustrates how far the ambition extends beyond occasional demonstrations.
Over the next five years, the important change may be the organization of these machines into working formations. Aerial drones could scout ahead while ground robots move supplies and support troops. Humans would still set objectives and handle situations the machines cannot reliably interpret. The advantage would come from coordinating those different roles, not simply putting more unmanned vehicles on the battlefield.
Remote control, however, is not autonomy. A vehicle that needs continuous steering from an operator remains dependent on communications and human attention. Greater autonomy could allow machines to navigate, avoid obstacles, or complete limited tasks when a connection fails. None of those functions automatically makes a robot capable of independently identifying legitimate targets or deciding when to fire.
The likely result is a race between robotic capability and countermeasures. More machines may reduce the number of soldiers exposed on supply routes, but those machines will themselves become targets. Communications, batteries, maintenance, and replacement parts will remain constraints. Robotization moves some risks away from people; it does not abolish the costs of war.
Nor will inexpensive robots make heavy weapons obsolete. Small drones, armored vehicles, artillery, and aircraft perform different jobs. The stronger force will be the one that combines them effectively and changes that combination faster than its opponent.
Meridian should be judged against this prospect, not the grandeur of its language. Can Washington build systems that cooperate, survive disruption, and remain affordable enough to replace? Can its procurement machinery adapt as quickly as the battlefield demands?
The next war will not be won by whoever unveils the most impressive robot. It may favor the side that can lose machines without losing momentum, preserve human judgment without slowing every decision, and turn battlefield lessons into production before the enemy does. The real revolution is not a machine that looks like a soldier. It is an army that learns to fight differently because machines are now part of its ranks.
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