Bumblebees, puffins, barn owls and hedgehogs will feature on the Bank of England's next series of banknotes, replacing Winston Churchill and other British historic figures after they were deemed "elitist and divisive".
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As part of the largest U.K. Commando Force exercise in 15 years, British special operators conducted a submarine insertion off Scotland, making use of a German Navy Type 212A — a boat you can read about in detail here. The maneuvers are the first time since the war in Afghanistan that all of the Commando Force’s specialist elements have operated together. The submarine insertion, conducted at Cape Wrath on September 29, is part of Exercise Strike Warrior, a major NATO drill intended to rehearse allied crisis-response and warfighting operations across the North Atlantic and High North.
The U.K. Royal Navy-led Commando Force specializes in amphibious, littoral, and expeditionary operations. It brings together Royal Marines commandos with specialist elements including reconnaissance, intelligence, targeting, artillery, logistics, and medical capabilities. The force is increasingly focused on smaller, dispersed teams operating across contested littoral environments.
Including elements of the Commando Force, more than 2,000 personnel from the United Kingdom, United States, Germany, Netherlands, Canada, and Norway are currently participating in Strike Warrior, with eight warships and 19 aircraft involved in activity spanning Scotland, the Western Isles, the North-West Approaches, Galloway, the Borders and the North Sea.
The submarine insertion underscores the type of maritime special operations the British Commando Force is now increasingly training to conduct. Personnel from 148 (Meiktila) Commando Forward Observation Battery, Royal Artillery, boarded the unnamed German attack submarine off Scotland before being infiltrated toward the coast. The sub provided intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support as the force approached the target area, after which the commandos conducted a discreet small-boat insertion using inflatable raiding craft.
Once ashore, the commandos moved onto the cliffs and established an extemporized observation post. From there, they confirmed the simulated target and coordinated live naval surface fires against a simulated enemy position. Here, firepower was provided by the Portuguese Karel Doorman class frigate Dom Francisco de Almeida, presumably using its Oto Melara 76mm deck gun. Following the engagement, the team was extracted. The complete sequence incorporated submarine infiltration, small-boat insertion, covert reconnaissance and targeting, live naval gunfire, and withdrawal into a single mission profile.
The German submarine involved is particularly well suited to this kind of mission. Conventional diesel-electric attack submarines (SSK) lack the nuclear-powered endurance and sustained high speed of an SSN, but those characteristics are not necessarily what a short-range clandestine insertion mission requires. Modern SSKs such as Germany’s Type 212A are designed around extremely low acoustic signatures and can remain submerged for extended periods using air-independent propulsion, making them difficult to detect while operating in relatively shallow and constrained waters.
That combination is hugely valuable for special operations. An SSK can approach a coastline covertly, conduct ISR, release a small team and its boats, and withdraw without exposing a large surface vessel or maintaining the high-speed transit capability associated with a nuclear submarine. Its comparatively small size can also be advantageous when operating closer to shore, where depth, seabed conditions and the presence of coastal sensors can constrain larger submarines. Conventionally powered boats are also far cheaper to procure and operate and have smaller crews.
An SSN offers major advantages for longer-range deployments: far greater endurance, sustained speed, and the ability to carry and support larger payloads over intercontinental distances. These payloads can include dry deck shelters and swimmer delivery vehicles, allowing divers easy exit and entrance while the boat is submerged and at a standoff distance from the coast.
But for a mission whose essential requirement is to quietly loiter near a coast, put a small team ashore and leave, an SSK remains a highly relevant platform. Conventional submarines are particularly valuable to the kind of distributed littoral operations NATO is rehearsing in northern European waters.
The U.K. Royal Navy’s four Upholder class were its last diesel-electric submarines. They were withdrawn in 1994–95 and subsequently transferred to Canada. The Royal Navy today operates an all-nuclear submarine fleet.
The Upholders were also particularly suited to inshore operations, reconnaissance, and other missions demanding extreme quietness and maneuverability.
With this in mind, TWZ has, in the past, examined whether the U.S. Navy should complement its all-nuclear submarine fleet with advanced conventional boats. Sweden’s Gotland demonstrated the value of these kinds of boats when it was leased to the U.S. Navy for adversary training and proved exceptionally difficult for American ASW forces to detect.
Returning to the Cape Wrath drill, the 148 Battery operations officer involved explained that “This level of complexity and coordination of live assets has not been achieved by 148 for nearly 30 years.”
“We wanted to demonstrate to our partners across the United Kingdom Commando Force, wider U.K. Defense and NATO SOF community the type of missions we are prepared to execute against future threats,” the officer added.
Multinational integration is central to the exercise. Strike Warrior is testing the ability of the British Commando Force to plug into a much larger allied force in which submarines, surface combatants, aircraft, drones, and small specialist teams can contribute to different parts of the same operation.
Earlier in Strike Warrior, 148 Battery also directed fires from the Dutch Karel Doorman class frigate HNLMS Van Amstel and Royal Canadian Navy Halifax class frigate HMCS St. John’s after establishing observation posts. Those ships were operating as part of Standing NATO Maritime Group One.
The exercise also provides a snapshot of how Britain’s commandos have evolved since their intensive employment in Afghanistan. The Royal Marines’ Future Commando Force concept emphasizes smaller, more dispersed formations capable of operating in contested littoral environments, with greater reliance on maritime mobility, uncrewed systems, long-range fires, and allied capabilities.
Strike Warrior combines those elements, with the exercise including amphibious landings, boarding operations, intelligence and surveillance missions, maritime security, and anti-submarine warfare, alongside drone missions involving strikes and combat resupply. Other elements have practiced establishing protected medical facilities.
The geography of Strike Warrior is equally significant. The exercise extends across Scotland and its surrounding waters, including the Western Isles and out into the North Sea, placing the Commando Force in the maritime environment connecting the highly strategic North Atlantic, Norwegian Sea, and northern European approaches.
That region has become increasingly important to NATO planning because of the difficulty of monitoring and controlling such a large maritime battlespace. Submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, surface combatants, drones, and long-range weapons all have roles to play, while the geography provides numerous opportunities for small forces to operate from the coast and islands.
The United Kingdom has been repeatedly using the region and the wider High North as a training ground for this type of activity. Earlier this year, British commandos conducted a submarine insertion during Exercise Cold Response in Norway using the German Navy’s Type 212A submarine U-35. That also involved submarine infiltration, small-boat deployment, establishment of an observation post, and the direction of allied naval fires.
Strike Warrior expands that concept considerably and across a much larger battlespace, providing an opportunity to test not simply individual capabilities but the ability to combine them during a sustained NATO exercise.
The exercise began September 28 and concludes October 9.
For the British Commando Force, the significance extends beyond the dramatic imagery of troops emerging from a German submarine at Cape Wrath. After years in which British commandos were heavily committed to land-based counterinsurgency operations, the exercise is intended to put them firmly back in a maritime and high-end warfighting context.
This is the kind of operation that the U.K. Commando Force is now preparing to conduct alongside NATO partners in the increasingly contested waters of the North Atlantic and High North.
Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com
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The UH-60 Black Hawk has been the rugged workhorse of U.S. Army aviation for nearly 50 years, with around 4,000 examples currently in service with 36 nations worldwide. Many of these helicopters, and new aircraft coming off the line, are set to fly as far out as 2070, and Sikorsky is curating a suite of upgrades to keep them valuable assets for the future fight. A new “digital backbone” is designed to underpin swift technological insertions such as launched effects, with related initiatives including the provision of more power to lug greater payloads, and the fully-autonomous U-Hawk cargo drone variant.
“As part of an overall “Black Hawk 2070” modernization effort we’re developing a number of complementary capabilities, including our U-Hawk uncrewed cargo variant, which we plan to fly later this year,” Jason Wrigley, Sikorsky’s director of business development for Black Hawk, told TWZ at the company’s Stratford plant in Connecticut.
“A new digital backbone for the Black Hawk is at an advanced design phase in our labs and it’s designed to provide interfaces throughout the aircraft that will provide power, data, a network, cooling and most importantly, open architecture interfaces that enable the easy integration of new equipment, such as sensors. We see this as a core building block for the next generation of Black Hawk, along with new engines and other airframe improvements designed to futureproof the platform.”
The new digital backbone is designed to work in concert with a modern, software-driven strategy that meets the Army’s Modular Open Systems Approach and the desire to add technologies cheaper, faster, and more easily. Wrigley says that as customers identify new capabilities and needs for their Black Hawks, the digital backbone will be sufficiently efficient to permit customization even on a mission-by-mission basis. Sikorsky is also introducing a new modular nose to the H-60, which is reconfigurable with sufficient volume to support even more sensors and electronics.
“There’s a big focus on open architecture and that ability to quickly plug-and-play,” says Wrigley. “The new modular nose will change the look of the Black Hawk up front to provide even more space for equipment that will work directly with the new digital architecture.”
The new modular nose will give the Black Hawk more than twice the internal volume of the original nose section and it’s designed to provide space for internal electronics and an integrated mount for external sensor pods. It is designed to provide sufficient space to accommodate electronics that enable roles such as search and rescue, drone control, and flying in degraded environments, and it will also house some of the equipment required as the Black Hawk’s autonomous capabilities expand.
Joshua Powers spent 22 years as an Army Aviation officer flying the Black Hawk, and he’s well qualified for his new role with Sikorsky handling business development for rapid capabilities insertions. “Army units know the Black Hawk inside out; how to fly it, maintain it, and use it to maximum effect. The upgrades we are developing will bring new capabilities faster, without time-consuming and complex changes to sustainment, training, and operations, plus we are adding more range, more payload, and more power to meet the demands of the Indo-Pacific region.”
“I find it amazing to pair new technology with a rugged platform like the Black Hawk. These new innovations are needed to meet the needs of the new complex battlefield. The fight I fought in Iraq is very different from the current operating environment and what future warriors are going to go up against, and what we’re asking them to do is very different from what came before.”
Autonomy is a central pillar of Sikorsky’s strategy for the future Black Hawk. The company’s MATRIX autonomy software is now being matured on a UH-60M variant, and while it’s not necessarily designed to completely replace pilots, MATRIX will assume some of their workload, making flying safer and simpler as mission sets grow increasingly complex and dangerous. “Pilots that are controlling collaborative drones, for example, need to be able to focus on the drone mission, and autonomy will help lighten their cognitive load,” explains Wrigley.
“The standard Black Hawk crew operates with two pilots. Adding our MATRIX autonomy system gives the operator options – a single pilot could fly without an unbearable workload and still fulfil a mission commander role, for example. The Army could then operate the Black Hawk with no pilots at all when that’s the appropriate option.”
Sikorsky’s MATRIX autonomy has been developed on the company’s UH-60A fly-by-wire Optionally Piloted Black Hawk, which has been tested by Sikorsky and Army aviators. MATRIX has accumulated more than 1,000 flight hours across 500 tests and demonstrations. It has already been integrated on over 20 different platforms, including on the Black Hawk for testing by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the U.S. Army in multiple exercises.
“We delivered the first UH-60MX to the Army earlier this year,” says Wrigley. The delivery marked the first full authority fly-by-wire and optionally-piloted UH-60 in the Army fleet. “They are using it for testing and soldier feedback to develop tactics, techniques and procedures for the autonomous Black Hawk. We have since received a contract to deliver three more MX aircraft to the Army.”
MATRIX autonomy kits have now been installed on all three U.S. Army Black Hawk models; the UH-60A, UH-60L and UH-60M. Sikorsky plans to incorporate autonomy options into all Black Hawks as they are built, plus the MATRIX system will be able to be retrofitted to existing examples.
Powers is well aware of the benefits autonomy will provide from complex combat operations to more mundane day-to-day missions. “Flying at night and seeing the tracer fire coming up at you, things like that, I honestly feel that’s not the big threat. It’s when you’re going to land and there’s just a big dust cloud. When you’re tired, you aren’t as focused. Having MATRIX, whether that’s with one, two, or no pilots, it’s about that reduced workload on the mission. Pilots won’t be as fatigued, plus they have the safety net of a fully autonomous aircraft that can, if needed, land in all of those difficult environments. It will give commanders more operational flexibility and the ability to mitigate risk in less-than-ideal conditions dictated by the enemy or weather.”
“The Black Hawk operation isn’t just about pilots, it’s also that integrated four-person crew. As a pilot, you’re relying on your senses and also on the guys in the back to watch out and tell you where you’re going. MATRIX is just going to help that team effort and put you in a better position to bring the crew back safely. It integrates all the systems and sensors and uses altitude, airspeed, radar altimeter, drift indications, and puts the fly-by-wire technology to where it can make rapid adjustments and changes based on what it’s seeing with the sensors.”
The volume of testing, the maturity, and the confidence in MATRIX helped Sikorsky to develop the S-70UAS, or U-Hawk, which was unveiled in 2025. The U-Hawk project essentially removes the cockpit and its associated equipment from a Black Hawk and replaces the front end with cargo doors to provide a huge internal space as a supply drone.
“We acquired a used UH-60L Black Hawk as the template for our initial U-Hawk. We added the clamshell doors and that was the actual aircraft that we showed at AUSA last year,” says Wrigley. “Since then we’ve been adding the fly-by-wire and integrating the MATRIX autonomy. It’s currently in our innovations hangar in Bridgeport, Connecticut, getting the final work done and it will make its first flight as a U-Hawk later this year.”
Sikorsky sees the U-Hawk as a natural evolution for the Black Hawk in contested logistics missions, when cargo needs to be moved but the threat is sufficiently high that it drives a need for uncrewed platforms to tackle the mission.
“We’re spending a lot of time on the U-Hawk and its roles. As well as being an uncrewed cargo helicopter, it can also be a truck that can carry a large volume of launched effects,” explains Wrigley. “There are Black Hawk models on the market right now that are being divested, and we see those as being an ideal option for conversion to U-Hawk configuration to affordably introduce this capability to the market.”
The integration of small drones dubbed ‘launched effects’ into rotary-wing operations is a major initiative from the Army as a new means to collect intelligence for commanders on the battlefield, relay communications, jam and distract enemy emitters, and act as loitering munitions. These mini air-launched drones can be carried and fired from stub-wing-mounted launchers, with other concepts seeing larger volumes of them carried inside the cabin as a “mega-pack,” with Sikorsky seeing both as being highly-applicable to both the Black Hawk and the U-Hawk.
This is exactly the kind of capability that the digital backbone in the Black Hawk is intended to open the door to; installing plug-and-play drone command kits, which could enable the Black Hawk to act as a “drone mothership” to launch, task, and command swarms of multi-mission launched effects.
The Army tested its latest operational concepts for launched effects during the Project Convergence Capstone 6 demonstration event this summer. This annual exercise is designed to develop concepts and tactics as well as gather soldier feedback, as it works to transition new systems into service. The latest exercise built on previous launched effects testing on the Black Hawk, when a UH-60M deployed Anduril’s Altius-700 launched effects that then operated as an autonomous hunter-killer team to locate targets, share data on those targets, and then strike them, without the need for the Black Hawk to expose itself to threats.
“As a young Black Hawk pilot, the OH-58 Kiowa Warrior was the primary scout platform, but it was limited by range and its ability to be detected,” explains Joshua Powers. “Today, we launch small drones that can remain unseen and they can give us real-time feedback. Launched effects make our lift assets more capable.”
“We see the Black Hawk as the aircraft capable of carrying, deploying and then acting as an airborne mission command node for launched effects,” adds Jason Wrigley. “In the operational environment of the future, it’s really about the mass of those launched effects. This isn’t about carrying one or two of them, this is about carrying and controlling a large number of them.”
“We’ve tested them on the stub-wings, but we are also exploring what we call “quiver” – that large number of launched effects inside the cabin in that “mega-pack.” This creates additional opportunities for mass that we think is going to be really critical. We’ve done a lot of operational analysis in concert with the Army on what the right mix of launched effects might be to extend the standoff range of the aircraft to improve survivability – which is of course what it’s all about – but the right mix will ultimately come down to the mission. We have seen a lot of testing over the past few years, so we do believe this is a capability that can be introduced operationally soon on the Black Hawk.”
To support the increased lift that might be needed for a missionized Black Hawk lugging large payloads, including an arsenal of launched effects, Sikorsky is well along in development of a new engine that is designed to create over 1,000 pounds of increased payload capacity and increased range for the Black Hawk. The T901 Improved Turbine Engine (ITE) from GE Aerospace provides 50 percent more horsepower over the existing T700 engines in the UH-60M.
“One of the key building blocks of the future of the Black Hawk are the twin ITEs as we look to expand the mission capability and the utility of this aircraft for decades to come,” explains Wrigley. Sikorsky began initial testing of the first UH-60M with ITE in January 2025. “We are actively in the test program right now at our test facility in West Palm Beach, Florida. The twin ITEs in each Black Hawk and that additional power translates into some pretty significant operational opportunities. Since our first flight with ITE in May 2025 we’ve flown the aircraft with the new engine for over 50 hours and up to 17,000 ft above sea level.”
Sikorsky is accompanying the addition of the new engines with a significant expansion of the fuel tank to increase capacity and range. This is being done without impinging on cabin volume and thus retaining the important ability to transport 11 combat troops, while increasing range by around 100 nautical miles. “The T901 also improves fuel efficiency and eases maintenance – so overall we are really improving the payload capacity of the aircraft. We’ll be getting to the milestone C production decision on ITE within the next couple of years, and at that point it will become a core element of the Black Hawk program going forward,” Wrigley explains.
Touring the Black Hawk production line in Stratford, Connecticut, it’s a hive of activity. Many of the major components for each helicopter are manufactured here. The long final assembly line sees teams of workers busily constructing UH-60M and HH-60M medevac Black Hawks for both domestic and foreign military sales customers, along with new HH-60W Combat Rescue Helicopters for the U.S. Air Force and MH-60R Seahawks.
“We’re designing all of these upgrades with the intent that they will all be available off the production line in new build aircraft, as well as in kit form for upgrades to existing assets in the field,” notes Wrigley. “Here in Stratford in what we call the “back shop” we build all the rotor blades, gearboxes, and many other components that go into each aircraft. We are already thinking ahead and we’ve invested significantly into additive manufacturing, with 11 parts on the Black Hawk today that are additively manufactured. It’s a great place to start, but there’s a long way to go and we’re working on qualifying more challenging components and load-bearing parts.”
Cohesively, the digital backbone, larger fuel tank, new engines, and the new modular nose will all be introduced on the production floor in the coming years to pave the way for that increased payload capacity to carry fully-equipped combat troops, supplies, and all the new kit needed for the future fight and the Black Hawk’s role as a multi-mission forward battlefield node. The autonomous U-Hawk and the optionally piloted flexibility afforded by MATRIX – all of these pieces of the future Black Hawk are presently coming together under an overarching effort.
“The future Black Hawk will be that complement to the future long-range MV-75 Cheyenne II,” says Powers. “These won’t be a one-for-one replacement for every Black Hawk currently in the fleet – the MV-75 has a specific purpose and function that the Black Hawk isn’t designed to do. What the Black Hawk can do with these new upgrades is shape the battlefield and with its autonomy be out there flying missions into contested environments.”
“Those homeland missions are equally necessary. I recall talking about this in flight school when choosing an aircraft to fly, how it’s one thing to be deployed on combat missions, but it’s also about being back in the homeland on disaster relief when you need the Black Hawk to go out and save lives, those kinds of missions the Army National Guard does – it really underlines the importance and versatility of the Black Hawk.”
Over the past 50 years and looking ahead to the next 50, continuing the proven legacy of the Black Hawk will mean constant evolution to meet new missions and needs. Sikorsky’s task is for all of these new elements to meld into a future Black Hawk that’s ready to roll off this production line soon, that still also provides the same dependable, rugged capability for the Army at home or overseas, well into the future.
The post Sikorsky’s “Black Hawk 2070” Strategy Includes Drones, New Engines, And Flying The Pilotless U-Hawk This Year appeared first on TWZ.
Castelion has released what appears to be the first image of its relatively ‘cheap’ Blackbeard hypersonic missile being fired from a ground launcher, providing a new look at the containerized launch architecture now under development for the U.S. Army.
The photograph, posted by Castelion on X, shows a Blackbeard missile leaving a launcher mounted on a high-mobility truck chassis. While the missile itself is by now a familiar sight, the new image offers a first public glimpse of how Castelion intends to package and operate the ground-launched version of Blackbeard, known as Blackbeard GL.
Container-compatible Blackbeard. Built to move with the fight. pic.twitter.com/OzWbiChCPQ
— Castelion (@Castelion) October 8, 2026
The Army’s previously disclosed plans for the program call for an initial Blackbeard ground-launch demonstration using a modified Multiple Launch Rocket System Family of Munitions, or MFOM, pod, followed by the development of Blackbeard GL prototypes and a dedicated launcher pod. Ultimately, the service intends to conduct an MVP flight test using the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System’s (HIMARS) fire-control system.
Blackbeard for HIMARS. pic.twitter.com/uA9XgcGvsI
— Castelion (@Castelion) August 3, 2026
The Army’s Fiscal Year 2027 budget documentation indicates that this effort is moving toward increasingly representative hardware. Among the milestones listed for FY2027 is a live-fire launch of a “production representative” Blackbeard GL and launcher pod.
Castelion has already released extensive imagery of Blackbeard test vehicles, and the company formally unveiled the weapon’s current external configuration earlier this year. Those images showed a two-stage arrangement with a booster and an upper vehicle that has characteristics consistent with a hypersonic glide or maneuvering payload. Compared to the air-launched version, seen below, the ground-launch model lacks the cruciform tailfins at the rear of the lower stage, but otherwise appears similar.
The precise propulsion system and flight profile of the production weapon remain undisclosed. Little is known about its performance parameters, either. Castelion has previously hinted that the missile could strike targets at ranges of just under 500 miles, although its range would likely be reduced when launched from the ground, without the altitude and speed provided by an aircraft launch platform.
The launcher appears to use a relatively compact enclosed container, consistent with the Army’s stated interest in leveraging the existing MFOM ecosystem and, eventually, HIMARS. The photograph doesn’t establish how many Blackbeards could be carried by a single launcher, although, based on the dimensions, at least two and perhaps as many as four missiles appears a feasible load.
Exactly how closely the pictured launcher corresponds to the eventual production Blackbeard GL pod is also not yet clear. Castelion has previously stressed that its test hardware is deliberately designed to support rapid development cycles and should not necessarily be interpreted as representative of the final weapon system.
Castelion had previously shown Blackbeard-related test articles alongside palletized launch equipment, including launch hardware mounted on an Oshkosh MKR18 Logistics Vehicle System Replacement truck. The company has also said it was converting such a vehicle into a launcher for flight testing. That appears to be the vehicle shown in the new image, too.
The Army’s interest in Blackbeard GL is rooted in cost as much as performance.
The service has described the weapon as an affordable, mass-produced hypersonic precision-fire capability intended to engage time-sensitive moving and hardened targets. The stated objective has been to obtain roughly 80 percent of the capability of the Army’s planned Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) Increment 4 while achieving a substantially lower cost per round.
Existing U.S. hypersonic weapons such as the Army’s Dark Eagle Long Range Hypersonic Weapon use large, highly specialized launch equipment. Blackbeard is instead being developed around the idea that a hypersonic weapon can be sufficiently compact, inexpensive, and manufacturable to be treated more like a conventional tactical munition.
A containerized launcher compatible with an existing mobile fires ecosystem would reinforce that concept. It could allow the Army to introduce a new hypersonic effect without creating an entirely separate launcher, crew, transport, and reload architecture.
The ground-launched version is only one part of Castelion’s broader Blackbeard effort.
The company is also working with the Navy to integrate the weapon onto the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. In April, Castelion received a $105 million Navy contract supporting integration and the transition toward an early operational capability, while a subsequent $23.4 million order covered 50 early-operational-capability pre-production missiles and associated storage and shipping containers.
The Navy has since moved into additional procurement, underscoring Castelion’s effort to establish Blackbeard as a weapon that can be produced in the quantities required. Blackbeard could also find its way onto Navy ships and submarines, as well as ground-based launchers, as we have discussed in the past.
As for the Army, the next major milestone will be the planned production-representative Blackbeard GL and launcher-pod live-fire testing.
“Once Castelion achieves testing and validation, the Department will award a two-year multi-year procurement contract for a minimum of 500 Blackbeard missiles annually, with options to extend for up to five years,” the Pentagon announced in May of this year. “To further encourage Castelion’s self-funded facility expansion, the Department is actively seeking the necessary authorizations and appropriations to purchase over 12,000 Blackbeard missiles over five years.”
This reflects a broader and accelerating U.S. military push for lower-cost precision weapons that can be manufactured relatively simply and at scale, increasingly with help from non-traditional defense contractors. The goal is to build large stockpiles affordably before a major contingency, particularly a potential large-scale conflict with China in the Pacific, while ensuring production can keep pace with demand during a prolonged war.
For now, Castelion has demonstrated what the Army’s Blackbeard launch system actually looks like when it fires, at least in its initial form.
Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com
The post Blackbeard Hypersonic Missile Shown Being Fired From Ground Launcher appeared first on TWZ.
Polish SIM cards were found inside some of the Russian drones that entered Polish airspace during a mass incursion in September 2025, Polish outlet RMF24 reported, citing findings from a Polish prosecution investigation.
SIM cards can allow drones to connect to local cellular networks for functions such as communications, data transmission, telemetry, or navigation-related services. However, investigators have not said what the Polish SIM cards found in the Russian drones were used for. The details remain classified.
The SIM cards were discovered in some of the Russian Gerbera drones recovered after the incursion, RMF24 reported.
Investigators have not disclosed whether the SIM cards were stolen or obtained illegally.
The investigation into the September 9–10, 2025 incursion was ultimately closed after prosecutors failed to identify those responsible for violating Polish airspace.
The incursion took place overnight on September 9–10, 2025, during a large Russian missile and drone attack on Ukraine. More than 30 Russian Gerbera drones entered Polish airspace from the east and came down at 27 locations across the country, according to RMF24.
Polish forces intercepted and shot down multiple drones, with the Territorial Defense Forces deployed to search for wreckage and other objects that came down on Polish territory. Poland also maintained contact with NATO command throughout the operation.
The incident prompted Poland to close four airports – Warsaw Chopin, Warsaw-Modlin, Rzeszów-Jasionka and Lublin – because of the military activity.
Polish officials described the airspace violations as unprecedented and a serious threat to national security. The incident marked the first time since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine that Polish forces had used weapons against Russian aerial objects that entered the country's airspace.
The mass incursion subsequently became the subject of a criminal investigation into the violation of Polish airspace and the threat to public safety.
After months of investigation, Polish prosecutors closed the case because they were unable to identify the perpetrators, according to Lublin District Prosecutor’s Office spokesman Marcin Kozak, as cited by RMF24.
Most of the case files, including the justification for the decision, are classified.
Investigators also examined whether the Polish military had responded properly to the drone incursion.
According to RMF24, prosecutors concluded that the military acted in accordance with procedures. Polish troops had the right to use force and shoot down hostile objects, and prosecutors found no irregularities in their response.
The investigation was therefore closed both over the failure to identify the perpetrators and over the assessment of the Polish military's actions.
Grzegorz Braun, leader of the Confederation of the Polish Crown, spoke in favor of restarting the Nord Stream 1 and 2 gas pipelines during a meeting Wednesday with politicians from the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party in Lubmin. He said Poland should be a shareholder in the German-Russian project.
“Nord Stream 1, and probably Nord Stream 2 as well, will be relaunched. Russian gas will flow to the West,” Braun said. He said Europe needs Russian raw materials and that their absence could have serious consequences for the economy.
Braun argued that Poland should not be excluded from future energy projects concerning Russian gas supplies. “Poland should participate, not boycott. Poland should be the initiator,” he said. He also proposed that Warsaw become a shareholder in Nord Stream.
Podczas roboczej wizyty w #Lubmin w Niemczech poseł do Parlamentu Europejskiego @GrzegorzBraun_, poseł na Sejm RP @Roman_Korona i dr @Slawomir_Ozdyk (Konfederacja @KoronyPolskiej) spotkali się z posłem do Bundestagu @SteffenKotre (AfD) oraz posłami do Landtagu Meklemburgii-Pomorza Przedniego z ramienia @AfD – Stephanem Reukenem i @Kevin_Kurtze.
— Konfederacja Korony Polskiej (@KoronyPolskiej) October 7, 2026
He also said that if Russian gas returns to Europe, Poland could lose economically if the supplies bypass its territory. In his view, Warsaw should seek participation in such energy projects rather than remain outside them.
Braun also spoke of the need to “normalize” and “de-escalate” relations and economic cooperation among Poland, Germany and Russia. He advocated a return to wider use of coal and the ability to buy oil and gas from suppliers offering favorable terms.
The speech took place in Lubmin, the site of the German terminal and infrastructure linked to the Nord Stream pipelines.
Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 were damaged in September 2022 by explosions on the Baltic Sea floor. Nord Stream 1 had been the main route for Russian gas to Germany. Nord Stream 2, though completed, was never launched because of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly urged the German government to start supplies through the sole Nord Stream 2 line that survived the blasts. He has said that if the line operates, 27.5 billion cubic meters of gas “will immediately reach Europe.”
“Why don’t they do it? I just can’t understand it. They can receive gas through Ukrainian territory, through TurkStream, but they cannot through the pipeline running along the bottom of the Baltic Sea,” Putin said.
“In my opinion, it’s crazy, just nonsense. Why? But if they don’t want to, fine,” Putin said in 2024 at the Vladivostok Economic Forum.
According to U.S. media reports, a group of Ukrainian officers conceived the operation to blow up Nord Stream in May 2022. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky initially approved the plan before he allegedly unsuccessfully tried to cancel it at the CIA’s request. Polish connections also appear in press accounts of the Baltic Sea sabotage.
U.S. President Donald Trump said last May that “many people know” who blew up Nord Stream. He added that he was the first to thwart the project.
Trump imposed sanctions on Nord Stream 2 in his first term, significantly slowing construction. President Joe Biden repealed them in 2021 and reimposed them after Russia invaded Ukraine. Germany withheld permission to start the pipeline because of the war.
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Ukraine plans 135 basic mobile shelters for civilians at 28 of its border crossings, the State Agency for Restoration and Infrastructure Development said on 7 October.
Since the start of September, Russian drones have repeatedly struck crossings on Ukraine's borders with Moldova and Romania. Since mid-September, strikes have also reached the Polish border near the Yahodyn crossing in Volyn Oblast. On 13 September, a Russian drone strike set a gas station near the crossing on fire. On 28 September, the blast wave from another strike damaged the checkpoint building. On 25 September, First Deputy Minister for Restoration, Infrastructure and Transport Serhii Derkach said Ukraine is exploring with its neighbors whether some checkpoints could move onto their territory. No agreement has been reported. On 2 October, Moldovan Interior Minister Daniella Misail-Nichitin said Moldova had set up shelters next to its crossings with Ukraine and started relocating staff from joint checkpoints.
The shelters will stand at the crossings and on the roads leading to them. Regional recovery services in Vinnytsia, Odesa, Chernivtsi, Zakarpattia, and Volyn oblasts are running the purchases. The agency said the shelters will make the border safer for people crossing it and for checkpoint staff.
In Chernivtsi Oblast, one of the 10 tenders the agency lists on Prozorro, Ukraine's public procurement system, covers eight shelters for 50 people each and three for 20 each, Ukrinform reported. They will stand on the approach road to the Porubne–Siret international crossing on the Romanian border. The work is expected to cost UAH 38.5 million (about $855,000), excluding VAT.
On 5 October, at about 09:38, a projectile fell near the Palanca–Maiaky–Udobne crossing on the Moldovan border. It ricocheted off the ground into a shuttle bus parked by the barrier and also damaged a control booth. One Moldovan border officer suffered light injuries, and the crossing was suspended, Moldova's Border Police said, linking the incident to Russia's attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure. Moldovan authorities did not specify the projectile's type or origin.
Overnight on 9 September, Russian drones struck the Starokozache crossing with Moldova, killing two people and injuring three. On 1 September, Russian Shahed drones hit the Orlivka ferry crossing on the Danube, opposite Romania's Isaccea, and temporarily shut it down. Another Russian strike on 6 September halted the crossing again.
Three foreigners were placed under arrest for killing a goat in the Polish city of Wałbrzych. However, Polish prosecutors now want to drop the case.
The incident occurred in late 2025 outside a restaurant in Wałbrzych that was closed for renovation and not operating, authorities said. A witness called police, who arrived and detained the men, two citizens of Bangladesh and one of India, at the scene.
Chief Inspector Marcin Świeży of the District Police Headquarters in Wałbrzych said the men told officers that such behavior is normal in their countries and they did not know it is prohibited in Poland.
The goat was intended as a meal for two of the men, according to Do Rzeczy. The Indian citizen said he is a vegetarian and pleaded not guilty.
In Poland, goats and other livestock may be killed for food only under rules that implement EU animal-welfare law, chiefly Council Regulation No. 1099/2009 on the protection of animals at the time of killing. The core requirement is that the animal be spared avoidable pain, distress, or suffering.
Unlike in many Third World countries where animals are slaughtered on the streets, often in extreme pain and fear, in the EU, the animal must remain unconscious until death. Bleeding must then be performed promptly and effectively. Slaughter outside a registered slaughterhouse is tightly restricted, and home or backyard killing for personal consumption is generally not permitted except in narrow, authorized circumstances, for example, certain emergency or remote situations under veterinary supervision.
Despite the clear violation of law, the District Prosecutor’s Office in Wałbrzych filed a motion seeking conditional discontinuance of the proceedings against all three foreigners. Prosecutor Mariusz Pindera said the outcome depends in part on the court’s assessment of the degree of “social harmfulness” of the act.
“If the court finds that it was not significant, it may grant the prosecutor’s request,” he said.
The court confirmed it received the application but has not yet considered it, in part because of a judge’s illness. No hearing date has been set, and no substantive decision has been issued regarding the men.
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Russia attacked Kyiv and 12 oblasts overnight on 7 October with about 70 missiles, many of them ballistic, as well as Shahed drones, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said. The strikes killed at least 20 people, with the deadliest hit on an apartment block in Pryluky in Chernihiv Oblast. Russia also hit Kremenchuk, Oleksandriia, Dnipro, and Zaporizhzhia, while Poland scrambled its jets.
Moscow has likely begun its winter strike campaign earlier than usual, aiming to make civilian life in Ukraine unbearable, and UN figures already show civilian casualties running 55% above last year's.
The death toll from the Russian strike on Pryluky has risen to 14, including four children, Ukraine's State Emergency Service said on the afternoon of 7 October. Fifty people were injured, seven of them children, and rescuers pulled 15 people from the rubble, including a child.
Russia attacked Pryluky with cruise missiles, and one scored a direct hit on the five-story apartment building, Chernihiv Oblast head Viacheslav Chaus said. Earlier in the day, he reported that 27 of the injured had been hospitalized, three in serious condition. The search-and-rescue operation was still under way.
A Russian missile struck a five-story apartment building in Pryluky early in the morning, while residents were still asleep, Chernihiv Oblast head Viacheslav Chaus said. The strike completely destroyed one sectkion of the building, killing five people and injuring 26, including five children, Ukraine's National Police reported. Rescuers pulled three people from the rubble, including a child, and more people may still be trapped, Chaus said.
"Today, for Putin's birthday, the Russian army 'gave' him the destruction of an apartment building in Pryluky in Chernihiv Oblast. It was an ordinary five-story building," Zelenskyy said.
In Kyiv, Russian missiles hit non-residential buildings and warehouses in the Obolonskyi and Podilskyi districts, Mayor Vitali Klitschko said. Strikes also hit the Shevchenkivskyi district, and debris burned in the Darnytskyi district, he added. In the Darnytskyi district, a missile set fire to a garage cooperative, where firefighters rescued two people and found two men dead, Klitschko wrote. Police and rescuers worked to defuse an unexploded ballistic missile that fell among apartment blocks in the same district, the National Police said.
In Kremenchuk, Russian missiles hit a densely populated residential area, killing two people and injuring seven, Poltava Oblast head Vitalii Diakivnych said. Zelenskyy later put the number of injured at eight and said four high-rises were damaged.
In Oleksandriia in Kirovohrad Oblast, Russia hit an enterprise. One person was killed, three injured, and two were out of contact, Kirovohrad Oblast head Andrii Raikovych said. Zelenskyy later put the death toll there at two.
In Dnipro, Russian strikes damaged an industrial enterprise, apartment buildings, and a sports club, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast head Oleksandr Hanzha said. In Nikopol district, the attacks injured a 65-year-old woman and a 64-year-old man. Russia also struck Lozova in Kharkiv Oblast with a missile, and a drone hit an apartment building in Zaporizhzhia, police said.
In Zaporizhzhia, Russia attacked a transport infrastructure facility, acting oblast head Mykhailo Semikin said, a day after a strike on one of the city's bridges over the Dnipro halted traffic. In Kyiv Oblast, three production and warehouse buildings were damaged in Obukhiv district, with no casualties, the Kyiv Oblast Military Administration said.
Air defense downed five ballistic missiles, 39 cruise missiles, and 117 drones, while missiles and drones hit 18 locations, the Air Force said. Polish military aircraft took off and Poland put its ground-based air defense on alert during the attack, Poland's Operational Command said.
Russian ballistic missiles remain the biggest challenge, Zelenskyy said, adding that Ukraine is searching daily for Patriot missiles.
Russian attacks killed one person and injured 11 in Kherson Oblast over the past day, the Kherson Oblast Military Administration reported. Russia injured 12 people in Donetsk Oblast on 6 October, Donetsk Oblast head Vadym Filashkin said. Two people were injured in Kharkiv Oblast, Kharkiv Oblast head Oleh Syniehubov said.
Russia has stepped up strikes on Kyiv's bridges and has now extended them to Zaporizhzhia. In September, a Russian ballistic and hypersonic missile attack on Kyiv damaged a maternity hospital.
The economic model that transformed Central and Eastern Europe after EU accession is losing momentum, according to the International Monetary Fund, which is warning governments that structural reforms are needed if the region is to continue narrowing the income gap with Western Europe.
Carlos Mulas-Granados, the IMF’s regional representative, said on Tuesday that medium-term growth potential across Central and Eastern Europe had declined to around 2.5 per cent, compared with roughly 5 per cent before countries in the region joined the European Union.
The slowdown does not mean that every economy is stagnating. Poland continues to grow faster than much of Western Europe, while the Czech economy has recovered from recent shocks. The concern is instead about the underlying rate at which these economies can expand once temporary fiscal stimulus, EU funding and post-crisis recoveries are stripped out.
Several of the forces behind the region’s earlier success are becoming weaker.
EU accession opened access to the single market, attracted foreign investment and integrated Poland, Czechia, Slovakia and Hungary deeply into European industrial supply chains. German manufacturers in particular moved production eastwards, taking advantage of lower labour costs, skilled workforces and geographic proximity.
That process generated rapid gains in productivity and incomes. It cannot simply be repeated.
Demographics are one of the most immediate constraints. Working-age populations are shrinking across much of the region while ageing increases spending requirements for pensions, health care and social support.
The IMF’s country assessments illustrate the problem. Its assessment of Poland says demographic pressures are mounting even as labour productivity remains comparatively strong, and calls for higher labour participation, better skills and deeper capital markets.
In Slovakia, the Fund expects growth of only 0.9 per cent this year and says adverse demographics and weaker productivity are weighing on the medium-term outlook. The economy remains particularly exposed to manufacturing and the automotive industry.
The Czech Republic faces a similar structural constraint. The IMF estimates its medium-term potential growth at around 1.8 per cent, with population ageing and modest productivity gains limiting further convergence.
External conditions have also changed.
Germany, the region’s principal industrial partner, has experienced prolonged weakness in manufacturing. Central European producers therefore face softer demand from the market around which many of their supply chains were originally built.
At the same time, China has moved from being primarily a source of imports and components to a direct competitor in sectors where Central Europe has substantial industrial exposure, including cars, batteries, machinery and electrical equipment.
That combination is particularly difficult for economies built around export-oriented manufacturing.
The problem overlaps with the wider European competitiveness debate. EU Today reported in July that only 15.7 per cent of the reforms recommended in Mario Draghi’s competitiveness report had been fully implemented at that stage, with important work still outstanding on capital markets, energy and investment.
For Central Europe, progress on those issues has a direct bearing on growth. Smaller national capital markets make it harder for companies to finance expansion. Fragmented energy systems add to industrial costs, while limited access to venture capital can restrict the development of businesses outside established manufacturing sectors.
There are significant differences between countries. Poland’s larger domestic market gives it more insulation from industrial weakness elsewhere and the IMF expects relatively strong growth. Hungary has faced a different combination of weak investment and fiscal constraints, while Slovakia’s dependence on car production leaves it particularly exposed to changes in the European automotive sector.
EU funding remains an important source of investment across the region, particularly for infrastructure and modernisation. But EU transfers cannot by themselves replace improvements in productivity.
The IMF’s argument is therefore less about an immediate recession than about the end of an unusually favourable period of convergence.
Central Europe entered the EU with lower wages, substantial scope to import Western technology and a powerful incentive for Western European manufacturers to move production eastwards. As those gaps narrow, future growth depends more heavily on innovation, skills, investment and domestic productivity.
The region is still converging with Western Europe. The question raised by the latest IMF warning is how quickly that process can continue once the economic advantages that powered its first two decades of EU membership become less powerful.
France has notified the European Commission that it will extend controls at its internal Schengen borders from 1 November 2026 until 30 April 2027, maintaining checks with Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Spain and Italy as well as at relevant air and sea borders.
The notification, published in the Commission’s official register of temporary internal border controls, means the restrictions currently due to expire on 31 October will continue for another six months.
Paris cites a combination of security and migration concerns, including persistent jihadist threats, antisemitic attacks, organised migrant-smuggling networks and risks associated with irregular movements towards the Channel coast.
The French notification also refers to instability in the Middle East, Afghanistan and Somalia, Russia’s continuing war against Ukraine and security considerations surrounding the Paris Peace Forum on 10–11 November.
France is not alone.
Germany has extended controls on all of its land borders until 15 March 2027, citing irregular migration, migrant smuggling and pressure on its asylum system. Austria is maintaining controls on borders with Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia until the same date, while Poland has notified Brussels of checks on its borders with Germany and Lithuania through 30 March.
Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Italy also have temporary internal controls in force.
The expansion has created an increasingly complicated map inside an area established around the principle that people should normally be able to cross internal borders without routine checks.
EU Today has been following that change closely. In September, EU Today reported that Germany had extended checks on all nine of its land frontiers, while a subsequent examination found that temporary controls were spreading across the Schengen area.
The French extension takes that trend into spring 2027.
Under the Schengen Borders Code, governments retain the right to restore controls when they identify a serious threat to public policy or internal security. The Commission stresses that such action must remain exceptional, proportionate and limited to what is necessary.
The revised rules permit controls responding to a foreseeable threat for an initial period of up to six months, with extensions possible under defined conditions. Governments maintaining controls for extended periods must provide additional risk assessments and reporting.
There is therefore no legal contradiction between Schengen membership and temporary border checks. The political question concerns their frequency and duration.
In June, the European Commission had called for a gradual reduction in internal controls where conditions allowed. EU Today reported at the time that Brussels regarded the restoration of normal passport-free movement as possible in several countries.
The direction since then has largely been the opposite.
Migration remains one factor, but national notifications increasingly cite several threats simultaneously: terrorism, organised crime, Russian sabotage, war in Ukraine, Middle Eastern instability and pressure on asylum systems.
That makes it harder to identify a single event after which controls could simply be removed.
The system also creates practical consequences for cross-border regions. Millions of Europeans live in one Schengen state and work, study or conduct business in another. Selective checks can therefore cause delays even when passports are not examined systematically.
France’s controls are especially significant because of the number and economic importance of its neighbours. The extension covers land connections with six countries and internal air and sea routes.
It also comes as the EU operates new systems intended to strengthen the external Schengen frontier. Europe’s Entry/Exit System has introduced biometric registration for many non-EU travellers, while the migration and asylum pact has changed procedures for handling irregular arrivals.
The original political bargain behind Schengen was that stronger management of the common external frontier would support open internal borders.
The growing use of national internal controls shows that several governments remain unwilling to rely on that external system alone when confronted with migration, terrorism and wider security risks.
France’s latest notification is formally temporary. But by the time the new period expires on 30 April 2027, internal checks will have become a long-running feature of travel across several of Europe’s most important borders.
The United Kingdom could be heading toward its most significant expansion of ground-based air defense in generations, under a plan announced by the Conservative Party. For now, however, with the Conservatives in opposition, the proposed £10 billion (about $13.3 billion) “Britannia Shield” exists only as a policy commitment rather than an approved government program. At the same time, it highlights the seriousness of U.K. military deficiencies in this area, as the threat from the air continues to grow.
The world is becoming more dangerous.
— Conservatives (@Conservatives) October 6, 2026
We will always do what is necessary to keep our country safe. pic.twitter.com/Z4EblxrGn7
Today the @Conservatives are announcing ‘Britannia Shield’ – our £10bn plan to protect the UK from drone & missile attack. This is only possible because @KemiBadenoch is willing to take tough decisions to fund 3% on Defence. pic.twitter.com/tLrF2KSOHw
— James Cartlidge MP
The proposal will move into the U.K. Ministry of Defense acquisition system if the party returns to government following the next general election and then follows through on the funding and procurement decisions required to turn the pledge into an operational capability. The party has proposed spreading the investment over a decade, with an initial capability intended to emerge during the first term of a future Conservative government and the wider network established after that.
Britannia Shield comes with the character of the air threat facing Europe having changed dramatically over the last decade. Russia’s war in Ukraine has demonstrated the scale at which relatively inexpensive drones can be employed alongside cruise and ballistic missiles, while recent fighting in the Middle East has clearly shown the costs involved in maintaining a sophisticated, layered air defense system under sustained attack. At the same time, the threat is no longer confined to weapons fielded by major state militaries. Small, widely available drone technologies can be weaponized with relative ease by non-state actors, providing a cheap and potentially highly scalable means of attack.
For Britain, which has traditionally relied heavily on fighter aircraft, naval air defense, and the protection provided by geography and NATO, it is increasingly doubtful whether those capabilities provide enough coverage for the infrastructure that would be most important to keep functioning during a major conflict.
While a party press release refers to it directly, Conservative leader Kemi Badenoch has made efforts to distinguish Britannia Shield from a British version of Israel’s Iron Dome.
Iron Dome has become one of the best-known elements of Israel’s layered air defense network, having been developed primarily to deal with short-range rockets, artillery, and mortar rounds threatening populated areas. The system has evolved, however, and newer configurations can also engage threats including cruise missiles and drones. Importantly, Israel’s Iron Dome systems protect a country a twelfth of the size of United Kingdom and deal with only a portion of the potential threats in critical areas.
Mention should also be made of the U.S. Golden Dome missile defense initiative, which envisions integrating sensors, interceptors, and other defensive capabilities as part of an enormous architecture with a greater emphasis on protecting the U.S. against a range of aerial and missile threats, up to and including intercontinental ballistic missiles.
Talking to the BBC, Badenoch argued that Britain does not face the same kind of persistent rocket and missile threat as Israel and therefore does not require an equivalent level of coverage. Instead, the Conservative proposal is intended to combine improved radar, command and control, interceptor missiles, and counter-drone capabilities into an integrated network designed around the threats Britain is considered most likely to face.
Britain already has some of the components that such a system could leverage. Royal Navy Type 45 destroyers — when they are available — provide a highly capable long-range air-defense layer through Sea Viper missiles, while the Army’s Sky Sabre system uses CAMM missiles for shorter-range engagements. The RAF provides combat aircraft and airborne surveillance capabilities, and Britain is integrated into NATO’s wider air and missile defense architecture. The problem is that these capabilities were not designed to provide a dense, permanent defensive umbrella over critical infrastructure, and the ground-based component in particular remains relatively limited when compared with the scale of the potential target set. There is also the reality that these assets are required to defend locales far from the British Isles themselves.
The government’s own 2025 Strategic Defense Review acknowledged that changing threat environment, allocating up to £1 billion in new funding for homeland air and missile defense and calling for improvements to the United Kingdom’s wider integrated air and missile defense architecture. Britannia Shield would therefore be a much larger political commitment to expanding and integrating capabilities that already exist, while adding new layers intended to deal with the growing drone and missile threat.
The £10 billion figure provides little idea of the scope of capabilities. The scale of the proposed system will determine whether that additional money represents a major expansion or simply the beginning of a much larger requirement.
Gen. Sir Richard Barrons has previously estimated that an entry-level system of the kind outlined could cost around £80 billion over a decade, illustrating how quickly the cost can rise once the requirement expands from protecting selected sites to providing something approaching comprehensive national coverage.
2/ Estimates suggest north of £80bn for the full cost of a perfect system, so we almost certainly need to think differently than a “dome” solution. A layered air defence will include a number of elements, including the ability to deter and strike back at an adversary.
— Greg Bagwell (@gregbagwell) October 6, 2026
Badenoch’s description of the threat instead points toward a system in which Britain would identify the infrastructure and military facilities most important to national resilience and then build increasingly dense layers of protection around them. That would include major airbases, ports, energy infrastructure, communications facilities, and other critical nodes, rather than attempting to create a continuous defensive bubble over the entire country.
Such a system would also have to account for the fact that the location of the launch platform can be as critical as the weapon itself. Badenoch described a scenario in which an adversary could operate in the English Channel to launch drones or missiles against targets in Britain. The resulting reduction in warning time would place greater demands on sensors and command systems, but it would also mean that the defensive problem could begin well before an incoming weapon reached British airspace. Maritime surveillance, intelligence collection, fighter aircraft, and naval forces could all potentially contribute to detecting or disrupting a launch platform before it had the opportunity to fire.
That broader approach is particularly important because the economics of countering drones are fundamentally different from those associated with conventional air defense targets. A system that responds to inexpensive drones by firing a sophisticated interceptor costing hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars would rapidly become unsustainable during a large attack. Any serious British architecture would therefore need several layers, with electronic warfare, guns, low-cost interceptors, and other counter-drone systems, potentially including directed-energy weapons, dealing with the lower end of the threat wherever possible. Meanwhile, more expensive surface-to-air missiles would be preserved for cruise missiles, aircraft and other targets that cannot be economically engaged by cheaper means.
The recent situation at RAF Fairford adds another dimension to that problem. The United States recently withdrew a dozen B-1 bombers from the Gloucestershire base amid reported concerns about a possible Iran-backed attack, after U.S. officials said commanders had received new information about a potential plot. British authorities maintained that the base was safe, while British sources reportedly questioned whether Iran could reproduce the kind of complex operation carried out by Ukraine against Russian airfields in 2025. The episode nevertheless demonstrated the degree to which even a major military installation can become a concern when an adversary is believed to be looking for unconventional ways to reach it.
That brings Operation Spiderweb into the discussion, although there is no public evidence that Iran is preparing a comparable operation against Britain. Ukraine’s June 2025 attack was prepared over roughly 18 months and involved small drones being moved deep into Russia inside containers carried by trucks before being launched remotely against military airfields. The operation illustrated that once relatively cheap drones have been positioned close to their targets, the defender may have little opportunity to intercept them through traditional long-range air defense means. This is exactly a scenario we have been warning of for many years.
Today, Ukrainian intelligence reportedly launched 117 attack drones from trucks that had been placed near Russian air bases. I tasked several collects this morning via @umbraspace and my first images have already started processing. What a remarkable success in a well-executed… pic.twitter.com/LzXulw8jnK
— Chris Biggers (@CSBiggers) June 2, 2025
For Britannia Shield, that means protecting an airbase such as RAF Fairford cannot simply be a matter of installing missile batteries. Physical security, counter-intelligence, surveillance of access routes, low-level drone detection, electronic warfare and the ability to identify suspicious activity before an attack begins would all become part of the same defensive problem. Hardened infrastructure would also be essential, helping to protect aircraft, fuel, munitions, command facilities and other critical assets from attacks that penetrate the outer layers of the defense. The distinction is increasingly important as military aircraft themselves become more valuable and as relatively inexpensive unmanned systems demonstrate their ability to threaten aircraft on the ground without ever having to penetrate the surrounding air defense network.
The new British proposal also becomes more complicated because its intended coverage extends beyond the British mainland. Badenoch has specifically referred to defending installations in Cyprus and the Falkland Islands, which introduces a very different set of operational and logistical requirements. A network supporting critical infrastructure in Britain can draw on dense communications infrastructure, nearby industrial support and the wider NATO system, whereas a defensive capability at RAF Akrotiri or in the Falklands requires its own radar coverage, launchers, personnel, ammunition stocks, and sustainment arrangements. Extending the same architecture across those locations would therefore consume considerably more resources.
A similar problem exists with ammunition stocks. Ukraine has repeatedly demonstrated that sophisticated air defenses can come under sustained pressure during large missile and drone attacks, while Western countries have struggled to replenish some categories of precision-guided weapons at anything approaching wartime consumption rates. A British system that looks impressive on paper but has only a small stockpile of interceptors would provide much less meaningful protection during a prolonged campaign, particularly if an adversary deliberately attempted to exhaust the defenses through repeated attacks using inexpensive drones.
Ukraine also offers lessons for how Britain could organize such a network. Mobile air defense teams, distributed sensors, acoustic detection systems, and digital applications that connect air defense operators with military units and civilian spotters have all become increasingly important in Ukraine, where defenders have had to detect and respond to large numbers of drones and missiles across a wide area. There are echoes here of the distributed air defense networks developed during World War II, when observers, radar operators, fighter controllers, and anti-aircraft units were linked together to provide early warning and direct defensive responses. As in 1940, Britain would need an air defense network that is distributed, mobile, and adaptable to new threats.
The most revealing details of Britannia Shield are yet to be provided. The number of defended sites, the types and numbers of radars, the number of launchers, the size of interceptor stocks, and the proportion of the budget devoted to counter-drone capabilities all remain unclear for now. The same applies to the money required for training, maintenance, software, communications, and replenishment across the life of the system.
There is also a straightforward political limitation to the proposal. The Conservatives have pledged to invest in Britannia Shield as part of a broader plan to increase defense spending, but that money is not currently sitting in a government procurement account waiting to be spent and defense budgets are increasingly stretched by other big-ticket programs. The Conservatives would first have to return to government, establish the program as a formal requirement, and then make the associated spending and procurement decisions. Even if those steps were taken quickly, the most capable elements of the system would take years to design, procure, integrate, and deploy.
Whether £10 billion would ultimately be sufficient depends on the mission the future government assigns to the system. If Britannia Shield were expected to provide nationwide protection against sustained attacks involving ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and large numbers of drones, the budget would fall far short, particularly once interceptor stocks and long-term sustainment are included. If it is designed as a layered network protecting a defined group of critical infrastructure sites and military bases, integrated with the RAF, Royal Navy, Army, and NATO systems already in place, the proposal becomes more realistic, but it wouldn’t address higher-end threats, like longer-range ballistic missiles.
That limitation is particularly significant when considering Russia, which remains the most serious military threat to the United Kingdom and its European allies. From what we know so far, Britannia Shield is heavily focused on drones and shorter-range missile threats, but Russia possesses a much broader strike arsenal that includes ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and hypersonic weapons. A British air defense program that concentrates primarily on the lower and middle tiers of the threat therefore leaves a significant gap at the upper end of the spectrum.
The United Kingdom is also not considering this problem in isolation. Across Europe, governments are increasingly pursuing multinational efforts to strengthen air and missile defenses, as the return of large-scale state-on-state warfare and the experience of the war in Ukraine have made the vulnerability of European infrastructure and military forces much more tangible. Nearly three decades after the end of the Cold War, ballistic and cruise missile defense has once again become a central European security requirement. Britannia Shield would therefore need to be considered not only as a national counter-drone and air-defense program, but as part of a much broader European effort to rebuild layered air and missile defenses against the full range of modern threats.
The experience of Ukraine and the Middle East suggests that Britain is unlikely to solve this problem simply by buying more surface-to-air missiles. Increasingly, air warfare relies on complex networks that find the attacker, identify the weapon, choose the appropriate response, and undertake this all at a cost that can be sustained throughout a conflict. That network also has to extend beyond the airspace itself, because the threat may involve a launch platform approaching the coast, a drone operator operating near a military installation, or small drones already hidden inside the defender’s security perimeter.
With their proposed reorientation of Britain’s air defense priorities, the Conservatives have put a financial value and a recognizable name around a capability gap that has become increasingly difficult to ignore. If they return to government, there will be many tougher questions to address, including which sites should receive protection, how many layers are required, how much ammunition must be held in reserve, and how the system can be sustained on a wartime footing.
The recent concerns surrounding RAF Fairford, together with the lessons of Operation Spiderweb, underline why that question is becoming more complicated. The next serious attack on a British military installation may not arrive as a large formation of aircraft or a visible wave of missiles crossing the Channel. It could involve a mixture of long-range weapons, cheap drones, electronic warfare, and hybrid warfare activity taking place much closer to the target. A future Britannia Shield would have to be designed around that reality, and would come with a price tag to match.
Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com
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