A combination of maritime fuel blockades, power grid collapses, and legal indictments deepens economic hardship across the island nation.

Since the beginning of Donald Trump’s second administration, the United States’ relentless hostility toward Cuba has been on the rise. This friction has centered on unilateral sanctions, trade restrictions, and direct legal actions against former Cuban government leaders.

RELATED:
Russia Condemns U.S. Arrest Warrant for Raul Castro

2026 brought to Cuba a series of severe economic challenges, particularly regarding its energy sector. U.S. executive orders and maritime monitoring actions aimed at restricting oil shipments to state-owned Cuban entities contributed directly to fuel shortages across the island. These restrictions affected power generation, agricultural transport, municipal services, and health sector logistics.

In May, the U.S. Department of Justice unsealed a federal jury indictment in Miami charging former Cuban President Raúl Castro and five co-defendants with conspiracy and murder related to a 1996 aerial shootdown.

Cuba Fuel Restrictions and the Energy Infrastructure Crisis

On January 29, Trump issued an executive order stating that the U.S. would impose tariffs on any country that sent oil to Cuba. The U.S. government authorized certain fuel shipments exclusively to private commercial entities, while blocking access to state-managed refineries and power facilities.

This policy created severe fuel deficits for public utilities responsible for national electricity generation. A deficit that led to recurring shutdowns across the National Electrical System. On March 16, 2026, the national grid suffered a complete collapse after a major boiler leak occurred at the Antonio Guiteras Thermoelectric Power Plant in Matanzas. By October 2026, another mechanical breakdown left up to 75 percent of the country without power.

The energy deficits extended beyond residential electricity. In February 2026, fuel shortages forced Cuban aviation authorities to suspend refuel operations for foreign air carriers. Consequently, airlines such as Air Canada, Rossiya, and Nordwind suspended flights to the island. International tourist arrivals dropped by approximately 58 percent by June 2026 compared to prior operational benchmarks.

Public sanitation and healthcare systems reported operational disruptions due to the fuel deficit. In Havana, local authorities reported that only 44 of 106 municipal collection trucks were operational in early 2026 due to empty fuel tanks.

In June 2026, United Nations human rights monitors showed a 60 percent decline in agricultural production caused by fuel shortages for farming equipment and transport vehicles.

🇨🇺 96,000 Cubans are waiting for surgery as a result of lack of fuel and lack of energy. Among them, 11,000 children.

The U.S. is denying oil to Cuba through a fuel blockade, despite that it’s perfectly legal for any country to export fuel to Cuba. @CarlosFdeCossio pic.twitter.com/DnHW2TONJ5

— Kawsachun News (@KawsachunNews) March 22, 2026

Hybrid Operations and International Diplomatic Positions

Throughout 2026, the U.S. diplomatic campaign was accompanied by increased military surveillance, intelligence monitoring, and diplomatic warnings. Reports documented an increase in U.S. military reconnaissance flights operating over international airspace near the Cuban coastline.

Cuban defense officials countered that the frequency of these flights constituted deliberate psychological pressure and surveillance of national infrastructure.

In parallel with maritime and aerial activities, U.S. diplomats engaged with governments in Latin America and Europe to restrict economic partnerships with Havana.

The U.S. State Department urged partner nations to terminate bilateral agreements involving Cuban medical professionals. Several governments, including Guatemala, Honduras, and several Caribbean nations, subsequently reduced or phased out participation in Cuban medical exchange programs.

In August 2026, UN human rights rapporteurs released a joint statement concluding that unilateral fuel restrictions and financial blockades exacerbated severe shortages of basic goods, medicine, and food.

The Legal Prosecution of Raul Castro and the 1996 Case

On May 20, 2026, the U.S. Department of Justice unsealed a federal indictment in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida charging former Cuban President Raúl Castro and five co-defendants with conspiracy, destruction of aircraft, and four counts of murder.

The legal push escalated further on October 19, 2026, when Florida Attorney General James Uthmeier announced that the Office of Statewide Prosecution and the Florida Department of Law Enforcement secured a state arrest warrant for Castro, charging him with conspiracy to commit first-degree murder.

Both prosecutions center on an incident that took place on February 24, 1996, when Cuban military MiG fighter jets intercepted and shot down two civilian Cessna 337 aircraft. The planes were operated by Brothers to the Rescue (Hermanos al Rescate), a Miami-based organization founded by José Basulto.

The group initially focused on search-and-rescue operations for Cuban migrants in the Florida Straits, but later expanded its activities to include dropping political leaflets directly over Havana.

The 1996 aerial interception resulted in the deaths of four crew members: Carlos Costa, Armando Alejandre Jr., Mario de la Peña, and Pablo Morales. U.S. federal and state authorities asserted that the civilian planes were destroyed over international waters without legal justification.

Florida state prosecutors cited military chain-of-command statements from the period in which Castro, then Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, authorized commanders to shoot down unauthorized aircraft over the sea without prior consultation.

In response, the Cuban government stated that the civilian aircraft had repeatedly violated Cuban sovereign airspace despite official diplomatic warnings issued to the U.S. State Department prior to the incident.

Cuban authorities and foreign affairs analysts characterized the revival of thirty-year-old charges as a coordinated exercise of extraterritorial judicial power. Officials in Havana rejected the dual legal actions as politically motivated efforts to criminalize Cuba’s historical leadership and create legal grounds for continuing trade and financial sanctions.

U.S. state of Florida's Attorney General James Uthmeier on Monday issued an arrest warrant for Cuban Revolution leader Raul Castro on charges of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder linked to the 1996 downing of two civilian aircraft. https://t.co/FyQMk8L6E6 pic.twitter.com/TDb95dNOk8

— China Xinhua News (@XHNews) October 19, 2026

Domestic Mobilization and Sovereign Defense

The Cuban government and civic organizations responded to the rising external pressures through formal diplomatic rejections, official government statements, and public mobilizations.

Following the unsealing of the May 2026 U.S. indictment against former President Raúl Castro, Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla rejected the legal action in an address to international media and diplomats.

Rodríguez Parrilla characterized the indictment as a politically motivated maneuver designed to justify economic sanctions and interfere with Cuban domestic jurisdiction. President Miguel Díaz-Canel reiterated this position, stating that national sovereignty and historical decisions regarding territorial air defense remain non-negotiable under international law.

In urban centers across Cuba, including Havana, Santiago de Cuba, and Matanzas, civil organizations and neighborhood committees organized rallies opposing external interference and economic restrictions.

At the same time, state ministries implemented emergency measures to manage reduced fuel supplies and maintain essential public services. Municipal governments established scheduled electricity rotations, prioritized available diesel fuel for medical facilities and water distribution pumps, and expanded the use of draft animals and non-motorized transport in agricultural regions.

On the international stage, Havana received diplomatic backing from several multilateral organizations and regional governments. The Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA-TCP) issued a joint declaration condemning unilateral coercive measures against Cuba’s energy sector.

During the United Nations General Assembly in September 2026, representatives from non-aligned nations called for an immediate end to the trade embargo, citing its negative impact on civilian health, infrastructure, and human development.

🇧🇧 Prime Minister @miaamormottley of Barbados condemns the US embargo and fuel blockade of Cuba 🇨🇺 at #UNGA81 pic.twitter.com/SzIXGvGYfa

— Michael Galant (@michael_galant) September 24, 2026

Analysis of Coercive Strategies and Long-Term Impacts

The events of 2026 reflect an intensification of U.S. policy toward Cuba through a combination of trade restrictions, infrastructural pressure, and legal mechanisms targeting state leadership.

The strategic focus on restricting fuel imports significantly affected Cuba’s national power grid, agricultural logistics, and public transportation. Simultaneously, the unsealing of a thirty-year-old indictment against Raúl Castro added a significant legal dimension to bilateral relations.

Economic data, energy assessments, and reports from international monitors demonstrate that the primary burden of fuel deficits and infrastructure instability falls directly on the civilian population. The disruptions to medical supplies, food distribution, and municipal sanitation illustrate the direct impact of unilateral economic sanctions on daily life.

Despite persistent resource constraints and structural deficits, the Cuban government has maintained state operations and institutional control through domestic conservation strategies and international partnerships.

#Russia | Moscow condemned a US arrest warrant against Raul Castro over the 1996 downing of two civilian aircraft, calling the charges politically motivated.
Russia warned that escalating pressure on Cuba could destabilize Latin America and the Caribbean.#RaulCastro #Cuba… pic.twitter.com/PhmRslPWFq

— teleSUR English (@telesurenglish) October 20, 2026

Sources:  Granma – Juventud Rebelde – Cuba Debate – Cubavisión – CiberCuba – EcuRed – TeleSUR – BBC – CNN – The Guardian – La Radio del Sur

The Cradle – October 20, 2026

US special envoy Tom Barrack conceded that a “ground kinetic” battle in Yemen by the US “seems fruitless” during a talk at the Global Security Forum in Qatar on 20 October.

“I think the president’s been clear that he supports Saudi Arabia and the backing that they need logistically he will supply. But America getting involved in a ground kinetic battle somewhere else seems fruitless.”

Barrack is Washington’s ambassador to Turkiye and special presidential envoy for Syria and Iraq.

He admitted that military force has failed in Yemen and that Riyadh is in a “very difficult position.”

“These kinetic reactions have never worked. It doesn’t work. It’s probably not likely that it’s going to work,” he said.

Barrack questioned whether US meddling across West Asia has helped or harmed the region, arguing that Ansarallah in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the resistance factions in Iraq would lose their reason to exist only once states took responsibility themselves.

He pressed for talks between Riyadh, Sanaa, and regional mediators, urging regional capitals to build their own alliances instead of leaning on Washington.

He went further, admitting that the US has had a hand in 23 regime changes across the region, none of which achieved their aims.

He declined to say whether the US-Israeli war on Iran launched on 28 February was a mistake, while conceding that it had unleashed unintended consequences across the region.

The admission comes as the Saudi-led coalition presses on with airstrikes on Yemen, drawing retaliatory missile and drone strikes by the Yemeni Armed Forces (YAF) on the kingdom.

Riyadh has turned to its defense partners under the Mecca pact, including Pakistan and Turkiye, after Washington declined its requests for direct US intervention against Yemen.

Barrack’s remarks follow Washington’s failed bid to subdue Yemen by military force, with more than 1,000 US airstrikes between March 2024 and April 2025 unable to halt Yemeni naval operations waged in support of Gaza, forcing the US into an Omani-brokered ceasefire with Sanaa in May 2025.

The campaign cost Washington $1 billion in its first three weeks alone, as Yemeni forces downed 17 MQ-9 Reaper drones and the US lost two F-18 fighter jets.

Ansarallah leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi said in November 2024 that the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier had retreated hundreds of miles after coming under Yemeni fire, while then US Under Secretary of Defense Bill LaPlante admitted he was “just shocked” by what Yemen’s missiles could do.

Europe fared no better, with Rear Admiral Vasileios Gryparis, commander of the EU’s Operation Aspides, telling Bloomberg in June 2024 that his Red Sea fleet needed to more than double in size and that US–UK strikes on Yemen were “not contributing to the solution,” after France withdrew one of his frigates citing the threat level.

 

U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff will meet Russian officials in St. Petersburg on Oct. 21 to discuss European and U.S. proposals for peace in Ukraine, Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Store said.

Staying quiet is riskier than speaking up, Ukrainian officials say, as President Trump goes further than ever in prioritizing Russia’s interests.

© Ludovic Marin/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

(Bloomberg) — A US plan to rehabilitate sanctioned tankers to boost oil supply may attract only a sliver of the dark fleet, as existing contracts, complex compliance checks and sky-high...

Iran has deliberately prolonged talks with the US to try to weaken Donald Trump politically ahead of November's US midterm elections, senior officials say, while fears of renewed military action and deep distrust of Washington have reinforced Tehran's reluctance to strike a quick deal to end the war.

Press TV – October 20, 2026

Iran’s Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN has urged the world body’s Security Council to hold an emergency meeting and condemn threats by the United States and the Israeli regime against the Islamic Republic’s territory and critical infrastructure.

Gholamhossein Darzi made the remarks in a letter dated Monday and addressed to UN Secretary-General António Guterres and the president of the Security Council.

The letter cited recent US media reports that the White House and the US Department of War had prepared fresh military options, including the possible use of the GBU-43/B, known as the Massive Ordnance Air Blast (MOAB) or so-called “Mother of All Bombs,” against Iran.

Darzi noted that US President Donald Trump had discussed the weapon in a televised interview and threatened further attacks.

The diplomat also cited remarks by Israeli minister for military affairs Israel Katz that the regime was prepared to attack the Islamic Republic and would target “all energy targets” in any renewed aggression.

The letter also pointed out how Katz had threatened to return Iran to the “Stone Age”, besides claiming that the United States and the regime had dropped a total of 35,000 bombs on Iran and that their military campaign was not over.

Darzi further denounced Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu for openly declaring an intention to launch another unprovoked war against the Islamic Republic, adding that the silence and explicit support of certain Security Council members had emboldened him.

He called for immediate action against “brazen existential threats” issued by Trump and renewed Israeli threats of military aggression.

“These unabated threats, in the context of the U.S.-Israeli wars of aggression launched on 13 June 2025 and 28 February 2026 against Iran, and the deliberate attacks against Iranian civilians and critical infrastructure, pose a grave risk of further violation of international law with catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences, and serious threats to regional and international peace and security,” he wrote.

The diplomat argued that threats to destroy Iran’s civilian and energy infrastructure could cause severe and potentially long-term humanitarian and environmental damage.

He also condemned Washington and Tel Aviv for disregarding obligations under the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and customary international humanitarian law.

Darzi requested an emergency Security Council meeting, unequivocal condemnation of threats against Iran’s civilian infrastructure, and accountability and full reparation for damage resulting from Washington’s and Tel Aviv’s internationally wrongful acts.

“The Security Council cannot remain silent in the face of explicit threats of renewed aggression and the destruction of essential civilian infrastructure,” he stated.

The letter, meanwhile, reaffirmed Iran’s right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

He warned that the United States and the Israeli regime would bear responsibility for the consequences of further aggression, including “the risk of unpredictable and uncontrollable escalation.”

"I think the important takeaway for you is that there has not been some deliberate political directive to go out and harm Ukraine," Rubio said, acknowledging possible delays in interceptor shipments.

Al Mayadeen | October 20, 2026

Tehran no longer views Pakistani and Qatari mediation as yielding tangible results, Iranian sources told Al Mayadeen on Tuesday, as a Russian initiative coordinated with China proposes joint management of the Strait of Hormuz with Iran.

Iranian sources told Al Mayadeen that Tehran has come to view Pakistani and Qatari mediation as ineffective in delivering tangible results, citing Islamabad and Doha’s limited ability to influence the US position. This has prompted Iran to explore alternative channels for mediation.

In this context, Iranian international affairs expert Mehdi Khan Alizadeh told Al Mayadeen that a new Russian diplomatic move could pave the way for Moscow to assume a more substantive mediating role, amid coordination between Russia and the United States. He pointed to a Russian initiative developed in cooperation with China that proposes joint management of maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz with Iran.

Alizadeh explained that the initiative concerns the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf security. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s visit to Tehran addressed these issues, while Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian is expected to visit Moscow again, reflecting continued efforts surrounding the Russian proposal.

Regarding Tehran’s immediate priorities, Alizadeh stressed that ending the war takes precedence over the nuclear issue. He said this position follows a decision by the Leader of the Islamic Revolution and the Islamic Republic, Sayyed Mojtaba Khamenei, adding that Iran’s current focus is on securing a ceasefire, while the nuclear file is not presently among its priorities.

These developments coincide with US President Donald Trump’s remarks about “providing a framework for Russia to communicate with Iran,” potentially intersecting with Moscow’s diplomatic efforts.

Lavrov visits Tehran for first time since start of war

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov arrived in Tehran on Monday for his first visit since the start of the war on Iran, as Moscow seeks to play a mediating role.

Lavrov said Moscow’s efforts “aim to prevent the return of a full-scale war.”

Meanwhile, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian told Lavrov that the establishment of US military bases in regional countries has offered, and will continue to offer, no benefit to the region beyond increasing tensions and undermining security.

During his meeting with Lavrov, Pezeshkian said US interference and divisive policies had led to the emergence of disputes across the region.

He stressed that there are no fundamental disagreements between Iran and regional countries, affirming Tehran’s readiness to address existing challenges through dialogue and mutual understanding.

Pezeshkian also said Iran shares common ground with countries across the region and has consistently sought to develop relations with them on the basis of brotherly engagement and mutual cooperation.

Araghchi, Lavrov reject military action, call for stability in Gulf

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, for his part, said during a joint press conference with Lavrov that Tehran and Moscow agree that military action is not the solution. He added that relations between the two countries contribute to strengthening regional stability.

Araghchi said he had hosted Lavrov in Tehran for “important discussions” covering several issues spanning Europe and West Asia, including Lebanon, Palestine, Ukraine, and Yemen.

The talks also focused on expanding economic and nuclear cooperation between the two countries. Araghchi underscored that ties between Iran and Russia have never been closer or more collaborative than they are today.

The difference between a blue ripple and a blue wave will be the turnout of young voters.

The difference between a blue ripple and a blue wave will be the turnout of young voters.

By Andrew M. Leonard | Responsible Statecraft | October 19, 2026

When the Senate returns to session after the midterm elections, it will face sharp debate over a highly contested Fiscal Year 2027 (FY2027) National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).

The House version passed with a slim margin of 216-212, and included a provision entitled, “United States – Israel Defense Technology Cooperation Initiative,” often referred to simply as “Section 219”; the pending Senate bill contains a related, but not identical provision, entitled “Section 1217: United States-Israel Framework for Upgraded Technologies, Unified Research, and Enhanced Security (FUTURES) Act of 2026”.

In title, the U.S.-Israel FUTURES Act sounds like one of many bilateral cooperative agreements between the U.S. military and a partner military force anywhere in the world. But in reality, as written, the provision would pressure existing security cooperation entities to expand and accelerate bilateral technological integration through a statutory executive agent arrangement that lacks clear precedent even among the U.S.’s closest allies.

The agreement isn’t necessary to advance cooperation. In practice, it puts undue pressure on the processes designed to protect U.S. interests and technology.

The issue discussed here is not if the U.S. should or should not increase its defense technological cooperation with Israel; the pros and cons are well-documented and highly debated elsewhere. What isn’t, or shouldn’t be, a matter of debate are the implications of putting undo pressure and influence to short cut established security processes for the benefit of any single partner nation, and that is precisely what Sections 219 and 1217 would do.

The U.S. Department of Defense is already well underway in reforming its technology release and foreign disclosure procedures following Executive Order 14268 of April 2025. Short cuts to these reforms, or additional legislation laying on top of ongoing actions, will only confuse and complicate the process, adding additional vulnerabilities in the end.

So which parts of Section 219 put the system at greatest risk? It starts with directing the secretary of defense to designate an executive agent responsible for synchronizing U.S.- Israel cooperative efforts to expand and accelerate bilateral defense technology research and development, testing, evaluation, integration, and industrial cooperation, with particular focus on counter-unmanned systems, missile and air defense, AI, quantum, autonomous systems, directed energy, cyber defense and electronic warfare, biotechnology and medical defense, network integration, and data fusion. These are some of our most sensitive, and classified, areas of research and development. Additionally, Senate Section 1217 directs the secretary of defense to “consult with” (i.e. formally seeking and considering views or input of) the Israeli minister of defense in establishing the initiative, providing a foreign nation with influence over access to and integration of U.S. sensitive technology.

To break this down a bit more…

• The power of an executive agent within the Department of Defense is significant. DoD Directive 5101.01 gives an executive agent, within the areas of its assigned responsibilities and functions, the authority to take precedence over other DoD component heads with related responsibilities or functions. Heads of Department of Defense (DoD) Components include the secretaries of the military departments (Army, Navy, and Air Force), the directors of the defense agencies, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Meaning, the executive agent could create significant institutional pressure over the Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA) on access to and release of sensitive U.S. technology. DTSA is the primary office within the Department of Defense tasked specifically with protecting sensitive technology from release to foreign entities.

• An executive agent is assigned by the secretary of defense alone, with no separate confirmation process nor congressional oversight over how it exercises its authority. So, if Congress legislates DoD create an executive agent for his initiative, it abdicates more of this congressional oversight authority to the Executive Branch — at a time when the executive branch already acts unilaterally on issues in which it is supposed to inform/consult Congress.

• Once the executive agent pushes the system to embed foreign-original technology or systems in U.S. programs of record (a formally established and funded DoD acquisition program), it becomes fiscally and politically costly to pull those pieces back out. Such a process would require re-competing contracts and re-certifying systems, among other time-intensive tasks. Integration of intellectual property can create long-term dependencies, regardless of future U.S. policy.

• Many of the areas of prescribed integration are highly sensitive, presenting significant counterintelligence risk. Sharing and embedding U.S. cyber, AI, and autonomous system developments with a foreign partner before the U.S. has even fully developed sufficient and adequate regulatory provisions to govern the use of this technology puts the U.S. under an unnecessary influence of a foreign partner. Additionally, if U.S. systems are dependent on foreign technology, that foreign partner gains leverage over the U.S., and at a time when the U.S. needs to be more clear-eyed on its own priorities, not those of other nations.

If such cooperation as outlined above was regular business, perhaps some of the arguments could be debated more reasonably. But, it is not ‘business as usual.’ In fact, Section 219 would legislate a relationship distinct and more powerful than others in existence today, even with the U.S.’s closest allies, like the Five Eye partners and NATO. Section 219 creates a multi-generational technological relationship with one partner that would be very difficult to rollback once incorporated into U.S. development and acquisition systems. It is a pure political maneuver with great risk to the U.S.; it is not necessary and is, in fact, dangerous.

At this point, to protect sensitive U.S. technological development and to ensure congressional oversight is not further abdicated, the House should make clear it won’t vote for an NDAA that comes out of conference if it includes this provision, and the Senate should remove or amend its corresponding Section 1217 from the FY27 NDAA and enter into a separate debate over the issue.

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Andrew M. Leonard is a retired US Army Colonel and Senior Fellow for Defense Policy and Military Affairs at the Quincy Institute.

Mr. Trump appears to wish to be both president and first lady.

© The New York Times

By Larry C. Johnson – SONAR21 – October 20, 2026

Washington and Israel are talking again about “finishing the job” in Iran. Before they do, someone should take a hard look at the bill for the jobs already done. My friend Karl Miller, who has called this region correctly more often than most of the people paid to do it, sent me his latest assessment on Monday. His conclusion is blunt: on the current course, another round of escalation is coming, and the countries paying for it will be the ones that never got a vote.

The Gulf is being bled dry

Start with the people who are supposed to be America’s partners. The IMF’s October outlook reads like a casualty report. Kuwait’s economy is forecast to shrink 16.7 percent this year. Qatar’s will shrink 15.6 percent, and Bahrain’s 11.3 percent. The UAE, long sold as the region’s safe haven, is now expected to contract 3.9 percent, a seven-point swing from the IMF’s April forecast. Saudi Arabia is forecast to shrink 3.3 percent. The only Gulf economy still growing is Oman, and that is because its ports sit outside the Strait of Hormuz.

These are not paper losses. Qatar lost two LNG trains at Ras Laffan in March, about 17 percent of its export capacity. QatarEnergy says the repairs will take three to five years and will cost it roughly $20 billion a year in revenue. Saudi Arabia’s escape route around Hormuz, the East-West Pipeline to Yanbu, is crippled. My sources tell me four of its 11 pumping stations are severely damaged and out of service. Riyadh now projects a deficit of 4.9 percent of GDP, is borrowing to cover it, and has frozen non-essential spending.

Miller explains why this is worse than the headline oil price suggests. A damaged plant produces nothing to sell, but the payroll, the debt payments and the repair bills keep coming. A plant that is still standing but cannot get parts in or cargo out is in almost the same position. A $108 barrel of oil is worth nothing if you cannot ship it. And the cash the Gulf states used to invest at home and abroad is vanishing fast. If a government takes in 100 and must spend 70, it has 30 left over. Cut income to 80 and that cushion drops to 10. A 20 percent hit to revenue wipes out two-thirds of the money for everything else.

The Gulf states bought American protection to safeguard exactly this wealth. Instead, as Miller puts it, they have ended up paying for the costs of American strategy. That is a bargain they will not keep making forever.

A new round means a deeper shortage

Now consider what another round of American and Israeli strikes would do to a world that is already short of energy. Oil flows through Hormuz are running around 11.6 to 11.9 million barrels a day, against a pre-war level of about 17 million. Middle Eastern fuel exports are below half of what they were before the war. The International Energy Agency says diesel will stay tight well into 2027, and that the diesel stocks already burned will not be rebuilt before the second half of that year. Brent is around $108, up more than 75 percent from a year ago.

Every escalation so far has followed the same pattern. Iran answers by tightening its grip on Hormuz. Its allies in Yemen widen their target list. Gulf facilities that were patched together get hit again before they earn back the cost of repairing them. That is the cruelest part of Miller’s analysis: repeated attacks make repairs pointless, because nobody will spend billions restoring a plant that may be destroyed again next month. A new campaign will not reopen the Strait. It will close it further, take more Gulf capacity offline, and push diesel back toward September’s record of more than $200 a barrel, just as Europe heads into winter. France and Italy are already rioting over the cost of living. Imagine them in February.

Israel’s dark future

Miller’s harshest judgment is reserved for Israel, and it deserves a full hearing. He believes Israel will never recover from what it has done in Gaza, which a UN commission of inquiry concluded last year was genocide. In his words, the state is “done economically. It is done politically. It is done morally.” That is strong language, but the argument behind it is not hysteria. It is about how a state wears itself out.

His reasoning runs like this. Israel’s leadership has bet everything on military domination: hit every opponent hard enough that no one dares resist. Force can win battles, but it cannot make anyone accept the result. Every campaign therefore creates the need for the next one. Opponents rebuild, resentment grows, and the circle of countries willing to stand with Israel gets smaller. So the government doubles down with more force, because the alternative, accepting real limits on occupation and on its treatment of the Palestinians, threatens the political project it is defending. War becomes a way to postpone the reckoning, not avoid it.

The cost is already showing. The IMF says Israel’s economy is about 9 percent smaller than it would have been without the war. The budget deficit is heading to 6.2 percent of GDP, and public debt is on track to reach about 74 percent of GDP by 2031. Reservists are pulled from their jobs again and again. Israelis are already fighting over who carries the burden, with ultra-Orthodox men still far less likely to work or serve than everyone else. Foreign investors and partners grow more cautious with each campaign. Miller’s warning is that Israel’s project could become unsustainable long before its military power runs out. A country can keep its tanks and jets and still lose the economy, the alliances and the legitimacy it needs to survive. That is the dark and uncertain future he sees, and I find it hard to argue with.

Trump says Russia is doing nothing. Lavrov says otherwise.

Which brings me to the President’s latest reassurance. On October 13, Donald Trump said he does not believe either Russia or China is helping Iran. On Sunday he went further on social media, insisting that “Russia is doing very little to help the Islamic Republic of Iran, compared with what it could be doing,” if it is doing anything at all, and that he wants it to stay that way “unless some stupid people get in the way.”

Less than a day later, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stood next to Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in Tehran and said the opposite. “I am confident that Iran’s cause, like Russia’s, is a just cause,” Lavrov declared. He said Russia “has no intention of abandoning the implementation of agreements with Iran in the economic and investment spheres,” and recommitted Moscow to the 20-year strategic partnership that formally took effect on October 2. He announced that Russian specialists will return to the Bushehr nuclear plant. He called for Hormuz to return to pre-war conditions, and tied that to protecting Iran from renewed attacks. Before landing in Tehran, he called Trump’s approach “wrong.”

To be fair to the President, Russia has not gone to war for Iran, and the partnership treaty does not require it to. There is no mutual-defense clause. But that is a lawyer’s distinction. Russia’s foreign minister does not fly into a capital under threat of attack to call its cause just by accident. Add the reported Russian satellite data reaching Iran’s allies and the steady improvement in the accuracy of Iranian and Houthi missiles, and the picture is of a partner that is careful, deniable and very much engaged. Moscow does not need to fire a shot. It only needs to keep Iran standing while America bleeds its Gulf allies and Europe’s economy.

The bill comes due

If Washington and Israel launch another round, they will be betting that this time force produces a settlement. Three years of evidence says it will not. What it will produce is deeper Gulf recessions, a longer energy shortage, more anger in Europe’s streets, and a bigger bill for an Israel that is already running out of room. Miller’s forecast is that the next round is coming anyway. I hope he is wrong this time. I doubt it.

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What is needed is a fundamental restructuring of financial crime education in the private sector.

What is needed is a fundamental restructuring of financial crime education in the private sector.

Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Store and Finnish President Alexander Stubb are also taking part in the talks.

Sputnik – 20.10.2026

“It’s quite possible that these facts could serve as a tool to exert pressure on the Kiev regime,” but the US government “will never publicly acknowledge that they have leveraged drug cartels to further their own interests,” RAS Institute of Latin America senior researcher Alexander Stepanov told Sputnik.

Commenting on the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service’s report that the US is looking into the deployment of 80+ cartel members to Ukraine for drone training, Stepanov said he suspects Washington won’t take any substantive measures “because the criminal networks and cartels operating in the Western Hemisphere are affiliated with the US intelligence community.”

“These groups serve as proxy instruments for the US, deployed when necessary to pressure opposing governments and act as a key destabilizing factor – thus creating opportunities for the US to exert influence over the region.”

US intelligence even “oversees the recruitment of individuals from these cartels, categorizing them based on technical proficiency, equipment, and intended use,” Stepanov pointed out, highlighting the historical use of American prisons for this purpose, and the fact that “virtually the entire leadership of Mexico’s cartels comes from security or military backgrounds, including the special forces.”

Possessing “the necessary skills, training and discipline,” gang members are “ideal mercenaries,” and deployment in Ukraine for drone training will allow them to transfer their skills back home as instructors at specialized paramilitary training centers affiliated with US intel agencies.

The drone link is also “only part of the picture,” Stepanov said, pointing to “deeper and more pervasive” links involving the transfer of arms sent to Ukraine by NATO to Latin America’s cartels, and to terror groups like those active in the Sahel region today – complete with Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate training assistance.

Ukraine is also “leveraging its capabilities, intelligence structures and affiliated networks of organized criminal groups that have taken root in Europe to facilitate the distribution of narcotics, with Mexican drug cartels serving as their primary suppliers,” Stepanov believes.

China's military said on Tuesday it had sent forces to watch a US warship that "illegally" entered waters around a disputed shoal in the South China Sea, while further north in the waterway, Taiwan reported a standoff with a Chinese vessel.

Early voting in two Republican strongholds puts Latino voters’ priorities and President Donald Trump’s declining approval under scrutiny.

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Early voting began Monday in Texas and most Florida counties, setting the stage for closely watched midterm contests in two Republican strongholds where Latino voters’ concerns over inflation, immigration and public safety could shape the electoral landscape.

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With Latinos accounting for 40% of Texas’ population and 28.7% of Florida’s, both states offer a key test of the parties’ ability to attract Hispanic voters. Economic pressures, rising living costs, immigration policy and public safety are among the issues shaping voters’ priorities.

In Florida, voters turned out early in heavily Hispanic areas, including Miami-Dade County and Doral. Their concerns varied: some pointed to rising food and fuel prices and the strain on households and small businesses, while others emphasized public safety, education and support for the Trump administration.

Foreign policy and immigration have also exposed divisions within the community. In Doral, home to a significant Venezuelan population, tensions over the conflict with Iran and its potential impact on oil prices have added to debate over the administration’s tougher immigration policies.

🗳️ EE. UU.: comenzó la votación anticipada en Texas, que se suma a Georgia y Arizona. Las elecciones del 3 de noviembre definirán el control del Congreso. #teleSUR #19oct pic.twitter.com/EHFa1yUbOU

— teleSUR TV (@teleSURtv) October 19, 2026

Text Reads: 🗳️ U.S.: Early voting has begun in Texas, joining Georgia and Arizona. The November 3 elections will determine control of Congress.

The early voting period coincides with a decline in Trump’s approval among Hispanic voters, according to a recent Pew Research Center study. His approval rating stood at 24% in October, down from 38% in February 2025, at the beginning of his term.

The figures come as both parties compete in high-profile state and congressional races. In Florida, Republican Byron Donalds and Democrat David Jolly are vying for the governorship in a contest that has proved closer than expected. Republican Representative María Elvira Salazar is seeking re-election in the state’s 27th Congressional District against Democratic challenger Eliott Rodríguez.

In Texas, Republican Attorney General Ken Paxton faces Democrat James Talarico in the Senate race, while Republican Governor Greg Abbott is challenged by state legislator Gina Hinojosa.

Democrats are hoping that declining support for Trump among Hispanic voters, combined with greater participation in early and mail-in voting, will help them contest key seats in the House of Representatives and Senate. Republicans, meanwhile, are seeking to maintain their dominance in both states through the end of the voting period.