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There’s no way to fight the Empire without bypassing its control of the international financial system.
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All hell is already breaking loose when it comes to probing what is exactly taking place related to the latest, definitely murky U.S.-linked movements in Pakistani land and sea. After an initial assessment at Transition Protocol – which avowedly did not provide all the necessary answers – we dug deeper into a way more comprehensive examination supported by several sources.
What we are watching across several nodes of extremely sensitive Iran-Pakistan overland connectivity is not a blanket border shutdown; but a surgical, two-track balancing act by Islamabad between Washington’s tremendous financial vise and Tehran’s strategic lifeline.
So here’s where it all stands – compounding the verified record with our latest consultations.
The key point: the regulatory trigger was a banking sanctions move, not just border security.
While provincial officials in Balochistan publicly framed Saturday’s halt at two key nodes, Taftan and Gabd–Rimdan, around security, counterterrorism, and anti-smuggling, what matters most is the exact mechanism around a memorandum issued last Friday by the Pakistani Ministry of Commerce.
That immediately revoked an October 3 extension of the Electronic Import Form (EIF) waiver for goods imported from Iran, and coincided with Islamabad’s instruction to close the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) immigration gate at Taftan.
What is key is that without the EIF waiver, Pakistani importers must process Iranian purchases through formal Pakistani banking channels – which U.S. sanctions, of course, make absolutely impossible.
Peyman Sanandaji, head of the Transportation Commission at the Tehran Chamber of Commerce, confirmed on the record that it is banking sanctions compliance (ditching the EIF) that halted Iranian exports into Pakistan.
The immediate shock at the formal gates was quite something: more than 4,000 tons of daily Iranian LPG imports through Gabd–Rimdan are at risk. Former Quetta Chamber of Commerce president Ayoub Miryani reported that over 2,000 containers are stranded at Gabd–Rimdan alone, with hundreds more freight trucks backed up at Taftan.
So why is this happening now? Because of the nasty convergence between the October 7 IMF tranche Pakistan had to pay, and the imperial U.S. Treasury “Operation Economic Outcast”.
Under Operation Economic Outcast, Washington gave third countries a “defined timeline to shut down” Iran-related commercial lifelines or face expulsion from the U.S. financial system. That was followed by OFAC’s October 1 designations against Iran’s overland rail and industrial networks and October 8 actions against 17 shadow-fleet tankers.
But then, on October 7 – only nine days before the Ministry of Commerce revoked the EIF waiver – Islamabad reached an agreement with the IMF on the Fourth Review of its Extended Fund Facility to unlock $1.21 billion. That still requires IMF Executive Board approval.
Of course there is no public document showing a direct U.S. or IMF order to close Iran-Pakistan borders. But sources in Islamabad stressed that leaving an open-ended banking-instrument waiver on the books ahead of the IMF Board vote had become an untenable sanctions vulnerability for Pakistan.
Islamabad sources are adamant that the move was paired with genuine counter-sabotage concerns and quietly coordinated between Islamabad and Tehran (italics mine) so the pause would not rupture bilateral ties.
Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei publicly called the disruption a temporary pause due to “technical issues” and “precautionary measures”.
Pakistani official sources, for their part, insisted that the tightened controls are a joint counterterrorism measure reflecting “mutual understanding” with Tehran after a spike in Sistan-Balochistan attacks; highway ambushes; and an October 11 maritime attack on Pakistan Coast Guard boats off Jiwani – which Pakistani officials attributed to “foreign actors” seeking to sabotage Pakistan’s mediation of the Iran peace deal.
Back to the same old pattern of Salafi-jihadis weaponized and manipulated by the usual suspects.
The only publicly confirmed telephone call between Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi took place on Sunday, October 18 – two days after the October 16 memorandum – and its official readouts mention only regional diplomacy and the Baghdad OIC meeting.
So prior coordination at the Dar–Araghchi Foreign Minister level and specific sabotage arrests therefore are part of our own reporting.
Asymmetric food exports and informal routes
In a nutshell, stuff is still moving across borders. Islamabad deliberately left alive Pakistani perishables and food exports to Iran. Essential perishables – including tomatoes, potatoes, and onions – continue to move, alongside traditional oil and fuel flows across the porous 909-km border.
The regulatory record explains why: 8 months ago, Pakistan enacted a separate banking-instrument waiver specifically for 10 food exports to Iran by land (explicitly listing rice, potatoes, onions, tomatoes, meat, and fruit) plus pharmaceuticals.
Tehran’s Chamber of Commerce confirmed this past Saturday that while Iranian exports to Pakistan are stalled by the EIF rule, imports from Pakistan into Iran are continuing, and informal fuel and border trade across Balochistan already operates at an estimated $800 million to over $1 billion annually outside formal customs.
Special attention should be placed on the ports of Gwadar and Karachi, and the overall China–Iran Transit Architecture. Third-country and China-Iran transit through Pakistan, according to our sources, remains protected.
On a legal level, a document detailing Pakistan’s transit of goods established six designated overland transit corridors linking Gwadar, Karachi, and Port Qasim to Gabd and Taftan for third-country cargo bound for Iran under a bank guarantee.
And a Federal Board of Revenue’s notification this past June formally designated Taftan railway station as a Land Customs Station, with Iranian and Pakistani ministers pitching the rail corridor to link China to Iran and Europe.
However, two very complicated operational constraints remain in place.
The Quetta-Taftan rail modernization is still listed officially as a planned upgrade; and OFAC’s October 1 designation of the Islamic Republic of Iran Railway Company (RAI) was explicitly designed to choke Tehran’s shift from blockaded sea lanes to rail.
To sum it all up: it takes supreme skill to face The Empire of Piracy. Islamabad has executed a classic, calibrated maneuver: visibly revoking the formal EIF import waiver at Taftan and Gabd–Rimdan to insulate its pending $1.21 billion IMF tranche and Pakistani banks from U.S. Treasury secondary sanctions.
And all the while keeping Pakistani food exports, informal border valves, and third-country transit frameworks alive with Tehran.
Whether this remains a brief administrative reset or hardens into a longer choke point will be decided by three indicators over the next fortnight:
May the lesson be imprinted on rare earths for the whole Global South to ponder: there’s no way to fight the Empire without bypassing its control of the international financial system.
When the Iran war closed the Strait of Hormuz earlier this year, about 20% of the world’s liquefied natural gas supply stopped flowing almost overnight. Roughly 90% of the LNG that moves through the strait goes to Asia, so the continent has absorbed the worst of it. Gulf producers have had few good responses. Saudi […]
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President Donald Trump is still playing hardball with Russia, according to US Department of Energy Secretary Chris Wright.
Wright defended Trump's decision to waive sanctions on Russia during a Sunday interview on CNN's "State of the Union with Jake Tapper and Dana Bash."
In September, Trump signed into law a sanctions package targeting Russian officials and parts of its economy in an effort to pressure Russia amid its war on Ukraine. Last week, Trump issued an executive order waiving those new sanctions, other restrictions, and some duties on Russia.
In early October, Trump also announced an agreement with President Vladimir Putin under which Russia would supply over 300,000 tons of diesel fuel to America and the global market.
"President Trump waived sanctions just on diesel exports, and what's the one thing Russia has not been able to export over the last month or so? Diesel, because they're short of diesel," Wright said.
The Energy Secretary said waiving the sanctions solves two problems: the diesel oil shortage and Russia's ongoing war with Ukraine.
"This is pressuring Russia. Russia does not have diesel to export," Wright said. "The only way they can get additional diesel to export is if they turn down the conflict with Ukraine."
Wright said Russia would have to enter into an energy ceasefire or reduce its war efforts to have enough additional diesel to export.
"This is not going soft on Russia. This is an incentive to end the war," Wright added.
Trump elaborated on his reasoning further on Sunday in a Truth Social post.
"I am in the process of negotiating Peace in the war between Russia and Ukraine, and don't want to do anything that will drive, foolishly, Russia away from the bargaining table," he wrote.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said waiving sanctions on Russia "seems wrong" to him. US lawmakers on both sides of the political aisle also criticized the move, including Republican Sen. Thom Tillis.
"Beyond irresponsible. What part of enforcing a law passed 86-11 by the Senate does the President and his advisors not understand? It's unconscionable that this administration is capitulating to a Russian dictator who illegally invaded Ukraine and butchers innocent civilians every single day," Tillis wrote on X.
He added, "If the President wants to actually bring down energy prices, he can do it by solving the Iran problem, not by doing a solid for Vladimir Putin."
Diesel and regular gas prices have skyrocketed globally as the US war on Iran drags on. Following surprise attacks by the US and Israel on Iran in February, Iran effectively shut down the Strait of Hormuz, which is a major waterway through which much of the world's diesel and oil is shipped. Last week, the International Energy Agency said the diesel shortage could run into 2027.
That's a problem for Trump, who is hoping voters overlook high gas prices and concerns over the cost of living when they head to the polls this November for the midterm elections. Higher diesel prices mean higher shipping costs, which trickle down to consumers as inflated prices for everyday goods.
Wright also appeared on ABC's "This Week" on Sunday, during which he said Trump was trying to find "innovative" ways to end the Russia-Ukraine war.
"This is a motivation for Russia to figure out how they can actually export some diesel," he said.
Dalle strade del Sud arriva una domanda che riguarda tutto il Paese: chi decide quanto costa produrre in Italia, e chi ne paga il prezzo quando la decisione viene presa altrove.
Una mappa che segue l’energia
A metà ottobre, per un camionista siciliano, tenere il mezzo fermo nel piazzale costa meno che metterlo in strada. Con il gasolio intorno ai 2,40 euro al litro sull’isola, il Comitato autotrasportatori siciliani stima fra 700 e 900 euro di perdita al giorno per ogni camion. Il coordinatore Salvatore Bella l’ha detto senza giri di parole: «Oggi lavorare in perdita con il gasolio a 2,40 al litro non è più possibile». Ne è nato il fermo che va dalla mezzanotte del 16 ottobre al 20, senza cortei: i tir restano nelle aziende, i semirimorchi non vengono ritirati dai porti. In Calabria Fedralog ha fermato i mezzi negli stessi giorni, mentre la sezione trasporti di Confindustria Catania ha deliberato all’unanimità uno stop fino al 22.
Il fermo arriva dopo settimane di mobilitazione. Il 1° ottobre agricoltori e autotrasportatori hanno bloccato lo svincolo di Pizzo sulla A2; il 12 i trattori hanno presidiato le portinerie del polo industriale tra Augusta e Melilli, rallentando il carico delle autobotti, per iniziativa degli stessi produttori e senza sigle sindacali alle spalle. In Puglia i blocchi hanno impedito l’accesso delle autocisterne alla raffineria Eni di Taranto, a ridosso dell’ex Ilva, i cui lavoratori sono in sciopero dal 12 ottobre. Gli olivicoltori sommano al caro carburante il calo del prezzo dell’olio. Il 22 toccherà ai pescatori: giornata di sciopero nazionale e cento pescherecci a chiudere simbolicamente lo Stretto di Messina.
La geografia dei presìdi dice qualcosa che i comunicati non dicono. Raffinerie, porti, svincoli autostradali, lo Stretto: chi protesta va a colpire i nodi da cui passa l’energia, come se sapesse bene dove nasce il problema. E c’è un paradosso evidente. Il Sud ospita Augusta, Priolo, Taranto, cioè una parte rilevante della capacità di raffinazione del Paese, ma i produttori che vivono a pochi chilometri da quegli impianti non riescono più a pagarne il prodotto.
La guerra arriva alla pompa
Queste proteste sono la coda italiana di una crisi aperta lontano. I rincari sono partiti con la guerra in Iran e con le difficoltà di approvvigionamento dal Golfo: già a fine marzo, nel Siracusano, il gasolio agricolo era salito da 0,88 a 1,45 euro al litro. A settembre la media nazionale del gasolio superava i 2,16 euro, 35 centesimi più di febbraio; il 12 ottobre il self costava in media 2,252 euro. La crisi di Hormuz, che finora abbiamo letto soprattutto come stress test per le petromonarchie e per i flussi finanziari del Golfo, ha anche una trasmissione verso il basso. Lungo la catena, ogni anello scarica il costo su quello successivo, finché arriva a chi non ha nessuno a valle: il piccolo autotrasportatore che non può ritoccare le tariffe, l’agricoltore che vende a prezzi fissati dalla grande distribuzione.
Le isole pagano due volte. Al carburante si sommano i noli marittimi, appesantiti dalle nuove regole ambientali sul trasporto navale, e i ritardi del Sea Modal Shift, l’ex Marebonus che dovrebbe compensare il costo del passaggio via mare da e per la Sicilia e la cui prima annualità non è stata pagata entro giugno. Le risposte arrivate finora agiscono sul prezzo alla pompa (tagli temporanei delle accise, il tetto annunciato da Eni sulla propria rete dal 28 settembre) e quasi mai sulla struttura dei costi. Per un trattore che brucia 300 euro di gasolio a mattina, uno sconto di 15 centesimi non cambia i conti.
Letta con gli strumenti dell’analisi dei sistemi-mondo, la vicenda ha una forma riconoscibile: gli shock esterni attraversano il centro e si depositano sulla periferia, che ha meno margini per assorbirli. Il Mezzogiorno funziona da periferia interna dell’Europa. Importa energia a prezzi di mercato globale, esporta prodotti agricoli in competizione con importazioni soggette a standard diversi, dipende da una logistica strada-mare che nessun incentivo pagato in ritardo riesce a rendere sostenibile. Su questo si innestano fragilità di lungo periodo come il credito difficile, lo spopolamento e l’arretramento dei servizi, che l’autonomia differenziata rischia di accentuare.
La copertura nazionale ha registrato i blocchi come cronaca del traffico più che come fatto politico. È una scelta che pesa: una protesta trattata come disagio stradale non obbliga nessuno a rispondere sul merito. Eppure il merito è chiaro. Un Paese che importa gli effetti delle guerre altrui senza strumenti propri per governare il costo dell’energia finisce per trasferirli sui territori e sulle categorie più deboli.
Per le prossime settimane gli indicatori da seguire sono pochi e osservabili: un intervento specifico sul gasolio agricolo e da autotrazione, il pagamento del Sea Modal Shift, l’eventuale proroga dei fermi oltre il 20 e il 22, la saldatura con lo sciopero dei pescatori. In assenza di misure, gli stessi promotori siciliani hanno già prospettato di proseguire. Se accadrà, sarà difficile continuare a chiamarla una vertenza di categoria.
Dalle strade del Sud arriva una domanda che riguarda tutto il Paese: chi decide quanto costa produrre in Italia, e chi ne paga il prezzo quando la decisione viene presa altrove.
Venezuela expects $76 billion in investment in its hydrocarbon sector over the next five years, with projects projected to generate 324,000 direct, indirect and induced jobs, Acting President Delcy Rodríguez announced Saturday.
RELATED: Venezuela Promotes Venezuela Feeds Plan and Local Economy Law to Achieve “Hunger 0”
Addressing the 2026 Energy, Oil and Gas Conference in Maracaibo, Zulia state, the Venezuelan Acting President reported that 61 hydrocarbon agreements had been signed, while another 44 remained under negotiation. She emphasized that the arrangements were intended to deliver returns for investors while benefiting the country.
The new energy contracts also include provisions for oil fields to generate their own electricity, Delcy Rodríguez explained. The measure is expected to free up capacity in the national power system and improve electricity supply for the population.
To attract investment and expand hydrocarbon production, Venezuela is offering several business models, including joint ventures, productive participation contracts, technical and financial partnerships, and specialized service agreements.
Text Reads: Venezuela’s acting president, Delcy Rodríguez, highlighted the Hydrocarbons Law as a cornerstone for transforming the Venezuelan energy sector.
At the conclusion of the 2026 Energy, Oil, and Gas Conference, the acting president emphasized that the legislation offers a flexible fiscal regime and absolute legal certainty to investors.
She pointed to Article 19, which guarantees the participation of domestic capital in the 61 agreements already signed and the 44 currently under negotiation, with the working class at the core.
Acting President Delcy Rodríguez highlighted provisions in the country’s Hydrocarbons Law that allow taxes and royalties to be adjusted according to the scale of each investment. The legislation also establishes arbitration and dispute-resolution mechanisms intended to provide legal certainty for investors.
The law further requires the state, organizations and companies to incorporate Venezuelan-owned businesses into procurement processes under conditions designed to ensure the effective use of domestic goods, services, labor and capital.
In Zulia, oil production has risen from 70,000 barrels per day to 370,000 barrels per day, according to figures presented by Delcy Rodríguez. She projected that output would reach 400,000 barrels per day by the end of the year and forecast that the state would begin producing liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) in 2027 as production expands.
The conference, known as CEPEG 2026, took place alongside the Zulia Energy Forum. Organized by the Venezuelan Petroleum Chamber, the events brought together more than 150 domestic and international companies, including oil operators and service providers, to discuss investment models, technological development and the revival of hydrocarbon production in the region.
Acting President attended alongside Héctor Obregón, president of state oil company PDVSA, and Anabel Pereira, vice president for administration and digital government.
The Venezuelan Acting President projected that the agreements signed and under negotiation would contribute to the creation of 324,000 direct, indirect and induced jobs over the next five to 10 years, presenting employment growth as one of the expected benefits of increased investment in the hydrocarbon sector.
Russia's state nuclear corporation Rosatom expects the first reactor at Turkey's Akkuyu nuclear power plant to achieve its first self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction before the end of this year, Rosatom head Alexei Likhachev said on Friday.
"We remain on track for the planned physical start-up in the second half of December... We hope that before the end of the year the Turkish unit will transition from the construction phase to the start-up phase," he said.
Moscow and Ankara signed an agreement in 2010 to build a nuclear power plant with four Russian VVER-1200 reactors, but the project has faced repeated delays and bureaucratic hurdles.
Rosatom began construction of the Akkuyu plant in 2018. The commissioning schedule has been repeatedly pushed back from its original 2023 target.
After Moscow launched military action in Ukraine in 2022, pressure on the project increased. Although Rosatom was not targeted by Western sanctions, risks related to payments and other issues remain.
Physical start-up involves fuel loading and achieving first criticality, the reactor's first self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction. The next major milestone is grid connection and the start of electricity generation.
Likhachev also reported progress in talks with potential partners for the Akkuyu.
He said he had discussed the matter the previous day with Turkish Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar, who attended the Russian Energy Week forum.
"We have developed a menu of possible arrangements for a Turkish investor. The choice is primarily up to the Turkish government. I hope that following our meeting, Mr Bayraktar will brief the country's leadership and that the right decisions will be taken."
The Akkuyu project, costing more than $20 billion, is financed by Russia. Rosatom, its sole owner, can sell up to a 49% stake to a partner to share the investment burden.
In April, Rosatom said it started new talks with Turkish companies on joint ownership of Akkuyu after the Iran war spurred interest in such assets.
The war in Ukraine has always been about fomenting a proxy war to defeat Russia.
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The contradictions are absurd but instructive of the criminal proxy war that the U.S. and European powers have perpetrated against Russia under the guise of “defending Ukraine”.
Western sanctions on Russia – the most heavily sanctioned nation on Earth – were meant to supposedly punish Moscow for its alleged unprovoked aggression against Ukraine.
The United States recently signed into law a “sanctions bill from hell” in honor of the late war hawk Senator Lindsey Graham, aimed at crushing the Russian economy, principally by shutting down its energy exports.
Likewise, the European Union has implemented more than 20 rounds of sanctions imposed on Russia over the past four years, again purportedly to block Russian exports of oil and gas. The EU has vowed to terminate all Russian energy imports by the end of this year.
The official rationale out of Washington and European capitals is to exact retribution on Russia for its alleged invasion and violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty. Western embargoes on Russia’s economy were immediately announced after Moscow launched its Special Military Operation in February 2022. (The real background to the SMO – unreported by Western media – was the NATO-backed coup in Kiev in 2014, and the arming of NeoNazis to conduct a proxy war against Russia.)
The U.S. and European Union, as well as Britain of course, presented the attempted economic blockade of Russia as a demonstration of the West enforcing international law and supporting Ukraine. The latter is portrayed in Western media as a fair maiden of democracy assailed by a drooling Russian tyrant.
In a nutshell, the sanctions are sold to the Western public as a plausible way of neutralizing “Russia’s war machine.” If Moscow’s oil and gas exports could be cut off, then, the dubious logic goes, Russia would not be able to continue its war effort in Ukraine.
However, laughably, the supposedly noble Western rationale is in tatters this week after the U.S. Treasury lifted sanctions off Russian diesel exports for the next six months in order to boost global oil supplies and curb soaring energy prices.
Another shattering blow to the facade of Western “principles” was the disclosure by Russia’s energy minister, Alexander Novak, that the European Union has continued to buy Russian energy exports at nearly pre-war levels. (Cue Western media silence on that!)
Since 2022, the EU has bought a total of $320 billion worth of Russian hydrocarbons. To put the expenditure in perspective, that far exceeds what the European governments have donated to Ukraine, some $226 bn, according to EU data.
How’s that for a contradiction? The European governments are throwing hundreds of billions of taxpayers’ money at Ukraine supposedly to defend itself against Russia, yet these same governments are giving Russia much, much more by buying its energy resources. In other words, to use their own rhetoric, Brussels and other European capitals are “fuelling the Russian war machine.”
As for the United States, it is equally duplicitous. The Americans blew up the Nord Stream pipeline in 2022 so that Europe would not be at the mercy of Russian oil dependency. Washington also imposed sanctions on Russian energy while increasing its more expensive gas exports to Europe. Yet last Friday, October 9, President Donald Trump announced, to the dismay and alarm of the Europeans and Ukraine, that he had made a deal with Vladimir Putin to release 3.5 million tonnes of Russian diesel onto the world market to ease pressure on crippling pump prices.
Whatever happened to American laws against “trading with the enemy”?
Of course, Trump is desperate for relief over record-high fuel prices as a result of his criminal aggression against Iran and Iran’s closure of the Persian Gulf oil route in retaliation. With the mid-term Congressional elections only three weeks away, Trump is seeking to assuage angry American consumers and spare his Republican Party from an electoral drubbing that will tarnish his presidency.
Out of sheer expedience, Trump wants Russian diesel exports to save his political neck. Some observers may question whether Moscow should oblige Trump considering that Washington is arming the NeoNazi Kiev regime with missiles and intelligence. Perhaps the Kremlin is calculating that Trump could finally pull off a peace deal in Ukraine.
Another smart move by Moscow, perhaps, is that the diesel deal with Trump has managed to unleash a storm of recriminations from Europe and Ukraine, which is severely undermining the transatlantic axis. Is this political judo by Putin?
The European NATO partners and the Kiev puppet president Vladimir Zelensky reacted with unprecedented insults and defiance of Trump. They accused the American leader of treachery and of siding with Russia. Within Washington, Trump has also been lambasted for “betrayal”.
Trump and his aides hit back furiously, dismissing the Europeans as “hypocrites” over their own record purchases of Russian energy exports. Trump even called for Zelensky to be replaced by someone who he can work with.
For his part, Zelensky doubled down with truculence, badmouthing Trump for being “weak” and accusing him of putting Ukrainian lives at risk. He refused to stop Ukrainian air strikes on Russia’s oil refineries, as requested by the White House. And the little money-grabbing, narco-Führer also attempted blackmail by suggesting to Trump that he would halt air attacks on Russian energy infrastructure “if” the Pentagon supplied more Patriot missiles.
Trump’s anger has exploded over Zelensky and his European patrons. He sees their obstruction of his diesel deal with Russia as not only hypocritical but a political attack on his presidency ahead of the crucial November polls.
The debacle is a rich farce. American and European posturing is seen for what it is, without any principle or genuine motives. It is a plague on all their houses.
Both the U.S. and its European partners are buying Russian energy like never before to sustain their struggling economies. The sanctions they imposed on Russia never had anything to do with “upholding international law” or “defending Ukraine”.
Using their own disingenuous logic, the NATO nations are fuelling the Russian war machine with their continuing business-as-usual purchase of Russia’s oil and gas.
That contradiction, in turn, exposes the fraud of the war in Ukraine. It was never about defending democratic Ukraine – a corrupt NeoNazi dictatorship – or European security from Russian “threat”.
The whole murderous episode has always been about fomenting a proxy war to defeat Russia. That covert policy is a gargantuan crime of aggression that has cost millions of lives and bankrupted Western societies. What’s more, it is an utterly failed policy which Western governments are covering up to avoid accountability. The destruction and deception go hand in hand.
What is all the more damning is that this travesty could have been easily exposed years ago if the Western news media had actually reported on facts instead of being the propaganda service they so evidently are to enable criminal aggression by their imperialist masters.
Iran has managed to export some liquefied petroleum gas and jet fuel since July, despite a US naval blockade, shipping intelligence showed and people involved in security said.
Tehran has in recent weeks been concealing such cargoes among a growing volume of ship-to-ship transfers by other Gulf producers off Oman, news agency Reuters reported- citing four people in maritime security who track Gulf oil movements.
The Iranian exports and methodology are reported for the first time here. While a fraction of its former energy exports, the cargoes are rare evidence of petroleum products getting through a blockade that has halted Iran's crude exports.
Analysis by US advocacy group United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), which monitors Iran-related tanker traffic using ship and satellite tracking, shows at least eight gas tankers carrying Iranian LPG have left the Gulf of Oman since mid-July.
Another tanker carrying Iranian jet fuel reached Myanmar in September, additional satellite imagery and analysis by maritime intelligence group SynMax show.
The US imposed targeted sanctions in 2023 on Myanmar's jet-fuel industry, citing military airstrikes on civilians that the United Nations says have killed thousands of people. Myanmar's military government has repeatedly denied targeting civilians, saying its operations are directed against armed groups.
Six of the eight gas tankers and the jet fuel tanker are under US sanctions for transporting Iranian petroleum and petrochemical products, a Reuters analysis of the vessels and sanctions imposed on ships by the US Treasury showed.
"What we have seen passing is a handful of tankers carrying Iranian LPG, but the overwhelming majority of tankers laden with Iranian products have been redirected by US forces," said Jemima Shelley, senior research analyst with UANI.
Shelley said some Iranian LPG tankers transferred cargoes near the Omani coastal towns of Shinas and Sohar, while others waited in the Gulf of Oman before heading past the US blockade, which US Central Command has said sits across the Gulf of Oman near the Iran-Pakistan border.
The total amount of these LPG cargoes was estimated at 4.1 million barrels, Shelley said.
Shelley said the shipments were driven "more by opportunism" than showing a new trend of Iran trying to export its oil and petrochemicals by using smaller ships.
Most of the cargoes sailed to Malaysia's Eastern Outer Port Limits to conduct further STS transfers for likely destinations in China, Shelley said, based on UANI's analysis.
The Iranian government did not respond to a request for comment. Myanmar's military-backed government did not respond to a request for comment on whether the country had received Iranian jet fuel.
The US military's Centcom said its naval blockade, which was first imposed on Iran-related oil exports on April 13, is "ironclad". The blockade was lifted in June after the US reached a draft understanding with Iran, but it was reimposed on July 14 following the collapse of the agreement.
Reuters reports, citing a US military official, that the passage of a vessel does not necessarily mean it had evaded the blockade.
Every ship was assessed individually, including through a review of its papers, and some vessels could be allowed through for humanitarian reasons, the official added.
The official said the appearance of a vessel on US sanctions lists is not the only factor to make it subject to the blockade, adding that US forces are also closely monitoring some ships without taking action against them for operational reasons.
Centcom said in an update on October 13 that during the three months of the latest blockade, four commercial vessels had been disabled and 135 ships had been turned around by US forces.
The US military has turned around ships from Asia and also seized some tankers, previous Centcom statements said.
Washington has coupled its blockade with a sanctions campaign aimed at severing Iran's remaining financial links and depriving it of revenue. Last week, it imposed fresh sanctions on 17 vessels involved in transporting Iranian crude, petrochemicals and petroleum products.
A US Treasury spokesperson questioned shipping data suggesting vessels had evaded the blockade, saying ships could spoof their locations or use false identities when loading.
Such data "should be taken with a grain of salt", the spokesperson said.
The Treasury spokesperson said Operation Economic Outcast, together with the blockade, was "suffocating the Iranian regime".
Torbjorn Soltvedt, principal Middle East analyst at risk intelligence company Verisk Maplecroft, said although there was no sign of Washington easing its blockade, worsening economic conditions in Iran could push Tehran to take greater risks.
"If Iran can move product tankers through, even in small numbers, jet fuel may be a good option. Iran's aviation industry is under increasing pressure from US sanctions, with a growing number of planes grounded, and a potential surplus of jet fuel at Iranian refineries," Soltvedt added.
Iranian crude exports fell to zero in September, according to Kpler, the first month without a shipment since the analytics firm began tracking the producer in 2013.
US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has said the blockade prevented most Chinese purchases of Iranian oil and left Iran unable to deliver crude to customers.
France and Germany want more detailed “Made in Europe” rules for electric cars, and want them split off from the rest of the EU’s flagship industrial law.
The Franco-German deal, agreed after months of haggling on the margins of the EU summit in Brussels late on Thursday (15 October), says both files should then be adopted “as fast as possible and simultaneously”.
That would split the most fought-over part from the rest of the Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA), which also sets “Made in EU” and low-carbon requirements for steel, cement, aluminium and clean-tech products such as batteries and solar panels.
Paris hopes the new car definition will serve as a benchmark for the rest of the IAA, which sets “Made in Europe” rules for steel, cement, aluminium and clean energy technologies.
But this still has to be negotiated with other member states, people familiar with the talks said.
“We are driven by a clear ambition: to successfully transform our automotive industry while upholding our climate goals and our production in Europe,” said French president Emmanuel Macron on social media, announcing the deal.
“This is an investment signal to industry,” said German chancellor Friedrich Merz.
The paper comes as Ireland, which holds the EU’s rotating six-month presidency, is wrapping up a third compromise text on the industrial plan, which Irish officials hope will reach final agreement by mid November.
Publicly, Paris and Berlin said on Friday that their car deal will not affect climate targets and that their course “remains unchanged”.
But the paper behind the deal shows the trade-off that’s been made. Berlin accepted France’s demand for stricter “Made in Europe” rules that apply to fewer countries, while Paris agreed to looser emission rules for carmakers, as Germany had wanted.
To count as “Made in Europe”, a car would have to clear thresholds that tighten over time, and only cars meeting these rules could be bought, leased or rented with public subsidies, or bought by public authorities.
From 2028, the car must be assembled in Europe, with at least 70 percent of total value creation in components – excluding the battery.
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