With Andy Burnham becoming the UK’s new Prime Minister, and Andrei Kelin leaving the post of Russian Ambassador to London, British‑Russian relations seem to be entering a new stage. Little is known about Burnham’s foreign policy agenda, let alone his position on Russia. The two sides have exchanged sharp statements in recent weeks, and tension is clearly growing. However, digging deeper, one can find some clues as to what will happen next.
Burnham has made clear that his priority is domestic policy and that he would prefer to make foreign trips only when there were compelling reasons. New to foreign policy, he will need to clarify his position on virtually all issues. His recent trip to Kiev proves that. It was an easy but symbolic success: coming to Kiev on the anniversary of Ukraine’s independence, he promised comprehensive support and brought several pleasant gifts.
From the British government and public’s perspective, everything went smoothly. In the media’s eyes, he made an unforgivable blunder wearing a zipper polo shirt instead of a business suit. Yet Burnham confirmed his commitment to continued support of Ukraine—even if his country cannot afford additional funding or significant arms supplies (while Russian gas imports keep growing).
At first glance, Burnham, like his predecessors, is struggling with the lack of long‑term foreign-policy planning and of new ideas from political parties. In the coming months, the government will have to focus on domestic affairs.
Party conferences and the autumn budget presentation will be a serious test for Burnham and the Labor, which is once again leading public opinion polls. In addition, voters’ annoyance with rising crime, abnormal heatwaves, and migrant problems persists. So, for now, he may stay away from foreign policy issues.
In this situation, the figure of the new foreign secretary may be more important. Ed Miliband, former leader of the Labor and of the opposition, the brother of the former head of the Foreign Office, is a politician disliked by the Right for his climate action undertaken as energy minister. Miliband has assembled an impressive team that includes many of those who worked under Gordon Brown. Among the secretary’s advisers are Lord Tom Wood, Hamish Falconer (who participated in negotiations with the Taliban), and Kirsty McNeil (who worked at Make Poverty History).
Former Prime Minister Brown would likely approve of Miliband’s initial steps in combating climate change and managing international aid. Miliband considers himself a realist: he supports center‑left governments around the world as a counterbalance to rising populism and advocates multilateralism in addressing global problems. He thus embodies social‑democratic internationalism that many Labor supporters have cherished for years.
Bluntly speaking, Burnham does not object to Miliband doing the bulk of foreign policy work for the time being. As the opposition’s former leader, Miliband has certain experience in this area. In fact, Miliband played a key role in the UK’s decision against strikes on Syria in 2013. Then Prime Minister David Cameron highly praised his role in the Syrian conflict—a rather unusual move, given their mutual animosity. Also, Burnham needs time to get used to his new position and learn the ropes. For example, the upcoming UNGA session will be a good opportunity for him to meet with world leaders in person.
As for the UK’s policy towards Russia, it is rumored in London that both Westminster and Whitehall recognize the need to resume dialogue with Moscow. London would like to quietly establish a channel of communication with Moscow, but the question is whom to choose for this mission.
(If you’re reading this, Mr. Prime Minister, I’m not very busy.)
Since 2010, the number of real Russia experts in the UK government has decreased dramatically. But even if the right person (or several) is found, what can British and Russian representatives say to each other? As we know, Sir Keir Starmer never called President Vladimir Putin, and the reason is almost certainly that they had nothing to discuss.
Certain hopes in this regard can be pinned on Miliband. The term ‘multilateralism’ can often be heard in Russian foreign policy discussions. Russia is also concerned about climate change and China’s growing influence in Africa and the Pacific. Combating crime is an important topic. Countering human trafficking in Southeast Asia and the Middle East is in the interests of both sides. Educational exchanges should not be overlooked either: the two countries interacted quite successfully in this area in the past. No British university actually wanted to sever ties with Russian partners, and some even suffered from these decisions.
Any of these steps could open the way for the restoration of relations and demonstrate the seriousness of both sides’ intentions to find realistic solutions to global problems. The diplomat who will replace Kelin at Kensington Gardens will be tasked with informing Moscow decisionmakers and conveying the Kremlin’s position to Westminster. If this person and Miliband find common ground, Burnham’s lack of foreign policy experience will no longer matter.
The 18th BRICS Summit, to be held on 12–13 September 2026 under India’s chairmanship at Bharat Mandapam in New Delhi, is set to be a major diplomatic spectacle. The elaborate protocol, heightened security and delegations from across the Global South are to symbolize the expanded BRICS’s growing political and economic weight. One major question on the agenda is who will write the rules of the emerging digital economy.
Artificial intelligence (AI), particularly in its current generative form, is already reshaping trade, production, finance, and the exercise of state power. The World Trade Organization’s 2025 World Trade Report estimates that AI could increase global trade by 34–37% and global GDP by 12–13% by 2040. AI-related goods, including semiconductors and computing equipment, are already becoming major drivers of global trade, with AI-enabling goods hitting $2.3 trillion in 2023. Over 98% of global subsidies for AI-related products currently come from high- and upper-middle-income countries, risking a deeper concentration of AI capabilities.
This transformation is distributed extremely unevenly across countries. According to Stanford University’s 2026 AI Index Report, U.S. private AI investment reached $285.9 billion in 2025, compared to $12.4 billion in China. In 2025 the U.S. also had 5,427 data centers—ten times more than any other country. Nvidia alone accounted for more than 60% percent of reported global AI computing capacity. Yet, challengers are catching up with alternative efficiencies: China now leads with 69.7% of global AI patent filings, and the performance gap between U.S. and Chinese top AI models has collapsed to just 2.7%.
These figures point to a new geopolitical reality. Countries that control advanced chips, computing capacity, cloud infrastructure, foundation models, and data and technical standards will have greater influence over the next phase of globalization.
The rules will determine how data crosses borders. They will also determine how AI-generated content is identified, how copyrighted material can be used for training, and who bears responsibility for algorithmic harm.
The Global South, therefore, faces a strategic choice. It can adapt to the rules largely developed elsewhere, or it can become a rule-maker.
BRICS+ should choose the latter.
BRICS+ has already recognized the stakes. The 2025 BRICS Leaders’ Statement on the Global Governance of Artificial Intelligence called for inclusive and development-oriented AI governance, greater participation by developing countries, and respect for national sovereignty. It also addressed data security, intellectual property, AI safety, and AI-enabled cybercrime.
The challenge is now implementation.
BRICS members already possess substantial regulatory experience. China has established rules for generative AI services and introduced mandatory identification requirements for AI-generated and synthetic content. Russia’s National Strategy for the Development of Artificial Intelligence to 2030, originally approved in 2019 and updated by Presidential Decree #124 in February 2024, treats AI as a strategic area of national technological and economic development. The revised strategy emphasizes domestic AI capabilities, computing infrastructure, trusted AI, regulation, and international cooperation, including greater coordination with partner states on AI development and governance.
India’s Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 and the 2025 DPDP Rules provide a framework for personal-data governance. India’s AI Governance Guidelines, released in February 2026, offer “a coherent and balanced AI governance framework that favor innovation while safeguarding trust, equity, and accountability.” Brazil has advanced AI regulation through PL 2338/2023, approved by the Senate in December 2024 and currently under consideration in the Chamber of Deputies. Brazil’s Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE) has proposed amendments to strengthen regulatory coordination and information-sharing, including cooperation on high-risk AI systems. South Africa’s 2024 National AI Policy Framework provides a foundation for AI policy that covers infrastructure, skills, research, innovation, responsible AI, and regulation. Its draft National AI Policy was withdrawn in April 2026 for revision, leaving the 2024 Framework as the country’s principal AI policy foundation.
These approaches, still evolving, are not yet aligned with one another. They must not be identical, but BRICS+ should work towards ensuring their interoperability. Common principles and technical standards could make different national systems compatible, without requiring that countries surrender their regulatory sovereignty.
The wider international framework is moving quickly.
The UN Global Digital Compact calls for international cooperation on AI, capacity-building in developing countries, and interoperable approaches to data and AI governance. The UN General Assembly has also established an Independent International Scientific Panel on AI and a Global Dialogue on AI Governance.
The WTO framework is equally important. The General Agreement on Trade in Services, the TRIPS Agreement and WTO work on electronic commerce already intersect with digital services, intellectual property, and cross-border data.
The lapse of the WTO moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions on 30 March 2026 provides a warning. The WTO members failed to reach consensus on extending the moratorium at MC14, thereby making digital trade rules part of the wider contest over economic sovereignty.
BRICS+ cannot afford fragmented positions on these issues. Individual developing economies will have less negotiating power if they approach them separately.
The New Delhi Summit should advance a practical BRICS+ Digital and AI Governance Framework with an emphasis on four priorities:
BRICS+ should also coordinate its positions in the ITU, ISO, IEC, UNESCO, and other standards bodies. Technical standards often become de facto global rules because companies adapt their products to major markets’ requirements.
The post-1991 international order has created an unusually concentrated distribution of economic, financial, and technological power. AI is now adding yet another layer to this structure.
For the Global South, the danger is not only in technological, but also in regulatory dependence. A country that imports AI systems, computing infrastructure and digital services may also end up adopting rules developed elsewhere. Its ability to shape how AI affects trade, employment, public services and national security would then remain limited.
BRICS+ has many of the assets required to avoid such outcome. Its members possess large markets, energy resources, scientific expertise, manufacturing capacity, digital infrastructure, and financial resources. Their combined weight gives them greater negotiating capacity than most developing countries can exercise individually.
The missing ingredient is coordination.
India’s 2026 BRICS chairmanship has already placed digital cooperation on the agenda. The BRICS ICT Working Group met in Pune in August to discuss AI, cybersecurity, future networks, digital public infrastructure, and digital ecosystem integration.
The New Delhi Summit should take the next step. BRICS+ should establish a coordinated position on AI and digital governance and carry it into negotiations at the UN, WTO, ITU, UNESCO, and international standards bodies.
The objective should not be a separate BRICS+ digital order. It should be a stronger Global South role in determining the global one.
The AI age is arriving while the international system is becoming more contested and multipolar. Economic power is dispersing, but technological power remains highly concentrated.
Multipolarity without technological and regulatory agency would therefore remain incomplete.
The spectacular event at Bharat Mandapam will last two days. The rules being written around AI will last much longer. BRICS+ should use the 18th BRICS Summit to make one proposition unmistakable: the Global South will enter the emerging digital order as a rule-maker, not a rule-taker.
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