The Kremlin on Monday declined to comment on President Trump’s claim that an agreement had been reached between Russia and Ukraine to halt strikes on each other’s energy infrastructure, as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky accused Moscow of continuing to hit energy targets. According to Russia’s TASS news agency, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said that he […]
Kyiv is heading into winter with damaged energy infrastructure and a growing number of residents leaving the city, prompting Mayor Vitali Klitschko to publicly urge those who can to leave the capital. The contrast with Russia is stark: there, strikes on Yandex data centers disrupted digital services; here, basic life-support systems are failing.
Energy: Dependence on a Single Node
Since early October, strikes on Kyiv’s energy hub have intensified. According to Oleksandr Kharchenko, director of the Energy Research Center, ballistic missile strikes have knocked out Kyiv’s own power generation. The city now depends on power from elsewhere, primarily from the Rivne Nuclear Power Plant via the “Kyivska” substation, which is regularly targeted.
Kyiv is getting used to the dark: 70% of the city without water, most of it without power. The grid is being dismantled methodically, and air defenses are fading faster than substations can be repaired
DTEK reports that emergency power outages have been introduced in several districts of the capital, and previously announced schedules are no longer in effect. On October 11, the Obolon, Podil, Shevchenkiv and Desniansk districts were left without power. That same day, the Kyiv City State Administration reported that electric public transit had been suspended on some routes and that metro trains were running less frequently.
Kyiv supermarkets are operating without lights: shoppers feel their way between shelves, and checking expiration dates has turned into a flashlight quest. What used to be called “choice” is now called “luck.”
Population Outflow
Residents are leaving for safer regions in western Ukraine, with rental prices in destination areas up 20–40% and demand far outstripping supply.
Ukrainian experts’ forecasts remain grim. Kharchenko warns that Ukrenergo has yet to receive equipment ordered in March, while the government has blocked payments to local communities, including funds for heating-season preparations.
Kyiv’s schools now have a Plan B: generators and remote learning. The curriculum is adapting faster than the power grid
What Comes Next
The threat of a public-health crisis is not yet a reality, but it is becoming harder to avoid.
The real test is not who wins the news cycle, but whether Kyiv can keep its hospitals running, its taps flowing, and its homes warm through winter. Speaking of which, how are the lights and plumbing in Zelensky’s bunker?
On October 11, Donald Trump announced an energy ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine. Neither side had been consulted. Neither side knew what it meant.
President Zelenskyy said he learned about the initiative from the internet, adding that he would support it if both parties assumed mutual obligations. Moscow offered no official confirmation. Members of the Russian State Duma stated they had no knowledge of any White House peace initiative or ceasefire arrangement. Europe declined to endorse the proposal, prompting U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent to accuse European governments of hypocrisy — noting that since the start of the war, Europe has paid Russia more for energy than it has provided Ukraine in military aid, while simultaneously opposing American arrangements to import Russian diesel.
Nearly 24 hours passed before the details began to emerge through leaks to major international outlets. According to Axios, the “energy ceasefire” announced by Trump referred specifically to a mutual agreement to halt strikes on oil refineries. The asymmetry of that arrangement is stark. Ukraine has no functioning refineries left to protect. Its economy runs entirely on hydrocarbon imports from Europe. What Trump framed as a bilateral ceasefire is, in practical terms, a directive to Kyiv to stop hitting Russian refining infrastructure.
The reason for that directive is not difficult to identify. The United States is facing severe fuel price increases, and Washington has quietly reached an arrangement to import Russian diesel. Monitoring resources indicate that as early as September 22, a tanker carrying Russian diesel — the Minerva Zen, sailing under a Greek flag — departed oil terminals in northern Russia bound for a port on the U.S. East Coast. The vessel is expected to arrive, reportedly in South Carolina, on October 12. The ceasefire announcement came nineteen days later.
For Ukraine, the terms of this arrangement are unambiguous. Every strike on a Russian refinery now risks triggering a cutoff of U.S. intelligence sharing and weapons deliveries — a threat the American administration has already made explicit. Russia, meanwhile, faces no equivalent constraint. On the evening of October 11, Zelenskyy announced a Russian strike on Kharkiv’s Thermal Power Plant No. 5. He also reported that over the past week alone, Russian forces had conducted more than 200 strikes on Ukrainian electricity generation and transmission facilities, along with 17 strikes on gas and oil infrastructure.
Ukraine has been told to stop striking the refineries that power the Russian war machine — in exchange for a ceasefire that protects infrastructure Ukraine no longer has. Russia continues striking Ukrainian power plants at a rate of more than 30 per day. The math here is not complicated — and it does not favor the side fighting for its survival.
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Donald Trump’s deal to buy Russian diesel has been met with fury from Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who said it was ‘a weak decision’ and would generate ‘billions’ in extra revenue for Putin’s war effort. The Ukrainian president has also rejected US calls for an ‘energy ceasefire’, which would require Kyiv to stop striking oil refineries, saying Moscow must first end its attacks on energy infrastructure. Lucy Hough speaks to the Guardian’s senior international correspondent, Luke Harding – watch on YouTube
Das große Thema der letzten Tage war das Diesel-Abkommen zwischen den USA und Russland, laut dem Russland früher als geplant mit der Aufhebung seines Exportverbots für Dieselkraftstoff beginnt und im Oktober 300.000 Tonnen Diesel, im November 500.000 Tonnen und im Dezember eine Million Tonnen an die USA und auf den Weltmarkt liefern wird. Damit Russland […]
Kyiv just cleared the important roadblock for Budapest, which stood between Kyiv and EU membership talks. Ukraine’s parliament has passed a bill on schooling in minority languages, meant to finally lift Hungary’s block on the country’s path toward EU membership, with 266 of the 450 lawmakers voting in favor, UNIAN reports.
Hungary has been the lone EU member blocking the opening of four of Ukraine’s negotiating clusters, stages of the membership process, over how Kyiv treats the Hungarian minority in Ukraine's Zakarpattia region. Roughly 80,000 ethnic Hungarians live in it, and Budapest had tied Ukraine’s entire EU course to their language rights.
Lawmakers have instructed the parliament’s speaker to sign the law without delay and send it to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.
What the law changes in schools
The bill keeps Ukrainian as the main language of education, but guarantees classes in minority languages where they exist. Minorities may study in the official languages of EU member states alongside Ukrainian, and pupils may use their language in other forms of communication on school grounds.
A school can gain the status of a national-minority institution if more than half of its pupils study in that minority language, provided that language is an official EU language. Parents of at least two-thirds of a minority class can also ask the school to expand the list of subjects taught in Ukrainian.
The dispute dates back years
Ukraine’s 2017 education law and 2019 language law narrowed minority-language schooling and required more Ukrainian in secondary grades, which then-Hungarian leader Viktor Orban treated as an attack on the Hungarians of Zakarpattia, blocking Kyiv’s NATO and EU steps for years, EUalive reports. Kyiv’s position was that the laws applied to all minorities and excluded Russian.
Hungary’s newer government, in office since spring 2026, inherited the veto. Budapest lifted it on the first cluster, which the EU opened in June, Ukraine’s first since gaining candidate status in 2022, but made the rest conditional on this law.
With the bill passed, Hungary is set to allow the EU to open two more clusters, on the internal market and competitiveness, at a Council meeting in Luxembourg on 13 October. Kyiv aims to open all its clusters by year’s end.
Vendredi 18 septembre 2026, Emmanuel macron réunit à l’Élysée chefs de partis et candidats à la présidentielle de 2027. Les patrons de la DGSE et de la DGSI sont là, la situation est grave ! Il affirme que la menace hybride russe s’intensifie : drones, cyberattaques, sabotages… La fin du monde ! Il cite Leipzig, où un drone chargé d’explosifs a été trouvé près d’un avion-cargo. Il ordonne un plan de protection des infrastructures critiques. Le message est clair, le pays doit se tendre. Cette mise en scène de tension sert à éviter le bilan et à peser sur le climat électoral. Point.
Georges Malbrunot va par contre citer un agent du renseignement français (DGSI). La menace existe oui, mais macron la surestime largement, c’est du vent. Aucun nouvel épisode n’aurait été détecté ces dernières semaines. Pourquoi sortir cela maintenant ? Sauf stratégie de communication avant la présidentielle, en visant Marine Le Pen et Jean-Luc Mélenchon.
L’agent ajoute autre chose. Poutine serait acculé en Ukraine, il perd beaucoup d’hommes. Des renforts nord-coréens arrivent et en Afrique, la logistique russe coince. Selon lui, mieux vaudrait frapper les télécoms russes que multiplier les discours. Il décrit aussi une offensive des services vers les médias pour appuyer la communication de l’Élysée. De la pure propagande bidon et grossière comme on en a l’habitude depuis 9 ans de macronisme dégénéré.
D’autant que ce n’est pas la première fois que macron ment concernant la menace russe, c’est un multi récidiviste. Il nous avait déjà fait le coup des cyberattaques des hôpitaux ! Pourtant les médias complices corrompus continuent de diffuser ses fake news sans aucun regard critique ou analyse sérieuse !
Malbrunot et la GDSI sur la menace russe
Le même jour, Poutine répète que la Russie n’a aucune intention agressive envers l’Europe. Aucun fondement, dit-il. Moscou serait prêt à rétablir des relations. Il ajoute : laissez-nous vivre en paix, sinon nous réagirons. On entend pourtant depuis des années que Poutine est mourant : multi cancers, tremblements, rumeurs de décès… Il a 73 ans certes mais il apparaît encore, il est allé en Inde. Rien de public ne prouve une mort imminente.
On dit aussi qu’il perd la guerre. En septembre 2026, c’est une guerre d’usure. La Russie avance peu et cher. L’Ukraine frappe Moscou et des raffineries. Ni effondrement russe ni victoire nette. Imaginer une attaque des 27 pays de l’UE est d’une grande absurdité et totalement contradictoire avec le discours dominant.
Deux jours plus tôt, Challenges révèle un autre fait. Le téléphone de Dora Cattuti, conseillère Afrique du Nord et Moyen-Orient à la cellule diplomatique de l’Élysée, aurait été piraté ; l’opération est attribuée au Mossad. Le logiciel espion a été mis en place via un faux mail de l’Autorité palestinienne. Découvert lors d’un contrôle de sécurité. L’Élysée parle d’inexactitudes et ne confirme pas. Le Quai d’Orsay se tait car il n peut pas sanctionner Tel-Aviv. Ce n’est pas une première : Pegasus, outil israélien, a déjà ciblé des responsables français. Paris avait même étudié son achat avant d’y renoncer.
Cette nouvelle affaire est d’autant plus grave qu’elle n’est pas une première et que l’Élysée ne fera absolument rien. Pas de sanctions, pas de convocation de l’ambassadeur israélien… walou ! Telles des serpillères, les membres de l’exécutif vont encore ramper.
Alors qui menace vraiment ? Mettre en scène une seule alerte et taire l’autre n’éclaire personne. Au contraire il est question de propagande et de tromperie. C’est aussi un joli écran de fumée pour camoufler 10 années de carnage de la macronie, 10 années de sabotage, 10 années de suicide français sans avoir besoin ni des Russes, ni des Iraniens, ni des fréristes…
Et ce n’est pas le risible air martial très théâtralisé de ce nain insignifiant qui va rendre réel un mensonge aussi pathétique.
They looked like Russian “porcupines” and fought where the Kremlin considers Russian rear territory. They were protected by their own drone.
Drones also struck Yandex’s third data centre.
The battle for Dobropillia on a new type of map.
Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG missiles caused the largest single massacre of senior Russian officers of the entire war in August.
Maps of the day — Dobropillia, Kharkiv region
Videos of the day — Abrams as a porcupine; MANPADS against a Geran; Russian port during an air raid; nighttime FPV drone combat; Kyiv resident narrowly escapes death at a playground
They looked like Russian “porcupines” and fought where the Kremlin considers Russian rear territory. They were protected by their own drone. Both the Russian and Ukrainian armies are continuing their efforts to return tanks and combat vehicles to the battlefield.
Russia recently attacked near Dobropillia with tanks fitted with upgraded Arena-M active protection systems.
The system itself proved effective, but was ultimately unable to withstand the flood of drones, and the attack ended in defeat and the destruction of the tanks deployed.
Last week, we also wrote about a successful operation by Ukrainian tanks from the 475th Assault Regiment.
And the same Ukrainian unit, also known as CODE 9.2, demonstrated a new use of heavy armoured equipment over the weekend.
Compared with the first case, this one revealed an important detail about the operation of accompanying drones and, thanks to geolocation, can also be used to verify the accuracy of Russian maps.
The battle took place in the Kharkiv region and involved a US-made Bradley combat vehicle as well as a tank. According to one source, it was an Abrams of Australian origin, although the appearance of its gun barrel does not suggest this.
In a video released by the unit, the Bradley advances first towards Russian positions and begins laying down covering fire. The tank joins it later, firing directly at the target.
While the Bradley’s turret has retained its mobility, the tank has effectively become an assault gun of the type known from the Second World War.
Its turret does not appear to be capable of moving, and the crew must aim the entire tank at the target. This reduces the effectiveness and speed of firing, while increasing its chances of survival.
A tank modified in this way is virtually indistinguishable from similar Russian adaptations. What distinguishes these attempts is, once again, the involvement of accompanying drones.
Aside from the heavy Vampire, first seen at 1:30, this primarily includes an FPV drone which, at 1:58, neutralises in an aerial duel the same type of Russian weapon that had attempted to strike the tank.
This is another example of how heavy equipment must be accompanied by drones at this stage of the war if it is to remain combat-capable.
Despite air support, another drone strikes it at 2:16 — after another had narrowly missed earlier. The tank remained mobile and withdrew successfully.
Beyond the operation itself, its location is also noteworthy: near the village of Anishchyne in the north-eastern part of the Kharkiv region, on the axis Russia calls the Velykyi Burluk direction.
The Ukrainian Telegram account Petrenko, which also provided the map below, precisely identified the site of the battle.
“The video reveals a discrepancy between reality and Russian claims of an alleged massive advance, the encirclement of Ukrainian units and the capture of more than 65 settlements,” the author wrote.
He noted that both vehicles operated in territory that most Russian maps mark in red — as a “Russian” zone.
This is the same area about which we have written repeatedly. For comparison, below is a map by the Russian state agency Ria Novosti. The village of Anishchyne does not appear on it, but the settlement of Vilkhuvatka — Olkhovatka in Russian — serves as a reference point in the centre-right.
The tank and Bradley were fighting around five km north of a location that Russia marks as securely captured.
Drones also struck Yandex’s third data centre. Graphs circulated online, particularly on Sunday, suggesting that Ukrainian attacks on Russia’s largest internet provider had restricted the operations of Russian bots around the world.
However, this has not yet been objectively proven. Russia has indeed reported outages affecting various internet-based services after each attack, but that is so far the only confirmed effect.
On this occasion, French analyst Clément Molin pointed out that the Russian Varyag drone brigade had attacked data centres in Ukraine in recent weeks and had boasted, among other things, of damaging Kyivstar, Ukraine’s largest operator.
The situation has now been reversed, as it was previously with attacks on ships and warehouses. This time, however, to Russia’s disadvantage.
Russia 🇷🇺 bombed multiple data centers in Kyiv, Dnipro or Odesa these last few weeks and proudly showed footage about it
Now, Ukraine is bombing Yandex data centers and causing much more harm to Russia than Russia did to Ukraine.
The first centre hit was in Sasovo, in the Ryazan region, followed by a second in Kaluga, in the Kaluga region. On Sunday, the third of Yandex’s four largest centres was struck, this time in Vladimir, in the Vladimir region.
“This complex houses one of the company’s Galushkin supercomputers, which is among the most powerful in Russia,” Kommersant wrote, adding that the facility had been taken out of service, affecting 10 core Yandex services, including its email service.
The defence ministry is also working on the issue in an effort to protect the company’s remaining facilities. Citing its sources, Kommersant said replacing the damaged capacity could take up to six months.
The battle for Dobropillia on a new type of map. As the war evolves, so do the ways it is mapped. This Ukrainian OSINT profile, for example, has depicted the fighting for the important Donbas town — which protects the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration from the south-west — on a dynamic map.
Among other things, it shows that Russian forces are infiltrating the town through the village of Hanivka from the Nove Shakhove area.
Mashovets Dobropillia Russia wants Kramatorsk, to the north-east. Its strongest attack here heads west, into Dobropillia: up to 40 men a day along the Byk river.
If Dobropillia and Druzhkivka hold to late December, Russia would have to replan the offensive. pic.twitter.com/OXg8F1WYXy
For a clearer picture, we are also including a static DeepStateUA map, as the previous one is rotated and does not follow the usual compass orientation.
The two maps are rotated by around 90 degrees in relation to each other. On the following one, Dobropillia is in the centre-left. Nove Shakhove, from where Russian infiltrators are advancing, is almost at the centre, exactly 10 km to the east as the crow flies. A small arrow directly next to the settlement’s name indicates the direction of Russian attacks.
The green area in the upper part of the map is the so-called Dobropillia salient, which was fought over a year ago.
Russia reported nothing significant concerning Dobropillia after the weekend. “On the Dobropillia axis, our forces continue to push forward, but Ukrainian units retain the ability to counterattack. Heavy fighting is under way,” the Two Majors wrote, for example.
The Ukrainian Telegram channel Petrenko published a map over the weekend showing sites of new infiltrations. Its interpretation differs considerably from DeepStateUA’s version. Russian forces are shown closer to the town, but the direction of their advance is the same as in the two previous sources.
The sites of the recorded incursions were established on the basis of videos showing drones killing Russian soldiers attempting to advance further west.
Storm Shadow missiles caused the largest single massacre of senior Russian officers in August. On Friday (9 October), a joint project by Russian exile newspaper Meduza and the BBC’s Russian service added another 17,124 names to its list of Russian war casualties. This was the number it had counted since 21 September. In total, 276,113 Russian soldiers killed in the war are now known by name.
On the same day, the project’s authors published a detailed analysis of events in Donetsk on 26 August. The Ukrainian air force had attacked a building in Donetsk with Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG missiles.
The strike was so intense that the target must have been something significant. Almost immediately, there was speculation that the building housed an important Russian headquarters.
Meduza and the BBC counted 20 high-ranking Russian military personnel killed during a joint meeting of the headquarters of the Centre group of forces and its subordinate 41st Army — 18 at the scene and another two from their injuries in the following days.
This week, in our update of Russian losses in Ukraine: – 17,000 names added to our list since September 21https://t.co/lBGxPNvv8z
They included seven colonels, six lieutenant colonels, five majors, one captain and one senior non-commissioned officer. They were identified thanks to access to nominal lists of headquarters staff as of 25 July and after that date.
It also emerged that this was not the first time officers of the 41st Army had had a bad day. During an attack on 8 September 2025, it lost a lieutenant colonel, two majors and a lieutenant. The toll on 4 August 2026 was even worse, when the army lost two lieutenant colonels, three majors, two captains and one lieutenant at once.
The following images illustrate the scale of destruction caused by the strike on 26 August:
— Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (@bayraktar_1love) August 26, 2026
Videos of the day
As Russian jet-powered drones become more widespread, videos are also appearing more frequently of Ukrainian soldiers shooting them down with man-portable air-defence systems, known by the English acronym MANPADS. This is one of them.
A Ukrainian soldier shot down a Russian jet-powered Geran-4 drone using an Igla-1 MANPADS over Ukraine’s Rivne region this morning. pic.twitter.com/4onx7UNclQ
Despite its best efforts, air defences at one of Russia’s ports were unable to shoot down a Ukrainian drone, which subsequently struck a Black Sea Fleet vessel. Note the beams of light used to assist with targeting.
Один из Z-блогеров опубликовал видео работы ПВО в гавани (Новороссийск?) и попадание дрона ВСУ в военный корабль. Дата съемки неизвестна, однако, уже видны те самые синие лучи, которые пару лет назад решили ввести как лучшее средство подсветки цели. Покупали их военные обычно за… pic.twitter.com/WvDuR369Z3
The Russian soldiers in this nighttime video appear relaxed. They were probably moving through an area they still considered relatively safe. But a waiting drone equipped with a thermal camera was tracking them.
A Ukrainian FPV drone lying in ambush at night spots a passing Russian assault group of four soldiers on a quad bike, waits for the right moment, then takes off and strikes them. pic.twitter.com/MD83B4RkKk
A Kyiv resident narrowly avoided a Russian drone at the last moment as it crashed into a playground.
A man narrowly escaped a Russian drone strike on the grounds of a kindergarten in Ukraine’s Kyiv region yesterday. pic.twitter.com/aOwWNAa6Vj
— Special Kherson Cat 🐈🇺🇦 (@bayraktar_1love) October 9, 2026
What are the losses
No update on Friday.
By Monday (5 October), Russia had verifiably lost 24,170 pieces of heavy equipment (24,138 on Tuesday, 22 September). Of these, 19,133 (19,105) were destroyed by Ukraine, 1,003 (1,000) were damaged, 1,194 (1,194) were abandoned by their crews, and 2,840 (2,839) were captured by the Ukrainian army. This includes 4,452 (4,448) tanks, of which 3,357 (3,353) were destroyed in combat.
Ukraine lost 12,238 (12,175) pieces of equipment, of which 9,633 (9,579) were destroyed, 711 (702) damaged, 695 (695) abandoned and 1,199 (1,199) captured. This includes 1,466 (1,464) tanks, of which 1,126 (1,125) were destroyed in combat.
Note: Neither side regularly reports its own dead or destroyed equipment. Ukraine publishes daily figures for Russian casualties and destroyed equipment, which cannot be independently verified. This overview uses data from the Oryx project, which has compiled a list based exclusively on photographically documented equipment losses since the start of the war.
The ordinary security camera watching a street or a parking lot has quietly become a weapon of war. Ukraine’s Security Service has identified about 40,000 surveillance cameras since Russia’s 2022 invasion that Russian forces and spy agencies could have used to snoop, find targets and correct strikes, and has protected, reoriented or blocked them, The Wall Street Journal reported.
The discovered threat reaches well beyond Ukraine: Dutch intelligence warned in July that Russian state actors are systematically hacking cameras across Europe to track arms deliveries to Ukraine and the whereabouts of Ukrainian troops.
AI makes it faster
About 1.2 billion internet-connected cameras now watch the world, in doorbells, traffic lights, and baby monitors, and almost any of them can be hacked, the journalists found.
In Ukraine, the danger is lethal. In 2024, Russian hackers took over residential webcams in Kyiv, including one that a condominium association had installed, to find targets and adjust missile strikes on the capital, Ukraine's Security Service says.
Spying on Europe’s edge
Evidence of European reach keeps surfacing. Cybersecurity firm CloudSEK has recently uncovered an exposed server it suspects belongs to a Russian-speaking hacker, containing hundreds of webcam images of Ukrainian defense, government, energy, and communications sites, as well as scenes of daily life.
Many of the images came from locations near Ukraine’s border with NATO member Romania, CloudSEK says.
The Dutch warning and the server point the same way: cameras far from the front line are feeding Russia data on how the West arms Ukraine.
Ukraine turns the lens back on Russia
Ukraine also uses the same tactic inside the occupied territory. The international hacker group Team OneFist took control of a camera in Sevastopol, in occupied Crimea, and used it to watch Russian ships, submarines, and helicopters, spotting a previously unknown air base that Ukraine later struck, damaging planes and air defenses.
Team OneFist also reached cameras on the Kerch Strait Bridge, learning that Russia had installed motion sensors beneath the bridge to guard against waterborne attacks. Penetrating a well-placed camera gets analysts closer to targets at less risk than any secret agent.
Ukraine has struck three of Russian tech giant Yandex’s data centers in four days. Known as "Russia's Google," Yandex said it shut down a facility in the country's Vladimir region following an attack on October 11. The strikes have reportedly caused huge disruptions to digital services in Russia.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Monday that Russia has continued to strike Ukraine's energy facilities after the U.S. President claimed there was an agreed ceasefire.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Monday that Russia has continued to strike Ukraine's energy facilities after the U.S. President claimed there was an agreed ceasefire.
“Pero les diré que es raro tener conversaciones tan largas en las que ninguno de ellos quisiera terminar la conversación, ninguno de ellos quería colgar el teléfono si se puede decir así”
“Fue una conversación muy intensa y amistosa. Nadie quería ser el primero en colgar”, reveló Ushakov, quien destacó el ambiente cordial del diálogo entre ambos mandatarios.
El día 9 de octubre un desesperado Donald Trump -que no había extendido como gesto cordial y diplomático una felicitación por el cumpleaños de su homólogo ruso el 7 de octubre- llamó al Kremlin y entabló un acuerdo para nada modesto: habilitó la venta de petróleo y diésel rusos, mismo que había vetado apenas en septiembre con aranceles del 100% a quien comerciara con Moscú.
…acordaron que Rusia suministrará inmediatamente más de 300.000 toneladas de combustible diésel a los mercados estadounidense y mundial. Según detalló, Moscú entregará otras 500.000 toneladas durante el mes de noviembre y un millón de toneladas adicionales inmediatamente después, así como otros tres millones de toneladas en un corto período de tiempo, dependiendo del estado de las refinerías rusas.
La noticia cayó mal en Kiev y en Europa e incluso congeló la conversación que mantenían una comitiva ucraniana con Kushner y Witkoff en Miami, terminándola un día antes de lo previsto.
La Europa desconcertada empezó a tener comunicaciones con Zelensky para mostrar de nuevo el apoyo a esta demencial apuesta por la guerra en donde Ucrania pone los muertos y los europeos endeudan a los ucranianos que quedan vivos.
Sin embargo, los vaivenes del presidente estadounidense no son nuevos y mucho menos en lo que tiene que ver con suministro energético. Una breve cronología lo confirma: 1) tras el inicio de la guerra contra Irán el 28 de febrero de este año, Trump se vio obligado el 5 de marzo a dar una licencia temporal para que India comprara petróleo a Rusia; 2) el 12 de marzo se emitió otra licencia temporal por parte del Departamento del Tesoro estadounidense por treinta días para venta de crudo ruso, que estaba sancionado; 3) el 18 de septiembre, Donald Trump firma la Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, que le daba el poder de imponer aranceles de hasta 100% a los 5 mayores compradores de petróleo y gas rusos (principalmente China e India); 4) finalmente este 9 de septiembre suspendió Trump esa ley exhibida con toda la parafernalia propia del siniestro gobierno Trump, por parte del senador Richard Blumenthal, quien dijo: “Vladimir Putin, te tenemos fichado, tu economía se tambalea” … amenazó a China e India y hoy, Trump da las gracias al presidente Putin por salvarle el trasero en vísperas de elecciones.
Y así, como un Déjà vu, Yuri Ushakov volvió a decir las mismas palabras del año anterior: ninguno de los dos quería colgar. Y bueno esta vez colgaron a Zelensky y a la Unión Europea, la pregunta es: ¿cuándo volverá a dar otro bandazo Trump? ¿Cuándo volverá a ser amigo de von der Leyen, mentor de Zelensky y enemigo de Putin?
La Unión Europea, ridículo completo
Es sabido por ellos y por varios analistas esta cruda verdad: Trump no quiere a los europeos, a penas los soporta, siempre ha querido sacar las tropas de esa zona, siempre quiso salir de la OTAN, les puso en ridículo desde las primeras reuniones, les dijo que estaban muriendo las buenas costumbres con una Europa llena de migración desordenada y grupos LGBTI+Q por todo lado, hombres en competencias de mujeres y etc. etc. El propio J.D. Vance les dijo que había una caída moral de Europa y a eso se debía su crisis.
No siendo esto poco, Úrsula von der Leyen se comprometió en nombre de la UE a comprar 750.000 millones de dólares en energía a EE.UU. (gas natural licuado, petróleo y productos nucleares) hasta 2028. Además, se comprometió a realizar inversiones adicionales por 600.000 millones de dólares en Estados Unidos. Y a cambio, Estados Unidos fijó un arancel general del 15% sobre la mayoría de productos europeos, en lugar del 30%.
Y ahora, luego de tanto ir y venir, Estados Unidos le sigue comprando petróleo a Rusia, además de uranio y otros materiales que luego revende a Europa más caro. Ya los precios de gas están reventando al ciudadano común y mientras Trump viola las sanciones occidentales que pretenden asfixiar a Rusia, Europa tiene que pagar por tratos leoninos con EE.UU., invertir en la guerra en Ucrania y exprimir al poco Estado de Bienestar que les queda y del cual ya se ven revueltas nuevamente por vivienda, educación o empleo en Francia, España, Alemania, Portugal y Bélgica.
Este nuevo pacto comercial, que va hasta abril de 2027 ridiculiza a Europa, la pone en el lugar que le corresponde: el de una civilización – collage en decadencia. Europa anhela el regreso de los halcones demócratas para retornar a una presión unánime sobre Rusia y en franca escalada bélica como la llevaba ‘sleepy’ Biden. Esto no pasará. El nuevo rumbo estadounidense es Asia Oriental.
Rusia y sus socios, actores globales
Si bien esta venta es un golpe no sólo económico sino reputacional a favor del presidente Putin y Rusia, también deja abiertos otros aspectos no menos relevantes.
Por un lado, China mira con celo cualquier acercamiento entre Rusia y USA en este baile de tres potencias globales. Los chinos son los principales socios comerciales de los rusos y muy seguramente de mantenerse la restricción al diésel ruso, chinos e indios lo comprarían. Entonces, ¿qué ganó y condicionó Vladímir Putin en la llamada con Trump? Los rusos tienen acuerdos comerciales y han aprendido a maniobrar en medio de más de treinta mil sanciones así que este trato fue un guiño a Trump ante su SOS.
Es claro que no le cae mal esto a Rusia que ahora puede poner un precio no por debajo de los costos -de haberlo tenido que vender con restricciones por sanciones- pero quien marcó el teléfono fue Trump no Putin.
Por otro lado, Irán no creo que esté cómodo con esto. Con claridad Trump quiere no sólo estar bien con los precios y abastecimiento de combustible en su país, sino estar lo suficientemente seguro de que se mantiene un flujo nada modesto de diésel en el mercado mundial para atacar a Irán sin problemas o no tantos. Por cierto, hay que ser una potencia para decir sin duda alguna: ‘cuente señor Trump con tres millones de toneladas de diésel’. Sin lastimar su consumo interno, lo hace Rusia.
Además, la ruta por el Ártico plantea una alternativa a los cierres de Ormuz y Bab el-Mandeb que derivan de las resistencias al imperio y al sionismo por parte de Irán y Yemen. Lo que implica que como de costumbre EE.UU. celebra comerciar por Alaska con Rusia.
De tal suerte que, si Irán lleva a su manera una presión mediante la diplomacia y el cierre estratégico del flujo de petróleo, fertilizantes y mercancías con lo cual busca desgastar a los estadounidenses y una salida de la guerra en sus términos, el guiño del Kremlin a Trump no le favorece. Fortalece a su enemigo, quien gana tiempo y sin desesperar puede atacarlo de mejor manera. No implica una derrota de Irán, implica un cambio en los cálculos de presión, si en abril se extiende el plazo y si Trump decide atacar antes.
Sobre Cuba se teje un genocidio. No le llega combustibles ni mercancías. ¿Se habrá acordado el presidente Putin de la Isla, patria del más grande antiimperialista del siglo XX en todo occidente cuando negoció con Trump salvando el trasero a su enemigo, este republicano vetusto? Si Trump permitió liberar de sanciones el combustible para todo el mundo, ¿Ese ‘todo el mundo’ incluirá a Cuba?
Potencias: sin amigos y sin engaños
Es claro que cuando el asesor presidencial, Ushakov, señala que la conversación fue amable y llego a un punto de: ‘cuelga tú, ¡no!, ¡cuelga tú!’ entre los dos mandatarios, sólo desea crear una sobrecarga de cortisol en la UE y los ucronazis y seguro logró tal efecto. Esto no significa que crean que están tratando con la esperanza de una amistad. Por el contrario, sólo un pragmatismo puro y duro tiene las tripas para llegar a estos acuerdos.
Qué pasaría si el presidente Putin le dice a Trump: no te daré un gramo de diésel. No lo sabremos, pero seguro ofende a este tarado mental y lo pone del lado de Europa y Ucrania.
Es el mismo hombre que respaldó a Marco Rubio, su secretario de Estado, cuando hace unos meses celebraba los bombardeos sobre colegios de infantes en Rusia señalando que era válida la máxima presión. Es el mismo hombre que autoriza la entrega de datos de la CIA y el Pentágono a los ucronazis para atacar las mismas refinerías que condena que Zelensky ataque.
Esto también es claro, como nota al pie. El propio neonazi Volodómir Zelensky, presidente ilegítimo de Ucrania hace dos años y asesino de su pueblo, tiene razón al criticar la acción de Trump y hasta de tildarlo de débil. “La paz nunca llega gracias a la debilidad”, señaló. Trump salió a decir que era ya necesario cambiar de presidente por alguien que deseara negociar, que Zelensky perdió más de un millón de ciudadanos y 30% del territorio.
Y lo que diga la UE al respecto tiene su parte de verdad, así como de ingenuidad, como señaló el presidente eslovaco Robert Fico. Pero nadie está seguro con lo que se pacte con Trump ni con ningún gringo. Nunca han mantenido la palabra. Quizá la excepción es Kennedy en la crisis de los misiles.
Siempre los más pequeños saldrán lastimados en los acuerdos entre potencias, pero no aprenden no leen la historia. Le pasó a Cuba en 1962 en la crisis de los misiles. Le pasó a Libia, cuando decidió no tener armas nucleares y europeos y estadounidenses acordaron robarla. Europa todavía era algo fuerte. Hay más ejemplos.
Lo clave es que en este intempestivo acuerdo hay más de enemistad que de amistad. EE.UU. no desea salvar ni ayudar a Rusia. No le interesa la paz, se limpió el trasero con el acuerdo del Anchorage, sólo vela por su bienestar, el de su élite. Por su parte Putin sabe que le desean muerto, que, durante una llamada en 2025, mientras hablaba con Trump caían drones en una de sus residencias.
La diferencia sustancial radica en que Putin juega a largo aliento, tiene calculadas las contingencias. No fue la venta de ese diésel lo que le interesaba, pero no sabemos bien todavía qué. Mientras, Trump lleva una política de mentiras apalancada en el poder de los medios y el peso de la información salida de la boca del presidente de una potencia, con la cual improvisa, salva, ataja, corrige, omite y salta a otra cosa.
Lo cierto es que por ahora -y sin saber cómo despertará mañana, pensando o deseando el frustrado candidato auto propuesto a Nobel de paz- felizmente al terminar la llamada, los presidentes, además de colgar sus teléfonos, colgaron a Zelensky y a la Unión Europea.
Ukrainian officials said Russian attacks killed six people in two Ukrainian cities on 11 October.
In Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city, a strike on a grocery store killed three people and injured 20 others, including two children, the regional governor, Oleh Syniehubov, said.
Footage released by the Kharkiv prosecutor’s office captured the moment of the strike, showing debris flying through the air and fires breaking out as car alarms sounded
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said that Ukraine's recent attacks on Russian tech giant Yandex’s data centers have resulted in fewer Internet bots promoting pro-Kremlin hate, a claim that has been disputed by many technology researchers.
Russia on October 12 accused Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky of using his demand for a 60-day ceasefire to give Ukraine’s military time to recover and prepare for renewed fighting, with the Kremlin offering to suspend attacks for just one day — the day of a presidential election.
“Kyiv does not want to hold elections. This is absolutely obvious,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said, according to Russian state news agency RIA Novosti. “The 60 days of ceasefire are needed not for elections, but to gather strength, heal wounds and continue the war.”
Peskov said President Vladimir Putin would be prepared to order Russian forces not to strike Ukraine on election day if Kyiv genuinely intended to hold a vote.
“Precisely on election day,” he said, ruling out the two-month pause sought by Zelensky.
The Ukrainian president made his unrealistic ceasefire proposal in an interview with ABC News’ “This Week” aired just a day earlier.
“Please tell Putin, give us two months, 60 days of total ceasefire, 60 days, and we will organise elections,” Zelensky said.
Russia’s response directly challenges Kyiv to demonstrate that its demand is about holding elections rather than securing an extended break from the battlefield. P
eskov’s accusation was explicit: Moscow believes the proposed pause would allow Ukrainian forces to rebuild their strength before continuing the war.
Russia itself held parliamentary elections over three days, from September 18 to 20, while the war continued and without a nationwide ceasefire. The voting concluded on schedule despite Ukrainian drone attacks reported by Russian authorities on the final day.
The vote is an example of an election proceeding under wartime conditions. Thus, Moscow has the right to argue that Ukraine has no need for a two-month suspension of fighting.
European Union leaders will meet in Brussels on 15–16 October under pressure to address surging energy costs, Russian hybrid attacks, continued support for Ukraine and the bloc’s next long-term budget. The summit comes as economic pressures expose growing differences between national governments.
European Union leaders are preparing for a two-day summit in Brussels dominated by the economic consequences of the Middle East conflict, Russia’s continuing war against Ukraine and mounting pressure on governments to reconcile defence commitments with deteriorating public finances.
The European Council meeting on 15–16 October will bring together the leaders of the 27 member states to consider immediate measures addressing high energy prices alongside longer-term decisions on competitiveness, enlargement, migration and the EU’s budget for 2028–2034.
European Council President António Costa has placed economic competitiveness and energy costs at the centre of the discussions, reflecting concerns that the disruption of global oil and gas markets is threatening the bloc’s industrial recovery.
The meeting also takes place against the background of renewed disputes over national spending limits, with Italy and Greece seeking greater freedom to finance energy relief and France facing increasing pressure over the credibility of its budget.
Energy crisis puts fiscal rules under pressure
The Middle East conflict has created a renewed energy shock for European economies, raising transport and industrial costs while pushing inflation higher.
The disruption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has also affected global oil supplies, exposing Europe’s continuing dependence on internationally traded fossil fuels despite efforts to diversify imports following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
European leaders are expected to consider targeted and temporary support measures for households and businesses, as well as longer-term policies intended to reduce energy dependence.
The political disagreement concerns how those measures should be financed.
The European Commission has resisted requests from Italy and Greece for further exemptions from the EU’s fiscal framework. Both governments argue that extraordinary energy costs require additional budgetary flexibility.
Brussels maintains that existing provisions already permit exceptional expenditure within defined limits.
The disagreement is particularly difficult for indebted governments that must simultaneously finance military expansion, maintain public services and protect their economies from energy inflation.
France’s position has added urgency to the debate. Its borrowing costs have increased sharply as investors question whether the government can adopt a credible budget ahead of the 2027 presidential election.
A summit agreement on emergency energy assistance would therefore have to accommodate substantially different national fiscal circumstances.
Ukraine and the changing transatlantic relationship
Support for Ukraine remains a central item on the summit agenda as Russia continues attacks against Ukrainian cities, energy infrastructure and industrial facilities.
EU leaders are expected to review military and financial assistance, the implementation of sanctions against Moscow and the resilience of Ukraine’s economy.
The discussions take place amid renewed uncertainty surrounding American weapons deliveries.
Washington’s reported threats to suspend supplies under the NATO-backed PURL procurement arrangement have raised further questions about Europe’s dependence on the United States for advanced military equipment.
European governments have increased defence expenditure and committed additional support to Ukraine, but replacing American capabilities remains difficult, particularly in air defence, precision-guided weapons and certain intelligence systems.
The summit is unlikely to resolve those industrial limitations, but the broader question of Europe’s ability to sustain Ukrainian defence over several years will influence discussions.
Member states must also consider how increased defence expenditure will be financed alongside other demands on national budgets.
Russian hybrid operations move higher on the agenda
The issue has gained prominence as European governments investigate sabotage, cyber operations, information interference and threats against infrastructure and defence-related industries.
Recent warnings concerning possible Russian assassination operations targeting European defence executives and employees of companies supplying Ukraine illustrate the changing nature of the security threat.
Such activities place additional demands on national intelligence services, police forces and European institutions responsible for cross-border cooperation.
The EU has strengthened its sanctions instruments against hybrid activities, but enforcement remains dependent on coordination between national authorities.
Any further measures would need to address intelligence sharing, protection of critical infrastructure and the relationship between internal security and the Union’s wider Russia policy.
Brussels has outlined possible institutional safeguards intended to prevent future members from undermining democratic standards or blocking common decisions.
Montenegro and Albania are advancing through their accession negotiations, while Ukraine and Moldova remain central to the EU’s geopolitical enlargement strategy.
The financial implications will become increasingly important as governments negotiate the next multiannual financial framework covering 2028–2034.
Existing members are already divided over how much the EU should spend, which programmes should receive priority and whether additional common resources should be raised.
Agricultural expenditure, cohesion funding, defence investment and support for Ukraine will compete for resources within the same budget negotiations.
The Commission argues that enlargement can be accommodated through targeted reforms, but securing agreement among member states will require decisions on future expenditure and the distribution of financial benefits.
Competitiveness and the single market
Leaders will also examine progress on the One Europe, One Market agenda, which aims to reduce barriers to economic activity within the EU and improve conditions for European businesses.
The initiative is intended to address structural weaknesses affecting investment, industrial development and the ability of European companies to compete internationally.
High energy prices have made those concerns more immediate, particularly for industries competing against producers in economies where electricity and fuel are cheaper.
The European Council will be asked to provide direction on measures planned for 2026 and 2027, but implementation will depend on subsequent legislation and decisions by member states.
The October meeting brings several unresolved European policy questions into the same negotiation: how to protect economic competitiveness, maintain fiscal credibility, finance defence, sustain Ukraine and prepare for enlargement.
The immediate test will be whether leaders can agree on a credible response to energy prices without reopening broader disputes over national budgets.
More difficult decisions concerning defence financing, institutional reform and the EU’s long-term expenditure commitments will extend well beyond the two-day summit.
Montenegro and Albania will hold separate accession conferences on 12 and 13 October as the European Commission introduces proposals for stronger safeguards against democratic backsliding, linking the next phase of EU enlargement to reforms within the Union itself.
Montenegro and Albania are preparing for another round of European Union accession negotiations this week, with meetings in Luxembourg scheduled to advance their membership bids as Brussels considers substantial changes to the conditions under which future countries will join the bloc.
Montenegro’s 29th accession conference will take place on Monday, 12 October, followed by Albania’s tenth conference on Tuesday. The meetings come less than a week after the European Commission presented a package of proposals intended to prepare the EU for enlargement while strengthening its ability to respond to breaches of democratic standards by newly admitted members.
For Montenegro, the immediate objective is to continue closing negotiating chapters after years of institutional and legal reforms. Albania’s meeting has a more precisely defined agenda: the provisional closure of Chapter 20, covering enterprise and industrial policy.
Both countries have made progress towards membership, but the Commission’s latest proposals indicate that the terms of accession could become more demanding as the EU considers admitting several new members.
Montenegro moves towards the final negotiating stage
Montenegro is widely regarded as the most advanced candidate among the Western Balkan countries.
Accession negotiations began in 2012, and all 33 negotiating chapters have been opened. Progress towards closure has accelerated as the government seeks to complete the process and secure an accession treaty.
At the end of 2025, Montenegro provisionally closed five chapters covering services, capital movements, company law, agriculture and fisheries.
As EU Today reported following that conference, the agreements brought the number of provisionally closed chapters to twelve at that stage, while the EU continued to emphasise the importance of judicial reform and sustained implementation.
The Commission has identified Montenegro as a country capable of concluding accession negotiations by the end of 2026, provided sufficient progress is maintained.
That objective does not mean membership would follow automatically. A completed negotiation must still lead to an accession treaty, which requires approval by all existing member states and ratification under their constitutional procedures.
Outstanding questions include the independence of the judiciary, enforcement of anti-corruption legislation and the capacity of state institutions to apply EU law consistently.
Albania advances in industrial policy negotiations
Albania’s accession process has also gained momentum, supported by renewed EU interest in incorporating the Western Balkans into European political and economic structures.
The chapter concerns the legal and institutional environment in which businesses operate, including industrial competitiveness, entrepreneurship and policies supporting small and medium-sized enterprises.
Provisional closure would represent further progress in Albania’s alignment with EU legislation and policy, although it would not constitute a final agreement on accession.
As with Montenegro, the negotiating framework requires sustained progress on the fundamentals of membership, notably judicial independence, fundamental rights, corruption and organised crime.
The Commission argues that enlargement can be accommodated within the existing treaties, but that the EU will need additional safeguards and improvements to decision-making.
Among the most consequential proposals is the possibility of suspending a new member state’s voting rights in the Council if it commits serious breaches of the Union’s fundamental values or the principle of sincere cooperation.
Such provisions would be incorporated into future accession arrangements, making some membership conditions enforceable after a country has joined.
The proposal reflects concerns that the EU’s existing mechanisms for responding to democratic backsliding can be slow and politically difficult to apply.
The Commission’s October package develops that argument into a broader programme of institutional preparation.
Enlargement beyond the Western Balkans
The debate extends to Ukraine and Moldova, whose membership applications have acquired greater strategic importance following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
The Commission is examining how candidate countries can progressively participate in EU policies and programmes before obtaining full membership.
These arrangements could include greater integration in energy, transport, defence and selected areas of the single market, subject to the implementation of relevant reforms.
Brussels is also considering transitional arrangements affecting agricultural support, financial transfers and sensitive sectors of the economy.
The political challenge is to provide candidate countries with credible membership prospects while reassuring existing members that enlargement will not weaken common decision-making or create unsustainable budget commitments.
For Montenegro and Albania, the October conferences therefore take place at a pivotal point in the accession process.
Both governments are moving through the technical stages of membership negotiations while the EU is still determining how its next enlargement will operate.
The outcome will depend not only on their progress towards meeting accession conditions, but also on whether the existing 27 member states can agree on the institutional changes required for a larger Union.
Samedi et dimanche, des responsables américains de la défense ont téléphoné à Kiev et à plusieurs capitales européennes. Selon le Financial Times, qui cite des officiels européens, le message tenait en deux menaces. Si l'Ukraine continue de frapper les raffineries russes, Washington bloquera les armes que les Européens achètent pour elle aux États-Unis. Il cessera aussi de lui transmettre son renseignement. « Ils appellent Kiev. Ils appellent tout le monde en Europe », a résumé l'un des destinataires. La Maison-Blanche n'a ni confirmé ni démenti.
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Le même week-end, Donald Trump a déclaré que l'Ukraine devait « se trouver un nouveau président ». Dimanche, il a annoncé seul un « cessez-le-feu énergétique » dont Kiev n'avait pas entendu parler. La question du titre se pose. Elle en appelle une autre, plus utile : dans quel état est l'homme qu'on menace de débrancher ?
Washington. Donald Trump affronte le 3 novembre les élections de mi-mandat avec un gazole à plus de six dollars le gallon. Le 9 octobre, il a obtenu de Vladimir Poutine des livraisons de gazole russe, et suspendu pour cela une partie des sanctions. Élise Rochefort a détaillé ce matin, dans ces colonnes, les chiffres de cet accord. Une seule chose compte ici : chaque raffinerie russe en feu retarde le gazole promis aux électeurs américains.
Kiev. Volodymyr Zelensky dispose de drones à longue portée qui frappent les raffineries russes depuis des mois. Ils ont contraint Moscou à interdire ses propres exportations de gazole en juillet. C'est la seule arme ukrainienne qui coûte de l'argent au Kremlin chaque jour, loin du front.
Moscou. Vladimir Poutine frappe de son côté le réseau électrique ukrainien. Samedi, un bombardement russe sur Zaporijia a tué 23 personnes, dont quatre enfants. L'accord du 9 octobre lui rapporte des recettes et un interlocuteur attentif à la Maison-Blanche.
Washington a déjà mis ce chantage à exécution. Le 28 février 2025, Volodymyr Zelensky avait été éconduit du Bureau ovale. Le 3 mars, l'aide militaire américaine était suspendue, et le partage de renseignement le fut à son tour. Le 11 mars, à Djeddah, Kiev acceptait le principe d'un cessez-le-feu, et l'aide reprenait. La suspension avait duré huit jours.
Le renseignement est le levier qui compte. Une arme se rachète ailleurs, plus cher et plus tard. Les images satellites et les interceptions américaines qui guident une partie des frappes ukrainiennes n'ont pas d'équivalent à vendre.
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Park Ki-chang, South Korea’s ambassador to Ukraine, has returned to Seoul after being recalled in protest at Kyiv’s disclosure of information regarding the handover of North Korean prisoners of war to the South Korean side. Shortly before this, Song Yeon-gil, known for his reputation as a Russophile, was appointed as an adviser to the president. […]
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