Sacrifice the inconvenient, never the project. “Pal-washing” in action.
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A familiar script
On 9 October 2026, the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded the Peace Prize to Navanethem Pillay, an 85-year-old South African jurist, former judge at the International Criminal Court and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. The citation speaks of a person who has paved the way for a more comprehensive global legal order. The Committee’s chair, Jorgen Watne Frydnes, added that the prize is a message to those who attack and undermine the international system and its institutions. The verdict is avowedly political, and it is on this level that it must be discussed.
The very same figure who, in 2011, is said to have ‘toppled’ Gaddafi, paving the way for the plundering of Libyan oil and the enslavement of African migrants, would now ‘topple’ Netanyahu, thereby paving the way for Israel’s rehabilitation. The underlying logic would be neither morality nor peace, but the agenda of George Soros’s Open Society: to sacrifice those who have become inconvenient, never the essence of the project itself. Some have dubbed it ‘pal-washing’. The fundamental question is a serious one, for it asks whether there is a pattern behind the prizes and jurisdictions of the liberal order.
It must be emphasised that the script is already familiar. Do you remember when Barack Obama received the Nobel Peace Prize, whilst launching war after war? Or do you recall figures in search of a cause such as Machado, Mohammadi, or the defenders of Ukrainian criminals? But let us proceed in order.
Act One: Libya
In February 2011, Pillay, the High Commissioner, called on the Human Rights Council to take vigorous action to stop the violence and hold those responsible to account; the Council condemned the violations and established a commission of inquiry. The next step fell to the Security Council: referral to the ICC via Resolution 1970, followed by Resolution 1973, approved with ten votes in favour and five abstentions (Brazil, China, Germany, India, Russia). No one claims that Pillay decided to go to war. What matters is the sequence of events: the language of human rights opened the door, that of the protection of civilians authorised the use of force, and the operation gradually shifted towards regime change. As early as April, Lavrov was accusing NATO of exceeding its mandate, and a French minister admitted that regime change would have required a new vote.
Then there are the costs. In 2017, the IOM documented auctions of sub-Saharan migrants in southern Libya, sold for sums ranging from 200 to 500 dollars. The link with the collapse of the state after 2011 is the most plausible interpretation, although the source documents the phenomenon rather than its cause. Libya and the migrants paid the price; the legal framework emerged, formally speaking, intact, even if the controversy over the mandate would later weigh on the vetoes of Moscow and Beijing in other matters.
Act Two: Bibi
On 21 November 2024, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the ICC issued arrest warrants for Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Gallant, for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Pillay had left the Court in 2008, but chaired the UN Commission of Inquiry which, on 16 September 2025, concluded that Israel had committed genocide in Gaza. This is where ‘pal-washing’ comes into play. International criminal law deals with individuals: a defendant, a charge, a period of time. If the case concludes with the fate of a leader, a narrative break occurs – the ‘before’ and ‘after’ of a man – after which the state can present itself as restored. Libya offers an analogy: there, the case concluded with the fall of a man.
The limitations of the process work in favour of this interpretation. The Court has no police force and the execution of warrants depends on the States Parties; the Commission is not a court and does not speak on behalf of the entire UN; the Committee itself, according to AFP, has stated that it is up to a court to determine whether genocide has taken place. The award has no legal effect, as we know, but it lends legitimacy to a system that promises justice yet cannot guarantee it.
We must also bear in mind that we have already seen dynamics of this kind on numerous occasions within the globalist order that dominates the West. The Open Society Foundations presents itself as the world’s largest private funder of groups working for justice, democracy and human rights, active in over one hundred countries, and Pillay received the Stockholm Human Rights Award, the same prize that went to Soros and Neier in 2011. It certainly seems that the pattern of the Soros agenda is repeating itself once again – an agenda comprising foundations, NGOs, tribunals, commissions and bureaucracies that share a common lexicon and worldview: that of a liberal order to be perfected and never called into question. Those operating within that lexicon may denounce a government, a leader, or even a state, but they cannot challenge the underlying assumptions of the order that grants them legitimacy.
Some will object that Pillay’s Commission attributes responsibility to Israel as a state, not merely to its leaders, which contradicts the idea of a purely personalised operation. The second point concerns the reaction. Netanyahu accused the Committee of having lost its moral compass; the Israeli Foreign Ministry spoke of a grotesque exploitation of the prize; and Washington announced sanctions against the ICC just a few hours after the announcement. All true. But it would make sense and have value if the Western system were not rotten to its very core, if its legal system were functioning properly, but this is not the case, in any respect (and we have already seen sufficient evidence of this – let us not forget the Epstein case either).
If, over the next twelve months, Netanyahu’s political downfall is presented as the conclusion of the case, rather than as a stage in proceedings concerning the state, ‘Pal-washing’ will gain traction. If the proceedings continue beyond his person, and if the State Parties execute the warrants, perhaps it will lose ground. Given the current evidence, the argument is plausible and, until proven otherwise, this is yet another ‘Non-Peace’ Nobel Prize – one we cannot call ‘war’.
O Auditório Municipal Maria Barroso recebe, esta noite, a partir das 21h30, um concerto de Tiago Bettencourt.
O conteúdo Hoje há concertos dos Blind Zero e Tiago Bettencourt no Algarve aparece primeiro em Algarve Marafado.
Russia and the United States have intensified their campaigns against the International Criminal Court (ICC) almost simultaneously, exposing an increasingly consequential convergence between the policies of Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump.
On 8 October, Moscow demanded the extradition of ICC President Tomoko Akane and eight other current and former officials. The following day, Washington announced sanctions against the court as an institution, extending earlier measures against individual judges and prosecutors.
The timing raises an obvious question: are these independent campaigns arising from different disputes with international justice, or do they reflect a broader political understanding between Washington and Moscow?
There is no publicly established evidence of a coordinated operation or an agreement between Trump and Putin to undermine the ICC. Nevertheless, the strategic consequences of their respective actions are remarkably similar. Both weaken an institution pursuing criminal proceedings against political leaders whom the two governments seek to protect.
Russia’s hostility towards the ICC is directly connected to the arrest warrant issued against Putin in March 2023 over the alleged unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children from occupied territories.
The court subsequently issued warrants against senior Russian military commanders, including Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov, over alleged crimes involving attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure.
Moscow’s response has been to pursue ICC personnel through its own criminal justice system. The latest extradition demands follow convictions handed down in absentia by a Russian court in December 2025.
Washington’s confrontation with the ICC has a different immediate origin. The Trump administration objects to the court’s jurisdiction over American nationals and Israeli officials, particularly following the arrest warrants issued against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former defence minister Yoav Gallant.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio has presented the American campaign as a defence of US sovereignty. Yet the sanctions announced on 9 October are not confined to the Israeli proceedings or any investigation involving American personnel.
They target the institution itself, potentially disrupting financial transactions and commercial relationships essential to its operation. This distinction matters because a court-wide restriction necessarily affects investigations beyond those cited by Washington. That includes Ukraine.
The political context cannot be separated from the relationship between Trump and Putin, including their meeting in Anchorage, Alaska, in August 2025.
The summit formed part of Trump’s efforts to negotiate directly with Moscow over the war in Ukraine. The American president has repeatedly treated relations with Putin as a question of diplomatic bargaining, seeking arrangements that might produce an agreement where conventional Western pressure has failed.
Against this background, suggestions that pressure on the ICC might form part of a wider accommodation with Moscow warrant scrutiny. However, the proposition that Trump specifically offered Putin assistance in neutralising the court during their Anchorage discussions remains unsubstantiated. There is no verified public account establishing such a commitment.
A more defensible conclusion is that Washington’s independently declared campaign against the ICC also advances an important Russian interest. For Putin, the benefit is clear. Measures designed to restrict the court’s financial and administrative capacity could complicate investigations into Russian conduct, irrespective of the American administration’s stated intentions.
The relationship therefore need not involve explicit coordination to produce politically significant results.
The escalation from targeting individual prosecutors to sanctioning the entire ICC represents a substantial change. Previous American measures imposed personal and financial restrictions on selected officials. The latest approach threatens the broader infrastructure upon which international criminal proceedings depend.
The court requires banking facilities, secure communications, technology services and commercial suppliers. American sanctions can reach beyond US territory because of the international financial system’s dependence on dollar transactions and American service providers.
The ICC had already anticipated this vulnerability. According to details disclosed in September, the institution has pursued alternatives to American software and financial services to reduce its exposure.
Nevertheless, operational continuity and investigative effectiveness are not necessarily the same thing. The court may remain formally functional while facing additional costs, delays and restrictions affecting prosecutors, investigators and international cooperation.
For Ukraine, this is particularly significant. The ICC holds and evaluates evidence connected to alleged Russian war crimes, including the deportation of children and attacks on civilian infrastructure. Its proceedings preserve a judicial process independent of whatever diplomatic settlement Washington and Moscow might eventually negotiate.
Weakening that capacity would not invalidate existing warrants or automatically destroy evidence, but it could make the pursuit of accountability more difficult.
The European Union now faces a dispute with Washington over an institution that European governments have spent decades supporting.
On 9 October, eight governments issued a joint statement, reaffirming their support for the ICC and rejecting the American sanctions. The signatories included Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Britain, Japan and Canada.
The European Commission also indicated that the EU was prepared to take measures necessary to preserve the court’s operations. Such assurances are politically important, but they do not automatically resolve the practical consequences of American restrictions.
European financial institutions and technology suppliers must consider their own exposure to US sanctions. Sustaining the court may require alternative payment arrangements, commercial protections and potentially further European regulatory intervention.
The EU has discussed extending its blocking statute to shield European operators from the effects of American sanctions. Whether that mechanism can provide sufficient protection remains uncertain.
The dispute also extends beyond the ICC’s current investigations. Ukraine and the Council of Europe are developing a separate Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression, designed to address jurisdictional limitations preventing the ICC from prosecuting Russia’s leadership for the decision to launch the invasion.
The two institutions have distinct legal mandates, although cooperation between them is envisaged. Undermining the ICC would not automatically prevent the special tribunal from operating, but it would weaken an important part of the wider international accountability framework.
Washington and Moscow have not adopted identical positions towards the ICC. Russia seeks to discredit and punish the officials responsible for pursuing Putin. The Trump administration is attempting to restrict the court’s authority and operational capacity, principally in response to proceedings involving Americans and Israelis.
Yet their actions converge at precisely the point where the ICC’s independence becomes politically inconvenient. The distinction between motive and consequence is essential. It would be premature to describe the American sanctions as evidence of a secret bargain struck in Anchorage. It would be equally mistaken to overlook the assistance these measures could provide to Moscow.
The broader concern is that the United States, traditionally central to Western efforts to hold Russia accountable for its invasion of Ukraine, is now applying pressure to one of the principal institutions carrying out that work.
For European governments, the immediate question is no longer simply whether they support the International Criminal Court. It is whether they are prepared to protect its practical independence when the political and financial pressure comes not only from Russia, but also from Washington.
US President Donald Trump has launched an attack on Norway and the Nobel Peace Prize committee after being overlooked for the 2026 award, declaring that the decision had permanently damaged the prize’s credibility and left an indelible stain on the country responsible for selecting its recipient.
Speaking at a campaign rally on Friday, 9 October, Trump insisted that his diplomatic achievements entitled him to the distinction and accused the committee of allowing political ideology to determine its choice.
His remarks followed the announcement that South African lawyer and former United Nations human rights chief Navanethem “Navi” Pillay had received this year’s prize for her contribution to peace and international law.
“The United States of America, represented by me as your president, should have received the Nobel Peace Prize, but didn’t,” Trump told supporters.
He described the committee’s decision as disgraceful and embarrassing before issuing a pointed warning: “We will not forget, Norway.”
The American president went further, claiming that the award had been discredited by radical ideologues whom he characterised as opponents of democracy and civilisation. He also questioned Pillay’s qualifications, telling his audience that he had never heard of the South African jurist.
The Norwegian Nobel Committee’s announcement honoured Pillay’s contribution to peace and international law.
Born in Durban in 1941 under South Africa’s apartheid system, Pillay became a prominent human rights lawyer before serving as a judge at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and subsequently at the International Criminal Court (ICC). She was also UN High Commissioner for Human Rights between 2008 and 2014.
Her judicial career included work on cases involving genocide and sexual violence during the Rwandan conflict. More recently, she chaired the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel. Israel rejected the commission’s findings.
The award comes at a contentious moment in Washington’s relations with international judicial institutions. On the same day as the Nobel announcement, the Trump administration introduced new sanctions against the ICC, expanding American restrictions and bringing Washington into conflict with European governments that support the institution.
Trump has repeatedly argued that his interventions in international disputes justify receiving the Nobel Peace Prize. During Friday’s rally, he claimed to have settled eight wars and suggested that he was approaching further breakthroughs involving Iran and Russia’s war against Ukraine.
Those claims remain contested. Several disputes cited by Trump have not resulted in comprehensive peace agreements, while others involved ceasefires or diplomatic arrangements that did not permanently resolve the underlying conflicts.
His administration also participated alongside Israel in the war against Iran earlier this year. Although Washington subsequently pursued a negotiated settlement, the conflict raised questions about the relationship between American military intervention and Trump’s presentation of himself as an international peacemaker.
Trump has likewise maintained that he can secure an end to the war in Ukraine, although Russian military operations continue and no comprehensive settlement has been reached.
The president’s dispute with the Nobel Committee is not new. He has frequently contrasted his diplomatic record with that of former President Barack Obama, who received the prize in 2009, less than a year after taking office.
Trump’s frustration has also been shaped by his relationship with Venezuelan opposition leader María Corina Machado, who received the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize for her campaign for democratic rights and political change in Venezuela.
In January 2026, Machado presented her Nobel medal to Trump in a symbolic gesture. However, the Nobel Committee subsequently reaffirmed that a Nobel Prize cannot be transferred to another person, regardless of what happens to the physical medal.
The president’s latest criticism also draws Norway into a dispute over which its government has no direct authority. The Nobel Peace Prize is awarded by an independent five-member committee appointed by the Norwegian parliament, rather than by the Norwegian government.
Under the rules governing the award, the committee is responsible for selecting the individual or organisation judged to have made the greatest contribution to peace in accordance with Alfred Nobel’s will.
Trump’s warning therefore raises a separate diplomatic question: whether his dissatisfaction with an independent committee’s decision will have consequences for relations with Norway, a longstanding NATO ally.
For European governments, the controversy also comes against the background of Washington’s escalating confrontation with international courts. Russia has separately demanded the extradition of ICC President Tomoko Akane and other judicial officials over proceedings connected with the war in Ukraine.
The Nobel Committee’s decision to honour a former ICC judge, just as the institution faces pressure from both Moscow and Washington, has consequently acquired significance beyond the question of Trump’s personal ambitions.
The 2026 Nobel Peace Prize will be formally presented in Oslo on 10 December.
The man charged with murdering Ann Widdecombe and targeting Nigel Farage, Joshua Kerry, had "an extreme Left-wing mindset" and hostility to Reform, a court has heard.
The post Man Charged With Murdering Ann Widdecombe and Targeting Nigel Farage Was Motivated by Extreme Left-Wing Mindset and Hostility to Reform, Court Hears appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.
Russia has demanded the extradition of International Criminal Court (ICC) President Tomoko Akane from the Netherlands, seeking to enforce criminal sentences against judges and prosecutors involved in issuing arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin and senior Russian military officials.
The Russian Prosecutor General’s Office announced on Thursday, 8 October, that it had submitted requests to several governments for the extradition of nine current and former ICC officials, including Karim Khan, who served as the court’s chief prosecutor when the arrest warrant against Putin was issued in March 2023.
The requests follow a ruling by Moscow City Court on 12 December 2025, when nine ICC officials were convicted in absentia and sentenced to prison terms ranging from three and a half to 15 years. Their alleged offences arose from their participation in investigations and judicial decisions concerning Russian officials suspected of international crimes.
Moscow’s latest move is unlikely to secure Akane’s extradition from the Netherlands, which hosts the ICC and is among its principal supporters. Russian authorities are nevertheless seeking cooperation from several countries, potentially exposing court officials to arrest when travelling to jurisdictions maintaining close relations with Moscow.
Japan has condemned the proceedings against Akane, a Japanese national who became ICC president in March 2024.
Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Masanao Ozaki said Tokyo had repeatedly protested to Moscow over its treatment of ICC personnel and regarded the latest measures as unjustified and unacceptable.
He indicated that Japan would consider further diplomatic action in consultation with the court and other states parties to the Rome Statute.
Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi reaffirmed Japan’s support for the ICC during a parliamentary session on Friday, 9 October, saying Tokyo would continue to defend the institution as part of its commitment to international law.
Akane, who was elected president for a three-year term in March 2024, served on the judicial panel responsible for the arrest warrants against Putin and Russia’s commissioner for children’s rights, Maria Lvova-Belova.
Russian investigators opened criminal proceedings against the judges shortly after those warrants were announced, subsequently adding other ICC officials to their wanted lists as investigations concerning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine progressed.
The confrontation began on 17 March 2023, when the ICC issued arrest warrants against Putin and Lvova-Belova over the alleged unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children from occupied areas to Russia.
The judges found reasonable grounds to believe that both officials bore individual criminal responsibility for the alleged offences. The warrants remain in force, although neither suspect has been brought before the court.
The investigation concerns the removal of children from Ukrainian territory following Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. Ukrainian authorities have documented cases involving children transferred to Russia, placed with Russian families or subjected to measures intended to integrate them into Russian society.
Russia maintains that the transfers were humanitarian evacuations. The ICC’s investigation concerns whether children were unlawfully deported or transferred from occupied territory, conduct prohibited under international humanitarian law.
The court subsequently issued further warrants against senior Russian commanders. In June 2024, former defence minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov were accused of responsibility for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity connected to attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure.
Russian prosecutors responded by expanding their criminal cases against ICC personnel. The charges included knowingly prosecuting innocent individuals and attacking representatives of a foreign state.
The December 2025 convictions provided Moscow with the domestic judgments it is now attempting to enforce through extradition requests.
The Netherlands has not indicated any intention to surrender Akane. Dutch authorities have consistently supported the ICC’s independence, and the Russian convictions concern actions undertaken by officials in the exercise of their judicial responsibilities.
The position may be less predictable in countries maintaining extradition arrangements with Moscow. Although Russian convictions would not automatically require another state to surrender an ICC official, the existence of arrest warrants could complicate international travel and expose those named to detention pending legal proceedings.
The situation recalls the difficulties surrounding Putin’s own international movements since March 2023. His arrest warrant has restricted travel to ICC member states, which are generally required to cooperate with the court’s requests for arrest and surrender.
Russia’s withdrawal of its signature from the Rome Statute in 2016 did not prevent the ICC from investigating alleged crimes committed on Ukrainian territory. Ukraine had already accepted the court’s jurisdiction and became a full member on 1 January 2025.
The ICC investigation into Ukraine continues, covering alleged offences committed since 21 November 2013 within the scope of Ukraine’s acceptance of jurisdiction.
The Russian extradition demands coincide with a separate dispute between the ICC and the United States, whose government has sanctioned several members of the court.
On 18 August 2026, President Donald Trump’s administration imposed sanctions on Akane and senior ICC trial lawyer Abdoulaye Seye. Washington has objected to investigations involving American personnel and Israeli officials, arguing that the court has exceeded its jurisdiction.
The ICC condemned the additional American sanctions, warning that restrictions targeting judges and prosecutors interfere with its judicial work.
The American measures primarily involve financial restrictions, while Russia has pursued criminal convictions and extradition requests. Both have placed ICC personnel under pressure for their involvement in proceedings opposed by governments outside the Rome Statute system.
The European Union has repeatedly defended the ICC against attempts to interfere with its investigations. The Netherlands, as host country, has particular responsibilities concerning the court’s operations and the security of its personnel.
Moscow’s latest requests are therefore expected to meet resistance from European governments. Their possible consequences elsewhere will depend on the countries approached and whether local authorities are prepared to act on Russian arrest warrants.
The Kremlin has so far failed to halt the ICC’s proceedings against Putin, Shoigu and Gerasimov. Its response has been to pursue the judges and prosecutors responsible, seeking prison sentences against international judicial officials while the allegations against Russia’s own leadership remain before the court.
As one advocate warned India’s Supreme Court on Monday that “this country will burn” unless action is taken to stop what thousands of protesters have denounced as an illegal purge of voters by the head of the Election Commission of India, the court demanded accountability from Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government. Chief Justice Surya Kant […]
The post Indian Supreme Court demands government answers on voter purge appeared first on Asia Times.
No one knows how the US Supreme Court will rule in Suncor v. Boulder, the case that will kick off the court’s fall term next week and will likely decide whether the city and county of Boulder, Colorado, will be able to put oil giants ExxonMobil and Suncor Energy on trial for deceiving the public for decades about the climate harms of fossil […]
The post Big Oil fears the evidence of its deliberate climate lies appeared first on Asia Times.
The application for interim measures follows Google’s challenge to a European Commission decision adopted in July under the Digital Markets Act. The company argues that implementation before the court rules on the main case could cause serious harm to the privacy of European users.
The Commission maintains that its requirements already contain safeguards for privacy, security and personal data.
At the centre of the dispute is Article 6(11) of the Digital Markets Act, which requires Google to give eligible rival search services access to anonymised ranking, query, click and viewing data on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.
The Commission opened specification proceedings in January and adopted binding measures on 16 July.
The rules explicitly allow AI chatbots offering search functions to qualify for access.
Brussels argues that Google has accumulated a quantity of search information which competitors cannot readily reproduce. User queries and interactions can improve search algorithms, reinforcing the position of an established provider and creating a substantial entry barrier for newcomers.
EU Today examined the issue in April, when the Commission first set out its proposed Google search-data sharing measures.
The final July decision turned those proposals into binding requirements.
The inclusion of AI services gives the case wider significance. Generative AI products increasingly answer questions directly rather than sending users through a conventional list of search results. That is putting AI developers and traditional search engines into increasingly direct competition.
The Commission’s data-access framework is intended to reduce the advantage obtained from data accumulated by designated gatekeepers and make it easier for competing services to enter the market.
Access will not be unrestricted.
Applicants must operate a genuine online search service in the EU and satisfy eligibility requirements. Established applicants generally need at least 50,000 average monthly EU users during the previous year, while newer companies can qualify under investment criteria.
They must also comply with security and data-protection requirements and undergo independent auditing. The Commission can exclude applicants presenting public-security risks, while the data must be processed within the European Economic Area or under arrangements providing equivalent protection.
Google argues that these safeguards do not remove the underlying privacy risk.
The company has therefore asked the General Court for an interim suspension while judges consider the legality of the Commission’s decision.
The case adds another front to an increasingly difficult relationship between Google and Brussels.
In July, the Commission imposed two Digital Markets Act fines on Google totalling €890 million. As EU Today reported following the penalties, one case concerned Google’s treatment of its own services in search results while another dealt with restrictions preventing app developers from directing users towards alternative offers.
The dispute subsequently developed into a wider transatlantic issue when President Donald Trump threatened a Section 301 trade investigation in response to the EU penalties, a development examined by EU Today.
Google has meanwhile begun altering some of its European services in response to regulatory pressure. Earlier this month it changed the presentation of European search results, while warning that the new format could make searches less useful.
The present case is different because it deals with access to the underlying information generated by searches rather than only the way results are displayed.
The Commission wants qualifying competitors to obtain data that could help them improve their own services. Google says opening those datasets creates privacy and security risks which cannot simply be reversed if it eventually wins the court case.
That is why the interim application is important.
Google is not asking the court merely to overturn the Commission decision at the end of the litigation. It wants implementation halted before the full case is resolved.
Unless judges intervene, the Commission timetable continues.
The wider dispute will determine how far Brussels can require a dominant digital platform to share data accumulated through its own users in order to encourage competition — an issue that is becoming increasingly important as search and generative AI converge.
Not long after the death of his father, Derek Askey, a new father himself, is selected as an alternate juror for a murder trial. The experience upends the typical vulnerability and openness of his life: Askey, under court order, cannot speak with his wife about the random violence heaped upon him, yet nevertheless worries about what his infant son “received from me” during his wordless days in the courtroom. He must withstand the gruesome details of the criminal trial, yet will not be allowed to participate in the jury’s deliberations. His personal essay is a challenging exploration of enforced silence, and the ways in which we seek to unburden ourselves through voice.
Before the trial, the other would-be jurors and I were asked our names, our occupations, whether we had spouses or children, and whether we could be impartial regarding the case, in which a man was being accused of murdering his girlfriend. At first I was curious to hear other people’s answers—Oh, wow, that guy fixes airplanes?—but curiosity quickly gave way to numb shock at how many people’s lives had been touched by domestic violence or murder. Or both. People you see every day. People who fix airplanes. One man said that, when he was little, his dad had beaten his mother; if he was being honest, he didn’t think he could be unbiased. The man was dismissed, and a woman was called up from the uncomfortable wooden pews to face the same interrogation. She had been attacked herself, she said. Some women had sisters, sisters-in-law, or best friends who’d been hit by a spouse or boyfriend.
Alejandro Betancourt’s tentacles in Spain are long. The Venezuelan businessman who amassed a fortune after his country’s power crisis at the end of the 2010s has seen his wealth rise again after the Trump administration touched him with the magic oil wand, entrusting him with crude exploitation in a deal with the government of Venezuela’s interim president, Delcy Rodríguez. The billionaire’s assets in Madrid alone are substantial, according to police documents that are part of an ongoing investigation into alleged money laundering. Authorities seized five luxury cars, a United Arab Emirates residency card and 17 firearms at his private estate in Toledo.
This story originally appeared in Common Dreams on Sep. 14, 2026. It is shared here under a Creative Commons (CC BY-NC-ND 3.0) license.
The US Supreme Court on Monday night rejected a bid by the Trump administration to keep onerous US Postal Service rules for mail-in ballots in place, which voting-rights defenders said risked depriving millions of people of the franchise in this year’s midterm elections.
After a back-and-forth legal battle over the USPS rules that dragged on for months, the nation’s highest court issued the 7-2 ruling without elaborating on its legal reasoning, though right-wing Justices Samuel Alito and Clarence Thomas issued dissents in favor of President Donald Trump’s side.
The ruling in USPS v. California was in response to a legal challenge brought by the League of Women’s Voters, the attorneys general of numerous states, and others who argued that newly-announced rules by the Postal Service regarding mail-in ballots, changes prompted by an executive order issued by Trump, would prevent people from having their ballots counted and cause chaos for those trying to administer this year’s elections.
A victory for democracy, a defeat for election deniers. https://t.co/MKjfKmgyTv
— David Crowley (@DavidCCrowley) September 15, 2026
In response to the ruling, the plaintiffs’ legal team said the decision was “a critical step to ensuring free and fair elections this November by maintaining access to mail voting for millions of eligible voters across the United States and lifting the dire threat that the Postal Service would disenfranchise them.”
“Mail voting is safe, secure, and reliable—and the Trump administration has presented no evidence to the contrary, as the courts have repeatedly recognized,” the statement continued. “We will remain vigilant in countering threats to free and fair elections and ensuring that every eligible voter is able to cast a ballot and have it count.”
“Today’s decision is a victory for our democracy and a powerful affirmation of the rule of law,” said California Attorney General Rob Bonta in a statement. “The stakes in this litigation could not have been higher.”
Virginia Kase Solomón, president and CEO of Common Cause, was among the other pro-democracy advocates who welcomed the decision.
“Today’s decision is a major win for the millions of everyday Americans who count on vote-by-mail—our seniors, service members, busy parents, rural voters, and voters with disabilities,” said Solomón in a statement. “Vote-by-mail is safe, proven, and vital; even the president uses it. This executive order was a blatant power grab designed to silence voters and undermine our elections, but it failed because the people and the law were on our side. Our Constitution is clear: states run our elections, and voters choose their leaders—not the other way around. No administration can strip the people of their power.”
Michael McNulty, senior policy director for Issue One, a nonpartisan group that works to defend free and fair elections, also welcomed the ruling, but said vigilance would still be necessary going forward.
“The fight to preserve states’ authority to administer elections is far from over,” warned McNulty.
“President Trump continuously and falsely claims fraud in mail-in voting without evidence,” he added. “Despite voting multiple times with this method, he remains obsessed with centralizing control over elections to tilt the playing field. However, for now, one piece of that centralization effort is blocked, and it ensures that mail-in voting for the midterms won’t be disrupted.”
What do privilege and accountability look like for an AI agent on the wrong side of the law? Evan Ratliff rounds up a collection of challenging cases in which AI agents have functioned as co-conspirators in criminal acts, offered courtroom statements on behalf of deceased victims, and perpetrated deeds that, for humans, are considered to be illegal. Legal teams have already sought to seal their clients’ chats with AI agents, likening the exchanges to conversations with an attorney. Ratliff’s feature is an omnibus, and you’ve likely encountered one or two of his stories via other outlets. Here, the concerns he gathers together reveal the breadth of challenges facing the American legal system.
AI chatbots are already serving as confidants and co-conspirators, assisting and even encouraging humans acting on their darkest impulses. They’re occupying ersatz roles as therapists and lawyers, relationships our legal system typically shields with confidential privilege. They’re producing new kinds of criminal evidence and offering up the beguiling possibility of preventing crime before it happens. And as they’re given more autonomy across our digital and physical systems, they’re even gaining the ability to commit crimes themselves, absent specific human instruction — and, perhaps, in defiance of it.
Earlier this year, the US Supreme Court heard an appeal from death row inmate Terry Pitchford, who was denied relief by the Mississippi Supreme Court after his attorneys claimed Black people were illegally struck from his jury. Investigative reporter Hannah McAlilly delves into the case, and into the wider problem of racial prejudice in the selection of juries in Mississippi:
A prosecutor struck a Black woman for having “red dyed hair” and in another, a prosecutor struck a Black man because he had “a ponytail, a sort of strange hair design.” That prosecutor told the judge he was concerned the juror might identify too closely with the defendant, who also was of a similar age. “Both have unusual hair styles,” the prosecutor said.
Prosecutors struck Black jurors who, they said, seemed angry, irritated or inattentive. A Black woman was struck because the prosecutor didn’t like her “vibe.” Another, who worked a night shift before showing up to jury selection, was struck for being “fidgety” and looking “angry.” Another was struck because she “frowned a lot.”
Dr. Uzma Khan sought an urgent hearing of her contempt petition over the government’s decision to transfer the PTI founder to PIMS instead of Shifa International Hospital.
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When Jessica Black was 16 years old, she told a story to North Carolina police detectives that helped convict five friends of murder. Decades later, she’s still trying to correct the record. Matthew Bremner’s feature for Financial Times is a brisk tick-tock of efforts by Black and her incarcerated friends to overturn criminal convictions they claim were built on disturbing intimidation tactics.
The investigators do not accept these firm denials. To them, they seem likely to be the initial stories of a group of boys who know more than they are saying. As officers move in and out of interview rooms, carrying information from one interrogation to the next, the pressure intensifies. They tell the teenagers that their friends are already telling their side of it, that they should too. Under North Carolina law in 2002, police are permitted to exaggerate, even to suggest they have evidence they do not possess. There is no rule requiring a parent or other adult to be present while 14- and 15-year-olds are questioned. For most of their time in these rooms, the five boys are alone. When I interviewed him in late 2025, Tolliver told me that a detective asked him to hold out his arm. “That’s the vein,” he told him. “This is where the lethal injection would go.”
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