La paralización del recuento en Brasil revirtió la tendencia y salvó a Lula: las urnas electrónicas, opacas e inauditables, no son confiables.
Únete a nosotros en Telegram 
, X
y VK 
.
Escríbenos: info@strategic-culture.su
El escrutinio de los votos en la primera vuelta de las elecciones generales en Brasil fue motivo de gran controversia. Flávio Bolsonaro, hijo del expresidente Jair Bolsonaro, iba por delante de Lula en el recuento oficial, con un 49,6% contra un 42,2% para el presidente que busca su reelección.
Habían sido computadas el 64,8% de las secciones electorales hasta ese momento. Pero el recuento se paralizó por más de una hora. Extrañamente, los votos para gobernador, senador y diputados continuaron siendo contabilizados con normalidad. Solo el recuento presidencial se paralizó.
Y, aún más extrañamente, cuando el recuento presidencial se reanudó, la tendencia ascendente de Flávio Bolsonaro y la tendencia descendente de Lula se revirtieron. Los votos del candidato opositor cayeron, mientras que los del actual presidente aumentaron. Flávio Bolsonaro estaba a menos del 0,5% de la victoria que le otorgaría la banda presidencial. Perdió más de un 2%, terminando con un 47,03%, mientras que Lula ganó casi un 3%, terminando con un 45,16%.
Parecía que Flávio Bolsonaro destronaría a Lula ya en la primera vuelta. Pero, tras más de una hora de paralización en los recuentos, Lula logró recuperarse y la disputa se decidirá recién en la segunda vuelta.
El recuento se paralizó a las 19h06 (hora de Brasilia), con el 64,8% de las urnas escrutadas. Recién a las 20h08 se presentaron los nuevos resultados, ya con el 85% de las urnas escrutadas.
La justificación oficial fue dada por el presidente del Tribunal Superior Electoral (TSE), Kassio Nunes Marques, quien también es ministro del Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF). «Lo que ocurrió fue una congestión de datos. En cada elección, nos vemos sorprendidos por alguna contingencia, lo cual es natural para quien lida con sistemas complejos y tan variados», dijo. «A priori, no se sabe si esto fue derivado de otro problema. Lo que nuestra tecnología de la información constató fue un flujo [de datos] superior a lo normal, y esa congestión generó un atraso», completó.
Existe una propaganda violenta en Brasil, encabezada por la Justicia Electoral, para presentar a los ciudadanos que las elecciones son 100% limpias. El principal foco de esa propaganda son justamente las urnas electrónicas. Las instituciones judiciales y los medios de comunicación dan gran difusión a las palabras de la Justicia Electoral sobre la total confiabilidad de las urnas electrónicas, destacando, incluso, que son sometidas a pruebas antes del plebiscito y luego selladas para que nadie pueda acceder a ellas.
Entonces, ¿por qué las urnas sufrieron una especie de pánico, si habían sido rigurosamente examinadas? Pues, el sapientísimo TSE tiene pleno conocimiento del número de electores aptos para votar y del número de votos que pueden ser registrados en las urnas, incluso en cada sección electoral. La propaganda de la Justicia Electoral indica al público que las urnas están plenamente preparadas con anticipación para registrar y computar perfectamente los votos de los electores.
No debería ocurrir ningún flujo de datos «superior a lo normal» que llevara a la congestión del sistema, porque los datos y estadísticas más variados en relación con el registro de votos son conocidos y los cálculos son perfectamente realizables. La infalibilidad de las urnas electrónicas exige que todos los resultados posibles sean previsibles y que, por tanto, no haya ninguna anomalía.
¿Cómo es posible, entonces, que un sistema tan perfecto, como es el propagado por las instituciones del Estado brasileño, presente una falla que, después de ser supuestamente resuelta, haya modificado tan radicalmente la tendencia de los votos presidenciales?
Puede ser una coincidencia que Flávio Bolsonaro se haya desplomado y Lula haya subido después de la falla de las urnas. Pero, ¿quién sabe? El presidente del TSE reconoció que el sistema electrónico de votación es «complejo». Solo especialistas altamente capacitados, del propio TSE y de empresas de tecnología, consiguen acceder a él y comprenderlo, de acuerdo con la Justicia Electoral. Así pues, está en manos de esos especialistas —que son 150 técnicos desconocidos del público— el destino de un país entero para los próximos cuatro años. El cálculo de los votos que salen de las urnas es totalmente automatizado, no pasa por ningún ser humano. Un número aún más selecto de 22 funcionarios accede a la totalización automatizada de los votos.
Esto significa que 214 millones de brasileños necesitan confiar en esos 150 o 22 sacerdotes egipcios para interpretar esa ciencia oculta. Deben ser los seres más iluminados del planeta Tierra, 100% íntegros, honestos, inmaculados y vírgenes. Incluso los ministros del STF, presentados a lo largo de los últimos 15 años como individuos impecables, probos y castos, aparecen ahora envueltos en el mayor escándalo de corrupción de la historia reciente de Brasil, pero esos especialistas anónimos merecen la más absoluta confianza de los ciudadanos.
Fue por motivos así que la Corte Suprema de Alemania declaró el voto electrónico inconstitucional: «cada ciudadano debe ser capaz de comprender y verificar las etapas centrales de las elecciones de forma confiable y sin ningún conocimiento técnico previo especializado».
El veredicto, fechado en 2009, concluye:
«Un procedimiento electoral en el que el elector no pueda comprender, de manera confiable, si su voto fue registrado de forma infalsificable e incluido en el escrutinio del resultado de la elección, y cómo el total de los votos expresados es atribuido y computado, excluye elementos centrales del procedimiento electoral de la vigilancia pública y, por tanto, no cumple los requisitos constitucionales.»
El sistema judicial brasileño está sumido en su mayor crisis histórica y vive un verdadero western, con peleas partidistas interfiriendo en el funcionamiento de los trabajos. El partidismo, de hecho, contaminó a la mayor parte del poder judicial, incluido el TSE. En la recta final de estas elecciones, decisiones de la Justicia Electoral, apoyadas por el ala dominante en el STF, favorecieron a Lula.
Es evidente que esa ala dominante (representada por los ministros Alexandre de Moraes, Gilmar Mendes y Flávio Dino) no quiere la victoria del bolsonarismo, pues este es su enemigo político declarado. Esos ministros actuaron, en los últimos años, como verdaderos justicieros contra el bolsonarismo. Ahora que ellos mismos fueron sorprendidos en relaciones extremamente promiscuas con un banquero que corrompió a incontables altos funcionarios del Estado, su carrera burocrática está amenazada. La continuidad de Lula es una esperanza de salvación para estos señores, pues el presidente está comprometido con ellos y no puede romper ese compromiso sin arriesgar la propia cabeza, dado el nivel de dependencia que Lula contrajo en relación con los mandamases del STF. Ya una elección de Flávio Bolsonaro tendería a conducir a un choque con los cabezas de esas instituciones, aunque el propio candidato opositor no ha demostrado gran disposición a enfrentarlos, porque los que controlan las elecciones en Brasil (el capital financiero internacional) exigen moderación y pacificación; de lo contrario, dificultarán la vida de cualquiera que se elija presidente.
Y el pueblo es tratado como ganado, víctima de un sistema que no puede comprender, para perpetuar su explotación a través de la escenificación de la «fiesta de la democracia».
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has retired the last of its P-3 Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft. The AEW version is instantly recognizable from the saucer-like radar dome on top, as seen on other AEW types like the E-2 Hawkeye and the E-3 Sentry. CBP was the only operator of this variant of the P-3 Orion and is said to have been the only law enforcement agency to fly any kind of dedicated AEW plane. The retirement of these aircraft comes at a time when American AEW assets, in general, are under heavy strain by demands globally.
CBP officially retired its final P-3 AEW on September 30, 2026, after a final flight from National Air Security Operations Center Jacksonville (NASOC Jacksonville), in Jacksonville, Florida. CBP has also flown Long Range Tracker (LRT) variants of the P-3, configured for more traditional maritime surveillance missions. The current plans for the LRT aircraft, and whether their sunset may also be on the horizon, are not immediately clear, and TWZ has reached out for more information. Orions of all types have been steadily disappearing from service with the U.S. military and elsewhere across the U.S. government as the aging aircraft become more difficult to operate and maintain.
End of the Road: AMO’s Iconic P-3 Dome Takes Its Final Flight!
— CBP AMO (@CBPAMO) October 1, 2026
On September 30, 2026, the distinct silhouette of a four-engine turboprop carrying its massive rotating radar dome touched down for the final time at the National Air Security Operations Center in Jacksonville.
Our… pic.twitter.com/doT9TZYJzD
“Our Jacksonville-based P-3 AEW fleet has served as a cornerstone of America’s outer-layer border security,” according to a brief announcement from CBP about the retirement on social media. “Its crews flew far beyond our borders, providing wide-area surveillance across the Caribbean, Gulf of America [Gulf of Mexico], and the transit zones of Central and South America, helping detect and track threats before they could reach the United States.”
By all indications, including official CBP sources, the P-3 AEW fleet consisted of eight aircraft at its peak. There is a confusingly worded 2014 CBP press release that mentions an “11th and final Lockheed Martin P-3 Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft overhaul,” but that figure looks to also include three of the six LRT versions. The same release says that CBP only had 14 P-3s of all types at that time.
What was then known as the U.S. Customs Service (USCS) first began operating the P-3 AEW version in the late 1980s. The aircraft were converted from second-hand maritime patrol variants of the Orion. The first example had started life as a P-3B for the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). Ex-U.S. Navy P-3s were also converted.
The initial three P-3 AEWs were equipped with the AN/APS-138 radar. The same radar was used on early E-2C Hawkeye airborne early warning and control aircraft operated by the U.S. Navy, as well as several other armed forces internationally.
“The Customs Service had previously borrowed U.S. Navy E-2Cs to meet its antinarcotics surveillance requirements, but required an aircraft with longer range and on-station time,” according to a 2006 report from Forecast International. “In June 1989, the U.S. General Accounting Office issued a report on the drug interdiction P-3B AEW aircraft. The findings indicated that the radar performance was as specified, but the P-3B (when compared to the E-2C) was less costly to operate per square mile of area covered because of the higher cruising speed and longer endurance. The P-3B had at least twice the in-flight endurance of the E-2C.”
Starting in the 1990s, USCS began the process of acquiring additional P-3 AEWs with newer AN/APS-145 radars, as also used on later model E-2Cs. The original AEW Orions were eventually refitted with APS-145s, as well. It’s worth noting here that the U.S. Coast Guard separately moved to acquire an AEW version of the C-130H, designated the EC-130V, in the 1990s, which used the AN/APS-125 radar, also used on older E-2s. Budget cuts led to the end of that program. The EC-130V that had been built was redesignated as an NC-130H and subsequently used for test purposes.
The P-3 AEWs were also equipped with a sensor turret containing electro-optical and infrared (EO/IR) video cameras, allowing the aircraft to more closely investigate targets spotted on radar. CBP regularly conducted P-3 operations that paired AEWs with LRT variants to provide an even broader array of sensor capabilities on missions. The LRTs have EO/IR sensor turrets, as well as AN/APG-66 and SeaVue radars. The pulse-doppler AN/APG-66 is primarily designed for spotting and tracking aerial targets, and was originally used on early variants of the F-16 fighter. SeaVue is a multi-function type with surface search and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery modes. Images produced via SAR are highly detailed maps of the surface below, and can be captured day or night, and regardless of any cloud cover, smoke, or dust.
Beyond radars and other sensors, the P-3 AEWs also had a robust communications suite consisting of VHF and UHF radios, as well as satellite communications links by the end of their career. CBP’s entire P-3 fleet, including the AEWs and LRTs, has received various updates over the years, including new ‘glass cockpits’ starting in the early 2000s.
Though primarily employed in support of counter-narcotics interdiction operations, the airborne radar and command and control capabilities were also applied to other missions, including disaster relief and humanitarian assistance efforts at home and abroad. As an example, CBP’s P-3 AEWs helped with air traffic coordination, as well as provided other support, during relief efforts in Texas in the wake of Hurricane Harvey in 2017.
At the same time, CBP’s entire P-3 fleet, including both the AEW and LRT versions, has only been getting increasingly older and difficult to sustain. The P-3B variant first entered U.S. Navy service in the 1960s. CBP did put its P-3s through a Service Life Extension Program overhaul in the 2010s, which included “new wings and tail for each aircraft and completely strips down the aircraft to its bare metal for an inspection,” according to a 2014 press release.
As mentioned, the P-3 family has been in steadily dwindling service in the United States, overall, in recent years. The U.S. Navy has completely retired the Orion as a maritime patrol platform, and the service has also fully divested its more specialized EP-3 intelligence-gathering variants. The Navy had retained a small number of P-3s for research and development and test and evaluation activities, but growing sustainment challenges have been prompting the retirement of those planes, as well. The last NP-3C assigned to the Navy’s Scientific Development Squadron One (VXS-1), the “Warlocks,” was also retired last month. VXS-1 previously operated a ‘domed’ NP-3D, similar to, but distinct from, CBP’s P-3 AEWs, as well. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is also in the process of replacing its pair of P-3s, configured as civilian hurricane hunter aircraft, with new C-130J Hercules-based platforms. The shrinking U.S. Orion operator base can only have a knock-on impact on CBP P-3 operations.
A key question now is how CBP will fill any gaps left by the retirement of the final AEW version. The agency does continue to operate a mix of other crewed fixed-wing aircraft with mixtures of radars and other sensors, as well as MQ-9 drones, but none of these platforms are equipped with a sensor like the AN/APS-145. CBP also has a network of tethered aerostats with radars at fixed sites around the Caribbean. As an aside, General Atomics, together with Saab, is now working on an AEW configuration for the MQ-9B drone, but there are no known U.S. orders for that capability at the time of writing. That platform will not offer the same level of flexibility and look-down capability as modern crewed AEW aircraft, either. Look-down AEW capability is only growing in importance today amid expanding and evolving drone threats, including to the U.S. homeland.
High demand for AEW support, in general, means that the U.S. military regularly steps in to provide additional coverage with U.S. Navy E-2s and U.S. Air Force E-3s to aid in U.S. counter-drug operations around Latin America. Newer E-2D Advanced Hawkeyes notably have far more powerful radars than the E-2C or the P-3 AEW, with added surface search and track capability, too. At the same time, as mentioned at the start, those assets are in heavy demand, especially in light of the conflict with Iran. On top of that, the Air Force’s E-3 fleet is facing serious sustainment challenges itself, with replacement E-7 Wedgetail aircraft still years away from being delivered.
The Air Force, in particular, is also aiming to eventually push most, if not all, air moving-target indicator (AMTI) tasks currently performed by aircraft like the E-3 and E-7 into space. The service is heavily investing to accelerate the fielding of those capabilities, which could eventually offer revolutionary constant, persistent coverage globally. The first of those satellites are still not expected to reach an early operational state until 2028. It is possible that CBP could get access to a tailored data feed from this system when it does become operational. It still does not obviate the need to have crewed or uncrewed aircraft capable of more closely investigating tracks of interest using EO/IR cameras and other sensors.
Whatever the future might now hold, CBP’s unique time as the operator of the P-3 AEW aircraft has come to an end.
Contact the author: joe@twz.com
The post The P-3 Orion Airborne Early Warning Aircraft Has Flown Its Last Mission appeared first on TWZ.
Uma violenta colisão entre dois veículos ligeiros causou, na madrugada deste domingo, dia 4 de outubro, quatro feridos graves em Ponte do Rol, no concelho de Torres Vedras, distrito de Lisboa.
Segundo o Comando Sub-Regional de Emergência e Proteção Civil do Oeste, o alerta para o acidente foi dado pelas 02:05, tendo a colisão ocorrido na Estrada Nacional 9 (EN9), junto à localidade de Ponte do Rol.
Os quatro feridos graves, todos ocupantes das viaturas envolvidas, foram assistidos no local e posteriormente transportados para unidades hospitalares. Segundo a Lusa, um dos feridos deu entrada no Hospital das Caldas da Rainha, enquanto os outros três foram encaminhados para o Hospital de Santa Maria, em Lisboa.
A circulação rodoviária na EN9 chegou a estar completamente interrompida para permitir o socorro às vítimas e a limpeza da via. De acordo com o portal da Autoridade Nacional de Emergência e Proteção Civil, pelas 05:20 ainda se mantinham no local 14 operacionais, apoiados por sete veículos de emergência.
Por: Dino Frazão
Data: 4 de outubro de 2026
————————————————–
© 2026 Os Monhacas. Todos os direitos reservados.
Este é um projeto independente de criação de conteúdos.
Se gostou do que leu e ainda não é seguidor, siga a nossa página para ver mais conteúdos!
————————————————–
O conteúdo Colisão entre dois ligeiros em Ponte do Rol provoca quatro feridos graves aparece primeiro em OS MONHACAS.
Student 'blockades' ostensibly called to protest the dilapidated condition of French high schools have degenerated into an orgy of urban violence in which those same schools have been destroyed, says John Rosenthal.
The post French Students Burn Down Schools to Protest School Decay appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.
They came to Madrid to counterprogram one of Europe’s largest real estate fairs, The District. What they found was an 87-year-old woman who was about to be evicted from their home — and was, before their eyes. Around 200 housing activists from more than 20 countries across Europe decided to join the demonstrations against the eviction, and later joined a spontaneous encampment in front of the Madrid regional government headquarters at the historic Puerta del Sol plaza.
An Essay on What the Fifteen-Minute Consultation Leaves Out
Lies are Unbekoming | September 10, 2026
What follows is twelve documented findings compressed into one sitting. It is written for the reader who has been prescribed one of these drugs, or is caring for someone who has, and who wants to know what the fifteen-minute consultation did not include. Every claim is drawn from the profession’s own literature, its own regulatory filings, its own package inserts, or the admissions of its own senior figures. Where an item is developed at greater length elsewhere in this series, that is noted. The purpose here is not depth on any single item. It is the cumulative weight of the twelve landing together.
Opening
Three percent of the 4,041 patients enrolled in the STAR*D trial remitted, stayed well, and remained in the study through the one-year follow-up.¹
The trial was announced with a cumulative remission figure of 67 percent.² When Ed Pigott and colleagues spent more than five years reanalyzing the data with fidelity to the original protocol, they found the 3 percent figure. When journalists put the 3 percent number to Maurizio Fava, one of the lead investigators, he acknowledged it was accurate. The investigators knew.³
The paper has not been retracted. It is still cited in psychiatric textbooks. The American Journal of Psychiatry ignored a petition signed by more than 1,800 people asking for retraction. The New York Times, repeatedly notified of the fraud, published the 70 percent figure again in a 2024 article praising the drugs.⁴
STAR*D was the largest depression trial ever conducted. It was funded by the National Institute of Mental Health. It was designed by the profession’s most senior researchers. What it proved, when honestly analyzed, was that the drugs did not work.
That fact has been available for over a decade. It has not reached the patients being handed the prescriptions.
What This Essay Draws On
Six of the twelve items below have been developed at greater length in earlier essays in this series: chemical imbalance theory, benzodiazepine dependence, ADHD stimulants, antipsychotic brain damage, SSRI withdrawal, and long-term antidepressant outcomes. Readers who want depth on any of those threads should follow them. The purpose of this essay is different. Twelve items, four sections, one sitting.
The evidence throughout is drawn primarily from Peter Gøtzsche, Robert Whitaker, Peter Breggin, Gary Greenberg, David Healy, and Joanna Moncrieff. What the twelve items share is that none of them are contested at the level of documentation. They are contested only at the level of what the profession chooses to tell patients.
The prescription is written on the basis of a mechanism, a diagnosis, and a trial. Each has failed on its own terms.
The theory that depression results from a deficiency of serotonin was never established in the scientific literature. Joanna Moncrieff and colleagues published a comprehensive umbrella review of the serotonin theory in 2022 and found no consistent evidence for its central claims.⁵ The theory was abandoned by serious researchers decades earlier. It continued to appear in direct-to-consumer advertising and patient education materials because it served a function. It explained why the pill was necessary and why the patient would need to keep taking it.
Steven Hyman, director of NIMH from 1996 to 2001, later observed that “the gold standard was the DSM criteria. It struck me as a fool’s errand to try to develop a biomarker for a fictive category.”⁶ The chemical imbalance was the mechanism proposed for a disease no one could measure, in a category no one could validate.
After four decades and hundreds of millions of dollars in federal research, not one disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders has a confirmed biological test. Not depression. Not schizophrenia. Not bipolar disorder. Not ADHD. Not anxiety. Not any of the more than three hundred conditions the manual lists.
Robins and Guze proposed a five-step validation process in 1970: clinical description, laboratory studies, exclusion criteria, follow-up studies, family studies.⁷ The five steps were meant to establish, over time, which alleged disorders were real diseases and which were figments. Four decades later, Darrel Regier, who chaired the DSM-5 task force, told Psychiatric News that “validity tests have not lived up to the expectations of Robins and Guze.”⁸ Kenneth Kendler, the field’s leading nosologist, wrote that the diagnostic categories in use had been “heavily influenced by expert opinion” and were “fuzzy constructs that shift when viewed in different ways.”⁹
Thomas Insel, director of NIMH from 2002 to 2015, put it most directly in a 2005 address to the American Psychiatric Association: “The DSM-IV has 100 percent reliability and zero percent validity.”¹⁰ Reliability means clinicians using the same manual will arrive at the same diagnosis. Validity means the diagnosis corresponds to a real thing. Insel was telling the assembled profession that its manual sorted patients consistently into categories that did not exist.
The APA response was to convene committees to plan the DSM-5. The committees did not find biological markers. They could not have. The categories were not built to have biological markers. They were built from clinical description alone. The manual reifies its own criteria.
The consequence for the patient is direct. When the doctor says “you have major depressive disorder,” the patient hears a diagnosis in the sense that a diabetes diagnosis is a diagnosis: a measurable biological state with a known mechanism. What the patient has actually received is a checklist tally. Five of nine symptoms present for two weeks. That is the whole test. There is no blood work, no scan, no biomarker. The diagnostic bible of American psychiatry sits on the shelf as an artifact of expert agreement, not a description of nature.
Manufacturing Madness: The DSM as Instrument of Social Control
The opening figures bear structural repetition: 3 percent versus 67 percent, admitted by the lead investigator, still not retracted, still cited. Ed Pigott’s reanalysis was published in BMJ Open in 2023.¹¹ The investigators, when confronted, doubled down on the fraud in the American Journal of Psychiatry rather than correct it.¹² The owner of the journal, the American Psychiatric Association, did nothing.
Peter Gøtzsche has documented the specific manipulations. The “remission” threshold was set so low that a patient scoring 7 on the Hamilton depression scale, including endorsement of “feels like life is not worth living,” was counted as symptom-free.¹³ Patients who exited the study were assumed to have remitted at the same rate as those who stayed, a statistical fiction that inflated the numbers by an order of magnitude. Eleven prespecified outcomes were never reported. Suicidal ideation was reported at 0.7 percent in one paper and ten times that in others by the same authors.
The trial that was supposed to establish the effectiveness of antidepressants in real-world practice established the opposite. The profession’s response was to continue citing the announced figure.
The prescription arrives with the phrase “you may notice some side effects.” The phrase does the work of concealment. Three effects, in particular, are not warned about with the seriousness they warrant.
Akathisia is a state of extreme inner restlessness produced by antidepressants, antipsychotics, and antiemetics. The Greek term means inability to sit still. The patient may pace, fidget, wring hands, or endlessly walk. The condition may also present without visible motor symptoms, as unbearable internal agitation the observer cannot see.¹⁴
In 1990, Martin Teicher and colleagues at Harvard published five cases of patients who developed intense suicidal preoccupations on fluoxetine, all associated with akathisia, all resolving when the drug was stopped and returning when it was restarted.¹⁵ Rothschild and Locke published the rechallenge study in 1991: three patients who had made serious suicide attempts on fluoxetine, all rechallenged under controlled conditions, all developing akathisia and becoming suicidal again. One patient said in retrospect: “I tried to kill myself because of these anxiety symptoms. It was not so much the depression.”¹⁶
A study of psychiatric inpatients found that 79 percent of those who had attempted suicide were experiencing akathisia at the time.¹⁷ Another found that half of all fights on a psychiatric ward were akathisia-related. Haloperidol at moderate to high doses made half the patients markedly more aggressive, sometimes to the point of wanting to kill their psychiatrists.
The FDA’s 2004 black-box warning on antidepressants describes what Breggin has called the stimulant syndrome: anxiety, agitation, panic attacks, insomnia, irritability, hostility, aggressiveness, impulsivity, akathisia, hypomania, mania.¹⁸ The label warns that these can occur in nonpsychiatric patients, meaning the drug produces the syndrome by itself, not by unmasking a preexisting condition.
Gøtzsche’s team examined manufacturer trial data and found akathisia miscoded as “hyperkinesia” in Zoloft trials. In paroxetine trials they found not a single case of akathisia recorded, which is statistically impossible given the drug class.¹⁹ The miscoding was systematic.
The FDA-approved label for Zyprexa describes akathisia as “extreme inner anxiety and restlessness.” At least one psychiatric textbook labeled it “agitated depression,” folding the drug’s most dangerous effect back into the diagnosis it was prescribed to treat. The patient who reports the akathisia is told the underlying illness has worsened. The dose is increased.
Mental Health Survival Kit and Withdrawal from Psychiatric Drugs (2022)
The FDA-approved label for Xanax states that withdrawal symptoms, including seizures, have been reported after only brief therapy at doses within the recommended range for treating anxiety.²⁰ In the eight-week trials used for FDA approval, patients were worse off at eight weeks than before starting the drug. Between 7 and 29 percent of patients could not withdraw after only six to eight weeks of exposure.²¹
If you are currently taking a benzodiazepine, do not stop it abruptly. Abrupt cessation can produce seizures. Item 12 addresses what safe withdrawal actually requires.
Heather Ashton, the British psychiatrist who ran a benzodiazepine withdrawal clinic at the University of Newcastle for decades, documented that long-term users often required a year or more to taper.²² Some experience withdrawal symptoms lasting years after cessation. Cognitive impairment, depression, and anxiety worse than the original condition are common outcomes of long-term use.²³ Gøtzsche, who has decades of clinical pharmacology experience, has noted that patients report benzodiazepine withdrawal as often worse than heroin. Heroin abstinence symptoms resolve within days. Benzo withdrawal can persist for years.
Anxiety Uncovered: The Truth About Benzodiazepines and Real Solutions
The DSM has a category for stimulant withdrawal, which lists depression, anxiety, irritability, sleep problems, fatigue, and agitation as the withdrawal syndrome after “several days or longer” of use. Rebound hyperactivity, talkativeness, and inattention are documented after a single dose in a placebo-controlled NIMH study of normal children ages 6 to 12.²⁴ Ten of fourteen children in that study showed marked behavioral rebound; three developed euphoria.
If a child is currently taking a stimulant, do not stop it abruptly. Rebound and withdrawal effects are commonly mistaken for a worsening of the original condition. Item 12 addresses safe withdrawal.
The teacher observes the child on Monday morning after a weekend off the drug, notices the child is more scattered and irritable than usual, and concludes the child needs the medication. The child is in withdrawal. The dose is increased. Peter Breggin’s observation from the early 1990s stands unchanged three decades later: if the child continues on Ritalin because they continue to have problems focusing, the disorder may be the drug’s effect.²⁵ Drug-induced inattention becomes the reason to continue and increase the drug.
The Multimodal Treatment Study of ADHD, the largest NIMH-funded stimulant trial, tracked children through eight years of follow-up. By three years, the medicated children showed no advantage over the non-medicated on any measure. They were, however, 2 cm shorter and 2.7 kg lighter than their unmedicated peers, a growth suppression the FDA eventually required on the label.²⁶
The drugs act on the brain and the brain responds. What the brain does under sustained chemical assault is documented in the profession’s own imaging studies.
Nancy Andreasen, editor-in-chief of the American Journal of Psychiatry from 1993 to 2005, began a longitudinal MRI study of over 500 first-episode schizophrenia patients in 1989. In 2003, she reported that frontal lobe white matter volume decreased progressively over the years of treatment.²⁷ In 2011, her team published in Archives of General Psychiatry the finding that antipsychotic exposure was directly associated with volume loss.²⁸ In a 2008 interview with the New York Times, Andreasen stated it plainly: “The more drugs you’ve been given, the more brain tissue you lose.”²⁹
Fusar-Poli and colleagues confirmed the pattern in a 2013 meta-analysis of longitudinal MRI studies.³⁰ The 2009 Navari and Dazzan review reported that both older and newer antipsychotics produce gross changes in brain volume in selected regions.³¹ In monkey studies, haloperidol and olanzapine produced substantial reductions in both grey and white matter, and reduced glial cell numbers.³²
Andreasen’s original interpretation was that the shrinkage reflected the disease. The follow-up data forced her to concede the drug was the cause.
Tardive dyskinesia is a drug-induced movement disorder produced by antipsychotics. It can affect any voluntary muscle: face, tongue, neck, torso, extremities, diaphragm, vocal cords. The condition presents as involuntary jerky movements, slower writhing movements, painful spasms, or restlessness the patient cannot control. The mechanism is understood. Antipsychotics block dopamine receptors in a brain region called the basal ganglia. Over time the brain compensates by growing more of those receptors. When the drug dose is reduced, or when the extra receptors eventually outnumber the block, the excess drives the involuntary movements.
The prevalence is not marginal. DSM-IV-TR sets the annual incidence at 3 to 5 percent per year in young adults and 25 to 30 percent per year in older patients.³³ These are cumulative rates. A young adult after three years of exposure has a 9 to 15 percent risk. An older patient after three years has a 75 to 90 percent risk. Prevalence in outpatient clinics runs above 40 percent. In long-term facilities, above 50 percent.³⁴ There is no established treatment. Most cases are permanent.
The condition often extends beyond motor symptoms. Gualtieri and Barnhill observed that “in virtually every clinical survey that has addressed the question, it is found that TD patients, compared to non-TD patients, have more in the way of dementia.”³⁵ Breggin has called this tardive dementia. Tardive akathisia and tardive psychosis have also been documented, representing further permanent damage to the higher brain function of patients whose brains were supposed to be helped.
The condition is frequently masked by the drug that caused it. Increasing the dose suppresses the visible movements while the underlying damage progresses. Reducing the dose brings the movements out, which the prescriber may interpret as evidence that the patient still needs the medication. The patient’s brain, already damaged, is offered more of what damaged it.
The neurological literature has documented tardive dyskinesia for over five decades. It is required disclosure on antipsychotic labels. It is not routinely disclosed at the point of prescription.
Electroconvulsive therapy applies electrical current to the head sufficient to produce a grand mal seizure. In modern practice, the patient is anesthetized and given a muscle relaxant to prevent the visible convulsion. The electrical dose is often increased to compensate for the seizure threshold raised by the anesthesia. Multiple treatments are given, typically 8 to 16 per course, sometimes more.
Autopsy studies dating to the 1940s documented brain necrosis in patients who died following ECT.³⁶ Animal studies documented brain damage. The brain’s response to ECT is an acute organic brain syndrome, medically indistinguishable from severe head injury. In neurological terms, multiple continuous seizures without full recovery of consciousness constitute status epilepticus, a medical emergency defined by its risk of permanent brain damage.
The memory loss is documented in every serious study that has looked for it. Larry Squire and Pamela Slater reported an average of 27 months of retrograde amnesia surrounding treatment.³⁷ Freeman and Kendell, using face-to-face interviews conducted by the treating doctors themselves (a design that biased strongly against reporting), found that 74 percent of patients reported memory impairment and 30 percent said their memory function was permanently affected.³⁸ Squire and Slater’s own longer follow-up found that 55 percent of patients felt they had not regained normal memory function over the years.
Gøtzsche summarizes the current literature: with strict definitions of memory loss, 29 to 55 percent of patients are affected. With looser criteria, 51 to 79 percent.³⁹ Death rates from ECT, according to a systematic review by John Read and colleagues, run at approximately 1 per 1,000 treatment courses, ten times higher than the American Psychiatric Association’s stated figure.⁴⁰
The efficacy evidence is thinner than the harms evidence. The 1985 NIMH Consensus Conference on ECT accepted the finding that no controlled study showed benefit beyond four weeks. The four-week window corresponds to the acute organic brain syndrome, during which severe brain dysfunction produces the euphoria or apathy interpreted as improvement.⁴¹ Once the brain begins to recover, the depression returns. If the patient is given more ECT, the brain damage accumulates. If the patient is not given more ECT, the profession points to the returning depression as evidence the disease was chronic.
The APA’s 1990 task force report on ECT omitted essentially the entire literature documenting memory loss and brain damage.⁴² The literature it omitted included the work of Squire, Slater, Janis, Friedberg, Breggin, and even the APA’s own previous 1978 report, which contained more information on memory loss than the 1990 update. In psychiatry, science sometimes runs backward.
At some point the patient decides they no longer want to be on the drug. The system was not built to help them leave.
The FDA-approved labels describe “discontinuation syndrome.” Patients and doctors alike were told the symptoms would last a few weeks and resolve. The systematic review by Davies and Read, published in 2019, established that this was false. Withdrawal symptoms are more common than reported, more severe than reported, and last far longer than reported. In one survey of 580 patients, 16 percent reported withdrawal symptoms lasting over three years.⁴³
If you are currently taking an SSRI or SNRI, do not stop it abruptly. Withdrawal reactions can include severe agitation, akathisia, suicidal ideation, and violence. Item 12 addresses the resources for safe tapering.
The Dutch tapering-strip program run by Peter Groot and Jim van Os has documented the shape of the problem. Of 895 patients on antidepressants, 62 percent had previously tried to withdraw without success. Using hyperbolic dose-reduction strips, 71 percent were able to withdraw within a median of 56 days.⁴⁴ Venlafaxine required 90 percent of patients to start at the lowest available dose and taper over three months. Some patients required more than six months. Dutch insurers refused to reimburse extended tapering because “there is no evidence in the literature” for its necessity, a circular defense against the very treatment the literature was documenting.
The withdrawal is routinely misinterpreted as return of the underlying illness. The patient is told they were unwise to stop and needs to remain on the drug indefinitely. Breggin’s term for this pattern is medication spellbinding. The drug produces effects the patient attributes to the disease.
The 1997 British study of a large inner-city primary care facility followed 95 never-medicated depressed patients and 53 drug-treated ones. Symptom reduction at six months: 62 percent for the never-medicated, 33 percent for the drug-treated.⁴⁵ A World Health Organization study of 640 depressed patients found that medicated patients had worse general health and were more likely to still be mentally ill at one year.⁴⁶ A Canadian five-year study of 9,508 depressed patients: 19 weeks of depression per year for the medicated, 11 for the unmedicated.⁴⁷ An NIMH study of 547 patients: medicated patients were three times more likely to lose their principal social role and nearly seven times more likely to become incapacitated at six years.⁴⁸
Rif El-Mallakh reported that 40 percent of patients on antidepressants end up in a chronically depressed “treatment resistant” state.⁴⁹ Giovanni Fava documented that drug changes induced by antidepressants “may propel the illness to a more malignant and treatment unresponsive course.”⁵⁰
The pattern extends to antipsychotics. Martin Harrow’s 15-year follow-up of first-episode psychosis patients found that those not on antipsychotics had significantly better outcomes and were far more likely to be in recovery.⁵¹ Lex Wunderink’s 7-year Dutch trial randomized first-episode psychosis patients to maintenance antipsychotics or dose reduction and discontinuation. The reduction group had double the recovery rate.⁵² Bockoven had documented in 1975 that rehospitalization rates rose after the introduction of antipsychotics and that medicated patients were more socially dependent than those treated in the pre-drug era.⁵³
The pattern is consistent across drug classes and across decades. Longer exposure produces worse outcomes. The drugs sensitize the brain and convert episodic distress into chronic dysfunction. The profession’s response has been to rewrite the natural history of the conditions to match the drug-damaged outcomes. The 1999 American Psychiatric Publishing Textbook of Psychiatry declared that older studies showing depression was self-limiting had been “disproved.” Depression became “a highly recurrent and pernicious disorder.”⁵⁴ The drugs had made it so.
The prescriber who put the patient on the drug is typically not trained in how to help them come off it. Withdrawal is not covered in the standard psychiatric curriculum. The tapering approach with the strongest evidence base is hyperbolic dose reduction, developed by Mark Horowitz and Joanna Moncrieff and published in Lancet Psychiatry in 2019.⁵⁵ The approach requires micro-dose reductions of a few percent at a time, made possible by liquid formulations or compounded tapering strips. Standard tablets do not come in the small doses required.
Peter Gøtzsche’s team spent two years trying to publish a Cochrane review protocol on antidepressant withdrawal support. The Cochrane depression group, chaired by Rachel Churchill, raised objections through 12,044 words of feedback across 86 numbered points, then rejected the protocol.⁵⁶ Cochrane refused to publish a review on how to help patients safely withdraw from a class of drugs prescribed to hundreds of millions of people worldwide. Gøtzsche’s PhD student Anders Sørensen mentored 30 consecutive patients through withdrawal in his unpaid spare time and documented the results, because it was the only way to do the work.
The insurance system compounds the problem. Dutch national health insurance refuses to reimburse extended tapering on the grounds of insufficient evidence, though the evidence exists and the insurers know it does. American insurers do not cover compounded formulations. The tapering strips developed at the Amsterdam pharmacy (taperingstrip.org) are available to prescribers in any country, but the patient must find a prescriber willing to order them, which many will not.
The knowledge exists. The Ashton Manual for benzodiazepine withdrawal has been public since 2002.⁵⁷ The Horowitz-Moncrieff hyperbolic tapering literature is in peer-reviewed journals. Mad in America hosts a withdrawal community with thousands of patients’ documented experiences. Breggin’s Psychiatric Drug Withdrawal was published in 2013.
None of it is on the psychiatric residency reading list. The doctor who wrote the prescription is, in most cases, not the doctor who can help the patient stop taking it. The patient is on their own.
The most common defense of the current prescribing paradigm is that the drugs help some patients, and that essays like this one endanger those patients by encouraging them to stop.
Some patients do report subjective benefit on these drugs. That is not disputed. What is not established is that this benefit exceeds placebo by a clinically meaningful margin, or that it survives the long-term outcomes documented in Item 11.
The safety caveats throughout this essay, and the resources listed below, exist precisely because abrupt cessation is dangerous. Nothing here recommends abrupt cessation. What is recommended is informed choice, which requires the twelve findings to be visible before the prescription is written or renewed. A patient who wishes to continue after seeing the twelve findings has made a different decision from a patient who was never shown them.
For patients currently on psychiatric drugs who wish to withdraw, resources exist outside the mainstream medical system. The Ashton Manual (benzo.org.uk/manual/) remains the standard reference for benzodiazepine tapering. The Horowitz-Moncrieff papers on hyperbolic tapering in Lancet Psychiatry (2019) provide the scientific basis for SSRI withdrawal. Mad in America (madinamerica.com) hosts an active community of patients who have withdrawn or are withdrawing. The Amsterdam tapering strip program (taperingstrip.org) makes hyperbolic dose reduction physically possible for antidepressants that do not come in the required small doses. Breggin’s Psychiatric Drug Withdrawal (2013) provides detailed clinical protocols. None of the above require permission from the prescribing physician. All require time and typically a support person. None should be attempted abruptly.
The twelve findings above are documented. They are not concealed by conspiracy. They sit in FDA labels, peer-reviewed journals, systematic reviews, and the admissions of senior figures within the profession. What conceals them is training.
Psychiatric residency does not require reading Whitaker or Breggin or Gøtzsche. It does not require examining the primary trial data on the drugs the resident will spend a career prescribing. It requires reading the textbooks the profession publishes about itself, the same textbooks that praised electroconvulsive therapy while omitting the memory-loss literature and that continue to cite the STAR*D 67 percent figure. The continuing medical education the practicing psychiatrist attends is funded largely by the pharmaceutical industry, whose interest in the twelve findings is that they should not surface. The drug representatives who visit the office once a month are the primary source of pharmacological information for many prescribers.
The doctor across from the patient in the fifteen-minute consultation is often not withholding information out of malice. The doctor does not have it. What was left out of the training reproduces itself in every consultation the doctor conducts for the rest of the career.
The training explains the local silence. It does not explain how the whole enterprise reached the point where twelve findings of this severity could accumulate without institutional response. That answer comes from someone who ran the enterprise.
Thomas Insel directed the National Institute of Mental Health from 2002 to 2015. He controlled the American federal research budget for psychiatry for thirteen years. He was, in that period, the single most powerful figure in American psychiatric science.
Reflecting on his tenure after leaving the position, he made the following observation, widely reported and repeated in the years since:
I spent 13 years at NIMH really pushing on the neuroscience and genetics of mental disorders. And when I look back on that I realize that while I think I succeeded at getting lots of really cool papers published by cool scientists at fairly large costs, I think $20 billion, I don’t think we moved the needle in reducing suicide, reducing hospitalizations, improving recovery for the tens of millions of people who have mental illness.⁵⁸
Twenty billion dollars over thirteen years, and the head of the enterprise said it moved nothing on suicide, hospitalization, or recovery.
That is not the assessment of a critic. That is the man who ran the enterprise, describing the enterprise, from inside it. Insel went on to write a book defending psychiatric drugs, so the admission cannot be attributed to conversion or apostasy. He continues to believe in the paradigm. He just concedes it produced nothing.
The twelve items above sit inside that enterprise. What the psychiatrist was trained not to tell the patient is what the man who ran it for thirteen years, on his own accounting, could not deny.
Imagine a garage that has been fixing cars for many years. Every car that leaves the garage has a bumper sticker that says FIXED.
One day someone counts. Out of every hundred cars leaving the garage, only three actually work. Ninety-seven do not.
The garage keeps operating. The mechanics keep putting on the FIXED stickers. The owner keeps telling everyone the garage fixes seven cars out of every ten.
When someone points out that the real number is three out of a hundred, the owner says yes, he knows the real number is three. He does not correct the seven-out-of-ten claim. He does not put up a new sign. He keeps the stickers.
The people bringing in their cars do not know about the three. They see the FIXED sticker and they drive off. Some of the cars catch fire on the highway. Some of the brakes fail. Some of the cars will not start again once they are turned off.
When people bring the broken cars back, the garage says the problem is not with the fix. The problem is with the car.
That is the garage. The cars are patients. The stickers are prescriptions. The garage is a whole profession.
The Unbekoming library is available in paperback, printed to order through Lulu and shipped worldwide. The shelf begins with the paradigm question underneath everything else — No Virus, the isolation problem, the collapse of virology’s foundational claims, and a disease-by-disease reappraisal — and moves through the suppressed compounds mainstream medicine set aside: The DMSO Book, Chlorine Dioxide: The Forbidden Remedy, The Iodine Book, and The Hydrogen Peroxide Book. Two more recover what’s still on the kitchen shelf: Baking Soda and The Castor Oil Book. Two more recover the minerals modern soil, water, and processing quietly stripped from the diet: The Magnesium Handbook and The Boron Book. Sitting alongside these is No Contagion, co-authored with Jamie Andrews — the case against germ theory itself, catalogued through 258 failed contagion experiments.
The critique books cover what medicine, dentistry, psychiatry, and veterinary practice have become. The Unvaccinated treats the completely unvaccinated as a comparison group across twenty chapters and five appendices. Medicalized Motherhood follows a woman through 123 documented interventions from teenage pill to postpartum discharge. Drilling for Profit treats cavities, gum disease, and crooked teeth as the dietary problem they are. What Your Vet Can’t Tell You applies the same critique to pets. Escape from Psychiatry documents the fabrication of the DSM and the specific damage of every major psychiatric drug class. The Vitamin K Injection covers what happens in the first hours of a newborn’s life.
The full shelf is at lulu.com/spotlight/unbekoming. A physical book reaches the person a Substack post never will — the skeptical relative, the friend who won’t click a link but might open a book, the visitor whose eye lands on a coffee table. Buy one to keep, and one to give away.
For those of you looking for practitioners who actually understand terrain medicine and the principles we explore here, I want to share something valuable. Dr. Tom Cowan—whose books and podcasts have shaped much of my own thinking about health—has created the New Biology Clinic, a virtual practice staffed by wellness specialists who operate from the same foundational understanding. This isn’t about symptom suppression or the conventional model. It’s about personalized guidance rooted in how living systems actually work. The clinic offers individual and family memberships that include not just private consults, but group sessions covering movement, nutrition, breathwork, biofield tuning, and more. Everything is virtual, making it accessible wherever you are. If you’ve been searching for practitioners who won’t look at you blankly when you mention structured water or the importance of the extracellular matrix, this is worth exploring. Use discount code “Unbekoming” to get $100 off the member activation fee. You can learn more and sign up at newbiologyclinic.com
LA NEWSLETTER · GRATUITE
L'essentiel de l'actualité, passé au crible par les cinq plumes du Courrier. Dans votre boîte, chaque jour ouvré.
Gratuit. Vous restez libre de partir quand vous voulez.
JE M'INSCRIS lecourrierdesstrateges.frAmis libertariens, laissez-moi vous exposer l'arithmétique la plus importante de votre année — celle dont aucun journal télévisé ne vous parlera, parce qu'elle n'a ni visage, ni victime photographiable, ni ministre à interrompre.
Pour bloquer un texte au Conseil de l'Union, il faut quatre États membres représentant plus de 35 % de la population. C'est écrit, c'est mécanique, c'est un tableur. Les neuf gouvernements qui refusent le scan obligatoire des messageries privées (dit chatcontrol) pèsent 32,9 %. Il manque 2,1 points. Trois pays peuvent les fournir : l'Allemagne (18,47 %), le Portugal (2,38 %), la Belgique (2,63 %). Accessoirement, le bloc des neuf ne peut perdre ni l'Italie, ni la Pologne, ni les Pays-Bas, qui pèsent à eux trois 25,5 % : une défection et il n'y a plus d'arithmétique du tout. Les chiffres sont là, et là.
L'Allemagne, elle, a trouvé la formule. En public, elle rejette le scan sans soupçon. Au Conseil, depuis juin, ses négociateurs ne s'y opposent plus. Admirez la manœuvre, elle mérite un cadre : on ne vote pas pour, on ne vote pas contre, on cesse de s'opposer. Voilà le degré zéro du courage politique porté à sa perfection technique — une abstention si bien élevée qu'elle n'a même pas besoin d'être déclarée.
ABONNEMENT
Deux grands formats par jour. Les cinq plumes du Courrier. La série Sécession, le dimanche.
Le monde commente. Vous, vous comprenez.
S'ABONNER lecourrierdesstrateges.frEt mon pays ? Mon pays, mes chers lecteurs sans tableur, est indécis. On le dit avec un mot d'agence de notation, comme s'il s'agissait d'un arbitrage délicat entre deux biens supérieurs. Indécis sur quoi ? Sur la lecture des messages de quatre cent cinquante millions d'Européens. Depuis quand ? Depuis que la Commission a déposé son texte, en mai 2022. Cinquante-deux mois. Miljaardedju — cinquante-deux mois, c'est plus long qu'une grossesse d'éléphante, plus long que la construction d'un pont sur la Dyle, plus long que la carrière moyenne d'un secrétaire d'État belge. Un pays qui n'a pas tranché en cinquante-deux mois n'est pas indécis. Il attend de voir qui gagne.
On me dira que le règlement protège les enfants, et il faut le dire sérieusement : son objet est l'abus sexuel des mineurs, qui n'est pas une abstraction de juriste. Seulement voilà — le Parlement européen, de son côté, ne propose pas de ne rien faire. Il propose la détection ciblée sur ordonnance judiciaire. Le choix n'est donc pas entre protéger et laisser faire. Il est entre scanner les suspects et scanner tout le monde. Et sur ce que coûte la seconde méthode, le texte a une élégance qu'il faut saluer : les plateformes ne publieront leurs taux d'erreur et de faux positifs qu'à partir du 1er février 2027. Soit après. On vous demande de signer avant de connaître le prix, et le prix sera facturé en vies privées de gens qui n'avaient rien fait.
TELEGRAM · L'INFO EN CONTINU
La newsletter vous donne le matin. Le fil vous donne l'instant.
Gratuit, et en continu.
REJOINDRE LE FIL t.me/resterlibreNotez maintenant l'asymétrie, elle est d'une perfection d'horloger. Pour étendre la surveillance, l'urgence suffit : le 9 juillet, le Parlement a prolongé le scan volontaire jusqu'au 3 avril 2028 parce que les 314 députés qui votaient contre n'atteignaient pas les 361 requis — dans cette maison, la majorité qui dit non ne suffit pas ; il faut une majorité qualifiée pour empêcher. Pour restreindre la surveillance, en revanche, il faut quatre États, 35 % de population, et l'accord de trois capitales qui ne décrochent pas. Le dispositif est monté de telle sorte que l'inertie travaille toujours dans le même sens. Ce n'est pas un hasard de procédure. C'est une architecture.
Mardi, si personne ne bouge, les négociateurs acteront le facile — le Centre européen, l'évaluation des risques, les obligations de transparence — et renverront le reste. Sans accord, le dossier passe à la présidence lituanienne en janvier, puis à la grecque en juillet. Il ne meurt pas. Il patiente. C'est sa nature profonde : un texte de surveillance n'a jamais besoin de gagner, il lui suffit de ne pas perdre, pendant que vous avez une vie, un métier, des enfants à récupérer à l'école et aucune raison de savoir ce qu'est un COREPER.
TIPS · SANS ABONNEMENT
Un média libre vit de ses lecteurs. Un pourboire ponctuel, sans compte ni engagement, quand le cœur vous en dit.
Vous donnez ce que vous voulez. Vous restez libre.
LAISSER UN POURBOIRE merci !Alors une dernière question, compagnons d'Absurdistan, à poser à votre député avant mardi soir. Le jour où une machine lira vos messages, elle le fera parce que quatre cent cinquante millions d'Européens l'auront voulu — ou parce que deux virgule un pour cent d'entre eux n'ont pas rappelé ?
Je connais la réponse. Elle tient dans un tableur, et personne n'aura signé.
Read in English here
La campaña de Donald Trump para poner a Groenlandia bajo el control de los Estados Unidos a menudo se ha descartado como pura fanfarronería. Eso es un error. Detrás del lenguaje de un acuerdo inmobiliario se esconde un intento serio de revivir un antiguo principio imperial: que Washington pueda decidir el futuro político y económico de todo el hemisferio occidental. Groenlandia, estratégicamente ubicada entre América del Norte y Europa, se ha convertido en una prueba de esa afirmación – y de si la soberanía de una pequeña nación indígena cuenta cuando entra en conflicto con las ambiciones de una gran potencia.
Trump planteó la idea de comprar Groenlandia durante su primer mandato presidencial en 2019. Tras su reelección, la propuesta se volvió más agresiva. En diciembre de 2024 declaró que la “propiedad y el control” de Groenlandia por parte de los Estados Unidos eran una “necesidad absoluta”. El 7 de enero de 2025, se negó a descartar la coacción militar o económica contra Groenlandia y el Canal de Panamá, afirmando: “Necesitamos Groenlandia por motivos de seguridad nacional”. Posteriormente, insistió en que los Estados Unidos se haría con la isla “de una forma u otra”. Esta afirmación combinaba varios argumentos: Groenlandia es vital para la defensa antimisiles; Rusia y China amenazan el Ártico; los yacimientos de tierras raras de Groenlandia tienen un valor estratégico; y, supuestamente, los groenlandeses acogerían con agrado el dominio estadounidense.
Esta última afirmación resultó ser demostrablemente falsa. Una encuesta de enero de 2025, realizada tanto en groenlandés como en danés, reveló que el 85% de la población de Groenlandia se oponía a abandonar el reino danés para unirse a los Estados Unidos, mientras que solo el 6% lo apoyaba. Sin embargo, la misma encuesta mostró que una mayoría estaba a favor de una eventual independencia. Esa distinción es fundamental. El deseo de los groenlandeses de poner fin a la tutela colonial danesa no puede interpretarse como un consentimiento a la anexión estadounidense.
El argumento de seguridad a favor de la propiedad estadounidense es engañoso, ya que Washington ya goza de amplios derechos militares en Groenlandia. La relación comenzó durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Con Dinamarca ocupada por la Alemania nazi, su embajador en Washington firmó un acuerdo de 1941 que permitía a los Estados Unidos defender Groenlandia y construir instalaciones allí. Dinamarca solicitó la retirada estadounidense después de la guerra, pero prevaleció la estrategia de la Guerra Fría.
El Acuerdo de Defensa de Groenlandia de 1951, celebrado en el marco del Tratado del Atlántico Norte, autorizó a los Estados Unidos a establecer y operar “zonas de defensa”. Esto permitió la rápida construcción de la Base Aérea de Thule – rebautizada como Base Espacial de Pituffik en 2023 – en un lugar ideal para las rutas aéreas y de misiles más cortas entre la Unión Soviética y América del Norte. En el apogeo de la Guerra Fría, los Estados Unidos operaba numerosas instalaciones en toda Groenlandia. Hoy en día, Pituffik, la base militar más septentrional de Washington, desempeña funciones de alerta de misiles, defensa antimisiles y vigilancia espacial.
El acuerdo ofrece a Washington una amplia libertad operativa. Una enmienda de 2004 – el Acuerdo de Igaliku – reconoció al Gobierno autónomo de Groenlandia, estableció a Pituffik como la única zona de defensa existente y exigió la consulta previa antes de realizar cambios significativos o crear nuevas zonas de defensa. También estableció la cooperación en temas económicos, técnicos y ambientales. En otras palabras, si los Estados Unidos considera que se necesitan más radares, puertos, aeródromos o personal, ya existe un mecanismo legal para negociarlo con Dinamarca y Groenlandia. La soberanía, por lo tanto, no es un requisito militar.
La historia de las bases también explica por qué “seguridad” no es un término neutral en Groenlandia. En 1953, las autoridades danesas ordenaron a 116 inughuit – 27 familias – que abandonaran la recién fundada Qaanaaq, mientras que el resto se reubicó en asentamientos en otras partes del distrito. Camp Century se construyó bajo el hielo entre 1959 y 1960 y estaba vinculado a la propuesta secreta del Proyecto Iceworm, que contemplaba una extensa red de bases de lanzamiento de misiles nucleares.
En 1968, un B-52 estadounidense que transportaba cuatro bombas de hidrógeno se estrelló sobre el hielo marino en la Base Aérea de Thule, lo que provocó contaminación por plutonio y otras sustancias. El accidente puso de manifiesto la inconsistencia entre la política declarada públicamente por Dinamarca en contra de las armas nucleares en territorio danés en tiempos de paz y los permisos secretos otorgados por el Gobierno danés a los Estados Unidos para almacenar armas nucleares en Groenlandia. Las instalaciones abandonadas dejaron combustible, desechos y otros contaminantes. Los reportajes de Groenlandia continúan cuestionando quién pagará por las futuras limpiezas. La relación militar protegió los intereses estratégicos de los Estados Unidos, mientras que los costos humanos y ambientales recayeron de manera desproporcionada sobre los groenlandeses.
Groenlandia dejó de ser formalmente una colonia en 1953, obtuvo autonomía en 1979 y amplió su autogobierno en 2009. La Ley de Autogobierno reconoce a los groenlandeses como un pueblo con derecho a la autodeterminación y establece un camino hacia la independencia. Washington reabrió su consulado en Nuuk en 2020, y la cooperación se intensificó en materia de comercio, educación, minería e investigación. Los gobiernos de Groenlandia (desde Kuupik Kleist hasta Jens-Frederik Nielsen) han acogido con beneplácito los vínculos económicos con Washington, pero rechazan la tendencia de este último a exigir cada vez más a la isla para satisfacer sus necesidades militares.
La exigencia de Trump respecto a Groenlandia forma parte de una política hemisférica más amplia. La Doctrina Monroe de 1823 advertía a las potencias europeas contra nuevas intervenciones coloniales en las Américas. Presentada como anticolonial, se transformó en una reivindicación de la supremacía estadounidense. El corolario de Theodore Roosevelt de 1904 afirmaba el derecho de intervención en América Latina, proporcionando una justificación ideológica para ocupaciones, cambios de régimen y el control de activos estratégicos.
Los partidarios de Trump rebautizaron su última versión como la “Doctrina Donroe”. Esta denominación vincula la presión sobre Groenlandia con las exigencias relativas al Canal de Panamá, las amenazas contra Cuba y Colombia, las reivindicaciones sobre Canadá y la intervención de los Estados Unidos en Venezuela. A finales de 2025, la Casa Blanca proclamó formalmente un Corolario Trump a la Doctrina de Monroe, en el que se afirmaba el liderazgo de los Estados Unidos en todo “nuestro hemisferio”. Groenlandia queda arrastrada a esta esfera porque geográficamente forma parte de América del Norte, aunque esté vinculada políticamente a Dinamarca y su pueblo inuit posea su propio derecho a la autodeterminación. Esta doctrina contiene una contradicción reveladora. Trump denuncia el control europeo sobre Groenlandia como un anacronismo, al tiempo que exige que la isla sea transferida a los Estados Unidos. El colonialismo no se ha abolido; simplemente cambia el colonizador propuesto. Las referencias de Trump a los minerales, las rutas marítimas y la geografía militar reducen a Groenlandia a un activo y a sus 56.000 habitantes a un obstáculo en una transacción entre potencias.
Las amenazas de Trump provocaron una ruptura extraordinaria entre los Estados Unidos y Europa. Dinamarca no es un adversario, sino un aliado de la OTAN cuyas tropas lucharon junto a los soldados estadounidenses en Afganistán. La amenaza de arrebatar territorio a un aliado por la fuerza ataca la premisa misma de la alianza. La primera ministra danesa, Mette Frederiksen advirtió que un ataque de los Estados Unidos contra otro país de la OTAN pondría fin al orden de seguridad de la posguerra. Los gobiernos europeos se unieron en torno al principio de que las fronteras no pueden modificarse mediante la coacción, un principio que invocan contra Rusia en Ucrania.
La crisis puso de manifiesto la dependencia de Europa. La OTAN no cuenta con un procedimiento claro para defender a un miembro frente a su miembro más poderoso. Los Estados europeos dependen en gran medida del poderío militar de los Estados Unidos, al tiempo que se les pide que resistan la coacción estadounidense. Copenhague respondió con una diplomacia cautelosa, un mayor gasto militar en el Ártico y la insistencia en que las decisiones corresponden a Groenlandia y a Dinamarca. Francia, Alemania, los países nórdicos y la Unión Europea expresaron su solidaridad, pero el episodio intensificó los llamado a la autonomía estratégica europea. También dañó la pretensión de Washington de liderar una alianza de democracias contra el revisionismo autoritario.
El 18 de septiembre de 2026, Trump anunció un nuevo acuerdo trilateral de seguridad tras meses de negociaciones, reivindicando el “control permanente” sobre la seguridad de Groenlandia. Los líderes daneses y groenlandeses lo describieron en términos más limitados: una ampliación de la cooperación militar con los Estados Unidos que preserva la soberanía y la autodeterminación de Groenlandia. El texto completo aún debe firmarse y aprobarse. Si su versión es correcta, el resultado confirma lo que era evidente desde el principio: los Estados Unidos podría obtener acuerdos de seguridad adicionales sin llegar a ser dueño de Groenlandia. Sin embargo, la presión que precedió al acuerdo sigue siendo una advertencia sobre las negociaciones llevadas a cabo bajo amenazas.
La respuesta de Groenlandia ha combinado rechazo, unidad y complejidad política. Kalaallit Nunaat – el nombre groenlandés del país – se convirtió en el centro de las declaraciones de que Groenlandia pertenece a su pueblo y no está en venta. En marzo de 2025, grandes manifestaciones en Nuuk, Sisimiut y Qaanaaq marcharon bajo la bandera roja y blanca de Erfalasorput. Los manifestantes le pidieron a Trump que respetara a los inuit, a su país y a su nacionalidad. Los partidos políticos de Groenlandia, a pesar de profundos desacuerdos sobre el ritmo y las condiciones económicas de la independencia, condenaron conjuntamente la presión externa. El Parlamento prohibió las donaciones políticas extranjeras y anónimas, defendiendo explícitamente la integridad de la democracia groenlandesa en medio del interés de las grandes potencias.
El colonialismo danés dejó profundas heridas: asimilación forzada, ingeniería social, desarrollo desigual y decisiones tomadas en Copenhague sobre la tierra y el pueblo groenlandeses (toda la cuarta temporada de la popular serie de televisión Borgen, en 2022, se centró en un conflicto entre Copenhague y Nuuk por el descubrimiento de un nuevo yacimiento de petróleo con implicaciones de China y Rusia). Muchos groenlandeses desean la independencia, y algunos ven el creciente interés de los Estados Unidos como una ventaja para atraer inversiones y lograr una relación más equitativa con Dinamarca.
Groenlandia revela el verdadero contenido de la Doctrina Donroe: una afirmación del siglo XXI de que la geografía otorga a Washington derechos superiores sobre los pueblos vecinos. La respuesta de Groenlandia es igualmente moderna y universal. La ubicación estratégica no anula la soberanía popular, los minerales no borran la identidad nacional, y ninguna gran potencia adquiere un país simplemente por declarar que lo necesita.
Vijay Prashad es un historiador y periodista indio. Es autor de cuarenta libros, entre los que se incluyen Balas de Washington, Una estrella roja sobre el Tercer Mundo, Las naciones oscuras: una historia del Tercer Mundo; Las naciones pobres: una posible historia del Sur Global y How the International Monetary Fund Suffocates Africa, escrito con Grieve Chelwa. Es el director ejecutivo de Tricontinental: Instituto de Investigación Social, corresponsal jefe de Globetrotter, y el editor jefe de LeftWord Books (Nueva Delhi). También ha hecho apariciones en las películas Shadow World (2016) y Two Meetings (2017).
Este artículo fue elaborado por Globetrotter.
On 19 November 2025, Indian police raided the ‘Kashmir Times’ in Jammu. They said they were on an “anti-terror” operation. The offices had been shut since 2022 and were in dilapidated condition, the equipment largely defunct. Yet, the police claimed to have recovered a “pistol and live AK-47 cartridges.”
Since 2018, only five journalists have faced cases under India’s draconian anti-terror Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. Trials rarely start, leaving journalists in a state of perpetual purgatory, even if they are out on bail under onerous conditions.
Before the police came charging into these unused offices last year, the ‘Kashmir Times’, founded by my father in 1954, had long suffered sustained persecution – the seizure of records, of equipment, the harassment of staffers, the use of social media to spread slurs, trumped up charges of tax evasion and the embedding of spies.
The first ever copies of Kashmir Times, initially a weekly, were seized by the government. In 1983, my father survived a murderous assault with serious injuries inflicted by a Hindu nationalist mob. I joined the newspaper in 1989, as the armed militancy, the ‘insurgency’ against the Indian state, became widespread, and experienced firsthand the struggle to report the news accurately and truthfully. The government would frequently withdraw its advertising, which was the main source of funding for most news outlets. We were besieged on several fronts, facing down the state, militants and aggressive Hindu nationalists.
In 2019, as Indian prime minister Narendra Modi began his second term in office, his government removed the special autonomous status granted to Jammu and Kashmir and protections that had existed for nearly 70 years. Once a state, Jammu and Kashmir was split into two federally governed territories. The Indian-administered part of Kashmir – the subject of several military conflicts between India and Pakistan, with both countries claiming the entire disputed territory while controlling a portion of it – had effectively become a police state and control of the media was a critical component of this transformation.
As Executive Editor of the ‘Kashmir Times’, one of the oldest newspapers in the region and the largest, with four editions, I petitioned India’s Supreme Court against the six-month-long internet shutdown that the Modi government imposed in 2019. But by 2020, three editions of the ‘Kashmir Times’ had shut down and the fourth only limped along, a once daily newspaper that was now only occasionally published. By February 2022, even this edition was shut down. I left India with my husband Prabodh Jamwal, the editor of the ‘Kashmir Times’, and revived it as a digital newsroom in exile in the United States in November 2023.
But, as the so-called terror investigation and the mysterious discovery of weapons in our long disused office in 2025 showed, the ‘Kashmir Times’ remained a thorn in the side of the Modi government. The Indian prime minister has frequently presented India on the international stage as the “mother of democracy” and the “Vishwaguru”, a moral exemplar and teacher to the world. Just last week, between September 12 and 13, Delhi hosted Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping and Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian as part of the annual BRICS meeting, the global group founded initially by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (hence the acronym) that is increasingly being presented as an alternative power centre to the American-led Western alliance. For an India seeking to portray itself as not just an emerging superpower but as a democratic force, it is vital that Kashmir remain repressed, hidden away from global scrutiny.
It’s why, even as a newsroom in exile, we continue to be pursued by an Indian government seeking to tarnish our credibility, to deny us the right to report on Kashmir. We are being subject to a vendetta and it represents what has happened to journalism in Kashmir. Journalists have been silenced by the Modi government, Kashmiri voices strangled, and the local media industry deliberately destroyed.
What is happening to journalism in Kashmir is a harbinger of what lies ahead for the rest of India.
Geeta Seshu of Free Speech Collective, which monitors press freedoms in India, argues that Kashmir is a laboratory where every strategy of media suppression is tested and perfected for use elsewhere. India, which once had a noisy, argumentative press, now ranks at a lowly 157 out of 180 countries in the World Press Freedom Index. Reporters Without Borders, which compiles the ranking, says “press freedom is in crisis” in Modi’s India.
The 2023 Digital Personal Data Protection Act provided a “dangerous framework for expansion of surveillance and censorship” across the country. It empowered the government to demand data from any entity, including journalists, effectively requiring them to reveal their sources. The amendments to the 2020 Information Technology Rules already burden intermediaries with harsh obligations and have been used to arrest journalists, block websites and compel social media platforms to restrict content. Recently, Instagram restricted posts about reports of Kashmiris shot by Indian security forces using pellet guns on unarmed protestors.
Seshu’s fear that what happens in Kashmir will be replicated in the Indian mainland has largely been borne out. For example, in 2023, nearly 50 journalists associated with the portal ‘NewsClick’ – some only vaguely – were subject to arrests and interrogations. Many had their devices seized without due process. Their alleged crimes were essentially guilt by association, charges manufactured not from evidence but from a, frankly, lazy piece of journalism published in the ‘New York Times’ about NewsClick’s funding. The charges were eventually quashed by an Indian court.
Such court rulings are less likely in Kashmir. As a Kashmiri journalist based in Delhi says, “unlike the rest of India, Kashmir is a police state, and state control requires any independent journalism to be shut down.”
In Kashmir, the Indian state has engineered a sophisticated edifice of control through securitization, surveillance and interrogation. It is invisible, intangible, and all-pervasive, a model that extracts quiet surrender and obedience. Unlike the targeted killings of journalists in Gaza, in Kashmir the control of information is seamlessly embedded in everyday life, requiring no enforcement, no traces of brutality. The journalists are essentially cowed into submission.
It began with the world’s longest internet shutdown – a complete lockdown for six months and a partial one for another year. What the shutdown created, despite a court verdict restoring communications, was fear among journalists compelled to work out of a government-surveilled computer facility, and then a perpetuation of that fear through consistent localized and temporary digital shutdowns. So commonplace are these shutdowns that they no longer warrant reporting or commentary.
In June 2020, the Modi government introduced a 53-page document called ‘J&K's Media Policy’ which gave the authorities sweeping powers to monitor, judge, and punish journalists, branding critical reporting as “fake news”, “unethical”, or “anti-national”. The authorities would also routinely remove government advertising from cash-strapped outlets and provide accreditation only to journalists deemed loyal, thus turning bureaucrats into arbiters of what constitutes news and who gets to report it. The effect is chilling.
And then there’s the monitoring of communications.
“I can’t say if they’re using Pegasus or some other spyware or technology,” a journalist told me about being interrogated over emails sent to an editor, “but they knew everything about our conversations.” In a 2021 leak, it turned out the Indian government was using Pegasus to spy on at least 40 Indian journalists, only one of who was Kashmiri.
But, a Kashmiri journalist says, “officials have told us ‘nothing in Kashmir is end-to-end encrypted’ and digital activity is clearly being constantly monitored.” No Kashmiri journalist I spoke to for this story, including those who contribute to the ‘Kashmir Times’, have the encrypted messaging Signal app, used worldwide by journalists, on their phones. Devices are routinely checked when journalists are summoned to police stations in Kashmir for questioning. Some said their devices were returned after being tampered with. “You face humiliation and beatings for using Signal and VPNs,” many journalists said. “You can only get away with it if you’re not on their radar,” said one.
In November 2025, the Indian government issued a directive insisting on verifying the “bona fides” of journalists working in Jammu and Kashmir, and the police followed up by requiring journalists to part with personal information including biometrics and bank statements. In January this year, senior journalist Basharat Masood of The Indian Express spent seven hours at a Srinagar police station, then was summoned for three more days and told to sign a bond promising not to “repeat his mistake” – for reporting on the surveillance of mosquea surveillance, even as officials had already admitted to large-scale data collection and verification.
Police also surveil Kashmiris through the use of drone cameras, a network of 1,000 electronic cameras installed at major traffic junctions, and through unrestricted access to people’s social media activity across platforms ostensibly to track anti-India activity. During an illegal “Census 2024” drive, the police collected residents' personal data and GPS-tagged coordinates of homes. And the soon-to-be-rolled-out Jammu and Kashmir-specific digital identity cards that collects the data of entire households, purportedly to ensure the smooth rollout of welfare schemes, has also sparked local anxieties.
Still, as pervasive as the surveillance is, it is journalists that find themselves in the firing line. Any critical word warrants a summons to a police station, interrogation, intimidation and even detention. This happens repeatedly, with journalists never aware of what specific “offence” might trigger a police summons. The reflex, after several such visits to police stations, is self-protection and self-censorship.
A Kashmiri journalist told me that the language the police use to summon journalists for questioning is particularly sinister. It is almost as if the police are enjoying instilling fear. “Aaj dastarkhan par aapki dawat hai”, for instance, is a typical summons. You are invited to a feast, the police say cynically, knowing a journalist is likely to be harshly questioned, even beaten.
Often, Kashmiri journalists, without notice, are placed on no-fly lists. Sanna Irshad Mattoo, a Pulitzer Prize-winning photojournalist, was twice prevented from travelling abroad for exhibitions and award ceremonies, a pointed message that even international recognition offers no protection. At least twelve journalists have had their passports revoked; two of them were already abroad at the time, rendering them stateless.
The Free Speech Collective filed a Right to Information (RTI) query in March 2024 to ascertain exactly how many Kashmiris had had their passports revoked or cancelled. The plea was rejected by the government on grounds of “national security”.
As India continues to press its case as a formidable, if still rising power, citing its 7.8% growth rate over the past quarter, it continues to be defensive and secretive about Kashmir. Foreign journalists are largely barred, or at least heavily restricted, from reporting from both Indian and Pakistani-administered Kashmir. In May, last year, India and Pakistan exchanged air strikes after a terrorist attack in Indian-administered Kashmir and Modi fell out with Donald Trump over the latter’s claim to have stopped both nuclear powers from accelerating towards a disastrous war.
Despite Kashmir being a long-standing issue that merits global attention, reporting from the region has reduced to a trickle.
A Google search of Kashmir-related news floods your screen with links, but it is bulk without substance. Articles read like a log of official announcements and statements, punctuated by the occasional piece on a shrinking water body, a development project, a political tussle over a non-issue, or unemployment figures. Each report floats like a loose, individual particle suspended in air, packaged and presented as definitive. No investigation into context. No excavation of the past. No interrogation of contributing factors. A story about an alleged terrorist’s hair transplant and cosmetic dentistry, based entirely on police sources, is passed off as an investigation into Kashmiri insurgency. A superficially detailed piece on anti-encroachment drives or home demolitions will carry little beyond the grief of the displaced, or the remarks of a politician whose interest in the community begins and ends with votes. A terrorist’s hair transplant story, based on the police version, passes off as an investigation into Kashmir’s complex insurgency dynamic.
Kashmir fell off the radar a long time ago, says Free Speech Collective’s Geeta Seshu.
Even mundane stories are difficult to report. No one wants to be quoted. A university professor said he could once “talk to journalists and trust they understood the context. Now, a single sentence can be pulled out, circulated on WhatsApp, and suddenly I’m either an anti-national or a government stooge. Both sides will use the same quote to attack you differently. Why would I take that risk?”
Tarushi Aswani, an Indian journalist, told me that “a curtain has been pulled over Kashmir by silencing journalists who ask questions.” Instead, she added, “press release journalism fills the vacuum, erasing the truth about Kashmir, its history, its politics, its development, environment and aspirations.” Kashmir is no longer looking at a mirror. The lack of truthful reporting means nothing is reflected back. Instead, Kashmiris are looking into the lens of a surveillance camera.
*The eight Kashmiri journalists interviewed for this story spoke on condition of anonymity.
Aakash Hassan
Alishan Jafri
The post How Modi silenced Kashmir appeared first on Coda Story.
Read in English here
La semana pasada, el 4 de septiembre, la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas aprobó una propuesta africana para un nuevo mapa mundial, que muestra el tamaño real de los países en relación con los demás. Su objetivo es corregir la visión del mundo moldeada por el mapa mundial ampliamente utilizado basado en la proyección de Mercator, creada por Gerardus Mercator, un cartógrafo flamenco del siglo XVI. El problema con el mapa de Mercator es bien conocido; por ejemplo, muestra a la isla de Groenlandia con el mismo tamaño que el continente africano, ¡a pesar de que África es 14 veces más grande que Groenlandia! En pocas palabras, los mapas de Mercator exageran enormemente el norte del mundo —los Estados Unidos y Europa— mientras que reducen África y la mayor parte de Asia. Tampoco trata con benevolencia al resto del hemisferio sur. Sudamérica, que tiene casi tres veces el tamaño de Europa, parece comparable a esta en un mapa típico de Mercator.
Aunque no existe ninguna razón geográfica por la que el hemisferio sur deba ser más pequeño que el hemisferio norte, los cartógrafos lo hicieron significativamente más pequeño porque tenía muy poca masa continental más allá de los 40 grados y, por lo tanto, se recortó. Esto significó que, en la mayoría de los mapas de Mercator, debido a que los cartógrafos occidentales recortaron gran parte del hemisferio sur, el ecuador quedó significativamente desplazado hacia abajo. El doble efecto de comprimir las zonas ecuatoriales, donde se encuentra gran parte de África, y desplazar el ecuador hacia abajo hizo que el norte del mundo, particularmente Europa y América del Norte, parecieran mucho más grandes de lo que realmente son. Por lo general, en la mayoría de los mapas de Mercator, el hemisferio norte parece el doble del tamaño del hemisferio sur, aunque ambos hemisferios son idénticos en tamaño.
Cualquier mapa, ya sea de Mercator o de cualquier otra proyección, presenta el problema de que se puede ser fiel al tamaño o a la forma, pero no a ambos. Se trata de un problema fundamental que surge al proyectar una superficie tridimensional sobre una hoja de papel bidimensional. No hay forma de hacerlo sin distorsiones. Solo un globo terráqueo puede representar fielmente la Tierra tridimensional. Pero entonces, ¿qué hacemos cuando queremos reproducir detalles geográficos para nuestros lectores en libros o artículos?
Las distorsiones evidentes de la proyección de Mercator y su enfoque eurocéntrico dieron lugar a varias alternativas, particularmente entre los cartógrafos de la izquierda amplia o progresista. Otros, especialmente en los Estados Unidos y Europa, se han opuesto a ella, argumentando que el tamaño no importa y que no les molesta que se les muestre mucho más grandes de lo que realmente son. Sin embargo, muchos discreparon e intentaron desarrollar proyecciones alternativas. La proyección de Gall-Peterson, que contó con el respaldo del gobierno socialdemócrata alemán de Willy Brandt, es una de esas proyecciones. La proyección de Hobo Dyer, que se encuentra en el dominio público global —lo que significa que cualquiera puede usarla sin pagar regalías—, es otra. Finalmente, las Naciones Unidas han puesto fin a las guerras de los mapas, con una victoria rotunda a favor de la moción presentada por las naciones africanas para utilizar mapas de área igual. La votación fue de 164 a favor de la moción, con los Estados Unidos como único voto en contra.
El objetivo del mapa de Mercator era facilitar la navegación de los barcos en mar abierto, donde ya no es posible orientarse reconociendo diversas características topológicas, como ríos, colinas, aldeas, pueblos, etc. En mar abierto, si identificamos nuestra ubicación en un mapa de Mercator y el destino al que deseamos llegar, podemos viajar en línea recta, tal como se muestra en el mapa. Conserva la dirección, lo que significa que, si trazamos un rumbo en un mapa de Mercator, podemos fijar nuestro rumbo según él. Es por eso que los países marítimos utilizaban proyecciones de Mercator para la navegación cuando contaban con pocos instrumentos, más allá de la brújula y el sextante, para determinar su ubicación con respecto a su destino.
Es importante señalar que la dirección que se muestra en el mapa no es la ruta más corta entre el punto de partida y el destino.
El camino más corto entre dos puntos en la superficie del globo terráqueo es el arco del gran círculo que va desde su ubicación hasta su destino. Una línea recta en un mapa bidimensional puede parecer la distancia más corta, pero no lo es, ya que no toma en cuenta la curvatura de la Tierra. En pocas palabras, el precio que pagamos por convertir una superficie curva en una plana y bidimensional es que distorsionamos la forma de la superficie. Estiramos ciertas áreas y encogemos otras. En una Tierra plana, la distancia más corta sería la que indica su brújula, pero no así en una esfera.
Anteriormente, los barcos utilizaban las estrellas y el sol del mediodía para estimar dónde se encontraban y hacia dónde debían dirigirse. Fijar un rumbo hacia su destino utilizando un mapa de Mercator y una brújula resultaba mucho más sencillo que tratar de adivinar dónde se encontraba en un océano desierto, sin puntos de referencia, y cambiar constantemente de rumbo en busca de una ruta más corta. La línea constante en el mapa se denominaba “línea de rumbo”, y seguirla ayudaba enormemente a los navegantes. Los mapas de Mercator eran populares en Europa, particularmente en Europa occidental, ya que, aparte de los árabes, eran las principales naciones marítimas.
Mientras que los árabes se enfocaban en el comercio, particularmente en el Océano Índico, los europeos occidentales se dedicaban no solo a la pesca, sino también, fuera de temporada, a la piratería, las incursiones y el saqueo de otras naciones. Los vikingos, importantes figuras románticas en Hollywood, eran particularmente brutales, ya que combinaban el saqueo con el comercio de esclavos. Por supuesto, como todos los piratas, una vez que se alcanza el poder, se puede convertir ese poder marítimo en conquista. Los hombres del norte, o nórdicos, conquistaron Francia y más tarde Inglaterra, y son conocidos por nosotros como normandos. No muy diferentes de las Compañías Holandesa y Británica de las Indias Orientales, que comenzaron con el comercio y la piratería y más tarde establecieron imperios coloniales.
No es de extrañar que los reinos marítimos de Europa occidental, para quienes la guerra, la pesca para alimentarse y la caza de focas, morsas, etc., con el fin de obtener grasa y pieles, constituían las principales fuentes de riqueza, se centraran mucho más en la navegación y la construcción naval. Esto significaba que los barcos construidos para el agitado Océano Atlántico contaban con ciertos avances de los que carecían los barcos árabes e indios, aunque la brújula, el astrolabio, los mapas astronómicos y otros instrumentos náuticos procedían todos de Asia.
Los barcos de Europa occidental contaban con cañones montados en cubierta, lo que les permitía disparar “andanadas”, es decir, disparar múltiples cañones simultáneamente, a diferencia de los cañones montados en la proa y la popa. Esa es una de las principales razones por las que un puñado de países de Europa occidental pudo aprovechar los océanos para, primero, hacerse con el comercio marítimo y, más tarde, construir sus imperios coloniales. A diferencia de los fuertes fijos, los barcos actuaban como fuertes flotantes, lo que proporcionaba a los europeos una movilidad en las guerras navales de la que carecían las fortificaciones terrestres estáticas.
Como muestra la monumental obra de Needham sobre la ciencia y la tecnología chinas, muchos avances náuticos en la construcción naval y la navegación procedían de China. Los siete viajes de los barcos de Zheng He en el siglo XV (1405-1443), que partieron de China, el sudeste asiático y la India, y recorrieron la costa árabe hasta África, demostraron que los chinos habían construido enormes barcos y una poderosa armada. En aquella época, se encontraban muy por delante de Europa y de los árabes, tanto en la construcción naval como en los buques de guerra. Las diferencias internas entre la aristocracia terrateniente y los comandantes navales condujeron a la destrucción de la armada y a la prohibición de construir cualquier buque de alta mar.
Aunque la India suministraba a los árabes la madera necesaria para la construcción naval y en algún momento contó con una poderosa armada, cedió el comercio de alta mar a los comerciantes árabes. Ni China, ni la India, ni los árabes consideraban que la armada tuviera importancia militar. Como dijo un emperador mogol: “Los océanos son para los comerciantes, no para nosotros, los guerreros”. Las divisiones de castas en la India también llevaron, en un momento dado, a prohibir a las castas superiores emprender viajes oceánicos. La travesía del Kala Pani, siempre prohibida por los brahmanes, no se respetó de manera estricta. La India experimentó una gran expansión marítima en el período budista, no a través de la guerra, sino mediante el comercio y la labor de proselitismo de los monjes budistas. Tras el resurgimiento del hinduismo en el sur, el tabú que prohibía a las castas superiores viajar a través de los océanos se aplicó de manera más estricta, dejando los océanos en manos de comerciantes y mercenarios. Por ejemplo, las principales flotas de los reyes indios – ya fuera el rey de Calicut, también conocido como Samundri o Zamorin, o Shivaji – dependían de comandantes navales y buques mercenarios, muchos de ellos al mando de árabes.
Como demuestra la historia, los mapas, el comercio marítimo y la guerra están íntimamente relacionados. Los viajes marítimos y las guerras navales confieren a los mapas una importancia estratégica. No es simplemente la ubicación de las fronteras de cada país lo que importa, sino también su visión estratégica del mundo. Podemos observar cómo esto se está manifestando actualmente en Bab el Mandeb y en el Golfo Pérsico. Un vistazo rápido a un mapa habría convencido a los líderes estadounidenses de que Irán cuenta con una clara ventaja estratégica en el Estrecho de Ormuz, al igual que los hutíes en el Mar Rojo y el paso hacia el Canal de Suez. Descuidar los océanos repite los errores que cometió Asia en una época diferente, errores de los que ha aprendido. Debemos tener esto presente también hoy en día.
Prabir Purkayastha es el editor fundador de Newsclick.in, una plataforma de medios digitales. Es activista en favor de la ciencia y del software libre.
Este artículo fue elaborado por Globetrotter.
Read in English here
La 18va Cumbre del BRICS, celebrada en Nueva Delhi del 12 al 13 de septiembre, tuvo lugar en medio de una intensificación excepcional de las contradicciones internacionales. Las guerras en Asia Occidental, las sanciones unilaterales, las barreras arancelarias y el uso de las finanzas y la tecnología como armas han puesto de manifiesto el carácter fundamentalmente desigual del orden internacional dominado por el imperialismo. En este contexto, la continua expansión del BRICS refleja el deseo de los países en desarrollo de alcanzar una mayor autonomía estratégica y un sistema más democrático de gobernanza global. Al mismo tiempo, la cumbre demostró que el BRICS+ sigue siendo una agrupación heterogénea cuyos miembros difieren sustancialmente en sus alineamientos políticos e intereses económicos.
La Declaración de Nueva Delhi, resultado de la cumbre, reiteró la exigencia de una reforma de las Naciones Unidas, las instituciones financieras internacionales y el sistema comercial multilateral. Se opuso a las sanciones unilaterales no autorizadas por el Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas y abogó por un mayor comercio en monedas nacionales. La declaración también respaldó una mayor representación de los países en desarrollo en instituciones cuyas normas siguen siendo determinadas principalmente por los Estados Unidos y sus aliados. Estas posturas tienen una importancia objetiva en un momento en que Washington recurre cada vez más a sanciones, aranceles, controles a la exportación y control sobre los sistemas de pago para disciplinar a los países que se niegan a aceptar sus dictados.
Sin embargo, el lenguaje cuidadosamente negociado de la declaración también reveló las limitaciones de la formación ampliada. El BRICS+ incluye ahora a países sometidos a una presión occidental sostenida, como Rusia e Irán, así como a los Emiratos Árabes Unidos y otros Estados que mantienen amplios vínculos económicos y de seguridad con Occidente. En consecuencia, el consenso solo puede mantenerse mediante formulaciones que reconozcan los conflictos sin identificar siempre sus causas políticas. Esta ambigüedad fue especialmente evidente en el tratamiento que se dio en la cumbre a la guerra cada vez más extensa en Asia Occidental y a la postura adoptada por Irán.
El presidente iraní, Masoud Pezeshkian, aprovechó la cumbre para denunciar las sanciones unilaterales y la guerra de agresión contra Irán llevada a cabo por los Estados Unidos e Israel. Destacó acertadamente que la resiliencia económica no puede separarse de la paz, la soberanía y la seguridad. Irán también abogó por el comercio en monedas nacionales, un mayor uso del Nuevo Banco de Desarrollo y la construcción de corredores independientes de transporte y energía (tal como ya lo ha hecho a través de Pakistán, que ha proporcionado seis rutas terrestres para que las mercancías chinas y rusas ingresen a Irán). Para un país sometido a décadas de sanciones, a la exclusión de las redes financieras occidentales y a repetidas amenazas de cambio de régimen, la pertenencia al BRICS+ representa una importante oportunidad diplomática y económica.
La postura de Irán, sin embargo, presenta una marcada ambigüedad. Teherán presenta al BRICS+ como un instrumento para resistir el unilateralismo y defender la soberanía. Al mismo tiempo, debe buscar un acuerdo con los estados vecinos del Golfo, varios de los cuales están profundamente integrados con el capital occidental y los acuerdos de seguridad.
Irán firmó una declaración en la que se pedía moderación y desescalada, al tiempo que acusaba a los Estados Unidos e Israel de agresión y defendía sus propias acciones de represalia. Su postura combativa frente a la presión hiperimperialista se combina, por lo tanto, con un esfuerzo pragmático por evitar el aislamiento regional, asegurar el alivio de las sanciones y preservar los canales de negociación.
Esto no debe interpretarse simplemente como una inconsistencia. Irán se enfrenta a una coalición militar y financiera muy superior y debe maniobrar dentro de severas limitaciones. Pero también ilustra el problema más amplio al que se enfrenta el BRICS+. La oposición a la dominación occidental no genera automáticamente un programa antiimperialista coherente. Los Estados participantes son Estados capitalistas que persiguen sus respectivos intereses nacionales. Sus clases dominantes pueden resistirse a aspectos particulares de la hegemonía estadounidense, al tiempo que se mantienen dispuestas a llegar a acuerdos con las finanzas globales o con potencias reaccionarias regionales. En consecuencia, el BRICS+ es un escenario de lucha dentro del orden mundial en transformación, no una alternativa ya constituida al hiperimperialismo.
El acontecimiento político más trascendental de la cumbre para Asia fue la reunión entre el primer ministro Narendra Modi y el presidente chino Xi Jinping. La primera visita de Xi a la India en siete años confirmó la mejora gradual de las relaciones desde los acuerdos de retirada militar iniciados en 2024. Los dos líderes coincidieron en que la India y China deben considerarse socios en lugar de rivales y abordar las relaciones bilaterales desde una perspectiva estratégica a largo plazo. También discutieron la cuestión fronteriza, el comercio, el acceso a los mercados y los problemas de la cadena de suministro.
Cualquier mejora duradera en las relaciones entre la India y China debe ser bienvenida. La prolongada confrontación tras el enfrentamiento en el valle de Galwan de 2020 perjudicó a ambos países, aumentó el gasto militar y fortaleció los esfuerzos de los Estados Unidos por incorporar a la India a su estrategia indopacífica. Washington ha buscado constantemente convertir a la India en un contrapeso estratégico frente a China a través del Quad y la expansión de la cooperación militar y tecnológica. Por lo tanto, una confrontación continua entre la India y China beneficia mucho más a la estrategia de los Estados Unidos que a los intereses de los pueblos indio o chino.
La paz y la tranquilidad a lo largo de la Línea de Control Efectivo siguen siendo indispensables. Los acuerdos sobre la retirada deben ir seguidos de un compromiso sostenido a nivel diplomático y militar, la aclaración de las zonas en disputa y la observancia estricta de los acuerdos existentes. No se debe permitir que ni la retórica nacionalista ni la construcción competitiva de infraestructura desencadenen otra confrontación. Las diferencias sobre la frontera no pueden ignorarse, pero pueden y deben gestionarse sin subordinar toda la relación a una rivalidad militarizada.
Las relaciones económicas presentan una contradicción igualmente difícil. China es uno de los mayores socios comerciales de la India y una importante fuente de maquinaria, componentes electrónicos, productos químicos, equipos de energía renovable y otros insumos industriales. Sin embargo, el enorme déficit comercial de la India con China refleja tanto la debilidad del sector manufacturero indio como los obstáculos que enfrentan las exportaciones indias en el mercado chino. Para abordar este desequilibrio se requiere un mejor acceso al mercado, inversión china en condiciones transparentes y, sobre todo, una política industrial india capaz de desarrollar la capacidad productiva nacional. Durante los últimos seis meses, el comercio bilateral se ha disparado.
El enfoque del Gobierno de Modi ha alternado entre la dependencia de las importaciones chinas y las restricciones, motivadas políticamente, a la inversión y la tecnología chinas. Su retórica de “China más uno” no puede ocultar el fracaso de sus propias políticas para generar una industrialización de base amplia. Tampoco una alineación estratégica más estrecha con los Estados Unidos puede proporcionar a la India una base manufacturera independiente. Los Estados Unidos busca un acceso privilegiado al mercado indio, al tiempo que recurre a aranceles, restricciones tecnológicas y presión política cada vez que las políticas indias se apartan de sus intereses. La incoherencia del Gobierno de Modi se pone de manifiesto, sobre todo, en su incapacidad para elaborar realmente una agenda nacional de desarrollo que aproveche el dinamismo de la economía china y se distancie de unos Estados Unidos más orientados hacia el nacionalismo económico.
China, por su parte, debe reconocer que unas relaciones estables requieren sensibilidad ante las preocupaciones legítimas de la India. Entre ellas se encuentran la cuestión fronteriza sin resolver, el acceso desigual al mercado y el desequilibrio comercial. La considerable asimetría entre las dos economías hace que la reciprocidad sea particularmente importante. El llamado de Pekín a la colaboración solo cobrará sentido cuando vaya acompañado de medidas prácticas que permitan el ingreso de bienes y servicios indios al mercado chino y eviten que las tensiones fronterizas acaben repetidamente por opacar el diálogo político.
La cooperación entre la India y China otorgaría al BRICS+ un peso mucho mayor en la lucha por la democratización del orden internacional. Juntos, ambos países representan más de un tercio de la humanidad.
Su cooperación podría impulsar la reforma de las instituciones internacionales, el financiamiento climático, el intercambio de tecnología, las iniciativas de salud pública y un sistema comercial más justo. Por el contrario, una nueva confrontación paralizaría al BRICS+ y permitiría que potencias externas se aprovecharan de las divisiones en toda Asia. Por lo tanto, la India debe seguir una política exterior independiente basada en la coexistencia pacífica, y no participar en un proyecto estadounidense destinado a contener a China.
La cumbre de Nueva Delhi generó propuestas para la continuidad institucional, una cooperación financiera más sólida y una mayor resiliencia entre las economías en desarrollo. Sin embargo, las declaraciones tendrán un valor limitado a menos que se traduzcan en acuerdos concretos. El Nuevo Banco de Desarrollo debe ampliar los préstamos en monedas nacionales y dar prioridad a la infraestructura socialmente necesaria, en lugar de reproducir las condiciones y la orientación corporativa del Banco Mundial. Los mecanismos de pago transfronterizos deben desarrollarse de manera transparente, sin crear nuevas formas de dominación por parte de las economías más fuertes del BRICS. Las enérgicas declaraciones en apoyo de la Revolución Cubana y de las aspiraciones de autodeterminación del pueblo palestino deberán tener una aplicación práctica. ¿Encontrará el BRICS+ una manera de romper el cruel e ilegal embargo de Estados Unidos contra Cuba, y brindará el BRICS+ apoyo para la reactivación de la vida política palestina?
El BRICS+ encarna tanto el movimiento hacia un nuevo equilibrio mundial como todas las contradicciones de ese movimiento. El cauteloso acercamiento entre India y China es un ejemplo de dicha contradicción, ya que combina el reconocimiento de la dependencia mutua con una desconfianza estratégica sin resolver. El futuro del BRICS+ dependerá de si dichas contradicciones se gestionan de manera pacífica y de si la cooperación genera beneficios tangibles para los trabajadores, en lugar de limitarse a ampliar el margen de maniobra de las clases dominantes nacionales.
Para la India, el camino a seguir es claro: restablecer relaciones normales y pacíficas con China, resistirse a ser incorporada a la estrategia militar de los Estados Unidos, oponerse a la agresión y a las sanciones unilaterales contra Irán, y trabajar por un orden multilateral genuinamente democrático. Solo habrá un nuevo equilibrio mundial cuando se restrinja la dominación hiperimperialista y se amplíen la soberanía y las posibilidades de desarrollo de los pueblos. La cumbre de Nueva Delhi marcó un paso más en esa transición controvertida, pero la dirección y el contenido social del orden emergente siguen siendo objeto de lucha política.
Vijay Prashad es un historiador y periodista indio. Es autor de cuarenta libros, entre los que se incluyen Balas de Washington, Una estrella roja sobre el Tercer Mundo, Las naciones oscuras: una historia del Tercer Mundo; Las naciones pobres: una posible historia del Sur Global y How the International Monetary Fund Suffocates Africa, escrito con Grieve Chelwa. Es el director ejecutivo de Tricontinental: Instituto de Investigación Social, corresponsal jefe de Globetrotter, y el editor jefe de LeftWord Books (Nueva Delhi). También ha hecho apariciones en las películas Shadow World (2016) y Two Meetings (2017).
Este artículo fue elaborado por Globetrotter.
America’s nuclear weapons deterrent and how it is controlled is increasingly critical in the face of the rapidly-expanding arsenals across multiple adversaries. A new fleet of E-4C nuclear-hardened survivable airborne operations center aircraft is now in development, as is the U.S. Navy E-130J, which will provide next-generation communications with nuclear ballistic missile submarines deep beneath the waves. Focus is also turning to a mission that’s dedicated to emergency communications with the U.S. nuclear forces in times of crisis, a role known as Operation Looking Glass, which is also poised for updating under a program dubbed Looking Glass-Next.
The comprehensive modernization of America’s nuclear strike muscle involves three major elements – new B-21 Raider stealth bombers, the LGM-35A Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program to replace Minuteman IIIs, and new Columbia-class nuclear ballistic missile submarines. A fourth facet that ties all these new elements, as well as existing ones, together is the next generation nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) architecture. It securely connects nuclear weapons systems to decision-makers. Without it, America’s nuclear deterrent isn’t a deterrent at all.
America’s nuclear modernization is set against a backdrop of rapidly-developing nuclear strength across adversaries and pacing threats, which could threaten not only U.S. fighting forces, but also the existing aging NC3 infrastructure. This could impede the collective responsiveness and effectiveness of the American nuclear enterprise. For example, a coordinated attack on NC3 could degrade the National Command Authority chain, which could prevent communications that are necessary to conduct a retaliatory strike.
If fixed underground command posts are targeted and rendered inoperable, the current strategy would involve turning to a set of highly-survivable air assets that are designed to be on hand to execute emergency war orders. This includes the U.S. Air Force’s E-4B National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC) “Nightwatch” aircraft, and the E-6B Mercury that is operated by the U.S. Navy.
A major recapitalization effort is already underway for the NAOC E-4Bs, which are being superseded under the E-4C Survivable Airborne Operations Center (SAOC) contract. It is being led by defense contractor SNC. The new SAOC aircraft are based on the far more modern 747-8i, and are planned to have a much broader mission set than the four E-4B Nightwatch types they are set to replace, as you can read more about here.
The Navy’s E-6B Take Charge and Move Out (TACAMO) aircraft have a primary role of strategic connectivity with the ballistic missile submarine fleet. These converted 707s also execute another mission known as the Airborne National Command Post (ABNCP), more recently renamed “Looking Glass.” For this they are manned by U.S. Air Force missileers and U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) battle managers who are responsible for running the airborne nuclear NC3 systems.
The joint service team on Looking Glass mirrors some operations performed by USSTRATCOM’s underground command posts, and a small portion of what the NAOC executes. The Looking Glass mission is really focused on performing an airborne backup mission solely for USSTRATCOM to ensure another means of communicating with fielded nuclear bombers, their assigned tankers, ICBMs and deployed nuclear submarines. It is best known for its ability to supply airborne communications connectivity to the USAF’s ICBM force on the ground and can command remote launches of those weapons if necessary.
Additional NC3-related modernization is coming on the heels of SAOC, with the new E-130J set to assume the Navy’s TACAMO role from the ageing E-6Bs, assuming strategic connectivity for nuclear ballistic submarines. It means that at some point roughly two-thirds of the E-6 current mission will go to the new E-130J aircraft – raising the question of what will fulfill the critical Looking Glass mission.
Since the E-130J is not planned to take on the Looking Glass role, the USAF is in the early stages of what’s dubbed Looking Glass-Next (LG-N), which presents the future pathway for USSTRATCOM’s mobile contingency operations. This could take on a number of forms, including NC3 communications functions being increasingly moved to space-based assets and more distributed operations across the ground, although an air platform is still likely to form a major part of the overall capability.
Brian Golden is a retired USAF colonel who intimately understands nuclear command and control (NC2) and the associated NC3 equipment and processes from both a service and industry perspective. As a subject matter expert for SNC, he draws on his extensive experience as a former E-4B NAOC commander and he commanded much of the USAF’s multi-domain NC3 systems, including the Airborne Launch Control System onboard the current E-6B Looking Glass. He is also extremely familiar with all the nation’s continuity of government and continuity of operations missions for both Congressional and executive branches of the U.S. government.
“Everyone referred to the nuclear triad as the platforms that were controlled through the NC3 architecture,” Golden told TWZ during a detailed discussion. “Those platforms received their messages and executed their missions. But this isn’t just about that platform triad. The U.S. nuclear enterprise has four primary pillars, and nuclear command, control, and communications is a critical part of it. Without a robust NC3 system, it’s like having a brand new Bugatti Veyron but without the keys! It looks awesome on the driveway, but you can’t drive it.”
Golden explains that the current NC3 enterprise consists of a series of exquisite systems that are extremely reliable, but that are in need of modernization to stay ahead of the steepening threat curve, and stay in front of supply chain constraints. “What we have currently is very reliable, robust, and very survivable, but it can be difficult to maintain some of our legacy systems. Additionally, as threats evolve we must ensure our communications pathways also evolve.
“Our nation’s industrial base engineers figured out extremely robust methods of nuclear communications when these systems were fielded. Looking at the overall command and control [NC2], and then the NC3 communications pathways, any new systems that we introduce must be sustainable, scalable and modular.”
The U.S. nuclear enterprise is facing greater threats than ever with adversaries challenging U.S. nuclear infrastructure in multiple domains: space, cyber, ground, air. Because of this, NC3 demands a continuous process of improvement.
Going forward, the NC3 enterprise will likely need to integrate upgraded proven legacy systems with all-new technology. “Sometimes the physics of radio waves may dictate the need for a legacy approach with upgraded systems, such as communicating with a submarine that’s very deep in the ocean.”
Golden’s view is that NC3 requires a layered, open architecture approach as modernization is evaluated. “Applying those same physics and then adding new layers such as artificial intelligence may determine a better way of doing things.”
Golden points to the SNC-led E-4C SAOC program as a clear example of critical NC3 modernization, while emphasizing that the NC2 mission is far from being the primary role of the E-4B and its forthcoming successor. “Nuclear command and control is only a fraction of what the current NAOC does and what the future SAOC will do for our nation and our allies and partners.”
The E-4B initially featured just a handful of communications systems, which have grown over time, leading to what Golden calls the “King Kong” of communication capabilities today. The E-4 is not a battlefield communications platform, its mantra is all about supporting Presidential-level requirements across the board. It does possess an extensive NC3 suite, but it also serves the White House Communications Agency (WHCA) and the Department of Homeland Security, through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), in many other crisis roles. Another mission the E-4B fleet performs is to safely transport the Secretary of War on trips within the United States and abroad.
The E-4B NAOC and Looking Glass are two complementary tiers of the same survivable architecture. The NAOC (and future SAOC) is designed to anchor national-level decision-making and government continuity from the very top, while Looking Glass provides USSTRATCOM with the dedicated airborne command and battle-management capacity required to direct forces. Both roles are critical and non-negotiable.
“The new E-4C SAOC, like the E-4B before it, will deliver an expansive communications suite and increased capacity supported by a larger fleet,” Golden explains. “SAOC is built to ensure the President and national leadership can direct the entire country through any crisis. Looking Glass supports an equally vital and highly specialized mission. It is dedicated to USSTRATCOM’s operational needs, connecting directly to bombers, ICBMs and submarines. Attempting to merge these unique missions on a single airframe would compromise the unique, essential role that each was created to perform.”
The Looking Glass role and the platform that fulfills it is not classified as a national-level mission. As Golden alluded to earlier, it’s not assigned to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs or to the Secretary of War. It’s exclusively assigned to USSTRATCOM; however, without the Looking Glass mission being upgraded soon, America has a gaping hole in its nuclear architecture.
The commander of USSTRATCOM is the customer and ultimately the decision-maker when it comes to Looking Glass-Next, and the USAF has been tasked by the Secretary of War to develop and field it. SNC is looking at several options for the requirement, with some sort of air platform at its core, which Golden refers to as an “E-6C.” He endorses that the current E-6B is one of the “cogs in the wheel that has to be replaced,” but adds that this doesn’t mean the next-generation Looking Glass is just an aircraft.
“At SNC, we have significant expertise and experience with mission system integration,” says Golden, adding that SNC is evaluating what he calls “aggressively creative options,” for the modernization requirement. He further noted that the modern threat is driving a requirement for Looking Glass-Next to be very difficult to target and must be dispersed.
“Having an aircraft as the only option for this USSTRATCOM mission is a legacy mindset,” Golden states. “We have advanced multi-domain capabilities, including numerous space capabilities available through the Sierra Space Corporation. Future mission resilience requires a creative and integrated approach.”
“We believe a creative approach to provide NC3 options will ensure a robust, reliable, survivable and cost-effective solution.”
Golden endorses this approach to creativity and development and indicated that SNC will continue to inform and respond to the ongoing Looking Glass-Next requests for information that may result in a future program.
“SNC has leaned heavily into the nuclear command, control, and communications architecture and it’s a natural fit for us, building on our work with the Department of War and our subcontractors on the E-4C SAOC. Our Looking Glass-Next responses and inputs will leverage relevant work and experience gained from SAOC, but we are also focused on being creative. We’re small enough to be agile, but big enough to deliver. That’s why we think we’re very well positioned in the NC3 space.”
The majority of SNC’s work on the E-4C SAOC is being completed at the NC3 Center of Excellence, housed in the Aviation Innovation and Technology Center (AITC) in Dayton, Ohio.
Golden believes the timing couldn’t be better to deliver bold and creative NC3 solutions. “The USAF is already asking the right questions, and industry is really able to innovate, which will result in a transformational era for nuclear command, control and communications.”
The post U.S. Nuclear Control Mission Could Dramatically Evolve Under Looking Glass-Next appeared first on TWZ.
Acredito que a vida adulta te coloca algumas provações inusitadas, como descobrir que detergente virou bebida de maluco negacionista e que o papel higiênico não se desenrola sozinho — a não ser quando seu gato faz picadinho dele numa madrugada qualquer.
Existem outras, claro, tão banais, como ir à lavanderia. Eu estou nessa prática há pouco tempo e percebi como esse ecossistema úmido é repleto de armadilhas sociológicas.
A lavanderia é um lugar onde a intimidade alheia se expõe, rodopiando a mil rotações por minuto, atrás de um vidro embaçado. Foi numa dessas incursões, armado com um cesto de roupas sujas e a ingenuidade de um novato, que o destino me pregou uma peça.
Recolhi minhas roupas da secadora e dobrei tudo com a pressa de quem quer voltar ao sofá. Ao organizar as gavetas, notei uma intrusa. Uma cueca vermelha. Não um vermelho discreto. Era um vermelho vibrante, quase radioativo, um vermelho que gritava “eu não tenho medo de desbotar na lavagem”.
Eu não tenho cuecas vermelhas. Minhas gavetas são um monótono degradê de cinza, preto e azul-marinho, o uniforme padrão da melancolia masculina urbana. Aquela peça rubra era um alienígena no meu guarda-roupa. Fiquei imaginando quem seria o dono e o que aquela cueca teria vivido.
Pensei em levar de volta. “Amanhã eu desço e deixo no balcão”, prometi. Mas o amanhã não chegou. A cueca vermelha ficou ali, no cesto de roupa suja, me encarando com toda a sua ousadia escarlate toda vez que eu me aproximava.
Semanas se passaram e a cueca foi soterrada por outras peças. Chegou o dia de lavar roupa novamente. No piloto automático, peguei tudo no cesto, desci, lavei, sequei, subi. Quando fui guardar… lá estava ela. Eu a havia lavado de novo. Avisei a Alexa para anotar o recado e me lembrar no dia seguinte. “Devolver a cueca”.
Por um momento, eu não só a tinha sequestrado, como também a mantinha num regime bizarro de cativeiro com pensão completa. Ela tinha dono e não era eu. Senti um misto de culpa e absurdo. E, por algum motivo besta, tinha nojinho dela.
Decidi que daria um fim naquilo. Um assassinato de algodão. Mas hesitei. Vai que o cara é apegado? A cueca já tinha ganhado status de entidade na minha casa.
Na vez seguinte em que desci à lavanderia, a maldita estava na minha sacola, pronta para ser devolvida. Enquanto a máquina girava, sentei-me e abri um livro, tentando fingir que não carregava a roupa íntima de um estranho no bolso. Fiquei sem jeito de colocar a danada na bancada porque havia mais gente.
Não é qualquer gente, é dessas que puxam assunto na lavanderia. Elas existem. Foi quando um rapaz deu início ao papo. Falamos do tempo, do síndico, da inflação do sabão. Amenidades. A conversa fluiu para o futebol. Ele suspirou pesado e, com a naturalidade de quem confessa um pecado, soltou:
— Pra piorar, perdi minha cueca da sorte aqui faz um mês. Sou flamenguista. Tinha uma cueca vermelha que eu só usava no dia de clássico. Sumiu na secadora. Sem ela, o Mengão perdeu o último jogo.
Eu, são-paulino desde o berço, congelei. A mão, que instintivamente tinha ido ao bolso, parou no meio do caminho. O tecido vermelho pareceu queimar meus dedos.
Olhei para o rapaz. Ele tinha um olhar triste, de quem acreditava que o time dependia daquela peça íntima. Pensei no meu Tricolor lutando no campeonato e nas minhas próprias mandingas de torcedor. Pensei no Flamengo. Pensei na cueca vermelha, limpinha, amaciada com lavanda, refém no meu bolso esquerdo.
Fiz o que qualquer homem ético e apaixonado por futebol faria naquela situação.
Fiquei em absoluto silêncio.
— Puxa, cara… que chato — lamentei, com a voz embargada por uma solidariedade falsa. — A máquina sempre come alguma coisa — consolei.
Ele assentiu, resignado. Recolheu suas roupas e saiu com sua sacola, levando consigo a esperança do seu time. E eu fiquei ali, com a cueca no bolso. Já sozinho, a depositei no balcão, olhando para os lados, e resolvi escrever um bilhete de improviso.
— Pertence a um flamenguista. Favor respeitar. Ele voltará.
Voltei para o apartamento satisfeito. Tirei as roupas da sacola, dobrei com cuidado e guardei. Para minha surpresa, e revolta, agora havia uma meia. Apenas o pé direito, daquelas estampadas com capivaras usando óculos escuros.
— “Não é possível”, pensei.
Levantei a meia contra a luz para observar melhor a capivara com seus óculos de lacração tug life. Se o Flamengo perdeu o jogo por causa da cueca, o que será que estava em jogo com aquela meia de capivara? Pelo sim, pelo não, passei a calçar a meia para ver os jogos do São Paulo. Passado um tempo, a conclusão: se o universo estava tentando me dar uma vantagem, definitivamente não funcionou.
With no secondary school in the southern half of the Isle of Mull, children must leave home for the mainland at the age of eleven, living in a youth hostel during the school week. It’s a system that has existed for generations—but what does sending children away so young do to a community? Fernando Pinho gently follows the families who must navigate this rite of passage, and explores the political decisions that have kept this structure in place.
You know that Monday morning dread, she said, when you hate your job and you can’t face going back? The children get that on a Sunday.
Sunday is the day of washing, drying and ironing, because the clothes that came home on Friday have to be packed again for Monday. And then the bag sits at the bottom of the stairs. You come down, and you see it, she said, and it’s this little reminder of what’s coming.
Sometimes there’s an invitation, a barbecue at someone’s house, all of them welcome, just a couple of hours, you’ll be home in time. But her son doesn’t want to leave the house on a Sunday, and she won’t leave him. How do I say I can’t go, she told me.
Stormy Morse lost two partners to gun suicide. She didn’t know that the second one, Lewis Tabler, had made the National Rifle Association the beneficiary of his retirement savings through its planned-giving program. In this feature, co-published with The New Yorker, Mike Spies describes what happens when the NRA, which has long denied a connection between access to guns and suicide rates, comes to collect:
Fisher, the NRA’s planned-giving director … e-mailed Applied Industrial, pointing out that Tabler had been dead for two months, and that “accounts with properly designated beneficiaries” are “generally available for distribution within 7–10 business days.” He went on, “We want to do whatever is needed to make this a smooth process.”
Meanwhile, multiple debt collectors had filed claims against Tabler’s estate, and the register of wills informed Stormy that she also owed an inheritance tax, since she was now the sole owner of the home.
As a favor, a neighbor of Stormy’s who was a lawyer spoke to the NRA’s assistant general counsel, Sarah Gervase, on her behalf. The neighbor raised the possibility that the organization might give up some of the money, according to Gervase, who recounted the exchange in an e-mail with Applied Industrial in early June. Gervase wrote that she “informed” Stormy’s neighbor that the “NRA is not willing to settle this.” Tabler’s cause of death did not seem to have any bearing on the organization’s position.
A 4-year-old boy has been drown in the swimming pool of a beach bar on the island of Paros on Saturday. The boy was alone in the pool area as the parents were swimming in the sea and had no visual contact with their child. Although the boy was struggling in the water of the […]
The post 4-year-old boy drowns in beach bar pool on Paros island appeared first on Keep Talking Greece.
Login
