British counter-terrorism police are investigating a security breach at RAF Molesworth in Cambridgeshire after two Latvian nationals were found inside the military installation. The arrests come amid heightened security concerns following a separate suspected terrorist plot targeting RAF Fairford, which prompted the withdrawal of American bombers.
Two Latvian nationals have been arrested in Britain on suspicion of entering a restricted military installation for purposes potentially harmful to national security. The men were discovered inside RAF Molesworth, a sensitive military facility in Cambridgeshire that houses American and NATO intelligence operations, during the early hours of Thursday, 8 October.
The suspects, aged 36 and 32, are both Latvian citizens residing in the United Kingdom. According to an official statement issued by the Metropolitan Police, they were initially detained on suspicion of trespassing and criminal damage before being arrested under the National Security Act 2023.
The incident follows a separate investigation into a suspected terrorist plot near RAF Fairford in Gloucestershire, where American strategic bombers had been deployed. British counter-terrorism officers have emphasised that there is currently no evidence connecting the two cases.
Security breach discovered during routine patrol
The investigation began at approximately 10pm on Wednesday, 7 October, when Ministry of Defence Police officers patrolling RAF Molesworth discovered an abandoned vehicle near the installation’s perimeter.
Officers from Cambridgeshire Constabulary joined the search and subsequently identified a small breach in the security fence. At approximately 2am on Thursday, the two men were located inside the restricted area and taken into custody.
The suspects were initially questioned over alleged trespassing and criminal damage. However, investigators subsequently invoked Section 4 of the National Security Act 2023, which covers entering, approaching or inspecting prohibited locations for purposes prejudicial to Britain’s safety or interests.
The legislation carries a maximum sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment upon conviction. Neither man has been publicly identified, and police have not disclosed evidence establishing their alleged intentions or any connection with a foreign intelligence service.
Officers have also searched two addresses in the Peterborough area. The abandoned vehicle was recovered and examined by specialist explosive ordnance disposal personnel after concerns arose during initial inspections.
As a precaution, police established a cordon affecting roads around Glatton, including part of the A1. Specialists subsequently found nothing of concern, allowing the restrictions to be lifted.
Intelligence facility serving American and NATO operations
RAF Molesworth is not an ordinary operational airfield. Although designated as a Royal Air Force station, the installation accommodates intelligence facilities supporting American military operations and NATO.
Among the organisations associated with the site is the NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre, which contributes to intelligence collection, assessment and information-sharing between allied military authorities. The installation also supports American military intelligence activities relating to operations in Europe and Africa.
The presence of these facilities makes Molesworth a sensitive location, where unauthorised access raises questions extending beyond conventional trespassing. Investigators will seek to establish how the men entered the compound, why they were there and whether they attempted to approach or examine restricted equipment or infrastructure.
Separate investigation at RAF Fairford
The arrests come less than two weeks after British police detained seven men in connection with a suspected terrorist plot involving RAF Fairford, another British installation used by the United States Air Force.
The Fairford investigation began on 27 September after suspicious activity was reported near the base. Police subsequently investigated possible offences involving explosives and preparations for terrorist acts. Those arrested in connection with that investigation have since been released on bail.
The incident was followed by the withdrawal of American bombers from Fairford. President Donald Trump subsequently referred to security threats affecting the installation, raising further questions about the protection of American military assets stationed in Britain.
Commander Helen Flanagan, head of Counter Terrorism Policing London, which is leading the Molesworth investigation, cautioned against drawing conclusions about the relationship between the two cases.
She said investigators had found nothing so far suggesting a connection with the Fairford incident and were continuing to examine possible motives.
British authorities have not publicly identified a foreign state or organisation as being responsible for the Molesworth breach.
The two Latvian nationals remain in police custody while investigators continue examining the circumstances surrounding their presence at the installation. The inquiry involves Counter Terrorism Policing, the Ministry of Defence Police and Cambridgeshire Constabulary.
The investigation is taking place against a wider background of security concerns involving European military facilities. Latvia itself reported an armed border provocation and sabotage of surveillance infrastructure near Belarus earlier this week, although there is no evidence linking that incident to the arrests in Britain.
For British investigators, the immediate task remains establishing whether the Molesworth intrusion was an isolated security breach or involved an intention to compromise military operations or intelligence infrastructure.
As part of the largest U.K. Commando Force exercise in 15 years, British special operators conducted a submarine insertion off Scotland, making use of a German Navy Type 212A — a boat you can read about in detail here. The maneuvers are the first time since the war in Afghanistan that all of the Commando Force’s specialist elements have operated together. The submarine insertion, conducted at Cape Wrath on September 29, is part of Exercise Strike Warrior, a major NATO drill intended to rehearse allied crisis-response and warfighting operations across the North Atlantic and High North.
The U.K. Royal Navy-led Commando Force specializes in amphibious, littoral, and expeditionary operations. It brings together Royal Marines commandos with specialist elements including reconnaissance, intelligence, targeting, artillery, logistics, and medical capabilities. The force is increasingly focused on smaller, dispersed teams operating across contested littoral environments.
Including elements of the Commando Force, more than 2,000 personnel from the United Kingdom, United States, Germany, Netherlands, Canada, and Norway are currently participating in Strike Warrior, with eight warships and 19 aircraft involved in activity spanning Scotland, the Western Isles, the North-West Approaches, Galloway, the Borders and the North Sea.
The submarine insertion underscores the type of maritime special operations the British Commando Force is now increasingly training to conduct. Personnel from 148 (Meiktila) Commando Forward Observation Battery, Royal Artillery, boarded the unnamed German attack submarine off Scotland before being infiltrated toward the coast. The sub provided intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support as the force approached the target area, after which the commandos conducted a discreet small-boat insertion using inflatable raiding craft.
British Commandos board the German U-boat off the north coast of Scotland during Strike Warrior 26. Crown Copyright
Once ashore, the commandos moved onto the cliffs and established an extemporized observation post. From there, they confirmed the simulated target and coordinated live naval surface fires against a simulated enemy position. Here, firepower was provided by the Portuguese Karel Doorman class frigate Dom Francisco de Almeida, presumably using its Oto Melara 76mm deck gun. Following the engagement, the team was extracted. The complete sequence incorporated submarine infiltration, small-boat insertion, covert reconnaissance and targeting, live naval gunfire, and withdrawal into a single mission profile.
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The German submarine involved is particularly well suited to this kind of mission. Conventional diesel-electric attack submarines (SSK) lack the nuclear-powered endurance and sustained high speed of an SSN, but those characteristics are not necessarily what a short-range clandestine insertion mission requires. Modern SSKs such as Germany’s Type 212A are designed around extremely low acoustic signatures and can remain submerged for extended periods using air-independent propulsion, making them difficult to detect while operating in relatively shallow and constrained waters.
That combination is hugely valuable for special operations. An SSK can approach a coastline covertly, conduct ISR, release a small team and its boats, and withdraw without exposing a large surface vessel or maintaining the high-speed transit capability associated with a nuclear submarine. Its comparatively small size can also be advantageous when operating closer to shore, where depth, seabed conditions and the presence of coastal sensors can constrain larger submarines. Conventionally powered boats are also far cheaper to procure and operate and have smaller crews.
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An SSN offers major advantages for longer-range deployments: far greater endurance, sustained speed, and the ability to carry and support larger payloads over intercontinental distances. These payloads can include dry deck shelters and swimmer delivery vehicles, allowing divers easy exit and entrance while the boat is submerged and at a standoff distance from the coast.
But for a mission whose essential requirement is to quietly loiter near a coast, put a small team ashore and leave, an SSK remains a highly relevant platform. Conventional submarines are particularly valuable to the kind of distributed littoral operations NATO is rehearsing in northern European waters.
The Upholders were also particularly suited to inshore operations, reconnaissance, and other missions demanding extreme quietness and maneuverability.
The Royal Canadian Navy long-range patrol submarine HMCS Victoria arrives at Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor for a port call and routine maintenance. This boat was formerly HMS Unseen with the U.K. Royal Navy. U.S. Navy photo by Lt. Ed Early/Released
With this in mind, TWZ has, in the past, examined whether the U.S. Navy should complement its all-nuclear submarine fleet with advanced conventional boats. Sweden’s Gotlanddemonstrated the value of these kinds of boats when it was leased to the U.S. Navy for adversary training and proved exceptionally difficult for American ASW forces to detect.
Swedish submarine HMS Gotland, left, HNLMS Tromp, center, and HMS Portland steam in formation with other NATO and partner nation ships during maneuvering drills as a part of exercise Dynamic Mongoose in 2015. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Amanda S. Kitchner/Released
Returning to the Cape Wrath drill, the 148 Battery operations officer involved explained that “This level of complexity and coordination of live assets has not been achieved by 148 for nearly 30 years.”
“We wanted to demonstrate to our partners across the United Kingdom Commando Force, wider U.K. Defense and NATO SOF community the type of missions we are prepared to execute against future threats,” the officer added.
148 Battery secures a remote beach in Cape Wrath during Exercise Strike Warrior 26. Crown CopyrightCrown Copyright
Multinational integration is central to the exercise. Strike Warrior is testing the ability of the British Commando Force to plug into a much larger allied force in which submarines, surface combatants, aircraft, drones, and small specialist teams can contribute to different parts of the same operation.
Earlier in Strike Warrior, 148 Battery also directed fires from the Dutch Karel Doorman class frigate HNLMS Van Amstel and Royal Canadian Navy Halifax class frigate HMCS St. John’s after establishing observation posts. Those ships were operating as part of Standing NATO Maritime Group One.
HNLMS Van Amstel from the Royal Netherlands Navy during Exercise Strike Warrior. Crown Copyright
The exercise also provides a snapshot of how Britain’s commandos have evolved since their intensive employment in Afghanistan. The Royal Marines’ Future Commando Force concept emphasizes smaller, more dispersed formations capable of operating in contested littoral environments, with greater reliance on maritime mobility, uncrewed systems, long-range fires, and allied capabilities.
Strike Warrior combines those elements, with the exercise including amphibious landings, boarding operations, intelligence and surveillance missions, maritime security, and anti-submarine warfare, alongside drone missions involving strikes and combat resupply. Other elements have practiced establishing protected medical facilities.
The geography of Strike Warrior is equally significant. The exercise extends across Scotland and its surrounding waters, including the Western Isles and out into the North Sea, placing the Commando Force in the maritime environment connecting the highly strategic North Atlantic, Norwegian Sea, and northern European approaches.
That region has become increasingly important to NATO planning because of the difficulty of monitoring and controlling such a large maritime battlespace. Submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, surface combatants, drones, and long-range weapons all have roles to play, while the geography provides numerous opportunities for small forces to operate from the coast and islands.
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The United Kingdom has been repeatedly using the region and the wider High North as a training ground for this type of activity. Earlier this year, British commandos conducted a submarine insertion during Exercise Cold Response in Norway using the German Navy’s Type 212A submarine U-35. That also involved submarine infiltration, small-boat deployment, establishment of an observation post, and the direction of allied naval fires.
Royal Marines on Exercise Cold Response in North Norway training in extreme cold conditions while exercising boat drills within the fjords of Norway. Crown Copyright
Strike Warrior expands that concept considerably and across a much larger battlespace, providing an opportunity to test not simply individual capabilities but the ability to combine them during a sustained NATO exercise.
The exercise began September 28 and concludes October 9.
For the British Commando Force, the significance extends beyond the dramatic imagery of troops emerging from a German submarine at Cape Wrath. After years in which British commandos were heavily committed to land-based counterinsurgency operations, the exercise is intended to put them firmly back in a maritime and high-end warfighting context.
This is the kind of operation that the U.K. Commando Force is now preparing to conduct alongside NATO partners in the increasingly contested waters of the North Atlantic and High North.
Before the hasty and unexpected departure of the bombers on Sunday, B-1s had been deployed to RAF Fairford continuously since March, initially in support of Operation Epic Fury against Iran. A contingent of B-52s had also conducted strikes on Iran from Fairford, but left back in July. The base is a major operational hub for the U.S. military in the United Kingdom, and regularly hosts strategic aircraft, including bombers and U-2 spy planes.
Dan Rivers, U.S. correspondent for ITV News in the United Kingdom, was among the first to report on Monday that the B-1’s quick departure had been prompted by concerns about a potential Spiderweb-like drone attack ordered by Iran, citing an unnamed source. Other outlets have subsequently reported similar details, all sourced to anonymous U.S. and British officials.
“They didn’t fly out by accident,” U.S. President Donald Trump told reporters during a gaggle at the White House on Monday when asked about why the B-1s had left Fairford. “There were some threats.”
“I can’t tell you that, but if they did, they’ll suffer greatly,” Trump added in response to a separate question about whether Iran might have managed to get weaponized drones into the United Kingdom.
“What you saw there was the Secretary of War [Pete Hegseth], out of an abundance of caution, trying to protect our guys,” U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance said during a separate press engagement on Monday. “We do feel, with some confidence, that the Iranians are – they’re trying to do what the Iranian state has done for 49 years, which is engage in acts of terrorism against the United States, and a lot of other people, as well. So, we are being extremely cautious.”
Another satellite image offering an overall view of RAF Fairford. Google Earth
“We’ve documented what happened [near Fairford] last week. I wouldn’t just directly tie that to the move that was made,” U.S. Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Marco Rubio also told members of the press on Monday. “The only reason why you guys are focused on how many planes are at Fairford is because of the threat that happened last week.”
“We have confidence in the security of all of our bases, because all of our bases are [sic] theoretically could be threatened at any moment,” he added.
Rubio’s comments notwithstanding, the remarks from Trump and Vance make clear that there was some recent threat intelligence that contributed to the decision to pull the bombers from Fairford. There are still many questions about the exact nature of the potential attacks, and how imminent, or not, the danger may have been.
Regardless, as mentioned, the prospect of a near-field drone attack on a base like Fairford carried out by actors in close proximity is extremely plausible, and the barrier to entry to such an operation is relatively low. Spiderweb may have thrust this reality into the public consciousness in dramatic fashion, but the danger well predates that operation, and even the start of Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
TWZ has been highlighting exactly these kinds of threats in the course of a decade or so now of regular reporting on drone incursions over U.S. and foreign military facilities and critical infrastructure, as well as American naval vessels operating offshore. Langley Air Force Base in Virginia and Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana, some of America’s most strategic airbases domestically, are among the facilities that have had to grapple with this in the past. After the Langley incident, in particular, it had become clear to the larger public what we had been reporting for many years, that the United States does not control the airspace over even its most critical military installations.
New footage of yet another act of Russian terrorism on EU soil, showing the drone loaded with explosives on the tarmac at Leipzig/Halle Airport, just meters from a Ukrainian Antonov An-124 cargo aircraft.
— SPRAVDI — Stratcom Centre (@StratcomCentre) August 5, 2026
A drone attack on Fairford would also not necessarily have had to come from somewhere very close by. Longer-range one-way attack drones are steadily proliferating, and can be launched using a variety of methods from positions on the ground, as well as vessels at sea. TWZ explored the very real threat of sea-based drone attacks, including ones conducted covertly, and Iran’s specific ability to carry them out globally, following the leak of an FBI alert back in March.
The proliferation of lower-end one-way-attack drones has ‘democratized’ precision-guided attacks, even for non-state actors. The fielding of automated targeting capabilities, driven by developments in artificial intelligence and machine learning, is also becoming more and more widespread. That technology will soon enable these weapons to find and strike even moving targets on their own. Even without anyone at the controls and without the drone putting out any detectable radio emissions, very effective precision attacks can still be launched at static targets, like known parking areas for aircraft at airbases, just by using basic map coordinates or Google Earth. It’s also worth pointing out here that the definition of a stand-off attack is becoming increasingly blurry, with even quadcopter-type drones capable of flying miles away to conduct a kamikaze attack on a target based on a set of GPS coordinates.
Ukrainian Saker UAV with AI capabilities. The video shows the process of target recognition. It has reportedly already been put to use several times against Russian targets. pic.twitter.com/NVNJyxUjGP
Overall, it is an indisputable fact that aircraft sitting exposed on a flightline are particularly vulnerable to drone attacks, as well as other threats. This is something U.S. military officials have acknowledged themselves. Fairford, where B-1s and other bombers have no option but to park out in the open in well-established areas that are plainly visible from outside the base’s immediate perimeter, is indicative of how American military aircraft are generally positioned on the ground abroad and at home.
As we wrote all the way back in 2017:
“Similar swarming strikes could be unleashed behind the front lines as well, with hugely expensive and low density/high demand combat aircraft being especially vulnerable to this sort of tactic—something General James Holmes alluded to inadvertently while speaking to the Air Force Association, stating:
‘Imagine a world where somebody flies a couple hundred of those and flies one down the intake of my F-22s with just a small weapon on it.’
Actually, it would be even easier to just strike the jets as they sit idle and vulnerable on the flight line. One swarm could see a whole squadron of tightly packed fighters destroyed without even having a chance to fight back.”
This picture of a B-1 at Fairford on March 7 shows how bombers and other aircraft are typically parked at the base. The line of photographers along the fence line also underscores how close those parking spots are to the base’s immediate perimeter. JUSTIN TALLIS / AFP via Getty Images
“I’m not a big fan of hardening infrastructure,” Gen. Kenneth Wilsbach said at a roundtable at the Air and Space Forces Association’s main annual symposium in 2023, offering a prime example of this viewpoint. “The reason is because of the advent of precision-guided weapons … you saw what we did to the Iraqi Air Force and their hardened aircraft shelters. They’re not so hard when you put a 2,000-pound bomb right through the roof.”
Wilsbach was commander of Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) at the time. He subsequently became head of ACC and is now Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the service’s top officer.
“I think that I don’t want to spend a lot of money on hardening shelters. Unless you’re going to send something 100 feet or more underground, we can blow it up, and so can they,” Wilsbach said in an interview with Breaking Defense in July of this year when asked explicitly if his position changed. “So, the economics of building a shelter that is impervious to a strike doesn’t work.”
U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Ken Wilsbach speaks during an all-call with personnel at RAF Mildenhall, another base in the United Kingdom, on July 13, 2026. USAF
“I think the economics favor defending your airspace, defending your ground space with systems that can defeat the incoming rounds, versus building a shelter,” he added. “Some people would argue, well, you should do both. Well, that’s even more expensive. And the other thing is, the shelter doesn’t go anywhere.”
It is fair to point out that typical above-ground hardened aircraft shelters are not invulnerable, especially to attacks involving ballistic, cruise, and certain air-launched threats. There are also substantial cost and other factors to consider when it comes to any major military construction effort.
That being said, having more hardened infrastructure also imposes costs and complexities on opponents, who have to dedicate more advanced and costly munitions and other resources to ensure targets are neutralized. Shelters have the knock-on benefit of complicating the targeting process for an enemy by obscuring where aircraft are or are not positioned, to begin with. An opponent has to treat shelters like they are full even if they are empty.
When thinking about hardened aircraft shelters, stereotypical Cold War-era reinforced concrete structures typically come to mind. However, they do not all have to be built to a one-size-fits-all standard with the same degree of hardening across the board to be useful. Shorter-range drone attacks are typically carried out by platforms carrying small explosive charges or that are designed to drop small bomblets. Even longer-range one-way-attack drones generally have smaller warheads than traditional missiles, they also hit with less kinetic energy.
A US Air Force F-16 fighter sits inside a traditional hardened aircraft shelter. USAF
A structure that shields against smaller blasts and shrapnel, also including from cluster munitions that can be readily scattered across wide areas, is one that then has to be addressed by more capable weapons. This could even include mobile or otherwise temporary shelters that offer sufficient concealment and protection.
This picture shows what the Air Force described as a “prototype portable camouflage, concealment, and deception hangar” in use during Exercise Hoodoo Sea in 2023. Air National Guard The prototype portable hangar intended to support camouflage, concealment, and deception efforts in use during an Air National Guard-led exercise in 2023. Air National Guard
Eliminating, or at least substantially mitigating, the lowest rung of threats creates a dilemma for opponents, who then have to decide whether it is even worthwhile to attempt certain types of attacks. There is clear value in narrowing the available options for the enemy and pushing them toward having to expend higher-end, more expensive munitions, that are available in smaller quantities, and that traditional active defenses may be better optimized to handle. As an example, it may be more viable to shoot down a small barrage of incoming cruise missiles than a swarm of dozens of drones.
There are magazine and stockpile depth issues at play here, too. This is something that has also been brought front and center by the conflict with Iran, which has fueled already long-standing concerns about the sufficiency of stockpiles of air defense interceptors, other critical munitions, and the capacity to replenish them quickly. This is something the British government, among others, is also grappling with, as you can read more about in our separate reporting here.
Furthermore, losses of aircraft on the ground are not without their own costs, which are even more lopsided if an opponent can simply use lower-cost weaponized drones. U.S. bombers are particularly expensive and prized assets that are in short supply compared to the level of demand, as seen during the height of combat operations earlier this year against Iran. When it comes to B-1s, specifically, there are only 45 of them left in service today. A dozen of them being knocked out in one go would have major repercussions strategically. Losing even one would also be a propaganda coup for whoever might be responsible.
How many shelters can we build for the upgrade cost of one Zumwalt class DDG that will probably be parted out in 10 years anyway?
On top of all this, the U.S. military simply will not always have the luxury of being able to rapidly relocate aircraft in response to threats. Moving a dozen bombers on short notice takes massive resources. It is not just aircraft that have to be repositioned, but supporting personnel and assets, as well as weapons and fuel. Having to shift to alternate locations could easily have negative impacts on tempo and other aspects of operations, especially in the midst of actual conflict. RAF Fairford is one of only a few bases globally that can support bomber operations for a prolonged period.
“There is value in some light protection against small, unmanned threats,” Gen. Wilsbach also told Breaking Defense in July. “Some of them — just nets that are up that keep a small, few-$100 drone from getting next to a $2 billion aircraft. That actually works, [and is] really cheap.”
A graphic included a contracting notice put out by authorities at Langley Air Force Base in 2024 showing how sunshade-type shelters at the base might be equipped with anti-drone nets. USAF
“It’s not either or,” Wilsbach said in a separate interview with Air & Space Forces Magazine in July. “The net keeps the small UAS [uncrewed aerial system] from getting close to an aircraft that you’re trying to protect… That’s a very inexpensive way to give you some modicum of protection without killing your checkbook on really exquisite defensive systems.”
In spite of these institutional developments, action to implement such recommendations on a broad basis has continued to lag. There still does not appear to be any major department-wide push to build new hardened aircraft shelters or other fortified structures at facilities globally. The U.S. Air Force does have a certain number of hardened aircraft shelters at bases now, especially in the Pacific and Europe.
This is all despite a very visible trend in the construction of new aircraft shelters and other hardened infrastructure elsewhere around the globe, including in China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. Even before Operation Spiderweb, Russia had already initiated a large-scale effort to build new hardened shelters at various bases, especially on the occupied Crimean Peninsula, in the face of expanding Ukrainian drone and missile attacks. This effort has now extended to building the huge hardened shelters for the country’s bomber force, something the country has never done before.
“It is inappropriate to discuss matters of intelligence, and we will not discuss specific force protection measures,” a U.S. Air Force spokesperson told TWZ yesterday when asked about the reports that Iranian drone threats prompted the recent removal of the B-1s from Fairford. “The Department will continue to assess the threat environment surrounding our installations and take appropriate actions to protect our people, our platforms and the bases where our forces operate from.”
We still do not know exactly how serious or imminent any recent threat to the B-1s at Fairford was that contributed to their hasty departure. Regardless, the reports of concerns about potential drone attacks remain very plausible. The reality here is that a dozen bombers were yanked from a forward operating location in Europe without an adversary ever having to fire a shot. This is a problem set that is only growing, especially as lessons and expertise on low-end weaponized drones from the war in Ukraine are spreading around the globe.
A B-1 bomber seen parked out in the open at RAF Fairford on March 15, 2026. Matthew Horwood/Getty Images
Erecting new aircraft shelters and other hardened infrastructure would not be a full solution to those threats by themselves. At the same time, they would be a valuable added layer of defense, and a passive one that would have a huge logistical footprint to operate once the initial investment is made. The lack of movement to better fortify American airbases globally is only becoming more and more glaring, and it remains to be seen if real action will not occur until lessons are learned in a most unfortunate way.
The United Kingdom could be heading toward its most significant expansion of ground-based air defense in generations, under a plan announced by the Conservative Party. For now, however, with the Conservatives in opposition, the proposed £10 billion (about $13.3 billion) “Britannia Shield” exists only as a policy commitment rather than an approved government program. At the same time, it highlights the seriousness of U.K. military deficiencies in this area, as the threat from the air continues to grow.
Today the @Conservatives are announcing ‘Britannia Shield’ – our £10bn plan to protect the UK from drone & missile attack. This is only possible because @KemiBadenoch is willing to take tough decisions to fund 3% on Defence. pic.twitter.com/tLrF2KSOHw
The proposal will move into the U.K. Ministry of Defense acquisition system if the party returns to government following the next general election and then follows through on the funding and procurement decisions required to turn the pledge into an operational capability. The party has proposed spreading the investment over a decade, with an initial capability intended to emerge during the first term of a future Conservative government and the wider network established after that.
Britannia Shield comes with the character of the air threat facing Europe having changed dramatically over the last decade. Russia’s war in Ukraine has demonstrated the scale at which relatively inexpensive drones can be employed alongside cruise and ballistic missiles, while recent fighting in the Middle East has clearly shown the costs involved in maintaining a sophisticated, layered air defense system under sustained attack. At the same time, the threat is no longer confined to weapons fielded by major state militaries. Small, widely available drone technologies can be weaponized with relative ease by non-state actors, providing a cheap and potentially highly scalable means of attack.
Operating in the Red Sea in 2024, the Type 45 destroyer HMS Diamond uses its Sea Viper missile system to shoot down a missile fired by the Iranian-backed Houthis from Yemen. Crown Copyright
For Britain, which has traditionally relied heavily on fighter aircraft, naval air defense, and the protection provided by geography and NATO, it is increasingly doubtful whether those capabilities provide enough coverage for the infrastructure that would be most important to keep functioning during a major conflict.
While a party press release refers to it directly, Conservative leader Kemi Badenoch has made efforts to distinguish Britannia Shield from a British version of Israel’s Iron Dome.
Iron Dome has become one of the best-known elements of Israel’s layered air defense network, having been developed primarily to deal with short-range rockets, artillery, and mortar rounds threatening populated areas. The system has evolved, however, and newer configurations can also engage threats including cruise missiles and drones. Importantly, Israel’s Iron Dome systems protect a country a twelfth of the size of United Kingdom and deal with only a portion of the potential threats in critical areas.
Mention should also be made of the U.S. Golden Dome missile defense initiative, which envisions integrating sensors, interceptors, and other defensive capabilities as part of an enormous architecture with a greater emphasis on protecting the U.S. against a range of aerial and missile threats, up to and including intercontinental ballistic missiles.
Talking to the BBC, Badenoch argued that Britain does not face the same kind of persistent rocket and missile threat as Israel and therefore does not require an equivalent level of coverage. Instead, the Conservative proposal is intended to combine improved radar, command and control, interceptor missiles, and counter-drone capabilities into an integrated network designed around the threats Britain is considered most likely to face.
Britain already has some of the components that such a system could leverage. Royal Navy Type 45 destroyers — when they are available — provide a highly capable long-range air-defense layer through Sea Viper missiles, while the Army’s Sky Sabre system uses CAMM missiles for shorter-range engagements. The RAF provides combat aircraft and airborne surveillance capabilities, and Britain is integrated into NATO’s wider air and missile defense architecture. The problem is that these capabilities were not designed to provide a dense, permanent defensive umbrella over critical infrastructure, and the ground-based component in particular remains relatively limited when compared with the scale of the potential target set. There is also the reality that these assets are required to defend locales far from the British Isles themselves.
A British Army Sky Sabre battery. Crown Copyright
The government’s own 2025 Strategic Defense Review acknowledged that changing threat environment, allocating up to £1 billion in new funding for homeland air and missile defense and calling for improvements to the United Kingdom’s wider integrated air and missile defense architecture. Britannia Shield would therefore be a much larger political commitment to expanding and integrating capabilities that already exist, while adding new layers intended to deal with the growing drone and missile threat.
The £10 billion figure provides little idea of the scope of capabilities. The scale of the proposed system will determine whether that additional money represents a major expansion or simply the beginning of a much larger requirement.
Gen. Sir Richard Barrons has previously estimated that an entry-level system of the kind outlined could cost around £80 billion over a decade, illustrating how quickly the cost can rise once the requirement expands from protecting selected sites to providing something approaching comprehensive national coverage.
2/ Estimates suggest north of £80bn for the full cost of a perfect system, so we almost certainly need to think differently than a “dome” solution. A layered air defence will include a number of elements, including the ability to deter and strike back at an adversary.
Badenoch’s description of the threat instead points toward a system in which Britain would identify the infrastructure and military facilities most important to national resilience and then build increasingly dense layers of protection around them. That would include major airbases, ports, energy infrastructure, communications facilities, and other critical nodes, rather than attempting to create a continuous defensive bubble over the entire country.
RAF No. 617 Squadron F-35B jets at RAF Marham in England. Crown Copyright
Such a system would also have to account for the fact that the location of the launch platform can be as critical as the weapon itself. Badenoch described a scenario in which an adversary could operate in the English Channel to launch drones or missiles against targets in Britain. The resulting reduction in warning time would place greater demands on sensors and command systems, but it would also mean that the defensive problem could begin well before an incoming weapon reached British airspace. Maritime surveillance, intelligence collection, fighter aircraft, and naval forces could all potentially contribute to detecting or disrupting a launch platform before it had the opportunity to fire.
A Russian Kilo class submarine, its accompanying tugboat (center), and the RFA fast fleet tanker Tidesurge (background), as seen from a Merlin helicopter from 814 Naval Air Squadron. The helicopter and RFA tanker shadowed the submarine and tugboat as they sailed westward from the North Sea, through the Strait of Dover and into the English Channel in 2025. Crown Copyright
That broader approach is particularly important because the economics of countering drones are fundamentally different from those associated with conventional air defense targets. A system that responds to inexpensive drones by firing a sophisticated interceptor costing hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars would rapidly become unsustainable during a large attack. Any serious British architecture would therefore need several layers, with electronic warfare, guns, low-cost interceptors, and other counter-drone systems, potentially including directed-energy weapons, dealing with the lower end of the threat wherever possible. Meanwhile, more expensive surface-to-air missiles would be preserved for cruise missiles, aircraft and other targets that cannot be economically engaged by cheaper means.
A British Army Wolfhound armored vehicle, seen here with a mounted portable Laser Directed Energy Weapon (LDEW). This was the first high-powered laser energy weapon to be successfully fired from a British Army combat vehicle. Crown Copyright
The recent situation at RAF Fairford adds another dimension to that problem. The United States recently withdrew a dozen B-1 bombers from the Gloucestershire base amid reported concerns about a possible Iran-backed attack, after U.S. officials said commanders had received new information about a potential plot. British authorities maintained that the base was safe, while British sources reportedly questioned whether Iran could reproduce the kind of complex operation carried out by Ukraine against Russian airfields in 2025. The episode nevertheless demonstrated the degree to which even a major military installation can become a concern when an adversary is believed to be looking for unconventional ways to reach it.
A B-1B Lancer assigned to the 9th Expeditionary Bomb Squadron parks on the flightline at RAF Fairford, United Kingdom, in 2023. U.S. Air Force Photo by Senior Airman Ryan Hayman
That brings Operation Spiderweb into the discussion, although there is no public evidence that Iran is preparing a comparable operation against Britain. Ukraine’s June 2025 attack was prepared over roughly 18 months and involved small drones being moved deep into Russia inside containers carried by trucks before being launched remotely against military airfields. The operation illustrated that once relatively cheap drones have been positioned close to their targets, the defender may have little opportunity to intercept them through traditional long-range air defense means. This is exactly a scenario we have been warning of for many years.
Today, Ukrainian intelligence reportedly launched 117 attack drones from trucks that had been placed near Russian air bases. I tasked several collects this morning via @umbraspace and my first images have already started processing. What a remarkable success in a well-executed… pic.twitter.com/LzXulw8jnK
For Britannia Shield, that means protecting an airbase such as RAF Fairford cannot simply be a matter of installing missile batteries. Physical security, counter-intelligence, surveillance of access routes, low-level drone detection, electronic warfare and the ability to identify suspicious activity before an attack begins would all become part of the same defensive problem. Hardened infrastructure would also be essential, helping to protect aircraft, fuel, munitions, command facilities and other critical assets from attacks that penetrate the outer layers of the defense. The distinction is increasingly important as military aircraft themselves become more valuable and as relatively inexpensive unmanned systems demonstrate their ability to threaten aircraft on the ground without ever having to penetrate the surrounding air defense network.
The new British proposal also becomes more complicated because its intended coverage extends beyond the British mainland. Badenoch has specifically referred to defending installations in Cyprus and the Falkland Islands, which introduces a very different set of operational and logistical requirements. A network supporting critical infrastructure in Britain can draw on dense communications infrastructure, nearby industrial support and the wider NATO system, whereas a defensive capability at RAF Akrotiri or in the Falklands requires its own radar coverage, launchers, personnel, ammunition stocks, and sustainment arrangements. Extending the same architecture across those locations would therefore consume considerably more resources.
A RAF 1435 Flight Typhoon FGR4 pair flying over West Falkland island during a routine training flight. Crown Copyright
A similar problem exists with ammunition stocks. Ukraine has repeatedly demonstrated that sophisticated air defenses can come under sustained pressure during large missile and drone attacks, while Western countries have struggled to replenish some categories of precision-guided weapons at anything approaching wartime consumption rates. A British system that looks impressive on paper but has only a small stockpile of interceptors would provide much less meaningful protection during a prolonged campaign, particularly if an adversary deliberately attempted to exhaust the defenses through repeated attacks using inexpensive drones.
Ukraine also offers lessons for how Britain could organize such a network. Mobile air defense teams, distributed sensors, acoustic detection systems, and digital applications that connect air defense operators with military units and civilian spotters have all become increasingly important in Ukraine, where defenders have had to detect and respond to large numbers of drones and missiles across a wide area. There are echoes here of the distributed air defense networks developed during World War II, when observers, radar operators, fighter controllers, and anti-aircraft units were linked together to provide early warning and direct defensive responses. As in 1940, Britain would need an air defense network that is distributed, mobile, and adaptable to new threats.
A RAF Regiment light anti-aircraft gun team man their Bofors 40mm gun in a rain-sodden emplacement in southeast England, to help defend London from flying bombs in World War II. Crown Copyright
The most revealing details of Britannia Shield are yet to be provided. The number of defended sites, the types and numbers of radars, the number of launchers, the size of interceptor stocks, and the proportion of the budget devoted to counter-drone capabilities all remain unclear for now. The same applies to the money required for training, maintenance, software, communications, and replenishment across the life of the system.
There is also a straightforward political limitation to the proposal. The Conservatives have pledged to invest in Britannia Shield as part of a broader plan to increase defense spending, but that money is not currently sitting in a government procurement account waiting to be spent and defense budgets are increasingly stretched by other big-ticket programs. The Conservatives would first have to return to government, establish the program as a formal requirement, and then make the associated spending and procurement decisions. Even if those steps were taken quickly, the most capable elements of the system would take years to design, procure, integrate, and deploy.
A rendering of of the new Dreadnought class of ballistic submarines for the Royal Navy, representing the largest British defense investment of recent years. Crown Copyright
Whether £10 billion would ultimately be sufficient depends on the mission the future government assigns to the system. If Britannia Shield were expected to provide nationwide protection against sustained attacks involving ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and large numbers of drones, the budget would fall far short, particularly once interceptor stocks and long-term sustainment are included. If it is designed as a layered network protecting a defined group of critical infrastructure sites and military bases, integrated with the RAF, Royal Navy, Army, and NATO systems already in place, the proposal becomes more realistic, but it wouldn’t address higher-end threats, like longer-range ballistic missiles.
That limitation is particularly significant when considering Russia, which remains the most serious military threat to the United Kingdom and its European allies. From what we know so far, Britannia Shield is heavily focused on drones and shorter-range missile threats, but Russia possesses a much broader strike arsenal that includes ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and hypersonic weapons. A British air defense program that concentrates primarily on the lower and middle tiers of the threat therefore leaves a significant gap at the upper end of the spectrum.
Russian Yars intercontinental ballistic missiles travel through central Moscow during a rehearsal for the Victory Day parade in 2025. Photo by Alexander NEMENOV / AFP
The United Kingdom is also not considering this problem in isolation. Across Europe, governments are increasingly pursuing multinational efforts to strengthen air and missile defenses, as the return of large-scale state-on-state warfare and the experience of the war in Ukraine have made the vulnerability of European infrastructure and military forces much more tangible. Nearly three decades after the end of the Cold War, ballistic and cruise missile defense has once again become a central European security requirement. Britannia Shield would therefore need to be considered not only as a national counter-drone and air-defense program, but as part of a much broader European effort to rebuild layered air and missile defenses against the full range of modern threats.
The experience of Ukraine and the Middle East suggests that Britain is unlikely to solve this problem simply by buying more surface-to-air missiles. Increasingly, air warfare relies on complex networks that find the attacker, identify the weapon, choose the appropriate response, and undertake this all at a cost that can be sustained throughout a conflict. That network also has to extend beyond the airspace itself, because the threat may involve a launch platform approaching the coast, a drone operator operating near a military installation, or small drones already hidden inside the defender’s security perimeter.
Last line of defense: British Army riflemen testing a Mossberg 590M Counter SUAS shotgun (foreground) and handheld Counter-Unmanned Aerial System effectors against drones. Crown Copyright
With their proposed reorientation of Britain’s air defense priorities, the Conservatives have put a financial value and a recognizable name around a capability gap that has become increasingly difficult to ignore. If they return to government, there will be many tougher questions to address, including which sites should receive protection, how many layers are required, how much ammunition must be held in reserve, and how the system can be sustained on a wartime footing.
The recent concerns surrounding RAF Fairford, together with the lessons of Operation Spiderweb, underline why that question is becoming more complicated. The next serious attack on a British military installation may not arrive as a large formation of aircraft or a visible wave of missiles crossing the Channel. It could involve a mixture of long-range weapons, cheap drones, electronic warfare, and hybrid warfare activity taking place much closer to the target. A future Britannia Shield would have to be designed around that reality, and would come with a price tag to match.
L’arrestation d’Ian Proud par la police secrète à l’aéroport de Londres marque un nouveau plus bas dans la mesure où l’État profond peut aller pour contrôler un faux récit.
L’arrestation d’Ian Proud par la police secrète à l’aéroport de Londres marque un nouveau plus bas dans la mesure où l’État profond peut aller pour contrôler un faux récit. Mais cela montre aussi un nouveau niveau de peur.
Aussi fou que cela puisse paraître, il semble bien que les nations d’Europe occidentale, du moins, se préparent à entrer en guerre contre la Russie à un moment donné dans un avenir pas trop lointain. Ce qui est particulièrement inquiétant, c’est qu’il semble y avoir un vide distinct dans tous les domaines de ce que nous pourrions appeler largement les « médias » pour remettre en question ce récit. Il y a trente ans, il était considéré comme normal que les journalistes soient la source de questions embarrassantes envers les acteurs étatiques et soient généralement une épine dans le pied, puisqu’ils remettaient en question chaque décision prise et chaque idée présentée. Notre travail était d’être anti-establishment et d’adopter un point de vue très cynique sur la « politique ». Cela n’avait rien de remarquable. C’était ce que nous faisions. Être méprisé par les grandes puissances faisait partie du travail ; travailler à des heures antisociales et avoir peu d’amis en faisait aussi partie.
Aujourd’hui, il n’y a plus de journalistes dans ce que nous appelons les médias « grand public » pour faire cela. Ils ont été remplacés par des « créateurs de contenu » plus jeunes, plus habiles avec les réseaux sociaux, qui croient que le journalisme est plus ou moins un rôle grammatical, où la matière première vous est remise avec toutes les informations qu’elle contient, et où le rôle du journaliste est simplement de la raffiner au style du jour pour la consommation de masse.
Le danger de cette transition est que presque tout ce qui nous est présenté comme des nouvelles est en réalité faux, ou au mieux lourdement expurgé pour maintenir les masses là où l’élite veut qu’elles soient : contenues, préparées et mal informées.
La guerre en Ukraine en est un excellent exemple. La principale raison pour laquelle les populations aux États-Unis et au Royaume-Uni sont si fabuleusement biaisées contre la Russie et si sympathiques à l’égard de l’élite corrompue de Kiev est que, pendant des années, elles ont été lavées le cerveau avec des « nouvelles » sur la Russie qui étaient négatives et qui alimentaient astucieusement un préjugé raciste – un préjugé cultivé depuis au moins une décennie, sinon plus. Le résultat est qu’aujourd’hui un certain nombre de mensonges sont devenus établis dans les salles de rédaction, où les journalistes, même ceux qui savent, contournent simplement les nuances et présentent une histoire de conte de fées, conçue pour être comprise par les masses qui n’ont pas d’autres sources d’information pour même la remettre en question.
Tout récemment, des médias occidentaux ont rapporté une « peste » en Russie, avec des histoires de « confinement », à la suite du cas d’un travailleur dans un laboratoire mort d’une pneumonie dans des circonstances encore incertaines. Les médias occidentaux, dans le cadre de leur rôle consistant à maintenir la russophobie à son apogée, sont si verrouillés et chargés que leurs réactions « à la gâchette facile » aux mauvaises nouvelles venant de Russie sont compréhensibles. Ils sont aussi avides de contenu accrocheur, et de telles histoires nourrissent un public affamé qui a déjà eu sa première dose de ce genre d’histoires d’hystérie COVID et qui en veut davantage. La vérité est totalement immatérielle. L’hystérie et les mensonges sont ce qui est injecté à un rythme fébrile par des « créateurs de contenu » aux dents et aux griffes rouges, l’écume à la bouche dans leur désir de servir l’État profond et les élites qui ont tant investi dans un agenda.
Le contraste entre la Russie et l’Occident est intéressant, cependant, lorsque nous examinons les médias. Tout récemment en Russie, le correspondant de la BBC basé à Moscou a fait vibrer Internet sur les réseaux sociaux avec sa courte interview du ministre russe des Affaires étrangères, qui a eu la gentillesse de répondre à sa question orientée sur l’idéologie de guerre de la Russie avec l’Ukraine. Ce que absolument personne n’a relevé, c’est à quel point la Russie est heureuse d’accueillir des journalistes étrangers qui ont un agenda si distinct pour alimenter la russophobie chez eux, tandis que les journalistes russes sont interdits dans ces capitales de l’UE depuis des années. La vieille Europe, qui tenait autrefois si cher des valeurs comme la liberté de la presse, a adopté le modèle soviétique, tandis que la Russie est en réalité plus avancée en ce qui concerne ces principes de ce que nous attendons dans une démocratie. La Russie n’a pas peur des questions embarrassantes, contrairement à l’Occident.
Nous devrions nous demander qui bénéficie réellement d’une guerre avec la Russie.
Est-ce trop sceptique et « théoriste du complot » de supposer que le complexe militaro-industriel a fait du lobbying avec succès pour une telle guerre pendant AU MOINS une décennie et, surtout, qu’il a réussi à convaincre l’establishment du renseignement et de l’armée au Royaume-Uni d’utiliser son levier sur les médias pour fournir aux journalistes la matière première qui renforce un préjugé contre la Russie ?
Normalement, une telle idée pourrait être rejetée comme pure absurdité. Mais considérez simplement jusqu’où le Royaume-Uni, par exemple, est allé pour éradiquer toute couverture médiatique pouvant être considérée comme au moins favorable à la Russie – ou même simplement pour tenir le gouvernement britannique responsable en posant les questions que les journalistes britanniques ont cessé de poser. Si l’élite au Royaume-Uni qui contrôle les journaux déficitaires (réfléchissez-y) est si sûre de sa logique selon laquelle la Russie est l’ennemi avec lequel nous devons aller en guerre, pourquoi est-elle si terrifiée par des journalistes – ou quiconque, d’ailleurs – qui expriment simplement un point de vue avec des questions sur le récit ?
Je ne peux pas être le seul commentateur occidental à croire que les agents doubles Sergueï Skripal et sa fille Ioulia n’ont pas été empoisonnés avec l’agent neurotoxique Novitchok à Salisbury en 2018, ce qui a été rapporté à l’époque comme ayant « déclenché une immense crise diplomatique entre la Grande-Bretagne et la Russie ». N’est-ce pas la véritable histoire que les chefs de la sécurité britannique ont décidé, après avoir découvert que Sergueï Skripal était en réalité un triple agent qui transmettait des informations à Moscou, qu’il était dispensable ? Et quel meilleur moyen de soi-disant donner une leçon aux Russes, tout en blâmant Moscou pour sa mort, que de l’assassiner lui et sa fille en utilisant un agent neurotoxique qui était soit du Novitchok – qu’un laboratoire britannique situé juste en bas de la rue où vivaient les Skripal avait commodément dans un réfrigérateur – soit un poison similaire ? Ce qu’il est important de noter à propos du Novitchok, c’est que les victimes meurent généralement instantanément au contact. Ce qui est probable, c’est que les Skripal n’ont pas été empoisonnés par la substance russe mais par une version britannique d’un autre agent neurotoxique. C’est un exemple choquant de la médiocrité du journalisme britannique que les scribouillards au Royaume-Uni rapportent simplement l’incident Skripal d’empoisonnement au Novitchok sans le moindre fragment de preuve pour l’étayer. Ils n’ajoutent même pas une note de scepticisme dans leurs reportages sur la substance et sur qui « affirme » qu’il s’agit de Novitchok.
Nous voyons le même niveau choquant de reportages atroces et biaisés sur la guerre en Ukraine, que le public britannique a simplement été informé par le récit médiatique comme une « invasion » par l’armée de Poutine. Aucun contexte, aucune nuance, aucun aperçu de la perspective russe, car personne ne peut supporter, semble-t-il, que l’histoire soit obscurcie par les faits.
Et c’est la même chose avec l’histoire de la « peste » russe, comme ce fut le cas avec l’histoire de l’« attaque » de la base de la RAF récemment, qui était probablement juste des voleurs locaux achetant de l’essence de contrebande à des soldats américains/britanniques corrompus cherchant à se faire un peu d’argent rapide à la base britannique. Remarquez avec quelle rapidité Trump a utilisé l’histoire comme base pour déplacer tous les bombardiers américains hors de la base et les renvoyer sur le sol américain, où ils sont complètement inutiles dans sa soi-disant guerre au Moyen-Orient. Pour Trump, c’était une occasion pour un autre coup médiatique qui le maintient à la une et tout le monde dans l’expectative. Il était probablement reconnaissant aux Britanniques de lui avoir offert la matière première. Un autre problème de cette nouvelle génération de journalistes est leur complaisance à rapporter des « nouvelles » qui ne sont pas du tout des nouvelles, mais simplement du matériel utilisé comme distraction, un jour à la fois. Trump est un maître dans la manipulation des médias avec ce jeu, disant généralement quelque chose de si stupide et de si controversé, ce qui détourne les journalistes du vrai journalisme. Si vous pouvez occuper les journalistes avec des articles sur le dernier commentaire ou la dernière déclaration idiote de Trump, alors vous les contrôlez en contrôlant leur temps.
Regardez simplement comment l’affaire Epstein n’est pas rapportée ni enquêtée. Comment Trump s’en est sorti impunément, puisque depuis le 28 février l’attention des journalistes a été détournée vers la guerre avec l’Iran – ce qui est l’une des raisons pour lesquelles Trump maintient cette histoire vivante avec des mouvements de troupes constants et des discours sur une attaque massive après les élections de mi-mandat. Les gens n’ont pas fait le lien entre la fuite du matériel Epstein et le déclenchement de la guerre avec l’Iran pratiquement le même jour.
Pour les Britanniques, l’histoire « les Russes arrivent » n’a aucun article cynique de la part de journalistes qui sont à 100 % complaisants avec son récit erroné. La peur des élites à Londres est cependant palpable, celle qu’elle sera toujours remise en question par des acteurs marginaux occupant de la bande passante sur les réseaux sociaux. Dans le passé, c’était le correspondant de RT à Londres, qui pouvait poser des questions difficiles et être généralement une épine dans le pied du village de Westminster qui contrôlait les journalistes comme des rats tenus dans un panier. La principale raison pour laquelle RT a été expulsé du Royaume-Uni était qu’il offrait un style de reportage sur la politique britannique qui nous avait quittés depuis trente ans – tel est le monde trouble de l’État profond et la façon dont il a vu comment, à Bruxelles, les journalistes pouvaient être manipulés jusqu’à devenir des sténographes pour lui.
Pourtant, même avec ce nouveau style stalinien de contrôle des médias au Royaume-Uni, l’État est branlant. Même avec la mise en place impressionnante qu’il a maintenant de domination médiatique totale, où les journalistes débitent des ordures totales sur la guerre en Ukraine ou sur ce qu’on leur dit d’écrire sur le Moyen-Orient, la peur est toujours là.
L’exemple du vidéoblogueur Ian Proud, un ancien diplomate britannique autrefois basé à Moscou, est inquiétant mais poignant. Le simple fait de se rendre à Moscou pour assister à une conférence où Poutine parlait a suffi pour qu’il subisse le traitement complet de la Stasi à l’aéroport de Heathrow – détenu et tout le contenu numérique saisi.
Les interviews YouTube de Proud, avec son style de présentation ringard, s’avèrent populaires car il offre simplement une vision plus sobre de la Russie et du Foreign Office britannique, son ancien employeur. Ces interviews attirent l’attention des espions britanniques, qui sont si nerveux à l’idée que la vérité sur la Russie éclate et que les mensonges honteux qui sont maintenant emballés pour le public britannique soient révélés, qu’ils ont dû infliger à Proud la routine américaine de « fouille en prison ». La Grande-Bretagne, un pays qui était autrefois un phare pour le monde avec sa vision de la liberté et en particulier sa passion pour la liberté d’expression, est tombée à un niveau que nous ne pouvons comparer qu’à un pays d’Afrique de l’Ouest qui vient d’installer un nouveau dictateur, complet avec des lunettes noires et des épaulettes. Ce que l’affaire Proud à l’aéroport de Heathrow montre, c’est que ce nouveau régime au pouvoir ne reculera devant rien pour contrôler un récit, et que le dernier bastion de la liberté d’expression – les podcasts YouTube – est la prochaine cible. Plus la chaîne de Proud devient prospère, plus il est inévitable qu’il soit contraint de quitter le Royaume-Uni et de s’installer en Russie pour continuer à exercer la liberté d’expression. Les glands d’épaule de l’État profond britannique ne dormiront pas bien tant que le pays n’aura pas un récit médiatique qui ferait rougir Joe Staline – et les journalistes britanniques les aident à atteindre cet objectif.
Originally posted on October, 7, 2026 – updated on October, 8, 2026
As the tragic anniversary of October 7, 2023, approaches —the day Hamas terrorists massacred Israelis near the Gaza Strip border, triggering the genocide in Palestine perpetrated by Benjamin Netanyahu’s Zionist regime —we are publishing an exclusive intelligence analysis.
This video marks the launch of a new Gospa News series titled “TOP SECRET Interview” by Fabio G.C. Carisio—founder and director of Gospa News—which will also be republished on the long-standing American site VT UnCensored Foreign Policy (where Carisio hosts a column).
This features an interview with Antonio Evangelista, a top Italian police official and counter-terrorism expert who spent seven years as Interpol official in Jordan, and who is now an author of geopolitical essayes and novels concerning international intrigue.
He confirms that the recent attack in the Holy Land—like the September 11 attack on the Twin Towers in New York—was a horrific “false flag” operations…
A “false flag” operation is one carefully premeditated over a long period by a foreign intelligence entity to implicate an enemy nation and discredit it in the eyes of global public opinion. It is planned down to the finest detail, carrying the risk of causing actual casualties.
In fact, if unforeseen “collateral damage”—such as unexpected deaths beyond the planned injuries or killings—occurs during the operation, the orchestrators are even more pleased, as the resulting bloodshed lends greater credibility to the terrorist attack.
Historically, the CIA (US counter-intelligence) and Mossad (Israeli counter-intelligence) have been recognized masters of such plots, occasionally utilizing partners such as the secret services of other nations or terrorist groups.
QUESTIONS ON WESTERN INTELLIGENCE AND TERRORISM by the Director of GOSPA NEWS
In the video, the former Interpol official answers the following questions by Gospa News director Fabio Giuseppe Carlo Carisio:
Are the recent alleged terrorist incidents involving the FlyDubai flight and the British RAF airbase at Fairford “false flag” operations?
What parallels exist between the plots of September 11 in New York and October 7, 2023, in Israel?
What has been the historical strategy of Western intelligence agencies regarding terrorist actions by Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and Hamas?
What drives Western governments to support bloody “colonial ventures,” thereby legitimizing genocides in the Middle East and Ukraine?
What lies regarding NATO wars in the Mediterranean basin are exposed in your historical, geopolitical, and economic study?
Do US, Europe and Italy face a real risk of a world war?
No summary today. If you want to hear the answers, watch the video to the end.
Below the video, you will find links to the major investigations mentioned in the footage.
VIDEO INTERVIEW to ANTONIO EVANGELISTA – Former Interpol official in Jordan
Two Iranian nationals have been charged with terrorism offences over an alleged plot targeting the Jewish community in Manchester, with investigators accusing them of researching potential targets and obtaining instructions and materials for an improvised explosive device.
Rahman Salehi, of Salford, and Salam Ahmadyan, 36, of Liverpool, were charged on Friday, 2 October, with engaging in conduct in preparation for terrorist acts, contrary to Section 5 of the Terrorism Act 2006.
They have been remanded in custody and are due to appear at Westminster Magistrates’ Court on Saturday, 3 October.
The arrests followed what police described as a long-running counter-terrorism investigation into a suspected plot directed against the Jewish community in the Manchester area.
Police allege that the two men were communicating with a third person overseas who may have been in Iran. No allegation has been made in the charges released so far that the Iranian government directed the suspected plot.
The particulars published by Counter Terrorism Policing allege that Salehi and Ahmadyan used encrypted communications and obtained material containing instructions for manufacturing an explosive device.
Investigators say the men acquired instructions relating to a device using powdered chlorine and vehicle brake fluid, along with video material concerning the manufacture or assembly of an improvised explosive device.
They are further accused of acquiring liquids, components and equipment, researching potential targets, obtaining images, maps and plans, and carrying out reconnaissance at locations considered as possible targets.
Frank Ferguson, Chief Crown Prosecutor for the CPS Special Crime and Counter Terrorism Division, said prosecutors had concluded that there was sufficient evidence for the case to be put before a court.
The CPS stressed that the proceedings are now active and that both men have the right to a fair trial. The charges are allegations and no finding of guilt has been made.
Arrests during Jewish High Holy Days
The arrests took place shortly before Yom Kippur, the holiest day in the Jewish calendar, and came amid heightened security surrounding Jewish institutions in Britain.
Deputy Assistant Commissioner Vicki Evans, Senior National Coordinator for Counter Terrorism Policing, said the investigation had disrupted what police believed to be a plot targeting Manchester’s Jewish community.
The timing is particularly sensitive because it comes one year after the terrorist attack at the Heaton Park Hebrew Congregation synagogue in Manchester on 2 October 2025.
The latest case also comes against the background of a series of alleged Iranian-linked threats and attacks involving Jewish and Israeli targets in Britain.
British security agencies have repeatedly warned about Iranian activity on UK territory. The government said earlier this year that more than 20 potentially lethal Iran-backed plots had been tracked by British security agencies over the preceding year.
The group, the Islamic Movement of Companions of the Right, was subsequently designated under Britain’s new state-threat legislation alongside Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
EU Today has previously examined Iran-linked security threats in Britain following counter-terrorism arrests involving Iranian nationals, as well as alleged Iranian-linked plots targeting Jewish institutions elsewhere in Europe and North America.
Britain expands protection for Jewish communities
The Manchester case comes as the British government increases security around synagogues, Jewish schools and community centres.
The package includes funding for more than 500 additional police officers across England and Wales, including around 80 officers in Greater Manchester, as well as additional resources for Counter Terrorism Policing.
The UK’s national terrorism threat level was raised to severe in April, meaning that an attack is considered highly likely. The government said the decision reflected both an increased threat from Islamist and extreme-right terrorism and a wider background of state-linked physical threats against the Jewish community.
The allegations against Salehi and Ahmadyan will now be considered by the courts. Prosecutors have warned against publishing material that could prejudice the proceedings.
Nearly half of voters in the United Kingdom support rejoining the European Union, according to a survey released as Prime Minister Andy Burnham reviews the country’s options for its long-term relationship with the bloc.
The Messina Group polled 11,461 people between 12 and 24 September. It found that 49 per cent supported EU membership and 28.5 per cent opposed it. The findings were weighted by respondents’ votes in the 2016 referendum, according to the survey results.
Several other options for closer cooperation also received more support than opposition. Retaining the current relationship while removing as many trade barriers as possible was backed by 48.2 per cent, with 20.9 per cent against. A customs union was supported by 47.1 per cent and opposed by 20.7 per cent.
Joining the single market was supported by 45.1 per cent, while 45.5 per cent backed associate membership. The existing relationship without further changes received 42 per cent support. Moving further away from the EU was the least popular option tested: 27.9 per cent supported it and 41.2 per cent opposed it.
The figures show support for a range of possible arrangements, but do not establish agreement on what Britain should seek or on the terms it should accept.
On timing, 25.9 per cent said the UK should rejoin immediately, 22.9 per cent favoured doing so within three years and 8.4 per cent within the next decade. A further 23 per cent said they did not want closer relations with the EU.
Respondents were also asked whether leaving the bloc had been the right decision. Some 52.4 per cent said it was wrong, compared with 29.7 per cent who said it was right; 17.9 per cent were undecided. Asked whether Brexit had been a success or failure, 54.9 per cent called it a failure and 12.2 per cent a success. Nearly a quarter, 23.2 per cent, said neither, while 9.7 per cent did not know.
The poll tested the possible electoral effects of different Labour positions on Europe. It found that scenarios involving closer ties could increase the party’s vote share by between 4.3 and 7.4 percentage points. The largest potential rise was linked to a proposal for a referendum in which Burnham campaigned for Britain to rejoin.
Burnham has said Labour will review the choices available, including keeping current arrangements, joining a customs union, returning to the single market or seeking EU membership. He plans to set out the options around the next UK-EU summit, expected in November. In recent remarks, he said the government would assess “what is doable” and the “pros and cons” of each option.
The review marks a shift from Labour’s 2024 election manifesto, which ruled out rejoining the EU, single market or customs union. Burnham has not proposed an immediate application or referendum. A UK bid for membership would require negotiations with the EU and unanimous agreement from member states.
The question of whether a referendum should come first also remains open. Almost a third of respondents said a vote would be needed before rejoining. More than one in six thought a general-election mandate would be sufficient, with a similar proportion saying Parliament could make the decision.
French President Emmanuel Macron and Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez have said the EU would welcome a British return. Their comments followed Burnham’s call for a review of Britain’s options, as EU Today reported this week. Earlier EU Today coverage also examined British and EU public support for a possible return.
On Thursday, October 1, health workers, patients, and activists protested Palantir’s role in the National Health Service (NHS) at more than 40 locations across England. Their demonstrations were part of a global week of action demanding that governments cut ties with the spy-tech firm over human rights and privacy concerns.
Rallies took place in front of Palantir’s London headquarters, as well as in Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, Sheffield and many more cities.
“Palantir’s tools are used by the Israeli military in Gaza and by ICE to track and surveil migrants in the US,” campaign groups – including Just Treatment, Health Workers for a Free Palestine, Medact, and Global Justice Now – stated. “A company profiting from human rights violations has no place in the NHS or in any of our public services.”
Palantir’s track record opposes core health values
Palantir currently holds a £330 million (approximately USD 436 million) NHS contract and has rolled out the service’s Federated Data Platform (FDP), managing sensitive patient data. The project has drawn criticism from virtually every group involved in the NHS: data workers say it lags behind local systems; patients share privacy and data ownership fears; and health workers insist Palantir’s record opposes the very values their profession embodies.
“I cannot stay true to that [Hippocratic] oath and tolerate Palantir continuing to profit from, and grow its malign business model through an NHS contract,” said physician Rhiannon Osborne from Medact at Thursday’s rally. “Every pound we give them helps to legitimize and sustain human rights abuses and erosion of democratic rule of law across the world.”
A central concern is the company’s support for Israel throughout the genocide in Gaza. “When we strive to save every possible life, they champion their ability to kill and celebrate their role in the repeated war crimes committed by Israel – including unprecedented deliberate attacks on the doctors, nurses, and paramedics I worked with,” pediatric neurologist Omar Abdel-Mannan stated. “No moral government should tolerate their involvement in our NHS or indeed any of our public services.”
Campaigners repeated calls for Prime Minister Andy Burnham to end the contract as soon as possible. Under an exit clause in the original agreement, that moment could arrive as early as February 2027. Campaigners and several commissions are pressing the government to notify Palantir of its intention to withdraw ahead of this date.
“The government only has two months to say no to Palantir and the momentum is all with us,” Good Law Project activists said at the rally in London. “All the energy is to say no to Palantir, say no to their global human rights abuses, say no to their crap technology that doesn’t work and get Palantir out of the NHS.”
Unions back appeal to bar Palantir from public sector contracts
Calls to break Palantir’s grip on public services resonate beyond Britain. On September 28, more than 120 groups and unions called upon European governments and the European Commission to “scrap all existing public sector contracts with the US tech company Palantir.” As reported by the European Federation of Public Service Unions (EPSU), the appeal seeks to end current agreements and bar the firm from future public contracts. It also urges governments to develop “alternative data solutions compatible with public service,” echoing NHS data workers’ recommendations.
“Palantir’s ramping up of ‘war-related’ support for Israel during the genocide in Gaza and the apparent disdain of its leadership for democracy are just two clear signs that this company serves the interests of the rich and powerful, not the general public,” said Tim Bierley of Global Justice Now. “Yet it has been allowed to embed dubious technologies across our public services, giving it access to sensitive data and creating worrying new technical dependencies.”
“The UK must work with other countries to end dependence on companies involved in human rights abuses, and end the outsourcing of the public sphere to a dangerous class of big tech oligarchs.”
People’s Health Dispatchis a monthly bulletin published by thePeople’s Health MovementandPeoples Dispatch. For more articles and subscription to People’s Health Dispatch, clickhere.
France and Spain have openly welcomed the prospect of Britain rejoining the European Union after British Prime Minister Andy Burnham put full membership back among the options for the country’s long-term relationship with Europe.
French President Emmanuel Macron and Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez addressed the question during Macron’s state visit to Spain on Wednesday, 30 September. Asked whether Britain could return under Burnham, Macron responded in English: “Welcome back.” He added that a British decision to move in that direction would be good news for both Britain and Europe.
Sánchez was similarly positive, saying Spain would “open our arms” if Britain sought to return.
Their comments followed Burnham’s intervention at the Labour Party conference and subsequent interviews in which he argued that Britain should reconsider the full range of options for its future relationship with the EU.
Those could include remaining under the present post-Brexit arrangements, returning to the customs union or single market, or ultimately “going all the way” and applying for EU membership again.
More recently, the argument has moved from diplomatic language to practical economic questions. Burnham has been pressing Brussels to ensure British companies are not disadvantaged by the EU’s emerging industrial preference rules, with access to the proposed “Made in Europe” framework becoming one of the principal issues ahead of the next EU-UK summit.
Macron nevertheless made clear in Madrid that closer relations could not become a system under which Britain selected individual advantages of EU membership while remaining outside the corresponding obligations.
That question dominated much of the Brexit negotiation after the 2016 referendum. Access to the single market is built around the free movement of goods, services, capital and people, while participation also entails accepting common rules and enforcement mechanisms.
A British application to rejoin would be a separate and considerably larger process. Under Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, Britain would have to apply for membership and secure unanimous agreement from the existing member states before negotiations could be completed.
A returning Britain could not assume that the special arrangements it held before Brexit would automatically be restored. The UK previously had an opt-out from the euro, remained outside the Schengen passport-free area and benefited from a budget rebate.
Any future terms would have to be negotiated.
Public opinion has also changed since the referendum. A YouGov poll in June found 55 per cent of Britons supported rejoining the EU and 34 per cent opposed it, although support falls when respondents are asked about specific membership conditions.
For the moment, however, Burnham is not proposing an immediate membership application or referendum.
The next test will be the UK-EU summit expected in November. The meeting was originally planned for July but was postponed following Keir Starmer’s resignation, with EU Today reporting at the time that the political transition in London had complicated preparations.
Burnham wants the summit to advance negotiations on industry, trade and migration and has said he intends to use the period around the meeting to set out the longer-term options available to Britain.
The immediate negotiations are therefore likely to focus on economic integration rather than membership.
Greater access to European markets would almost certainly involve greater regulatory alignment. The political argument in Britain will concern how far the country is prepared to accept common European rules in return for reducing barriers created by Brexit.
Macron and Sánchez have now made clear that, if the discussion eventually moves beyond closer economic cooperation towards membership itself, two of the EU’s largest states would welcome it.
In late 2025, conservators from Oxford’s Ashmolean Museum brought an unassuming object to the Diamond Light Source synchrotron in Oxfordshire: a terret, a small bronze loop that Iron Age chariots used to keep a horse’s reins from tangling. It looked modest. It was nearly 2,000 years old. And under X-ray analysis, it turned out to […]
Leaders of pro-independence parties in Ireland, Scotland, and Wales met in Cardiff on Monday to sign a memorandum of understanding laying out a plan for strengthened cooperation. The document commits Sinn Féin, the Scottish National Party (SNP), and Plaid Cymru to deepen exchanges on renewable energy, economic policy, and, notably, “supporting the right of each nation to determine its own future.”
“For the first time ever, people across these islands have First Ministers in Scotland, in Wales, and in the North of Ireland who are all committed to independence from the United Kingdom,” the memorandum states. “For people watching across these islands – for people watching around the world – there could be no clearer sign that Westminster’s time is coming to an end.”
The agreement includes commitments to break with the economic policy shaped in London and to build a different approach that would “create good jobs, tackle inequality and ensure that wealth and opportunity are spread more fairly.” It also outlines an energy strategy promising to leverage the three regions’ renewable resources to bring more affordable energy to communities.
However, the provision that has attracted most attention is the commitment to realize the three nations’ right to self-determination. “We call for the British Government to prepare for, plan and facilitate constitutional change in each jurisdiction,” the party leaders wrote. “No Westminster government has the right to block democracy or undermine the principle that our people will decide their own future,” they added.
The meeting followed comments by British Prime Minister Andy Burnham on the possibility of independence referendums in Scotland and Ireland. Burnham ruled out – in different terms – such public votes, drawing criticism from independence-oriented parties.
In Ireland, his remarks were called out for contradicting Good Friday Agreement provisions that foresee a path to the island’s unity. “It is not an option that the British government can choose whether or not to exercise based on what is politically convenient, but a legal obligation that plays a critical role in underpinning the relative peace achieved since 1998,” the Workers’ Party of Ireland wrote.
The SNP insisted their ongoing efforts for achieving independence must be contextualized as a response to the aftermath of the 2014 referendum, where unionist parties argued that staying in the UK provided more stability and predictability. Following that vote – where a majority of Scots opted for remaining in the UK – British authorities failed to live up to such arguments, the party said, including when it comes to the protection of public services. “Westminster blocked legislation designed to protect the NHS from being opened up to US healthcare corporations in post-Brexit trade deals, treating our public health service like a garage sale item,” the SNP wrote.
Pro-union critics suggested the memorandum’s commitments risk diverting public attention from everyday issues toward lengthy constitutional discussions. However, Sinn Féin, the SNP and Plaid Cymru contrasted this with a different approach, insisting that independence would allow more space for challenging harmful policies imposed by the British government and for realizing a different vision of society.
Winchester Cathedral covers roughly 53,800 square feet (about 5,000 square meters) of floor space, making it one of the largest cathedrals in Northern Europe. At 558 feet (170 meters) long, it’s also the longest medieval cathedral in the world. Neither the congregation nor the more than 365,000 tourists who visit each year to admire its […]
The EU welcomes Cambodia’s decision to join the Multi-party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA) for WTO members, contributing to efforts to uphold a rules-based multilateral trading system.
With Cambodia’s participation, the MPIA now covers 62 World Trade Organization (WTO) members and 60.4% of world trade.
The MPIA brings together participants from all continents and at different levels of development, united by a shared commitment to upholding the rules-based trading system.
The MPIA preserves the right to appeal in trade disputes among participating WTO members, at a time when the WTO’s Appellate Body remains non-functioning. It helps ensure that disputes can continue to be resolved in an orderly and binding manner, avoiding appeals 'into the void'.
“I welcome Cambodia to the MPIA. The arrangement plays an important role in upholding the rules-based trading system. Each new participant helps reinforce the predictability, stability and credibility of global trade rules. I encourage other WTO members to join the MPIA,” said EU Trade and Economic Security Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič.
Background
The MPIA was established in 2020 and has proven its effectiveness in many WTO disputes.
Under the MPIA, appeals are heard by arbitrators randomly selected from a pool of 10 standing appeal arbitrators set up by the participating WTO members. These arbitrators are persons of recognised authority, with demonstrated expertise in law, international trade and WTO agreements.
The MPIA is open to all WTO members as a practical tool for appeal arbitration, pending the restoration of a reformed and fully functioning WTO dispute settlement system.
As of 1 June 2025, the MPIA has anupdated pool of appeal arbitrators to ensure that appeals continue to be heard by independent arbitrators of the highest calibre.
At the WTO Ministerial Conference that took place earlier this year, MPIA ministers stressed the importance of the MPIA for the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system.
The current MPIA participants are Australia, Barbados, Benin, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, China, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, the European Union (and its Member States), Guatemala, Hong Kong (China), Iceland, Japan, Liechtenstein, Macao (China), Malaysia, Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Singapore, Switzerland, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, Uruguay and Vietnam.
A team from the University of York and Curtin University, in Australia, has settled one of the most persistent puzzles in British archaeology: the exact origin of the towering standing stones known as the Devil’s Arrows, near Boroughbridge, in North Yorkshire. High-resolution geological analysis of microscopic minerals has confirmed that the three surviving pillars — […]
Amid the diplomatic escalation between Russia and Germany over a drone incident at Leipzig airport, blamed by Berlin on Moscow without providing the slightest evidence but sufficient to close Russian consulates (read here),Italy too finds itself increasingly exposed to reprisals threatened by Russian President Vladimir Putin for the wild speculation of the “weapons demon” Guido Crosetto, Minister of Defense.
The Fedorov first Shady Mission for Italy with Palantir AI
Mykhailo Fedorov lasted just six months as Ukraine’s defense minister before Zelensky fired him amid bitter clashes with the military leadership.
«Now he is turning the same wartime machinery into a private defense-tech business — withPalantir CEO Alex Karp as his first major investor»News-Pravda has reported in the lates days publishing a photo of the meeting.
Mykhailo Fedorov and Karp
American AI industry Palantir, one of the main AI partner of Israel Defense Forces and Benjamin Netanyahu Zionist regime, was denounced for complicity in war crimes in Palestine… (read below)
“You and your colleagues are launching a company that I think will be defining for the world, bringing your knowledge and acumen about the art of war as a product to allied countries,” Karp told Fedorov. That “product” was developed on Ukraine’s battlefield.
On September 1, 2026, Mykhailo Fedorov—Ukraine’s Minister of Defense until last July—announced the launch of a military technology company in which Karp himself will be the first investor.
The company aims to translate Ukraine’s wartime experience into products for Kyiv and its allies, including combat robotics, interceptor drones, and low-cost, AI-guided missiles. Plans also include an investment fund and a think tank, though the company’s name and financial figures have not yet been disclosed.
Fedorov has become an adviser to Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto.
“I met with Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto. I thanked Guido for his personal support and his offer for me to become his adviser on defense innovation. I am grateful for the trust and strategic partnership. In this role, I will help Italy develop modern warfare technologies and improve its defense sector,” Fedorov wrote on Telegram.
CLICK TO READ MORE IN ENGLISH WITH MACHINE TRANSLATION AVAILABLE
Palantir is already embedded across Ukrainian government agencies, while its infrastructure underpins the Brave1 Dataroom, where companies train military AI on real combat data. Karp says he and Fedorov have worked together for “half a decade.”
But Fedorov’s meeting with Karp appears to have been launched under the banner of Italy’s war mission against Russia.
The Leonardo Ukraine to Work with Ukrainian Defense Industry and Palantir
Leonardo SpA, the Italian industrial group operating in the defense, security, and aerospace sectors, is majority owned by the Italian government with a 30.2% stake, but without parliament approval has opened a new subsidiary, Leonardo Ukraine, directly in Kiev, aiming to collaborate with the Ukrainian defense industry, particularly in drones and other military technologies.
We recall that minister Crosetto, founder of Brother of Italy far-right party, was blamed by many newspaper for conflict of interests due to, before to entry in Meloni Government, he was the AIAD president which represented th Italian Industries Association for Aerospace, Defence and Security, but above all because he was a overpayed advisor of Leonardo spa, main partner of Rheimetall which opened some factories in Ukraine.
Leonardo Ukraine, registered in the commercial register since May 20, is not only aiming to establish relations with the Ukrainian Brave1, or to test the new “Michelangelo Dome”, the multi-layered and multi-domain missile air defense system which is estimated to have 21 billion euros of potential commercial opportunities over the next 10 years.
Leonardo thus intends to build increasingly strong relationships with the Ukrainian state hub Brave1 Dataroom, created with the country’s Ministry of Defense, its intelligence agency and the US company Palantir.
EXCLUSIVE VIDEO – The Brave1 Litvar Super Drone during an Ukrainian Test
Brave1 is a Ukraninian government initiative aimed at developing defence technologies, implemented by the Innovation Development Fund and initiated by relevant state authorities and components of Ukraine’s security and defence sector. Initially, it was a grant program for defence startups. We have already become the largest angel investor in Ukrainian defence tech, having issued over 750 grants amounting to 3.7 billion UAH, around $82,000.
In this exclusive video shared on YouTube by UATV Espanol lift the veil of secrecy for the first time on the latest development in the Ukrainian defense industry: the unique “Litavr” interceptor drone from F-Drones, created specifically for the cost-effective and efficient hunting of enemy kamikaze drones like the “Shahed.”
Thanks to the BRAVE1 defense cluster, Kiev army gained unprecedented access to this fully encrypted technology,capable of speeds up to 350 km/h, operating at altitudes up to 9,000 meters, and automatically locking onto targets using the Pixel Lock (Last Mile)
Palantir removed by European countries and Denounced for Complicity in War Crimes and Genocides
Palantir is the industry, removed after various investigations from many European countries.
«The Spanish government is ordering state-backed companies to cut their ties with US defense contractor Palantir, Spain’s El Confidencial newspaper has reported. The move follows similar bans in France and Germany»RT has reported some weeks ago.
But above all Palantir was one of the AI company denounced for war crimes and genocide in Gaza inside the UN Dossier by Francesca Albanese, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territory occupied.
The same American company has also been heavily criticized in the USA for its collaboration with ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement) officers accused of murdering illegal immigrants and even making unjustified arrests of children.
VIDEO – French-Italian “Mambas” won’t change Ukraine battlefield situation
Excerpts by Ahmed Adel originally published on VT UnCensored Foreign Policy
All links to Gospa News articles or video have been added in the aftermath
Italian media report plans to sell four batteries of the newest SAMP/T NG system, also known as “Mamba,” to Ukraine, claiming its performance rivals or even surpasses that of the American Patriot system in some respects. However, these new missile and air defense system deliveries to Ukraine are unlikely to significantly impact the battlefield. Rather, they are primarily aimed at enabling Western countries and their military industries to profit.
La Repubblica reports that Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and French President Emmanuel Macron agreed in July to procure four new SAMP/T NG batteries capable of intercepting ballistic missiles. The system, produced by the Franco-Italian consortium Eurosam, is the next generation of European air and missile defense.
SAMP/T NG is a significantly improved version of the SAMP/T system already in use in Ukraine. Compared with the previous version, SAMP/T NG offers greater range and engagement altitude, as well as improved performance against ballistic targets. The maximum range of the SAMP/T system with the Aster 30 missile is up to 100 kilometers, while the newer SAMP/T NG version has a range of about 150 kilometers.
According to La Repubblica, Ukraine already has two SAMP/T batteries delivered by Italy and France, but since the summer of 2025 it has faced a shortage of Aster 30 missiles due to reduced European stocks. Missile production has since been accelerated, enabling Rome and Paris to continue deliveries.
Yet, despite the acceleration, Ukrainian air defenses remain in poor condition. Although Ukraine still has Patriot systems, it is short on missiles, as they have already been depleted. Italy plans to transfer Aster 30 missiles from its military stocks to Ukraine by October, while France would temporarily provide two additional SAMP/T batteries from its arsenal, to be replaced later with new systems.
According to La Repubblica, the entire operation, including newly produced systems, is expected to be completed by 2027. The operation will cost three billion euros and will be structured as a purchase financed by a loan from the European Credit Fund for Ukraine.
Morens Guilty to Conspirancy for Concealing the dangerous gain-of-function research on SARS virus in China
«A former National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) employee pled guilty in federal court, today, to a conspiracy charge stemming from a scheme to evade Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests and the Federal Records Act in connection with communications about coronavirus research grants» we can read in statement released by United States Attorneys Office – District of Maryland.
David M. Morens, 78, of Chester, Maryland, pled guilty to conspiracy to commit offenses and to defraud the United States. Morens served as a senior advisor in NIAID’s Office of the Director from 2006 through 2022.
He was therefore one of the closest collaborators of former NIAID director Anthony Fauci, who was charged by a US Senate committee with contempt for invoking the Fifth Amendment by failing to answer 111 questions about the cover-up of the SARS-CoV-2 laboratory theory and the efficacy and dangers of Covid vaccines.
If Fauci fails to benefit from the preemptive pardon granted to him by President Joseph Biden, he risks a sentence of a few months in prison, as contempt of American justice is a misdemeanor.
While according to the statement of O. Hayes, U.S. Attorney for the District of Maryland, Morens risks much more…
«Morens is facing up to five years in prison for conspiracy to commit offenses and to defraud the United States. Actual sentences for federal crimes are typically less than the maximum penalties. A federal district judge determines sentencing after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors».
He was charged with concealing funding for dangerous gain-of-function research aimed at enhancing viruses in the laboratory and conducted at the Wuhan Institute of Virology under Fauci’s supervision. But not only…
«Morens and Co-Conspirator 2 pledged to help Co-Conspirator 1 restore the termination of the bat coronavirus grant and counter the narrative that COVID-19 leaked from a lab».
The charges pertain to the notorious NIH grant titled Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus Emergence that funded Peter Daszak, Ralph Baric et al. to perform their gain-of-function research on SARS bat coronaviruses with their colleague Shi Zhengli at the Wuhan Institute of Virology.
The SARS-Cov-2 manmade: the supspicions on UNC, DARPA, Ukraine, UK and Moderna
Previous investigations by the two congressional committees have highlighted the concrete likelihood that the artificial SARS-COV-2 was created in China with the help of Fauci’s NIAID and other entities, including the US Pentagon (via the military agency DARPA), as confirmed by a CIA whstleblower.
This is not what emerges from the investigations in the Wuhan-Gates series by Gospa News, which have also targeted of well-founded suspicions other biolaboratories, such as those in Ukraine, the Pirbright Institute in the United Kingdom, and the University of North Carolina.
The UNC, thanks to funding from Fauci and DARPA, collaborated with the American pharmaceutical company Moderna trough the microbiologist Raloh Baric who is one of the researcher in the grant for which was indicted Morens (details below).
Moderna has ended up at the center of our journalistic investigations for two reasons:
A Conspiracy to Defraud the US After Withdrawing Funding for Wuhan
But let’s now analyze Morens’ case in detail, as reported in the statement from the Attorney General’s Office for the District of Maryland:
Morens, Co-Conspirator 1, Co-Conspirator 2, and others conspired during the COVID-19 pandemic to defraud the United States after NIH terminated Co-Conspirator 1’s grant. NIH terminated the grant, Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus Emergence, based on allegations that COVID-19 emerged from the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) in Wuhan, China. NIAID awarded the grant to Company 1 and Co-Conspirator 1, who made a subaward to the WIV.
Following the termination, Morens and Co-Conspirator 2 pledged to help Co-Conspirator 1 restore the termination of the bat coronavirus grant and counter the narrative that COVID-19 leaked from a lab. In anticipation that their communications would be requested through FOIA Requests, Morens, Co-Conspirator 1, and Co-Conspirator 2 agreed in writing to intentionally hide their communications from public view by corresponding using Morens’s personal Gmail account, rather than his official NIH email account.
The co-conspirators used Morens’s personal Gmail account to exchange non-public NIH information; correspond about their efforts to influence NIH to fund Company 1; exchange edits to drafts of letters addressed to NIH leadership for Company 1 and Co-Conspirator 1; and “back-channel” information to Senior NIAID Official 1. According to court documents, each of these matters fell within Morens’s role as senior advisor and constituted federal records that needed to be created, maintained, and exchanged on government systems.
All these highly documented and detailed investigations of the Wuhan-Gates cycle instead prove Fauci’s covert direction under the aegis of the CIA, with which he has always collaborated, so much so as to induce the former director of US Intelligence ODNI, Havril Haines (an expert in bioweapons and former deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency itself) to be the main accomplice (if not director…) in the conspiracy aimed at concealing the laboratory origin of SARS-Cov-2 for which Morens will be convicted.
All links to previous Gospa News investigation have been added in the aftermath
The U.S. Department of Justice just announced in a press release that Former Senior NIAID Official Pleads Guilty to Charges Connected to Concealing Federal Records During COVID-19 Pandemic.
David M. Morens served as a Senior Advisor to the Director (specifically in NIAID’s Office of the Director) from 2006 through 2022, and was also a long-time senior advisor to former NIAID Director Dr. Anthony Fauci.
The charges pertain to the notorious NIH grant titled Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus Emergence that funded Peter Daszak, Ralph Baric et al. to perform their gain-of-function research on SARS bat coronaviruses with their colleague Shi Zhengli at the Wuhan Institute of Virology.
The Judicial Details of DOJ Statement
The gist of the federal criminal charge to which Morens pleaded guilty is, according to the press release:
Morens, Co-Conspirator 1, Co-Conspirator 2, and others conspired during the COVID-19 pandemic to defraud the United States after NIH terminated Co-Conspirator 1’s grant. NIH terminated the grant, Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus Emergence, based on allegations that COVID-19 emerged from the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) in Wuhan, China. NIAID awarded the grant to Company 1 and Co-Conspirator 1, who made a subaward to the WIV.
Following the termination, Morens and Co-Conspirator 2 pledged to help Co-Conspirator 1 restore the termination of the bat coronavirus grant and counter the narrative that COVID-19 leaked from a lab. In anticipation that their communications would be requested through FOIA Requests, Morens, Co-Conspirator 1, and Co-Conspirator 2 agreed in writing to intentionally hide their communications from public view by corresponding using Morens’s personal Gmail account, rather than his official NIH email account.
The co-conspirators used Morens’s personal Gmail account to exchange non-public NIH information; correspond about their efforts to influence NIH to fund Company 1; exchange edits to drafts of letters addressed to NIH leadership for Company 1 and Co-Conspirator 1; and “back-channel” information to Senior NIAID Official 1. According to court documents, each of these matters fell within Morens’s role as senior advisor and constituted federal records that needed to be created, maintained, and exchanged on government systems.
I perceive this criminal charge and guilty plea for conspiracy to defraud the US government as akin to Al Capone being convicted for income tax evasion. The real issue here is not the concealment of public records and communications, but the illegal creation and subsequent illegal concealment of a bio-weapon in a Chinese biosecurity lab that resulted in incalculable death and damage to all of humanity.
Though Morens will likely serve time behind bars, his guilty plea and his punishment for this particular act of fraud strike me as a distraction from the elephant in the room.
Morens was one of Fauci’s top advisors, and I find it highly conspicuous that he took such a keen personal interest in Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus Emergence, which was reviewed by the NIH in January 2014—the beginning of the period covered by Dr. Fauci’s preemptive pardon, as I documented in my post President Biden’s Preemptive Pardon of Fauci.