The imposition of emergency rule in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, an opposition-controlled province, raises disturbing questions about the relationship between Pakistan’s civilian government and its powerful military establishment. Is this a legitimate response to terrorism, or another calculated assault on democracy?

There is an old saying in Pakistan that most countries have an army, but in Pakistan the army has a country. It is a cynical observation, certainly, but one that has survived successive governments, constitutional crises and military interventions with remarkable durability.

The latest developments in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the northwestern province governed by the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party of imprisoned former Prime Minister Imran Khan, suggest that the observation may be as relevant today as ever.

President Asif Ali Zardari’s decision to impose emergency rule in the province, ostensibly in response to deteriorating security conditions, has prompted an obvious and deeply uncomfortable question: is Pakistan witnessing another military coup, albeit one conducted without tanks surrounding parliament or generals appearing on television to announce the suspension of democracy?

The answer depends largely upon how one defines a coup.

A constitutional manoeuvre with political consequences

Under Pakistan’s constitutional framework, federal authorities possess emergency powers that can, under specified circumstances, override provincial administrations.

Such powers are not inherently illegitimate. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has experienced serious violence involving the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and the federal government has a responsibility to protect citizens against terrorist attacks.

Nevertheless, the timing of the intervention demands scrutiny.

The province represents one of the most significant remaining political strongholds of Imran Khan, whose imprisonment and continuing confrontation with Pakistan’s political establishment have generated considerable unrest.

Suspending an elected provincial administration in these circumstances inevitably raises suspicions that national security has become a convenient instrument for achieving political objectives.

The crucial distinction is between responding to a genuine emergency and exploiting that emergency to neutralise an inconvenient opposition.

Pakistan’s authorities must demonstrate not merely that a security threat exists, but that the removal of elected provincial leadership is necessary and proportionate.

The army that never really left politics

Pakistan’s military has exercised an extraordinary degree of influence over the country’s political development since independence in 1947.

General Ayub Khan seized power in 1958. General Zia-ul-Haq overthrew Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s government in 1977. General Pervez Musharraf removed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in 1999.

These were unmistakable military coups, involving direct intervention against civilian authority.

Yet Pakistan’s experience also demonstrates that generals need not formally assume the presidency to dominate political affairs. The military establishment has long maintained substantial influence over national security, relations with India, Afghanistan policy and, at various moments, the composition and survival of civilian governments.

Under Field Marshal Asim Munir, the relationship between the armed forces and civilian political authority has again attracted intense scrutiny. The central question is therefore not simply whether Pakistan’s generals have seized power. It is whether elected politicians retain sufficient independence to exercise it.

Imran Khan and the price of political defiance

Imran Khan’s political trajectory illustrates the extraordinary volatility of Pakistan’s relationship between civilian leadership and military power.

Once widely regarded as enjoying the establishment’s favour, Khan subsequently became one of its most prominent critics. His removal through a parliamentary no-confidence vote in April 2022 marked the beginning of an increasingly bitter confrontation.

His subsequent imprisonment, the prosecution of PTI figures and restrictions affecting the party’s political activities have fuelled allegations that Pakistan’s democratic institutions are being manipulated to exclude a popular opposition movement.

The authorities reject accusations of politically motivated persecution, while Khan’s supporters insist that his treatment demonstrates the extent to which democratic competition has been compromised.

Against this background, emergency intervention in a PTI-governed province cannot reasonably be viewed in isolation. It forms part of a wider struggle over who ultimately controls Pakistan’s political future.

A coup without the traditional trappings?

The latest emergency is particularly significant because Pakistan’s civilian government and military leadership appear aligned in their criticism of PTI.

According to Reuters reporting on 11 October, the province will be administered by a governor for an initial six months, with troops deployed to support security operations.

Hundreds of activists and three of Khan’s sisters have reportedly been detained ahead of opposition demonstrations.

PTI spokesperson Zulfikar Bukhari has characterised the emergency as a disguised coup. Even Maulana Fazlur Rehman, whose party has been involved in mediation efforts, condemned the intervention as an attack on democracy.

Yet evidence that the military directly ordered the takeover remains absent from the public record. Accusations of military involvement should be investigated rather than treated as established fact.

Nevertheless, a coup need not always involve soldiers removing a prime minister. Democratic institutions can also be progressively hollowed out through ostensibly lawful decisions that concentrate authority and deprive opposition parties of meaningful power.

A dangerous precedent for Pakistan

For Pakistan’s international partners, including the European Union, the implications extend beyond an internal constitutional dispute.

Pakistan benefits from preferential access to European markets under the EU’s GSP+ trading arrangement, which is linked to commitments concerning human rights, democratic governance and international conventions. Brussels should therefore be watching developments closely.

If emergency powers become a mechanism for suppressing political opposition rather than protecting public security, the European Commission will face legitimate questions about Pakistan’s adherence to its international obligations.

The immediate crisis may not constitute a conventional military coup. But the more troubling possibility is that Pakistan’s political system is evolving towards a form of government in which elections continue, civilian politicians remain in office, and the military’s influence is sufficiently powerful to determine the boundaries of democracy.

For Imran Khan‘s supporters, that distinction may offer little consolation.

Pakistan’s generals have seized power openly before. The question now is whether they need to do so again.

Geneva side event sharpens focus on Pakistan’s GSP+ status and rights record

Saudi Arabia is desperately trying to reverse its losses on the ground in the Yemeni conflict, while Houthi attacks reach its airports and threaten its oil trade. Yet the coalition Riyadh has assembled does not match the war it wants to fight. Washington is engaged in the conflict with Iran, Turkey excludes offensive deployments, and Pakistan draws the line at crossing into Yemen. The kingdom has foreign support, but the burden of recovering and holding territory still falls on its weakened Yemeni partners.

Retreat Before the Counteroffensive

By early October 2026, Riyadh was responding to a deteriorating military position. The Houthis’ September advance along Yemen’s western coast brought the loss of Mokha and strategic positions around Bab el-Mandeb. These setbacks exposed the weakness of Saudi-backed forces and strengthened the Houthis’ leverage over a shipping route increasingly important to Saudi oil exports.

The renewed Saudi–Houthi escalation began with the July 13, 2026, strike on Sanaa airport’s runway. Saudi aircraft sought to prevent an Iranian Mahan Air flight carrying a senior Houthi delegation from landing without coalition permission. The plane later landed in Hodeida after Omani mediation, but the Houthis retaliated against Abha airport and subsequently announced a blockade on Saudi shipping. The strike broke the relative calm established by the 2022 truce; September’s coastal offensive then turned the confrontation into a major territorial setback for Riyadh’s partners.

The retreat exposed divisions within the anti-Houthi camp. Saudi–Emirati cooperation had broken down, and the withdrawal of the UAE left command arrangements that Riyadh failed to replace effectively. The factions expected to carry the offensive remained divided and poorly prepared for a sustained campaign. Saudi airpower could not compensate for the absence of a coherent local force.

The cost is also being felt inside Saudi Arabia. The October 10, 2026, attack on Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport killed 12 people and wounded 309, according to Saudi authorities, and temporarily suspended operations. Riyadh blamed the Houthis, who renewed their warning against using Saudi airports and airspace on October 11. Airport disruption, cancelled flights and attacks on oil facilities bring the economic consequences of the war directly into the kingdom. The Saudi air campaign has not secured its civilian infrastructure.

Operation Dawn of Yemen began on October 5, 2026, after Saudi-backed Yemeni leader Rashad al-Alimi announced military action the previous day. The immediate objective was to recover the coastal positions lost in September, alongside the Saudi-backed Yemeni government’s broader ambition to restore its authority over Houthi-held territory. On October 11, the coalition announced the destruction of 136 military targets in a large-scale operation. That tally says little about whether Saudi-backed units can hold territory, secure supply routes or reopen shipping lanes.

Houthi footage released October 10, 2026: Shawaz drone strikes on Saudi-backed forces in Kahbub and Al-Waziya, as presented by the movement’s military media

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Why Taiz Matters

The counteroffensive has produced conflicting accounts of control on the coast. On October 9, 2026, Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to Yemen announced that Bab el-Mandeb and Mayun Island had been cleared of Houthi forces. The Houthis maintained that they still held those positions. Control of the waterway remains contested, despite Riyadh’s announcements of success.

Taiz adds another strain after the coastal setbacks. Pressure on its approaches threatens supply routes and forces Saudi-backed units to divide their effort between the inland front and the Red Sea coast. The Houthis can disrupt their opponents’ counteroffensive without winning every coastal engagement: sustained pressure inland prevents those opponents from concentrating their forces. Saudi airpower does not resolve the fragmentation of the Saudi-backed Yemeni forces expected to hold the ground.

Houthi military footage released October 10, 2026: the movement presents advances and the surrender of opposing fighters in Sami, As-Silw and Al-Mawasit, Taiz province. The fighting places further pressure on the ground forces on which Riyadh’s campaign depends

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The Iran War Narrows Saudi Options

The US–Israeli war with Iran, which began in February 2026, has expanded the military demands on Washington. Regional deployments, shipping protection and operations against Iran compete with Saudi requests for a larger American role in Yemen. Riyadh cannot assume that American support will expand on its terms. Its dependence on outside assistance has grown at the same time as the regional war has made that assistance more conditional.

The Iran war compounds Saudi Arabia’s vulnerability. Disruption at Hormuz has increased Riyadh’s dependence on its westbound pipeline and Red Sea ports. Southbound cargoes from Yanbu must pass Bab el-Mandeb; northbound exports follow a different route. Moving crude across the peninsula bypasses Hormuz, but it does not remove the threat to shipping off Yemen.

Pressure at Bab el-Mandeb gives Iran an additional advantage while the Houthis gain territory and bargaining power of their own. Their overlapping interests put Riyadh under pressure on two fronts. A Washington–Tehran agreement would not automatically end the war in Yemen: the Houthis have their own territorial, political and economic demands.

Washington is already involved through military advisers, intelligence and targeting support. The issue is the extent of that involvement, not American neutrality. Earlier in October 2026, Trump rejected Saudi requests for direct strikes; after the Riyadh airport attack, he said the United States might join them. Riyadh still lacks a firm American commitment to the wider offensive. Its requests compete with Washington’s military operations and priorities in the Iran war.

Allies Draw Their Own Lines

Riyadh’s response is to widen its support network through the Mecca pact, signed with Turkey and Pakistan on August 7, 2026, and activated on October 5. But an agreement to defend Saudi Arabia is not an agreement to win its war in Yemen. Pakistan’s military presence and Turkey’s technical, intelligence and air-defense assistance address the kingdom’s security without supplying a joint ground campaign across the border.

The alliance has a secretary-general, retired Pakistani general Nauman Mahmood, but its detailed force-generation timetable, operational command arrangements, cost-sharing formula and mission duration remain unpublished. On October 8, 2026, Ankara excluded offensive operations while parliamentary ratification was pending. On October 9, Islamabad confirmed a substantial military presence in the kingdom but ruled out crossing into Yemen to attack the Houthis. Riyadh is obtaining defensive commitments, not a combined expeditionary army.

Pakistan’s decision-making has also shifted. In 2015, parliament unanimously rejected participation in the Yemen war while promising to defend Saudi territory and holy sites. In October 2026, reinforcement commitments are proceeding without a parliamentary vote. The government says it followed the necessary procedures. The political result is a narrower domestic debate over a commitment that could draw Pakistan further into the conflict.

Fewer political checks make deployments easier to authorize and harder to reconsider once costs and casualties accumulate. Pakistan’s own security pressures add another burden: the October 11, 2026, emergency in opposition-run Khyber Pakhtunkhwa coincides with its commitments to Saudi Arabia. Islamabad is extending support abroad while managing a deepening confrontation at home.

Saudi-led coalition footage, October 9, 2026: the coalition announces strikes on three Houthi missile launchers. The continuing attacks inside Saudi Arabia expose the limits of destroying individual launch sites

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Defensive support can still sustain the offensive by freeing Saudi assets for use in Yemen. France’s support for the defense of Yanbu and Britain’s refueling assistance contribute to that effort. But none of this repairs the weakness of Riyadh’s Yemeni ground forces. Pakistan also has its border with Iran and its mediation role to consider, while Turkey keeps its commitment separate from offensive operations. Each partner sets limits according to its own interests.

Different Interests, No Shared Victory

Pakistan’s proposed $1.21 billion IMF disbursement awaits board approval. Turkey’s September 2026 inflation was 29.73%, with its policy rate at 37%. Both face financial pressures that favor limited missions over an open-ended expedition. Who pays for the current assistance remains undisclosed.

Saudi Arabia’s updated deficit forecast is 4.9% of GDP. September 2026’s non-oil purchasing managers’ index stood at 55.3, indicating expansion before the latest escalation. The airport attacks and disruption to transport now place that activity under additional pressure. Riyadh must finance the campaign while protecting the infrastructure and trade on which its wider economic plans depend.

The Houthis are using that pressure to advance their negotiating demands. On October 10, 2026, the Houthi authorities proposed reciprocal exclusion of airports, ports and other humanitarian infrastructure from blockade and attack. The proposal seeks to exchange limits on disruption for concessions over access and blockade. It puts the economic consequences of continued fighting at the center of the bargaining.

The conflict of interests runs through the entire coalition. Riyadh wants to reverse Houthi gains and protect Saudi infrastructure. The Saudi-backed Yemeni government wants to restore its authority. Turkey and Pakistan seek bounded commitments, and Washington calculates its involvement against the Iran war. The Houthis seek concessions while preserving their military leverage. A common adversary has not produced an agreed objective or a shared willingness to bear the cost.

Saudi Arabia therefore has partners willing to help defend the kingdom, but those partners have made no common commitment to reverse Riyadh’s setbacks in Yemen or sustain the ground campaign of the Saudi-backed Yemeni government. That is the gap behind the coalition’s announcements and strike tallies. Without stronger local forces and a political settlement addressing shipping, attacks and access, additional foreign support can prolong the campaign without resolving it. Riyadh risks remaining surrounded by allies while carrying a war none of them has agreed to finish.

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MORE ON THE TOPIC:

• Houthis Claim Key Taiz District as Pressure Tightens on Provincial Capital (Videos)
• Military Situation In Yemen On October 11, 2026 (Map Update)
• Houthis Strike Riyadh Airport Again, Claim Hits on Saudi Oil and Gas Facilities (Videos)

The post Saudi Arabia Has Allies. But Who Will Fight Its War in Yemen? appeared first on South Front.

In a world of shifting alliances, Pakistan must balance strategic partnerships with national interests — and the key question is whether the Makkah Pact will become a tool of strategic autonomy or another form of dependence. In recent years, the world has seen an unprecedented shift in global alliances. According to the realist school of […]

Il titolo definitivo dell’intera vicenda, tuttavia, è che la Casa dei Saud sta attaccando Ansarallah per proteggere il culto della morte in Asia occidentale

Segue nostro Telegram.

Cominciamo con alcune informazioni esclusive. Giovedì, Yahya Ali al-Ra’i, presidente della Camera dei Rappresentanti con sede a Sana’a sotto il controllo di Ansarallah, ha consegnato una lettera a Sardar Ayaz Sadiq, presidente dell’Assemblea Nazionale del Pakistan, richiedendo la mediazione pakistana tra Ansarallah e Riyadh.

Ra’i, figura ampiamente rispettata, ricopre la carica di presidente a Sana’a dal 2008. Sadiq ha iniziato il suo attuale mandato come presidente a Islamabad nel marzo 2024. Questo canale parlamentare diretto riveste un’enorme importanza come apertura diplomatica – poiché il Pakistan si trova ad affrontare enormi pressioni, sia a livello interno che in tutto il mondo islamico, riguardo ai suoi reali impegni relativi allo scontro tra Arabia Saudita e Yemen, come stabilito dall’Alleanza per la Difesa della Mecca.

Per quanto l’intera situazione sia in realtà oscura, informazioni dirette provenienti sia da Islamabad che da Teheran, ai massimi livelli, come da me specificatamente richiesto, hanno stabilito quattro punti chiave: Sembra che sia così – per ora.

Islamabad è irremovibile nel sostenere che il Pakistan non attaccherà Ansarallah e non impiegherà truppe a tal fine. L’intesa raggiunta a Riyadh la scorsa settimana escludeva l’ingresso nel territorio yemenita. Le forze pakistane dovrebbero rimanere al di fuori di qualsiasi offensiva terrestre contro Ansarallah.

Il Pakistan stava già mediando tra Riyadh e Sana’a attraverso Teheran. Il feldmaresciallo Asim Munir ha personalmente richiesto al ministro degli Esteri iraniano Araghchi di esercitare l’influenza dell’Iran su Ansarallah, avvalendosi dei contatti di Araghchi sia con Islamabad che con Riyadh. Il Ministero degli Esteri pakistano non ha smentito l’esistenza di questo canale diplomatico.

Il Pakistan sarebbe tenuto a difendere il territorio saudita in virtù dei propri impegni nell’ambito dell’Alleanza per la Difesa della Mecca. I dispiegamenti finalizzati alla protezione dei confini e alla difesa contro droni e missili lanciati dalle Forze Armate yemenite rientrano in questo quadro. Il problema è se alcuni consiglieri pakistani siano già dispiegati in territorio yemenita. Se il Pakistan avesse anche solo pochi «consiglieri» ad Aden e truppe da qualche parte nel nord dello Yemen, al confine con l’Arabia Saudita, ciò costituirebbe già una violazione delle sue promesse.

Le forze pakistane dovrebbero essere in grado di difendersi da sole – è una conseguenza naturale del territorio. Si tratta di una contingenza dichiarata; non di una previsione di ritorsione. Almeno un ufficiale pakistano è stato ucciso in Arabia Saudita senza che il Pakistan reagisse con una ritorsione. Ciò denota moderazione – almeno per ora.

Transito attraverso lo Stretto di Hormuz: utilizzare il CIPS e pagare in rial

Sul più ampio fronte USA-Iran, le mosse diplomatiche confermano quanto abbiamo riportato negli ultimi giorni riguardo al Protocollo di Transizione. Il Pakistan, infatti, è determinato a mantenere i rapporti sia con Riyadh che con Teheran, parallelamente a un coordinamento costante con Pechino. Dopotutto, la Cina sostiene pienamente la mediazione pakistana; e Araghchi continua a dialogare con Munir, come ha fatto in seguito ai colloqui con Wang Yi a Pechino.

Nel frattempo, sul fronte di Washington, le speculazioni sono febbrili su tutta la linea riguardo ai preparativi per una ripresa della guerra da parte dell’amministrazione Trump – compresi potenziali attacchi alle infrastrutture energetiche iraniane e persino, cosa piuttosto preoccupante, a obiettivi nucleari. Non vi è ancora alcuna decisione definitiva da parte dello «psicopatico/sociopatico al comando», tanto meno una data di avvio.

I rischi immediati, in ogni caso, sono sbalorditivi.

La diplomazia – anche nella sua forma surrogata – è impantanata in un vicolo cieco. Teheran rimane – e continuerà a rimanere – ancorata alle proprie condizioni attuali, specificate nel memorandum d’intesa ormai privo di significato, ma ora con l’aggiunta della minaccia di bloccare le rotte di transito lungo la costa dell’Oman che considera illegali. Washington, dal canto suo, è ossessionata dall’ottenere vaste concessioni in materia nucleare. All’inizio di questa settimana, abbiamo confermato che il Consiglio Supremo di Sicurezza Nazionale (SNSC) di Teheran ha preso due decisioni di grande rilevanza.

1. Teheran ha deciso di riscuotere il pedaggio di transito nello Stretto di Hormuz esclusivamente in valuta iraniana. Niente yuan, niente criptovalute. In realtà, tramite un meccanismo collegato al CIPS, il sistema cinese di pagamento e compensazione, aggirando il dollaro statunitense. Si utilizza il CIPS per acquistare elettronicamente yuan, convertirli in rial e pagare il pedaggio. Le entrate derivanti dal transito nello Stretto di Hormuz, dopotutto, rappresentano una delle poche fonti di valuta forte rimaste a Teheran. Il nuovo meccanismo rafforzerà sicuramente il valore del rial.
2. Attraverso il Pakistan, Teheran ha comunicato a Witkoff, il «Bismarck» del settore immobiliare di Trump, che l’Iran non si smuoverà di un millimetro dalle proprie condizioni per un accordo negoziato – ed è pienamente preparato a qualsiasi possibile offensiva statunitense. E questo dopo che J.D. Vance ha avanzato un’ulteriore condizione sull’arricchimento nucleare: una riduzione «significativa» e «sostanziale». Ciò blocca il dossier nucleare e rende quasi impossibile una formula di risoluzione rapida.

Il punto fondamentale è che la spirale di escalation potrebbe sfuggire al controllo in un batter d’occhio.

La “Tempesta yemenita in arrivo 1.0” è già in atto

Sul fronte saudita-yemenita, le Forze Armate yemenite si stanno dimostrando assolutamente spietate. La “Tempesta yemenita in arrivo 1.0” è già in atto.

I danni alla raffineria di Jeddah, vicino a Yanbu, sono ingenti. Ansarallah sta colpendo contemporaneamente la costa orientale e quella occidentale dell’Arabia Saudita, oltre all’oleodotto est-ovest che le collega.

A tutti gli effetti, Sana’a sta prendendo di mira l’intera infrastruttura chiave di Riyadh. Il «paracadute» difensivo statunitense è una farsa: le batterie PAC-3 e Patriot rimaste sono inutili contro i missili balistici yemeniti.

Le truppe saudite potrebbero ammontare, nella migliore delle ipotesi, a 75.000 unità, più 125.000 della Guardia Nazionale. Le Forze Armate yemenite dispongono di almeno 350.000 uomini, che possono essere facilmente portati a 800.000. Aspettarsi un «aiuto» dai petrol-sceicchi del CCG non è nemmeno degno di essere definito uno scherzo.

Le Forze Armate yemenite hanno inoltre lanciato due missili balistici e droni esplosivi in direzione dell’aeroporto internazionale di Aden. Ansarallah ha dichiarato che l’obiettivo erano i rifornimenti militari sauditi appena giunti al Campo di Badr, il quartier generale dei mercenari adiacente all’aeroporto. È stato ucciso un numero non specificato di ufficiali e funzionari sauditi di alto rango – forse anche alcuni pakistani.

Da parte sua, anche la Turchia sta per schierare truppe, velivoli e sistemi di difesa aerea sul territorio saudita. Queste forze turche potrebbero, in teoria, proteggere Riyadh, le città sante e l’oleodotto Est-Ovest. Ankara, proprio come Islamabad, insiste nel sostenere di non avere alcuna intenzione di entrare in guerra nello Yemen.

La rapida liberazione da parte delle Forze Armate yemenite della costa occidentale vicino al Mar Rosso ha inoltre reso chiarissimo come la cosiddetta «coalizione» saudita – in realtà una banda di proxy e mercenari – stesse schierando di fatto dei terroristi fin dall’inizio.

Ansarallah ha recuperato una grande quantità di passaporti stranieri – in particolare provenienti dal Kuwait, dal Qatar, dalla Turchia e dalla Siria – appartenenti a sicari dell’ISIS e di Al-Qaeda. Chiamatela pure la Legione della Terror Inc.

È sempre la solita storia. Il Qatar e la Turchia, di comune accordo, hanno strumentalizzato il trasferimento di miliziani dell’ISIS e dei salafiti-jihadisti dalla Siria e dall’Iraq: questi sono stati accolti nello Yemen dal Partito Islah. La Turchia è stata la principale via di transito; almeno 2.100 di questi membri dell’ISIS sono turchi.

AQAP è tornata! Già nel lontano 2020, Ansarallah aveva sequestrato documenti, mappe e video che mostravano jihadisti dell’ISIS/Daesh e di Al-Qaeda, direttamente sostenuti da Riyadh, mentre vagavano per lo Yemen, con i miliziani catturati che confessavano di essere stati pagati, armati e sostenuti logisticamente dai sauditi.Ora è già in atto una nuova incarnazione dell’ex Al-Qaeda nella Penisola Arabica (AQAP) – attraverso almeno 20.000 mercenari terroristi del Daesh/takfiri “importati” dalla Siria. Essi saranno inviati nel governatorato di Aden – in seguito alla richiesta, anzi alla pretesa dello stesso MbS, pienamente approvata dall’amministrazione Trump e dal suo vassallo tagliagole diventato presidente a Damasco, l’ex membro dell’ISIS al-Jolani.

Il titolo definitivo dell’intera vicenda, tuttavia, è che la Casa dei Saud sta attaccando Ansarallah per proteggere il culto della morte in Asia occidentale. Controllando Bab al-Mandab, Ansarallah isola di fatto il porto israeliano di Eilat. Ciò era già accaduto in precedenza durante il genocidio di Gaza. Riyadh era furiosa perché aveva stretto accordi per il progetto NEOM – ora praticamente accantonato – che avrebbe collegato Eilat una volta che gli Accordi di Abramo trumpiani fossero entrati in vigore. Considerando il quadro d’insieme, una singola scintilla potrebbe ancora scatenare l’inferno. Tra le possibilità figurano: un attacco yemenita contro l’Arabia Saudita che causi ingenti perdite; un caos nella riscossione dei pedaggi nello Stretto di Ormuz; un attacco iraniano contro un obiettivo legato ai «petro-sceicchi» del CCG, a seguito di una provocazione americana; un attacco legato all’Iran contro una base statunitense, ancora una volta a seguito di una provocazione americana; e, soprattutto, una (dis)avventura del CENTCOM «via terra, aria e mare» imposta da un sociopatico.

Allacciate le cinture di sicurezza.

The House of Saud is attacking Ansarallah to protect the death cult in West Asia, Pepe Escobar writes.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

Let’s start with exclusive intel. On Thursday, Yahya Ali al-Ra’i, speaker of the Sana’a-based House of Representatives under Ansarallah, delivered a letter to Sardar Ayaz Sadiq, the speaker of Pakistan’s National Assembly, requesting Pakistani mediation between Ansarallah and Riyadh.

Ra’i, widely respected, has been the speaker in Sana’s since 2008. Sadiq began his current term as speaker in Islamabad in March 2024. This direct parliamentary channel is immensely significant as a diplomatic opening – as Pakistan faces enormous pressure, domestically and across the lands of Islam, over its real commitments related to the Saudi Arabia vs. Yemen clash as determined by the Mecca Defense Alliance.

As murky as the the whole situation really is, direct intel from both Islamabad and Tehran, at the highest levels, as I especifically requested, has established four key points:

1. Islamabad is adamant that Pakistan will not attack Ansarallah and will not commit troops to that effect. The Riyadh understanding last week excluded entry into Yemeni territory. Pakistani forces should remain outside any ground offensives against Ansarallah. That seems to be the case – for now.
2. Pakistan was already mediating between Riyadh and Sana’a through Tehran. Field Marshal Asim Munir personallly requested that Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi use Iran’s influence with Ansarallah, together with Araghchi’s contacts with both Islamabad and Riyadh. Pakistan’s Foreign Office did not deny this diplomatic channel.
3. Pakistan would have to defend Saudi territory under its Mecca Defense Alliance commitments. Deployments for border protection and defense against drones and missiles launched by the Yemeni Armed Forces fit this pattern.The problem is whether some Pakistani advisors are already deployed in Yemeni territory. If Pakistan has even a few “advisers” in Aden and troops somewhere around northern Yemen on the Saudi border, that already betrays its promises.
4. Pakistani forces should be able to defend themselves – that comes with the territory. It’s a stated contingency; not a prediction of retaliation. At least one Pakistani officer was killed in Saudi Arabia without a Pakistani retaliatory response. That spells out restraint – at least for now.

Transiting Hormuz: use CIPS and pay in rials

On the wider U.S.-Iran front, diplomatic moves support what we have been reporting for the past few days on Transition Protocol. Pakistan in fact is desperate to maintain engagement with both Riyadh and Tehran, alongside non-stop coordination with Beijing. After all, China completely supports Pakistan mediation; and Araghchi keep speaking to Munir, as he did following talks with Wang Yi in Beijing.

Meanwhile, on the Washington front, speculation is feverish all over the spectrum over preparations for a Trump administration renewal of the war – including potential strikes on Iranian energy infrastructure and even, quite worrisomely, nuclear targets. There is no final decision yet by the Psycho/Sociopath in Charge, much less a launch date.

The immediate risks anyway are staggering.

Diplomacy – even in ersatz form – is mired in impasse. Tehran remains – and will continue to remain – anchored to its existing conditions, detailed by the dead cat MoU, but now carrying the threat of blocking transit routes along Oman’s coastline that it considers illegal. Washington for its part is obsessed with vast nuclear concessions.

Earlier this week, we confirmed that the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) in Tehran made two very consequential decisions.

1. Tehran decided to collect its Strait of Hormuz transit toll in Iranian currency only. No yuan, no crypto. Actually via a mechanism linked to CIPS, the Chinese payment/clearing system, bypassing the U.S. dollar. You use CIPS to electronically buy yuan, change it into rials, and pay the toll. Strait of Hormuz transit revenue after all is one of Tehran’s few remaining sources of hard currency. The new mechanism will definitely strengthen the value of the rial.
2. Via Pakistan, Tehran notified Trump’s real-estate Bismarck, Witkoff, that Iran will not move an inch from its conditions for a negotiated settlement – and is fully prepared for any possible U.S. offensive. And this after J.D. Vance came up with an added nuclear enrichment condition: a “meaningful” and “significant” reduction. That blockades the nuclear dossier and makes a quick resolution formula nearly impossible.

The bottom line is that the escalation ladder could get out of control in no time.

Coming Yemeni Storm 1.0 in effect

On the Saudi-Yemen front, the Yemeni Armed Forces are absolutely ruthless. The Coming Yemeni Storm 1.0 is already in effect.

The damage at Jeddah refinery, close to Yanbu, is massive. Ansarallah is simultaneously hitting Saudi Arabia’s eastern and coast and western coast, plus the East-West pipeline in between.

For all practical purposes Sana’a is going for the whole key Riyadh infrastructure. The U.S. defense umbrella is a joke: remaining PAC-3 and Patriot batteries are useless against Yemeni ballistic missiles.

Saudi troops may number at best 75,000, plus 125,000 from the National Guard. The Yemeni Armed Forces command at least 350,000 that can be easily ramped up to 800,000. To expect “help” from the GCC petrosheiks doesn’t even qualify as a joke.

The Yemeni Armed Forces also unleashed two ballistic missiles plus explosive drones in the direction of Aden’s international airport. Ansarallah said the target was Saudi military supplies that had just arrived at Badr Camp, the mercenary HQ adjacent to the airport. An unspecified number of high-ranking Saudi officers and officials – perhaps even some Pakistanis – were killed.

Turkey for its part is also about to put boots, aircraft and air defenses on Saudi ground. These Turkish forces in thesis could protect Riyadh, the holy cities and the East-West pipeline. Ankara, just like Islamabad, insists it has no plans to enter the war inside Yemen.

The swift liberation by the Yemeni Armed Forces of the western coast close to the Red Sea also made it crystal clear how the so-called Saudi “coalition” – actually a gang of proxies/mercenaries – was deploying de facto terrorists all along.

Ansarallah recovered a wealth of foreign passports – especially from Kuwait, Qatar, Turkey and Syria – belonging to ISIS and Al-Qaeda goons. Call it the Terror Inc. Legion.

I’ts the same old song. Qatar and Turkey, in sync, instrumentalized the transfer of ISIS/Salafi-jihadi goons from Syria and Iraq: they were welcomed in Yemen by the Islah Party. Turkey was the key transit route; at least 2,100 of these ISIS assets are Turkish.

AQAP is back!

Way back in 2020, Ansarallah had already seized documents, maps, and videos showing ISIS/Daesh and Al-Qaeda jihadis directly supported by Riyadh roaming Yemen, with captured goons confessing they were paid, weaponized and logistically supported by the Saudis.

Now a new incarnation of the former al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is alread in effect – via at least 20,000 Daesh/takfiri terror goons “imported” from Syria. They will be sent to Aden governorate – following the request, actually the demand by MbS himself, fully approved by the Trump administration and its throat-slitter vassal turned President in Damascus, former ISIS al-Jolani.

The definitive headline of the whole affair though is that the House of Saud is attacking Ansarallah to protect the death cult in West Asia.

By controlling the Bab al-Mandab, Ansarallah de facto cuts off the Israeli port of Eilat. That had already happened before during the genocide of Gaza. Riyadh was furious because they had struck deals for the – now virtually scrapped – NEOM project that would connect up to Eilat once the Trumpian Abraham Accords were up and running.

Considering the whole picture, all hell could still break loose due to a single spark. Possibilities include: a Yemeni strike on Saudi Arabia causing massive casualties; a toll-enforcement mess in the Strait of Hormuz; an Iranian strike on a GCC petro-sheikh target, following an American provocation; an Iran-linked attack on a U.S. base, once again folowing an American provocation; and most of all a Sociopath-forced “land, air and sea” CENTCOM (mis)adventure.

Fasten your seat belts.

Pakistan’s deployment of troops to Saudi Arabia under the Makkah Pact could deepen domestic political instability, strain its relations with Iran, and undermine its strategic autonomy by drawing Islamabad further into a regional conflict with wider US and Israeli strategic implications. For decades, Israel has been committing genocide and war crimes in Palestine. In the […]

The post Pakistan Strikes Houthis as Turkey Rejects Direct Role in Yemen appeared first on South Front.

Operation Dawn has opened a new chapter in Yemen’s long-running war, bringing the strategically vital Bab al-Mandeb Strait back to the centre of the conflict, as Iran, the United States, Pakistan and Türkiye are increasingly drawn into a wider struggle. On 4th October, Yemeni President Rashad al-Alimi said in a televised address, “Today, I announce […]

Daniel Davis / Deep Dive – October 7, 2026

By Junaid S. Ahmad | MEMO | October 7, 2026

There are careers that end in triumph, careers that end in scandal, and careers that achieve the rarer distinction of staging their own final indictment. António Guterres has found his in Islamabad.

After nearly a decade as Secretary-General of the United Nations, he arrives in Pakistan in the twilight of his tenure and performs the ritual that has come to define him: smile warmly, praise generously, deplore abstractly, and avoid saying anything that might seriously inconvenience the powerful men standing beside him. His record is littered with eloquent concern, grave warnings and solemn appeals. What it has lacked, again and again, is the one quality that gives moral language meaning: courage when courage carries a cost.

In Islamabad, the performance is almost indecent. Guterres praises Pakistan as a source of “solidarity and solutions,” commends the “resilience” of its people, and assures them that the United Nations stands with them. Meanwhile, former prime minister Imran Khan remains imprisoned after the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention declared his detention arbitrary.

UN experts have raised concerns about his treatment, prolonged isolation and conditions of confinement; the UN Committee Against Torture has separately highlighted broader allegations of politically motivated detention, torture, intimidation and repression.

Guterres does not need opposition politicians or troublesome journalists to brief him. He could simply read his own institution’s reports. But that would ruin the choreography.

So the Secretary-General moves through meetings with Pakistan’s political and security establishment while one of the country’s most popular and persecuted political leaders sits behind bars. Outside the diplomatic bubble, Khan’s supporters confront barricades, arrests and the familiar machinery of coercion. The Pakistani state, chronically incompetent at governing, once again discovers astonishing administrative efficiency when citizens decide to protest.

And Guterres praises their resilience. The euphemism is almost grotesque. A population is subjected to repression, institutional decay and coercive politics, and the world’s senior international diplomat congratulates it for enduring the experience. It is the diplomatic equivalent of praising a prisoner’s fortitude while refusing to ask who locked the cell.

But Islamabad is not a lapse in the Guterres record. It is the culmination of it.

The same moral evasion has defined his response to Gaza. For years, Guterres has described the catastrophe in increasingly apocalyptic terms: mass death, starvation, displacement, destroyed hospitals, shattered families, collective punishment and violations of international law. He has rarely lacked adjectives for horror.

What he lacked was willingness to name its most consequential possibility. Genocide.

When confronted directly, Guterres retreated into procedure, insisting that such a determination belonged to the courts. It was bureaucratic cowardice dressed as juridical sobriety. Apparently, a Secretary-General may describe the destruction of a people in exhaustive detail, denounce their starvation, mourn their children and warn of their dehumanization — but the moment the facts threaten to crystallize into the politically dangerous word, he develops an almost priestly devotion to institutional restraint.

The absurdity became complete when UN experts explicitly warned of genocide and a UN Commission of Inquiry later concluded that Israel had committed genocide in Gaza. The institution Guterres leads could say what Guterres himself repeatedly would not. This was not neutrality. It was evasion refined into method.

That is the essence of the Guterres tenure: moral vocabulary without moral escalation. He has perfected the art of sounding anguished while remaining politically non-threatening. His speeches travel bravely to the edge of the necessary conclusion, stare into the abyss, invoke international law, then retreat into another carefully worded appeal to governments that have already demonstrated their contempt for it.

Gaza became a theatre of catastrophic adjectives without commensurate political naming. Pakistan now becomes a festival of diplomatic compliments beside a prison cell.

The parallel is devastating. In Gaza, the UN system could document devastation while its Secretary-General recoiled from the word that carried the greatest political charge. In Pakistan, UN mechanisms can document arbitrary detention, abuse and repression while their chief shakes hands with the authorities presiding over the system they have condemned.

That is not merely institutional contradiction. It is leadership failure.

No serious person expects a UN Secretary-General to command armies, free prisoners by decree or compel governments into decency. But the office possesses one form of power that cannot be dismissed so easily: moral authority. Guterres has spent much of his tenure conserving it so carefully that, when history demanded its expenditure, there was often nothing to show for it.

He has confused caution with wisdom and diplomatic acceptability with statesmanship. But statesmanship is not the art of saying only what power can comfortably tolerate. Its purpose, at decisive moments, is precisely the opposite.

And so Islamabad is a fitting final tableau: Guterres praising resilience while surrounded by evidence of why resilience is necessary; representing institutions whose own findings he seems unwilling to embody; smiling through repression in Pakistan after years of speaking around genocide in Gaza.

History will not care how many statements he issued, how solemnly he frowned, or how often he invoked international law.

It will ask what he said when speaking plainly became dangerous. Too often, António Guterres chose not to. He saw almost everything. He described almost everything. And when history demanded courage rather than description, he chose cowardice.

By Salman Rafi Sheikh – New Eastern Outlook – October 7, 2026

On October 5, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan activated the Makkah Pact, taking their new alliance to war for the first time, and potentially revealing the future of American power in the Middle East: Washington provides the security umbrella while regional partners increasingly do the fighting.

From treaty to military alliance

Only two months after Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye signed the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, the new alliance has been activated. As representatives of the three countries met in Riyadh and Houthi missiles and drones targeted Saudi territory, Saudi-backed Yemeni forces launched a major counteroffensive around the strategically important Bab al-Mandeb Strait. Despite hundreds of strikes, the Saudi offensive has not been enough to push the Houthis back to their original position. In this context, the alliance’s Strategic-Political and Defense Committee agreed to move “immediately” toward implementing its collective-defence commitments and to provide agreed military forces and capabilities for rapid deployment in Saudi Arabia. The meeting also appointed retired Pakistani Lieutenant General Nauman Mahmood as the alliance’s first secretary-general.

The significance goes beyond additional military assistance for Riyadh. The Yemen war is transforming – and that, too, very rapidly – a remarkably young agreement into an operational military alliance. Signed on August 7, the Makkah Pact contains a collective-defence commitment under which an armed attack against one member is regarded as an attack against all three. Pakistan describes the agreement as defensive and grounded in the right to collective self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

That inevitably invites comparisons with NATO. The analogy should not be exaggerated. NATO possesses 32 members, an integrated command structure and more than seven decades of institutional development. The Makkah Pact possesses none of that depth.

But its institutional development has been unusually rapid. On August 31, the three governments established mechanisms for political and military coordination, agreed to create a permanent secretariat in Saudi Arabia and committed themselves to joint activities, defence-industrial cooperation and joint technology development and production. Now comes the most important stage in the evolution of any military alliance: responding to an actual threat.

Pakistan and Türkiye were already assisting Saudi Arabia before formal activation. Reports show that Pakistan had supplied air-defence systems, drones, anti-drone equipment and light artillery, while Pakistani advisers were working with Saudi counterparts supporting Yemeni forces. Türkiye had supplied drones. The October 5 decision potentially integrates such capabilities into something larger: collective military action undertaken because one alliance member has come under attack.

The distinction between defensive and offensive action consequently becomes blurred. Defending Saudi airspace against Houthi missiles is clearly defensive. Destroying the launchers firing those missiles from Yemen would involve offensive operations undertaken for a defensive purpose. Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Asif has deliberately avoided ruling out that possibility, saying Pakistan would make “whatever means are available” at its disposal available to defend Saudi Arabia.

America stays, but its role changes

It would be tempting to interpret this development as evidence that Saudi Arabia is preparing for a post-American Middle East. That conclusion would be premature. The more interesting possibility is almost the opposite: the Makkah Pact may fit remarkably well into the kind of Middle Eastern security order the Trump administration itself wants to create. Trump welcomed the agreement shortly after it was signed. He called it’s a “big, bold and important first step” and argued that it demonstrated how regional countries could “defend themselves in a more meaningful way.” That language closely matches the administration’s formal defence strategy.

The 2026 National Defense Strategy says Washington wants regional allies and partners to assume “primary responsibility” for deterring and defending against Iran and its proxies, while the United States supports them and deepens cooperation with Gulf partners. The administration’s arms-transfer strategy similarly argues that allies should assume more responsibility for regional security while Washington equips them with advanced American military capabilities. Yemen now offers an unusually clear illustration of what this division of labour can look like.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman sought direct American military intervention against the Houthis in September. Trump declined to order US strikes. But Washington did not withdraw from the conflict. Instead, it offered intelligence and targeting assistance, while CENTCOM commander Admiral Brad Cooper travelled to Saudi Arabia for consultations. As the Saudi-backed offensive subsequently began, the same pattern continued. Saudi aircraft provided extensive air support to Yemeni government forces, while the United States supplied intelligence and targeting support. America therefore remains deeply involved. What has declined, at least for now, is direct participation in the fighting. This distinction matters.

The choice facing Washington is not simply between dominating Middle Eastern security and abandoning it. There is a third possibility: remaining the indispensable strategic enabler while shifting more of the immediate military burden onto regional states. That is precisely where the Makkah Pact becomes useful.

Saudi Arabia brings financial resources, geography and enormous investments in advanced weaponry. Türkiye contributes a large, NATO-trained military and a rapidly expanding defence industry. Pakistan brings substantial conventional forces, longstanding military relations with Saudi Arabia and extensive operational experience. Together, they can potentially perform missions that previously might have generated demands for more direct American intervention. The United States can remain above this architecture rather than outside it: supplying intelligence, weapons, logistical assistance, strategic deterrence and diplomatic backing while allies provide more of the personnel and firepower required to confront regional threats. Seen this way, the pact is not necessarily a rebellion against American primacy. It could become one mechanism through which that primacy is made less militarily expensive for the US.

A different kind of American order

This model also helps explain why describing the emerging Middle East as “post-American” can be misleading. American power has traditionally been measured partly through deployments, bases and direct military intervention. But primacy does not require Washington to fight every regional war itself. The Makkah Pact could push this transformation considerably further.

Its future significance will depend less on what its three members call the alliance than on what they build after Yemen, and whether their first experiment in collective defence proves sufficiently successful to encourage deeper cooperation. Regular military planning, interoperable forces, integrated air and missile defence, intelligence-sharing arrangements and joint weapons production would gradually give the agreement institutional substance.

Yet therein lies a paradox for Washington. The same burden-sharing that reduces America’s military responsibilities could eventually reduce its leverage. More capable allies are not necessarily more dependent allies. As regional powers acquire the institutions, experience and capabilities to conduct military operations with diminishing direct American involvement, they may also acquire greater freedom to pursue threats and strategic objectives that do not fully correspond with Washington’s preferences. An arrangement that initially reinforces the US security architecture could therefore gradually produce greater regional strategic autonomy.

The consequences could extend to military technology. Saudi Arabia’s armed forces remain heavily equipped with American weapons, but neither Pakistan nor Türkiye operates exclusively within a US defence ecosystem. Pakistan, for example, operates the JF-17 fighter aircraft jointly developed with China. In fact, Islamabad has deployed this jet in Saudi Arabia as part of the pact. While Türkiye has built an increasingly indigenous defence industry. A more deeply integrated Makkah alliance could therefore eventually combine American, Turkish, Pakistani and Chinese-origin military technologies rather than reproduce an exclusively US-centred weapons architecture.

That may prove more consequential for American primacy than the pact itself. If the Makkah alliance fades once the immediate Houthi threat recedes, it will remain another temporary regional alignment. But if Yemen produces permanent military integration, Washington could confront an unexpected consequence of its own burden-sharing strategy: the more successfully regional allies learn to defend the American-led order themselves, the less dependent that order may eventually become on America.

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Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of international relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs

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On October 5, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan activated the Makkah Pact, taking their new alliance to war for the first time, and potentially revealing the future of American power in the Middle East: Washington provides the security umbrella while regional partners increasingly do the fighting. From treaty to military alliance Only two months after […]

The Pakistan government’s decision on Monday, October 5, to deploy its armed forces to Saudi Arabia and provide other military assistance in its fight against Yemen is facing widespread criticism from the left and other progressive sections within the country.

Critics have questioned the rationale behind the decision, expressing concerns that it will further erode the credibility of Pakistan among the people in the region and unnecessarily drag it into endless wars.

According to the joint statement, the constituents decided “to move immediately to the practical implementation of the collective defense commitments” under the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement and provide military force and other capabilities to Saudi Arabia to protect its security and territorial integrity.

The statement was issued after a meeting of the Strategic-Political and Defence Committee of the Mecca Alliance countries in Riyadh on Monday. 

The Mecca Alliance is a three party group (Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkiye) created earlier this year as a regional collective security alliance. 

Though Pakistan has one of the largest armed forces in the world along with being the sole Muslim majority country with a nuclear weapon, the decision has invited strong criticism from the scholars and activists in the country.  

Critics have pointed out how its armed forces have already been engaged in numerous domestic conflicts, such as prolonged operations against the terrorist groups such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and other separatist forces in Balochistan 

These groups have been allegedly involved in carrying out large-scale violent attacks against civilian and military targets.

Terrorism and the failure of the country’s armed forces to curb it has emerged as one of the central issues in the ongoing long march to the capital, Islamabad, by thousands of supporters of former Prime Minister Imran Khan and the country’s main opposition party Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI).  

Pakistan, which is also facing a grave financial and economic crisis is also involved in cross border fights with the Taliban-ruled Afghanistan for months now and has an active decades-long conflict on its eastern borders with India.

Given the multifrontal engagement of the Pakistan army at the moment it would be dangerous to get involved in yet another conflict in West Asia, experts have pointed out.

Pakistan is being drawn into an endless quagmire 

Saudi Arabia has been involved in an over-a-decade-long war against Yemen since 2015. It has imposed a complete air, sea, and land blockade on the country, which has caused an unprecedented humanitarian crisis in the Arab world’s poorest nation.

Though the joint statement issued after the meeting on Monday did not name Ansar Allah or Yemen explicitly, it condemned the alleged attacks on Mecca and Medina, two of the holiest places of Islam, last month.

Ansar Allah has denied Saudi Arabia’s accusations about its involvement in those attacks.  

“Pakistan is getting sucked into the Saudi-Yemen war. We can all thank Trump for igniting a new war in the Middle East. But shouldn’t we also have more sense to stay out of such a quagmire?” asked Taimur Rahman, leader of the left-wing Mazdoor Kisan Party (MKP), in a post on X on Tuesday.

Ammar Ali Jan, leader of another major left formation in the country, the Haqooq-e-Khalq Party (HKP) claimed that the “deployment of troops in Saudi Arabia is a dangerous escalation that can push Pakistan into an endless quagmire.”

He questioned the government for moving against “the people of Yemen” who “have shown exemplary solidarity to Gaza despite suffering endless aggression and siege,” claiming “attacking them would be a political and moral catastrophe.”

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Pakistan and Turkey will deploy forces to Saudi Arabia under their new trilateral defense pact as the war in Yemen continues to escalate several months after it was reignited by Saudi airstrikes on the Sanaa International Airport. The Mecca defense pact between Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia was signed back in August, and as Ansar […]

I have watched Pakistan-Afghanistan relations long enough to distrust easy headlines, and last week’s news produced a few of them. At the Center-2026 (Tsentr-2026) war games in Russia’s Chelyabinsk region, Taliban officers stood among the foreign observers. Reports say it was the first time Moscow had invited a Taliban military delegation since the movement returned […]

The post Russia courts the Taliban without dropping Pakistan appeared first on Asia Times.

The prolonged closure of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border has brought cross-border trade to a standstill, leaving tens of thousands of people on both sides without work. It has also disrupted commercial activity and strained longstanding family and social ties.

A 2,500-seat stadium in suburban Nagoya has become the unlikely setting for one of sport’s most combustible rivalries — and a glimpse of cricket’s growing reach beyond its traditional heartlands.

There are few sporting rivalries capable of transporting an entire stadium thousands of miles away from home. On Saturday, India and Pakistan managed precisely that — turning a modest Japanese baseball facility into an arena charged with all the anticipation, colour and emotion normally associated with the great cricket grounds of South Asia.

The setting could hardly have been more incongruous. The Asian Games final was being staged at Korogi Athletic Park in Nisshin, near Nagoya, a purpose-built cricket venue with capacity for only about 2,500 spectators. Beyond the boundary stood the unmistakable features of a Japanese baseball ground, including a pitcher’s mound.

Yet for those inside, this was no novelty fixture.

Hours before the first ball, Indian and Pakistani supporters were queuing to enter. Flags were draped over shoulders, shirts provided the national colours and tickets had become sufficiently scarce to generate reports of inflated resale prices. For many members of the South Asian communities living in Japan, the occasion represented a rare chance to see the two countries meet in person.

That matters because India-Pakistan cricket is not simply another international sporting contest. Political tensions mean that the teams generally encounter each other only in major tournaments, making every meeting an event in its own right. Their February T20 World Cup encounter in Sri Lanka was played before a sell-out crowd of 35,000; television audiences in the two countries routinely run into the hundreds of millions.

Japan therefore found itself hosting one of cricket’s most valuable commodities: scarcity.

For Japanese spectators, meanwhile, the spectacle offered an introduction to a sport that remains distinctly niche in the country. Some had attended earlier matches simply out of curiosity. Teachers from nearby Gifu admitted that they knew virtually nothing about cricket, but found themselves enjoying the experience after reading explanatory material and watching the action.

The comparison with baseball is inevitable. Japan possesses one of the world’s great baseball cultures, while cricket remains a relative outsider. But the recent arrival of India has provided an intriguing bridge between the two.

Last week, Japan played India in its first-ever T20 international against a full-member cricket nation. The hosts came within two runs of a remarkable victory in a rain-shortened five-over contest, giving Japanese cricket precisely the sort of exposure its administrators could scarcely have manufactured themselves.

The significance extends beyond the scoreboard.

India’s appearance in Japan was linked to the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the countries, while the Asian Games have provided an unusually prominent platform for cricket. The sport is already established among expatriate communities, but encounters involving India’s global stars can introduce it to an entirely new audience.

That is perhaps the most interesting aspect of Saturday’s extraordinary scene. Cricket did not need to conquer Japan overnight. It merely needed to persuade a few thousand people to come and watch.

And India versus Pakistan is perhaps the ultimate sales pitch.

The match was always going to generate passion. What nobody could have guaranteed was that the passion would survive the journey from the packed stadiums of Colombo and Mumbai to a small baseball field outside Nagoya.

It did.

The geography changed. The rivalry did not.

Main Image: By 運動会プロテインパワー – Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=112511600

Historian Margaret MacMillan warns that increasingly interconnected wars are increasing the risk of a wider conflict, as she discusses Ukraine’s future, Putin’s Russia, NATO’s vulnerabilities, and an emerging “new world disorder.”

RT | October 2, 2026

Yemen’s Houthis have denied targeting a power station in the city of Medina. A Saudi-led coalition earlier accused the militant group of targeting the facility supplying power to the Prophet’s Mosque – one of the holiest sites in the Muslim world.

A senior Houthi official branded the accusation a “lie” aimed at tarnishing the group’s image and reinforcing similar claims made by the coalition in the past.

On Thursday, the Saudi coalition’s spokesman, Major General Turki al-Maliki, accused the Yemeni militants of striking the Taibah electricity distribution station in Medina earlier this week in what he called a “cowardly terrorist act” and a part of an alleged broader campaign by the Houthis to “target the Two Holy Mosques.”

In mid-September, Saudi Arabia accused the Houthis of launching a drone towards the holy city of Mecca. The unmanned aerial vehicle was intercepted and destroyed, it added. The Yemeni movement’s leader, Abdel-Malik al-Houthi, dismissed that claim as a “heinous lie” in a televised address at the time, claiming Riyadh was “weaponizing lies” to advance its own agenda.

The developments have sparked concerns in Türkiye and Pakistan, which signed a joint defense agreement with Saudi Arabia in August. Speaking to the United Nations General Assembly last week, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif called any “threat to the sanctity” of the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina a “red line that must never be crossed.”

Ankara denounced this week’s alleged Medina attack. “Any attack targeting the sanctity, peace, and security of the Two Holy Mosques is an unacceptable affront directed at the shared sensitivities of the entire Islamic world,” the Turkish government spokesman, Burhanettin Duran, said on X on Friday. He vowed that Türkiye “will continue to stand by Saudi Arabia.”

The developments come amid the continued escalation between the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition. Riyadh has backed Yemen’s internationally recognized government against the Houthis since intervening in the country’s civil war in 2015.

Large-scale fighting largely subsided after a UN-brokered truce in 2022, but the conflict erupted again this summer after an airport in the Houthi-controlled Yemeni capital of Sanaa was bombed to prevent a returning Houthi delegation that had flown to Iran from landing.