Beijing has proposed banning exports of the technology used to make next-generation solar cells, a move that could complicate United States technology guru Elon Musk’s plan to expand into space solar power. The ban, which covers production technology for perovskite and tandem solar cell modules, is part of a proposal by China’s Ministry of Commerce […]
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© Aaron Wojack for The New York Times
On Monday, the Brazilian Superior Electoral Tribunal gave the technology company Meta a 24-hour deadline to demonstrate that the campaigns of the two presidential candidates, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and Flavio Bolsonaro, are receiving equal treatment on Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp.
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Magistrate Marco Aurelio Bellizze warned that if Meta does not demonstrate that it has complied with the equity measures previously ordered, the court will double the planned daily fine to about US$185,000 until the end of the runoff that will take place on Oct. 25.
His decision comes after both campaigns went to court to denounce that their political content is being harmed by Meta’s platforms and to accuse the company of favoring its rival.
This discriminatory treatment has been particularly notable against the campaign of President Lula da Silva, according to denunciations by militants of the Workers’ Party.
More generally, Brazilians have confirmed that Meta-controlled social networks have imposed limitations on the advertising boost of the leftist candidacy and have selectively restricted the dissemination of posts linked to Lula and his supporters.
Esto es un escándalo por el que tendría que responder Zuckerberg
— Julián Macías Tovar (@JulianMaciasT) October 14, 2026
La periodista Daniela Lima muestra en directo como la IA de Meta favorece la campaña de Bolsonaro creando imágenes de "Flavio 22", y con las mismas instrucciones se niega a hacerlas de "Lula 13". pic.twitter.com/SGb5NjStcR
The text reads, “This is a scandal for which Zuckerberg would have to answer. Journalist Daniela Lima shows live how Meta’s AI favors Bolsonaro’s campaign by creating images of ‘Flavio 22,’ and with the same instructions refuses to make images of ‘Lula 13’.”
Last week, Judge Bellizze determined that Meta offer equal treatment to both candidates in a decision that was endorsed on Friday by the entire electoral tribunal.
In Monday’s decision, the magistrate stated that there are still not enough elements to conclude that Meta deliberately manipulated the distribution of content, but he considered that the multinational has not satisfactorily demonstrated compliance with all previous orders.
Bellizze also questioned that Meta has assumed the authority to modify the deadlines set by the Court, since it requested more time to comply.
Among the court’s demands on Meta are explanations about recommendation systems, the review of ads from both candidacies, the identification of those responsible for political advertising and the measures adopted against possible networks of inauthentic profiles.
The new decision comes after Meta last week denied any interference in the Brazilian elections and rejected accusations of favoring a candidate. The company attributed the problems denounced by the Lula campaign to technical incidents and assured that its systems do not classify or distribute content based on political ideology.
teleSUR/ JF
Source: EFE
Ehsan MOVAHEDIAN
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La advertencia de Aliyev contra la influencia extranjera llega en medio de una disputa con los círculos políticos turcos sobre la religión, Karabaj y las relaciones de Azerbaiyán con Israel.
En el octavo congreso del Partido del Nuevo Azerbaiyán, celebrado en Bakú el 2 de octubre, el presidente Ilham Aliyev ofreció una descripción inusualmente directa de lo que denominó la «seguridad ideológica» de Azerbaiyán. Era tan importante como la seguridad física, afirmó, ya que las amenazas ideológicas podían traspasar las fronteras a través de Internet, los ciberataques y la inteligencia artificial (IA).
Hizo un llamamiento a la educación y al patriotismo para defender el espacio político del país, al tiempo que insistió en que Azerbaiyán no necesitaba «ayuda ni patrocinio» extranjeros. Añadió que otros Estados no debían interferir en sus asuntos ni decirle cómo vivir.
Estas declaraciones las realizó el presidente y líder del partido gobernante en un congreso en el que se definió su rumbo político. Aliyev situó el control de la esfera ideológica de Azerbaiyán al mismo nivel que el poder militar, la independencia económica y la toma de decisiones soberana.
No mencionó a Turquía como fuente de ninguna amenaza. Sin embargo, sus palabras se produjeron en medio de críticas en los círculos políticos y mediáticos turcos hacia las políticas internas de Azerbaiyán, especialmente su trato a las estudiantes que llevan hiyab. El 26 de septiembre, el Consejo de Medios de Comunicación y Radiodifusión de Azerbaiyán acusó a círculos no identificados de llevar a cabo una campaña contra el país en los medios turcos y en las redes sociales.
Ese enfrentamiento agudiza aún más la fórmula «una nación, dos Estados». La proximidad política nunca ha eliminado las diferencias en los intereses nacionales. A medida que Ankara y Bakú se han ido acercando, la cuestión de quién define su identidad común —y qué influencia permite— se ha vuelto más difícil de eludir.
Los analistas que hablaron con The Cradle consideran que el discurso de Aliyev es un intento de renegociar la relación, más que de romperla. Azerbaiyán no tiene ninguna intención aparente de renunciar a su asociación militar, económica y cultural con Turquía. Sin embargo, Bakú quiere dejar claro que el parentesco no otorga a Ankara ninguna autoridad sobre la política interna azerbaiyana.
Una advertencia que se ha escuchado en Ankara
Hazel Yalin, investigadora especializada en las relaciones turco-rusas, interpreta que el discurso estaba dirigido, en gran medida, al Gobierno del presidente Recep Tayyip Erdogan. El analista turco Aydin Sezer también percibe un mensaje diplomático indirecto. Según Sezer, Aliyev se dirigió a varios públicos, entre ellos Occidente, Armenia, Rusia e Irán, pero es posible que Ankara se encontrara entre sus principales destinatarios.
El contexto inmediato es la controversia sobre la religión en las escuelas de Azerbaiyán. Una enmienda de septiembre a las normas de vestimenta de las escuelas públicas prohíbe prendas adicionales consideradas incompatibles con la educación laica. La decisión no menciona el hiyab por su nombre, pero las noticias de que se ha impedido a algunas niñas asistir a clase por llevar pañuelo en la cabeza han suscitado objeciones por parte de críticos turcos.
Ankara no ha abordado públicamente el tema con Bakú. Sezer interpreta la exhortación de Aliyev a que otros países se ocupen de sus propios asuntos como una advertencia contra convertir el lenguaje de la hermandad en un derecho a supervisar a Azerbaiyán.
La propia alianza reconoce este límite. La Declaración de Shusha de 2021 celebra «una nación, dos Estados» y formaliza una amplia cooperación, pero también compromete a Ankara y Bakú a respetar la soberanía y la no injerencia en los asuntos internos de la otra parte. La disputa actual ha puesto en contacto esas dos partes de la declaración.
Si los actores políticos turcos reclaman voz en la política religiosa y educativa de Azerbaiyán alegando una nacionalidad compartida, el margen de soberanía ideológica de Bakú se reduce. Si esas cuestiones pertenecen exclusivamente a Azerbaiyán, el lema sigue siendo una expresión de afinidad cultural y solidaridad política, sin otorgar a ninguna de las dos capitales un mandato sobre la otra.
¿A quién pertenece la victoria en Karabaj?
Yalin afirma que los canales de noticias y las cuentas en redes sociales pro-Erdogan han acusado a Bakú de presionar a los musulmanes en materia de prácticas y organización religiosas. Algunos también han presentado la victoria de Azerbaiyán en la Segunda Guerra de Karabaj como algo que debía a Turquía, calificando las políticas laicas de Aliyev de ingratas y exigiendo respeto por las sensibilidades religiosas turcas.
«Este argumento también se ha esgrimido basándose en el lema “dos Estados, una nación”: si los turcos y los azerbaiyanos son miembros de la misma nación, entonces, según este razonamiento, el Gobierno azerbaiyano también debería tener en cuenta la voz de esa nación».
El discurso de Aliyev en el congreso apuntaba en la dirección opuesta. Afirmó en repetidas ocasiones que Azerbaiyán había actuado por su cuenta, había pagado sus armas y se había impuesto sin ningún patrocinador externo. Esta fue su interpretación política de la guerra; no debe interpretarse como una conclusión de que el apoyo turco no desempeñó ningún papel.
De hecho, la Declaración de Shusha recoge explícitamente el agradecimiento de Bakú por el apoyo moral y político de Turquía. La controversia gira en torno a quién puede atribuirse el mérito político del resultado y qué derechos podría otorgarles ese mérito para exigir algo posteriormente.
Para Aliyev, la victoria militar forma parte de un proyecto más amplio de construcción del Estado. Describió la independencia, la fortaleza económica, el poderío militar y la confianza en las capacidades azerbaiyanas como la línea de actuación duradera de su Gobierno. Cuanto más se convierte esa narrativa en el eje central de su legitimidad, menos margen queda para que otra capital se presente como la artífice del éxito de Azerbaiyán.
La implicación es significativa: no se puede permitir fácilmente que un actor externo —ni siquiera uno amigo— se convierta en el artífice político del éxito de Azerbaiyán.
Jafar Haghpanah, profesor de la Universidad de Teherán, sostiene que Bakú ya no quiere ser tratado como un socio subordinado de Turquía. Yalin identifica tres elementos en la postura de Aliyev.
El primero es la preocupación por la presión ideológica: según la interpretación de Yalin, el intento de golpe de Estado de 1995 contra el padre de Aliyev, Heydar Aliyev, dejó una advertencia duradera sobre las posibles consecuencias de la actividad política vinculada a Turquía.
El segundo es la resistencia a las descripciones nacionalistas turcas de Azerbaiyán como un «hermano pequeño». El tercero es la creciente confianza de Aliyev en que Azerbaiyán puede ejercer su propia influencia política en toda la región. Las acusaciones relativas a figuras turcas en el episodio de 1995 no deben confundirse con la responsabilidad por parte del actual Gobierno turco.
Bakú tiene ahora un mayor peso militar y económico que a principios de la década de 2000. La Compañía Estatal de Petróleo de la República de Azerbaiyán (SOCAR) ha ampliado el alcance energético de Azerbaiyán; el país ha establecido profundos lazos con Israel, relaciones estratégicas con China y Estados Unidos, y ocupa un lugar destacado en la Organización de Estados Turcos (OTC). Esas conexiones le dan más margen para rechazar una jerarquía dentro de su alianza más estrecha.
Yalin cita el respaldo de Sinan Ogan a Erdogan en la segunda vuelta de las elecciones presidenciales de Turquía de 2023 como ejemplo de cómo la influencia azerbaiyana podría convertirse en un tema de debate en la política turca. A Ogan se le preguntó si Aliyev había influido en su decisión y lo negó explícitamente, afirmando que Aliyev no le había llamado. La acusación no puede demostrar que Bakú dirigiera su elección. No obstante, su difusión muestra la rapidez con la que la cuestión de la influencia funciona en ambos sentidos.
El alcance de la seguridad ideológica
La advertencia de Aliyev fue más allá de la controversia sobre los uniformes escolares. Su respuesta consistió en reforzar la educación y el patriotismo y, con ellos, el control del Estado sobre cómo se interpretan su historia y sus victorias.
Turquía dispone de medios inusualmente potentes para llegar a ese público: la televisión, las redes sociales, las universidades, las redes religiosas, la cultura popular, las empresas y las instituciones del mundo turco en general. Esas conexiones han ayudado a mantener la alianza. También pueden inquietar a Bakú cuando los debates políticos turcos comienzan a moldear las expectativas sobre el orden interno de Azerbaiyán.
El problema para Aliyev no es que la influencia turca sea uniformemente hostil. Es que incluso una influencia amistosa puede seguir desafiando la autoridad de un Gobierno para definir la identidad y la política nacionales. Su énfasis en la seguridad ideológica sugiere que pretende proteger esa autoridad incluso dentro de la asociación más estrecha de Azerbaiyán.
El lugar de Israel entre los aliados
La relación de Azerbaiyán con Israel añade otra fuente de tensión. Ankara ha condenado la guerra de Israel contra Gaza, mientras que Bakú ha mantenido estrechos vínculos en materia de seguridad y energía con Tel Aviv. Las armas israelíes han constituido una parte importante del arsenal de Azerbaiyán, y el crudo azerbaiyano ha seguido llegando a Israel a través del puerto de Ceyhan, en Turquía, a pesar de las restricciones comerciales declaradas por Ankara. The Cradle ha informado sobre la relación en materia de armas y petróleo y sobre los continuos flujos de petróleo.
El analista del Cáucaso Ahmad Kazemi no considera que las diferencias entre Ankara y Bakú sean lo suficientemente profundas como para amenazar su alianza. No obstante, cree que la confianza de Aliyev se basa en parte en el apoyo israelí.
Según la valoración de Kazemi, «si Bakú se viera obligada a elegir entre Ankara y Tel Aviv, elegiría a Israel». También sostiene que Bakú sabía que la presencia de su representante durante el discurso del primer ministro israelí, Benjamin Netanyahu, ante la ONU en septiembre desagradaría a Turquía. Un análisis de la Agencia Anadolu reveló que Turquía se sumó a la protesta contra el discurso, mientras que Azerbaiyán siguió estando representado.
Kazemi ve otra consecuencia para el Cáucaso. Sostiene que la preocupación compartida por Turquía e Irán respecto a la posición de Israel en Azerbaiyán podría acercar a Ankara y Teherán en algunas cuestiones, incluidos los corredores de transporte regionales. Dicha convergencia tendría que lidiar con la amplia cooperación estratégica y de defensa de Turquía con Bakú.
Haghpanah ofrece una interpretación más contundente del discurso pronunciado en el congreso:
«Aliyev pretendía con su discurso indicar a Turquía que Azerbaiyán es el principal aliado de Israel y que Ankara debería moderar su tono hacia Tel Aviv y evitar adoptar una postura dura contra este país. Predice que Turquía e Israel entrarán en conflicto por los recursos energéticos del mar Mediterráneo, así como por sus intereses geoeconómicos y geopolíticos».
Yalin interpreta de manera similar las referencias de Aliyev a la producción y venta de petróleo de Azerbaiyán como una respuesta a las críticas a su comercio con Israel. Esas observaciones por sí solas no permiten determinar las intenciones de Bakú. Por su parte, Dariush Safarnejad, un destacado experto en el Cáucaso, señala la relación «petróleo por armas», pero espera que la influencia israelí en Azerbaiyán se reduzca en cierta medida si la cooperación directa de Bakú con Washington se intensifica tras la iniciativa de paz con Armenia. También hace referencia al debate sobre unos lazos más estrechos con la OTAN.
Los demás socios de Bakú
Aliyev aprovechó el congreso para describir a China y a EE. UU. como las dos superpotencias mundiales y para destacar las alianzas estratégicas de Azerbaiyán con ambas. El esfuerzo de Bakú por establecer vínculos con centros de poder rivales le proporciona alternativas a la dependencia de un único socio, ya sea turco, ruso, chino u occidental.
Sus comentarios sobre Armenia y Rusia encajan en ese contexto. Yalin llama la atención sobre la afirmación de Aliyev de que Armenia reconoció la integridad territorial de Azerbaiyán en octubre de 2022, con el consiguiente reconocimiento de la soberanía azerbaiyana sobre Karabaj.
Aliyev presentó el restablecimiento del control azerbaiyano como un logro conseguido frente a la presión de las grandes potencias. Yalin considera que esto forma parte del intento de Bakú de reposicionarse tras la guerra.
Azerbaiyán y Armenia rubricaron un borrador de acuerdo de paz en Washington en agosto de 2025, aunque aún no se ha firmado el tratado definitivo. Safarnejad sostiene que unos lazos más estrechos con Washington podrían dar a Bakú más margen para tratar directamente con EE. UU. y, con el tiempo, reducir su dependencia de Israel.
Hermandad sin un socio dominante
Ninguno de los cinco analistas sugiere que sea inminente una ruptura entre Ankara y Bakú. Safarnejad destaca la profundidad de su interdependencia: la cooperación militar, las infraestructuras energéticas, los corredores de transporte, la inversión, las industrias de defensa y las instituciones culturales confieren a la alianza una base sólida.
La OTS refuerza esos lazos. En septiembre, funcionarios turcos y azerbaiyanos seguían debatiendo una cooperación más profunda en materia de defensa y seguridad.
Azerbaiyán sigue queriendo a Turquía a su lado en materia de seguridad, comercio y diplomacia regional. Aliyev marca el límite en lo que respecta a la influencia de Ankara sobre la política religiosa de Bakú, sus vínculos con Israel y sus relaciones exteriores en general. Para él, el lema «una nación, dos Estados» otorga a Azerbaiyán la última palabra sobre sus propios asuntos.
Hasta qué punto Bakú podrá hacer valer esa reivindicación dependerá, en parte, de la política interna de Turquía tras Erdogan, de la durabilidad de la relación de Azerbaiyán con Israel y de su capacidad para gestionar las relaciones con Washington, Moscú, Pekín y Teherán sin perder el apoyo de Ankara.
Para Irán, un Bakú más seguro de su independencia pero más dependiente de Israel difícilmente resultaría tranquilizador. La alianza puede perdurar; la discusión sobre quién establece sus límites ya está en marcha.
Two hundred years ago, the invention of Braille allowed blind people to read and write. By the 1930s, recorded sound made "talking books" possible. Developments in text-to-speech technology in the 1980s made reading more accessible and widespread. Then came personal computers, screen readers, smartphones, cameras, GPS, voice assistants, and myriad other technological advancements that gave blind people more independence.
Now a pair of sunglasses can read your mail, describe the person in front of you, tell you what is on a restaurant menu, and help you find your way home. Meta, the parent company of Facebook, is using artificial intelligence to turn glasses into a hands-free companion. For any person, this technology is impressive. For the approximately 700,000 Americans who are blind, it is potentially life-changing.
In June, Meta announced that every single blind veteran in the United States could receive its AI glasses free of charge. According to the Department of Veterans Affairs (V.A.), approximately 130,000 American veterans are legally blind, and over 1 million veterans have vision impairment that makes performing daily activities difficult. Don Overton, a blind veteran and former executive director of the Blinded Veterans Association, told Meta that he had "lost [his] independence" after losing his eyesight in a bunker explosion. "The moment I put on my Ray-Ban Meta glasses," he said, "I got my independence back."
The V.A. has a history of failing to fully support blind veterans. In 2022, the V.A.'s Office of Inspector General found that claims processors were instructed to contact visually impaired veterans by telephone, but 87 percent of claims showed no evidence of these calls ever happening. A 2022 investigation by the Senate's Special Committee on Aging found that "roughly 90 percent" of V.A. websites were not compliant with federal accessibility requirements. "We feel we've been abandoned by the agency that is tasked with providing our care and services for us," Overton told The Washington Post in 2022.
Meta's AI glasses have come under fire due to their privacy risks. The company was sued in March after Swedish publications Svenska Dagbladet and Göteborgs-Posten reportedly found that Meta's contractors in Kenya were accessing videos by users of their AI glasses. "We see everything, from living rooms to naked bodies," one worker noted.
Users should be aware of those risks. Still, for blind veterans, companies such as Meta have stepped up to fill a gap that the government has failed to address.
The post Meta Is Gifting AI Glasses to Blind Veterans: 'I Got My Independence Back' appeared first on Reason Magazine.
Alex Cristi /Getty Images | Chris Williams
Practically every company is making AI tools available to their employees. As the former VP of HR at Microsoft and a leadership advisor with over 50 years of business experience, I'm amazed at how quickly this rollout has progressed.
Some people are all in, using the tools for nearly everything they do. Others have barely stuck their toes in the AI waters. I've been using a broad range of AI tools and encourage my clients to do the same.
AI isn't without controversy, and if someone is strongly against using it — for whatever reason — I'm not going to convince them otherwise.
But if you're wondering how and why you should use these tools, I'm here for you. Let's talk about three ways I advise all my executive clients to use AI effectively in the workplace.
Use AI as a way to see things you might not have seen. Ask it, "What am I missing?"
I agree with many that AI is lousy at most creative efforts. Whether written or visual, AI results can be generic, mediocre, and often embarrassing. The output usually deserves the "AI Slop" label it gets. But to dismiss it entirely misses a core value.
AI is useful with, perhaps even because of, that generic, often obvious other perspective.
It can be amazingly helpful to simply ask: what am I missing? Since AI has a tendency to agree with me, I explicitly ask for pushback: "review this and tell me what I'm missing, tell me where I'm wrong." The fact that AI is so obvious, so average, is actually a core value here. I'm often surprised at the points I missed and the viewpoints I overlooked.
Even if AI doesn't find things you missed, a contrarian angle can be very helpful to shore up your own case. You'll be able to say, "Yes, I considered those things, and here's why my take on this issue is better."
In that way, AI can also help you prepare for your discussions with colleagues. With so many letting AI draft their arguments, it's very valuable to see their perspective in advance.
So no, I don't let AI make my case, but I always look for another perspective in what I do — wherever it comes from. Having a tool that can give me that on a moment's notice is incredibly useful.
Long before AI, we all had that colleague who always told you far more than you needed to know. With some now using AI heavily, it can frankly be overwhelming.
You ask a simple question and get a blizzard of AI-generated noise in response. AI can be the worst over-explainer when simply left to run. You see the results in a seven-page response.
When I'm faced with one of these walls of text, I've learned there are really only two ways to respond. I can, and often do, ask the person to try again. What does this all really mean? Can you summarize your point in a couple of sentences? I occasionally get snarky and ask for the "non-AI slop" version.
Another way to deal with this is to ask AI to summarize it, whether AI tools or a wordy colleague wrote it. Importantly, I don't trust the AI summary to be the full explanation, but it helps me understand the key points. Which I then work to find in the original blizzard response.
Yes, this is a little circular. After all, why not just have the two AI systems have the discussion? Leave me out of it. But in a world where it seems everyone has a hard time getting to the point, any tool to cut through the noise is welcome. And AI is very good at that.
In a similar vein, one thing AI does incredibly well is organize. This kind of rote task of sorting, filtering, and filing is right in the sweet spot for most AI systems.
I'm wary of letting AI systems automate tasks like filtering or filing things without my supervision. I'd never let an AI system automatically send emails, texts, or documents without my careful review. But I often have AI systems help me sort through mountains of accumulated debris.
I recently moved to a new computer system and had AI review what I was planning to move over. I discovered decades of accumulated cruft. Simply from a comprehensive list, I found gigabytes of programs, files, and settings, 90% of which I just left behind.
So if you have 8,000 emails in your inbox, or a documents folder that has grown a second life, let an AI system take a look for you. Don't just tell it to "deal with it." Your judgment is needed.
Rather, have it give you a review of it and another perspective. And once you've reviewed it, perhaps you'll find, as I did: AI can be better at deletion than creation.
So when your company rolls out the next new AI, use those tools to your advantage. AI can help you see another perspective, find the important points in the blizzard, and cut through the mess. I've embraced AI, use it with great care, and encourage everyone to do the same.
BASTIEN INZAURRALDE/AFP via Getty Images
At an internal staff meeting in September, AWS CFO John Felton had a joke for Prasad Kalyanaraman, the executive overseeing much of Amazon's AI infrastructure expansion.
"You've taken us free cash flow negative as a company, so congratulations," Felton said, according to a recording of the meeting obtained by Business Insider.
The remark was lighthearted. But it captured a stunning reversal.
Just two years ago, Wall Street was debating what Amazon would do with its growing cash hoard. Now, cash flow has evaporated as Amazon embarks on its biggest bet ever, spending $220 billion this year alone to build the physical backbone for AI.
At the meeting, Kalyanaraman did not dispute Felton's premise. Amazon's machine-learning and AI business is "hugely free cash flow negative," he said, adding that he expects the company's free cash flow to remain negative for "the next couple of years or so."
Amazon has made big bets before. It spent heavily on cloud computing, fulfillment centers, and its delivery network long before they became some of the company's most valuable assets. Investors questioned those investments at the time, but Amazon ultimately built enormous, profitable businesses from them.
AI is testing this playbook at a far larger scale. Amazon is committing hundreds of billions of dollars to data centers, servers, and power before investors know how quickly those investments will generate revenue.
The company is the best, or among the best, at building data centers, with decades of experience. But the size and complexity of these projects, and the bottlenecks holding progress back, are challenging — even for such a respected cloud pioneer.
Internal documents reviewed by Business Insider and people familiar with the matter show the company trying to coordinate a sprawling industrial system whose parts move on different schedules. A delay in power, equipment, or construction can leave billions of dollars in hardware waiting — and Amazon's cash tied up — while forecasts and costs keep shifting.
Amazon says it has strong evidence that the capacity will be needed. AWS revenue grew 37% in the second quarter, its fastest pace in 18 quarters, while its backlog reached $496 billion.
CEO Andy Jassy thinks the company has a "clear line of sight" to strong financial returns from this record investment cycle. In his latest annual shareholder letter, he called AI a "once in a lifetime opportunity" and said Amazon would not be conservative in its investments.
"We've been through this cycle with the first big AWS growth wave, and liked the results," Jassy wrote. "We expect to feel similarly about this next wave."
Investors are concerned by the scale of the industry's expansion, especially as AI data centers are costing more to build and taking longer to complete.
The market is "repricing anything that funds multi-year builds against revenue that arrives later," Dan Ives, an analyst at Yorkville Ives, wrote in a recent report. Growing uncertainty around data center permitting and the political fight over electricity prices have given investors another reason to question how quickly these investments will pay off, he added.
One major industry challenge is securing enough power to run the equipment that goes inside data centers. This includes expensive racks of servers that contain GPUs and other chips that train and run AI models and services such as ChatGPT.
Internal emails from August show Amazon preparing a new "Early Rack Receipt" process for an expected wave of server racks carrying Nvidia's GB300 chips at US facilities before final deployment.
One Amazon email projected the company would take delivery of about $5 billion of Nvidia GB300 racks in August, followed by another roughly $3 billion each month "for the foreseeable future."
Some AWS data center sites had room for more racks but not enough available power to turn them on, people familiar with the effort said, leaving the equipment to be staged at intermediary warehouses until the facilities were ready. These people asked not to be identified discussing sensitive matters.
Usually, Amazon doesn't pay for racks until the gear is put into a data center, leaving suppliers to carry the cost of the equipment in transit, according to the internal documents obtained by Business Insider. This helps the company conserve cash.
However, the intensity of the AI data center building boom has made this type of coordination harder. Amazon has to compete more for scarce resources as it jockeys with rivals for access to Nvidia GPUs and other AI components.
Under the new "Early Rack Receipt" process, Amazon now takes ownership of these racks earlier in the supply chain, rather than waiting until the equipment reaches a data center.
The means spending cash sooner. And any delays getting the racks installed and plugged into a reliable power source potentially pushes back the moment when revenue starts flowing from these assets.
At least one AWS supply chain team did not have "a clear forecasted path" for getting racks into data centers, according to one of the emails reviewed by Business Insider.
An Amazon spokesperson said the company routinely stages finished hardware near deployment sites so it can be installed once power capacity is available, calling that approach "best business practice."
The spokesperson added that AWS has "long-established systems" to track infrastructure assets and disputed that the broader company lacks a forecasted path for getting racks into data centers.
This problem is not unique to Amazon.
Bernstein analysts wrote in a recent note that power permits, cooling systems, electrical equipment, construction, and hardware all move on separate schedules.
"Timing is imperfect," the analysts said.
Chris Jung/NurPhoto via Getty Images
During the internal staff meeting in September, Felton, the AWS CFO, described the broader problem eloquently: "How do you work in the future when the future is inherently uncertain?"
Kalyanaraman, the AI infrastructure leader, said Amazon's internal outlook for the return on its AI investments had improved. But the assumptions behind those returns keep shifting.
"The forecast is changing on a daily basis," Kalyanaraman said. "The world that we live in is extremely dynamic."
Those shifting assumptions include when data centers will be ready and how much equipment AWS needs to keep on hand, he explained.
An eight-week supply buffer might be routine for a smaller company. But at Amazon's scale, Kalyanaraman said, this could mean holding "billions and billions of dollars" worth of additional equipment inventory — tying up precious cash.
Such tensions are especially striking for Kalyanaraman, a 21-year Amazon veteran who earlier this year was promoted to the elite S-team that reports directly to Jassy.
Amazon's founding story is defined by frugality. It famously used cheap doors as desks when founder Jeff Bezos started in Seattle in the mid-90s.
Kalyanaraman has absorbed this lore into bones. In late 2023, as AWS faced slower growth and layoffs, he urged employees to do more with less. "Frugality breeds innovation," he said back then.
That instinct still shapes his approach. In the September meeting this year, Kalyanaraman told Felton that AWS tries to make major investments at the "last responsible moment," when it has the clearest possible view of demand.
"If we can wait to spend the capital as late as possible, it's better for us," he said.
Bloomberg/Getty Images
But the frenetic pace of the AI boom makes this principle difficult to follow. By the time demand is fully visible, the servers, power, and construction capabilities that AWS needs may no longer be available. That puts pressure on the company to commit more money sooner to secure supply and meet its data center capacity goals.
Kalyanaraman recalled telling Jassy in 2023 that AWS would "surely" be out of its capacity crunch by 2027. Instead, Amazon still expects demand to exceed its available capacity in 2027, the AI infrastructure chief said during the meeting this September.
Getting enough electricity may be the biggest challenge for an industry leader like Amazon.
The company has 44 gigawatts of data center capacity under development across 16 states, more than double Google, Meta, and Microsoft, according to Cleanview Research estimates.
An internal AWS dashboard called "Secured Power at Risk" tracks utility and regulatory constraints affecting electricity capacity AWS has lined up for its data centers.
The risks include transmission bottlenecks, requirements to reduce use during grid stress, and "use it or lose it" provisions that can jeopardize capacity if a data center project misses usage or construction milestones.
In other words, AWS is not simply waiting for electricity to arrive. It is managing a portfolio of commitments that can become more costly if a data center project is delayed.
A submission to Maryland's utility regulator last year, obtained through a public records request, illustrates the kind of exposure that can accompany massive data center buildouts.
Amazon told the Maryland Public Service Commission that large data center customers could help pay for grid upgrades or bring new power capacity to market without burdening other electricity ratepayers.
The company also proposed setting aside collateral to help utilities get more comfortable with the large investments needed to generate more electricity for data centers. Amazon proposed three years of collateral so that if a large electricity customer abandoned unused capacity, the utility would have time to re-sell the power.
The proposal is not evidence that AWS has made such a payment or posted collateral. It does, however, show that large data centers can face extra financial obligations, beyond their own electricity bills, if projects are delayed or cancelled.
The Amazon spokesperson said such utility rules are not unique to AWS. The company has not disclosed how much cash it has paid upfront to secure power.
The AI buildout also incurs expenses that are harder to model than a conventional capex plan.
In the September meeting this year, Kalyanaraman said that while reviewing plans for gigawatts of capacity in West Texas, AWS confronted a labor problem: There weren't enough nearby pipefitters, electricians, and other skilled workers to build the facilities.
The company's response, he said, was to pay to construct housing complexes near its data centers so workers could live there for the two or three years needed to complete the projects.
Even the crates used to ship servers have become a planning issue. It may seem absurd to worry about the price of a container when servers cost hundreds of thousands of dollars, Kalyanaraman said. But at AWS's scale, where the company needs so many crates, even trivial items can become a material expense.
"We have new constraints that keep popping up," Kalyanaraman said.
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AI companies have already scraped much of the web. Now they're chasing something even more valuable: data that shows how humans actually work.
That's the focus of Business Insider's new series, The AI Data Grab. This week, we published three stories showing how the race for workplace data is accelerating.
One piece, from Charles Rollet, Tom Carter, and Stephen Council, examines the booming market for company records. AI firms are offering businesses six- and even seven-figure sums for anonymized Slack messages, emails, presentations, and internal documents.
The goal is to teach AI systems how people solve problems, collaborate, make decisions, and complete long, multi-step tasks. Those real-world workflows are becoming the fuel for the next generation of AI agents.
Another story, from Melia Robinson, explores how law firms are building AI systems around decades of legal knowledge, turning their own experience into a competitive advantage rather than relying solely on off-the-shelf AI models and tools.
A third piece, by Rya Jetha, reveals how AI companies pay people to record real-world work, such as cooking dinners and packing warehouses, to teach robots how humans perform everyday physical tasks.
Together, these stories point to a major shift in AI development. The first wave of generative AI was mostly about bigger models and faster chips. The next chapter is about machines understanding how work gets done, so AI can help us do it better and quicker.
Sign up for the AI Insider newsletter here. Reach out to me via email at abarr@businessinsider.com
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By Katie FORSTER
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Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su
STARK warnings from artificial intelligence researchers that advanced forms of the technology could wipe out humanity have raised questions over whether governments are moving fast enough to regulate it.
What are the potential dangers of “superintelligent” computer systems, and should we be worried?
In 2023, hundreds of AI scientists and industry figures, including the heads of top US labs, signed a “statement on AI extinction risk” calling for the issue to be treated as seriously as pandemics or nuclear war.
If an out-of-control future AI deems that humans are obstructing its goals, it could use robots to “synthesise and spread novel pathogens”, said Stuart Russell, computer science professor at the University of California, Berkeley.
Or it could “convince people to initiate nuclear war, including by hacking into early warning systems”, Russell, a prominent voice on AI safety, said.
Such existential fears do not concern current AI systems, he said. But as the technology improves, it could take lethal action beyond our understanding, such as by removing oxygen from the atmosphere.
“We are less intelligent than superintelligent AI. If you ask chimpanzees how humans could wipe them out, they probably wouldn’t be able to give you all the right answers.”
In the meantime, “in the next year or two, I think the risk is higher from human misuse”, Russell added, such as an AI-enabled terror attack.
“The stakes are well-understood,” Jacob Coxon, a 27-year-old researcher, wrote on X last week, announcing his resignation from US AI startup Anthropic.
“But they are locked in a race to get there first,” he added, saying that Anthropic “believes no one else will act responsibly, so they must do it themselves”.
Anthropic this year removed a pledge from its safety charter to halt development of its models if it failed to control their risks.
It argued that if it unilaterally paused its work, its less cautious rivals would dominate the industry, making it less safe overall.
“The people building AI earnestly believe that it could kill us all by the end of the decade,” said Coxon, who previously worked at ChatGPT maker Open-AI.
He accused both companies of “gambling with our lives” as they strive to develop AI models capable of self-improvement.
Fears are heightened over rogue AI after OpenAI technology operating outside human supervision hacked into Hugging Face, a repository of AI models.
“We really do earnestly believe AI could kill all humans!” Anthropic safety executive Evan Hubinger chimed in on X, estimating the risk at more than 10 per cent over the next decade.
It’s important to remember that doom-laden percentage predictions are “absolutely unscientific”, said Hussein Abbass, a computing professor at UNSW Canberra.
“The situation is still controllable, and it can be managed,” Abbass said.
But governments should not sit on their hands when it comes to regulating AI, he added, urging an “agile” approach as AI development accelerates.
Both Anthropic and OpenAI are expected to go public soon, and some sceptics say scary warnings make AI appear powerful and worthy of large investments.
Others argue that focusing on the risk of extinction distracts from more pressing problems caused by AI, from job losses to machines discriminating against minorities.
In July, more than 1,000 tech employees, including Anthropic’s CEO, called on Washington to support a coordinated slowdown in the development of the most advanced AI systems.
OpenAI halted training of its latest models for two weeks in August before resuming it under tighter controls.
The United States has been firmly against global regulation of the sector that could stifle innovation.
But the hacking capabilities of the most cutting-edge models have given Washington pause, with recent Anthropic and OpenAI releases delayed over national security concerns.
Even then, “we don’t want to restrict them where all of a sudden we come in second to China”, President Donald Trump has said.
“Maybe it will take a massive, Chernobyl-scale disaster to get governments to act,” Russell said, urging them to establish a licensing regime for AI, as exists with aviation, medicine or water supply.
“Perhaps at some point governments will remember that their voters prefer not to be dead.”
Original article: www.nst.com.my
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© Haiyun Jiang/The New York Times
La tecnologia può stabilire come un’arma raggiunge il bersaglio, mentre spetta all’umanità decidere se quel bersaglio debba essere colpito. La domanda che si cela dietro a tutto ciò è chi, concretamente, eserciti quell’umanità, con quali strumenti di conoscenza e dentro quali istituzioni.
Dalla persona al bersaglio
Che cosa ne è dell’umanità quando la tecnologia diventa capace di riconoscere, classificare, seguire e infine uccidere esseri umani senza che chi colpisce li abbia mai visti? Se lo è chiesto l’amico Mohammad Reza Dehshiri e la sua risposta ha una formula efficace. Il pericolo, scrive, non è l’intelligenza artificiale ma l’inumanità artificiale, cioè la possibilità che le macchine diventino più accurate proprio mentre gli uomini smettono di sentirsi responsabili di ciò che quelle macchine fanno in loro nome.
Con questo articolo apro una serie che parte dalla diagnosi di Dehshiri e prova a spingersi oltre. Se il problema è l’inumanità artificiale, la risposta non può consistere in un’IA «più etica», come se l’etica fosse un modulo da installare a valle di un sistema già progettato. Bisogna recuperare una categoria che il lessico tecnologico ha reso quasi impronunciabile: l’intelligenza umana, intesa non come un residuo da proteggere nelle pieghe dell’automazione, ma come una forma di conoscenza con prerogative proprie, che nessun aumento della potenza di calcolo può surrogare.
La chiamerò Human Intelligence, e l’ambiguità è voluta. Nel gergo dei servizi di informazione, HUMINT designa la più antica delle discipline informative: quella che passa per le persone, le fonti, le lingue, la frequentazione paziente dei luoghi. Nel lessico filosofico l’espressione indica la facoltà di comprendere. La tesi di questo primo contributo è che i due significati oggi convergono, e che la loro convergenza ha una portata geopolitica che va ben oltre il dibattito sull’etica delle armi.
Possiamo descrivere la catena operativa della guerra contemporanea in sette passaggi: rilevare, identificare, classificare, predire, ordinare per priorità, designare, colpire. Ogni anello può essere tecnicamente raffinato senza che la sequenza, presa nel suo insieme, lo sia sul piano morale. Il fenomeno che ne risulta viene chiamato «datificazione della vita umana»: l’individuo ridotto a un’identità, a una posizione, a uno schema di comportamento, a un punteggio di minaccia.
Non si tratta di un’astrazione. Nell’aprile 2024 un’inchiesta di Yuval Abraham per +972 Magazine e Local Call ha descritto Lavender, un sistema impiegato dalle forze armate israeliane a Gaza per attribuire a decine di migliaia di persone una probabilità di affiliazione ai gruppi armati. Secondo le fonti interne citate dall’inchiesta, la verifica umana di ciascun nominativo si riduceva spesso a una ventina di secondi, il tempo necessario per accertare che il bersaglio fosse di sesso maschile. Le forze armate israeliane hanno contestato questa ricostruzione e hanno descritto Lavender come una banca dati di supporto agli analisti. Anche accettando la versione ufficiale, però, il nodo resta intatto: un operatore umano era presente, e la sua presenza non bastava a trasformare la raccomandazione del sistema in un giudizio.
La psicologia cognitiva ha un nome per questo fenomeno, automation bias: la tendenza di chi lavora con un sistema automatizzato a trattarne le indicazioni come sostituto della propria verifica, e a non cercare le informazioni che potrebbero smentirle. Nel 1976 Joseph Weizenbaum, che aveva costruito uno dei primi programmi conversazionali della storia, distingueva già tra la capacità di calcolare e quella di giudicare, e sosteneva che vi sono compiti che non andrebbero affidati a un calcolatore anche se il calcolatore fosse in grado di svolgerli. Mezzo secolo dopo la distinzione è diventata più urgente. Il calcolo lavora su ciò che è già stato tradotto in dato. Il giudizio deve decidere se quella traduzione è stata fedele.
Dehshiri fissa il punto con quattro distinzioni: la precisione tecnica non è precisione etica, l’accuratezza non è giustizia, l’automazione non è responsabilità, la superiorità tecnologica non è superiorità morale. Ne aggiungerei una quinta, di ordine epistemico, da cui dipendono le altre: la correlazione non è comprensione. Un sistema di apprendimento automatico riconosce regolarità statistiche in un insieme di dati. Non sa che cosa sia una scuola, perché non sa che cosa sia un bambino, e non sa nemmeno di non saperlo.
L’iraniano prende un caso studio interessante: Il 28 febbraio 2026, nelle prime ore della guerra, la scuola elementare Shajareh Tayyebeh di Minab, nella provincia di Hormozgan, fu colpita più volte durante l’orario di lezione. Le cifre fornite dalle autorità iraniane oscillano tra 150 e 175 morti, in grande maggioranza bambine, con decine di insegnanti e alcuni genitori; il procuratore della contea ha indicato un bilancio definitivo di 156 vittime. Washington non ha mai riconosciuto direttamente la propria responsabilità né pubblicato le conclusioni dell’indagine del Pentagono. Amnesty International ha parlato, nella migliore delle ipotesi, di un grave fallimento dell’intelligence.
C’è un dettaglio, emerso dalle immagini satellitari, che sposta l’analisi dal piano morale a quello conoscitivo. Secondo i media occidentali, la scuola sorgeva accanto a una base navale dei Guardiani della Rivoluzione e in passato ne aveva fatto parte; tra le spiegazioni circolate negli ambienti statunitensi c’è quella di dati di puntamento non aggiornati. Se l’ipotesi venisse confermata, Minab non sarebbe il caso di una macchina che sbaglia, ma di un archivio che ha smesso di corrispondere alla realtà. L’edificio era cambiato. Il dato no.
Nessun algoritmo di classificazione, per quanto sofisticato, può accorgersi che un vecchio fabbricato militare è diventato una scuola se nessuno ha registrato il cambiamento. Lo sapeva chiunque vivesse a Minab: i genitori che ogni mattina accompagnavano le figlie, il conducente dello scuolabus, gli insegnanti. È esattamente il tipo di sapere che la HUMINT raccoglie e che la guerra a distanza tende a considerare superfluo, perché lento, costoso, difficile da scalare. Allo stato delle fonti pubbliche, la responsabilità statunitense appare altamente probabile, mentre la dinamica resta indeterminata e la confidenza su questo punto è bassa: errore della banca dati, errore di classificazione, oppure accettazione consapevole del rischio. Le tre ipotesi, però, convergono sulla stessa domanda. Chi, prima del lancio, ha verificato se in quell’edificio ci fossero persone?
Oltre il “human-in-the-loop”
Il dibattito internazionale si è a lungo accontentato del principio del human-in-the-loop, l’essere umano inserito nel circuito decisionale.
La formula è insufficiente: un uomo può essere presente nel circuito e limitarsi a ratificare la raccomandazione dell’algoritmo. Propone di sostituirla con un principio più esigente, che chiama humanity-in-command: la capacità effettiva di mettere in discussione, respingere, scavalcare e arrestare il processo automatizzato.
La storia della Guerra fredda offre due esempi che chiariscono che cosa significhi in concreto. Il 26 settembre 1983 il sistema sovietico di allerta precoce Oko segnalò il lancio di cinque missili balistici dagli Stati Uniti. L’ufficiale di turno, Stanislav Petrov, classificò l’allarme come un errore e non lo trasmise come attacco in corso, ragionando che un primo colpo americano non sarebbe mai consistito in cinque missili soltanto. Aveva ragione: il satellite aveva scambiato per lanci i riflessi del sole sulle nubi. Ventuno anni prima, il 27 ottobre 1962, nelle acque dei Caraibi, il sottomarino sovietico B-59, isolato e bersagliato da cariche di profondità di segnalazione, fu sul punto di impiegare un siluro a testata nucleare. Il lancio richiedeva il consenso dei tre ufficiali superiori a bordo, e Vasilij Archipov lo negò.
In nessuno dei due casi l’uomo approvò una raccomandazione del sistema. La contraddisse. E non lo fece perché disponeva di più dati: i dati, anzi, erano il problema. Lo fece perché seppe porsi una domanda che nessuna procedura gli imponeva, cioè se ciò che vedeva avesse senso rispetto a tutto il resto che sapeva del mondo. Petrov conosceva la dottrina nucleare americana; Archipov conosceva la differenza tra un attacco e un’intimidazione. È questa capacità di confrontare il segnale con l’insieme, il particolare con il plausibile, che chiamo Human Intelligence. Vale la pena notare che il Dena è stato affondato da un sottomarino. Non sappiamo che cosa sia stato chiesto ai suoi ufficiali, né quali margini di valutazione avessero.
La proposta va precisata, perché il rischio è di ridurla a un appello umanistico generico. La Human Intelligence, così come la intendo, si articola su tre piani distinti, ciascuno dei quali segna un limite strutturale, e non contingente, dell’intelligenza artificiale.
Il primo piano è epistemico. La tradizione scolastica distingueva tra intellectus, l’atto con cui la mente coglie in modo immediato una verità, e ratio, il procedere discorsivo da un elemento all’altro: per Tommaso d’Aquino (Summa Theologiae, I, q. 79, a. 8) le due non sono facoltà diverse ma momenti di un unico intelletto, in cui il ragionamento parte da una comprensione e a una comprensione ritorna. I sistemi attuali di apprendimento automatico realizzano una ratio di potenza inaudita, capace di inferire, combinare, predire su scale inaccessibili alla mente umana. Manca loro il momento dell’intellectus, cioè la presa sul senso di ciò che elaborano. È una tesi filosofica e va presentata come tale, ma ha conseguenze operative precise: un sistema privo di comprensione non può sapere quando il proprio modello del mondo è diventato falso.
Il secondo piano è pratico. La prudentia, nella definizione tomista, è la retta ragione applicata all’agire, e il suo compito specifico consiste nel portare il principio universale fino al caso singolare. La macchina generalizza: il suo valore sta nel ricondurre il singolo caso a una classe. La prudenza fa l’opposto, perché deve riconoscere ciò che, in questo caso, sfugge alla classe. La guerra, che è il regno del singolare e dell’imprevisto, è il terreno in cui la differenza pesa di più. La nota vaticana Antiqua et nova del gennaio 2025 ha ripreso questa linea, insistendo sul carattere incarnato e relazionale dell’intelligenza umana e sulla sua irriducibilità a una funzione di elaborazione.
Il terzo piano è relazionale, ed è qui che il significato filosofico incontra quello dei servizi. Sherman Kent, che negli Stati Uniti del dopoguerra fondò di fatto gli studi sull’intelligence, la definiva prima di tutto come conoscenza, prima ancora che come organizzazione o attività. La HUMINT è la forma di questa conoscenza che passa attraverso l’altro come persona: chi parla la sua lingua, conosce le sue abitudini, sa leggere un quartiere, distingue una festa da un raduno. Negli ultimi tre decenni le grandi potenze hanno progressivamente spostato risorse verso le discipline tecniche, dalla raccolta di segnali all’osservazione satellitare, fino alle piattaforme di fusione dei dati. Minab mostra il prezzo di questo squilibrio.
Nulla di tutto questo implica un rifiuto della tecnologia. La Human Intelligence non si oppone all’IA come il manuale si oppone al meccanico. Ne stabilisce la gerarchia: l’algoritmo come strumento ordinato a un giudizio che non può produrre da sé. E ne ricava un principio, che Dehshiri formula e che merita di diventare criterio operativo: quanto più la tecnica allontana chi agisce dalle conseguenze del proprio atto, tanto più deve crescere la responsabilità cosciente di chi decide, non diminuire.
Geopoliticamente parlando
Fin qui la questione potrebbe sembrare di filosofia morale. Non lo è soltanto. La distribuzione della capacità di guerra algoritmica è una distribuzione di potere, e le regole che la governeranno saranno scritte, se mai lo saranno, da chi ha interesse a limitarle il meno possibile.
Lo stato del diritto internazionale lo conferma. Il gruppo di esperti governativi istituito nell’ambito della Convenzione su certe armi convenzionali discute dei sistemi d’arma autonomi letali dal 2017 senza essere approdato a uno strumento vincolante. Gli Stati Uniti hanno promosso nel novembre 2023 una dichiarazione politica sull’uso militare responsabile dell’IA, per definizione non vincolante; nel dicembre dello stesso anno l’Assemblea generale delle Nazioni Unite ha adottato la prima risoluzione dedicata a questi sistemi, mentre il Comitato internazionale della Croce Rossa chiede dal 2021 il divieto dei sistemi autonomi imprevedibili e di quelli progettati per colpire esseri umani. Nel giugno 2024, intervenendo al G7 di Borgo Egnazia, Papa Francesco aveva chiesto che nessuna macchina sia mai messa nelle condizioni di decidere della vita di una persona. Il divario tra queste posizioni e la pratica dei teatri di guerra del 2026 si misura in vittime.
C’è poi un’asimmetria più profonda. Chi controlla i dati decide chi è un bersaglio, e le vittime della guerra algoritmica si trovano in larga parte fuori dall’Occidente: a Gaza, in Iran, nel Sahel, nello Yemen. Per gli Stati che non producono le piattaforme e non ne controllano gli archivi, la Human Intelligence diventa allora una questione di sovranità. Un Paese che mantiene competenze linguistiche, conoscenza regionale, reti umane di informazione conserva un’autonomia di giudizio; un Paese che affida la propria visione del mondo a sistemi progettati altrove, spesso da imprese private, la cede insieme ai dati. In un ordine che tende al multipolarismo, questa differenza separerà gli attori che giudicano da quelli che vengono giudicati.
Ne discende una proposta concreta, che svilupperò nei prossimi contributi. Accanto al principio generale del controllo umano significativo, il diritto internazionale umanitario potrebbe codificare un obbligo specifico di verifica umana dello status civile per ogni infrastruttura fissa inserita in una lista di obiettivi, con una data di validità oltre la quale l’informazione decade e va rinnovata con fonti dirette. È una norma minima. Applicata a Minab, avrebbe imposto a qualcuno di chiedersi se quell’edificio fosse ancora ciò che l’archivio diceva.
La tecnologia può stabilire come un’arma raggiunge il bersaglio, mentre spetta all’umanità decidere se quel bersaglio debba essere colpito. La domanda che si cela dietro a tutto ciò è chi, concretamente, eserciti quell’umanità, con quali strumenti di conoscenza e dentro quali istituzioni. A Minab qualcuno avrebbe dovuto sapere che c’era una scuola. Il fatto che nessuno lo sapesse, o che nessuno lo abbia chiesto, è il punto da cui ricominciare.
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