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Brazil’s general election on October 4 delivered a severe warning to the left. Flávio Bolsonaro, the presidential candidate of the Liberal Party (PL), finished ahead of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, with approximately 47% against 45%. Neither secured a majority, sending them into a runoff on October 25. More troubling than this narrow presidential gap was the advance of bolsonarismo through Congress. The election has strengthened a political movement whose ambitions extend beyond defeating Lula to reshaping the institutions that obstruct its exercise of power.

The imprisonment (house arrest) and electoral exclusion of Jair Bolsonaro have not dissolved his movement. His son Flávio carries its presidential banner, while other members of the family have won seats in Congress. Michelle Bolsonaro, Jair’s wife, and Carlos Bolsonaro, his son, enter the Senate; Jair Renan, another son, and Renato, Jair’s brother, enter the Chamber of Deputies. Nepobolsonarismo is an appropriate name for this family’s expansion through the state. Yet the family is only the most visible expression of a broader project, rooted in powerful economic interests and a deeply organized reactionary politics.

A presidential contest with continental stakes

Lula remains the principal obstacle to the return of this project to the presidency. His defeat would affect workers and peasants throughout Brazil, but also the possibilities for regional cooperation and an independent Latin American foreign policy. Brazil’s size, industrial capacity, raw minerals (such as critical minerals), agricultural resources, and diplomatic reach give its political direction continental significance. A government that subordinates these assets to Washington’s priorities would weaken the space available to neighboring countries seeking their own paths of development.

The first-round geography demonstrates both Lula’s strength and his difficulties. He retained a commanding position in the Northeast, while Flávio led across the other four regions. São Paulo’s enormous electorate provided a particularly important advantage to the right. These divisions cannot be explained by an opposition between an enlightened population and an ignorant one. They require an examination of the different conditions of work, the organization of political life, and the capacity of competing movements to interpret people’s frustrations.

Lula approaches the runoff with a substantial social record. Unemployment fell to 5.3% in the quarter ending in August, the lowest rate for that period in the statistical series beginning in 2012. Such improvements matter enormously to families for whom a regular wage brings relief from daily uncertainty. But an improved national indicator does not settle the political argument. Employment can coexist with exhausting journeys, expensive housing, inadequate public services, and the insecurity of debt. The distance between statistical improvement and lived experience remains terrain on which the right operates.

Bolsonarismo, or Brazil’s far right of a special type, translates these frustrations into resentment against the left, all public institutions, and vulnerable sections of society. Its promise of order offers an immediate language for fear, while concealing the economic arrangements that produce insecurity. The left cannot answer this merely by advertising government achievements. It must connect those achievements to a credible program for changing everyday life, and explain which interests prevent further advances. A worker struggling with debt needs more than reassurance that the economy is performing well. This has been the problem for Lula, whose program for the future does not seem to promise more than what has been delivered till now.

The senate: a struggle over institutional power

The Senate election is particularly consequential because 54 of its 81 seats were contested. Senators serve eight-year terms, so the results will shape national politics well beyond the next presidential administration. The PL won 19 seats and will hold 28 in the new Senate, making it the largest party. The PT will have nine. The bolsonaristas have therefore established a formidable position, although the PL itself remains short of a majority and must bargain with other parties.

Michelle Bolsonaro and Bia Kicis took both seats in the Federal District, while Carlos Bolsonaro and Carol de Toni won the two seats in Santa Catarina. These victories show the movement’s ability to organize coordinated campaigns and concentrate support behind its candidates. There were important successes for the left: Rui Costa and Jaques Wagner won in Bahia, Humberto Costa retained representation in Pernambuco, and Marília Campos won in Minas Gerais. These results preserve points of resistance within an increasingly hostile chamber. The Senate’s significance extends beyond ordinary legislation. The bolsonaristas have made their confrontation with the Supreme Federal Court a central political objective, including demands to impeach its ministers. Their strengthened representation increases their capacity to pursue that confrontation and to influence the election of the Senate president. Predictions of an automatic majority for impeachment should be treated cautiously: party affiliation, campaign declarations, and votes in a specific proceeding are different things. Nevertheless, the danger of using legislative power to intimidate the judiciary has plainly grown.

This is part of a struggle over the conditions under which the far right can govern. The judicial proceedings against Jair Bolsonaro did not remove the social forces supporting him. Those forces now seek greater leverage over institutions capable of restraining them. For the left, defending democratic space must therefore accompany the struggle to expand social rights. Workers’ organizations cannot afford to lose the freedoms through which they organize, educate, and confront capital.

Federal deputies: the right advances, the left finds openings

All 513 seats in the Chamber of Deputies were up for election this year. The PL secured 121, consolidating its position as the largest party in this chamber as well as in the Senate. The federation of the Workers’ Party, Communist Party of Brazil, and Green Party won 88 seats, with the PT itself taking 70. The federation’s growth is significant, but it leaves Lula’s allies far from a majority. Parties of the right hold 303 seats, while the broader parliamentary left holds 124.

The outcome strengthens the far right of a special type within a legislature already dominated by conservative interests. It also weakens some established brokers of parliamentary power, such as the centrão, the collection of parties that trades legislative support for influence over appointments and public resources, although it remains indispensable for majority building. What bargaining will take place within the centrão will now take place alongside a larger and more assertive PL. If Lula wins in the second round, he will confront substantial congressional resistance, but if Flávio wins, the same Congress could facilitate a reactionary program.

Yet the election also brought important representatives of a fighting Left into the Chamber. Jones Manoel, the communist historian elected through PSOL in Pernambuco, received 249,077 votes and finished first in Recife. Elias Jabbour, the communist geographer, was elected for the PCdoB in Rio de Janeiro. Their victories suggest an audience for political education and socialist arguments, even amid the right’s advance. They offer resources for rebuilding confidence among people who have grown impatient with the narrowing ambitions of parliamentary politics. Jones Manoel has already offered to assist Lula’s runoff campaign, including its digital communication, while proposing stronger attention to demands such as free public transport. This is a useful example of political clarity: criticism of the government’s limitations can coexist with active mobilization against the far right of a special type. Such unity does not require workers to abandon their demands. It becomes stronger when those demands supply the campaign’s energy and direction.

The task before October 25

The runoff cannot be won through negotiations among party leaders alone. It requires organized activity in workplaces, neighborhoods, universities, and rural communities, with a program people can recognize in their own lives. Transport, wages, housing, debt, public healthcare, and the time consumed by work must become the substance of a democratic campaign. Defense of sovereignty becomes tangible when it is connected to the ability to use Brazil’s wealth for the needs of its people.

The angry tide has advanced, but it has not carried away the millions who still seek another Brazil. The new communist deputies, the surviving mass organizations (especially the landless workers of the MST), and Lula’s enormous electoral base provide foundations for resistance. The immediate task is to defeat Flávio Bolsonaro. The longer task is to build a popular power strong enough to prevent the oligarchy from deciding, election after election, how little change the majority will be allowed.

Vijay Prashad is an Indian historian and journalist. He is the author of forty books, including Washington Bullets, Red Star Over the Third World, The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World, The Poorer Nations: A Possible History of the Global South, and How the International Monetary Fund Suffocates Africa, written with Grieve Chelwa. He is the executive director of Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research, the chief correspondent for Globetrotter, and the chief editor of LeftWord Books (New Delhi). He also appeared in the films Shadow World (2016) and Two Meetings (2017).

This article was produced by Globetrotter.

A statue of Donald Trump, naked from head to toe and covered in 23-karat gold leaf, has appeared in one of the busiest corridors of the European Parliament building in Strasbourg. The work, created by a Danish artist, does not pull any punches. It depicts the American president naked, with a sizable belly, sitting on the neck of a much smaller, tormented figure.

As left-wing members of Parliament call it “brilliant” satire, the right decries it as tasteless political provocation.

Anyone recently walking the corridors of the European Parliament in Strasbourg stands a good chance of stumbling upon one of the strangest artistic creations of recent years. The bizarre work of art stands at the busy junction connecting members’ offices and the plenary chamber: a 2.5-meter-tall (8 feet tall), glittering golden statue depicting President Donald Trump completely naked.

TRUMP NU, AU PARLEMENT EUROPÉEN. À Strasbourg, une statue de Donald Trump entièrement nu trône dans l’un des lieux les plus fréquentés du Parlement européen. Son nom ? « La peste orange ». 23 carats d’or Un immense club de golf 2,5 mètres de haut Signée par l’artiste danois Jens Galschiøt, l’œuvre restera exposée jusqu’à jeudi. Le message envoyé à Washington est difficile à rater.

— Camille Moscow (@camille_moscow) October 8, 2026

The work is titled “The Orange Plague,” and its creator is Danish artist Jens Galschiot, known for his provocative public sculptures. The statue, a reference to Trump’s alleged adoration of luxury and the style of his properties, was fully coated with real 23-karat gold leaf.

“Trump loves gold. In some ways, I think he would even like this statue,” the creator told the press.

The composition of the statue carries sharp political criticism. The full-bodied figure of the naked president sprawls over the shoulders of a tiny, bone-thin and visibly suffering man. Trump holds a scale in one hand — a symbol mocking justice — and clutches a golf club like a scepter in the other, while a golf ball patterned after a globe lies at his feet.

According to the Danish sculptor, Trump’s policies and his sabotage of the green transition against climate change put all of humanity at risk.

To complete the statute, the statue’s pedestal bears a cynical inscription addressed to the “King of Injustice”:

“I’m sitting on a person’s back. It collapses under my load. I would do anything to help him. Except get off his back.”

How was this allowed into the European Parliament?

Many immediately wondered how the strict Brussels bureaucracy could allow such a crude and provocative naked political statue through the gates of the institution. The answer lies in the European Parliament’s rules: Each elected member has the right to sponsor two cultural or artistic events per parliamentary term in designated areas of the building, subject to formal approval by the College of Quaestors, which handles administrative matters.

The naked president was brought into the building by Danish left-wing member Per Clausen, who said Europe should finally launch an open debate on how to protect itself from Trump and build a policy independent of him. Clausen also lashed out at outraged deputies:

“If one has skin so thin that one cannot stand the sight of such a statue in the European Parliament, one has no place on the stage of world politics!”

The statue immediately drew sharp criticism from the parliamentary right. According to Patriots for Europe and other right-wing factions, it is outrageous, tasteless and unworthy of the European Parliament to mock the democratically elected president of an allied superpower in this form in the official corridors.

The gilded exhibition in the corridors of the Parliament will not last long; it will be removed on Thursday. The naked Trump statue is then expected to travel to Turkey, where it will appear at the next U.N. climate summit (COP31). Donald Trump — from whom a quick and angry online reaction is seldom far away — has not yet commented on the Strasbourg surprise.

The post Naked golden Trump statue erected outside EU parliament building appeared first on Remix News.

International health authorities are on alert over a possible case of plague that may not even exist. The death of a laboratory worker at a plague research facility in Russia’s Irkutsk region on October 2 sparked concerns, and the World Health Organization (WHO) on Wednesday offered technical assistance to the Russian government while requesting additional information needed to assess any potential risk.

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Trying to pin the blame for the depletion of U.S. military stockpiles on something other than the war in Iran, President Donald Trump fell back on a usual scapegoat last week: Ukraine. “The Biden administration gave far more munitions away to Ukraine, at no cost to them whatsoever, than we have used in Iran,” Trump wrote on Truth Social.

This is a familiar refrain. Trump loves to remind his audience that because of him, Americans are “not spending on Ukraine anymore” and instead, Europe is footing the bill. In truth, most people in the United States don’t think about Ukraine much these days. But since Trump himself brought it up, it’s worth asking: What exactly is going on with U.S. military support to Ukraine?

The answer might surprise you. Despite Trump’s rhetoric, the United States remains deeply embroiled in Ukraine’s ongoing conflict with Russia in ways that create national security risks and run counter to Trump’s own foreign policy goals.

It is true that Trump has reduced U.S. support to Ukraine compared to its high mark under his predecessor, Joe Biden. First, his administration has stopped the use of Presidential Drawdown Authority to transfer weapons from U.S. stocks directly to Ukraine. The Biden administration used this mechanism to give Ukraine almost $35 billion in weapons free of charge. Second, the Trump administration has not requested additional funds for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI), which uses U.S. financing to purchase new weapons for Ukraine.

But Trump has not cut off all assistance to Ukraine. Several important channels remain. First, there are about $13 billion in outstanding USAI contracts as of June 2026, down from $20 billion in January 2025. These contracts, signed by Biden and now implemented by Trump, will procure weapons for Ukraine through about 2028. Weapons in the pipeline include longer-lead time systems like NASAMs, Patriot missiles and components (Ukraine is reportedly receiving at 10-20 PAC-3s per month under these contracts), counter-drone systems, artillery rockets, and ammunition.

These continuing deliveries are not new awards, but they are still taxpayer-funded military aid to Ukraine that will add up to about $20 billion in aid over the 4 years of Trump’s term. Weapons produced under these contracts come off overburdened U.S. production lines. This has a high opportunity cost given the limits of U.S. defense industrial capacity. Without obligations to Ukraine, industrial resources could shift to different weapons or systems that the United States needs more.

If the Trump administration were serious about ending U.S. spending on the Ukraine war, it could still recoup these funds and reallocate the money to support U.S. defense production needs. It has instead allowed the aid to continue.

There has also been some new funding approved since Biden left office. Congress included about $800 million of USAI funding in the 2026 and 2027 NDAAs. We can expect more in future bills as well.

And the State Department has continued to send military aid of its own. A portion of this aid goes through the Ukraine’s Ministry of Interior, including drones, armored vehicles, guns, grenade launchers, and similar equipment. Since this equipment ends up with Ukraine’s National Guard and border police it is often counted as non-military and intended for things like counterdrug operations, but today these personnel serve as combat units.

The State Department has also approved $3 billion of new arms sales to Ukraine in 2025 and 2026 that will be at least partially funded from foreign military financing (FMF), which means U.S. dollars supporting foreign government purchases of U.S. weapons. Some of these funds may come from money allocated but not spent under President Biden, but much of the funding will be new, coming from the State Department’s budget.

The bottom line is that U.S. weapons transfers to Ukraine continue under Trump, amounting to, on average, as much at $5 billion per year. But this is no longer the most important, or expensive, type of support that the United States gives to Ukraine.

For example, the United States gives Ukraine real-time targeting information, including on the movement of Russian troops and the location of key command centers. This information has been important to Ukraine’s mid-range strike campaign on Russian logistics as well as its deep strikes against military and energy targets inside of Russia. In addition, U.S. reconnaissance and surveillance assets in countries on the NATO border (including routine E-3 flights) are integrated with Ukraine’s air defense network, improving the accuracy and speed of Ukraine’s response.

Beyond intelligence, the United States also provides logistical and maintenance support, including forward and remote assistance to repair American-made equipment, necessary spare parts to keep older systems running, and training. It also facilitates the expensive transfer of European purchases of U.S. weapons.

The cost of the intelligence, logistics, and other operational support the United States provides to Ukraine does not show up anywhere as an itemized bill, even as U.S. assistance increases. But we can use available public information to draw some conclusions about the expenses incurred.

The 2024 defense supplemental bill, for instance, allocated about $15 billion to “military training, intelligence sharing, increased presence, and other support activities.” In theory, these funds are intended to cover activities conducted in support of Ukraine that would not occur if the United States remained uninvolved in that conflict. Some portion of this money will go to the salaries of military personnel who would be paid no matter where they work.

Since about a third of each military service’s budget is personnel costs, we could estimate the cost of extra activities conducted for Ukraine, excluding baseline manpower, at about $10 billion over the course of a year or so. If Trump has truly expanded intelligence sharing with Ukraine, this price tag may have increased over time.

The money included in the bill is likely only a portion of the actual burden the U.S. military and intelligence community have shouldered to support Ukraine’s war. Many intelligence activities, like tasking and analyzing satellite data and collecting signals intelligence, might be covered in classified national security budgets. Starting in 2023, in fact, the classified intelligence budget increased by 10%, a large jump over the 2022 total. The increase was justified by intelligence community leaders as resulting from shifts in the national security landscape, including especially concern about China’s rise and spillover from conflict in Ukraine. Since the total increase in funding was about $10 billion, we can guess that Ukraine-related expenditures might amount to $3-$5 billion per year, or about one-third to one-half of the total increase.

All told, then, U.S. taxpayers are still spending roughly $20 billion per year on Ukraine. Today, assistance to Ukraine comes primarily in the form of direct operational support, not weapons. But the shift in type of aid increases the risk of U.S. support to Ukraine to average Americans.

First, assisting Ukraine in striking energy targets inside of Russia has a perverse effect on the Trump administration’s efforts to keep gas prices low. As Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent acknowledged, Ukraine’s strikes inside Russia push global oil prices up, imposing higher costs of living on Americans.

Second, U.S. intelligence support deepens U.S. involvement in Ukraine’s war, making it an all-but-direct combatant. Russian assistance to Iran, both in terms of weapons and intelligence sharing, is a reaction to the comparable U.S. role in Ukraine, and it leaves U.S. servicemembers in the Middle East and elsewhere less safe. Growing U.S. participation in Ukraine also increases the risk that miscalculation leads to a direct U.S.-Russia confrontation, a nightmarish possibility given the degraded state of U.S. military readiness.

Trump promised to end the war in Ukraine in 24 hours. He has instead deepened U.S. entanglement in ways that create real risks and new fiscal costs for the United States. American interests would be best served if the United States were to walk away entirely, but if Trump instead opts for the status quo, he should at least be honest about it.

Original article: responsiblestatecraft.org

When Republican Greg Abbott was re-elected governor of Texas in 2022, his margin over opponent Beto O’Rourke was nearly 11 percentage points. Less than a month before the midterm elections, however, polls no longer show him with a comfortable lead. Survey averages put Democratic candidate Gina Hinojosa just over two points behind and rapidly closing the gap, raising alarm among Democrats over the need to boost campaign funding in the final stretch.

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An analysis published on Wednesday by ABC News estimated that companies backed financially by Donald Trump Jr. and Eric Trump have so far scored more than $6 billion in contracts from the US Department of Defense. As ABC documented, many of the investments into the defense firms come through 1789 Capital, a venture capital firm […]

The post Trump sons-backed firms bank $6 billion plus in Pentagon deals appeared first on Asia Times.

With a month still to go before America’s mid-term congressional and gubernatorial elections, the prospect of a “blue wave” of Democratic success in the House of Representatives, the Senate and in many governorships is looking increasingly likely. But whether that forecast holds true or not, one important aspect has already become clear. It is that […]

The post Plainly, Trump doesn’t really care about the midterms appeared first on Asia Times.

Today marks three years since October 7th, Al-Aqsa Flood and the escalation of Israel’s campaign to eliminate Gaza into a full-blown genocide. The world watched the livestream – and while that turned public opinion on its head, US policy hasn’t budged. Layan Sima Fuleihan, education director at The People’s Forum and an editor at 1804 Books, joins Zoe Alexandra and Rania Khalek to reflect on how Israel lost the hearts and minds of American voters – and how to turn that shift in consciousness into real power.

From Occupy Wall Street to the 2020 uprising for George Floyd, Fuleihan traces the Palestine movement through more than a decade of the mass rebellions that empowered it. She lays out key lessons from the past three years: radical change happens fast, repression can’t intimidate people out of solidarity, and Americans do care what their government does abroad. And she explains how, as Washington stays shielded from public opinion, both parties are equally culpable – and warns of the stakes of letting Democrats court pro-Palestine voters ahead of the midterms while the bombs keep falling.

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A federal judge just dismissed the Trump administration’s lawsuit against pro-Palestine protesters in New Jersey, in a major First Amendment win after the DOJ claimed a 2024 social media post calling to protest an illegal land sale at a West Orange synagogue amounted to a threat against Jewish worship. The Partnership for Civil Justice Fund called it a vindictive prosecution and viewpoint discrimination, citing the DOJ’s stated aim to “dismantle” the movement. Carl Messineo, co-founder and legal director of the PCJF and its Center for Protest Law and Litigation, joins Rania Khalek and Zoe Alexandra to break down the historic First Amendment victory for PSL New Jersey. They dig into the 1994 FACE Act meant to protect abortion clinic access and the East Jerusalem land sale at the center of the case. Messineo explains what this win means for the Trump administration’s lawfare against pro-Palestinian dissent – and why he says the tide is turning:

“[This] offers protection, safe harbor, and reassurance to all the groups being threatened … that fighting back, legally and politically, is effective.”

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Rough transcript follows:
[Host:]
Last Wednesday, a federal judge in New Jersey dismissed a civil lawsuit the Trump administration’s Department of Justice had brought against pro-Palestine protesters under the FACE Act, a law passed in 1994 actually to protect access to reproductive health clinics. The suit, which was led by Assistant Attorney General Harmeet Dhillon of the Civil Rights Division, named the Party for Socialism and Liberation New Jersey and American Muslims for Palestine New Jersey, among others.

The accusations against PSL New Jersey in this case were that there was a social media post calling for a protest at a public intersection. The protest in question in this lawsuit was against a land sale where stolen Palestinian land in East Jerusalem was being sold to people living in the United States to encourage further settlement, occupation, and ethnic cleansing of Palestinians from their lands. Such events have been strategically held at synagogues in order to create a spectacle where pro-Palestine protesters are outside synagogues, so the accusations of antisemitism just flourish with those photos.

But in this ruling, the DOJ argued that the post amounted to a threat against and interference with Jewish worship. The court disagreed, finding that the post in question was protected speech—a call to assemble and engage in political advocacy in a public forum. The Partnership for Civil Justice Fund, which represented PSL New Jersey in the case, argued that the lawsuit was vindictive prosecution and viewpoint discrimination, pointing to Dhillon’s public statement that the DOJ aims to dismantle groups behind such protests.

To talk about what the ruling means and what comes next, we’re joined by Carl Messineo, co-founder and legal director of the PCJF and its project, the Center for Protest Law and Litigation. Carl, thank you so much for joining us here at BT Live.

[Carl Messineo:]
It’s my pleasure to be here, and you guys do terrific work reporting on critical issues.

[Host:]
Oh, thank you so much for saying that. Well, crucially, in this ruling, which many are calling a victory for free speech, the court found that the social media post in question was protected political speech and not a threat, as the DOJ sought to argue. Can you walk us through the significance of this ruling, and on the other hand, what a ruling against the protest groups would have meant for free speech?

[Carl Messineo:]
Well, we can talk about what the ruling, had it gone the other way, would have meant for protest groups. First, Judge Hayden described in her opinion that allowing this civil prosecution to continue on the terms that it was advanced would effectively demonize protesters who were simply engaged in their First Amendment rights to have free speech on an issue of public importance. It would dramatically undermine the ability of people to organize and peacefully assemble on issues that are critical.

And there are few issues more critical than the subject matter of this protest. The subject matter of this protest was a land sale that was really strategically placed at a synagogue, and the land sale itself was selling Palestinian land in the occupied territories in East Jerusalem in clear violation of international law. Every major human rights or international law organization that has looked at this issue concludes that this plainly constitutes a form of war crime—having an occupying force, the state of Israel, transferring its civilians onto stolen land.

And here that’s very strategic, because the establishment of these settlements would create a barrier for the free movement of Palestinians going from East Jerusalem over to Bethlehem. It’s an absolutely horrible division of land that is not theirs to sell. And indeed, the racism of this practice is inherent. The real estate developer in their advertising materials boasts that they will be bringing a new Anglo community to East Jerusalem to take over this Palestinian land. That’s the language that they themselves use, so no one has to resort to inference as to whether this is racism. It is on its face.

[Host:]
You spoke, Carl, about the illegal land sales, right? And these land sales you said are held in religious institutions. They’re held sometimes in synagogues, which has an impact, of course, in terms of optics, but also legally, like we saw in this case. So can you talk about the legality of shielding these illegal land sales in religious institutions? Because these settlements are actually illegal under international law. So why aren’t these land sales being prosecuted?

[Carl Messineo:]
Well, absolutely, you’re correct. I mean, the Trump administration is using every means to engage in a form of lawfare, which I would say is ideological warfare, using abuse of legal process in order to shut down dissent and to promote what is clearly unlawful, illegal, and a war crime: the sale of Palestinian lands to Anglo investors here in the United States.

[Host:]
Well, in its argument, the PCJF said that this was vindictive prosecution, and it cited Harmeet Dhillon’s statement about dismantling groups like the PSL and others who are part of the movement for Palestine. We just had a really great segment speaking about this movement that’s made tremendous gains and challenged not only Donald Trump, but really has transformed the political scene in the United States. But as the PCJF mentioned, the court did not rule on the claim about this being a vindictive prosecution. So how does the PCJF intend to bring this claim forward in the future? Is there a worry that Dhillon will make good on this threat and continue challenging in such cases? What is the future of that element?

[Carl Messineo:]
Well, the ideological motivations of the Trump administration and Dhillon are clear. It’s overt. When Dhillon says that the Trump administration is going to use a law that was intended to protect medical facilities and also Black churches from the use of force and violence to target and dismantle—and that’s the language that Dhillon uses—to dismantle groups like the PSL New Jersey as well as other groups that engage in protest on a range of important issues. Now, that is plainly unconstitutional and clearly falls under the legal framework of a vindictive prosecution. That is the abuse of legal process in order to shut down a particular disfavored viewpoint.

Look at what has transformed in terms of political and cultural understanding over the past number of years. It’s groups that are engaged in this type of protest that have actually been at the forefront of a tremendous change in understanding across all segments of society about how intolerable this genocidal warfare and also the ethnic cleansing that this land transfer and land theft constitutes. So naturally, what does the Trump administration intend to do? Well, it intends to go and abusively use legal process to try and shut down groups that are having a significant political impact across consciousness.

And what does it mean for the Partnership for Civil Justice Fund? What does it mean for those who are protesting peacefully? Well, we’re all going to continue. The PCJF will continue to be a legal bulwark against this. But most importantly, it’s folks like them, folks from a multitude of organizations that are really changing the tide here. It’s not going to stop that.

[Host:]
And you know, Carl, this case came after a DOJ memo saying FACE Act cases against anti-abortion activists would be brought only in extraordinary circumstances. So what does this ruling signal to other organizations facing similar suits? And do you think it’ll deter the government from using the law this way?

[Carl Messineo:]
Deter this government? Well, I can’t say it’s going to deter them, but what I can say is that it offers protection, safe harbor, and reassurance to all the groups that are being threatened verbally and through abusive legal process that actually fighting back legally and fighting back politically are effective. And there are organizations such as ours and other great civil rights practitioners across the country who come forward and are willing to dedicate their time to help clear the way so that people can engage in peaceful protest and assembly on these critical issues. So I think that this is actually very heartening, and it sends a message of strength and support for those who are engaging in this.

[Host:]
It’s crucially important, and I think that’s why so many people have called this ruling a victory for free speech for the Palestine movement, which did face so much repression of different forms. So Carl, we thank you so much for joining us, and I’m sure that all of the protesters and movements thank the work of the PCJF for defending everyone’s right to free speech, because actually it’s not just the activists who will benefit from this ruling—it’s really everyone who values their right to free speech.

[Carl Messineo:]
That’s right. Thank you so very much for your kind words and for dedicating the time to have this issue here.

Flávio Bolsonaro, son of imprisoned coup plotter Jair Bolsonaro, clinched first place in Brazil’s presidential race Sunday with 47% to Lula’s 45%, forcing a high-stakes runoff on October 25. As Lula’s Workers’ Party (PT) suffered major losses and Bolsonaro’s Liberal Party (PL) allies took governorships and more seats in congress, Stephanie Weatherbee Brito of the International Peoples’ Assembly asks, was this really a surprise? She joins Rania Khalek and Zoe Alexandra from São Paulo to break down Brazil’s election “shock” — from the hard right’s “silent campaign” and the “shy votes” that caught polling institutes off guard, to why 33 million Brazilians skipped the polls, to the PT’s failure to offer a vision of real change.

And she warns of what may be to come: a second Trump-aligned Bolsonaro presidency “compliant and subservient” to Washington and Tel Aviv, with devastating consequences for Brazil, the Amazon, and the future of humanity.

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Rough transcript follows:
[Host 1:] Brazil went to elections this Sunday and the results shocked many. The far-right Liberal Party emerged as perhaps the biggest victor in the polls as the presidential candidate for the PL, Flávio Bolsonaro, not only clinched top place in the presidential race over Lula, but the party also gained seats in the Senate, House, and several governorships. The Workers’ Party meanwhile suffered significant losses, and incumbent progressive president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva finished in second place with 45% to Flávio’s 47%. Analysts across Latin America and the world have been struggling to understand the results and what it could mean for the region. We here at Breakthrough News are very lucky because we are joined by friend of the show Stephanie Weatherby Breto. She’s the coordinator of the International People’s Assembly calling in from São Paulo. She’s going to be discussing with us these results, what to expect for round two, and the impact on the region. Stephanie, thank you so much for joining us today.

[Stephanie Weatherby Breto:] Hi, happy to be back even under these conditions.

[Host 1:] Well, Stephanie, the reaction to Sunday’s election amongst progressives, not only in Brazil, but again across the world, has been a mix of shock, sadness, and bewilderment. I want to ask you first, how should we understand the results? Was October 4th a victory for the far right?

[Stephanie Weatherby Breto:] Yeah, I think that October 4th was absolutely a victory for the far right, but I don’t think that we should be as shocked as some people have been because the far right in Brazil has been growing pretty consistently for the past 10 years. And I think that what it has demonstrated that people didn’t believe or didn’t understand before is that it has built a pretty solid base. It is not just a reaction movement. It’s not a spontaneous movement built over social media. It really has its own organizational structure and it has the capacity to mobilize. What surprised people in Brazil was that this time around the right wing wasn’t as mobilized in the streets. Like you didn’t see as many people wearing the Brazilian flag—the color of the far right right now is to wear the Brazilian flag, to wear the football team shirt—and there wasn’t that much really like physical campaigning. Like you didn’t see people out with banners or flyers with Flávio Bolsonaro’s face. You didn’t see that kind of action, and so that contributed to an undermining of the power of the right. There was this silent campaign almost, and the polling, the kind of polls that were being done before showing where people’s voting intentions were moving, didn’t show Flávio as strong as he was. But that has happened in the past. Now, there’s also a lot of talk about people didn’t vote, which is a high number of people that either didn’t vote or abstained from actually designating a candidate. They didn’t choose a candidate on their ballot. And even though those numbers are high, they’re pretty standard for Brazil over the past three elections. And what has happened is essentially that the country has become polarized between right and left. Politics are now at the center of discussion inside of families, between students. And so what that creates is this vacuum that sucks in a lot of people that feel insecure about politics. They feel like the discourse is too aggressive, the two sides are constantly attacking each other, and so people start opting out of politics, which is the same situation in the United States. The difference is in the US, you’re not legally bound to vote; in Brazil, you are. So what you see is a lot of people canceling out their ballot. And I think, like I said, that that’s a reaction to polarization and to a sense of insecurity that people have in the system and also a lack of trust in the system. People don’t think that it makes any difference.

[Host 2:] We want to try to—we’re having a little bit of an audio kerfuffle. Okay, we’re going to try to power through, but we may try to stop and fix it. Let’s see how it goes. I know you can’t tell, Stephanie, because you can’t hear it, but we can. But no, I appreciate what you’re saying here. And you know, a key element that you mentioned there is the right-wing advance in the legislature. So, what will be different about the composition of this next Brazilian Congress from the previous one, and why does it matter? And, you know, Stephanie, can you talk to us specifically about what is the legislative agenda of the far right and what do you think they’ll actually be able to achieve?

[Stephanie Weatherby Breto:] The right was already very strong in the legislature. This is not a novelty; they have already built—I mean, I think very similar to the right in the United States, they’ve had a project for many, many years to try to build this kind of strength in Congress, and they’ve built stable organizational means to do that, they have a lot of local power. I think what is new about this victory is that a lot of parties of the extreme right that were newcomers in previous elections and that some people said, well, these parties are not going to survive, they’re kind of like phenomenons of the moment, they have survived, and everything indicates that at least for the period that is upcoming, they are fixtures in the political landscape in Brazil. Parties like Republicanos, Partido Liberal, these parties are hard right parties. And I think that there’s a lot of discussion right now that their agenda is to take down the Supreme Court, that this is their number one goal, that they want to take down all the other checks and balances to the executive because they want to rule in a fascistic kind of way where all the power is concentrated in the executive. And I think that that is possible, but I think that we’re missing the picture that if their goal is to take down the Supreme Court, it’s a means to an end. It’s not an end in and of itself. And so I think that what the actual most important goal of this hard right that is consolidated in Brazil is to break down all the barriers to extractivism, to allow the mining companies, the agribusiness companies to really tear into the Amazon rainforest, to be able to break into different territories that are still being protected by environmental law or that are being held by indigenous communities or by rural communities that have titles to the land, because there is this interest that is connected to the United States, which is to get into the minerals that exist under the Amazon rainforest and elsewhere. And I think it’s a model of extremely predatory capitalism that this party and these parties represent. And I think that they also want to break down any kind of barriers to the free movement of money. They want to liberalize finance even more than it already is. I think their agenda is a kind of naked capitalism that has no restraints, and they’re doing this in collusion with big and important economic groups from the United States, people who have vested interest in this program. Of course, they also intend to scale back social programs. Brazil has built over decades a form of welfare state. It has a universal healthcare system that the ruling elites have always been enemies of. They want to privatize healthcare, they want to privatize education. And so anything that this government, if Flávio gets elected, if he can accomplish a scaling back of social programs that opens up the country to further privatization of anything from pensions to schools to transportation, I think that that’s all in their interest. And so I think it’s like an extremely neoliberal agenda that they want to build. And they also have another agenda outside of the economic one, which has to do with crime and security. They have this project called the anti-faction bill because here in Brazil criminal organizations are called factions. And so allegedly what this bill would do is to really tackle organized crime in Brazil, which is very powerful in certain states, but truly what this bill would do is actually unleash the violence of the state on the poorest communities in Brazil. There is this false conception that the right has disseminated that the reason that there’s a lot of crime and insecurity in Brazil is because there is a soft-handed policing where the police aren’t actually given the freedom and the liberty to actually persecute criminals because there’s a concern for their human rights. This is absolutely false. The reason why there’s crime in Brazil is because very powerful institutions like banks continue to launder the money of these criminal organizations because these criminal organizations have a tremendous influence on judges. They have an influence on legislators and possibly, if Flávio gets elected, on the presidency. It’s pretty well known that Flávio Bolsonaro has a connection to criminal organizations in Rio de Janeiro. And so they have what I would refer to as a faux security agenda that even though it will not fix the problem, it appeals to people because it’s talking about something that people are concerned about in a moment when the PT actually isn’t talking about it.

[Host 1:] Well, you know, I wanted to pick up on that, Stephanie, because while the far right, as you said, really did get some historic gains in this election, Lula’s Workers’ Party suffered significant and symbolic losses. Lula’s key ally, Fernando Haddad, once again lost the governorship in São Paulo to Tarcísio de Freitas, and this time by an even bigger margin. Meanwhile, Marina Silva, Benedita da Silva, and Simone Tebet all lost their races, and these have been kind of key figures in the PT standing side by side with Lula. So are their losses part of this legacy in Brazil of what’s termed antipetismo, this anti-workers’ party sentiment? Is it something else? Is it purely the popularity of the far right? What is behind this losing ground of the PT in Brazilian politics?

[Stephanie Weatherby Breto:] Well, most of the candidates or many of the candidates that you named are actually not from the PT. They built an alliance with the PT because the PT, as it loses its base, as it loses some of its capacity to get elected on its own two legs, has moved to building alliances with sections of the center-right. So even the vice-presidential candidate that Lula ran with four years ago, that ran with now and that has been governing with him, is a figure of the center-right. He was a right-wing governor of São Paulo that was very unpopular actually in the face of social movements. And so I think that I wouldn’t see this as a recourse of antipetismo. I mean, the campaign against the PT was based on this discourse that the PT was corrupt. But I think that the population has moved on from that. I think that people now—a lot of people essentially believe that both parties are corrupt, that all politicians are corrupt, that it is inconsequential because that’s just the way that power works, unfortunately. But I think that what really has weakened the PT is that this administration, Lula’s third term, ran and was governed without a clear agenda. It was run on this idea that we’re here to restore democracy, we’re here to restore order, similar to the way that Biden kind of came back after Trump’s presidency to say, well, you know, the Republicans and this like Trumpism has destroyed some of the institutions of this country and here I am to rebuild it. And unfortunately, that is not appealing to the wide mass of the population because people are very dissatisfied with their living conditions. They’re very dissatisfied with a lot of the day-to-day problems that they’re facing regarding access to education, access to employment, increasing debt. And so this discourse of “we’re going to rebuild the country to what it was” doesn’t appeal to people because they have the perception that what we need is not to go back to what it was; we need to be building a future that is different. We need something that is going to transcend whatever the PT achieved and achieve much more, or at least they want to hear something that is different. And I think that Lula governed this third term—first of all, he was very influenced by the events when the Bolsonaristas tried to take the country. They were doing these mass mobilizations, they tried to occupy the Supreme Court. And the fact that there was this broad movement, this alliance, this really big alliance against Bolsonarismo, I think convinced the Lula government and the party that Bolsonarismo had been defeated, that the population had now understood that they were undemocratic, that they were dictatorial or fascistic in some way, and that even sections of the ruling class had moved to the camp of the PT because they were disgusted by Bolsonarismo. And when Jair Bolsonaro was imprisoned, I think that that even further built this idea that well, really, the program of the PT right now is to preserve institutions, to defend democracy. And that is the last thing that I think people are thinking about. People don’t want a defense of the status quo. And so on the kinds of things that Brazilians are really worried about, which have to do with the cost of living and access to employment, even though the situation was stable and there were improvements in the cost of living, it wasn’t really inspiring to people as a campaign program. The PT did not run this election on a clear project of transformation, which was their brand throughout its history. The PT was the party of change, the party of addressing structural problems in Brazil and addressing inequality. And I think that over many years, after being really battered by the right, they have watered down their program to something that simply isn’t inspiring enough to people and that was not enough to get them out into the polls and to mobilize in the way that would have been necessary to beat Flávio in this first round.

[Host 1:] I mean, there are so many numbers that stand out from Sunday. Zoe had mentioned some of them earlier. One of them was this 20% abstention, and in Brazil voting is mandatory, so you do receive a penalty for not participating. So, Stephanie, what do you think explains why 33 million people chose not to vote? Are they expected to do so, do you think, in the second round? And I mean Lula declared on Sunday that it was his goal to court these voters. Do you think this is actually possible?

[Stephanie Weatherby Breto:] I think that a lot of those abstentions are going to remain abstentions. I think that what has created them is the climate of polarization. People have been repelled from politics. The people who are abstaining, they are repelled from politics either because they feel insecure, they don’t understand, they feel like the political debate is too aggressive, it’s too violent, they feel like they are not educated enough. But also, I think that people don’t see the difference. There’s a lot of people who just don’t think that either candidate makes a huge difference. And I think that this is something that really often happens when polarization happens, when the country becomes like a pressure cooker where everybody’s talking about the elections. Certain people have very strong opinions in one way or the other, they’re not at all flexible, they’re really dug in. It’s a situation that we know in the United States as well. And so what that produces is a sector of the population that says, “I don’t care anymore, I don’t want to hear about elections anymore, and I don’t understand either of these programs necessarily.” Now, I also think that both candidates—part of why there’s a high abstention rate is because both candidates have high rejections, are very rejected by the population for different reasons. Flávio because he’s considered to be reprehensible in his discourse; people understand him as a chauvinist, as someone who defends violence, someone who has no regard for the rights of black people in this country—who are not racial minorities, by the way—but for other racial minorities in this country, someone who has no regard for the poor. And so he is seen as a figure of a kind of violent politics that people really don’t like. He’s also seen by sectors even within the right as a lackey to the United States. Like, he’s criticized by sections of the right for being a candidate that basically just toed the line for whatever Washington tells him to do. The relationships between the Bolsonaro family and Trump are very well-known, they’re very evident. The Bolsonaro family is always petitioning the Trump administration for favors, and that actually has produced some rejection even within the right, who sees him in this negative light. Now, Lula has high rejection ratings for other reasons. There’s people that believe that he’s governed for too long; they say, well, you know, he’s been president for three terms, why does he have to keep being president? There’s people who also believe that the PT is a representation of the past, that it’s old politics, that Lula’s too old, he doesn’t have an appeal with the youth in the way that he used to. Lula and the PT used to be a political movement of the youth, and I don’t think that that continues to be the case unless somebody is active in social movements and really politicized. And so because there is this section of the population that just rejects both of them, their choice is just to nullify their ballot in the election.

[Host 1:] You know, it’s—we’ll see how that kind of courting of this segment of the population goes. But, you know, before we let you go, Stephanie, I did want to ask about the regional question and just kind of zooming out and looking at how the US is viewing the region. Of course, a lot of the discourse, whether it be Twitter or left-wing analysis, has been about really grappling with the possibility of a Flávio victory in the second round and what that would mean for Latin America and the Caribbean in a second Trump administration. So, on one hand, how would this impact regional ties? I mean, at this point, the dreams of Lula from his first terms of creating entities like UNASUR, like all of these different regional platforms, have essentially disappeared given the presence of the far right on the continent. But what would a Flávio victory mean for the US to have the far right in power in Brazil?

[Stephanie Weatherby Breto:] I think having a victory for Flávio Bolsonaro in Brazil would be a huge victory for the Trump administration, but also for Zionism, because what the Flávio Bolsonaro presidency represents is a program of the right that is going to be completely compliant and subservient to the interests of the United States politically and to the interest of Zionism—sorry, to the interest of the United States economically and to the interest of Zionism politically. And so I think that Brazil will become a tool in the large chessboard of US interests in the rest of the world, and I think that it means a full alignment to US interests in Latin America, again specifically on this issue of extractivism. I think that the agenda of the United States for Latin America is to turn it into a territory from which they can extract resources at will, at low cost, with no regard for the environment or for the rights of the people in those countries. And the Bolsonaro family definitely represents that kind of interest. You know, they’re very happy to play that role. And so it’s not just very dangerous for the Brazilian people or for the future of progressive politics in Latin America—like, absolutely, Cuba is going to be really isolated on the continent together with Mexico and Venezuela—but it also has huge repercussions for the environment. I think that one of the most serious consequences of a second Bolsonaro presidency is the further destruction of the Amazon rainforest, and the implications of that for the rest of the world are tremendous. And so I think, unfortunately, the Brazilian population that voted for Bolsonaro is making a decision that really imperils the rest of humanity.

[Host 1:] No, really important perspective there. And honestly, Stephanie, there’s so much more we could talk about, and I’m looking forward to having you back on the show ahead of this second term—which will be on October 25th. Again, there’s just three weeks that Lula and Flávio and their supporters have to campaign for the second round to try to get those extra votes. It will be a very interesting period. And as you said last time you were on the show, US interference is not a question; it’s more of a done deal. We just have to see how it is going to manifest. So I think that’s something else we’ll be definitely looking out for. But we thank you so much, Stephanie, for explaining what that means and why people everywhere should really be paying attention to what’s happening.

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In a stemwinder of a speech in Nebraska, our mentally ill president joked around that if Iran took out Los Angeles and San Diego, it would be a small price to pay for keeping the rest of the country safe. Or at least that is what he appeared to say. What his slurred free association […]

The post Trump finds it’s funny to joke about Iran bombing California appeared first on Asia Times.

Beyond all the pageantry, the Chinese leader Xi Jinping had a strategic goal for his Washington visit – to undermine the American relationship with Japan. Xi succeeded, perhaps beyond his expectations. Japanese policy makers saw this coming. They arranged a brief meeting on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly between Prime Minister Takaichi […]

The post How China deploys wartime history against Japan appeared first on Asia Times.

Abbiamo assistito a uno spettacolo da prima serata – in realtà un doppio inganno: il 11 settembre rivisitato su FlyDubai.

Segue nostro Telegram.

Il 30 settembre, termine ultimo per una possibile mossa militare iraniana contro il blocco navale di Trump , è passato senza che l’Iran intervenisse. L’Iran ha mantenuto la sua posizione, senza però sferrare l’attacco decisivo contro la Marina statunitense (che è così lontana) impegnata nel blocco. Ma lo spettacolo deve continuare. Come piano B, abbiamo assistito a uno spettacolo in prima serata, in realtà una doppia farsa: la riedizione dell’11 settembre su FlyDubai.

Questa patetica trovata non è mai stata un “attacco terroristico”; si è trattato di una mediocre operazione psicologica del Mossad, confezionata in modo approssimativo e arricchita da una serie di comparse improbabili, tra cui un idraulico che ha preso i comandi dell’aereo perché lo aveva visto in televisione.

I manipolatori erano il culto della morte in Medio Oriente, gli stessi Emirati Arabi Uniti e Washington. La narrazione ufficiale è per persone con un QI inferiore a 50: un copilota “jihadista” – guarda caso proveniente dall’Oman, perché la demonizzazione lo richiede – tenta di far schiantare un aereo pieno di sionisti. I proverbiali passeggeri eroici – idraulico incluso – lo sopraffanno a mani nude.

Il culto della morte sta facendo di tutto per assolvere gli emiratini da ogni responsabilità. L’attenzione è puntata sul “terrorista” omanita.

Ecco la combinazione perfetta: i musulmani sono e saranno sempre terroristi; il culto della morte è sempre una vittima; e l’Arabia Saudita deve consegnare il “terrorista” al culto della morte.

Un gioco da ragazzi, quindi, per un copilota contrabbandare un coltello nell’aeroporto ultra-sorvegliato di Dubai, a bordo di una delle rotte più sorvegliate del pianeta. E che dire dell’aeronautica militare, fanatica della morte, che non è riuscita a impedire l’atterraggio dell’aereo a Tabuk?

Perché il piano è sempre stato quello di atterrare a Tabuk. Si tratta della più grande base aerea saudita nel nord-ovest, e la più vicina a Israele; la setta della morte ha cercato per anni di ottenerne l’accesso. Ora potrebbero finalmente ottenere tutto: accesso allo spazio aereo saudita, informazioni riservate e altro ancora, grazie alla pressione congiunta di Abu Dhabi e Washington.

Presso Transition Protocol abbiamo appurato che quando il leader della setta della morte si è recato “segretamente” ad Abu Dhabi per incontrare il capo degli Emirati Arabi Uniti, MbZ, in un incontro bilaterale, potrebbe aver incontrato anche persone provenienti da diverse nazioni arabe, tra cui Qatar, Oman, Libia e Marocco.

L’Arabia Saudita ha negato categoricamente di far parte del pacchetto. Lo stesso ha fatto la Giordania. L’Oman compare solo attraverso una fonte israeliana. Non vi è alcuna conferma ufficiale da parte di Qatar, Oman, Marocco o Libia.

Teheran ha comunque reagito con estrema irritazione, avvertendo di “conseguenze molto pericolose”. La determinazione iraniana è chiara: non permettere che quei chihuahua facciano deragliare il processo fondamentale di riduzione al massimo dell’influenza statunitense e israeliana in Medio Oriente.

Islamabad, dal canto suo, continua a perseguire l’impresa sisifea di avanzare a piccoli passi verso un progresso minimo, mediando sia tra Arabia Saudita e Ansarallah, sia tra Stati Uniti e Iran.

Martedì scorso a Doha, il Qatar ha effettivamente consegnato al ministro degli Esteri iraniano Abbas Araghchi la risposta degli Stati Uniti. Lo scontro sembra riguardare la sequenza degli accordi, piuttosto che i singoli elementi. Il testo, così com’è, è una sorta di versione migliorata del famigerato memorandum d’intesa fallimentare, noto anche come Accordo quadro di Islamabad. Nessuno scommette che il carro morto risorgerà, ancora una volta.

Russia, Iran, Yemen: diamo una lezione a quei bastardi senza pietà.

Ora veniamo al dunque: lo Yemen. E a quale livello di annientamento sono disposti a infliggere a Riyadh i duri di Sana’a. La distruzione degli impianti petroliferi è fin troppo facile: basta un’apertura graduale. Lo Yemen è in preda alla furia. E non si fermeranno davanti a nulla.

Possiamo già osservare una sorprendente convergenza tra la Casa dei Saud, la Marina statunitense al di fuori della Persia e la NATO nel Paese 404: vengono tutti martellati senza pietà. Russia e Iran non hanno ancora iniziato. E parliamo dello Yemen.

All’inizio di questa settimana, Sergey Karaganov lo ha ribadito pubblicamente: lo Stavka russo ha finalmente preso la fatidica decisione di porre fine alle sofferenze dei neonazisti di Kiev. E in una sessione informale di due ore al Valdai, alle porte di Mosca, il Gran Maestro Sergey Lavrov, in totale relax, ha ribadito ancora una volta che la Russia è pronta per la guerra in Europa. E sì, sarà rapida. Senza esclusione di colpi.

Ansarallah e le Forze Armate yemenite attendono che tre fattori si combinino: un’inevitabile Ora Zero che risuoni in tutta l’Asia occidentale; la crescente tensione e l’esplosività degli scontri interni alla famiglia reale e tra le tribù in Arabia Saudita; e il perfetto incastro di tutti i pezzi del puzzle per scatenare la prossima Tempesta Yemenita sull’Arabia Saudita.

Allo stato attuale, Riyadh non riconosce alcun attacco proveniente dallo Yemen, mentre Sana’a annuncia ogni giorno, con precisione svizzera, il numero di raid aerei sauditi sullo Yemen, che prendono di mira mercati, fattorie, case, ponti, infrastrutture idriche, reti di telecomunicazioni: il proverbiale manuale del sindacato Epstein.

L’Iran, dal canto suo, ha già alzato la posta in gioco, colpendo il giacimento di Bu Hasa della ADNOC, a sud-ovest di Abu Dhabi: si tratta di uno dei più grandi giacimenti di petrolio e gas onshore degli Emirati Arabi Uniti, che alimenta lo strategico oleodotto Habshan-Fujairah, l’unica via di esportazione degli Emirati Arabi Uniti che aggira lo Stretto di Hormuz.

Il gasdotto East-West, di proprietà dell’Arabia Saudita, è stato colpito tre settimane fa e bombardato nuovamente dallo Yemen all’inizio di questa settimana, ad Abqaiq.

Colpire ADNOC e Abqaiq quasi simultaneamente potrebbe comportare la perdita di ben 13 milioni di barili di petrolio al giorno dal mercato. Non si ripete mai abbastanza che Iran e Yemen sono un tutt’uno. È questo il tutt’uno che conta, e nessun misero attacco informatico dell’11 settembre potrà cambiare le cose.

“Keep our city out of your reckless war talk,” said San Diego’s mayor, Todd Gloria, Monday night after President Donald Trump’s rambling speech at a rally in Nebraska included a particularly violent mention of the California city. Gloria was among several Democratic political leaders who were incensed after Trump – moments after predicted the Republican […]

The post Did he really invite Iran to take out California cities? appeared first on Asia Times.

A quarter-century ago, after a deadly terrorist attack raised fiery explosions from the World Trade Center buildings, the US Department of Homeland Security introduced a color-coded advisory system, under which orange signified “High Risk of Terrorist Activities.” For many people, including Dushko Petrovich Córdova, “this ambient, lingering orange signaled that emergency was continuous, a new way of living.” Ours is a world of prison jumpsuits and Home Depot, leaders with an affinity for fake tans and “aptitude for the orange of perpetual crisis,” public health maps of infection rates painted various shades of orange to mark severity, a sky dyed orange by wildfire smoke. We are inundated by the color; it feels, at times, inescapable. Is it really? Follow Córdova to the brilliant end of this stunner.

Once, in the late ’90s, a few years before the dawn of the orange era, I found myself in Montreal for a friend’s wedding. There was a wildfire nearby, and I remember trying to capture the eerie effect of the atmosphere turning orange with the disposable cameras that had been handed out to all the guests. The resulting pictures looked underexposed and nothing more, the otherworldly orange haze rendered mostly regular gray.

So, decades later, in 2023, when photos of smoke from yet another Canadian wildfire began to appear on social media, I was surprised by how well digital photography had captured what had proved so elusive in the late disposable-camera era. The best civilian shot I saw was of the scenery through a window. The cool interior lighting framed the orangeness outside, in the same way that you might frame a sunset, except that instead of a bright band of orange light at the horizon, this orange was everywhere, pressing at all the edges of the window frame and probably trying to get in through the cracks. In another image I saw a gray cat sitting on a windowsill, apparently unperturbed by the wide expanse of horror just behind it.

“There is only one president in this country and his name is Nicolás Maduro Moros,” Venezuela’s current interim president, Delcy Rodríguez, said on the same day as the U.S. attack that ended with the detention of the former chavista leader and his wife, Cilia Flores. Rodríguez described the military intervention in Caracas as an “illegal and illegitimate kidnapping of the president and first lady.” However, Venezuela later did not take any formal steps to demand the couple’s release or to request their immunity so they would not be tried in the United States.

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