Moldova is creating protective zones at border crossing points along its border with Ukraine amid the threat of drone attacks. It is also relocating its personnel from joint border crossings on Ukrainian territory back to Moldova. Moldovan Interior Minister Daniella Misail-Nichitin said this on 7 October, according to NewsMaker.

In recent months, Russian attacks on Ukrainian border crossing points near the country's borders with neighboring states have become more frequent. Ukrainian-Moldovan border crossings are among those most frequently targeted by Russia. As a result, Moldova now plans to withdraw all of its border personnel from Ukrainian territory.

A Moldovan border guard was also recently injured when a projectile struck near a passenger bus at the Palanca border crossing, Moldova's Border Police reported.

Chisinau strengthens protection of border crossings against Russian drone attacks

Moldovan authorities are working to strengthen security measures at all Border Police crossing points, including those located on Ukrainian territory, according to the statement.

Authorities are already setting up protective zones so that Border Police officers, government officials and civilians at the crossings can evacuate to a safe location if necessary, the minister said.

Moldova is also discussing moving its personnel from joint border crossings located on Ukrainian territory to Moldova. Personnel have already been withdrawn from two crossings, with plans to do the same at other joint crossings, Missail-Nikitin said.

NewsMaker clarified with Moldova’s Interior Ministry that the measure involves withdrawing Moldovan personnel from two joint border crossing points with Ukraine — Criva and Palanca.

Ukraine and Moldova seek a response to a new challenge

The first time Chisinau withdrew its personnel from Ukrainian territory at the Ukrainian-Moldovan border crossings was a month ago. Moldova temporarily changed the operating arrangements at three joint border crossings with Ukraine because of security risks linked to Russian attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure near the border, Moldova's Border Police reported on 11 September.

The crossings in question are Giurgiulesti–Reni, Briceni–Rossoșani, and Criva–Mamalyga, where Moldovan border guards and customs officers had previously carried out controls on Ukrainian territory, according to the Border Police.

Starting 12 September, Moldovan personnel returned to Moldovan territory for 90 days and began working from existing infrastructure on the Moldovan side. The crossings themselves remained operational, and the cross-border movement of people and vehicles continued. Only the location where Moldovan services carried out their duties changed, the authorities said.

Ukraine is also strengthening the protection of its border infrastructure. The State Agency for Restoration and Infrastructure Development plans to install 135 basic mobile shelters at 28 border crossing points and on access roads leading to them. The shelters are intended to protect civilians crossing the border and border crossing personnel. Procurement is being carried out by the Restoration Services in Vinnytsia, Odesa, Chernivtsi, Zakarpattia, and Volyn Oblasts, according to the statement.

Ukraine’s border crossings near Moldova face ongoing Russian attacks

Russia has repeatedly attacked Ukrainian border infrastructure near the Moldovan border in recent weeks. On 25 August, a Russian drone struck the Vynohradivka–Vulcănești border crossing in Odesa Oblast.

On 5 October, Russian strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure caused an incident near the Palanka–Mayaky–Udobne border crossing. A projectile fell near the crossing, ricocheted off the ground and struck a passenger bus. The control booth was also damaged, and one Moldovan border guard sustained a minor injury.

On 9 September, Russia attacked the Starokozache–Tudora border crossing. One drone struck the crossing, while two others crashed nearby on Ukrainian territory. Two people were killed and three others were injured in the attack, and the crossing was temporarily closed. Russia claimed that this strike on a border crossing was prompted by Ukraine transporting weapons through the facility, a claim Moldova has denied.

More than 80% of Moldovans believe the country is not prepared to withstand external aggression, according to a CBS AXA poll presented ahead of the Moldova Security Forum 2026, NewsMaker reports. 

The findings come as Moldova has faced a sharp increase in Russian drone incursions linked to Russia’s war against Ukraine. Moldova recorded 44 airspace-violation incidents in the first nine months of 2026, compared with 17 in all of 2025. Authorities have reported Russian drones crossing Moldovan airspace, while drone and missile debris has also fallen on Moldovan territory.

According to NewsMaker, more than 60% of those surveyed said Moldova is completely unprepared for a possible armed attack, while nearly 24% described its preparedness as weak.

Moldovans see country as unprepared for attack

The survey found that 82% of respondents also do not feel sufficiently informed or prepared to know what to do in a major crisis. According to CBS AXA Deputy Director Vasile Cantarji, respondents tend to trust specialized emergency institutions more than Moldova’s main state institutions.

More than half said they trust Moldova’s General Inspectorate for Emergency Situations, while 35% expressed trust in the church. Trust in the government, parliament, and courts was much lower, at roughly 4–6%.

The findings come as Moldova faces a security environment shaped by Russia’s war against Ukraine, hybrid threats, energy dependence, and disinformation. Moldova’s government has supported Ukraine and strengthened security cooperation with European partners, while repeatedly condemning Russia’s war and its spillover effects.

The repeated drone incursions are now increasingly exposing Moldova to risks from the war next door.

Most favor neutrality over NATO membership

Despite the widespread perception that Moldova is poorly prepared for external aggression, only about 4% of respondents said joining NATO would be the right way to make the country safer.

Around 45% instead favored maintaining Moldova’s neutrality. At the same time, six in 10 respondents said Moldova needs continued external support to strengthen its security and defense.

Nearly two-thirds considered cooperation with the European Union and Romania important for Moldova’s development.

Moldova’s constitution establishes permanent neutrality, while the country has been deepening security and defense cooperation with European partners.

EU seen as preferred source of emergency assistance

The poll also asked whom Moldova should turn to for help during a major disaster such as an earthquake or flood.

About 33% selected EU countries, followed by Russia at roughly 16% and Romania at 15%. The CIS, NATO, UN, and Ukraine each received support from 4% or fewer respondents.

War in Ukraine is one of several security concerns

Respondents identified a range of threats to Moldova’s security, with internal problems ranking alongside external risks.

Corruption was cited by more than 15% of respondents, while poverty was named by 13.5%. Just over 13.5% identified the war in Ukraine as a security risk. Energy dependence and disinformation were each cited by nearly 10%.

Other concerns included economic instability, crime, and external aggression.

CBS AXA conducted the survey from August 25 to September 9 among 2,009 Moldovans aged 18 and older. The reported margin of error is 2.2%. NewsMaker published the findings on October 7.

Moldova strengthens protection at Ukrainian border

Moldovan authorities are now responding to the Russian drone threat by creating protected areas at border crossings with Ukraine where border guards, officials, and civilians can shelter during potential drone attacks, Interior Minister Daniela Misail-Nikitin said on October 7, according to NewsMaker.

Authorities are also moving Moldovan personnel from joint checkpoints located on Ukrainian territory back to Moldova. The measures follow an incident at the Palanca–Maiaki–Udobne crossing in which a Moldovan border guard was injured by a falling projectile.

Transnistria adds another security challenge

Moldova also faces a longstanding security problem in Transnistria, a breakaway region along the country’s eastern border with Ukraine. The region declared independence from Moldova in 1990 and has remained outside Chisinau’s control since a brief war in 1992.

Transnistria is not internationally recognized as an independent state. Russia maintains a significant troop presence there and has long supported the separatist authorities, making the region a persistent source of tension between Chisinau and Moscow. 

Moldova saw more Russian drones crash on its territory in August than it did over all of 2025. Moldovan authorities are increasingly rattled—but there’s little a cash-strapped government can do beyond complaining diplomatically.

Ukraine plans 135 basic mobile shelters for civilians at 28 of its border crossings, the State Agency for Restoration and Infrastructure Development said on 7 October.

Since the start of September, Russian drones have repeatedly struck crossings on Ukraine's borders with Moldova and Romania. Since mid-September, strikes have also reached the Polish border near the Yahodyn crossing in Volyn Oblast. On 13 September, a Russian drone strike set a gas station near the crossing on fire. On 28 September, the blast wave from another strike damaged the checkpoint building. On 25 September, First Deputy Minister for Restoration, Infrastructure and Transport Serhii Derkach said Ukraine is exploring with its neighbors whether some checkpoints could move onto their territory. No agreement has been reported. On 2 October, Moldovan Interior Minister Daniella Misail-Nichitin said Moldova had set up shelters next to its crossings with Ukraine and started relocating staff from joint checkpoints.

135 shelters for travelers and border staff

The shelters will stand at the crossings and on the roads leading to them. Regional recovery services in Vinnytsia, Odesa, Chernivtsi, Zakarpattia, and Volyn oblasts are running the purchases. The agency said the shelters will make the border safer for people crossing it and for checkpoint staff.

In Chernivtsi Oblast, one of the 10 tenders the agency lists on Prozorro, Ukraine's public procurement system, covers eight shelters for 50 people each and three for 20 each, Ukrinform reported. They will stand on the approach road to the Porubne–Siret international crossing on the Romanian border. The work is expected to cost UAH 38.5 million (about $855,000), excluding VAT.

Russian strikes on crossings

On 5 October, at about 09:38, a projectile fell near the Palanca–Maiaky–Udobne crossing on the Moldovan border. It ricocheted off the ground into a shuttle bus parked by the barrier and also damaged a control booth. One Moldovan border officer suffered light injuries, and the crossing was suspended, Moldova's Border Police said, linking the incident to Russia's attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure. Moldovan authorities did not specify the projectile's type or origin.

Overnight on 9 September, Russian drones struck the Starokozache crossing with Moldova, killing two people and injuring three. On 1 September, Russian Shahed drones hit the Orlivka ferry crossing on the Danube, opposite Romania's Isaccea, and temporarily shut it down. Another Russian strike on 6 September halted the crossing again.

Aspiring member states of the European Union could face special post-accession safeguards lasting up to 15 years, including the possible suspension of Council voting rights, under proposals intended to prevent countries reversing democratic and rule-of-law reforms after joining.

The European Commission has proposed a new system of safeguards for future EU members that could remain available for up to 15 years after accession, allowing Brussels to respond if a newly admitted country abandons commitments on democracy, the rule of law or cooperation with the Union.

The proposals form part of the Commission’s new package on preparing the EU for enlargement and are directly relevant to candidate countries including Ukraine, Moldova, Albania and Montenegro.

Under the framework, existing safeguards covering the economy, the internal market and justice and home affairs would remain available for substantially longer after accession.

A separate institutional mechanism would address serious breaches of the fundamental values contained in Article 2 of the EU Treaty or of the principle of sincere cooperation, according to the Commission’s enlargement package.

In the most serious cases, voting rights in the Council could be suspended.

Reporting on the proposal indicates that the exceptional framework could apply for up to 15 years following a country’s entry into the Union. The Commission describes the proposed measures as temporary, targeted and reversible rather than a permanent second tier of membership.

The plan addresses a problem that has become increasingly prominent in the enlargement debate: the EU has considerably greater influence over political and judicial reforms while a country is negotiating membership than after it has joined.

Candidate governments must meet detailed conditions to open and close negotiating chapters. Once membership is obtained, sanctioning a government for democratic backsliding becomes considerably more difficult because many EU decisions require unanimity or large qualified majorities.

The Commission is therefore seeking to build additional guarantees into future accession treaties.

President Ursula von der Leyen described enlargement as a “geopolitical imperative” when presenting the package on Tuesday. Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos said the EU could accommodate additional countries but needed stronger instruments to protect the rule of law and ensure that new members continued to honour commitments made during negotiations.

The proposal goes beyond voting rights. Transitional arrangements could be applied to the free movement of workers and services, agriculture, sensitive products, EU funding and participation in common European systems.

The Commission has also proposed targeted arrangements for incorporating Ukraine’s large agricultural sector into the Common Agricultural Policy, reflecting concern among existing member states about the potential budgetary and market consequences of Ukrainian accession.

At the same time, Brussels is offering candidate states deeper integration before full membership. EU Today reported recently on plans to give Ukraine and Moldova wider access to parts of the Single Market, research programmes and industrial cooperation before accession.

The new safeguard proposal adds the other side of that equation: earlier integration would be accompanied by stronger mechanisms to ensure reforms are not reversed after membership is achieved.

The Commission argues that the mechanisms would supplement, rather than replace, rules applying to all EU members. None of the proposed changes automatically brings membership closer. Accession remains dependent on the individual performance of candidate states and requires the approval of the existing member states.

The debate will now move to national governments and the European Parliament, with the 15-year safeguard likely to be among its most contested elements.

By Uriel Araujo | October 7, 2026

The European Commission has now declared enlargement a “geopolitical imperative” – with important implications.

The bloc has just presented a package of reforms designed to prepare the Union for new members – with Ukraine and Moldova at the center of the effort, alongside Albania and Montenegro.

Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated that “Europe’s future depends on the choices we make today,” framing expansion as essential to making the bloc “more resilient” and better able to shape its own destiny.

Candidate countries are already advancing: Ukraine and Moldova opened their first negotiating cluster in June 2026, and in July, opened Cluster 6 on external relations, foreign policy, security and, importantly, defense. In the words of Vessela Cherneva: “Currently, EU membership is the only way to integrate Ukraine’s and Europe’s security systems.”

The Commission plans “indicative roadmaps” for these four frontrunners (Ukraine, Moldova, Montenegro, and Albania) in its 2026 Enlargement Package, provided reform momentum continues. Gradual integration into strategic sectors such as energy, transport, digital networks and defense is explicitly on the table

This is no longer presented as a purely technical or economic process. Again, Brussels itself now describes enlargement as a “geopolitical” tool linked to European safety, prosperity and security. One may recall that earlier enlargement rounds were often framed in terms of shared values and market access.

Political scientist John Mearsheimer has long argued that the West’s “triple package” of policies – NATO enlargement, EU expansion and Western-style democracy promotion – added fuel to a fire waiting to ignite – meaning the Ukrainian crisis since 2014.

Actually, in his view, the trouble over Ukraine began in earnest at NATO’s 2008 Bucharest summit, when the alliance announced that Ukraine and Georgia “will become members”.

Russian leaders treated this as an existential threat. Washington ignored the red line and continued to push Ukraine toward Western institutions, including closer ties with the EU.

Back in his 2014 analysis Mearsheimer noted that the Union’s eastward march and the Eastern Partnership initiative were viewed in Moscow as hostile enough. “In the eyes of Russian leaders, EU expansion is a stalking horse for NATO expansion,” he wrote.

In this framework, the West’s efforts to promote “democracy” and “peel Ukraine away” from Russia completed the package. When Yanukovych rejected an EU deal in 2013, the “spark”, as Mearsheimer puts it, came. The result was crisis, then war. If one applies that framework consistently today, the resulting picture is quite straightforward.

To be clear, EU membership is not identical to NATO membership. Yet from a Russian great-power perspective the distinction becomes less meaningful when the two institutions are moving in the same geographical direction.

EU accession after all entails progressive alignment on law, foreign-policy positions, sanctions, energy, borders and increasingly elements of security and defense cooperation. The point is that an EU-member Ukraine would be economically, legally, institutionally and politically embedded in a Western bloc – and the same applies to the other Eastern European states. That, in broad terms, is precisely the structural transformation process Mearsheimer argued helped fuel the 2014 and then the 2022 crisis.

Ukraine remains the clearest case in point: before 2014 it functioned as a contested buffer. Mearsheimer (as well as specialists of the caliber of Henry Kissinger and Stephen Walt) argued a neutral Ukraine would be preferable, from a Western perspective – akin to Austria during the Cold War. In any case, the trajectory now points toward full Western institutional integration.

Moldova is arguably just as sensitive: it has a Russian military presence in Transnistria, occupies a strategic position between Ukraine and Romania – and is accelerating toward EU membership while deepening practical cooperation with Western militaries.

The recent Independence Day parade in Chișinău illustrated the point (without Soviet symbology, for the first time), as I’ve commented: Moldovan troops marched with Western weapons and vehicles; contingents from the Ukraine and eight NATO members, including the US, took part. NATO’s Political Committee had visited just days earlier, describing intensified cooperation.

Moldova for its part remains formally neutral, yet it is simultaneously negotiating EU accession – including the cluster on external relations and defense policy – and publicly displaying Euro-Atlantic partnerships.The Western center of gravity (post-USAID) in Moldova is shifting toward Brussels, which has stepped in with a large Reform and Growth Facility.

From Moscow’s point of view, the cumulative process looks like progressive incorporation of its western strategic environment into a Western political-security system.

Historically, great powers care intensely about the direction of strategic change in their immediate neighborhood. They typically do not wait until the process is complete before reacting – as seen in 2022.

In any case, the EU now frames enlargement itself as a geopolitical and security instrument. This language reinforces the very security dilemma Mearsheimer identified over a decade ago. The buffer zone between Russia and the Western institutional order continues to shrink. The risks of further escalation keep rising eastwards – adding to the tensions farther north, in the Baltic.

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Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.

The European Commission has proposed new safeguards allowing voting rights and funding to be restricted if future EU members breach fundamental European rules after accession, as Brussels prepares for possible membership of Ukraine, Moldova, Albania and Montenegro.

The European Commission has set out a new framework for enlargement that would allow the European Union to impose restrictions on recently admitted countries for up to 15 years after accession if they retreat from commitments on democracy, the rule of law or other fundamental EU principles.

The measures form part of the Commission’s new pre-enlargement policy review, published on Tuesday, which examines how the EU’s institutions, budget and policies would have to change before another round of expansion. Brussels says the Union could accommodate additional members without rewriting its treaties, but would need stronger safeguards to prevent enlargement from making decision-making more difficult.

Under the proposals, accession treaties could contain an institutional safeguard allowing action against a new member that seriously breaches the values contained in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union or the principle of sincere cooperation. In the most serious cases, Council voting rights could be suspended.

The Commission’s public summary describes those arrangements as temporary, targeted and reversible. Reporting on the underlying proposal indicates that the enhanced safeguard could remain available during the first 15 years of membership.

The proposal addresses a problem that has moved steadily up the enlargement agenda: how to ensure that a country continues to meet membership conditions after it has entered the EU.

Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg had already raised the issue earlier this year. As EU Today reported in June, the five governments called for mechanisms capable of restricting some rights of new members if democratic standards deteriorated after accession.

The Commission has now turned that political argument into a wider institutional proposal.

The change is particularly relevant to Ukraine, Moldova, Montenegro and Albania, which Brussels identifies as the four candidates currently furthest advanced. The Commission says it will prepare indicative roadmaps for each country provided reform momentum continues.

Ukraine and Moldova may also make further progress within days. EU Today reported earlier on Tuesday that two more negotiating clusters could potentially be opened next week if Ukraine’s parliament passes legislation dealing with minority-language education.

Alongside stronger rule-of-law safeguards, the Commission wants candidate states to be integrated gradually into parts of the EU before full membership. Energy, transport, digital policy and defence are among the sectors identified for deeper participation.

Brussels is also proposing greater use of qualified-majority voting during the accession process, including for decisions to open negotiating clusters. At present, individual governments can delay progress at several stages because unanimity is required.

Another proposed safeguard would require a newly admitted state, for a limited period, not to block subsequent enlargements because of bilateral disputes. The measure reflects long-standing difficulties in the Western Balkans, where disputes between neighbouring states have repeatedly entered accession negotiations.

Ukraine’s agricultural sector presents a separate challenge. The Commission says transitional arrangements could be used for agriculture, sensitive products, EU funding, the movement of workers and participation in common systems. Reporting on the package indicates that unrestricted access by Ukraine to existing Common Agricultural Policy support is unlikely immediately upon accession because of the scale of Ukrainian farming.

That question is politically important for existing agricultural beneficiaries, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, where Ukrainian grain and food imports have already caused disputes.

The institutional proposals do not guarantee membership for any candidate. Accession remains dependent on meeting the EU acquis, completing negotiations and obtaining the agreement of existing member states.

Nor has the 15-year safeguard yet become EU law. The Commission has asked the European Council and European Parliament to take forward discussions, and the eventual provisions would have to be reflected in future accession arrangements.

What has changed is the shape of the enlargement debate. Brussels is no longer concentrating solely on what candidate countries must do before joining. It is also designing mechanisms governing what happens after they enter.

For Ukraine, Moldova and the Western Balkans, that could produce a more credible path towards membership, but one accompanied by conditions extending well beyond accession itself.

The European Commission has proposed up to 15 years of post-accession safeguards to punish new member states in case of bad behaviour, in a long-delayed pre-enlargement policy review out on Tuesday (6 October).

The reforms were initially requested by the European Council in June 2024 to be ready by spring 2025, but were delayed several times due to political sensitivities in EU capitals.

They are aimed at frontrunners for future EU membership – Montenegro, Albania, Moldova, and Ukraine – each of whom will get an accession roadmap this month.

EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen has deemed union enlargement a “geopolitical imperative” amid the war in Ukraine and shift towards a new global order.

By expanding, the EU hopes to promote democracy and strengthen the single market.

But this also comes with fears that countries could misbehave after getting in, prompting the commission’s proposed new guardrails.

The commission suggests that new member states promise “not to oppose EU decisions on future enlargements” due “to bilateral disputes” for an unspecified time.

But Marta Kos, the EU’s enlargement commissioner, said this commitment would be voluntary.

Commissioner dismisses ‘two-tier’ concerns

This article continues, but the full version is available only to EUobserver.com subscribers. Visit account.euobserver.com/membership

Ukraine and Moldova could advance to two further stages of their European Union accession negotiations as early as next week, Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos has said, provided Ukraine approves legislation addressing minority-language education.

The European Union could open two additional negotiating clusters with Ukraine and Moldova next week if the Ukrainian parliament passes legislation intended to address concerns over education rights for national minorities.

EU Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos confirmed the possible timetable on Monday following a meeting of the EU-Moldova Association Council in Brussels.

Asked whether further intergovernmental conferences could take place this month, Kos said the next two clusters could potentially be opened during meetings in Luxembourg next week.

The condition is passage by the Verkhovna Rada of legislation dealing with educational rights for national minorities, an issue that has been central to Hungary’s objections to further progress in Ukraine’s accession negotiations.

Kos said during the Commission’s recorded press conference that Brussels was aware of the Ukrainian parliament’s procedures and hoped the legislation would be approved. Member states would then have to complete their own procedures quickly.

A draft law covering education rights for indigenous peoples and national minorities was registered in the Verkhovna Rada on 1 October.

The legislation is intended in part to address Hungarian demands concerning the use of minority languages in Ukrainian schools, particularly by the ethnic Hungarian community in Zakarpattia.

Hungary has repeatedly linked support for Ukraine’s EU accession process to those issues.

Ukraine and Moldova formally opened accession negotiations in 2024 and have since moved into the detailed cluster-based process used to organise negotiations over the EU acquis.

EU Today reported in June that the two countries had moved into the first substantive stage after political agreement allowed negotiations on the “fundamentals” cluster to proceed.

That cluster covers areas including the judiciary, fundamental rights, public administration, democratic institutions, public procurement and financial control.

Unlike most negotiating areas, the fundamentals cluster remains open throughout the accession process and is normally closed last.

The possible opening of two additional clusters would therefore mark another practical step in a process that remains dependent on unanimous support among EU governments at key stages.

Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha has said he hopes adoption of the minority-education amendments will remove the remaining basis for Hungary to block the next steps.

The negotiations have also become linked increasingly closely to the wider security relationship between the EU and Ukraine.

EU Today has followed the accession process as Kyiv and Chișinău seek to keep negotiations moving despite political resistance within the bloc.

Brussels continues to stress that accession remains merit-based and conditional on reforms.

Kos said on Monday that both Ukraine and Moldova were delivering reforms in difficult circumstances and described them as being among the four front-running candidate states.

The Commission is due to publish its annual enlargement reports on 28 October, providing a detailed assessment of progress across individual negotiating chapters.

Moldova has set itself a target of being ready to complete negotiations by early 2028, although any final accession date would depend on the member states.

The country has also been moving closer to EU structures outside the formal accession negotiations.

Kallas said on Monday that the EU had committed €1.9 billion under its Growth Plan for Moldova and was releasing another €157 million tranche. Moldova has joined the Single Euro Payments Area and is moving towards inclusion in the EU’s mobile roaming area.

Ukraine’s path is more politically complicated because of both the war and recurring disputes with individual EU members.

The next immediate test is parliamentary: whether Kyiv can pass the education amendments quickly enough to allow EU governments to approve the next negotiating stages in Luxembourg.

EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas has warned that Russia is intensifying hybrid operations across Europe, citing sabotage attempts, airspace violations and Russian drones and missiles crossing into Moldovan territory.

Her intervention adds pressure for a more coordinated European response to hostile activity below the threshold of conventional warfare.

Russia is putting lives at risk across Europe through an expanding campaign of hybrid activity, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said on Monday, after another series of Russian drones and missiles entered Moldovan airspace.

Speaking in Brussels alongside Moldovan Prime Minister Vasile Tofan and Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos, Kallas said Europe had experienced an increase in sabotage attempts and airspace violations during recent weeks.

“Russian missiles and drones violated Moldovan airspace again over the weekend,” she said, describing the incidents as unacceptable.

According to the official EU record of the press conference, Kallas said the Kremlin was seeking to create fear and interfere with European decision-making, and argued that the response should include greater resilience and continued support for Ukraine.

Her remarks follow Russia’s renewed large-scale attacks against Ukraine’s energy system and continued reports of drones crossing borders beyond Ukrainian territory.

Moldova’s defence authorities reported that three drones entered Moldovan airspace during Russia’s 30 September attack on Ukraine. Moldova, which shares a long border with Ukraine and is seeking EU membership, has repeatedly accused Moscow of attempting to destabilise the country.

The latest incidents broaden a European debate that has been developing for months: how governments should respond to hostile operations that are deliberate and potentially dangerous but fall short of an overt military attack.

EU Today reported on 28 September that European governments were discussing an emergency security protocol intended to improve coordination when member states face sabotage and other hybrid threats.

That followed earlier warnings concerning suspected attacks on infrastructure, cyber operations, interference campaigns and airspace violations across several European countries.

The problem is partly one of attribution and partly one of thresholds.

A conventional armed attack on a NATO member may trigger consultation under Article 4 or, in sufficiently serious circumstances, collective defence provisions under Article 5. The European Union also has its own mutual assistance provision under Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union.

Hybrid activity is frequently designed to remain below those thresholds.

Cyberattacks, covert sabotage, GPS interference, disinformation, drones and operations conducted through intermediaries can impose costs without giving governments an obvious basis for a military response.

Kallas’s warning comes as Germany has also reported an increase in activity it attributes to Russia.

Chancellor Friedrich Merz has warned that Germany faces growing hybrid pressure involving drones and cyber operations. European security services have separately investigated suspected Russian involvement in sabotage and attacks on infrastructure in several countries.

Moscow has denied Western accusations that it is directing such operations.

The EU has already used sanctions against individuals and entities accused of Russian hybrid activity, while governments are considering faster systems for sharing intelligence and attributing incidents.

EU Today examined the debate in September as the European Parliament considered proposals for quicker attribution, stronger intelligence-sharing and improved protection of critical infrastructure.

Moldova occupies a particularly exposed position.

The EU has provided €317 million through the European Peace Facility for Moldovan defence modernisation, according to Kallas, including €120 million allocated in 2026 for air defence. Brussels is also supporting Moldova through its EU Partnership Mission, which provides assistance against hybrid and cyber threats.

Unlike Ukraine, Moldova is not a NATO member and has constitutional neutrality. Its ability to counter Russian missiles or drones entering its airspace is therefore closely connected to the development of its own detection and air-defence capabilities.

For the EU, repeated incidents involving Moldova, NATO airspace and European infrastructure are increasingly being considered as parts of the same security problem rather than isolated events.

Moldova’s Prime Minister Vasile Tofan will meet senior EU officials in Brussels on Monday as the country attempts to move from the opening stages of accession negotiations towards deeper economic, security and institutional integration with the European Union.

The 10th EU-Moldova Association Council will be held in Brussels on 5 October, chaired by EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas. Tofan will lead the Moldovan delegation, while Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos will represent the European Commission.

The meeting will review Moldova’s accession process, political reforms, justice, freedom and security, foreign and security policy, trade, energy and wider economic co-operation. Regional and global security issues will also be discussed during a restricted session.

The timing is significant because Moldova has moved considerably further along the accession process during 2026.

In June, the EU formally opened negotiations on the Fundamentals cluster, which covers the rule of law, fundamental rights, democratic institutions, public administration and economic criteria. Progress in that cluster determines the overall pace of accession negotiations.

EU Today described that step as the point at which the accession bids of Moldova and Ukraine moved from political commitment to a practical rule-of-law test.

A second step followed in July when negotiations began on the External Relations cluster. That part of the process covers commercial policy, development co-operation and alignment with the EU’s common foreign, security and defence policy, including sanctions.

Moldova is consequently moving beyond the declaration that it has a European future and into negotiations over specific areas of EU law.

That process is taking place under conditions markedly different from previous rounds of enlargement.

Moldova borders Ukraine and has faced persistent Russian political pressure, disinformation campaigns and attempts at electoral interference. Energy vulnerability remains another concern, while the unresolved Transdniestria conflict leaves part of the country outside the effective control of the government in Chișinău and with Russian forces still present.

Security and accession policy have therefore become increasingly difficult to separate.

At the EU-Moldova summit in June, European leaders concentrated on accession, reform implementation and gradual integration into EU structures. The meeting took place only a week after the first negotiating cluster was opened.

EU Today argued at the time that the summit had turned Moldova into a test of whether enlargement can provide practical security and resilience for a candidate country exposed to sustained Russian pressure.

Finance is another component of that policy.

Moldova is benefiting from the EU’s €1.9 billion Reform and Growth Facility, intended to accelerate economic convergence and reforms connected to accession. The Commission’s current Moldova enlargement record shows that a second regular payment of €189 million was delivered in March 2026.

The Association Council will not decide when Moldova joins the European Union. Accession remains conditional on reforms, compliance with membership criteria, completion of negotiations and unanimous approval by the member states.

What Monday’s meeting will show is whether the process is maintaining momentum.

Moldova and Ukraine formally began accession negotiations together in 2024 and entered the first substantive negotiating cluster together this June. The two countries remain politically connected in the EU enlargement debate, although Brussels formally assesses each candidate on its own record.

The next challenge is less ceremonial.

Opening clusters demonstrates political progress. Closing negotiating chapters requires legislation to be adopted, institutions to function and reforms to be enforced beyond their appearance in government programmes.

For Moldova, that work is being undertaken while the country manages Russian pressure, energy security, economic restructuring and domestic political change.

Monday’s Association Council will provide Brussels with its latest opportunity to judge whether those pressures are slowing the accession process or whether Moldova remains capable of moving through the EU’s negotiating machinery.

“What is remarkable is that Ukraine and Moldova, despite finding themselves in a very tense situation regarding their security, are extremely keen to move closer to the EU and have therefore already begun negotiations and opened the first cluster.”

These are the words of the deputy director of the European Council on foreign relations (ECFR), Vesela Cherneva, and they come just as the official negotiation process for the two countries’ accession to the European Union has begun.

With this, the EU embarked on a truly geopolitical enlargement – driven not only by the pursuit of shared values, a larger market, and stronger common institutions, but also by the need to safeguard the continent’s security in a shifting environment.

Ukraine: a battle-hardened nation’s journey from the post-Soviet world to the EU

According to Cherneva, the EU’s upcoming enlargement is the only way to institutionally anchor Ukraine within a serious and lasting framework, given that the US position has remained clear under both presidents Donald Trump and Joe Biden: Nato enlargement to include Ukraine is not possible.

“Currently, EU membership is the only way to integrate Ukraine’s and Europe’s security systems. This is an entirely different discussion from negotiations on chapters, clusters, sanitary standards and other accession requirements. We are talking about security guarantees, but also about the transfer of military technologies from Ukraine to Europe and, more broadly, about how Ukraine – which currently possesses the strongest and most combat-capable army in Europe – can, while defending Europe, also become part of the European security debate,” Cherneva says.

Ognyan Minchev, political scientist, professor and executive director of the Institute for Regional and International Studies, an independent think-tank in Bulgaria, also believes that Ukraine’s importance is substantial and that the questions surrounding its integration are highly complex.

“Ukraine currently possesses the only genuinely combat-capable army on the European continent. Western European armies have very limited personnel numbers and, until recently, received extremely low levels of funding. The lack of real resources, including weapons, to address the challenges of military security makes Ukraine a more attractive partner,” he says.

Although many experts would point to Ukraine’s contribution to European security as the greatest benefit of its accession to the EU, the country can also contribute to development in other areas. There is undoubtedly great potential for development in the fields of agriculture and farming.

The country has a vast area of cultivated land and is among the world’s leading producers of a number of cereal crops such as wheat, maize, barley, rice, and others. It exports these products to third countries, and membership would increase the EU’s economic influence in these regions.

Ukraine’s accession could also lead to cooperation between different sectors and result in an increase in meat and dairy production as a consequence of increased cereal production.

Beyond agriculture, Ukraine’s pharmaceutical industry could offer the EU an opportunity to reduce its reliance on imports of generic medicines from China and various Asian countries. Thanks to its favourable climate, Ukraine also has great potential for various types of renewable energy.

Deposits of gallium, rutile, graphite, magnesium ores, lithium and other minerals vital to the green transition could contribute to European production and help the EU compete with China.

According to Minchev, integrating Ukraine represents a major challenge because it involves a large country that is institutionally weak, with high levels of corruption, poor economic organisation and significant shortcomings in the functioning of public life.

“Ukraine has been forced to transform itself into an effective fighting machine, but in other respects it remains a post-Soviet society with serious problems in the areas mentioned above. This makes its rapid integration into the EU extremely difficult,” Minchev says.

Moldova: a key piece in Europe’s security architecture continues to struggle under Russia’s shadow

“For Moldova, we can say that it is a small but significant element in the broader domino effect of Black Sea security, which is becoming an increasingly crucial aspect of overall European security. This is because the confrontation between the Kremlin regime and Europe is effectively unfolding along the line of a new Iron Curtain being formed across Ukraine and the Black Sea region,” Minchev says.

According to Cherneva, Moldova’s accession is also crucial precisely because the country is a buffer state, and Russia has demonstrated that it does not tolerate buffers.

“Russia seeks to conquer and control such buffer zones. If Moldova does not want to share the fate of Belarus or Georgia, it must take rapid steps towards European integration,” Cherneva says.

For years, Moldova has served as a testing ground for Russia’s hybrid warfare. As Western European countries are only now confronting the full scale of Russian hybrid attacks, Moldova has already spent years developing its own resilience and countermeasures.

The country brings to European security valuable expertise gained from combating Russian disinformation and resisting repeated attempts by the Kremlin to interfere in its domestic political processes.

Yet Moldova’s accession would have implications extending far beyond security. Although it possesses far less agricultural land than Ukraine, the country has the potential to make a meaningful contribution to the European agricultural sector. Moldova has been gradually integrating into the EU’s Single Market through the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA).

This article continues, but the full version is available only to EUobserver.com subscribers. Visit account.euobserver.com/membership

The European Commission is considering giving candidate countries wider access to the EU single market, research programmes and industrial cooperation before they become full members, as Brussels prepares a broader overhaul of its enlargement policy.

Under a draft proposal reported on Tuesday, Brussels would offer what it describes as “gradual integration”, extending access to trade, research, innovation and industrial cooperation as individual candidates bring their legislation into line with EU rules and demonstrate that they can enforce them.

The proposal would take considerably further an approach the Commission has been developing for several years. Its existing policy review on pre-enlargement reforms already provides for gradual integration into selected EU policies before accession, including early access to parts of the single market.

According to the reported draft, earlier integration would create new opportunities for EU businesses, reinforce European value chains and reduce strategic dependencies.

“Earlier integration will unlock opportunities for Union businesses, strengthen European value chains and reduce strategic dependencies,” the draft states.

The Commission would determine where sufficient regulatory alignment and enforcement capacity existed to permit deeper participation in research, innovation and industrial cooperation, as well as broader market access.

The arrangement would remain conditional. Candidate countries would not receive unrestricted access simply because accession negotiations had begun.

Instead, the extent of integration would depend on progress in adopting and enforcing EU legislation, as well as cooperation with Brussels on foreign policy, sanctions, investment screening, export controls and the protection of sensitive technologies.

Market access linked to strategic alignment

One of the most significant elements of the proposal is the connection between economic integration and the EU’s wider security policy.

As industrial and market integration deepens, participation in sensitive sectors would have to be accompanied by cooperation on investment screening, export controls, sanctions implementation and protection of sensitive technologies, according to the draft.

Access would also take account of strategic alignment, critical dependencies and a candidate country’s ability to manage risks involving infrastructure and supply chains.

The Commission has already established the principle that early integration into the single market requires both alignment with EU legislation and effective enforcement. Existing arrangements with Ukraine, Moldova and Western Balkan countries have been used to test integration in individual sectors before membership.

The new proposal would expand that model considerably.

It could also increase pressure on candidate countries whose foreign policies diverge from those of the EU, particularly over relations with Russia and China.

Ukraine and Moldova among countries targeted

Ukraine, Moldova, Albania and Montenegro are expected to be offered specific roadmaps intended to accelerate their integration over the coming years.

All four have advanced in the accession process, although at different speeds.

Ukraine and Moldova have moved into substantive negotiations covering the legislation and institutional reforms required for membership. As EU Today reported in June, the process now involves detailed scrutiny of the rule of law, public administration, democratic institutions and the ability to implement EU legislation.

Moldova is already being integrated into selected areas of the European economy. It has joined the Single Euro Payments Area and the EU’s roaming regime, while Brussels has also expanded its participation in European programmes. The Commission said after the EU-Moldova summit in June that gradual integration into the single market was already under way.

Ukraine has similarly been moving towards deeper economic integration through its existing free-trade arrangements with the EU and sector-by-sector alignment with European legislation.

Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos has previously said that Brussels intends to accelerate Ukraine’s integration into additional parts of the single market before membership, adding that ideas developed for Ukraine should also be considered for other candidates.

A wider change to enlargement policy

The proposal comes as the EU attempts to resolve a central problem surrounding its current enlargement round: accession can take many years, while the political and economic consequences of keeping candidate countries outside the Union continue to grow.

Croatia, which joined in 2013, remains the EU’s most recent new member.

Several candidates have spent years — and in some cases decades — within the accession framework. Negotiations with Türkiye are effectively frozen, while Serbia, North Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have experienced prolonged delays.

Brussels is also considering how to protect EU decision-making and rule-of-law standards as membership expands. EU Today reported earlier this year that five member states had proposed additional safeguards for future members, including stronger monitoring and mechanisms intended to prevent individual governments from obstructing EU decisions.

Gradual integration offers a separate response to the same enlargement problem: economic integration would no longer have to wait until every stage of accession had been completed.

The European Parliament has backed the principle of merit-based and reversible gradual integration, including access to parts of the single market for candidates making sufficient progress. Parliament has also stressed that such arrangements should not become a substitute for membership or create different permanent categories of EU states.

Under the Commission’s emerging model, candidates could therefore move progressively into the EU’s economic and regulatory system while accession negotiations continue.

Full membership would remain the stated objective. But a process in which most of the economic advantages arrive only at the end could increasingly be replaced by one in which access is granted sector by sector as candidates meet the required conditions.

The Commission is due to present its assessment of how future enlargement will affect major EU policies, and what changes the Union itself will need to accommodate new members, on 6th October.

In this week's Wider Europe, Rikard Jozwiak drills down on whether the EU could drop some of its Belarus sanctions and the road map for the most advanced EU candidates.

A new Kyrgyz sheep breed is charging to fame in Central Asia for the size of its males and the massive prices being reported for prime specimens of the variety.

The EU welcomes Cambodia’s decision to join the Multi-party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA) for WTO members, contributing to efforts to uphold a rules-based multilateral trading system. 

With Cambodia’s participation, the MPIA now covers 62 World Trade Organization (WTO) members and 60.4% of world trade.  

The MPIA brings together participants from all continents and at different levels of development, united by a shared commitment to upholding the rules-based trading system. 

The MPIA preserves the right to appeal in trade disputes among participating WTO members, at a time when the WTO’s Appellate Body remains non-functioning. It helps ensure that disputes can continue to be resolved in an orderly and binding manner, avoiding appeals 'into the void'. 

“I welcome Cambodia to the MPIA. The arrangement plays an important role in upholding the rules-based trading system. Each new participant helps reinforce the predictability, stability and credibility of global trade rules. I encourage other WTO members to join the MPIA,” said EU Trade and Economic Security Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič. 

Background 

The MPIA was established in 2020 and has proven its effectiveness in many WTO disputes.  

Under the MPIA, appeals are heard by arbitrators randomly selected from a pool of 10 standing appeal arbitrators set up by the participating WTO members. These arbitrators are persons of recognised authority, with demonstrated expertise in law, international trade and WTO agreements.  

The MPIA is open to all WTO members as a practical tool for appeal arbitration, pending the restoration of a reformed and fully functioning WTO dispute settlement system. 

As of 1 June 2025, the MPIA has an updated pool of appeal arbitrators to ensure that appeals continue to be heard by independent arbitrators of the highest calibre. 

At the WTO Ministerial Conference that took place earlier this year, MPIA ministers stressed the importance of the MPIA for the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system.  

The current MPIA participants are Australia, Barbados, Benin, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, China, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, the European Union (and its Member States), Guatemala, Hong Kong (China), Iceland, Japan, Liechtenstein, Macao (China), Malaysia, Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Singapore, Switzerland, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, Uruguay and Vietnam.

More information

MC14: Supporting the rules-based multilateral trading system: the role of the MPIA

What happens if your economy is suddenly in crisis, Brussels offers help with strings attached—and Turkey, China or Russia can move faster? What if your country delivers every reform the EU asks for, only for a member state to block the next step anyway? And after years of waiting, would voters still choose to join?

In this special bonus episode, The Neighbourhood goes live from Lisbon for an EU enlargement game. Jessica Hendrick brings together RE-ENGAGE experts representing six EU candidate countries and throws a series of fictional—but very plausible—political and economic shocks at them inspired by real headlines: Russia’s intensified attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure, Ireland’s EU presidency push on enlargement, Iceland’s referendum, Germany’s regional elections and the upcoming 2026 Enlargement Package. Drawing on three years of surveys, interviews and crisis simulations, each expert has to answer for their country.

Playing for each country:

• Albania: Morten Bøås, research professor at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), representing RE-ENGAGE’s Albanian partners at the European University of Tirana
• Bosnia and Herzegovina: Damir Kapidžić, director of the Institute for Social Science Research at the University of Sarajevo
• Georgia: Ketevan Bolkvadze, senior lecturer in the department of political science at Lund University, originally from Georgia
• Moldova: Mathilde T. E. Giske, research fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), representing RE-ENGAGE’s Moldovan partners at Moldova State University
• Serbia: Luka Filipović, research associate at the Institute for Contemporary History in Serbia
• Ukraine: Roman Petrov, president of the Ukrainian European Studies Association

The result is part enlargement simulation, part policy conversation and part game night. The experts bargain over a fictional €100 million EU cheque, decide whether the EU can compete with faster offers from other powers, test how easily disinformation could exploit frustration with enlargement, and imagine what would happen if EU membership was finally put to a public vote. Along the way, Serbia proposes keeping its relationship with Brussels “casual”, Bosnia finds a creative use for €100 million, and Ukraine calls for Hungarian “Varangians” when backsliding strikes.

When a crisis hits, does speed matter more than values? Can “Europe never wanted you anyway” become a winning political message? And if a country finally joins the EU, what stops democracy from sliding backwards once the prize of membership is secured?

Further reading:
RE-ENGAGE research overview
RE-ENGAGE research on Albania
RE-ENGAGE research on Bosnia and Herzegovina
RE-ENGAGE research on Georgia
RE-ENGAGE research on Moldova
RE-ENGAGE research on Serbia
RE-ENGAGE research on Ukraine

This podcast was recorded live in Lisbon on September 3rd, 2026.

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