Intelligence services from five European countries warn that Russia is expanding assassination and sabotage operations against defence manufacturers supplying Ukraine. The threats coincide with an alleged plot against Poland’s prime minister and defence minister, raising concerns about Moscow’s efforts to undermine European military assistance through intimidation and political destabilisation.

European intelligence agencies have warned that Russia is intensifying efforts to assassinate executives of defence companies supplying Ukraine, extending its campaign of sabotage and intimidation into the European military-industrial sector.

According to intelligence assessments obtained from five European security services, Moscow has ordered an expansion of covert operations targeting senior figures at major arms manufacturers and smaller companies producing drones and military components. Germany’s domestic intelligence agency, the BfV, has reportedly advised executives to strengthen personal security, while some manufacturers have already increased protection for senior personnel.

The warnings emerged alongside reports of an alleged assassination plot against Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and Defence Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz. Polish authorities convened an emergency security meeting and subsequently detained a suspect. No connection between the Polish case and Russian intelligence has been established.

Europe becomes Moscow’s principal target

The apparent expansion of Russian covert operations reflects a shift in Moscow’s calculations concerning Western military assistance.

President Vladimir Putin had reason to anticipate that Donald Trump’s return to the White House would weaken American support for Kyiv. Trump repeatedly questioned US military expenditure on Ukraine and advocated a negotiated settlement with Russia. A substantial reduction in American weapons deliveries could have increased pressure on Ukraine to accept Moscow’s territorial demands.

Instead, European governments assumed greater responsibility for sustaining Ukrainian defence capabilities, including financing weapons purchases and expanding domestic production.

The European Union’s €90 billion support programme for 2026–2027 allocates €60 billion to defence procurement and industrial capacity. The EU has also established mechanisms allowing Ukraine to participate in European joint procurement programmes.

Disrupting European manufacturers therefore offers Moscow a means of restricting Ukraine’s military capabilities without directly confronting NATO.

Assassination threats can interfere with procurement even when attacks are never carried out. Large manufacturers can afford extensive security arrangements, but smaller companies producing electronics, drone components and specialised equipment often lack comparable resources.

Intimidation could delay contracts, discourage investment and persuade individual suppliers to withdraw from Ukrainian defence programmes.

Sabotage as an instrument of political pressure

Russia’s alleged interest in targeting defence executives is not unprecedented. In 2024, American intelligence reportedly uncovered a Russian plot to assassinate Armin Papperger, chief executive of Rheinmetall, one of Germany’s principal suppliers of ammunition and military equipment to Ukraine.

As EU Today previously reported, Moscow has also publicly identified European factories involved in Ukrainian drone production, increasing concerns that civilian industrial facilities could become targets of Russian operations.

European authorities have investigated suspected Russian involvement in arson, infrastructure attacks and clandestine networks. An earlier cross-border investigation into alleged assassination and sabotage preparations demonstrated how intermediaries could be recruited to conduct operations while obscuring their sponsors.

Such activity also carries political consequences. Attacks against infrastructure and industrial facilities can reinforce public fears about confrontation with Russia, particularly during elections when parties advocating accommodation with Moscow seek to exploit security concerns.

Poland has already experienced mounting Russian hybrid pressure, including threats to critical infrastructure and information operations intended to aggravate domestic political divisions.

Putin’s strategy against European rearmament

Ukraine’s continuing strikes against Russian refineries and military-industrial facilities have added economic and operational pressures to Moscow’s prolonged war effort. Russia retains substantial military production capacity, but the costs of sustaining the conflict remain considerable.

Interfering with European weapons manufacturing could serve two objectives: restricting Ukraine’s access to equipment and obstructing Europe’s longer-term rearmament.

The Kremlin does not necessarily need European governments to abandon Ukraine formally. Production delays, disrupted contracts and reluctant suppliers could reduce the practical effect of military assistance even while political commitments remain unchanged.

European governments have acknowledged the industrial challenge. In its June conclusions on European defence, the European Council called for accelerated manufacturing capacity, stronger supply chains and closer cooperation with Ukraine’s defence industry.

Russia’s apparent strategy seeks to exploit the dependence of these programmes on private companies and skilled civilian personnel.

The warnings from European intelligence agencies suggest that protecting defence executives, engineers and contractors is becoming part of the continent’s wider security responsibilities.

For Moscow, intimidation offers the possibility of weakening Ukrainian military resistance without an open confrontation with NATO. For European governments, preventing covert operations from disrupting weapons production is increasingly inseparable from their commitment to sustain Ukraine’s defence.

Ukraine’s Defense Procurement Agency has contracted about 5.5 times as many drones of various types in recent months as in the same period of 2025. It is roughly 300% more over the year as a whole, the Defense Ministry said.

Drones are the weapons this war runs on, from short-range strikes to hits deep inside Russia, and Ukraine has raced to build and buy more of them while sparing its troops. The agency contracted for about $8 billion worth of drones in the first half of 2026 alone, double the amount for the same period last year.

The ministry wants to arm the force at every level, Defense Minister Yevhenii Khmara stresses. Deep-strike drones hit targets far inside Russia, while middle-strike drones kill enemy drone crews and burn logistics and command posts, lowering the risk to Ukrainian soldiers.

“Technology and having enough of these systems raise combat effectiveness and at the same time reduce the risks for our soldiers,” Khmara said.

FPV drones lead the surge

The sharpest growth is in FPV drones, the cheap first-person-view quadcopters that do much of the killing on the front. Contracting for them in 2026 already exceeds the total for all of 2025 by 54%, and deliveries have risen almost 3.7 times, the ministry notes.

International support and the scaling of Ukraine’s own defense industry made the jump possible, Khmara adds. Much of the buying now runs through the DOT-Chain Defense marketplace, where units select what they need, and the agency handles contracts and logistics, cutting the average delivery time for in-stock items to 9 days.

Making supply predictable

The ministry is trying to make deliveries steadier, Khmara explains. It is aligning the front’s needs, purchase planning, and the production capacity of the Ukrainian industry, making supply more predictable.

Predictable contracting lets manufacturers build their production lines step by step, plan logistics and order components in advance, he says. The ministry frames the push as a larger order book for the domestic industry and a way to scale the solutions that work in combat.

Ukraine wants to build more weapons at home while making it easier to draft the people who build them. Kyiv has proposed cutting the draft-exemption quota for defense-industry enterprises from 100% of their workers to 85%, while the Ukrainian Council of Arms Manufacturers says the limit should stay at the previous level for qualifying critical plants.

The change would strip the draft shield from 15% of the workers at plants the Defense Ministry has deemed critical to the economy. Those are the people who set production volumes, delivery dates, and new designs, the council argues, so losing them would hit output just as Ukraine pushes to make more of its own weapons.

The draft resolution has already been sent to the Cabinet of Ministers for approval.

“We consider that the proposed reduction of the limit does not account for the staffing needs of defense production,” the council says.

A workforce that takes years to build

Ukraine’s defense industry is still growing, with new plants, expanding capacity, and new technologies, the council adds. Raising the share of Ukrainian-made weapons in the forces, localizing components, and cutting reliance on imports all require more specialists, not fewer.

These teams are built over the years, the manufacturers add. Companies invest in finding and training people who master specific technologies and production processes, and keeping them is what lets firms plan expansion and take on new commitments to the military.

Uncertainty at the worst moment

Cutting the exemption limit would add uncertainty, just as the state expects producers to raise output. The fallout could affect both manufacturers and military units awaiting their weapons.

The council urges the Economy Ministry to drop the cut to 85%and asks the Defense Ministry and the Cabinet to maintain exemptions of up to 100% for qualifying defense workers. It offers to share data on the industry’s staffing needs and help assess how the change would affect defense orders.

The reservation rules must reflect the growth of the defense industry and Ukraine’s need for more of its own weapons, it concludes.

Según revela Instituto Alemán de Economía (IW), durante la primera mitad de la década de 2020-2025, la economía germana creció un 0,2% anual y esa tasa se debió mayormente al gasto público, el cual, solamente en el segundo trimestre del 2026, fue superior a la media anual de 2019.

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Lo que significa que se diluye la “Alemania como motor económico europeo” de la que tanto se habló en el último medio siglo.

El empresariado invirtió muy poco en estos años y en el entorno productivo y de realce económico nacional ha caído drásticamente.

El mismo gobierno federal reconoció, a principios de este mes, que la situación de crecimiento es “precaria” y, en los círculos cerrados del empresariado escasean los vaticinios halagueños para el 2027 y 2028.

Creditreform informó que 1 de cada 3 empresas está muy endeudada y que las inversiones retrocedieron a su rango de 2013.

Durante el pasado mes de abril, más de 2 mil empresas quebraron, destacándose entre estas empresas las abocadas al transporte, la logística, la hotelería y la cervecería.

Klaus Wohlrabe, jefe de estudios del Instituto Ifo de Investigación Económica, declaró que todavía no se vislumbra una recuperación real para el mercado laboral y “Los despidos continúan en la industria manufacturera y el comercio”.

Por su parte, Rolf Bürkl, experto en consumo del NIM, dijo que “La mayoría de los hogares prevé que los altos precios de la energía reduzcan su poder adquisitivo” y, en consecuencia, “se muestran más escépticos sobre sus perspectivas de ingresos para los próximos doce meses”.

El agricultor e influencer, Hannes Kuhnwald («Landwirt aus MV»), pronosticó que se avecina una crisis en la agricultura ya que “Cada vez cierran más explotaciones. Y las pequeñas son las primeras en verse afectadas. Ahora, las grandes empresas se benefician de ello. Y muchas corporaciones también”, afirmando que las explotaciones pequeñas y medianas no pueden competir con las compañías grandes y que, por lo tanto, la clase política debería aplicar medidas sensatas para proteger de la pauperización, la quiebra y la exclusión económica a los pequeños y medianos productores agrícolas.

Dentro de la misma Alemania hay quienes se quejan de la forma en que llegan los fondos provenientes de la UE, pidiendo, como una de las soluciones más rápidas, que dichos fondos lleguen hacia abajo de una forma más equitativa.

Simultáneamente, se produce, en esta segunda mitad del 2026, un descenso pronunciado en las ventas del sector minorista, cuyos niveles son, según consignas las estadísticas más fiables, de mayor caída en los últimos cinco años.

Hay negocios de los más consolidados que, debido a la situación, están llegando al límite.

El Grupo Theo Müller -líder de la industria alimentaria- anunció, en esta semana, que cerrará dos de sus plantas más importantes con la consecuencia de cientos de empleados que serán despedidos.

Asimismo, en entorno de Volkswagen seguirá convulso en lo que resta de este año y en 2027.

Publicado originalmente por  Geopolítica rugiente

Ukraine, which long kept its weapons at home, is now clearing its arms makers to sell abroad. Its Commission on Export Control has granted 18 Ukrainian companies permission to send their finished weapons abroad and has processed more than 400 export applications, with over 90% approved, the National Security and Defense Council says, citing commission head Davyd Aloian.

Ukraine now produces far more weapons than it can afford, with defense production growing from about $1 billion a year at the start of the invasion to a projected $55 billion in 2026.

The exports are reportedly conducted under the Drone Deals framework that President Volodymyr Zelenskyy unveiled in April, which allows controlled sales of surplus weapons to partner countries while the Defense Ministry and General Staff retain first claim to everything the front needs. Some categories already run up to 50% beyond what Ukraine can use or finance.

From a stalled commission to 18 approvals

The commission’s work had been halting. It resumed in February after an eight-month freeze and issued the first permits then, and its updated membership has been working since, Aloian notes.

Building partnerships abroad

Aloian framed the goal as scaling Ukrainian technology rather than one-off deals. The state wants domestic producers to expand abroad while partners get working solutions, he says, and is open to dialogue with the defense industry to fix problems as they arise.

Earlier, an industry group that represents more than 400 companies warned in September that the mechanism was choking. A new 20-to-30% fee on export permits priced Ukrainian goods out of the market, it said, and a joint-production program had stalled with hundreds of foreign bids pending.

Euromaidan Press cannot verify whether the Commission on Export Control has taken the issue into consideration.

The council recently met a UK Defense Ministry delegation to discuss closer cooperation, including a Drone Deal, an anti-ballistic coalition, and joint production, Aloian adds. Reaching foreign markets enables producers to attract new orders and investment, scale up, and build long-term partnerships.