Seven US senators from both parties said the Trump administration's decision to authorize Russian diesel imports conflicts with a 2022 law banning Russian energy imports and accused it of failing to consult Congress, in a statement on 11 October.
The dispute comes as the war with Iran drives up US fuel prices, which US President Donald Trump has blamed on Ukraine's strikes on Russian refineries. Trump says Russian supplies will help bring prices down, while lawmakers warn that purchases could provide Moscow with revenue to continue its war against Ukraine.
The senators—Republicans Susan Collins, Lisa Murkowski, Thom Tillis, and John Curtis, and Democrats Jeanne Shaheen, Richard Blumenthal, and Ron Wyden—called on the administration to reverse course, saying the US should not provide Russian President Vladimir Putin with “a financial lifeline.”
The law, signed on 8 April 2022, allows the president to end the import ban only after submitting a certification to Congress. The certification must find that Russia has agreed to pull out its forces and stop the fighting on terms Ukraine's free and independent government accepts, no longer poses an immediate threat of attack to any NATO member, and recognizes Ukrainians' right to pick their own government.
The law also requires consultation with four congressional committees and a report at least 45 days before certification. The termination takes effect 90 days after certification unless a joint resolution of disapproval is enacted into law during that period. The senators allege the administration failed to meet the consultation and reporting requirements. Their statement does not establish whether a certification has been submitted.
The Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control issued General License No. 135 on 9 October, authorizing certain transactions involving Russian-origin diesel that would otherwise be restricted under US sanctions regulations. It runs until 7 April 2027 and cites sanctions regulations, not the 2022 import-ban law.
Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent defended the deal on Fox News on 11 October, saying the administration would proceed under existing legal authority. He said lawmakers who argued that either the earlier law or the current Lindsey Graham sanctions law prohibited the deal were wrong, and argued the agreement would lower prices, Reuters reported.
Trump said on Truth Social that Russia would immediately supply more than 300,000 tons of diesel to US and global markets, followed by 500,000 tons in November and 1 million tons after that. He said Russia would deliver another 3 million tons “within a short period of time,” depending on the condition of its diesel refineries. The promised volumes have not been independently verified.
Russia partially lifted its diesel export ban on 10 October, allowing 500,000 tons onto the global market at this stage, the Russian government said, according to state news agency TASS.
Pennsylvania Republican Rep. Brian Fitzpatrick plans to introduce the Ronald Reagan Peace Through Strength Act to block Russian oil purchases and use a discharge petition to force a House vote, Axios reported. The procedure can force consideration of a bill if 218 House members sign. Republican Rep. Don Bacon said he would support the bill and called Trump's decision a serious mistake, according to Ukrainska Pravda.
On CBS's Face the Nation on 11 October, Senate Majority Whip John Barrasso, a Republican from Wyoming, called the deal “another point of leverage” for Trump to use against Putin. Asked whether the decision violated US law, Barrasso said the president was balancing competing priorities and had to make tough decisions.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy wrote on Telegram on 9 October:
“Allowing Russia to sell petroleum products is an investment in a war that must be ended, not prolonged.”
Trump also expects Ukraine to stop striking Russian refineries under his proposed energy ceasefire, a White House official told Axios. Zelenskyy said Kyiv would halt such strikes if Moscow did the same.
The EU adopted its largest-ever round of sanctions listings on 12 October, targeting the suppliers behind Russia’s war industry, the Council of the EU announced. The bloc acted as Russia keeps killing Ukrainian civilians every day, while US President Donald Trump eases sanctions on Russian diesel.
Russia’s planned winter campaign against Ukraine’s infrastructure depends on arms factories fed by a web of component suppliers and on oil revenue that still flows despite Ukraine’s refinery strikes, so every supplier cut off from that web raises the cost of waging it. As Washington eases off, Europe’s own pressure has a gap: its ports still take record volumes of Russian Arctic gas, and a full ban on long-term contracts starts only in 2027.
More than half of the new listings hit the supply chain for ballistic missiles that Russia “uses to kill Ukrainian civilians every day,” EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said in the statement. Russian attacks killed more than 150 people in the past week, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on 11 October.
The list names 826 Russian companies, mid-level firms the Council calls the “core” of Russia’s arms industry, with at least €20 billion in yearly turnover, and 743 people who run them. They make parts for missiles, drones, and military aircraft, from semiconductors and radars to explosives and navigation systems. Their assets are frozen, EU firms may not finance them, and the executives may not enter the EU.
Foreign ministers ratified a deal EU envoys reached on 7 October. Ukraine’s sanctions commissioner Vladyslav Vlasiuk said 60% of the listings came from Ukrainian proposals.
EU foreign ministers in Luxembourg vowed to keep the sanctions despite Trump’s diesel deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Euronews reported. Kallas addressed Washington directly as she arrived.
“The US is our biggest ally, but our message is clear: if we want to end this war, the only way we can do this is (by) putting more pressure on Russia,” Kallas said.
Irish Foreign Minister Helen McEntee called the deal “concerning,” and Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys said it was “not the European way.” Kallas warned that an energy truce covering only refineries would favor Russia, since Ukraine has one refinery and Russia “plenty.”
Trump announced the diesel deal on 9 October, and the US Treasury waived sanctions on Russian diesel until April 2027. Zelenskyy said the EU would provide about €3 billion more in military aid this week.
Trump expects Ukraine to stop hitting Russian refineries under his proposed energy ceasefire, a White House official told Axios. Zelenskyy said Kyiv would halt such strikes if Moscow did the same. On 10 October, Trump told reporters it was time for Ukraine to get a new president. Germany’s foreign minister, Britain’s defense secretary, and a senior lawmaker from Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s party backed Zelenskyy, while the Kremlin sided with Trump.
Zelenskyy offered to hold elections after a 60-day ceasefire, and Kallas said elections are impossible while the war goes on. The Institute for the Study of War assessed that Russia exploits Ukraine’s legal ban on wartime elections to drag out the war.
On 9 October, three weeks after signing the first major Russia oil sanctions in two years, Donald Trump agreed with Vladimir Putin to bring Russian diesel back to world markets. The US Treasury suspended its sanctions on that trade until April 2027 the same day. In the two days before, Russian strikes had killed more than 80 Ukrainian civilians.
Europe answered on 12 October with its largest sanctions package yet: nearly 1,600 new listings, almost all in Russia’s military-industrial complex. Its core, says Ukraine’s sanctions envoy Vladyslav Vlasiuk, is Russia’s missile program and the electronics inside it, from capacitors to semiconductors. Six in ten listings came from Ukrainian proposals, and Brussels adopted them within weeks.
That is the right reflex, and proof that Europe can move fast when it chooses. But the package names companies and people one by one. On the measures that cut whole sectors, the ones that would hurt Moscow most, Europe still waits for Washington.
It waits for Trump to decide whether to enforce the Graham Act he signed in September. It waits for him to decide whether to lean on Hungary and Slovakia or let them off. It waits for the G7 to rule on tanker services before touching its own ships. Europe keeps asking the Trump administration to decide things it is perfectly able to decide itself.
If the EU is serious about ending a war on its own continent, it does not need a miracle from Washington. It needs to pull the levers already in its hands. Here they are.
1. Fix export-control enforcement on dual-use goods. It is unacceptable that the newest Russian drones and missiles contain not only Chinese parts but American and European ones. The "War and Sanctions" portal logs what turns up. The EU should find and close the enforcement gaps in its own dual-use export law. Choking the supply to Russia's war industry serves Ukraine and Europe alike.
2. Force Hungary and Slovakia off Russian oil. The EU banned Russian oil imports in 2022, with temporary exemptions for landlocked states: Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary. Czechia has since diversified and dropped Russian oil entirely. Slovakia and Hungary can do the same; the Czech case proves it is a question of will, not feasibility. Ending the exemptions would also make good on REPowerEU's central promise, phasing out Russian energy. The gas-import ban is already decided. Oil is the gap that remains.
3. Close the Greek and Maltese tanker loophole. Up to 40% of Russia's seaborne oil travels on European tankers, Greek and Maltese. The EU has banned maritime services for Russian oil since 2022, with one exception: cargoes sold below the price cap. This spring the Council discussed scrapping that exception, which would have meant a full ban, then made any change conditional on coordination with the G7. Once again, Europe is asking Washington to act for it. The EU should overcome Greek and Maltese resistance and ban every maritime service for Russian oil: transport, insurance, and the rest.
4. Stop the shadow fleet in European waters. Russia ships oil to India, China, and Türkiye through a shadow fleet of aging, often uninsured tankers. Europe can check their insurance and turn away any that lack EU or G7 cover, especially in the North Sea and the Baltic, where any spill would be an ecological disaster, and an uninsured operator would not pay for it.
Patrols in territorial waters and exclusive economic zones have to be reinforced. Russia also uses these ships for espionage, sabotage, and damage to undersea infrastructure. Strengthen NATO's Baltic Sentry. Consider adding a maritime operation by the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force or the Coalition of the Willing across the North and Baltic Seas and the Skagerrak, before the Danish straits. If the Russian Baltic Fleet escalates, Europe should be ready for confrontation. Moscow should hear that it is not feared and that it will be stopped. At sea, it is weaker than even NATO's Baltic Sea states alone, never mind NATO's European members together.
5. Scrap the Lingen nuclear-fuel deal. In July, Lower Saxony approved a plan for the French state company Framatome to make nuclear fuel jointly with Rosatom, Russia's builder of nuclear weapons, at Lingen. It is dressed up as serving REPowerEU, since the venture lets Hungary, Slovakia, and Bulgaria buy fuel from a Franco-Russian joint operation instead of straight from Rosatom.
This is nonsense. Ukraine was once wholly dependent on Russian nuclear fuel and diversified fast; Finland and Czechia have done the same. Hungary, Slovakia, and Bulgaria can follow. Stretching the dependence out and hiding it behind a French partner is the opposite of what REPowerEU is for. Lower Saxony's own environment minister called the deal "grundfalsch," fundamentally wrong.
6. Build a Ukraine Fund from frozen Russian assets. Supporting Ukraine will cost more next year, not less, so it is time to get serious about Russia's frozen assets. Not confiscation, which European capitals still resist, and not a simple transfer to Kyiv, which amounts to the same thing, but a dedicated EU-run Ukraine Fund that could invest these assets and use them better than they are used now. ICUV has set it all out in a policy paper.
7. Adopt the Graham-bill sanctions. Sanction every Russian state company (majority or controlling state stake) and every Russian oligarch who has not taken a public anti-war stand. Forbes counts 155 Russian billionaires.
8. Cut every Russian and Belarusian bank off SWIFT. Russia still has 301 operating banks, yet only 103 Russian banks and financial institutions sit under the EU's transaction ban, and just a handful of Belarusian ones. Gazprombank, which the US Treasury says pays Russia's soldiers, is still not on the EU list. Stop listing banks one by one: disconnect the entire Russian and Belarusian banking systems and put them under a full transaction ban, with narrow exceptions for food, medicine, and humanitarian trade.
9. End land transit to and from Russia, Kaliningrad included. Stop all overland freight, rail and road, between the EU and Russia. Baltic ports should carry no Russian trade at all, not just grain. Halt the gas transit to Kaliningrad through Lithuania's pipelines, too; let it arrive by sea, where Russia already runs an LNG terminal. Winters are mild now, so the real effect is mostly higher costs, and even that is worth doing.
10. Ban visas for Russian (ex-)servicemen and their families. The EU's 21st sanctions package laid the legal basis in July and then set no start date. Bring it into force, and extend it to the families.
11. Launch the Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression and the Claims Commission. Speed up the creation of, and accession to, the tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine, and the convention establishing a Claims Commission.
Europe cannot escape this burden. A Russian victory, even a partial one such as a peace on Moscow's terms, would cost it far more than helping Ukraine to a partial victory of its own, a peace along the line of contact. If Europe wants the war to end, it has to lead, alongside Ukraine, instead of waiting on a miracle from the Trump administration. The tools are already in its hands.
Editor's note. The opinions expressed in our Opinion section belong to their authors. Euromaidan Press' editorial team may or may not share them.
Submit an opinion to Euromaidan Press
On Monday, the European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas informed that the European Union foreign ministers adopted nearly 1,600 new sanctions listings targeting Russia’s military-industrial complex.
RELATED:
U.S. Temporarily Authorizes Russian Diesel Imports Until April 2027
She said more than half of the new listings were linked to the production chain for ballistic missiles, adding that it was the largest single expansion of the bloc’s sanctions list since the start of the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
The measures are aimed at making it significantly harder, slower and more expensive for Russia to produce weapons used against Ukraine, she said.
Speaking ahead of the Foreign Affairs Council meeting in Luxembourg, Kallas said the new listings would also address what she described as “sham elections in Russia regarding the occupied territories of Ukraine.”
Kallas reiterated the EU’s position that continued pressure on Russia was necessary to end the conflict. She also called for greater coordination with the United States on sanctions against Russia, saying that such alignment would strengthen pressure on Moscow.
EU announces its ‘largest expansion’ of anti-Russia sanctions with 22nd package
— RT Intl (@RT_on_X) October 12, 2026
EU foreign ministers approved nearly 1,600 new sanctions listings, with more than half reportedly linked to the production chain for ballistic missiles pic.twitter.com/0JNWYaJw1t
Ukraine Needs Political Will to Reach Peaceful Settlement: Kremlin
On Sunday, Kremlin Spokesman Dmitry Peskov said that Moscow wanted someone in the Ukrainian leadership to demonstrate the political will to recognize realities on the ground and work toward a peaceful settlement.
Peskov made the remarks in an interview with RIA Novosti in response to U.S. President Donald Trump’s comments on replacing Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.
On Saturday, Trump told journalists that it was time for Ukraine to elect a new president. He said Zelensky could have brought the Russia-Ukraine conflict to an end on several occasions but did not want to do so.
On Sunday, Zelensky told ABC News that he was ready to hold presidential elections in Ukraine if Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to a 60-day ceasefire.
teleSUR/ JF
Source: Xinhua
President Donald Trump’s decision to reopen trade in Russian diesel has implications extending well beyond American fuel prices. The agreement, announced ahead of November’s congressional elections, coincides with negotiations over Russian energy assets and mounting American pressure on Ukraine to suspend attacks against Moscow’s oil infrastructure.
The US Treasury’s General Licence 135, issued on 9 October, authorises transactions involving Russian-origin diesel until 7 April 2027. Unlike Trump’s public announcement, which referred to specific quantities destined for the American market, the licence establishes no corresponding volume ceiling or restriction confining authorised trade to the United States.
Its provisions permit American businesses to participate in eligible international transactions involving Russian diesel, including associated financial and commercial services. Existing sanctions remain formally in force, but an important category of Russian petroleum trade has been reopened.
The arrangement potentially benefits not only Russian producers but also American commodity traders, financial institutions and intermediaries capable of purchasing Russian fuel and distributing it internationally.
The legal mechanism offers Washington considerable flexibility. Rather than formally abandoning restrictions imposed over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the administration can authorise selected transactions while maintaining the broader sanctions framework.
Congress’s Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 strengthened the legislative basis for economic pressure on Moscow but also provided presidential waiver powers.
General Licence 135 was issued under existing Treasury sanctions authorities, rather than necessarily through those waiver provisions. Nevertheless, the combined framework leaves the administration substantial discretion over the practical application of economic restrictions.
Washington can consequently maintain its declared sanctions policy while selectively restoring commercial relations with Russia. European governments, which have maintained extensive restrictions on Russian energy, have little influence over such unilateral American exemptions.
The timing becomes more revealing when considered alongside negotiations over Lukoil’s international assets.
American investors have been exploring the acquisition of the Russian company’s overseas operations, including oilfields, refineries, storage facilities and retail distribution networks. The portfolio has been valued at approximately $20–22 billion.
Among the prospective investors is billionaire Todd Boehly, while discussions concerning Russian-American economic cooperation have involved Trump’s representatives Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner.
An American-controlled acquisition of Lukoil’s international network could complement the commercial opportunities created by the diesel authorisation.
Russian petroleum products could potentially be purchased and marketed through American-controlled businesses, allowing Russian suppliers to retain export revenues while intermediaries earn profits from financing, distribution and resale.
No evidence establishes that General Licence 135 was specifically designed for the prospective Lukoil purchasers, or that Trump personally holds an interest in the proposed transactions. Nevertheless, the parallel negotiations suggest the possibility of an emerging commercial arrangement under which American intermediaries assume a greater role in Russian energy exports.
The consequences for Ukraine could be considerable.
Kyiv has expanded attacks against Russian refineries, fuel depots and petroleum infrastructure, seeking to reduce Moscow’s export earnings and disrupt supplies supporting its armed forces.
Trump has repeatedly criticised these strikes, linking them to higher international fuel prices. His administration now has an additional commercial reason to seek their suspension.
On 11 October, Trump announced an energy ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine, although President Volodymyr Zelenskyy indicated that Kyiv had not agreed to such an arrangement.
Ukraine has maintained that any suspension of attacks against Russian energy facilities must be matched by an end to Moscow’s strikes on Ukrainian power infrastructure.
An agreement protecting Russian refineries without equivalent Russian concessions would preserve an important source of Kremlin revenue while depriving Kyiv of military and economic leverage.
The immediate political advantage for Trump is apparent. Rising diesel prices have become a concern ahead of the 3 November midterm elections, particularly among farmers and transport businesses. Additional Russian supplies offer the administration an opportunity to demonstrate action on domestic fuel costs.
Yet the six-month Treasury authorisation extends considerably beyond the election, suggesting commercial objectives that cannot be explained exclusively by short-term electoral considerations.
The emerging pattern is one of bilateral economic engagement with Moscow proceeding independently of a settlement in Ukraine. Russian energy trade is being selectively reopened, American investors are pursuing Russian-owned assets, and Washington is seeking restrictions on Ukrainian operations against the infrastructure underpinning those commercial interests.
For European governments, this threatens the cohesion of the sanctions regime. Brussels may continue restricting Russian energy revenues while Washington authorises transactions that restore access to international markets.
The larger prospect is a system in which Russia retains export earnings, American intermediaries acquire profitable commercial positions, and sanctions become instruments of bilateral negotiation rather than coordinated Western pressure.
Trump’s diesel agreement may therefore represent the opening stage of a wider economic accommodation with Putin, negotiated while Russia continues its war against Ukraine and without any corresponding Russian commitment to withdraw from occupied territory.
Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su
No one expected that Donald Trump, after a congratulatory birthday phone call to his Russian counterpart, would declare that Russian diesel fuel would prove to be the solution to America’s current fuel shortages. If the Trump presidency has yielded anything it is a lot of interesting headlines that seem to come out of nowhere, that can sadly, quite often, fade right back into the mist from whence they came. Sometimes Trump’s words can fill us with hope like this ‘Diesel Deal’, and others like his recent UN speech, where he threatened to potentially kill all Iranians, fill us with dread. This declaration by our enigmatic leader presents a very interesting media narrative and a potential end to ‘Project Ukraine’ that is worth taking a deeper dive into.
Trump has blamed Zelensky for the global energy shortages, especially those concerning diesel fuel. At the time, everyone thought this was just a cheap Twitter-style deflection from the failed war against Iran, which certainly caused a lot of fuel transport disruption. That is to say, the White House was projecting this crisis, that it allowed to happen, or actively caused, to be thrown onto the scapegoat Zelensky. However, this form of deflection or projection is no longer just words in a pre-election narrative, but has become action. Sanctions on Russian diesel have been lifted and the first shipment is already on its way as I write these words. Something tangible has occurred.
Zelensky was actually warned some six times to stop attacking Russian oil infrastructure. Blow up children in the Donbass and beyond ‘sure’, but attacking what the West wants from Russia more than anything is ‘totally unacceptable’. Zelensky, who as stated above was warned half-a-dozen times to back of strikes on oil/gas, upon hearing of Trump’s decision to purchase Russian diesel fuel did the following:
1) He quickly attacked Russian oil infrastructure again seemingly to spite the U.S. President
2) He immediately cut off peace talks in Miami with the Trump’s aides, the Kushner-Witkoff duo, which is yet another spitting in the face of Donald Trump.
The wildest thing of all is that the ‘narcissist’ Trump has already publically thanked President Putin twice for this deal. Appearing at a rally, Americans standing behind Trump wildly cheered in favor of the announcement of peace with Russia plus extra fuel for America. Russophobia is a hobby of the globalist bourgeoisie and Epstein Island, not American truckers and farmers.
It’s a great narrative, let’s hope it lasts
Trump has now put 100% of the blame for global energy/fuel problems directly onto Zelensky, and called him out personally for keeping the war going over the last two years. Thus, the narrative is forming into something like: If the war in Ukraine is the cause of the fuel shortages, and Zelensky is the cause of the war continuing, that means the U.S. can make a deal with Russia even if ‘they started it’, with the corollary that Zelensky logically needs to go as he is the source of the problem. But going even deeper into the narrative we can see the most interesting thing of all or as they like to say online ‘the quiet part’: Trump has essentially declared that Russian energy output is of vital strategic interest to the United States.
It is these kind of words that take the black pill out of my mouth and directly inject ‘hopium’ into my bloodstream. The idea of the American President declaring that NOT being at war with Russia is of vital strategic interest to the USA is something I have been dreaming of my entire adult life. This is exactly the logic that we need to finally and ultimately end the Cold War + Project for a New American Century mentality in politics and finally allow the USA to rebuild and invest into itself. This very well could be America’s mulitpolar awakening by using a logic trap similar to the other ones that have been used to do the exact opposite and keep the USA locked in eternal foreign wars of luxury for ‘national security’. This new logic trap could look something like this: “So you want war with Russia? That must mean you want to harm America, you dirty traitor! You’ll take the fuel from farmer Joe and our kids will starve, you monster! Russia being left alone to produce fuel is a national security interest of America, are you against our country’s national security? Do you want to weaken manly America for those gay Europeans?”.
But as we slam that hopium injection into our veins we have to remember that Donald Trump has said a lot of things, changed his mind many times, or was forced to change it, and perhaps isn’t quite the unilateral decider that he makes himself out to be on TV.
It takes two to tango, but one orange man to keep his word.
The transcripts from this now famous birthday phone chat look very different on the American and Russian sides, which is par for the course. Trump’s team tends to write discussed things as proven facts whereas the Russians are more noncommittal in their language. But the diesel sanctions are gone for now and the boats are moving, so this looks to be real… at least until the mid-term votes are cast.
The American side has since threatened to cut Zelensky off from intelligence sharing, which could be an instant deathblow to their military efforts as many experts believe that only U.S. intel has allowed them to survive this long. Without such targeting data they will be sent back to 20th century warfare instantly, and they would no longer be able to strike deep into Russia. RT wrote the following on this issue:
A Ukrainian official told Axios that Witkoff and Kushner threatened to cut off US intelligence sharing with Kiev if it continued to ignore Trump’s requests to halt strikes on Russian oil refineries, but the US official denied that any such threat had been made.
But here is where we have to hold our breath, for despite how nice this new narrative sounds, and how it is the perfect exit for the USA from its participation in Project Ukraine we should not forget the words of President Putin from some time ago when he talked about the true power of any U.S. President:
“So a person is elected — he comes with ideas… Then people with briefcases come visit him, well-dressed, in dark suits — kind of like mine.”
So the real question might be, will the Zionist Lobby, Epstein Elite, Three-Letter Organizations, Influential Billionaires, and all the other spooks on Capitol Hill actually let President Trump actually end this war? Will the POTUS be allowed to do this?
We should recall that after Zelensky acted disgracefully in the White House at the start of Trump’s second term everyone thought this conflict would be over. Trump the famous narcissist seemed visibly angry and offended on camera during their verbal spat. But the war went on. There was the Anchorage Summit, which had tons of hype and everyone thought then that the U.S. would pull support from Kiev. But it did not. Trump’s enemies including the Biden Clan are linked to massive corruption in Ukraine which has all been exposed. This would have been a great off ramp from the conflict, but Trump did not or could not take it. And in general, Trump’s rhetoric towards Zelensky and other European politicians has been overtly harsh and disrespectful. The man accused of being a ‘blowhard’ somehow always speaks quite politely behind the backs and to the faces of Putin and Xi.
Thus, although I want peace and mutually-respectful cooperation between the USA and Russia perhaps this deal will only last till the midterm elections, when all of a sudden Zelensky will go back to being “a bastard, but he’s our bastard”, and the conflict will go marching on. Perhaps this is our October Surprise from the Republican side of the aisle? And in December we can all be ‘surprised again’ when the war resumes full-force and thousands more Slavs die on the battlefield?
Now, Donald Trump with gritted teeth is slinging forth the idea that he thinks “it’s time for Ukraine to get a new President”. But after the votes are counted in America he may just go back to passively hating and tolerating Zelensky till the end of his term or till an Oreshnik finds the mark one day. We also cannot forget that the West has been lobbying for a major ceasefire from the Russians for a long time. Presumably this would be used to regroup, rest, rearm and then just go right back to fighting till the last Ukrainian. Now Trump wants elections in Kiev, which will probably demand a ceasefire to enact. But will he be pushing for a three-day ceasefire, or try to trick the Russians into agreeing to a month-long freeze or more?
One ‘good’ sign on this issue from a Russian standpoint is that there are now already calls for Zelensky to resign over this issue on Twitter/X coming from all sides even pro-Ukrainian ones:
“’Zelensky must resign’ – Ukrainian media. That was quick. Zelensky ignored Trump’s warnings not to attack Russian oil refineries SIX times. This morning, Zelensky has bombed another Russian oil refinery. Ukrainians are calling for Zelensky‘s resignation.
Former Ukrainian MP and Metinvest co-owner Vadym Novynskyi has called on Zelensky to resign and hand over all power to Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada following the Trump-Putin agreements.”
We have to remember that Ukraine in 2026 is already a police state where any dissent means you could get thrown into a bus and taken to the front to die or vanish into a prison as a Russian ‘spy’. Thus, when important people gang up against Zelensky openly it is much more of a potent statement than Hollywood actors safely making Tik-Toks against Trump from their luxurious bedrooms.
The rest of the world won’t sit around and do nothing.
Some moronic ‘Putin sold out the BRICS’ counter-narrative is sure to arise from Kiev’s bot accounts soon. Obviously someone is going to say that the Kremlin threw their Iranian brothers to the Zio-lobby machine! But in actuality, it looks like the Iranians are going to just ship their oil through Russia and sell it as ‘Russian’ and everyone will be happy. The Caspian Sea will be even more busy in the near future. If sanctioned accomplished anything they really increased trade between Russia and Iran.
No one in Moscow is planning on selling out Tehran; they want America to join the Multipolar World while still saving face and reduce the global threat level of nuclear war which is vastly too high at present. Iran and China were surely consulted on this issue before any Diesel Deal was finalized.
The real danger of Trump calling for the removal of Zelensky comes from Europe, where certain factions, politicians and their financiers may take radical action in response. And Trump’s reaction to this response could be even more radical now. Would it be possible that NATO might greenlight the Baltics to just open up another front to ‘see what happens’? Will France finally go through on its threat and just deploy troops openly en masse to save the Napoleon in Green from political or potentially physical death? So far the EU has only threatened even more sanctions. If the previous 20+ packages of sanctions failed, I wonder what is left to actually sanction. Ursula is promising the biggest and most expansive sanctions packet for Monday, October 12th, but I doubt it will change anything. The only thing that would change the situation is if the EU did something really aggressive, drastic and stupid militarily.
What about the rest of the sanctions?
The Russian media has done a disservice to the public by writing that “Trump will lift sanctions” over-and-over again when the only sanctions being lifted are on diesel exports for half a year. All of the rest of the sanctions are still there. You still cannot fly directly from Moscow to New York, and money transfers via SWIFT are still mostly blocked. We have to remember that at least in theory sanctions are a form of punishment for crimes committed against, in this case, international law and the United States. So how can relations between the USA and Russian Federation truly be normalized when one still accuses the other of crimes it believes it did not even commit?
After Project Ukraine ends things could change rapidly, but there can be no true friendship until Washington trusts Aeroflot enough to let them land on U.S. territory. We cannot be both under a sanctions war and normalized at the same time. But this new Trump narrative, if he can stick with it to its logical conclusion, is the perfect off-ramp for America and the way we can finally end this war and go back to some sense of normalcy with the apocalypse pushed far off into the future beyond all of our lifespans.
By rejecting the transformation of their country into a new front against Russia, Georgians preserved their strategic autonomy.
Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su
In recent years, Georgia has become the stage for a struggle whose implications extend far beyond its borders. The political conflict, often presented as a debate over democracy, European integration, and civil rights, should in fact be understood as another chapter in the delicate geopolitical game unfolding across the Caucasus.
It is against this backdrop that Tbilisi’s decision to distance itself from the confrontational policies promoted by its Western partners takes on particular significance.
The fundamental question is not whether Georgia should be “European” or “Russian.” Such a framework is excessively simplistic. The real issue is whether a small state situated between major centers of power should be free to determine its own foreign policy or whether its international position should be dictated by the strategic interests of outside actors.
The Georgian government chose the first option.
The rise of Georgian Dream brought about a significant shift in the country’s foreign policy. Rather than automatically echoing the anti-Russian rhetoric prevailing in Brussels, Tbilisi adopted a more pragmatic approach. Its priority became avoiding another war while preserving economic relations with its neighbors.
For Georgia, this is no abstract matter. Russia remains an important economic partner. Trade, tourism, energy, and the movement of people create realities that cannot simply be erased by political decisions. Fully adopting the Western sanctions regime against Moscow would have particularly serious consequences for an economy far smaller and more vulnerable than those of Europe’s major powers.
This is where Tbilisi’s policy fundamentally diverges from the strategy advocated by Brussel’s hawks. Brussels wants Georgia to become increasingly integrated into European political structures. The Georgian government, however, has insisted that integration cannot mean automatically submitting to the European Union’s geopolitical priorities.
The adoption of the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence became the main symbol of this dispute. Its critics regard the legislation as a democratic setback. Its supporters see it as a legitimate attempt to limit the political influence of organizations financed from abroad.
The same divide is evident in cultural matters. Georgian legislation concerning LGBT propaganda provoked a strong European reaction and reinforced the perception among its critics that Tbilisi was abandoning the liberal values promoted by the European Union.
Yet one question rarely receives the same attention: who should determine Georgia’s political and cultural rules?
For Georgian Dream, the answer is the Georgian state itself. It was precisely this insistence on autonomy that made the government the target of increasingly intense international pressure.
Recently, Tbilisi Mayor Kakha Kaladze openly accused Brussels of financing an attempted coup in Georgia during last year’s protests. He claims that European actors funded groups involved in the demonstrations and supported efforts to bring about a change of government. According to Kaladze, the objective was to install political forces more closely aligned with the interests of the European Union.
In fact, such allegations should come as little surprise in the current geopolitical environment. Brussels is now discussing the possibility of imposing sanctions on most Georgian Dream leaders and government officials. These developments nevertheless reveal the broader geopolitical dimensions of the crisis. The dispute is not merely a controversy over domestic legislation, but a genuine struggle over the country’s strategic orientation.
Here lies the principal danger facing Georgia. The Caucasus is not a neutral space. The region lies between Russia, Turkey, Iran, and the Euro-Atlantic world. Any attempt to turn Georgia into a platform for confrontation with Moscow would have far greater consequences for Georgians themselves than for the powers supporting such a policy from a distance.
The experience of Ukraine has made this reality even more obvious. A state can receive political, financial, and military support from foreign powers while ultimately paying the highest price when rivalries between those powers escalate into open conflict. For a small country such as Georgia, avoiding this fate is a fundamental strategic consideration.
It was precisely on this point that Tbilisi projected a different course from Kiev. Rather than accepting the transformation of the country into another frontline state, the Georgian government sought to preserve workable relations with Moscow. This does not mean that Georgia has formed an alliance with Russia. The two countries still lack formal diplomatic relations, and Tbilisi maintains its own disagreements with the Kremlin. The national priority, however, is to safeguard strategic autonomy, peace, security, and development.
By avoiding direct confrontation with Moscow, Georgia reduces the risk of opening another military front near Russia’s borders. It also preserves economic ties with neighboring countries and retains greater freedom to engage with different centers of power simultaneously.
What is at stake is the sovereignty of a small state amid competition between major powers. In a region increasingly shaped by geopolitical rivalry, the most important question may not be which side Georgia belongs to, but how the country intends to protect itself amid the confrontation between opposing external forces.
The Georgian people have shown that Georgia’s interests come first. And they were right to make that choice.
Europe keeps buying record amounts of Russian gas even as it plans to punish its war machine against Ukraine. The EU ports took in a record 12.18 million tons of Russian liquefied natural gas from January to September, 9.5% more than in the same period of 2025, according to a study by the German group Urgewald based on Kpler tracking data.
Europe spent about 7.88 billion euros on that Russian gas in nine months, revenue that helps fund a war Russia wages with daily missile and drone strikes on Ukrainian cities. The flow continues even as the EU prepares its largest-ever package of sanctions against Russia’s military industry.
The gas comes from Russia’s Yamal project, which sent 167 cargoes to EU ports over the nine months, roughly one every 1.6 days. Europe took 85% of the project’s recorded deliveries by volume, remaining by far its biggest market, Urgewald reports.
Europe’s share grew even as Yamal’s worldwide deliveries fell 1.3%, so the EU absorbed a larger slice of Russia’s Arctic output. In September alone, EU ports received 792,440 tons worth an estimated 818 million euros, nearly three-quarters of it going to France.
The imports run up against a looming US decision. The Trump administration has until 18 October to complete its first review under the Lindsey Graham sanctions act, signed into law on 18 September, which allows Washington to sanction this gas trade at any time, the group notes.
However, after the US allowed Russian diesel to enter the US and global market, the decision will likely remain stalled.
Originally, the law covered Yamal’s leadership, foreign vessels that knowingly carried Russian LNG, and foreign ports that serviced US-sanctioned ships. Yamal depends on specialized Arc7 ice-class tankers and on nearby European ports where they can unload and quickly return, so closing that route would make the Arctic trade far harder to sustain.
The EU’s measures so far have barely dented the trade. A ban on short-term LNG contracts took effect in April and has had no visible effect, while the full import ban under long-term contracts only starts on 1 January 2027, Urgewald says.
Every month of largely uninterrupted trade means more revenue for Russia while Ukraine suffers daily attacks, sanction campaigner Sebastian Rötters says. The next EU package should close the remaining loopholes, above all those keeping the Arc7 tanker fleet running.
Estonia’s answer to the US-Russia diesel agreement: deals with dictators lead to hell. Prime Minister Kristen Michal wants the European Council to discuss giving Ukraine more aid so it can destroy Russia’s oil refineries, after sharply criticizing the US decision to strike a diesel deal with Russia, ERR reports.
Washington has eased sanctions on Russian diesel, a move Ukraine says funds a war that has killed more than 80 Ukrainian civilians in two days. Estonia’s answer is to go the opposite way and help Ukraine hit the source of that fuel, the refineries, harder.
"It is worth discussing in Estonia and at the European Council next week whether we can quickly contribute more to Ukraine so they can blast Russia's oil refineries to smithereens," Michal says.
He casts the US deal as a historic error. Innocent people are being killed for gas and fuel money, Michal warns, saying that the promised fuel may never arrive. For years, the US urged allies to drop Russian fuel, and Estonia did, so cutting Moscow’s revenue must continue, not reverse, he adds.
Meanwhile, Marko Mihkelson, chair of the Riigikogu Foreign Affairs Committee, says that Russia's strategic objectives remain the same as they were before: to rebuild its empire, beginning with the subjugation of Ukraine, and to dismantle the Euro-Atlantic system of collective defense.
"That is why European allies still have only one way to prevent this war of aggression from spreading: to do everything possible to ensure that Russia’s strategic objectives fail and that the imperial wars launched by the Kremlin end in defeat," he says.
This clear strategic objective should also serve US interests, he continues, adding that "Russia’s long-standing ambition, pursued in concert with China and Iran, to undermine America’s global leadership is entering a decisive phase."
Australia has no need to buy fuel from Russia, despite US President Donald Trump’s move to bring Russian diesel back to world markets. Climate Change and Energy Minister Chris Bowen says that imports from Russia will remain banned to ensure the country does not benefit from its invasion of Ukraine, Bloomberg reports.
Trump has agreed with Russia's President Vladimir Putin to release Russian diesel onto global markets, a move Ukraine says funds a war that has killed more than 80 Ukrainian civilians in two days.
“We don’t need or want Russian fuel in Australia. We do not want Vladimir Putin to benefit from this war in the Middle East. What the United States does is a matter for them, but we won’t be changing our approach,” Bowen said.
Trump announced on 9 October a series of cargoes beginning this month totaling about 13.5 million barrels of Russian diesel. The release upends years of sanctions, as the White House looks for ways to tame soaring fuel prices before the US midterm elections.
Bowen draws a clear line between that approach and Australia’s. What the US does is its own affair, he stresses, but Canberra will maintain its arrangements with trading partners to keep Russian fuel out of the market.
Australia can hold out without Russian supply, Bowen argues. The country has 43 days’ worth of petrol, two days more than a week earlier, and 31 days’ worth of diesel, one day less, he notes.
He adds that Australia stays in close contact with domestic refiners to keep them running at full capacity. The stance lets Canberra wait out high prices rather than buy fuel that would send money to Moscow.
Australia’s fuel costs have stayed high since the war between the US and Iran disrupted shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, the route that normally carries about a fifth of the world’s oil and gas.
Washington has put its sanctions on Russian diesel on hold. The US Treasury has authorized the sale, delivery, offloading, and import of Russian-origin diesel fuel, effectively suspending sanctions on that trade until 7 April 2027, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) said on its website on 9 October.
The waiver lets Russian diesel back onto world markets and, Ukraine argues, hands Moscow fresh revenue for its war, which has killed more than 80 Ukrainian civilians in two days. Until now, it was unclear whether Washington would roll back the sanctions it imposed on Russia in 2022.
OFAC has issued the measure as General License 135, signed by the office’s director, Bradley Smith, according to the report. It authorizes transactions in Russian-origin diesel that sanctions would otherwise block.
The license sets one limit. It does not permit any debits from accounts at US financial institutions held by Russia’s central bank, its National Wealth Fund, or its finance ministry, the document says.
On 9 October, US President Donald Trump wrote on Truth Social that Russia would immediately supply more than 300,000 tons of diesel, then 500,000 tons in November, and another million tons right after.
Moscow would later send the US up to 3 million more tons, depending on the state of Russia’s refineries, Trump added, framing the deal as a way to bring down energy prices.
Analysts say the amounts are too small to move prices much. Together, the first tranches would cover about a day and a half of US demand, while US diesel use alone runs near 16 million tons a month. Experts read the move as politics ahead of an election rather than a real shift in the market, pointing out that Trump cited volumes in tons, which look larger than the barrels traders track.
The deal drew fury in Kyiv, and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy called it a weak decision by strong partners. The EU is moving the other way, with ambassadors approving the bloc’s largest sanctions package against Russia’s war machine, due for final adoption on 12 October.
Europe will not loosen its pressure on Russia after the US-Russia diesel deal, EU Foreign Policy chief Kaja Kallas says. She has announced that EU foreign ministers will approve the bloc’s largest set of sanctions against Russia’s war machine since the full-scale invasion on 12 October.
Washington has just eased the pressure on Russia, letting Russian diesel back onto world markets and handing Moscow more money to wage war. This comes as Russian strikes have killed more than 80 Ukrainian civilians in two days, 22 of them on Russian President Vladimir Putin's birthday on 7 October.
Moreover, Russia has stepped up its hybrid attacks against Europe, both EU Member States and NATO Allies. It is now the time to tighten sanctions, not loosen them, Kallas says.
“Suspending sanctions on Russian diesel provides Moscow with more revenues to wage war. This is not the time to ease pressure on Russia, and Europe won’t,” she claims.
On 9 October, Trump claimed he had agreed with Putin to put more than 300,000 tons of Russian diesel on world markets immediately.
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy called the deal a weak decision by strong partners, arguing that Russia turns oil-product revenue into weapons against Ukraine's civilians, according to the BBC.
On 7 October, EU ambassadors approved the 22nd package of sanctions, with about 1,700 listings, Ukrainian President’s Commissioner for Sanctions Policy Vladyslav Vlasiuk notes. It is expected to be formally approved on 12 October.
This package contains the largest number of sanctions targeting Russia’s defence industry. Of these, 60% were drawn from Ukrainian decrees and proposals. The package includes measures targeting machine tools, Lancet drones, ballistic weapons, and related technologies.
“The core of the package is Russia’s missile programme and electronic components: electronics, capacitors, resistors, and semiconductors. It also covers electronic warfare, shipbuilding, and explosives,” Vlasiuk says.
It took just a few weeks from Ukraine's decision to the European one.
"But we are already working on further measures, including sectoral sanctions targeting energy, the defense industry, finance, and trade,” he stated.
US President Donald Trump said on 9 October that he had agreed with Russian leader Vladimir Putin to bring Russian diesel to world markets to lower energy prices. However, energy analysts say the deal, which drew fury in Ukraine, is unlikely to lower diesel prices meaningfully, CNN reports.
Trump wrote on social media that Putin would “immediately supply” more than 300,000 tons of diesel, with another 500,000 tons in November. Together, those volumes would cover about a day and a half of US demand, according to the US Energy Information Administration.
Meanwhile, former head of the Center for Countering Disinformation Andrii Kovalenko says that US diesel consumption alone is about 16 million tons per month, and global consumption is roughly 120 million tons.
The US experts read the move as politics more than a market shift. Trump spoke in tons rather than barrels because the figure looks bigger to an ordinary observer, said Dan Pickering, founder of Pickering Energy Partners, calling it “more politics than a game changer.”
Former US officials question whether Putin holds the diesel Trump described, as Ukrainian strikes strain Russia’s refineries. A former senior State Department official says it hardly matters whether the fuel arrives, because Putin “has already achieved the result he wants,” with Trump believing he has a pre-election card that could move markets.
Even if the fuel flows, it would be a temporary measure. Gregory Brew of Eurasia Group says that he suspects Putin expects Ukraine to halt its strikes on Russian refineries in return, and that he cannot imagine Zelenskyy agreeing.
For Putin, the gain is plain, Kovalenko says: he pushes for sanctions relief and for no new US sanctions, all without any demand to end the war in Ukraine.
"Trump’s bet was more on the news itself, driving prices down somewhat, because, in reality, figures like these shouldn’t bring prices down," Kovalеnkо believes.
He adds that Trump will "make a big fuss about diesel ahead of the elections, nothing more," and that the average American is unlikely to feel any lasting effect.”
Earlier, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy warned that allowing Russia to sell petroleum products abroad without securing a lasting de-escalation agreement would help finance Moscow's war against Ukraine.
He criticized the decision, calling it "a birthday gift for Putin," per Axios.
The next day after the announcement, Russia launched six bombs on Zaporizhzhia, killing 17 people.
Ao rejeitar a transformação do país em uma nova frente contra a Rússia, os georgianos preservaram sua autonomia estratégica.
Junte-se a nós no Telegram 
, X
e VK
.
Escreva para nós: info@strategic-culture.su
Durante os últimos anos, a Geórgia tornou-se palco de uma disputa que ultrapassa em muito suas próprias fronteiras. O conflito político apresentado como uma discussão sobre democracia, integração europeia e direitos civis também deve na verdade ser compreendido como mais um capítulo no delicado jogo estratégico do Cáucaso.
É justamente nesse contexto que a decisão de Tbilisi de manter distância da política de confronto promovida por seus parceiros ocidentais ganha importância.
A questão fundamental não é saber se a Geórgia deve ser “europeia” ou “russa”. Essa formulação é excessivamente simplista. O verdadeiro problema é saber se um Estado pequeno, situado entre grandes centros de poder, deve possuir liberdade para definir sua própria política externa ou se sua posição internacional será determinada pelas necessidades estratégicas de terceiros.
O governo georgiano optou pela primeira alternativa.
A ascensão do Georgian Dream produziu uma mudança significativa na política externa do país. Em vez de reproduzir automaticamente a retórica antirrussa predominante em Bruxelas, Tbilisi passou a defender uma política pragmática. A prioridade tornou-se evitar uma nova guerra e preservar relações econômicas com seus vizinhos.
Para a Geórgia, isso não é uma questão abstrata. A Rússia continua sendo um importante parceiro econômico. Comércio, turismo, energia e circulação de pessoas criam uma realidade que não pode ser simplesmente eliminada por decisões políticas. Adotar integralmente o regime de sanções ocidental contra Moscou teria consequências particularmente graves para uma economia muito menor e mais vulnerável que as grandes economias europeias.
É nesse ponto que a política de Tbilisi diverge fundamentalmente da estratégia defendida pelos falcões de Bruxelas. Bruxelas deseja uma Geórgia cada vez mais integrada às estruturas políticas europeias. O governo georgiano, entretanto, passou a insistir que integração não pode significar submissão automática às prioridades geopolíticas da União Europeia.
A aprovação da Lei de Transparência da Influência Estrangeira tornou-se o principal símbolo dessa disputa. Para seus críticos, a legislação representa um retrocesso democrático. Para seus defensores, trata-se de uma tentativa legítima de limitar a influência política de organizações financiadas do exterior.
A mesma divisão aparece nas questões culturais. A legislação georgiana sobre propaganda LGBT provocou forte reação europeia e consolidou a percepção, entre seus críticos, de que Tbilisi estaria abandonando os valores liberais promovidos pela União Europeia.
Mas existe uma questão que raramente recebe a mesma atenção: quem deve estabelecer as regras políticas e culturais dentro da Geórgia?
Para o Georgian Dream, a resposta é o próprio Estado georgiano. Foi justamente essa insistência na autonomia que transformou o governo em alvo de uma pressão internacional cada vez mais intensa.
Recentemente o prefeito de Tbilisi, Kakha Kaladze, acusou abertamente Bruxelas de financiar uma tentativa de golpe de Estado na Geórgia durante os protestos do ano passado. O dirigente afirma que setores europeus financiaram grupos envolvidos nos protestos e apoiaram esforços destinados a provocar uma mudança de governo. Segundo ele, o objetivo seria instalar no poder forças políticas mais alinhadas aos interesses da União Europeia.
De fato, não há qualquer novidade nisso. Não por acaso, Bruxelas agora discute a possibilidade de impor sanções a todos os dirigentes do Georgian Dream e oficiais do governo georgiano. Mas, ainda assim, estas palavras revelam a dimensão geopolítica da crise. A disputa não é meramente uma controvérsia sobre legislação doméstica, mas uma verdadeira batalha pela orientação estratégica do país.
E aqui aparece o principal risco para a Geórgia. O Cáucaso não é um espaço neutro. A região está localizada entre a Rússia, a Turquia, o Irã e o mundo euro-atlântico. Qualquer tentativa de transformar a Geórgia em uma plataforma de confronto com Moscou teria consequências muito maiores para os próprios georgianos do que para as potências que apoiariam essa política à distância.
A experiência ucraniana tornou essa questão ainda mais evidente. Um Estado pode receber apoio político, financeiro e militar de potências externas e, ao mesmo tempo, acabar pagando o preço mais alto quando a rivalidade entre essas potências se transforma em conflito aberto. Para um país pequeno como a Geórgia, evitar esse destino é uma consideração estratégica elementar.
Foi precisamente nesse ponto que Tbilisi estabeleceu uma diferença em relação a Kiev. Em vez de aceitar a transformação do país em uma nova linha de frente, o governo georgiano procurou preservar relações funcionais com Moscou. Isso não significa uma aliança com a Rússia. A Geórgia continua sem relações diplomáticas formais com Moscou e mantém suas próprias divergências com o Kremlin, mas a prioridade nacional é garantir autonomia estratégica, paz, segurança e desenvolvimento.
Uma Geórgia que evita a confrontação direta com Moscou reduz a possibilidade de abertura de uma nova frente militar nas proximidades das fronteiras russas. Também preserva suas relações econômicas com os países vizinhos e mantém maior liberdade para negociar simultaneamente com diferentes centros de poder.
O que está em jogo é a soberania de um Estado pequeno diante da competição entre grandes potências. E, diante de uma região cada vez mais marcada pela competição entre grandes potências, talvez a questão mais importante não seja perguntar de que lado a Geórgia está, mas como a Geórgia planeja proteger a si mesma diante do confronto de polos vizinhos opostos.
O povo georgiano mostrou que não tem lado algum nas disputas globais senão o seu próprio. E agiu corretamente ao fazê-lo.
Ukraine has published data on 20 vessels that carry Russian oil and liquefied natural gas or refuel the sanctioned fleet, parts of the logistics network the Kremlin uses to fund its war, Ukraine's Defense Intelligence reports. All 20 are under British or Ukrainian sanctions, and only one faces US restrictions.
Russia’s shadow fleet runs on roughly 500 aging ships of uncertain ownership that dodge sanctions and keep oil money flowing. That seaborne oil trade is worth more than 80 billion euros a year.
The headline vessel is the Russian ship Portovyy, an LNG carrier and floating gas store owned by the sanctioned Gazprom since 2021, according to the agency. On 15 August 2026, it left the Gulf of Finland with Russian LNG for the first time since November 2021, sailing the Northern Sea Route to the Chinese port of Beihai to unload.
Portovyy is now at the Zhoushan Huafeng Shipyard in China, which has been set as the site for its maintenance, intelligence says, an example of the foreign yards Kyiv wants closed to the sanctioned fleet.
Two more gas carriers show how Moscow expanded the fleet in spring 2026 through front companies, intelligence said. The Avacha, once owned by China’s Jovo Energy, was bought by the little-known Tudor Maritime of the Marshall Islands, took the Russian flag in June, and now ships gas from the Arctic LNG 2 project to Beihai.
The Chaivo, formerly owned by Greece’s Maran Gas Maritime, was also bought by Tudor Maritime and moved under the Russian flag in July. Now it carries cargo to Beihai from a floating gas storage facility off Kamchatka, intelligence says.
Intelligence urged partners to act together: tighten control over sales of commercially owned ships, block servicing of the sanctioned fleet at foreign yards, and cut off the energy revenue that Russia turns into weapons against civilians.
Russia is building ice-class ships at home and, at the same time, widening its shadow fleet through offshore networks. The UK Foreign Office made the same point on 1 October, saying Moscow is assembling a new shadow fleet to keep its gas revenues flowing.
A Russian air strike with guided bombs on the southeastern city of Zaporizhzhia has killed at least 17 people, including three children, according to Ukraine’s State Emergency Service. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has tied the attack to a US decision to let Russian diesel reach world markets without demanding Moscow halt its strikes on Ukraine first.
On 9 October, President Donald Trump said that Russia would immediately supply more than 300,000 tonnes of diesel fuel to the US and global markets, a further 500,000 tonnes during November, and 1 million tonnes immediately thereafter. The move has already drawn criticism from US lawmakers in both parties.
“Today, Russia expressed its gratitude for the lifting of sanctions on diesel exports by dropping five guided aerial bombs on residential buildings in Zaporizhzhia,” Zelenskyy wrote on Telegram.
These figures were accurate at the time the post was written. Later, the State Emergency Service reported that the death toll had risen by two. Meanwhile, Zelenskyy stated that Ukraine would not stop striking oil refineries that bring additional revenues for the Kremlin, which spends them on the war.
“There will be responses to Russian attacks. Thank you to everyone who is helping,” Zelenskyy concluded.
According to Zelenskyy, two of the injured are in critical condition, and doctors are fighting to save their lives. Information is also being verified regarding another 12 people who may have been at the strike site.
“Thirteen of our regions came under attack overnight. Residential buildings, infrastructure, and railway facilities have been damaged,” the Ukrainian leader said.
Zelenskyy stressed that the latest Russian strikes further demonstrate the need to increase pressure on Russia. In his view, easing restrictions is interpreted by the aggressor as a signal that it can continue the war and attack Ukrainian cities.
“This night provided yet another confirmation that Russia interprets any easing of pressure as a signal that it can supposedly continue fighting and that it can supposedly drop bombs on cities,” he emphasized.
He also noted that Ukraine’s long-range strike capabilities are inflicting such losses on Russia and stressed that Ukraine would respond to Russian attacks.
Russia and the United States have intensified their campaigns against the International Criminal Court (ICC) almost simultaneously, exposing an increasingly consequential convergence between the policies of Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump.
On 8 October, Moscow demanded the extradition of ICC President Tomoko Akane and eight other current and former officials. The following day, Washington announced sanctions against the court as an institution, extending earlier measures against individual judges and prosecutors.
The timing raises an obvious question: are these independent campaigns arising from different disputes with international justice, or do they reflect a broader political understanding between Washington and Moscow?
There is no publicly established evidence of a coordinated operation or an agreement between Trump and Putin to undermine the ICC. Nevertheless, the strategic consequences of their respective actions are remarkably similar. Both weaken an institution pursuing criminal proceedings against political leaders whom the two governments seek to protect.
Russia’s hostility towards the ICC is directly connected to the arrest warrant issued against Putin in March 2023 over the alleged unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children from occupied territories.
The court subsequently issued warrants against senior Russian military commanders, including Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov, over alleged crimes involving attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure.
Moscow’s response has been to pursue ICC personnel through its own criminal justice system. The latest extradition demands follow convictions handed down in absentia by a Russian court in December 2025.
Washington’s confrontation with the ICC has a different immediate origin. The Trump administration objects to the court’s jurisdiction over American nationals and Israeli officials, particularly following the arrest warrants issued against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former defence minister Yoav Gallant.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio has presented the American campaign as a defence of US sovereignty. Yet the sanctions announced on 9 October are not confined to the Israeli proceedings or any investigation involving American personnel.
They target the institution itself, potentially disrupting financial transactions and commercial relationships essential to its operation. This distinction matters because a court-wide restriction necessarily affects investigations beyond those cited by Washington. That includes Ukraine.
The political context cannot be separated from the relationship between Trump and Putin, including their meeting in Anchorage, Alaska, in August 2025.
The summit formed part of Trump’s efforts to negotiate directly with Moscow over the war in Ukraine. The American president has repeatedly treated relations with Putin as a question of diplomatic bargaining, seeking arrangements that might produce an agreement where conventional Western pressure has failed.
Against this background, suggestions that pressure on the ICC might form part of a wider accommodation with Moscow warrant scrutiny. However, the proposition that Trump specifically offered Putin assistance in neutralising the court during their Anchorage discussions remains unsubstantiated. There is no verified public account establishing such a commitment.
A more defensible conclusion is that Washington’s independently declared campaign against the ICC also advances an important Russian interest. For Putin, the benefit is clear. Measures designed to restrict the court’s financial and administrative capacity could complicate investigations into Russian conduct, irrespective of the American administration’s stated intentions.
The relationship therefore need not involve explicit coordination to produce politically significant results.
The escalation from targeting individual prosecutors to sanctioning the entire ICC represents a substantial change. Previous American measures imposed personal and financial restrictions on selected officials. The latest approach threatens the broader infrastructure upon which international criminal proceedings depend.
The court requires banking facilities, secure communications, technology services and commercial suppliers. American sanctions can reach beyond US territory because of the international financial system’s dependence on dollar transactions and American service providers.
The ICC had already anticipated this vulnerability. According to details disclosed in September, the institution has pursued alternatives to American software and financial services to reduce its exposure.
Nevertheless, operational continuity and investigative effectiveness are not necessarily the same thing. The court may remain formally functional while facing additional costs, delays and restrictions affecting prosecutors, investigators and international cooperation.
For Ukraine, this is particularly significant. The ICC holds and evaluates evidence connected to alleged Russian war crimes, including the deportation of children and attacks on civilian infrastructure. Its proceedings preserve a judicial process independent of whatever diplomatic settlement Washington and Moscow might eventually negotiate.
Weakening that capacity would not invalidate existing warrants or automatically destroy evidence, but it could make the pursuit of accountability more difficult.
The European Union now faces a dispute with Washington over an institution that European governments have spent decades supporting.
On 9 October, eight governments issued a joint statement, reaffirming their support for the ICC and rejecting the American sanctions. The signatories included Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Britain, Japan and Canada.
The European Commission also indicated that the EU was prepared to take measures necessary to preserve the court’s operations. Such assurances are politically important, but they do not automatically resolve the practical consequences of American restrictions.
European financial institutions and technology suppliers must consider their own exposure to US sanctions. Sustaining the court may require alternative payment arrangements, commercial protections and potentially further European regulatory intervention.
The EU has discussed extending its blocking statute to shield European operators from the effects of American sanctions. Whether that mechanism can provide sufficient protection remains uncertain.
The dispute also extends beyond the ICC’s current investigations. Ukraine and the Council of Europe are developing a separate Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression, designed to address jurisdictional limitations preventing the ICC from prosecuting Russia’s leadership for the decision to launch the invasion.
The two institutions have distinct legal mandates, although cooperation between them is envisaged. Undermining the ICC would not automatically prevent the special tribunal from operating, but it would weaken an important part of the wider international accountability framework.
Washington and Moscow have not adopted identical positions towards the ICC. Russia seeks to discredit and punish the officials responsible for pursuing Putin. The Trump administration is attempting to restrict the court’s authority and operational capacity, principally in response to proceedings involving Americans and Israelis.
Yet their actions converge at precisely the point where the ICC’s independence becomes politically inconvenient. The distinction between motive and consequence is essential. It would be premature to describe the American sanctions as evidence of a secret bargain struck in Anchorage. It would be equally mistaken to overlook the assistance these measures could provide to Moscow.
The broader concern is that the United States, traditionally central to Western efforts to hold Russia accountable for its invasion of Ukraine, is now applying pressure to one of the principal institutions carrying out that work.
For European governments, the immediate question is no longer simply whether they support the International Criminal Court. It is whether they are prepared to protect its practical independence when the political and financial pressure comes not only from Russia, but also from Washington.
Until Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Czech Vanadium was among the European companies which clearly had Russian owners.
Since 2007, the company has been controlled through the Evraz group by Russian businessman Roman Abramovich, who is close to Russian leader Vladimir Putin.
The ferrovanadium producer was part of a chain through which vanadium ore mined in Russia reached Europe before being sent on to Abramovich’s factories in the US. Ferrovanadium is an alloy added to steel to help improve its properties. And Czech Republic accounts for six percent of global production.
But sanctions following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 forced the oligarch to sell up.
Evraz, the holding company in which Abramovich is the largest shareholder, supplied the Russian army, according to media reports. But Evraz denied this.
In 2024, the Abu Dhabi-based company Metco (now ‘Metco Holding’) became the sole shareholder in the Czech factory, but it is not clear who controls it.
Czech authorities and police suspect the transfer of the vanadium factory to a new parent company in the UAE may conceal the true owner. They are seeking to establish who is really behind the opaque company in the Persian Gulf, and whether it is still Roman Abramovich.
According to Deník N sources familiar with the investigation, specialists from Czech police bodies for organised crime (NCOZ) and the financial intelligence unit (FAÚ) are involved.
“Yes, we are investigating who is behind the company. There are many leads and the suspicion is clear that the company may still be backed by its former owners from Russia,” a source close to the investigation confirmed.
NCOZ spokesperson Jaroslav Ibehej declined to comment in more detail on the search for Czech Vanadium’s beneficial owner. “As a rule, we neither confirm nor deny what we are working on,” he said.
According to documents in the Czech judicial database, the company is formally controlled by one owner — a Dubai-based lawyer of Indian origin who provides nominee services for beneficial owners. The lawyer has been linked to money-laundering investigations in Ukraine and Moldova.
The officially declared owner of Czech Vanadium is Nikhil Skariah Kolekunnel. According to the ADGM free zone business register in the UAE, he is both the sole shareholder and director of Metco Holding.
However, the Gulf state’s database does not disclose so-called beneficiaries, who are entitled to the company’s profits and may also secretly control it.
Although the Czech judicial register lists Skariah as Czech Vanadium’s beneficial owner, this does not necessarily indicate the person exercising control in the background. For example, trustees of trust funds are also listed in the registers as beneficial owners.
The nature of Skariah Kolekunnel’s business suggests that he performs the specific role of an administrator, a so-called fiduciary — someone who accepts an ownership mandate and effectively manages another person’s assets.
He is a lawyer originally from India who founded two law firms in the UAE years ago. His companies represent large corporations and businesspeople who do not wish to publicly acknowledge ownership of a business.
“South Bridge Legal is an advisory firm for comprehensive business establishment in Dubai, Abu Dhabi and the UAE. Our highly experienced team has been active in the sector for more than 10 years, providing services tailored to the unique needs of every ambitious entrepreneur setting up companies in Dubai,” the company wrote on its website.
“We have all activities, which is tax management, tax consulting, accounting, corporate services, offshore company formation, free zone company formation…everything,” Skariah said in a recently published video on YouTube.
Metco Holding’s address in Abu Dhabi suggests it may be a shell company. And it is headquartered from a WeWork.
‘Skariah’, the name of the Indian administrator, had already emerged eight years ago in connection with the concealment of ownership structures during an investigation into the privatisation of Moldova’s national airline. At the time, Skariah appeared as the owner of the opaque company Gold Craft FZE, established in Dubai in 2015.
“On Monday 1 October 2018, one day before the privatisation agreement for Air Moldova was signed, a plane from Istanbul landed at Chișinău International Airport. One of the passengers, a 39-year-old man, was carrying nearly €2.6m in cash in his luggage. He declared the money to customs officers, which, according to the Office for the Prevention and Fight against Money Laundering, he had borrowed four days earlier from Gold Craft FZE in the United Arab Emirates,” the investigative outlet RISE Moldova reported.
It finds that Andrei Ianovici brought cash from Dubai, equivalent to tens of millions of Czech crowns. Later that day, he deposited the money in a bank, and it ended up in the accounts of Civil Aviation Group SRL. That company privatised Air Moldova, and Ianovici was one of its partners.
The true origin of the money was never established, leading local investigators to suspect that the money had not been earned legally. No charges were brought, however.
According to court records, Skariah was also involved in disputes in Ukraine, where Gold Craft FZE claimed ownership of an Ilyushin aircraft which the company allegedly purchased in 2017.
However, the UAE-based lawyer was not the only individual to have emerged as an administrator of Czech Vanadium. Another is Sergei Gushchin.
A man of this name was formerly a prominent Russian businessman in rail freight transport and, although he withdrew from Russia three years ago, he appears on Ukrainian sanctions lists for supporting the Russian army.
Gushchin became a senior manager at PJSC TransContainer, a Russian rail freight carrier, after Evraz sold its stake. In the past, a quarter of the company was owned by the holding company of Abramovich.
Meanwhile another of Gushchin’s companies, Rail Service, formed a joint venture with Evraz in 2019 focused on the production of railway wheels.
According to a UAE register, Gushchin was a director and shareholder of Metco, which became Czech Vanadium’s parent company from 2022-23.
US credit-rating agency Moody’s shared data with Deník N that listed Gushchin as a recent beneficiary of Metco Holding and as the company’s director.
Czech Vanadium’s revenues regularly exceed €81m, and in 2024 the company reported profits of more than €8m. This summer, the company sent over €0.6m of that sum to the Dubai company, the remaining funds staying in its retained earnings account.
Last year, the company recorded a modest €0.2m loss. Its accounts retained more than €12m in undistributed profits in total.
Czech Vanadium’s business remains closely tied to Russia. Last year alone, vanadium oxides or hydroxides worth nearly €82m were imported into the Czech Republic from the Russian Federation. Russia is effectively the sole supplier of the raw materials needed to produce ferrovanadium. According to the statistical office database, exports mainly go to the United States, as well as Germany and Taiwan.
Czech Vanadium did not reply to requests for comment or an explanation of its ownership structure.
It also did not answer the question of how a Dubai lawyer had bought the Czech company, which, according to some estimates, is worth more than €40m.
Company representatives have not responded to questions about its owners since 2024, when the company left the Evraz group structure.
Jiří Skuhrovec, an analyst at Datlab, specialises in the global vetting of business partners. He says Abramovich uses a similar model for concealing ownership in the United States.
Sanctions also forced the Russian oligarch, who became better known through his former ownership of the British football club Chelsea, to withdraw from US companies. But Skuhrovec concluded that they were probably still controlled by people linked to Abramovich just like the factory in Czech Republic.
“We mapped the entire chain, from the Russian ore supplier through the Czech smelter to the final recipient: the US company Strategic Alloys LLC. Until recently, all three companies officially belonged to Abramovich, and all three are now controlled by people with links to his Evraz group. Abramovich may therefore still secretly control the entire supply chain for this strategic raw material. This would be a textbook case of sanctions circumvention, as well as an obvious security risk,” Skuhrovec said.
Findings led Datlab and Transparency International to submit a complaint to police. “We believe that the 16m Czech crowns (around €655,000) in distributed profit may have gone to Abramovich, who is on a sanctions list. That would constitute a criminal offence,” the analyst explained.
Login