Login
What does Europe want – a war with Russia?
By Ricardo Martins – New Eastern Outlook – October 2, 2026
It was common practice during the Cold War to exaggerate the threat from the Soviet Union. Nowadays, Russia has assumed that role. Although the circumstances have changed, some of the political methods employed to create a sense of insecurity are still remarkably similar.
Europe is not formally engaging in preparations for war since it desires one. Instead, the governments of Europe and the institutions of the EU describe their rapidly growing defence policies and war preparedness as being aimed at deterrence, on the basis that Europe has to become strong enough to avoid a bigger conflict.
NATO does likewise, presenting itself as a defensive alliance whose role is to deter aggression. Nevertheless, the extent and the terminology used in Europe’s present military transformation should be examined. If preparedness becomes a top political concern, if huge amounts of public money are channelled into defence industries, and if support for Ukraine becomes more and more tied to Europe’s own security, then a significant question arises: where does deterrence cease and the political preparation for war begin?
The question is especially relevant to the EU, which has throughout its history been based on reconciliation, economic interdependence and a rejection of war.
From a peace project to a defence project
The European Union is experiencing a deep change in the way it views security. This change is no illusion. As part of the ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030 programme the European Commission plans to commit up to 800 billion euros towards defence spending, and the EU has set up a 150 billion euro SAFE lending facility to assist with military investment and joint procurement. The various EU institutions have made it clear that the aim is to eliminate capability gaps, boost the European defence industry and enhance deterrence.
The language that goes with this transformation is just as important. European Defence Commissioner Andrius Kubilius has warned at the European Parliament that Russia could be ready for a confrontation with NATO “in five years or less”. He has also invoked Jean Monnet’s wartime “Victory Programme” analogy, arguing that Europe needs a comparable transformation of its defence industry.
The official view of the Commission is that the issue is one of deterrence and not about starting a war. However, a military system which is intended to deter war needs to have weapons, logistical support, industrial capacity, troops and operational plans. As these capabilities increase, so too does the institutional ability to conduct war.
A paradox arises since Europe claims it is arming itself and preparing its hospitals to receive 2,000 wounds per day – as it is the case in Germany — in order to maintain peace while at the same time setting up a more and more integrated belligerent European defence structure. The EU is considering not just an increase in weapons but also the creation of a European Defence Union, a European Security Council, common procurement, military mobility and a closer relationship between European institutions and NATO.
The fact that this might constitute a necessary adaptation to a new security situation also brings up a more general issue concerning European identity: is the European Union still mainly a peace project which happens to have military capabilities, or is it instead becoming a geopolitical and military actor for which readiness for confrontation is becoming increasingly important?
Is Russia a threat, an adversary, or a permanent enemy?
Here, there is a mixture of perceived threats, old ressentiments and Russophobia in play. The threat perceptions are not the same throughout Europe. Because of historical reasons, such as foreign occupation and Soviet domination, Poland has long viewed Russia differently from countries such as France and Germany, which after the Cold War initially placed greater emphasis on economic engagement and interdependence with Moscow. But that distinction has changed dramatically.
Germany, in particular, has moved from the Ostpolitik-era logic of engagement towards a confrontational security posture. Under Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Berlin has described Russia as a serious threat, committed to a major expansion of defence spending, and taken a leading role in sustaining military support for Ukraine. Germany has also intensified defence cooperation with France, including discussions on nuclear deterrence and European capabilities. Germany has also established a permanent military presence in the Baltic States, with a brigade of around 5,000 soldiers being stationed in Lithuania.
The military buildup that Poland has since carried out has depended largely on the United States and South Korea, highlighting a further weakness: even though the EU has aimed at setting up a European defence industry, European manufacturers have not always been able to provide weapons at the speed and on the scale required by countries that have been rearming since 2022.
A more serious issue is that those who question the military escalation are seen as showing a lack of strength, a state of naivety or a failure to have sufficient solidarity with Europe — what then becomes of democratic debate? French Socialist Ségolène Royal.
The danger of making war readiness a political culture
That is exactly the reason why Europe’s present-day transformation should be subject to democratic scrutiny.
Deterrence becomes a politically dangerous thing when preparedness itself comes to be the main idea of security, when military expenditure starts to compete with other public priorities, and when diplomacy and negotiation are regarded as being of less importance than the building up of military power.
The proper European question therefore isn’t whether Europe is “strong enough” to fight Russia. It is rather what kind of security arrangement the Europeans would like to establish.
The present danger is that, as a result of years of confrontation, rearmament and politics based on the use of threats, Europe might slowly create a political and institutional setting in which war seems ever more certain and peace ever more unrealistic.
Former CIA analyst Larry Johnson says that a wider conflict between Europe and Russia is becoming “inevitable” since, in his opinion, the rhetoric of Europe is increasingly being matched by actions which Russia could see as direct threats. He highlights Germany as especially important, stating that Berlin’s more confrontational rhetoric, its military preparations and its demands on Moscow are leading to a dangerous escalation.
Johnson also sees the capture of Russian ships as a key point of escalation. He maintains that Moscow might view any attempt by Europe to seize its ships as an act of war and could then retaliate against the ships or military assets in question. He also mentions the collapse of diplomatic relations, the rearmament of European forces, preparations for a possible future confrontation, and the increasing pressure surrounding Kaliningrad as factors which reduce the room for de-escalation. In his view, the real danger is not that Russia is seeking war but that European actions are gradually making a direct confrontation inevitable.
Ricardo Martins – Doctor of Sociology, specialist in European and international politics as well as geopolitics
Follow new articles on our Telegram channel
