Russia's state nuclear corporation Rosatom expects the first reactor at Turkey's Akkuyu nuclear power plant to achieve its first self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction before the end of this year, Rosatom head Alexei Likhachev said on Friday.
"We remain on track for the planned physical start-up in the second half of December... We hope that before the end of the year the Turkish unit will transition from the construction phase to the start-up phase," he said.
Moscow and Ankara signed an agreement in 2010 to build a nuclear power plant with four Russian VVER-1200 reactors, but the project has faced repeated delays and bureaucratic hurdles.
Rosatom began construction of the Akkuyu plant in 2018. The commissioning schedule has been repeatedly pushed back from its original 2023 target.
After Moscow launched military action in Ukraine in 2022, pressure on the project increased. Although Rosatom was not targeted by Western sanctions, risks related to payments and other issues remain.
Physical start-up involves fuel loading and achieving first criticality, the reactor's first self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction. The next major milestone is grid connection and the start of electricity generation.
Likhachev also reported progress in talks with potential partners for the Akkuyu.
He said he had discussed the matter the previous day with Turkish Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar, who attended the Russian Energy Week forum.
"We have developed a menu of possible arrangements for a Turkish investor. The choice is primarily up to the Turkish government. I hope that following our meeting, Mr Bayraktar will brief the country's leadership and that the right decisions will be taken."
The Akkuyu project, costing more than $20 billion, is financed by Russia. Rosatom, its sole owner, can sell up to a 49% stake to a partner to share the investment burden.
In April, Rosatom said it started new talks with Turkish companies on joint ownership of Akkuyu after the Iran war spurred interest in such assets.
The war in Ukraine has always been about fomenting a proxy war to defeat Russia.
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The contradictions are absurd but instructive of the criminal proxy war that the U.S. and European powers have perpetrated against Russia under the guise of “defending Ukraine”.
Western sanctions on Russia – the most heavily sanctioned nation on Earth – were meant to supposedly punish Moscow for its alleged unprovoked aggression against Ukraine.
The United States recently signed into law a “sanctions bill from hell” in honor of the late war hawk Senator Lindsey Graham, aimed at crushing the Russian economy, principally by shutting down its energy exports.
Likewise, the European Union has implemented more than 20 rounds of sanctions imposed on Russia over the past four years, again purportedly to block Russian exports of oil and gas. The EU has vowed to terminate all Russian energy imports by the end of this year.
The official rationale out of Washington and European capitals is to exact retribution on Russia for its alleged invasion and violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty. Western embargoes on Russia’s economy were immediately announced after Moscow launched its Special Military Operation in February 2022. (The real background to the SMO – unreported by Western media – was the NATO-backed coup in Kiev in 2014, and the arming of NeoNazis to conduct a proxy war against Russia.)
The U.S. and European Union, as well as Britain of course, presented the attempted economic blockade of Russia as a demonstration of the West enforcing international law and supporting Ukraine. The latter is portrayed in Western media as a fair maiden of democracy assailed by a drooling Russian tyrant.
In a nutshell, the sanctions are sold to the Western public as a plausible way of neutralizing “Russia’s war machine.” If Moscow’s oil and gas exports could be cut off, then, the dubious logic goes, Russia would not be able to continue its war effort in Ukraine.
However, laughably, the supposedly noble Western rationale is in tatters this week after the U.S. Treasury lifted sanctions off Russian diesel exports for the next six months in order to boost global oil supplies and curb soaring energy prices.
Another shattering blow to the facade of Western “principles” was the disclosure by Russia’s energy minister, Alexander Novak, that the European Union has continued to buy Russian energy exports at nearly pre-war levels. (Cue Western media silence on that!)
Since 2022, the EU has bought a total of $320 billion worth of Russian hydrocarbons. To put the expenditure in perspective, that far exceeds what the European governments have donated to Ukraine, some $226 bn, according to EU data.
How’s that for a contradiction? The European governments are throwing hundreds of billions of taxpayers’ money at Ukraine supposedly to defend itself against Russia, yet these same governments are giving Russia much, much more by buying its energy resources. In other words, to use their own rhetoric, Brussels and other European capitals are “fuelling the Russian war machine.”
As for the United States, it is equally duplicitous. The Americans blew up the Nord Stream pipeline in 2022 so that Europe would not be at the mercy of Russian oil dependency. Washington also imposed sanctions on Russian energy while increasing its more expensive gas exports to Europe. Yet last Friday, October 9, President Donald Trump announced, to the dismay and alarm of the Europeans and Ukraine, that he had made a deal with Vladimir Putin to release 3.5 million tonnes of Russian diesel onto the world market to ease pressure on crippling pump prices.
Whatever happened to American laws against “trading with the enemy”?
Of course, Trump is desperate for relief over record-high fuel prices as a result of his criminal aggression against Iran and Iran’s closure of the Persian Gulf oil route in retaliation. With the mid-term Congressional elections only three weeks away, Trump is seeking to assuage angry American consumers and spare his Republican Party from an electoral drubbing that will tarnish his presidency.
Out of sheer expedience, Trump wants Russian diesel exports to save his political neck. Some observers may question whether Moscow should oblige Trump considering that Washington is arming the NeoNazi Kiev regime with missiles and intelligence. Perhaps the Kremlin is calculating that Trump could finally pull off a peace deal in Ukraine.
Another smart move by Moscow, perhaps, is that the diesel deal with Trump has managed to unleash a storm of recriminations from Europe and Ukraine, which is severely undermining the transatlantic axis. Is this political judo by Putin?
The European NATO partners and the Kiev puppet president Vladimir Zelensky reacted with unprecedented insults and defiance of Trump. They accused the American leader of treachery and of siding with Russia. Within Washington, Trump has also been lambasted for “betrayal”.
Trump and his aides hit back furiously, dismissing the Europeans as “hypocrites” over their own record purchases of Russian energy exports. Trump even called for Zelensky to be replaced by someone who he can work with.
For his part, Zelensky doubled down with truculence, badmouthing Trump for being “weak” and accusing him of putting Ukrainian lives at risk. He refused to stop Ukrainian air strikes on Russia’s oil refineries, as requested by the White House. And the little money-grabbing, narco-Führer also attempted blackmail by suggesting to Trump that he would halt air attacks on Russian energy infrastructure “if” the Pentagon supplied more Patriot missiles.
Trump’s anger has exploded over Zelensky and his European patrons. He sees their obstruction of his diesel deal with Russia as not only hypocritical but a political attack on his presidency ahead of the crucial November polls.
The debacle is a rich farce. American and European posturing is seen for what it is, without any principle or genuine motives. It is a plague on all their houses.
Both the U.S. and its European partners are buying Russian energy like never before to sustain their struggling economies. The sanctions they imposed on Russia never had anything to do with “upholding international law” or “defending Ukraine”.
Using their own disingenuous logic, the NATO nations are fuelling the Russian war machine with their continuing business-as-usual purchase of Russia’s oil and gas.
That contradiction, in turn, exposes the fraud of the war in Ukraine. It was never about defending democratic Ukraine – a corrupt NeoNazi dictatorship – or European security from Russian “threat”.
The whole murderous episode has always been about fomenting a proxy war to defeat Russia. That covert policy is a gargantuan crime of aggression that has cost millions of lives and bankrupted Western societies. What’s more, it is an utterly failed policy which Western governments are covering up to avoid accountability. The destruction and deception go hand in hand.
What is all the more damning is that this travesty could have been easily exposed years ago if the Western news media had actually reported on facts instead of being the propaganda service they so evidently are to enable criminal aggression by their imperialist masters.
Iran has managed to export some liquefied petroleum gas and jet fuel since July, despite a US naval blockade, shipping intelligence showed and people involved in security said.
Tehran has in recent weeks been concealing such cargoes among a growing volume of ship-to-ship transfers by other Gulf producers off Oman, news agency Reuters reported- citing four people in maritime security who track Gulf oil movements.
The Iranian exports and methodology are reported for the first time here. While a fraction of its former energy exports, the cargoes are rare evidence of petroleum products getting through a blockade that has halted Iran's crude exports.
Analysis by US advocacy group United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), which monitors Iran-related tanker traffic using ship and satellite tracking, shows at least eight gas tankers carrying Iranian LPG have left the Gulf of Oman since mid-July.
Another tanker carrying Iranian jet fuel reached Myanmar in September, additional satellite imagery and analysis by maritime intelligence group SynMax show.
The US imposed targeted sanctions in 2023 on Myanmar's jet-fuel industry, citing military airstrikes on civilians that the United Nations says have killed thousands of people. Myanmar's military government has repeatedly denied targeting civilians, saying its operations are directed against armed groups.
Six of the eight gas tankers and the jet fuel tanker are under US sanctions for transporting Iranian petroleum and petrochemical products, a Reuters analysis of the vessels and sanctions imposed on ships by the US Treasury showed.
"What we have seen passing is a handful of tankers carrying Iranian LPG, but the overwhelming majority of tankers laden with Iranian products have been redirected by US forces," said Jemima Shelley, senior research analyst with UANI.
Shelley said some Iranian LPG tankers transferred cargoes near the Omani coastal towns of Shinas and Sohar, while others waited in the Gulf of Oman before heading past the US blockade, which US Central Command has said sits across the Gulf of Oman near the Iran-Pakistan border.
The total amount of these LPG cargoes was estimated at 4.1 million barrels, Shelley said.
Shelley said the shipments were driven "more by opportunism" than showing a new trend of Iran trying to export its oil and petrochemicals by using smaller ships.
Most of the cargoes sailed to Malaysia's Eastern Outer Port Limits to conduct further STS transfers for likely destinations in China, Shelley said, based on UANI's analysis.
The Iranian government did not respond to a request for comment. Myanmar's military-backed government did not respond to a request for comment on whether the country had received Iranian jet fuel.
The US military's Centcom said its naval blockade, which was first imposed on Iran-related oil exports on April 13, is "ironclad". The blockade was lifted in June after the US reached a draft understanding with Iran, but it was reimposed on July 14 following the collapse of the agreement.
Reuters reports, citing a US military official, that the passage of a vessel does not necessarily mean it had evaded the blockade.
Every ship was assessed individually, including through a review of its papers, and some vessels could be allowed through for humanitarian reasons, the official added.
The official said the appearance of a vessel on US sanctions lists is not the only factor to make it subject to the blockade, adding that US forces are also closely monitoring some ships without taking action against them for operational reasons.
Centcom said in an update on October 13 that during the three months of the latest blockade, four commercial vessels had been disabled and 135 ships had been turned around by US forces.
The US military has turned around ships from Asia and also seized some tankers, previous Centcom statements said.
Washington has coupled its blockade with a sanctions campaign aimed at severing Iran's remaining financial links and depriving it of revenue. Last week, it imposed fresh sanctions on 17 vessels involved in transporting Iranian crude, petrochemicals and petroleum products.
A US Treasury spokesperson questioned shipping data suggesting vessels had evaded the blockade, saying ships could spoof their locations or use false identities when loading.
Such data "should be taken with a grain of salt", the spokesperson said.
The Treasury spokesperson said Operation Economic Outcast, together with the blockade, was "suffocating the Iranian regime".
Torbjorn Soltvedt, principal Middle East analyst at risk intelligence company Verisk Maplecroft, said although there was no sign of Washington easing its blockade, worsening economic conditions in Iran could push Tehran to take greater risks.
"If Iran can move product tankers through, even in small numbers, jet fuel may be a good option. Iran's aviation industry is under increasing pressure from US sanctions, with a growing number of planes grounded, and a potential surplus of jet fuel at Iranian refineries," Soltvedt added.
Iranian crude exports fell to zero in September, according to Kpler, the first month without a shipment since the analytics firm began tracking the producer in 2013.
US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has said the blockade prevented most Chinese purchases of Iranian oil and left Iran unable to deliver crude to customers.
France and Germany want more detailed “Made in Europe” rules for electric cars, and want them split off from the rest of the EU’s flagship industrial law.
The Franco-German deal, agreed after months of haggling on the margins of the EU summit in Brussels late on Thursday (15 October), says both files should then be adopted “as fast as possible and simultaneously”.
That would split the most fought-over part from the rest of the Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA), which also sets “Made in EU” and low-carbon requirements for steel, cement, aluminium and clean-tech products such as batteries and solar panels.
Paris hopes the new car definition will serve as a benchmark for the rest of the IAA, which sets “Made in Europe” rules for steel, cement, aluminium and clean energy technologies.
But this still has to be negotiated with other member states, people familiar with the talks said.
“We are driven by a clear ambition: to successfully transform our automotive industry while upholding our climate goals and our production in Europe,” said French president Emmanuel Macron on social media, announcing the deal.
“This is an investment signal to industry,” said German chancellor Friedrich Merz.
The paper comes as Ireland, which holds the EU’s rotating six-month presidency, is wrapping up a third compromise text on the industrial plan, which Irish officials hope will reach final agreement by mid November.
Publicly, Paris and Berlin said on Friday that their car deal will not affect climate targets and that their course “remains unchanged”.
But the paper behind the deal shows the trade-off that’s been made. Berlin accepted France’s demand for stricter “Made in Europe” rules that apply to fewer countries, while Paris agreed to looser emission rules for carmakers, as Germany had wanted.
To count as “Made in Europe”, a car would have to clear thresholds that tighten over time, and only cars meeting these rules could be bought, leased or rented with public subsidies, or bought by public authorities.
From 2028, the car must be assembled in Europe, with at least 70 percent of total value creation in components – excluding the battery.
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Qatar on Friday announced plans to invest in Lebanon’s electricity sector and help address the country’s chronic power crisis, including through the development of a solar power plant.
During his visit to Lebanon, where he met with President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani said the two sides held "lengthy discussions" on an energy project that Doha had been discussing with Beirut for years.
"Now, thank God, we see this project getting closer to becoming a reality," he said.
Speaking at a joint press conference with Salam at the Grand Serail, Al Thani said the two countries had agreed to establish a comprehensive framework for cooperation in the energy sector and provide integrated solutions through a major investment project that would benefit Lebanon’s economy.
Salam said Lebanon and Qatar were close to reaching an agreement on a joint project to rehabilitate, develop and modernise the country’s electricity generation infrastructure.
He said the comprehensive project would cover various sources of energy production and the infrastructure required to support them, with the aim of providing a more reliable electricity supply at a lower cost.
Salam said the project would follow a build-operate-transfer (BOT) model, under which Qatari entities would finance, build and operate the infrastructure before transferring it to the Lebanese state. He stressed that Lebanon’s treasury would bear no upfront investment costs.
He said he hoped to present the project to the Lebanese cabinet soon, adding that it should be prepared with support from the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and adhere to the highest standards of transparency, governance and financial viability.
Salam said the aim was not to add another promise to the many previously made about the electricity sector, but to establish a sustainable solution by increasing generation, lowering costs, diversifying energy sources and improving management.
Al Thani also said QatarEnergy had agreed with TotalEnergies to jointly develop a solar power plant in Lebanon. He described this as an initial project, saying the two countries were now working towards a broader framework for energy cooperation.
He said Qatar hoped to see an agreement take shape soon, allowing Qatari institutions to work alongside their Lebanese counterparts.
Salam said his government did not want to add "another promise to the many that the Lebanese have heard" about the electricity sector, but instead hoped to establish the foundations for a practical and sustainable solution based on increasing generation, lowering costs, diversifying energy sources and improving management.
"Reliable electricity at an affordable cost is essential to reviving the economy, encouraging investment, restarting productive businesses and easing the burden on citizens," he said.
Lebanon’s Energy Minister Joe Saddi recently announced that he would no longer take part in cabinet sessions, citing what he called a lack of seriousness in dealing with the crisis and saying he refused to be held responsible for the lack of progress in the sector.
Saddi and fellow ministers from the Lebanese Forces party walked out of a cabinet session on Thursday over the issue.
Lebanon has suffered a decades-long electricity crisis which saw the emergence of an unofficial and largely unregulated network of private generators across the country. These generators typically run on fuel oil, contributing significantly to poor air quality in cities, while charging consumers high prices.
The energy sector virtually collapsed following Lebanon’s 2019 financial collapse, with the national grid barely keeping the lights on for two hours a day. Before this, Beirut, where many of Lebanon’s government institutions are located, had up to 20 hours of electricity a day, with rotating blackouts in the rest of the country.
Much of Lebanon has gradually moved to renewable energy alternatives, relying on solar panels to manage their electricity needs, although this option remains somewhat limited in larger cities like Beirut due to restricted rooftop space in residential buildings.
There has been an outcry among generator subscribers this year, with bills reaching hundreds of US dollars a month in some areas. Operators, many of whom control supply in particular neighbourhoods and are linked to sectarian political parties, have attributed rising costs to higher global fuel prices as a result of the Middle East war.
Lebanon’s electricity sector is estimated to have cost the country more than $40 billion since the end of its 1975-1990 civil war, largely because of heavy subsidies and the cost of importing fuel for ageing power stations. These costs account for a substantial share of the treasury’s losses.
On Thursday, Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez said that renewable energy now accounts for more than one-fifth of the country’s electricity generation as it seeks to reduce the impact of U.S. fuel restrictions.
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Cuba Accuses United States of Pressuring UN Votes on Blockade
In a post on X, Rodriguez said the Cuban government and Communist Party were responding to the U.S. energy blockade, which “aims to punish all Cubans,” with “greater sovereignty and measures” to ease the impact of U.S. sanctions.
Cuba now has 144 solar parks with a combined installed capacity of 1,418 megawatts, while renewable sources account for 21.4 percent of national electricity generation, he said.
The country also has 44 solar-powered electric vehicle charging stations and 64 public charging stations, he said, adding that all polyclinics, nursing homes, maternity homes and funeral homes have been equipped with renewable energy facilities.
🇨🇺 At the @UN, #Cuba condemned the U.S. blockade and energy siege as tools of economic coercion, hallmarks of a foreign policy that disregards multilateralism.
— Southern Africa Eye (@eye_southern) October 16, 2026
"We reaffirm our commitment to decolonization and the defense of our sovereignty and right to self-determination". pic.twitter.com/OA20PdV7Zl
In January, U.S. President Donald Trump signed an executive order imposing sanctions and tariffs on countries and entities supplying fuel to Cuba, a move Havana has condemned as an “energy blockade.”
Over the past nine months, Cuba has received only one shipment of crude oil from Russia, totaling about 100,000 tonnes, only enough to meet the country’s demand for two weeks.
Cuba is scheduled to submit a resolution to the United Nations General Assembly on Oct. 29 for the 34th time, calling for an end to the U.S. economic, commercial and financial blockade imposed on the island for more than six decades.
According to Cuban government figures, the blockade has caused nearly 179 billion U.S. dollars in economic losses.
teleSUR/ JF
Source: Xinhua
Dopo questa decisione sul diesel, la guerra potrebbe essere appena diventata molto più semplice e più netta.
Trump sta forse pensando di avvalersi di Putin per tirarsi fuori dal pasticcio causato sia dai suoi bassi consensi nei sondaggi sia dalla guerra con l’Iran? A prima vista potrebbe sembrare inverosimile, ma egli è completamente intrappolato nella questione iraniana, e qualsiasi opzione prenda in considerazione sembra portare a uno scenario apocalittico. Potrebbe Putin aiutarlo sia a risolvere la questione dei prezzi del gasolio nel Paese, sia a negoziare un accordo con l’Iran che faccia apparire agli americani che lui, e l’America, siano in qualche modo i vincitori?
Il fatto che il presidente russo venda quasi 2 milioni di tonnellate di gasolio ai Paesi occidentali, compresi ovviamente gli Stati Uniti, sembra un cerotto su una ferita enorme nelle economie americana e occidentale. A meno che, ovviamente, non vi sia un secondo accordo dietro le quinte di cui giornalisti ed esperti non siano a conoscenza, o che semplicemente scelgano di non riportare. Per quanto riguarda l’iniziativa di Putin sul gasolio, la quantità offerta non è enorme, ma vi sono un paio di precedenti che essa stabilisce e che sono più importanti.
In primo luogo, apre le porte a un’ulteriore revoca delle sanzioni (che potrebbe essere abbinata a quella relativa all’Iran, date le relazioni di Mosca con Teheran), ma, cosa forse ancora più importante, rende il presidente ucraino Zelensky un bersaglio ancora più importante per Trump. Molto dipenderà dai prossimi giorni e dalla decisione che Zelensky prenderà riguardo al proseguimento dei bombardamenti contro gli impianti petroliferi russi. Prenderà quella pillola suicida? Le guerre sono spesso caotiche e vi sono sempre zone d’ombra in cui i due paesi in conflitto si trovano di fronte a situazioni illogiche e impraticabili. Forse i bombardamenti degli impianti petroliferi russi nell’ambito della guerra in Ucraina hanno raggiunto il loro punto di svolta e, indipendentemente da quanto i leader dell’UE siano vicini a Zelensky – che, nella migliore delle ipotesi, possiamo definire un leader ad interim – ciò metterà alla prova questo rapporto fino al punto di rottura.
È necessario che un gran numero di cittadini in Francia e Germania muoia quest’inverno semplicemente a causa di una crisi energetica e/o di una crisi economica nei propri paesi, che hanno investito miliardi per mantenere viva la guerra in Ucraina? Putin è così sicuro che quest’inverno sarà l’ultimo per le sue truppe, dato che la linea difensiva tra le forze ucraine e quelle russe sembra sul punto di cedere da un momento all’altro? Gli stessi ucraini sono pronti ad affrontare un inverno gelido a Kiev, incapaci di fornire elettricità o riscaldamento ai propri appartamenti? Tante guerre sono iniziate per le riserve energetiche, ma non quella in Ucraina. Eppure potrebbe finire proprio per quelle.
I commenti minacciosi di Trump sui social media riguardo a Zelensky dovrebbero essere presi sul serio. Se la stessa cricca di consiglieri incompetenti di Trump riesce davvero a convincerlo che un’invasione terrestre dell’Iran sia fattibile, se non addirittura vincente, si potrebbe semplicemente sostenere che un cambio di regime in Ucraina dovrebbe essere un gioco da ragazzi e garantirgli un enorme guadagno – dal punto di vista politico, economico e geopolitico. La rimozione di Zelensky porrebbe immediatamente fine alla guerra, e Trump potrebbe rivendicarne la vittoria, mentre chiede al suo amico Putin di intervenire discretamente in Iran e di risolvere la questione dello Stretto di Hormuz.
Il fatto che Trump abbia effettivamente reagito allo sfogo di Zelensky davanti ai giornalisti – secondo cui la decisione di acquistare gasolio russo fosse «debole» – minacciando di destituirlo, dimostra che la sua pazienza ha raggiunto un punto in cui sta iniziando a considerare il presidente ucraino come la fonte dei problemi. Rimuovere Zelensky sostenendo un rivale sarà difficile e lo metterà in contrasto con i leader dell’UE, ma si potrebbe sostenere che le relazioni non potrebbero davvero peggiorare ulteriormente e che, una volta che Macron e Merz avranno compreso che la pace è l’unica opzione e che Zelensky è in realtà l’unico vero ostacolo a ciò, faranno ciò che fanno tutti i leader dell’UE e seguiranno l’esempio degli Stati Uniti.
Spesso sentiamo gli analisti su YouTube parlare del gioco del «chi ha più coraggio», ma non c’è mai stato un momento più fugace di questo, poiché sia Trump che Zelensky si osserveranno a vicenda per vedere chi batterà ciglio per primo. Zelensky, fino ad ora, ha condotto un gioco pericoloso fingendo di essere servile nei confronti dell’egemonia statunitense, mentre in realtà si limitava a incassare denaro e armi e a ridere di Trump in mezzo a una cerchia di deboli leader europei nelle loro residenze sontuose. La guerra è stata complessa sin dall’inizio, poiché gli Stati Uniti e l’UE raramente erano d’accordo, ma se Trump dovesse dare seguito alla sua minaccia di negare agli ucraini la condivisione di informazioni di intelligence, ciò costituirebbe un pessimo presagio per il futuro di Zelensky, poiché egli eserciterà una pressione ancora maggiore su britannici, francesi e tedeschi affinché forniscano ulteriori armi e denaro in una guerra impossibile da vincere, su cui hanno puntato tutto e da cui dipendono le loro intere carriere politiche.
La guerra, dopo questa decisione sul gasolio, potrebbe essere appena diventata molto più semplice e binaria, e dalla follia delle farneticazioni dell’UE potrebbe emergere una narrativa collettiva da parte di paesi che non riescono nemmeno a proteggere la propria popolazione sul proprio territorio dall’invasione di falsi richiedenti asilo. Non sarà solo la prova definitiva per le relazioni tra Stati Uniti e Ucraina, ma anche per quelle tra Stati Uniti e UE, e potrebbe forse rappresentare la fine della NATO così come la conosciamo.
When Rudolph Diesel disappeared in 1913, many suspected foul play. The prime suspects were Germany’s Kaiser Wilhelm II and US oil man John D. Rockefeller. Both would have had reason to want the inventor of the diesel engine dead. The militaristic kaiser was building a diesel-powered submarine fleet. He had no interest in other countries […]
The post Rudolph Diesel was thinking of farmers when he invented his engine appeared first on Asia Times.
A spike in diesel prices is hammering broad sectors of the US economy – especially agriculture and shipping – and becoming a flash point ahead of the November 2026 midterm elections. This squeeze has prompted Republicans from hard-hit farm states to call for a ban on US diesel exports, with President Donald Trump reportedly weighing […]
The post Is the world pricing the risk of a US diesel export ban? appeared first on Asia Times.
The U.S. Army is pursuing a family of modular and scalable laser directed energy weapons that can be fitted to any vehicle in its inventory. The service sees this as key to expanding the operational use of lasers, particularly to provide an extra layer of defense against drone threats, and outside of dedicated units. The Army is already fielding high-energy lasers operationally on a limited basis, including along the border wth Mexico, but the technology has faced continued hurdles to more widespread use in recent years.
Army officials and industry representatives discussed what is currently called the Enduring-High Energy Laser (E-HEL) program during a panel discussion this week at the Association of the U.S. Army’s (AUSA) main annual convention, at which TWZ was in attendance. In September, AeroVironment received the first production contract under E-HEL to supply examples of its 30-kilowatt-class LOCUST X3 laser directed energy weapon system. The Army has already acquired earlier LOCUST variants, including vehicle-mounted and palletized types, through more experimental programs, and these are the systems now deployed along the southern border. The U.S. Navy has also at least tested a containerized version of LOCUST for shipboard use as part of its own larger laser ambitions.
“We’re focused on any vehicle in the motorpool. I want to try to integrate future capability of high-energy lasers into it,” Army Brig. Gen. Guy Yelverton, the Capability Program Executive for Defensive Fires with the Portfolio Acquisition Executive Office for Fires, said during the panel on Monday. “And, so, our E-HEL is on a sled. With that, I can look at integrating it onto multiple different vehicles.”
“And then, as I think about vehicle agnosticness, if I open up my aperture to MOS [military occupation speciality] agnostic, and ensure that it’s easy to train, easy to operate, I can not just focus on air and missile defense organizations,” he continued. “I can now look at any formation type to be able to put a high-energy laser capability into it for the counter-UAS [uncrewed aerial systems] fight.”
“That gives me even more opportunities to share this capability across all Army formations, and give our senior leaders [the] maximum amount of thought process and input into where the system goes, who the soldier is that’s operating it, and I’ve given them quite a solution,” he added. “It’s a great dilemma to have of where do I put all this capability.”
In 2022, the Army reactivated the 4th Battalion, 60th Air Defense Artillery Regiment (4-60th ADA) at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, as part of plans to field new laser-armed Directed Energy Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense (DE M-SHORAD) systems based on the 8×8 Stryker light armored vehicle. Reliability and other issues with DE M-SHORAD vehicles led the Army to shift focus, and 4-60th ADA has since assumed a more traditional air defense role. The problems with the DE M-SHORAD system are indicative of struggles that have dogged laser-directed energy weapon developments across the U.S. military, and that have led to several other programs being severely truncated or outright cancelled in recent years.
The Army does now have the aforementioned LOCUST systems, including versions mounted on 4×4 Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTV) and Infantry Squad Vehicles (ISV), as well as the palletized types. Those systems appear to be currently fielded on a more ad hoc level to units at forward locations.
LOCUST is well suited to the Army’s current vision for fielding E-HEL without being tied to specific vehicles or unit types. At the core of the system is a turret with the laser beam projector, as well as built-in electro-optical and infrared video cameras for target acquisition and tracking. Other sensors, such as small-form-factor high-frequency radars and passive radio frequency signal detection systems on host vehicles, as well as off-board radars and other capabilities positioned elsewhere, can be used to cue the turret.
With the 30-kilowatt power rating, the new X3 versions of LOCUST the Army is acquiring now are still at the lower end of the power spectrum for laser directed energy weapons. All versions of LOCUST to date are geared explicitly toward countering small drones.
It is possible that the Army could field other types of laser directed energy weapon systems through E-HEL in the future. The service, in cooperation with other branches of the U.S. military, is also pursuing designs with far higher power ratings through separate programs.
Just being able to field LOCUST X3 more broadly would still offer valuable additional layers of defense against drones across different types of Army units. More broadly speaking, the central benefit that laser directed energy weapons offer is the promise of functionally unlimited magazine depth, though this is dependent on there being sufficient power and cooling capacity. This, in turn, translates to a substantial reduction in the cost-per-intercept equation compared to traditional anti-air interceptors. All of this is especially advantageous for tackling drone threats, which do not have to be large or expensive to present real dangers.
By miniaturizing and ruggedizing lower-power systems like LOCUST, the Army could distribute these capabilities across a broad area, or deploy them in a more concentrated fashion, depending on the fight. Even a convoy with a number of the vehicles sprinkled in with them could help defend it from pop-up attacks
In this context, mobility and flexibility are also important boons. LOCUST systems mounted on light vehicles can be readily positioned and repositioned to respond to changes on the battlefield, as well as be brought to forward locations slung under helicopters. Palletized and containerized versions offer additional kinds of flexibility for providing point defense at sites on land, as well as installation on ships.
At the panel on Monday, Brig. Gen. Yelverton stressed that when it comes to laser weapons systems, in general, the technology is no longer a matter of “science fiction” but has become “science reality.” The U.S. military says laser systems positioned along the border with Mexico have downed real targets, though many questions remain about those deployments. Regardless, challenges do clearly remain.
“Lasers are real. We can do it. We can go out. We can shoot things,” Kirk Williams, Chief Engineer at the Army’s Directed Energy Project Office, another one of the panelists, said. “But what we got to do now is make these systems reliable enough so that the soldiers have the faith in them when they need them, and that’s really the main point that we’re trying to go after right now.”
“We’re getting to the point where the systems are reliable enough, but we still have to make them maintainable and repairable because this is an Army system,” he continued. “It’s going to be on a battlefield. Things are going to break. We can break things in very creative ways, right? So if it’s not reliable, or if it’s not maintainable, if it’s not repairable, that’s a problem.”
“We’re also looking to reduce size, weight, and power,” he added. “JLTV has a lot better payload capacity than ISV. So we really need to be able to get something smaller if we want to have the same effectiveness on an ISV. So that same modular architecture will allow us to go in, take some of those components, make trade-offs.”
The focus on modular and open systems architectures will also help when it comes to integrating new and improved functionality down the line. It will also feed into the larger goal of having E-HEL options not tied to a particular vehicle or other platform.
“By going after the modular architecture, that gives us the flexibility to not only go after increases in reliability, but also increases in performance,” Williams further explained. “It gives us the way to inject new technology into existing systems, and then hopefully it also gives us a way of getting better prices out of some of our vendors.”
In addition, “one of the things we learned is you can have a really cool integrated system, and then when that truck needs an oil change, well, then your laser weapon system is down for the count,” he added. “So, trying to make it so that you can just pull it off of any vehicle, put it on any other vehicle is really one of the things that we’re trying to go after.”
The Army is also very cognizant of the basic fact that a single laser can only engage one target at once. The beam from any laser weapon system also drops in power as it gets further from the source, just because of the need to propagate through the atmosphere. Weather and other environmental conditions like smoke and dust then also become a factor. This has driven demand for more power (and cooling capacity) to improve effectiveness, especially at range. Developments in adaptive optics can also help overcome these issues to a degree, but lasers currently remain very short-range weapons overall.
“That’s why it’s important to us to get enough energy on the target to kill it as quickly as possible and move on to the next threat. Speaking about the magazine, you know I have battery power on there, so depending upon which system, around 80 seconds, 120 seconds, whatever that is, you know that’s the magazine depth I have,” Brig. Gen. Yelverton said on Monday. “The quicker I get on the target, kill it, and off the target, I start rebuilding, regenerating that magazine depth.”
“It’s the targeting system. It’s the optics system that lets you focus on the target,” Williams also chimed in at this point on the panel discussion. “I mentioned trying to make the trackers better and take some of the onus off of the operator. If we can do better aim point control and keep the laser in the same spot, it gives you a better and a quicker kill.”
Earlier on, Williams had highlighted how artificial intelligence-assisted targeting capabilities could be a particularly important addition to laser directed energy weapons. Networking multiple systems together could help with sorting and assigning targets as efficiently as possible.
When it comes to the actual operational employment of laser directed energy weapons, “as these systems get smaller, as they get more powerful, the quicker we could get them into our soldiers’ hands,” Army Col. Charles Kean, Deputy Commanding Officer for Support at the 7th Infantry Division at Joint Base Lewis-McChord in Washington state, another one of the panelists, said.
This, in turn, will open up important new opportunities to “operate with them forward, test them in the mud, the dirt, the humidity of the Pacific, test them down in the southern border where they’re different conditions, whether it’s in the Middle East and Europe, it’s applicable across the board,” Kean continued. “We have to understand it, get it in our hands as quickly as possible, so we could iterate it, iterate on it, and make it better and continue to iterate, because the adversaries continue to iterate in reverse against us.”
This last point is worth highlighting. The U.S. military’s chief global competitor, China, has been particularly active in the development and fielding of ground-based laser and other directed energy weapons, as well as designs for shipboard use. Chinese firms are selling laser weapon systems to foreign armed forces, as well. Other countries, including American allies and partners, are also very actively pursuing these capabilities.
Touted as the "world’s most powerful," China’s LY-1 ship-based laser air defense system was displayed on an eight-wheeled truck, with no specs released. pic.twitter.com/WalkQffaA9
— Polymarket Intel (@PolymarketIntel) September 3, 2025
Col. Kean also stressed that laser directed energy weapons would still only be one part of a larger layered air and missile defense ecosystem for the Army.
As it stands now, the Army hopes to have the first LOCUST X3 systems acquired through E-HEL in operational service by early 2028. A similar timeframe has been put forward for the separate Joint Laser Weapon System (JLWS) program, which the Army is also involved in. JLWS is aiming to produce a viable containerized 150-kilowatt-class laser directed energy weapon, with plans to work toward 300- and 500-kilowatt-class designs. At the panel on Monday, Scott Keeney, CEO of laser systems developer nLIGHT, which has been working together with AeroVironment on LOCUST, among other projects, said he saw further scaling up of capabilities to the one-megawatt-class as being on the horizon. This is a power rating the U.S. Navy has also talked about as a future goal.
The Army clearly sees E-HEL already as a path to truly operationalizing laser directed energy capabilities across the system, but the service itself acknowledges that there is still significant work to be done to make this goal a reality.
Contact the author: joe@twz.com
The post Army Wants High-Energy Laser Weapons It Can Put On “Any Vehicle In The Motorpool” appeared first on TWZ.
Europe’s trade deficit with China reached a record $34.8bn [€31bn] in September, as EU leaders meet in Brussels on Thursday (15 October) to discuss Europe’s competitiveness agenda and what they call “macroeconomic imbalances” — a euphemism to avoid mentioning China by name.
EU heads of state and government are expected to give a mandate to the EU Commission to propose a set of trade defence measures and tools to reduce the EU’s reliance on Chinese industry, based on a new Franco-German blueprint, as a united front spreads across the bloc.
There was a move towards a “surprising unitary position” on Beijing among member states, said an EU diplomat, ahead of a two-day summit in Brussels which began on Thursday (15 October).
A joint letter and policy paper submitted by French president Emmanuel Macron and German chancellor Friedrich Merz to commission president Ursula von der Leyen last week was viewed by many EU diplomats as marking a decisive shift towards a more consolidated EU stance on trade relations with China.
“For a long time, there were significant differences between these two countries on how to deal with China, how to address the economic situation,” parliament president Roberta Metsola told reporters on Thursday.
The diplomat added that the commission’s trade diversification package, designed to reduce the bloc’s reliance on Chinese industrial inputs and curb Chinese exports, will be presented by the end of the year and will be based on the Franco-German paper.
But the commission, for its part, has downplayed the prospect of rapid progress to EU-Chinese trade statistics. “It’s an issue which is not going to be solved in a couple of months,” said one official.
This article continues, but the full version is available only to EUobserver.com subscribers. Visit account.euobserver.com/membership
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said Thursday that Ukraine is ending a brief pause on attacks against Russian oil refineries and will resume the strikes, despite warnings from U.S. President Donald Trump.
“The block [on attacking refineries] is out. We’re done,” Zelensky told the Financial Times in an interview published Thursday.
Ukraine had refrained from striking Russian energy facilities for three days after U.S. President Donald Trump announced what he called an “energy ceasefire,” Zelensky said. During that period, Russian forces continued attacking Ukrainian energy infrastructure and civilian areas. Zelensky said more than 100 civilians were killed in Russian strikes over the past week.
Trump had pressed Ukraine to halt the refinery attacks, which he linked to rising diesel and fuel prices. He also moved to ease restrictions on Russian diesel imports. Moscow never confirmed it had agreed to any reciprocal pause on energy strikes.
Ukraine has for months used long-range drones to target Russian refineries in an effort to reduce revenue and fuel supplies supporting Moscow’s war effort. Western and Ukrainian assessments have reported significant damage to Russia’s refining capacity.
Zelensky also told the Financial Times that Ukrainian forces received no U.S. early-warning alerts for incoming ballistic missiles during the pause. He said Starlink satellite communications were restricted or slowed, affecting military operations. He rejected claims that the Starlink issues were technical, saying it was “a matter of will.” Ukrainian officials were warned that continued energy strikes could lead to a cutoff of U.S. intelligence sharing, he said.
Zelensky indicated Ukraine could consider further restraint only if the United States supplies additional Patriot interceptor missiles, which he described as the minimum requirement.
On Thursday, Russian authorities reported a large Ukrainian drone attack on the Ryazan region that caused a fire at a Rosneft-owned oil refinery. The plant accounts for roughly 5 percent of Russia’s refining capacity. Ryazan Gov. Pavel Malkov said emergency crews were assessing damage. No civilian casualties were reported. Russian officials said air defenses intercepted numerous drones.
The developments underscore continued friction between Kyiv and Washington over energy attacks, with reports already claiming that Trump was considering cutting off intelligence to Ukraine entirely.
The post Zelensky defies Trump, says Ukraine will resume strikes on Russian oil refineries appeared first on Remix News.
Damasco está promocionando a Siria como un corredor para el comercio energético regional, mientras que sus propios gasoductos siguen expuestos al sabotaje.
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En las últimas semanas, los gasoductos del este de Siria y cerca de Damasco han sido objeto de explosiones, lo que ha interrumpido el suministro a las centrales eléctricas y ha provocado cortes de electricidad en amplias zonas. Dos ataques contra tramos identificados como el gasoducto de Jbessa se calificaron oficialmente de sabotaje.
Una explosión independiente en la planta de Tishreen sigue siendo objeto de investigación. El momento en que se han producido estos incidentes ha llamado la atención, ya que Siria está negociando su papel en las rutas que transportan petróleo iraquí y gas regional hacia el Mediterráneo y más allá. Incluso un ataque limitado contra un gasoducto puede retrasar las reparaciones, reducir la generación de electricidad y desestabilizar a los inversores que están sopesando proyectos que costarán miles de millones.
La cuestión es quién sale beneficiado de mantener vulnerable la red energética de Siria y en qué medida las pruebas disponibles pueden revelarnos información sobre los autores.
El gasoducto de Jbessa y la explosión de Tishreen
El primer incidente confirmado tuvo lugar el 18 de agosto, cuando una explosión interrumpió el bombeo a través del gasoducto de exportación desde la planta de gas de Jbessa, situada en la zona rural de Hasaka, al noreste de Siria. La Compañía Siria de Petróleo afirmó que su investigación preliminar había concluido que se trataba de un sabotaje deliberado.
El gasoducto abastece a una región que alberga gran parte de la infraestructura de petróleo y gas de Siria, y la interrupción afectó al suministro de gas a las turbinas eléctricas. Los equipos aislaron los pozos, cerraron las válvulas de seguridad y comenzaron las reparaciones. No se registraron heridos. Ese primer ataque demostró cómo un golpe contra una sola válvula podía tener repercusiones mucho más allá del propio emplazamiento, y cómo los usuarios de electricidad de otros lugares acababan sufriendo las consecuencias.
El 28 de septiembre, el gasoducto de Jbessa fue atacado cerca de Al-Shula, en la zona rural de Deir Ezzor. Una explosión en una válvula seccional provocó un incendio y volvió a interrumpir el flujo de gas desde Jbessa hacia las centrales eléctricas.
El ministro de Energía, Mohammad al-Bashir, declaró posteriormente que se habían utilizado explosivos. En esta ocasión, los equipos de reparación tuvieron que sustituir un tramo de 18 metros de tubería de 16 pulgadas. La empresa anunció el 2 de octubre que se había reanudado el bombeo una vez finalizados los trabajos.
Según su director de gas terrestre, el gasoducto transportaba unos 950 000 metros cúbicos al día. Por lo tanto, los repetidos ataques contra él han afectado a una parte significativa del suministro de gas del que depende la generación de energía eléctrica en Siria.
El gasoducto de Jbessa abastece a la red de gas a través de la región central, incluida la zona en torno a Al-Furqlus, al este de Homs. Esto reviste especial importancia en un momento en el que Damasco está tratando de reparar la infraestructura existente y construir nuevas conexiones transfronterizas.
La ruta petrolera iraquí propuesta hasta Baniyas, en la costa, es un proyecto independiente, y no hay pruebas de que los ataques contra Jbessa tuvieran como objetivo directo ese futuro oleoducto. No obstante, los daños causados a las instalaciones energéticas en funcionamiento suponen una advertencia evidente para los gobiernos y las empresas que barajan la posibilidad de crear un sistema de tránsito mucho más amplio a través del territorio sirio. Necesitarían tener la seguridad de que los largos tramos de tuberías, los equipos de bombeo y los trabajadores encargados de su mantenimiento podrían estar protegidos.
El 30 de septiembre se produjeron otros dos incidentes violentos. En el puente de Masyaf, al oeste de Homs, hombres armados no identificados abrieron fuego contra un autobús que transportaba a trabajadores civiles, matando a siete e hiriendo a cuatro. Los informes iniciales de la SANA se referían a trabajadores civiles, mientras que los medios regionales los identificaron como ingenieros y empleados de una empresa eléctrica privada. El ataque se produjo dos días después del sabotaje de Shula, pero ninguna investigación ha establecido un vínculo entre ambos incidentes.
Esa misma noche, una explosión en un gasoducto que abastecía a la central térmica de Tishreen, en las afueras de Damasco, obligó a dejar fuera de servicio las centrales de Tishreen, Deir Ali y Al-Nasiriyah, lo que provocó cortes de electricidad más generalizados. Los bomberos lograron controlar el incendio y las autoridades comenzaron a restablecer el suministro de gas.
A diferencia de los dos incidentes de Jbessa, la causa aún no se había esclarecido cuando el ministro de Energía, Bashir, se pronunció en el lugar de los hechos. Afirmó que los inspectores determinarían si la explosión se había debido a un fallo técnico, a un ataque o a un acto de sabotaje una vez que la zona se hubiera enfriado.
¿Quién se beneficia de una Siria debilitada?
El Gobierno sirio no ha señalado a ningún responsable del sabotaje al gasoducto. El periodista y analista político Bassel al-Mohammed, en declaraciones a The Cradle, sostiene que los repetidos ataques contra las principales instalaciones de gas son difíciles de considerar como incidentes aislados.
Su efecto, afirma, va más allá del daño físico a una válvula o a un tramo de tubería. Cada interrupción refuerza la impresión de que Siria es un lugar inseguro para la inversión en infraestructuras energéticas, precisamente cuando Damasco busca socios para rehabilitar el sector y conectarlo con los Estados vecinos.
Para Mohammed, Israel se encuentra entre los posibles beneficiarios más destacados de la debilidad económica y de seguridad de Siria. Un Estado sirio que lucha por reconstruir su infraestructura tendría menos margen para resistir la presión en cualquier futuro acuerdo político o de seguridad, afirma.
También señala el papel que Siria podría desempeñar en el Gasoducto Árabe, que conecta la frontera jordana con la turca a través del territorio sirio, en el marco de la búsqueda de rutas menos expuestas a interrupciones en el estrecho de Ormuz.
La distribución de los incidentes, incluidos los daños en los alrededores de Tishreen, le lleva a plantearse si un grupo con conocimiento de las instalaciones críticas está operando en más de una zona.
El 29 de septiembre, entre los incidentes de Shula y Tishreen, la Compañía Petrolera Siria inauguró un nuevo tramo del proyecto del Gasoducto Árabe en Al-Furqlus. Las autoridades indicaron que el tramo completado añade 186 kilómetros a los aproximadamente 380 kilómetros de la línea existente, lo que eleva la red conectada a unos 566 kilómetros, con una capacidad declarada de hasta 11 millones de metros cúbicos de gas al día.
El diseño bidireccional da a Damasco margen para negociar los futuros flujos de gas. Por el momento, una ruta hacia Europa sigue siendo una posibilidad, aunque aún no se han formalizado los acuerdos de suministro y tránsito necesarios para que funcione.
Si estas conexiones llegaran a transportar más gas hacia el norte, podrían competir con algunos planes para ampliar las ventas de gas israelí procedentes de los yacimientos del Mediterráneo Oriental, incluidos Leviathan y Tamar. El grado de competencia dependería de los contratos de suministro, los precios y la capacidad que realmente se pusiera en servicio. No puede darse por sentado solo por la existencia de un gasoducto.
Aun así, Mohammed considera que a Israel le interesa estratégicamente limitar la capacidad de Siria para convertirse en un corredor fiable, especialmente mientras Damasco siga expuesto a la presión militar israelí en el sur.
Rutas energéticas y cálculos israelíes
La rivalidad en torno a Siria también se inscribe en una contienda más amplia por las rutas de transporte de petróleo y gas desde Irak y el Golfo. Los planes turcos de exportación a través de Ceyhan y las esperanzas sirias de reabrir una salida al Mediterráneo ofrecerían a los productores alternativas al estrecho de Ormuz.
Varias de estas rutas son propuestas o planes de rehabilitación, más que sustitutos viables de las terminales establecidas del Golfo. Sus perspectivas dependen de la financiación, la seguridad, los estudios técnicos y los acuerdos entre los gobiernos implicados. Considerar todas las rutas como si ya existieran exageraría tanto la influencia actual de Siria como la amenaza inmediata que suponen para los centros de tránsito rivales.
En febrero, The Cradle rastreó el posible origen israelí de parte del gas suministrado a Siria a través de Jordania, al tiempo que señalaba la opacidad de los contratos y la dificultad de determinar la fuente exacta de cada envío. Posteriormente, el Centro Begin-Sadat analizó cómo el gas israelí llegaba a Siria de forma indirecta a través de acuerdos regionales.
Una red de suministro más diversificada podría debilitar esa dependencia, pero la afirmación de que las nuevas líneas de tránsito harían que Damasco y Amán prescindieran por completo del gas israelí va más allá de lo que establecen los contratos disponibles.
Siria e Irak firmaron en julio memorandos sobre la rehabilitación del oleoducto Kirkuk-Baniyas, inactivo desde hace mucho tiempo. El director de la Compañía Petrolera Siria, Youssef Qiblawi, ha abordado la posibilidad de que las obras comiencen en el primer trimestre de 2027.
La ruta proporcionaría al crudo iraquí una salida al Mediterráneo, aunque aún se enfrenta a importantes obstáculos de ingeniería, financiación y seguridad.
Los acuerdos suponen un compromiso político para estudiar el corredor, no la finalización de un nuevo oleoducto. Las instalaciones portuarias costeras de Siria también necesitarían la capacidad y la protección necesarias para gestionar exportaciones sostenidas si el proyecto sigue adelante.
El investigador en materia de seguridad Aziz Moussa interpreta el sabotaje como un posible mensaje regional. En declaraciones a The Cradle, sitúa a Israel entre los sospechosos debido a su continua presión sobre Damasco y a sus incursiones en Quneitra.
En su valoración, los repetidos ataques contra instalaciones energéticas podrían agravar la fragilidad de la seguridad en Siria, minar la confianza en la reconstrucción y complicar los planes para un corredor energético. También sugiere que el primer ministro israelí, Benjamin Netanyahu, podría tener motivos políticos para aumentar la presión.
Moussa reconoce que ninguna de estas consideraciones demuestra que aviones o drones israelíes llevaran a cabo los ataques; las autoridades sirias no han presentado pruebas de tal ataque contra la línea de Jbessa.
Moussa señala una dificultad con respecto a esa teoría. Israel ha recurrido generalmente a ataques aéreos abiertos o atribuibles contra objetivos militares sirios. Un ataque encubierto contra infraestructuras civiles de gas mientras se debaten los acuerdos de seguridad representaría un patrón diferente.
Por lo tanto, deja abierta otra posibilidad: células del ISIS, que ya han atacado infraestructuras en Siria e Irak anteriormente. Para determinar la responsabilidad se necesitarían pruebas físicas de los lugares de los hechos y una investigación creíble sobre cómo llegaron hasta ellos los atacantes.
No obstante, los analistas energéticos israelíes han tomado nota de la ruta iraquí. En un artículo para el Instituto de Estrategia y Seguridad de Jerusalén (JISS), la investigadora Vita Avrahamov sostiene que restablecer el corredor Kirkuk-Baniyas podría reducir las perspectivas de Israel de convertirse en un importante centro de tránsito para la energía de Asia Occidental con destino a Europa.
Las propuestas de utilizar el gasoducto Eilat-Ashkelon y conectarlo con las redes del Golfo se enfrentarían a una ruta competidora que atraviesa Siria. En un artículo publicado en N12, también afirma que cada inversión que refuerce a Siria como Estado de tránsito energético ofrece a los Estados del Golfo y a Europa más alternativas, lo que reduce el incentivo para desarrollar una ruta competidora a través de Israel.
Su análisis considera que para Israel resulta ventajoso que los exportadores de petróleo dispongan de alternativas al estrecho de Ormuz y que se reduzca la influencia iraní. Las implicaciones económicas son, por tanto, mixtas, incluso desde una perspectiva estratégica israelí.
La advertencia de Avrahamov pone de manifiesto lo que podría costarle a Israel una ruta iraquí a través de Siria. Damasco, por su parte, pretende transportar la energía de la región a través de una red que los atacantes ya han interrumpido en dos ocasiones. Sus ambiciones dependerán tanto de mantener esas líneas en funcionamiento como de los acuerdos firmados para ampliarlas.
Publicado originalmente por Geopolítica rugiente
La dichiarazione di Trump offre una prospettiva mediatica molto interessante e potrebbe segnare la fine del “Progetto Ucraina”, un argomento che merita di essere approfondito.
Nessuno si sarebbe aspettato che Donald Trump, dopo una telefonata di auguri di compleanno al suo omologo russo, dichiarasse che il gasolio russo si sarebbe rivelato la soluzione all’attuale carenza di carburante negli Stati Uniti. Se la presidenza Trump ha prodotto qualcosa, sono stati molti titoli interessanti che sembrano spuntare dal nulla e che, purtroppo, molto spesso, svaniscono nuovamente nella nebbia da cui sono emersi. A volte le parole di Trump possono riempirci di speranza, come in questo «accordo sul gasolio», mentre altre, come il suo recente discorso alle Nazioni Unite, in cui ha minacciato di uccidere potenzialmente tutti gli iraniani, ci riempiono di terrore. Questa dichiarazione del nostro enigmatico leader presenta una narrazione mediatica molto interessante e una potenziale conclusione del «Progetto Ucraina» che vale la pena approfondire.
Trump ha accusato Zelensky della carenza energetica globale, in particolare per quanto riguarda il gasolio. All’epoca, tutti pensavano che si trattasse solo di una banale manovra diversiva in stile Twitter per sviare l’attenzione dalla fallita guerra contro l’Iran, che certamente ha causato notevoli interruzioni nel trasporto di carburante. In altre parole, la Casa Bianca stava proiettando questa crisi – che aveva permesso che si verificasse, o che aveva attivamente provocato – addossandola al capro espiatorio Zelensky. Tuttavia, questa forma di diversione o proiezione non è più solo una questione di parole in una narrativa pre-elettorale, ma si è trasformata in azione concreta. Le sanzioni sul gasolio russo sono state revocate e la prima spedizione è già in viaggio mentre scrivo queste righe. È accaduto qualcosa di tangibile.
Zelensky è stato infatti avvertito circa sei volte di smettere di attaccare le infrastrutture petrolifere russe. Far saltare in aria dei bambini nel Donbass e oltre va «bene», ma attaccare ciò che l’Occidente vuole dalla Russia più di ogni altra cosa è «assolutamente inaccettabile». Zelensky, al quale – come indicato sopra – era stato intimato una mezza dozzina di volte di sospendere gli attacchi alle infrastrutture petrolifere e del gas, dopo aver appreso della decisione di Trump di acquistare gasolio russo, ha agito come segue:
1) Ha rapidamente attaccato nuovamente le infrastrutture petrolifere russe, apparentemente per fare un dispetto al Presidente degli Stati Uniti
2) Ha immediatamente interrotto i colloqui di pace a Miami con i collaboratori di Trump, il duo Kushner-Witkoff, il che rappresenta l’ennesimo schiaffo in faccia a Donald Trump.
La cosa più incredibile di tutte è che il «narcisista» Trump abbia già pubblicamente ringraziato il presidente Putin due volte per questo accordo. Durante un comizio, gli americani in piedi dietro a Trump hanno applaudito con grande entusiasmo all’annuncio della pace con la Russia e dell’approvvigionamento extra di carburante per l’America. La russofobia è un passatempo della borghesia globalista e di «Epstein Island», non dei camionisti e degli agricoltori americani.
È una narrazione eccellente, speriamo che duri
Trump ha ora attribuito il 100% della colpa dei problemi energetici e di approvvigionamento globali direttamente a Zelensky, accusandolo personalmente di aver alimentato la guerra negli ultimi due anni. Pertanto, la narrazione sta prendendo forma più o meno così: Se la guerra in Ucraina è la causa della carenza di carburante e Zelensky è la causa del protrarsi della guerra, ciò significa che gli Stati Uniti possono stringere un accordo con la Russia anche se «sono stati loro a iniziare», con la conseguenza logica che Zelensky debba logicamente andarsene, poiché è lui la fonte del problema. Ma approfondendo ulteriormente la narrazione, possiamo cogliere l’aspetto più interessante di tutti o, come si suol dire online, «la parte taciuta»: Trump ha sostanzialmente dichiarato che la produzione energetica russa riveste un interesse strategico vitale per gli Stati Uniti.
Sono proprio queste parole a togliermi la «pillola nera» dalla bocca e a iniettarmi direttamente «hopium» nel sangue. L’idea che il Presidente americano dichiari che NON essere in guerra con la Russia riveste un interesse strategico vitale per gli Stati Uniti è qualcosa che ho sognato per tutta la mia vita da adulto. Questa è esattamente la logica di cui abbiamo bisogno per porre fine, una volta per tutte, alla mentalità della Guerra Fredda e del «Progetto per un Nuovo Secolo Americano» in politica e consentire finalmente agli Stati Uniti di ricostruirsi e investire in se stessi. Questo potrebbe benissimo rappresentare il risveglio multipolare dell’America, utilizzando una trappola logica simile a quelle che sono state impiegate in passato per ottenere l’esatto contrario e mantenere gli Stati Uniti intrappolati in eterne guerre all’estero, condotte per il puro lusso della «sicurezza nazionale».
Questa nuova trappola logica potrebbe presentarsi più o meno così: «Quindi volete la guerra con la Russia? Ciò significa che volete danneggiare l’America, sporco traditore! Prenderete il carburante al contadino Joe e i nostri figli moriranno di fame, mostro che non siete altro! Lasciare che la Russia produca carburante in pace è un interesse di sicurezza nazionale per l’America; siete forse contrari alla sicurezza nazionale del nostro Paese? Volete indebolire la virile America per conto di quegli europei omosessuali?».
Ma mentre ci iniettiamo quella dose di «hopium» nelle vene, dobbiamo ricordare che Donald Trump ha detto molte cose, ha cambiato idea numerose volte, o è stato costretto a farlo, e forse non è proprio il decisore unilaterale che si dipinge in televisione.
Ci vogliono due per ballare il tango, ma basta un uomo arancione per mantenere la parola data.
Le trascrizioni di questa ormai famosa conversazione telefonica di compleanno appaiono molto diverse tra la versione americana e quella russa, il che è del tutto normale. Il team di Trump tende a riportare gli argomenti discussi come fatti accertati, mentre i russi utilizzano un linguaggio più evasivo. Ma le sanzioni sul gasolio sono state sospese per ora e le navi si stanno muovendo, quindi la cosa sembra essere reale… almeno fino a quando non si terranno le elezioni di medio termine.
Da allora la parte americana ha minacciato di escludere Zelensky dalla condivisione di informazioni di intelligence, il che potrebbe rappresentare un colpo mortale immediato per i loro sforzi militari, poiché molti esperti ritengono che solo le informazioni degli Stati Uniti abbiano permesso loro di sopravvivere così a lungo. Senza tali dati di puntamento, verrebbero immediatamente riportati alla guerra del XX secolo e non sarebbero più in grado di sferrare attacchi in profondità nel territorio russo. RT ha scritto quanto segue su questo tema:
Un funzionario ucraino ha riferito ad Axios che Witkoff e Kushner hanno minacciato di interrompere la condivisione delle informazioni di intelligence statunitensi con Kiev qualora questa continuasse a ignorare le richieste di Trump di sospendere gli attacchi alle raffinerie di petrolio russe, ma il funzionario statunitense ha negato che fosse stata formulata una simile minaccia.
Ma è qui che dobbiamo trattenere il respiro, poiché nonostante questa nuova narrativa possa sembrare allettante e rappresenti l’uscita perfetta per gli Stati Uniti dalla loro partecipazione al «Progetto Ucraina», non dovremmo dimenticare le parole del presidente Putin di qualche tempo fa, quando parlò del vero potere di qualsiasi presidente degli Stati Uniti:
«Quindi una persona viene eletta — arriva con delle idee… Poi vanno a trovarlo persone con le valigette, ben vestite, in abiti scuri — un po’ come i miei.»
Quindi la vera domanda potrebbe essere: la lobby sionista, l’élite di Epstein, le agenzie di intelligence a tre lettere, i miliardari influenti e tutti gli altri agenti segreti di Capitol Hill permetteranno davvero al presidente Trump di porre fine a questa guerra? Al Presidente degli Stati Uniti sarà consentito farlo?
Dovremmo ricordare che, dopo che Zelensky si è comportato in modo vergognoso alla Casa Bianca all’inizio del secondo mandato di Trump, tutti pensavano che questo conflitto sarebbe finito. Trump, il famoso narcisista, appariva visibilmente arrabbiato e offeso davanti alle telecamere durante il loro scontro verbale. Ma la guerra è proseguita. C’è stato il vertice di Anchorage, che ha suscitato un enorme clamore e tutti pensavano allora che gli Stati Uniti avrebbero ritirato il sostegno a Kiev. Ma così non è stato. I nemici di Trump, compreso il clan Biden, sono coinvolti in un enorme scandalo di corruzione in Ucraina, ormai tutto allo scoperto. Questa sarebbe stata un’ottima via d’uscita dal conflitto, ma Trump non l’ha colta o non ha potuto farlo. E, in generale, la retorica di Trump nei confronti di Zelensky e di altri politici europei è stata palesemente dura e irrispettosa. L’uomo accusato di essere un «spaccone» in qualche modo parla sempre in modo piuttosto cortese sia alle spalle che in faccia a Putin e Xi.
Pertanto, sebbene io desideri la pace e una cooperazione improntata al rispetto reciproco tra gli Stati Uniti e la Russia, forse questo accordo durerà solo fino alle elezioni di medio termine, quando all’improvviso Zelensky tornerà a essere «un bastardo, ma è il nostro bastardo», e il conflitto proseguirà senza sosta.
Forse questa è la nostra «sorpresa di ottobre» da parte della fazione repubblicana? E a dicembre potremo tutti essere «di nuovo sorpresi» quando la guerra riprenderà con tutta la sua forza e altre migliaia di slavi moriranno sul campo di battaglia?
Ora, Donald Trump, a denti stretti, sta lanciando l’idea secondo cui ritiene «sia giunto il momento che l’Ucraina abbia un nuovo presidente». Ma una volta conteggiati i voti in America, potrebbe semplicemente tornare a odiare passivamente e a tollerare Zelensky fino alla fine del suo mandato o fino a quando un giorno un certo Oreshnik non colpirà nel segno. Non possiamo inoltre dimenticare che l’Occidente sta da tempo esercitando pressioni affinché i russi concedano un cessate il fuoco di ampia portata. Presumibilmente ciò verrebbe utilizzato per riorganizzarsi, riposarsi, riarmarsi e poi tornare semplicemente a combattere fino all’ultimo ucraino. Ora Trump vuole che si tengano elezioni a Kiev, il che probabilmente richiederà un cessate il fuoco per poter essere attuato. Ma spingerà per un cessate il fuoco di tre giorni, o cercherà di indurre con l’inganno i russi ad accettare una tregua di un mese o più?
Un «buon» segnale su questa questione dal punto di vista russo è che ora ci sono già richieste di dimissioni di Zelensky su Twitter/X provenienti da tutte le parti, persino da quelle filo-ucraine:
«“Zelensky deve dimettersi” – media ucraini. Ci hanno messo poco. Zelensky ha ignorato per ben SEI volte gli avvertimenti di Trump di non attaccare le raffinerie di petrolio russe. Questa mattina, Zelensky ha bombardato un’altra raffineria di petrolio russa. Gli ucraini chiedono le dimissioni di Zelensky.
L’ex deputato ucraino e comproprietario di Metinvest, Vadym Novynskyi, ha esortato Zelensky a dimettersi e a cedere tutti i poteri alla Verkhovna Rada ucraina a seguito degli accordi tra Trump e Putin.»
Dobbiamo ricordare che l’Ucraina del 2026 è già uno Stato di polizia in cui qualsiasi dissenso comporta il rischio di essere caricati su un autobus e portati al fronte a morire, oppure di scomparire in una prigione con l’accusa di essere una «spia» russa. Pertanto, quando personalità di rilievo si coalizzano apertamente contro Zelensky, si tratta di una dichiarazione ben più incisiva rispetto agli attori di Hollywood che, al sicuro nelle loro lussuose camere da letto, realizzano video su TikTok contro Trump.
Il resto del mondo non resterà a guardare senza fare nulla.Presto dagli account bot di Kiev emergerà sicuramente qualche stupida contro-narrazione del tipo «Putin ha tradito i BRICS». Ovviamente qualcuno dirà che il Cremlino ha gettato i propri fratelli iraniani in pasto alla macchina della lobby sionista! Ma in realtà, sembra che gli iraniani si limiteranno semplicemente a spedire il proprio petrolio attraverso la Russia e a venderlo come «russo», e tutti ne saranno soddisfatti. Il Mar Caspio sarà ancora più trafficato nel prossimo futuro. Se le sanzioni hanno ottenuto qualcosa, è stato proprio quello di aumentare il commercio tra Russia e Iran.
A Mosca nessuno ha intenzione di tradire Teheran; si vuole che l’America entri a far parte del mondo multipolare, salvando al contempo la faccia e riducendo il livello globale di minaccia di guerra nucleare, che attualmente è decisamente troppo elevato. L’Iran e la Cina sono stati sicuramente consultati su questa questione prima che qualsiasi accordo sul diesel fosse finalizzato.
Il vero pericolo che Trump invochi la destituzione di Zelensky proviene dall’Europa, dove alcune fazioni, politici e i loro finanziatori potrebbero intraprendere azioni radicali in risposta. E la reazione di Trump a tale risposta potrebbe ora rivelarsi ancora più radicale. Sarebbe possibile che la NATO desse il via libera ai Paesi baltici per aprire semplicemente un altro fronte e «vedere cosa succede»? La Francia metterà finalmente in atto la propria minaccia e schiererà apertamente truppe in massa per salvare il «Napoleone in verde» dalla morte politica o, potenzialmente, fisica? Finora l’UE si è limitata a minacciare ulteriori sanzioni. Se gli oltre 20 pacchetti di sanzioni precedenti hanno fallito, mi chiedo cosa rimanga effettivamente da sanzionare. Ursula promette il pacchetto di sanzioni più ampio e di maggiore portata per lunedì 12 ottobre, ma dubito che cambierà qualcosa. L’unica cosa che potrebbe cambiare la situazione sarebbe un’azione militare da parte dell’UE davvero aggressiva, drastica e sconsiderata.
E il resto delle sanzioni?I media russi hanno reso un disservizio al pubblico scrivendo ripetutamente che «Trump revoca le sanzioni», quando le uniche sanzioni revocate riguardano le esportazioni di gasolio per sei mesi. Tutte le altre sanzioni sono ancora in vigore. Non è ancora possibile volare direttamente da Mosca a New York e i trasferimenti di denaro tramite SWIFT sono ancora in gran parte bloccati. Dobbiamo ricordare che, almeno in teoria, le sanzioni sono una forma di punizione per i crimini commessi contro, in questo caso, il diritto internazionale e gli Stati Uniti. Come possono quindi normalizzarsi veramente le relazioni tra gli Stati Uniti e la Federazione Russa quando l’una parte accusa ancora l’altra di crimini che ritiene non siano stati nemmeno commessi?
Una volta concluso il «Progetto Ucraina», le cose potrebbero cambiare rapidamente, ma non potrà esserci vera amicizia finché Washington non avrà fiducia in Aeroflot al punto da consentirle di atterrare sul territorio statunitense. Non possiamo trovarci contemporaneamente in una guerra di sanzioni e in una situazione di normalizzazione. Ma questa nuova narrativa di Trump, se riuscirà a portarla avanti fino alla sua logica conclusione, rappresenta la via d’uscita perfetta per l’America e il modo in cui potremo finalmente porre fine a questa guerra e tornare a un certo senso di normalità, con l’apocalisse relegata in un futuro lontano, ben oltre la durata delle nostre vite.
The first criminal trial arising from the destruction of the Nord Stream gas pipelines has opened in Hamburg, confronting German judges with allegations against a former Ukrainian military officer and a dispute over whether Russian energy infrastructure constituted a legitimate wartime target.
Serhii Kuznietsov, 50, is accused of organising an operation that destroyed three of the four Nord Stream pipeline strands in the Baltic Sea in September 2022. German prosecutors have charged him with offences involving explosives, damage to infrastructure and participation in a war crime.
At the opening hearing on 14 October, Kuznietsov’s lawyers sought to have the proceedings dismissed, challenging both the evidence against their client and the prosecution’s classification of the pipelines as protected civilian infrastructure.
According to the account of the opening proceedings, the defence argued that the installations served Russia’s strategic interests and had been used to exert economic and political pressure on European countries.
Kuznietsov denies involvement in the explosions. His lawyers maintain that the prosecution has not established that he participated in, let alone directed, the operation.
The explosions occurred on 26 September 2022, approximately seven months after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Underwater detonations near the Danish island of Bornholm ruptured sections of Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2, releasing large quantities of natural gas into the Baltic Sea.
German investigators allege that a group of Ukrainians used a rented sailing yacht, the Andromeda, to transport divers, explosives and equipment to the pipelines.
According to the prosecution, the operation involved military-grade explosive devices and was organised with the knowledge or direction of Ukrainian state authorities.
These allegations remain to be tested in court. Ukrainian officials have denied state involvement, and no German judicial finding has established responsibility on the part of Kyiv’s political or military leadership.
The defendant was arrested in Italy in August 2025 and subsequently extradited to Germany following lengthy legal proceedings.
As EU Today reported following the Italian Supreme Court’s ruling, Kuznietsov’s defence had challenged the legality of his transfer and questioned the evidence underpinning the German investigation.
His appearance in Hamburg now moves the case from extradition disputes to direct examination of the prosecution’s allegations.
The central legal controversy concerns whether the Nord Stream infrastructure was entitled to protection as a civilian installation during an international armed conflict.
Under international humanitarian law, civilian objects are generally protected against attack unless their nature, location, purpose or use makes an effective contribution to military action and their destruction offers a definite military advantage.
Kuznietsov’s defence argues that Nord Stream had served Russian strategic interests by generating energy revenue and providing Moscow with leverage over European governments.
Defence lawyer Nicola Canestrini has described the pipelines as an instrument of Russian economic coercion rather than infrastructure serving an exclusively civilian purpose.
German prosecutors reject the proposition that those circumstances automatically justified their destruction. They maintain that the operation involved attacks against civilian infrastructure and therefore constituted a war crime.
The legal assessment is more complicated than determining who owned the pipelines.
Financial benefits to a belligerent state do not necessarily make every commercial installation a military objective. Equally, civilian ownership or use does not automatically exclude infrastructure from becoming a military target if the conditions established under the laws of armed conflict are satisfied.
The operational circumstances in September 2022 could become important. Nord Stream 1 had already ceased delivering gas, while Nord Stream 2 had never received German certification to begin commercial operations.
The court will therefore have to consider both the pipelines’ strategic significance and their actual contribution to Russia’s military operations at the time of the explosions.
Kuznietsov’s lawyers have also argued that his military status restricts his ability to discuss information that could be covered by Ukrainian state secrecy obligations.
According to the opening-day court reporting, the defence contends that these restrictions undermine his ability to challenge the prosecution’s case.
The proceedings also raise questions concerning the legality of his extradition from Italy and the precise offences for which his transfer was authorised.
These are separate from the underlying question of responsibility for the explosions. A procedural objection could affect the conduct of the trial without resolving the factual allegations.
The case has implications for relations between Germany and Ukraine, although criminal responsibility must be determined independently of diplomatic considerations.
Germany remains a major supplier of military and financial assistance to Kyiv. At the same time, German prosecutors are pursuing allegations that Ukrainian personnel damaged infrastructure in which German companies had invested heavily.
The pipelines themselves remain politically contentious. As EU Today previously examined, the owner of Nord Stream 2 has separately challenged the EU’s plans to eliminate Russian gas imports, demonstrating that the commercial and legal consequences of Europe’s former energy relationship with Moscow remain unresolved.
The Hamburg trial will not determine the legality of Russia’s invasion, nor will it establish Ukrainian government responsibility merely because a former officer stands accused.
It will examine the evidence against Kuznietsov and the circumstances in which the destruction of infrastructure connected to an aggressor state can constitute a criminal offence.
Further hearings are scheduled, with the evidentiary proceedings expected to begin on 27 October. The outcome will depend on whether prosecutors can establish the defendant’s alleged role and overcome the legal challenges raised by his defence.
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