A new Council of Europe protocol is intended to strengthen cross-border investigations, confiscation and the recovery of criminal wealth. European authorities currently recover only a small proportion of the proceeds generated by organised and financial crime.

The European Union has signed an international agreement strengthening the recovery of criminal assets, as Brussels seeks to address the failure of national authorities to confiscate the overwhelming majority of wealth generated through organised crime, corruption and money laundering.

The agreement, opened for signature in Strasbourg on Wednesday, 14 October, introduces additional provisions governing the identification, freezing, confiscation and management of assets held across national borders.

It supplements the Council of Europe’s Warsaw Convention, which established an international framework for cooperation against money laundering and the financing of terrorism.

The Additional Protocol adopted by the Council of Europe extends existing asset-recovery mechanisms and strengthens the ability of national authorities to cooperate when criminal proceeds are transferred beyond the country where an offence occurred.

The financial foundations of organised crime

European authorities have long struggled to deprive criminal organisations of the profits generated by their activities.

An estimate frequently cited by European institutions suggests that only around one per cent of criminal proceeds are ultimately confiscated.

The figure highlights a persistent weakness in criminal enforcement. Police and prosecutors may identify offenders and secure convictions without recovering the money used to finance further criminal operations.

Organised crime networks can distribute their assets through bank accounts, companies, property holdings and intermediaries operating in different jurisdictions.

Investigators must establish the origin and ownership of those assets, obtain the necessary legal orders and secure cooperation from foreign authorities before funds or property can be transferred again.

The problem has become increasingly serious as criminal organisations operate across several countries while enforcement powers remain largely national.

In an earlier examination of Europe’s response to drug-trafficking networks, EU Today reported on the importance of confiscating criminal assets rather than concentrating exclusively on arrests and drug seizures.

The financial structures supporting trafficking organisations can survive the prosecution of individual members, allowing criminal enterprises to replace personnel and continue operations.

New powers for cross-border investigations

The protocol is intended to address practical obstacles encountered when authorities seek assistance from another country.

Its provisions cover international cooperation in asset recovery, the management of seized property and the execution of confiscation decisions.

They also address circumstances in which confiscation may be possible without a conventional criminal conviction, subject to the safeguards and legal requirements established by participating states.

Such arrangements can be particularly relevant when suspects have fled, proceedings cannot be completed or assets are held through structures designed to conceal their ownership.

The protocol also provides for improved cooperation between designated asset-recovery authorities.

These mechanisms are intended to reduce the delays that can arise when investigators must navigate different national procedures while attempting to secure property that may be rapidly moved or disposed of.

The Council of Europe’s treaty documentation explains that the protocol seeks to update the Warsaw Convention in accordance with developments in international anti-money laundering standards.

The revised framework has also been developed with reference to EU rules and the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force.

Existing European legislation

The agreement builds on legislation already adopted within the European Union.

The 2024 Asset Recovery and Confiscation Directive established stronger provisions concerning the tracing, freezing, confiscation and management of assets associated with criminal activity.

That directive is intended to improve national asset-recovery systems and strengthen cooperation between authorities.

The EU has separately developed a new anti-money laundering framework, including the establishment of the Frankfurt-based Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism.

The authority has responsibilities concerning the supervision of high-risk financial institutions and coordination between national bodies combating illicit financial activity.

The new Council of Europe protocol addresses a related but distinct problem: how authorities recover assets once suspected criminal proceeds have been identified, particularly when those assets are located in another jurisdiction.

An earlier EU Today report on criminal enforcement of sanctions violations illustrated the importance of asset confiscation in cases involving breaches of European restrictions.

Although sanctions enforcement and organised crime investigations operate under different legal arrangements, both can require authorities to identify property, obtain judicial orders and prevent assets from being moved beyond their reach.

Ratification and implementation

The protocol was adopted by the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers on 15 May 2026 and opened for signature on 14 October.

The European Union’s participation requires further legal procedures before the new provisions become binding.

The Commission had previously submitted proposals authorising the EU to sign the agreement, reflecting the division of responsibilities between the Union and its member states in criminal justice and financial regulation.

Individual governments must also determine how the international obligations interact with national procedures governing investigations, property rights and confiscation.

The effectiveness of the agreement will depend on the speed of its implementation and the resources available to investigators, prosecutors and financial intelligence authorities.

Criminal organisations can transfer funds internationally through transactions completed in minutes. Judicial cooperation and the enforcement of confiscation decisions frequently require considerably longer.

The protocol offers governments additional instruments for narrowing that gap, but cannot eliminate the administrative and legal obstacles without corresponding improvements in national enforcement.

For European authorities, the practical measure of success will be the amount of criminal wealth that can be identified and recovered.

The Strasbourg agreement provides a wider legal framework for that task at a time when the profits generated by organised crime continue to exceed the assets confiscated by enforcement agencies.

EU ministers have reviewed reforms introduced by Prime Minister Péter Magyar’s administration but left the Article 7 proceedings against Hungary unresolved. The European Commission has acknowledged significant progress while warning that further changes are required to restore the rule of law.

The European Union has maintained its Article 7 proceedings against Hungary despite acknowledging significant improvements in the country’s rule-of-law situation since Prime Minister Péter Magyar’s government took office earlier this year.

Ministers meeting at the General Affairs Council in Luxembourg on Tuesday, 13 October, reviewed reforms introduced by the Hungarian administration and received an updated assessment from the European Commission.

The proceedings, initiated by the European Parliament in September 2018, remain open eight years after concerns over judicial independence, corruption, media freedom and democratic accountability first prompted action under the EU treaties.

No decision was announced to terminate the procedure following the latest meeting.

Brussels acknowledges progress

European Commissioner Michael McGrath said ahead of the discussions that Hungary had made substantial progress towards addressing the institutional problems inherited from the administration of former prime minister Viktor Orbán.

Speaking in Luxembourg, McGrath acknowledged improved cooperation between the Hungarian government and European institutions.

However, he also indicated that the reform process remained incomplete, noting that the new administration had been in office for only several months.

The Commission’s assessment reflects the changing relationship between Budapest and Brussels following Magyar’s election victory and the subsequent introduction of reforms intended to restore judicial and institutional independence.

As EU Today reported in June, the change of government created an opportunity to resolve long-standing disputes over the condition of Hungary’s democratic institutions and the suspension of European funding.

The latest Council discussions indicate that the EU is prepared to recognise reforms already undertaken without automatically treating them as sufficient to close the Article 7 procedure.

An eight-year institutional dispute

The European Parliament initiated the proceedings in 2018 after raising concerns over developments affecting Hungary’s constitutional system, judicial independence, corruption safeguards and civil society.

Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union provides mechanisms for responding when a member state is considered at risk of seriously breaching the Union’s fundamental values.

Under its preventive provisions, the Council can determine whether there is a clear risk of such a breach.

More severe measures, including the possible suspension of certain membership rights, require additional procedures and higher institutional thresholds.

Hungary’s case has remained within the preventive stage, with successive Council meetings examining the country’s legal and political developments.

The Council’s account of the 13 October meeting confirms that Hungarian representatives presented measures intended to address concerns raised by the European Parliament and member states during earlier proceedings.

The Commission also briefed ministers on its latest assessment.

The meeting did not produce a formal finding that the outstanding concerns had been fully resolved.

Magyar faces the consequences of Orbán’s legacy

Since assuming office, Magyar has sought to reverse elements of the institutional structure established during Orbán’s lengthy premiership.

The reforms have included measures concerning public administration, judicial accountability and the relationship between national institutions and European law.

The new government has also attempted to improve relations with Brussels after years of disputes that affected EU budget decisions, sanctions policy and cooperation over Ukraine.

EU Today has previously examined Magyar’s programme of institutional renewal and the political difficulties involved in changing institutions shaped by the previous administration.

Reforming legislation does not necessarily transform the institutions responsible for applying it.

Judicial appointments, regulatory structures, public procurement procedures and anti-corruption enforcement may all require additional measures before the effects of reform can be fully assessed.

The European Commission must therefore consider not only the laws adopted by the new government but also whether the institutions concerned operate independently and effectively.

EU funding remains a separate question

The Article 7 proceedings are closely associated with wider disputes over Hungary’s access to European funding, although the relevant legal mechanisms are different.

During Orbán’s administration, the Commission and Council used financial conditionality procedures to restrict access to certain EU resources because of concerns affecting the protection of the Union’s budget.

Magyar’s reforms have opened the possibility of reversing some of those restrictions.

As EU Today reported in September, the Commission moved towards releasing €4.2 billion following changes intended to address rule-of-law concerns.

The financial decisions involve compliance with conditions attached to EU funding and can proceed independently of the Article 7 mechanism.

Consequently, the release of money does not automatically establish that all the institutional problems identified in the original parliamentary proceedings have been resolved.

Likewise, the continuation of Article 7 does not necessarily prevent the Commission from recognising progress under separate funding arrangements.

Who can end the proceedings?

McGrath addressed the possibility of terminating the procedure during remarks before Tuesday’s meeting.

He explained that the Commission could provide its assessment but did not have unilateral authority to bring the Article 7 process to an end.

In his recorded statement in Luxembourg, the Commissioner pointed to the responsibilities of the European Parliament, which initiated the case, and the Council, which has conducted the subsequent examination.

The institutional arrangements mean that improved relations between the Commission and the Hungarian government cannot by themselves dispose of the proceedings.

The Council must consider the reforms and the remaining concerns within the framework established by the treaties.

Political agreement among member states will consequently be required to determine how the process develops.

A changed relationship with Brussels

The latest discussions take place against a substantially different political background from previous years.

Budapest has recently withdrawn objections to further steps in Ukraine’s EU accession negotiations following Ukrainian legislation addressing educational rights for Hungarian speakers and other national minorities.

The change has removed one obstacle to enlargement negotiations and reflects the government’s more cooperative approach towards other EU institutions.

Nevertheless, Hungary’s position on foreign policy and enlargement is distinct from the assessment of its domestic rule-of-law arrangements.

The Council’s examination remains focused on the institutional concerns that led to the procedure being initiated.

The Irish presidency’s summary of the October Council meeting confirms that ministers received an update rather than reaching a new formal determination.

The proceedings therefore remain open while the Commission and member states continue examining the measures introduced by Magyar’s administration.

The coming decisions will establish how European institutions respond when a new government undertakes reforms intended to reverse the conduct that originally led to action under Article 7.

For Hungary, the outcome will influence its relationship with Brussels well beyond the immediate debate over EU funding. For the Union, it will demonstrate how its rule-of-law procedures operate when political circumstances change and the member state concerned begins addressing previously identified institutional problems.

European businesses rely increasingly on artificial intelligence (AI).

That is what the results of the latest Eurobarometer survey.

The publication coincides with the European AI Innovation Month that brings together policymakers, industry, public sector, and research to discuss and showcase … Read more

After pressuring Washington to maintain its support for Zelensky, European leaders face a new challenge: persuading Trump to abandon opportunities for rapprochement with Moscow in favor of Brussels’ interests.

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Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

Since the meeting between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin in Anchorage in August 2025, European governments have worked to prevent a significant shift in American policy toward Russia. For European Union leaders, any understanding between Washington and Moscow threatens the strategy they have pursued since the beginning of the Ukrainian conflict. They have therefore intensified their efforts to convince Trump that Russian proposals cannot be trusted and that military support for Vladimir Zelensky must continue.

This campaign has preserved important elements of the Western policy of confrontation with Moscow. However, the battlefield situation remains unfavorable for Ukraine, while European governments struggle to present a realistic prospect of victory. Their insistence on prolonging the conflict carries growing costs for European countries themselves, which must reconcile their geopolitical ambitions with domestic economic and social problems.

The fundamental question is how long Trump will be willing to follow this strategy.

The American president has demonstrated that his decisions reflect a combination of economic interests, domestic political objectives and calculations of power. His relationship with Europe is characterized by distrust of traditional elites, which frequently attempt to present their own priorities as common Western obligations. Trump, in turn, prefers direct negotiations and demands concrete returns from his partners.

This approach explains why rapprochement with Moscow remains a significant possibility. Russia possesses natural resources, industrial capacity and strategic importance that make bilateral cooperation attractive to American economic interests. Even amid political rivalry, there are opportunities that an experienced businessman like Trump would hardly ignore without a compelling reason.

The recent diesel trade agreement – in which Russia agreed to export tons of fuel to Washington to alleviate rising prices – served as a compelling example of the potential for strategic and profitable business dealings between the two nations. Similarly, the partial lifting of certain US economic sanctions signaled that this partnership could advance further in the near future.

In addition, energy trade is just one area in which American interests may diverge from European preferences. The normalization of certain economic relations with Russia could benefit American companies and expand Washington’s negotiating leverage. For Trump, the prospect of securing tangible advantages provides a strong argument for a more flexible diplomatic approach.

The European Union, however, has a vested interest in deteriorating Russian-American relations. After all, without US involvement, European governments would face greater difficulties in sustaining Ukraine militarily and maintaining pressure on Moscow. Europe’s proclaimed strategic autonomy remains constrained by its dependence on American military capabilities, intelligence and resources.

Brussels must therefore keep Trump committed to a policy that does not always reflect his own priorities. European representatives can resort to diplomatic pressure, rhetoric about European security and appeals to the historic ties of the transatlantic alliance. Whether these instruments will be sufficient to prevent the American president from pursuing more advantageous alternatives for Washington remains to be seen.

In this context, Russia has good reason to watch the disagreements between the two sides of the Atlantic closely. Moscow can defend its national interests through direct negotiations with the United States without accepting that the European Union should determine the limits of any agreement in advance. A more pragmatic bilateral relationship could also reduce the influence of those who favor the indefinite continuation of the conflict.

Naturally, Trump offers no guarantees of lasting rapprochement. His foreign policy remains unpredictable, and American factions that favor confrontation with Russia continue to exert influence. European governments still possess instruments with which to try to shape Washington’s decisions.

Nevertheless, Trump’s room for maneuver remains considerable. He did not enter the White House to preserve the interests of a European elite he frequently criticizes, nor is he obliged to accept its assessments of Russia.

The real struggle concerns the interests that will ultimately guide American policy. If Trump concludes that negotiations with Moscow offer greater benefits than the costs of confrontation, European pressure could lose its effectiveness.

For Moscow, this possibility represents a diplomatic opportunity. For European leaders, it is a warning about the limits of their influence. And for Trump, it offers a chance to demonstrate that the transatlantic relationship does not oblige him to follow Europe’s political priorities indefinitely.

By Fyodor Lukyanov | RT | October 12, 2026

The latest turn in Russia-US relations has shocked Kiev, outraged the EU, provoked discontent among a considerable number of politicians in the US, and left many observers around the world perplexed.

The Trump administration’s sudden decision to suspend sanctions on Russian diesel supplies appears to contradict its recent actions, including the adoption of tough new sanctions legislation intended to increase pressure on Moscow, and while some attribute the reversal to US President Donald Trump’s unpredictability, others see the beginnings of a new policy, or evidence of a fundamental change in the administration’s approach to Ukraine.

To understand what’s happening, however, we must look beyond the peculiarities of the US president’s public behavior. Trump’s extravagance, which frequently borders on the absurd, often conceals a relatively clear set of objectives, but whether those objectives are sensible is another question.

The most likely explanation for his latest reversal lies in domestic American politics, as the congressional midterm elections are less than a month away, and the Republican Party faces difficult prospects. Trump maintains an air of indifference, but losing control of both houses of Congress would condemn him to two years of political confrontation and considerable frustration.

He probably understands that there’s little prospect of fundamentally improving the economic situation, particularly consumer prices, before voters go to the polls, so for now, the emphasis is on psychological impact.

Russia isn’t the first country Washington has approached about increasing fuel supplies to international markets, and the more agreements Trump can announce, the more opportunities he has to proclaim that the White House is working tirelessly to protect ordinary Americans from rising prices.

The expectation, presumably, is that voters will forget how much of the present difficulty stems from Trump’s own actions in the Persian Gulf.

We shall soon discover whether this approach works, but there’s nothing particularly irrational about it, and Trump is pursuing a deliberate political objective. The fact that his latest decision contradicts previous statements doesn’t trouble him because he’s long operated on the assumption that words have value at the moment they’re spoken, but impose few obligations thereafter.

What does this mean for Russia, beyond the welcome prospect of additional budget revenues?

Colleagues from the Vatfor project have identified an important development, in that for the first time since the beginning of the conflict, the US president has made a significant decision regarding Russia without making Ukraine the determining consideration.

Until now, the Ukrainian question has been inseparable from virtually every aspect of Washington’s policy towards Moscow, but this time, not only has it been set aside, the decision directly contradicts Kiev’s interests at a particularly difficult moment.

Hence the indignation of the Ukrainian leadership, as from its perspective, the Americans have behaved unfairly.

There are probably several reasons for this change, but the principal one appears to be Ukrainian leader Vladimir Zelensky’s unwillingness to accommodate Washington’s demands that Ukraine stop attacking Russian energy infrastructure.

The strikes have become one of Kiev’s principal instruments of warfare, and American requests to curtail them have largely gone unanswered.

Trump, meanwhile, has become fixated on Russian oil supplies as a means of addressing rising fuel prices, and their importance shouldn’t be exaggerated, even if additional Russian supplies alone are unlikely to transform the global market. Nevertheless, Trump has evidently decided that Zelensky bears responsibility for aggravating the situation.

Once the US president reaches this conclusion, persuading him otherwise becomes extremely difficult. Therefore, for the moment, Kiev’s objections have simply been disregarded.

The more consequential question concerns American intelligence assistance, because to stop, or at least substantially reduce, Ukrainian attacks on Russian targets, Washington would have to restrict the intelligence it provides to Kiev, and much of this information amounts, in practical terms, to targeting assistance.

Trump already demonstrated willingness to use this instrument when around a year and a half ago, he temporarily suspended intelligence cooperation for several days to put pressure on the Ukrainian leadership.

A longer interruption would be a different matter and it would represent a genuine change in Washington’s approach to the conflict, effectively distancing the US from its Ukrainian partner, but whether Trump is prepared to take this step is uncertain.

There is, after all, an extensive informal coalition interested in maintaining the present course, and it includes the US defense industry, increasingly influential technology companies, European governments, and their political allies in Washington.

Trump encountered these forces during his previous attempt to advance his preferred settlement following the Anchorage summit, and that initiative ultimately produced little, so it remains to be seen whether the present effort will fare any better.

If Washington proves unwilling to exert sustained pressure on Kiev, the latest initiative could gradually lose momentum, and this is especially likely after the congressional elections, when the immediate political value of announcing presidential achievements will diminish.

The decisive question, therefore, is whether the US leadership can compel its partners to move in the direction it considers necessary, and if it can, an opportunity for further negotiations on a settlement could emerge.

There’s also a second conclusion which is particularly important for Russia, because Washington’s latest actions offer a glimpse of how Russia-US relations could develop after the military phase of the conflict ends.

The enormous collection of sanctions imposed on Russia is unlikely to disappear, and removing them would be exceptionally difficult, both procedurally and politically, given too many restrictions have become embedded in law and institutional practice.

Instead, the sanctions will probably remain formally in place, while decisions about their enforcement are taken according to circumstances; thus, when a particular restriction conflicts with US interests, Washington could suspend its application, but when the circumstances change, it can be restored.

In other words, sanctions will become instruments to be activated or deactivated according to immediate political and economic requirements, rather than permanent expressions of an immutable policy, and this is an important distinction between the American and European approaches.

The Americans generally display a greater degree of pragmatism as they are perfectly capable of proclaiming principles with great conviction, abandoning them when circumstances demand it, and returning to the same principles when doing so becomes convenient. European governments, by contrast, have increasingly bound themselves to political commitments from which retreat is both institutionally complicated and publicly embarrassing.

For Moscow, understanding this difference will be essential when constructing its future relationship with Washington now that the confrontation over Ukraine has reached a stage at which its consequences extend far beyond the immediate military and territorial questions.

Whatever the eventual outcome, it will help determine the structure of future political relations between Russia and the various components of the Western world, and while that structure is already beginning to emerge, its geometry remains unsettled, and the lines are still moving.

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Fyodor Lukyanov is the editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs, chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, and research director of the Valdai International Discussion Club.

The Spanish prime minister has been a lonely champion of progressive values in the EU. But the polls look ominous

When it comes to risk-taking, Spain’s prime minister, Pedro Sánchez, has a formidable track record. In 2018, the Socialist party leader swept to power by triggering a no-confidence vote that unexpectedly ousted his centre-right predecessor Mariano Rajoy. He held on to it against the odds after calling a snap election in 2023, at a time when the popularity of his own party had plummeted and the far right was on the rise.

As he endures another rocky period in office, Mr Sánchez has once more rolled the dice. Last week, he announced a snap poll for November after his minority government was blocked from passing measures to ease Spain’s chronic housing crisis. The eviction of 87-year-old María del Carmen Abascal from her Madrid home sparked nationwide protests over soaring rents and prices. The outrage grew with news of her death last Wednesday. Mr Sánchez clearly hopes that campaigning on a national cause célèbre gives him a chance of winning a stronger progressive mandate next month.

Do you have an opinion on the issues raised in this article? If you would like to submit a response of up to 300 words by email to be considered for publication in our letters section, please click here.

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© Photograph: Javier Soriano/AFP/Getty Images

© Photograph: Javier Soriano/AFP/Getty Images

© Photograph: Javier Soriano/AFP/Getty Images

By Freddie Ponton | 21st Century Wire | October 12, 2026

For four years, Europe presented its energy break with Russia as a strategic and moral necessity, with Brussels expanding sanctions, promising to cut Moscow’s revenues and preparing a complete ban on Russian liquefied natural gas. Yet European companies bought more LNG from Russia’s Yamal project in the first nine months of 2026 than in the same period of 2025.

EU ports received a record 12.18 million tonnes of Yamal LNG between January and September 2026, an increase of 9.5% over the same period in 2025. The gas arrived in 167 cargoes, roughly one every 1.6 days. The EU received 85% of Yamal’s recorded deliveries by volume even as the project’s worldwide shipments fell by 1.3%.

Urgewald, a German environmental and human rights organisation, placed the estimated benchmark value of those deliveries at €7.88 billion, using cargo volumes and monthly European TTF gas prices rather than disclosed contract payments. European leaders spoke of economic separation while EU ports remained the destination for a multibillion-euro Russian LNG trade.

Sanctions that preserved trade

The EU’s ban on Russian LNG under existing short-term contracts took effect on 25 April 2026. Eligible long-term agreements signed before 17 June 2025 could continue supplying Europe through the end of 2026, with the prohibition taking effect on 1 January 2027. Brussels could announce the coming break while established contracts kept Russian cargoes moving.

Five months after the ban on imports under eligible short-term LNG contracts took effect, EU ports received 792,440 tonnes of Yamal LNG in September, slightly more than a year earlier.

Yamal sold most of its output under long-term contracts signed before the war. TotalEnergies agreed to buy 4 million tonnes a year directly from the project, CNPC contracted 3 million, Germany’s SEFE inherited a 2.9 million tonne agreement, and Spain’s Naturgy held another for 2.5 million tonnes. Novatek sold part of its own allocation through separate agreements with TotalEnergies, Shell and Gunvor, now known as Centalion Group Ltd, These contracts kept major European energy companies commercially tied to Yamal after the political rupture with Moscow, securing supplies that could be sold or traded through their international portfolios, with destination flexibility varying by agreement.

TotalEnergies chief executive Patrick Pouyanné confirmed that its Yamal agreements were linked to Brent crude. During periods of extreme volatility, those long-term contracts secured supplies that could cost less than replacement gas on the European spot market. When spot prices outpaced oil-linked purchase prices, the gap created an opportunity to earn more from selling the contracted cargoes.

Buyers could exploit that opportunity through global portfolios spanning ships, terminals, storage facilities and supplies from several producing countries. They could exchange cargoes, redirect available gas and meet customer obligations from alternative sources, freeing supplies for sale in markets offering stronger returns.

Russian officials acknowledged that portfolio buyers could swap Yamal supplies against gas from other sources and direct available cargoes towards the most lucrative markets. A Yamal cargo could fulfil one obligation while freeing another supply for sale elsewhere, allowing traders to earn from price differences across markets.

The contracts that bound companies to Russian suppliers also secured access to gas that could cost less than replacement cargoes bought at crisis prices. Keeping those agreements meant preserving both the supply and the trading opportunities it created.

The profits behind the policy

TotalEnergies owns 20% of Yamal LNG and holds 19.4% of Novatek, the project’s controlling shareholder. It also buys and markets Yamal cargoes, giving it commercial interests as both a shareholder and a cargo trader.

In July 2026, chief executive Patrick Pouyanné told analysts that lifting and selling Yamal cargoes generated an average of about $400 million annually. TotalEnergies had direct access to the cash booked through its UK trading entity. The income fluctuated with Brent crude prices because the contracts were linked to oil.

TotalEnergies also retained rights to dividends through its ownership positions, although sanctions limited its ability to transfer those funds from Russia to Europe. Pouyanné confirmed that some cash flows had been distributed without disclosing how much had been repatriated, while the company’s Novatek dividends, which he had valued at around $600 million annually in 2024, had previously remained stuck abroad.

The commercial incentive extended beyond the immediate Yamal income, as continued deliveries preserved access to contracted gas while removing Russian LNG before replacement supplies became available could drive prices higher across the wider market. Pouyanné warned at a French Senate hearing that replacing those supplies would force Europe to pay more, and told analysts in April 2024 that sanctions on Yamal would benefit TotalEnergies’ global portfolio by pushing LNG prices higher.

TotalEnergies had commercial interests under either outcome, as continued Yamal trade generated sales income while a sudden prohibition could tighten supply and raise the value of gas sold elsewhere in its portfolio. Continued access and greater scarcity offered different routes to income, leaving the company with a potential financial benefit even if Russian deliveries stopped.

A French Senate inquiry called in 2024 for France to lead efforts to sanction Russian LNG and end its own imports as soon as possible, yet two years later TotalEnergies was still earning about $400 million annually from Yamal sales.

Germany’s retained Russian contract

Germany’s state-owned energy group SEFE inherited a contract for about 2.9 million tonnes of Yamal LNG annually through the former Gazprom Marketing & Trading business, after Berlin nationalised its parent company, Gazprom Germania, in 2022. The group became Securing Energy for Europe, retaining the Russian supply agreement under German state ownership.

SEFE’s trading operation later attributed substantial profits across its LNG portfolio to contractual flexibility, freight optimisation and arbitrage, while its 2024 financial report recorded £411.2 million in EBITDA and £199.4 million in profit after tax. Those figures covered SEFE Marketing & Trading and its subsidiaries, without isolating the contribution from Yamal.

That flexibility extended to its Indian supply obligations, for which Reuters reported that the business had arranged cargoes from other sources to reduce freight costs. SEFE’s chief executive also explained that it could retain Yamal supplies in Europe and serve India from elsewhere in its portfolio when doing so was cheaper, although that account described an available trading option rather than documenting individual cargo swaps.

Under German state ownership, SEFE retained a long-term agreement for about 2.9 million tonnes of Yamal LNG annually, even as Europe sought to reduce its dependence on Russian energy. Berlin’s nationalisation changed the ownership of Gazprom’s former German business, but the Russian supply agreement remained in place, preserving its commercial ties to Yamal inside a state-owned international trader.

Shell’s phased withdrawal

On 8 March 2022, Shell announced a phased withdrawal from Russian hydrocarbons, including oil, gas and LNG, but later acknowledged that long-term contractual commitments remained despite the end of its spot purchases of Russian LNG.

Among those commitments was a 2015 agreement with Novatek for approximately 900,000 tonnes of Yamal LNG annually, with a term exceeding 20 years. In February 2023, a Shell spokesperson confirmed that the company was still receiving Russian LNG cargoes under that contract, almost a year after announcing its withdrawal.

Shell’s Yamal agreement sat within a global LNG portfolio, with its cargoes passing through a contractual transhipment point at Montoir-de-Bretagne in France. Across the wider business, Shell used its international operations to capture differences in regional demand and prices, and chief executive Wael Sawan attributed strong late-2023 trading results to arbitrage between eastern and western markets. Those results demonstrate the commercial value of portfolio flexibility, without identifying how much came from Yamal.

Naturgy and former Gunvor also retained access to Yamal supplies through long-term agreements, with Naturgy contracted for 2.5 million tonnes annually and Centalion Group Ltd,  for about 500,000 tonnes through Novatek. Reporting on Yamal’s portfolio buyers describes how companies could exchange those supplies with gas sourced elsewhere and direct cargoes towards more lucrative markets.

The contracts therefore carried commercial opportunities alongside their obligations, preserving access to gas that could be sold or exchanged within wider portfolios. Remaining in the trade could generate value even where companies presented their continuing purchases as a contractual constraint, although that potential should not be confused with a verified profit from each agreement.

Russian gas beyond Nord Stream

On 7 February 2022, then US President Joe Biden stood beside German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and said that a Russian invasion would bring Nord Stream 2 to an end. Asked how Washington could achieve that when Germany controlled the project, he maintained that the United States could ensure the outcome without explaining the mechanism.

Germany halted Nord Stream 2’s certification on 22 February 2022, preventing a pipeline that had never entered commercial service from beginning operations. Nord Stream 1 had already stopped delivering gas when explosions ruptured three of the system’s four pipeline strings on 26 September 2022, leaving only one Nord Stream 2 string intact. With the Nord Stream route out of operation, Russian LNG continued reaching European terminals through the contracts held by companies such as TotalEnergies, SEFE and Shell.

Yamal had begun exporting LNG in December 2017, almost five years before the Nord Stream explosions, and its seaborne supply network survived the loss of the pipelines. European companies continued buying Russian gas under long-term contracts, receiving by-sea supplies that remained commercially valuable even as the direct pipeline connection between Russia and Germany stood idle.

America captured the market

The decline of Russian pipeline supplies opened a larger European market for American LNG, and Washington worked with Brussels to expand the trade. In their 25 March 2022 agreement, the United States pledged to work towards at least 15 billion cubic metres of additional LNG for the EU that year, including supplies from international partners, while maintaining a regulatory environment that would support additional export capacity. The European Commission committed to working with member states to secure demand for approximately 50 billion cubic metres of additional American LNG annually until at least 2030, giving the effort to reduce Russian dependence a long-term market for US supplies.

American deliveries to the EU rose from 22 billion cubic metres in 2021 to 56 billion in 2022, exceeding the initial expansion target. By the second quarter of 2026, the United States supplied 63.2% of EU LNG imports, with Russia second at 17.3%. Europe’s retreat from Russian pipeline gas had been accompanied by a US-European policy effort to expand American supply, while Russian LNG retained a substantial place in the same market.

Dependence became leverage

Europe’s reliance on American supplies extended beyond LNG, giving Washington leverage over another essential fuel when the Trump administration asked the EU to release 120 million barrels of emergency diesel over six months. Washington presented reserve releases as an alternative to restricting American diesel exports, a threat with considerable force because the United States supplied around half of the EU’s diesel imports in August 2026.

Washington was pressing Europe to release finished diesel that could reach consumers without further refining, while its own emergency contribution consisted of crude offered to companies under loan arrangements requiring repayment in oil with additional barrels. The US Department of Energy’s September solicitation explicitly built replenishment into those contracts, leaving Europe under pressure to draw on immediately usable fuel while American releases carried a contractual obligation to restore its crude reserves.

The pressure was followed by a G7 agreement on 2 October 2026 to coordinate the release of 100 million barrels over four months, with a substantial diesel release brought forward into the first 20 days. G7 leaders also reaffirmed their commitment to refrain from energy export restrictions against one another, placing continued access to supplies alongside the agreement to draw down emergency stocks.

Washington had helped build a larger European market for American energy as part of the effort to reduce dependence on Russia, then used the prospect of restricting diesel exports to press European governments to release their reserves. Europe’s reliance on an allied supplier had left it exposed to pressure over access to fuel, with emergency stocks becoming part of the negotiation over keeping those supplies flowing.

A credibility crisis

European leaders need to explain how their effort to cut Russia’s energy revenues can be reconciled with rising Yamal deliveries to EU ports and European traders earning income from the cargoes. TotalEnergies’ disclosure of about $400 million in annual income makes continued trade harder to present solely as an unwanted contractual obligation, when the same agreement also sustained a valuable business. Compliance with the sanctions timetable does not resolve the political contradiction; it shows how much commerce that timetable allowed to continue.

Brussels also committed to building long-term demand for American LNG, while Washington later demonstrated its willingness to use fuel exports as leverage over European governments.

Whose interests are being served when Europe distances itself from Russian pipeline supplies, remains a paying customer for Russian LNG and becomes more exposed to American pressure?

European leaders owe their citizens an explanation of why Russia remained an acceptable supplier for profitable LNG contracts while economic separation was presented as a strategic necessity. They must also explain whose interests were served by replacing that dependence with greater exposure to Washington.

par Alvaro GARCIA LINERA

En 1858, Karl Marx avait prédit l’ascension de l’Asie au rang de centre du capitalisme. Aujourd’hui, la Chine confirme sa prophétie en occupant une position dominante dans l’économie mondiale (19,9% du PIB mondial en PPA) et dans le secteur industriel : elle est en tête dans 7 des 10 industries les plus avancées, dans la transition énergétique et dans la fabrication de haute technologie. Sa croissance a multiplié son économie par 54 depuis 1990 grâce à la planification et aux investissements de l’État. Bien que les États-Unis conservent la primauté du dollar et de leurs bases militaires, la Chine est le plus grand créancier mondial et la puissance décisive. L’article conclut en critiquant l’aveuglement des élites latino-américaines qui se tournent vers des puissances en déclin.

En 1858, Karl Marx s’était penché sur la marginalisation imminente de l’Europe et des États-Unis face à l’expansion du capitalisme en Asie. Dans une lettre adressée à Engels, il exprimait sa crainte qu’une future révolution européenne ne soit géographiquement réduite à un «petit coin» du monde, compte tenu de la montée de la société bourgeoise dans de vastes régions de la planète telles que la Chine, le Japon, l’Australie et la Californie (Œuvres complètes, vol. 40).

Nous étions au milieu du XIXe siècle, marqué par la domination mondiale absolue de l’Empire britannique, l’élan de la première révolution industrielle — la puissance de la vapeur, l’industrie textile — et la présence des États-Unis en tant que puissance intermédiaire fournissant du coton aux grandes usines de Manchester. Mais au-delà de tout cela, Marx voyait en Asie, et en Chine en particulier, la formation embryonnaire du nouveau cœur du capitalisme mondial.

Cent soixante-huit ans se sont écoulés, et les prédictions de Marx ont été confirmées par l’histoire. Aujourd’hui, la Chine est la plus grande économie de la planète. En mesurant le PIB en parité de pouvoir d’achat (PPA) — ce qui élimine les distorsions liées aux taux de change du marché et aux différences de coût de la vie —, le FMI estime que l’économie chinoise représente aujourd’hui 19,9% de l’économie mondiale, tandis que celle des États-Unis atteint 14,5% et celle de l’Union européenne (UE), 14%. En 1990, le PIB de la Chine ne représentait que 3% du total mondial, celui des États-Unis 19% et celui de l’Europe 23% (IMF DataMapper, 2026). Si l’on prend en compte l’ensemble de l’Asie, le PIB du continent atteint 49% du total mondial.

Cela n’a rien de surprenant. En 1700, l’économie asiatique représentait 60% de l’économie mondiale, tandis que celle de l’Europe atteignait un peu moins de 30% et celle de l’ensemble des États-Unis, 3% (Piketty, Le Capital au XXIe siècle, p. 76). À cette époque, le revenu moyen d’un Chinois était similaire à celui d’un habitant des Pays-Bas, alors leader commercial et financier de l’Europe. La colonisation européenne de l’Asie a détourné cette trajectoire pendant 200 ans, et aujourd’hui, ce continent est à nouveau à la tête de l’économie mondiale.

Mais la Chine n’est pas seulement en tête aujourd’hui en termes de taille de son PIB, mais aussi en ce qui concerne les fondements matériels sous-jacents de la puissance du pays.

En ce qui concerne la valeur ajoutée manufacturière, la Chine génère 29% du total mondial, tandis que les États-Unis et l’Union européenne y contribuent chacun à hauteur de 17% (Statista Research, 2025). On estime que d’ici 2030, cette part atteindra 45% (ONUDI, 2024). Ce leadership ne se limite pas à la fabrication de masse de jouets ou d’appareils électroménagers, mais s’étend également aux domaines des technologies de pointe et à la maîtrise de l’ensemble de la chaîne de valeur des produits. L’Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) — un groupe de réflexion américain — montre que la Chine est déjà leader dans 7 des 10 industries les plus avancées au monde : les systèmes informatiques et électroniques, les produits chimiques, les machines et équipements, les métaux de base, les véhicules à moteur, les produits métalliques transformés et les équipements électroniques. De leur côté, les États-Unis occupent la première place dans la production de technologies de l’information et de services — en particulier la conception de puces d’IA —, dans le secteur pharmaceutique et dans d’autres secteurs des transports (ITIF, 2026).

En 2024, la Chine a fabriqué 86% des panneaux solaires mondiaux, 80% des batteries électriques, 72% des voitures électriques, 64% des smartphones, 54% des robots industriels et 49% des drones (El País, 25 septembre 2026).

En matière de consommation d’électricité, l’essor de la Chine a été spectaculaire. En 1990, la Chine consommait moins de 1 000 térawattheures (TWh), tandis que les États-Unis en consommaient 3 000 TWh. En 2025, la Chine a atteint 10 300 TWh, tandis que la consommation des États-Unis stagne depuis 20 ans autour de 4200 TWh (EIA, 2026).

De plus, la Chine est le premier «État électrique» au monde, étant à la fois le plus grand investisseur et le plus grand producteur mondial d’énergies alternatives. Elle a réussi à réduire le coût de production de l’énergie solaire de 350 dollars par MWh en 2016 à 35–60 dollars par MWh d’ici 2025. Ce coût est inférieur à celui de l’électricité produite à partir du gaz en cycle combiné (60–120 dollars par MWh) ou du charbon (71–170 dollars par MWh) (Lazard, LCOE, 2026).

La Chine est un pays qui ne produit pas de pétrole et qui, au cours du siècle dernier, a été l’un des plus grands extracteurs de charbon pour la production d’énergie. Cependant, au cours de la dernière décennie, c’est le pays qui a le plus contribué à la transition énergétique mondiale. Sa capacité installée de production d’énergie solaire s’élève aujourd’hui à 1175 TWh, alors que le reste du monde ne produit à lui seul que 1600 TWh (Statista, avril 2026). Aujourd’hui, la Chine dispose d’un complexe de production dont la capacité annuelle de fabrication de panneaux solaires s’élève à 1200 TWh, de sorte qu’en moins de 10 ans, une fois les problèmes de stockage et de transport surmontés, elle pourrait fabriquer suffisamment de panneaux pour enrayer le changement climatique (Tooze, 19 septembre 2025). Aucun pays au monde ne possède aujourd’hui une telle capacité de restauration écologique à l’échelle mondiale.

Dans l’ensemble, la croissance de l’économie chinoise représente entre 25% et 30% de la croissance de l’économie mondiale. De 1990 à 2025, la croissance moyenne de son PIB a été de 8,5%, atteignant 14% certaines années, bien qu’elle se soit stabilisée ces dernières années autour de 5%. Ce développement sans précédent lui a permis de multiplier la taille de son économie par 54 depuis 1990, alors que les États-Unis l’ont multipliée par 5,1 et l’Union européenne par 2,9 au cours de la même période (Banque mondiale, données ouvertes, 2026).

Grâce à une combinaison mûrement réfléchie d’ouverture aux investissements étrangers, de transferts de technologie, de soutien à l’investissement privé national et de création d’entreprises publiques dans des secteurs stratégiques de l’économie, la Chine a atteint cette position de leader tout en maintenant un taux d’investissement annuel qui, depuis plus de deux décennies, oscille entre 35% et 45% du PIB. À titre de comparaison, ce taux s’est établi à environ 17% aux États-Unis et à 22% dans l’Union européenne.

Sur le plan commercial, de 1990 à 2025, la Chine a accumulé un excédent commercial de 9 700 milliards de dollars. Pour la seule année 2025, alors que les États-Unis avaient déclaré une guerre commerciale, cet excédent a atteint 1100 milliards de dollars (BBC, janvier 2026). De plus, comme dans toutes les économies développées, la dette publique est élevée. Pour 2025, elle est estimée à 120% du PIB, un chiffre très proche des 125% des États-Unis (FMI, 2026). À cette différence près que la totalité de la dette chinoise est contractée en yuan auprès de banques d’État chinoises, tandis que la majeure partie de la dette américaine est détenue par des investisseurs privés et des gouvernements étrangers.

Ces flux de revenus ont permis à la Chine de devenir le premier créancier bilatéral mondial, devant la Banque mondiale ou le FMI. De 1990 à 2025, la Chine a accordé des prêts commerciaux d’une valeur de 2200 milliards de dollars, notamment aux États-Unis (AidData, novembre 2025). Ce chiffre est déjà supérieur aux 1300 milliards de dollars que, sur la même période, les États-Unis ont versés à titre d’aide militaire et économique à leurs pays alliés (USAFacts, septembre 2026). Ainsi, alors que la Chine a mis en place une infrastructure mondiale pour l’approvisionnement en matières premières et la distribution de marchandises (la «Route de la soie»), les États-Unis ont maintenu des armées et des dirigeants soumis à leurs desseins politiques.

Malgré toute cette puissance économique, la Chine — contrairement à ce qu’ont fait les États-Unis au XXe siècle et, avant eux, le Royaume-Uni — n’a pas encore établi l’hégémonie mondiale de sa monnaie, n’a pas déployé de bases militaires pour garantir sa suprématie politique, et n’exporte pas non plus sa culture ou son système politique comme un modèle à imiter par le reste des pays.

Aujourd’hui, le dollar continue de remplir la fonction de monnaie de réserve mondiale pour 85% des opérations de change mondiales, représente 58% des réserves internationales des banques d’États et sert de monnaie de règlement au sein du système SWIFT pour la plupart des paiements internationaux (BRI, 25 février 2026). Mais sur le plan intérieur, la Chine a déjà créé le deuxième plus grand marché obligataire au monde, évalué à 28 000 milliards de dollars, derrière celui des États-Unis, qui représente 61 000 milliards de dollars (Deutsche Bank, juillet 2026). De même, elle compte trois des dix centres financiers les plus importants au monde (Shanghai, Hong Kong et Shenzhen) et a lancé le système CIPS comme alternative pour les paiements internationaux.

Quant aux bases militaires à l’étranger, la Chine en possède trois, contre 750 pour les États-Unis, et, pour l’instant, elle ne semble pas intéressée par l’exportation de son modèle d’organisation politique appelé «socialisme aux caractéristiques chinoises». Quant à l’expansion culturelle, elle n’en est qu’à ses débuts — jeux vidéo, esthétique asiatique, plateformes de vente en ligne rapides —, alors que le marché intérieur gagne en importance pour la croissance économique. Aux États-Unis, la consommation des ménages représente 69% du PIB ; en Chine, 40% (Banque mondiale, 2026). À titre de comparaison, il y a vingt ans, le rapport entre le revenu par habitant de la Chine et celui des États-Unis était de 1 pour 20. Aujourd’hui, ce rapport est de 1 pour 3,5. Dans moins de 50 ans, il sera de 1 pour 1 (Milanovic, 2026). Tout indique que le «Grand Renouveau du pays chinois», par lequel ses dirigeants envisagent le rétablissement de la grandeur mondiale de leur pays, ne se mesure pas à l’aune de la précipitation de quelques décennies, mais à celle de la patience obstinée de plusieurs siècles.

Il ne fait aucun doute que la Chine est déjà aujourd’hui le centre du monde. Et, face à cela, il est tout simplement pathétique de voir les élites réactionnaires d’Amérique latine chercher désespérément à obtenir un visa américain ou acheter un appartement à Madrid pour rehausser leur statut de «modernes». Elles courent dans tous les sens, hébétées, à la poursuite des mirages de pays qui ne sont désormais plus que de «petits coins» du monde.

Publié à l’origine par  China Beyond the Wall

Traduction:  Reseau International

Sem condições materiais para disputar a supremacia industrial chinesa, a União Europeia insiste em transformar suas dificuldades econômicas em justificativa para uma nova escalada de hostilidades.

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A liderança europeia parece ter encontrado uma nova missão estratégica: reconstruir a capacidade industrial do continente e, simultaneamente, reduzir sua dependência da China. A iniciativa foi recentemente trazida por França e Alemanha conjuntamente e é apresentada como uma resposta à crescente participação chinesa no mercado europeu. O problema é que os dirigentes responsáveis por esse projeto continuam ignorando uma questão elementar: nenhuma reindustrialização de grande escala pode prosperar sem uma base energética estável, abundante e economicamente acessível.

A Europa possui universidades de excelência, mão de obra qualificada, centros tecnológicos avançados e uma tradição industrial que ainda lhe confere vantagens consideráveis. Entretanto, essas capacidades não funcionam isoladamente. Fábricas de produtos químicos, siderúrgicas, instalações metalúrgicas e numerosas outras atividades dependem de fornecimento energético contínuo e competitivo. A existência de capital, conhecimento científico e trabalhadores especializados não compensa indefinidamente os custos elevados de produção. É justamente nesse ponto que a estratégia europeia entra em contradição com seus próprios objetivos.

Durante décadas, a integração econômica entre a Europa Ocidental e a Rússia proporcionou condições favoráveis ao desenvolvimento de importantes segmentos industriais. O fornecimento de gás natural russo, em particular, contribuiu para sustentar atividades que exigem grandes quantidades de energia. Essa relação atendia a interesses econômicos concretos de ambas as partes: Moscou encontrava um mercado importante para suas exportações, enquanto as economias europeias obtinham um insumo fundamental para sua competitividade.

O começo do regime de sanções em 2022 alterou profundamente esse cenário. As medidas coercitivas ilegais cortaram a parceria russo-europeia de longa data, tornando o lado ocidental do continente economicamente fraco e dependente de energia externa mais cara e menos segura. A Europa, que já vinha progressivamente se desindustrializando antes disso, entrou então no total caos energético, com todas as suas consequências, desde contas de energia mais altas até empresas falindo por incapacidade produtiva.

Seria razoável esperar que uma estratégia de recuperação industrial começasse pela revisão dessas vulnerabilidades. O que se observa, porém, é a tentativa de construir uma nova base produtiva sem resolver adequadamente o problema energético. Os responsáveis pela política europeia parecem acreditar que subsídios, incentivos fiscais e programas de investimento serão suficientes para restaurar a competitividade. Tais instrumentos podem contribuir para o desenvolvimento industrial, mas seus resultados serão limitados enquanto persistirem desvantagens estruturais nos custos de energia.

É nesse contexto que a China passa a ocupar uma posição cada vez mais importante na lista de preocupações de Bruxelas. A capacidade chinesa de produzir em grande escala, abastecer cadeias industriais complexas e oferecer equipamentos a preços competitivos representa um desafio para uma Europa que procura recuperar sua autonomia produtiva. Em vez de reconhecer a dimensão do atraso acumulado e elaborar uma estratégia coerente para superá-lo, setores da liderança europeia preferem recorrer a barreiras comerciais, investigações punitivas e mecanismos de contenção econômica.

Essa orientação revela uma compreensão bastante superficial da competição industrial. Restringir as importações chinesas não cria automaticamente fábricas europeias, tampouco reduz o custo da eletricidade ou garante o fornecimento de gás às instalações industriais. Pelo contrário, empresas que dependem de equipamentos, componentes e matérias-primas chinesas poderão enfrentar despesas maiores justamente quando precisam investir para recuperar sua posição no mercado internacional.

A questão russa torna esse quadro ainda mais delicado. Recuperar a cooperação energética com Moscou seria o passo inicial de qualquer plano de recuperação industrial. Com energia russo e parcerias comerciais amplas com a China, a Europa reencontraria o caminho do desenvolvimento – da mesma maneira que países africanos e asiáticos, em parceria com Rússia e China, estão agora encontrando pela primeira vez.

Mas Bruxelas, Paris e Berlim fazem o contrário. Os estrategistas europeus parecem determinados a enfrentar simultaneamente dois dos maiores polos industriais e energéticos do mundo, sem demonstrar que possuem os recursos necessários para sustentar essa ambição. Primeiro, comprometeram uma relação energética fundamental com a Rússia. Agora, arriscam transformar a China em um adversário comercial permanente.

No fim, o que os falcões europeus querem não é o desenvolvimento da própria Europa, mas a instrumentalização de pautas como indústria e comércio para avançar seus próprios planos autodestrutivos – nos quais os cidadãos europeus, já sem energia russa e possivelmente sem produtos chineses em breve, são sempre as primeiras vítimas.

Brussels, 14 October, (Brussels Morning Newspaper) – European Union leaders are preparing to examine tougher trade measures against China amid growing concerns over Chinese exports, industrial competitiveness and manufacturing jobs. The EU-China trade relationship is under increasing pressure … Read more

Relations between Iran and the United States have entered a phase in which the line between war and diplomacy appears increasingly fragile with each passing day. Military attacks, mutual threats, a crisis in energy transit routes, and efforts by mediators … Read more

Escrito por Mehmet Perinçek en United World International. Traducción por el Dr. Enrique Refoyo.

El enfrentamiento entre la OTAN y Rusia desde la perspectiva de Turquía

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El profesor asociado Mehmet Perinçek, autor de la UWI, historiador y politólogo, participó como invitado en directo en el canal turco Ulusal Kanal para analizar el aumento de las tensiones entre Europa y Rusia y las razones que las subyacen.

Compartimos el programa con nuestros lectores.

La «amenaza rusa» como pretexto para la agresión

La «amenaza rusa» se está convirtiendo cada vez más en un tema de debate político en Europa. ¿Qué está ocurriendo y qué hay detrás de ello?

El discurso en Europa sobre una «amenaza rusa» no se ajusta a la realidad. Europa está inventando una supuesta amenaza rusa con el fin de ocultar su propia agresión hacia Eurasia y Rusia. Si echamos la vista atrás a Hitler y a la Segunda Guerra Mundial, ¿qué dijo Hitler cuando actuó contra Checoslovaquia? Las vidas de los alemanes en Checoslovaquia estaban en peligro, y Alemania tuvo que enviar tropas y ocupar Checoslovaquia para protegerlos. Afirmó que el comunismo se estaba extendiendo y que Alemania tenía que eliminar esa amenaza de raíz. Así pues, incluso la Alemania de Hitler intentó disimular sus ambiciones imperialistas y agresivas y fabricar un pretexto para justificarlas.

Observamos cómo resurgen tendencias similares en la Europa actual, con Merz, Macron y otras figuras destacadas del panorama europeo. Cuando analizamos los hechos, lo que realmente vemos no es a Rusia avanzando hacia Europa, sino a Europa y al bloque atlántico avanzando hacia Rusia.

La expansión de la OTAN: hacia Rusia y los demás

A principios de la década de 1990, cuando la Unión Soviética se desmoronaba, los dirigentes soviéticos, bajo el liderazgo de Gorbachov, afirmaron en esencia: disolveremos el Pacto de Varsovia, pero la OTAN no debe expandirse hacia el este. Los dirigentes occidentales dieron garantías verbales en ese sentido. Sin embargo, no cumplieron esas promesas. Por el contrario, la OTAN se expandió hacia el este, en dirección a Rusia, en seis ocasiones y, finalmente, llegó a las fronteras rusas.

Este intento de rodear a Rusia tiene paralelismos en otros lugares: en el Mediterráneo oriental y la cuestión de Chipre, en la cuestión de Taiwán, en el estrecho de Ormuz y en Yemen. En todas estas regiones, observamos intentos por parte de las mismas fuerzas de rodear, contener y asfixiar a Irán, China y Turquía.

«No se puede descartar la posibilidad de una guerra a gran escala»

Así pues, lo que usted está diciendo es que no hay fundamento alguno en esa afirmación de que Rusia no está preparando realmente un ataque. Por el contrario, usted sostiene que el bloque atlántico está tratando de traspasar las líneas rojas de Rusia y expandirse hacia el este, en dirección a Rusia. Entonces, permítame plantear la pregunta de otra manera. ¿Dispone Rusia actualmente de la capacidad militar y los recursos necesarios para abrir un segundo frente contra la OTAN?

No se puede descartar la posibilidad de tal guerra o enfrentamiento. Es necesario subrayar esto.

Alemania, Gran Bretaña, Francia y Polonia también deberían incluirse aquí, ya que vemos que se están preparando para una posible guerra con Rusia. Se están rearmando rápidamente. Están aumentando sus presupuestos militares y de defensa. Al mismo tiempo, están llevando a cabo campañas de propaganda y otras actividades destinadas a preparar a la sociedad para la guerra. Están diciendo a los jóvenes europeos que deben estar preparados para la guerra. La industria europea también se está orientando cada vez más en esa dirección.

Los principales fabricantes de automóviles y otras grandes empresas occidentales están empezando a invertir en la industria de la defensa. Volkswagen, por ejemplo, se ha puesto en contacto con el ejército alemán con propuestas para fabricar equipamiento militar. La francesa Renault se ha lanzado a la producción de drones. Añadimos a esta lista a Rheinmetall y otras grandes empresas. Esto demuestra claramente que Europa y las potencias atlantistas se están preparando para la guerra. Por lo tanto, la posibilidad de una guerra de este tipo sí existe.

Simulaciones de guerra por parte de EE. UU.

Si se produjera un conflicto de este tipo, también habría que señalar que la fuerza militar de Europa y su capacidad militar general son bastante débiles. Europa no está preparada para una guerra de este tipo. Y esta no es meramente nuestra valoración. Los propios expertos militares occidentales, los funcionarios occidentales e incluso algunas de las fuerzas que abogan por la confrontación reconocen que Europa no está realmente en condiciones de hacer frente a Rusia en el ámbito militar.

Tampoco, desde el punto de vista social, está la población europea preparada para la guerra. Además, por supuesto, está el hecho de que Rusia es una potencia nuclear. Asimismo, se han llevado a cabo numerosas simulaciones de guerra en EE. UU., incluidas aquellas realizadas o encargadas por el propio Gobierno estadounidense. Estas simulaciones han concluido que, en una guerra convencional no nuclear, EE. UU. sería derrotado por Rusia y China.

Hay otro factor que debemos tener en cuenta. En cualquier enfrentamiento armado con Rusia, especialmente en caso de una intervención militar dirigida contra Rusia, también existe la posibilidad de que se vean implicados los aliados y países amigos de Rusia.

Una posible guerra que se extienda desde Rusia y la OTAN

¿Qué quiere decir exactamente con eso? ¿Podría explicarlo con más detalle?

Una guerra entre Rusia y la OTAN significaría, en efecto, el inicio de una guerra mundial. No se limitaría a Rusia y la OTAN, sino que daría lugar a un conflicto mucho más amplio que abarcaría el mundo entero. En un enfrentamiento de tal magnitud, los países del lado euroasiático también se verían involucrados. Al igual que existe solidaridad económica entre ellos, países como Irán y otros no permanecerían indiferentes ante una guerra de esta magnitud. Inevitablemente surgirían otros frentes.

Como he dicho antes, la guerra en Ucrania y la cuestión de Taiwán no pueden separarse realmente entre sí. Tampoco pueden separarse la cuestión de Taiwán y el estrecho de Ormuz o el Mediterráneo oriental.

Por eso podemos afirmar que Europa, con su actual potencia y capacidades militares, no está preparada para hacer frente a Rusia. Una vez más, son los propios responsables occidentales quienes lo afirman.

Guerra justa e injusta

Existe otro factor: la distinción entre una guerra justa y una guerra injusta. No creo que un joven europeo, o por ejemplo un trabajador turco que viva en Europa, esté especialmente dispuesto a ir a morir al frente ruso en defensa de los intereses imperiales de Alemania. Los jóvenes rusos, por su parte, lucharían con una motivación mucho mayor si creyeran que están defendiendo su propia patria.

Así pues, el principal problema al que se enfrenta Europa hoy en día no es la afirmación de que Rusia esté a punto de atacar. Más bien, Europa carece de un enfoque político común y de un mecanismo de seguridad común capaz de gestionar tal confrontación o de librar una guerra contra Rusia u otro país. ¿Es eso lo que está diciendo?

Sí. Y están intentando crear ese mecanismo y la legitimación necesaria para ello. Pero se enfrentan a una fuerte oposición dentro de sus propios países. Lo hemos visto reflejado en las recientes elecciones en Alemania. En Suiza se están celebrando referéndums sobre la cuestión de la neutralidad. Macron se acerca al final de su carrera política, mientras que Le Pen y Mélenchon están ganando terreno.

El enfrentamiento entre la OTAN y Rusia desde la perspectiva de Turquía

Usted argumentó que, si estallara una guerra entre la OTAN y Rusia, esta no se limitaría a esas dos partes, sino que se extendería. Y mencionó algunos países. Esto nos lleva a la perspectiva de Turquía.

Cuando las potencias atlánticas intentan rodear a Rusia a través de Ucrania y el Mar Negro, también están rodeando a Turquía. Sus planes en el Mar Negro no pueden separarse de sus planes en el Mediterráneo Oriental ni de aquellos destinados a socavar la soberanía de la República Turca del Norte de Chipre (RTNC).

Del mismo modo, el sistema de dominación basado en el dólar que pretenden imponer a Turquía es similar al que pretenden imponer a Rusia. Por lo tanto, los intereses objetivos de Turquía la sitúan claramente en el bando opuesto al bloque atlántico. Si el bloque atlántico se fortaleciera y lograra llevar a cabo sus planes, ello también perjudicaría la soberanía de la TRNC. Debilitaría a Turquía en el equilibrio de fuerzas del Mediterráneo Oriental y fortalecería al bando contrario.

Un bloque atlántico más fuerte también implica un mayor apoyo a Israel. Significaría un aumento de la presión y las amenazas dirigidas por Israel contra Turquía, Siria, Palestina, el mundo árabe, el mundo islámico e Irán. Esto nos lleva de vuelta a lo que dije al principio: el Mar Negro y el Mediterráneo Oriental forman parte del mismo frente estratégico. La cuestión de Taiwán y el estrecho de Ormuz también forman parte de ese mismo frente más amplio. Desde ese punto de vista, los intereses objetivos de Turquía residen en oponerse al bloque atlántico.

La posición y la alineación adecuadas para Turquía

Pero hay algo que añadir aquí: existe una forma de evitar esta escalada. El mundo no tiene por qué encaminarse hacia una gran guerra. Si Turquía adopta la posición adecuada y se establece una alineación estratégica entre Turquía, Rusia, China e Irán, el poder económico creado por dicha agrupación, la disuasión militar que podría generar y la red más amplia de alianzas internacionales que podría atraer contribuirían a evitar tal guerra.

El bloque atlántico ya se encuentra en declive económico. Cada día que pasa pierde legitimidad a nivel internacional. Además, está cada vez más dividido internamente. Acontecimientos como el auge de la AfD en Alemania, el creciente apoyo a Le Pen y Melenchon en Francia, y las contradicciones entre Europa y EE. UU. lo demuestran. Todo el mundo es testigo de su fracaso en Irán y Palestina.

En ese sentido, la cuestión principal para Turquía, tanto para resolver sus propios problemas económicos y de seguridad como para ayudar a evitar que el mundo se vea arrastrado a otra gran guerra, es construir esta alianza. Dicha alianza también permitiría a Turquía establecer relaciones con Occidente sobre una base más equilibrada y sólida.

Ataques ucranianos contra buques y oleoductos turcos

Y me gustaría plantearle una última pregunta. ¿Cómo afectarán las tensiones entre Europa y Rusia al campo de batalla en Ucrania? Se acerca el invierno. ¿Seguirán los países occidentales y europeos prestando apoyo militar a Ucrania? A corto plazo, ¿hacia dónde cree que se dirige la guerra?

El apoyo occidental va a continuar. Sin embargo, el ejército ucraniano no ha podido avanzar y, de hecho, se ha visto obligado a retroceder. Por eso estamos asistiendo a un aumento de los ataques con drones y de los atentados terroristas en el interior de Rusia, dirigidos contra objetivos civiles. Estos ataques están ejerciendo presión sobre Rusia para que responda con mayor dureza, tal vez incluso hasta el punto de plantearse el uso de armas nucleares a escala limitada y táctica. La intensificación de los ataques tras las líneas del frente se debe a que fracasan en el campo de batalla.

Creo que cabe esperar que la intensidad de la guerra aumente en el próximo período, si tenemos en cuenta los preparativos que está llevando a cabo Occidente.

Debo señalar un aspecto relativo a Turquía. Los buques turcos y algunos de los proyectos energéticos más importantes de Turquía, entre ellos TurkStream y Blue Stream, también han sido objeto de ataques por parte de Ucrania. Debemos reconocerlo. Rusia no es el único objetivo en este contexto. Fíjese en el mar Negro hoy en día: el comercio se ha paralizado prácticamente por completo. Los barcos ya no navegan de un lado a otro de la costa opuesta como solían hacerlo. Los tomates cultivados por los agricultores turcos y la maquinaria fabricada por los fabricantes turcos ya no pueden llegar a Rusia como antes. Del mismo modo, las materias primas y otros bienes que Turquía necesita ya no llegan desde la otra orilla del mar Negro como antes.

Por lo tanto, no podemos considerar esta guerra como algo que no tenga una repercusión directa en Turquía. Y el coste del conflicto para Turquía aumenta con cada día que pasa.

Publicado originalmente por  Geopolítica rugiente

Exclusive: Douglas Alexander, on trade delegation to India, talks up economic benefits of joint trading arrangements with Europe

Britain will benefit from much closer trading relations with the EU even if that means giving up its ability to negotiate free trade agreements, the Scotland secretary has said.

Douglas Alexander helped negotiate deals with India and the US when he was a trade minister under Keir Starmer.

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Ola Källenius says it will ‘weaken the industry on both sides’ ahead of act intended to counter non-EU competition

Locking the UK out of the EU’s flagship industrial “Made in Europe” legislation would amount to a “deliberate choice” by EU leaders to “hurt” the car industry across the bloc, the head of Mercedes-Benz has said.

Speaking in his capacity as president of the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (ACEA), Ola Källenius said such a move would “weaken the industry on both sides”.

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Brussels, 14 October, (Brussels Morning Newspaper) – Around 10 Greenpeace activists were detained for questioning outside the European Parliament in Brussels on Wednesday morning during a Greenpeace protest against rising energy prices and Europe’s dependence on fossil fuels. … Read more

By Ron PAUL

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This past week we have seen several serious Administration corruption scandals. Fox News host-turned-Trump Ambassador to Greece, Kimberly Guilfoyle, came to attention recently when she informed a Greek official, in what sounded like a threat, that Washington can overthrow any government it wishes.

While hardly breaking news, such an admission is not normally considered part of diplomatic dialogue. But for Guilfoyle, that was only the beginning. She is reported to have strong-armed a donor into paying off her $100,000 American Express bill before she took office. Most recently, she is in even hotter water for reportedly using her ties to the Trump family – she was once engaged to Donald Trump, Jr. – to set up business deals for a wealthy Greek businessman who was coincidentally funding her supposedly lavish lifestyle in Greece.

Similarly, last week the media reported that US Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee’s right hand man David Millstein was abusing his post to further his own political biases. Millstein, who first came under scrutiny for sending a request to Israeli citizens for “monetary wedding gift[s],” has also reportedly been suppressing or even falsifying Embassy reporting that is critical of Israel. In a supposedly “America first” Administration, it is shocking that officials are abusing their power for the benefit of a foreign country over their own.

The corruption taint goes even deeper. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick is reported to have doubled his net worth while in office. Likewise, the Trump family itself is said to have earned billions from sketchy business deals – including military deals while a war is on – while Donald Trump has been in office. President Trump himself, who has made a show of refusing his salary as President, is said to have made over two billion dollars in the first year of his second term. That is a far cry above the $400,000 US Presidential salary!

While there is much noise on the Right about the danger of socialism – and it should not be discounted – what is not discussed enough is the “socialism” for the rich and well-connected. One word for this is “corporatism.” It is the merger – even if temporary – of state power with “private” interests.

Rich Greek businessmen are not lavishing gifts on Ambassador Guilfoyle because she is a nice person. They are looking for favors that only those holding the levers of political power can grant.

Ideally, elected and appointed government officials would be more like Rep. Thomas Massie, who was already a successful businessman before winning office and therefore did not view his “public service” as a kind of piggy bank. However, we live in the real world and such standards are probably too high to expect.

So, what is the solution? Corrupt officials abuse their positions because the government is so enormous and invasive that there are endless opportunities for graft and grift. If we are really seeking to end or reduce government corruption, we must return government to the size it was when this country was founded. Rather than waiting for a government of saints to lead the country, we must remove the incentives that tempt mere men and women to view elected and appointed office as an opportunity for personal and financial gain.

Original article:  ronpaulinstitute.org

The Commission says it shares member states’ desire for “greater focus” on speedy implementation of EU laws.

The pledge comes in response to a new move by 13 EU members who are calling on the EU to design new EU … Read more

Capitalism, fascism, wars, the Epstein class, endemic poverty and suffering – it’s a death cult in a theater near you.

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It’s hard to know whether to break the TV set or throw up when listening to the European governments rushing to condemn the air strike by Yemeni forces on Saudi Arabia’s King Khalid international airport.

The blast from a ballistic missile that slammed into the airport at the weekend, October 12, killed at least 13 civilians and injured scores of other travellers. Horrific video footage shows the moment the missile explosion ripped through a terminal lounge.

European leaders immediately in a coordinated fashion trotted out condemnations of Yemeni “terrorism” and vowed solidarity and support for Saudi Arabia. U.S. President Donald Trump called it “a terrible thing.” (As if bombing schoolchildren is not quite a terrible thing.)

Britain, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Austria, the Netherlands, and Spain all issued strident denunciations of the Yemeni attack.

The strike on the Saudi capital came after the Ansar Allah-led Yemen Armed Forces had given ample warning to the Saudis that their airports would be targeted and for civilians to avoid the areas. The airports were kept open for business as usual. The Yemenis have said that the attack on Riyadh and other Saudi airports are retaliation for weeks of multiple air strikes by the Saudis on Yemeni civilian centers.

Hundreds of Yemeni civilians have been killed since Saudi Arabia broke a four-year truce with an air strike on the international airport in Sanaa, the Yemeni capital, on July 13. Saudi warplanes, U.S.-supplied F-15s and European Typhoon jets, have been continously bombing homes across Yemen. This week, two days after the Riyadh strike, at least nine people including five children were killed in air raids on houses in Taiz city and in northern al Jawf province. Al Masirah TV footage showed a distraught father holding up a child’s shredded body amid rubble. There was no condemnation of that atrocity from any European leader.

As Mick Wallace and Clare Daly, former Irish Members of the European Parliament, point out in their podcast this week, the official European reaction is utter hypocrisy and a cynical distortion of the conflict on the Arabian Peninsula.

Britain and France in particular, along with the United States, have backed the Saudi aggression against Yemen beginning in 2015. Over seven years, that aggression killed up to 400,000 Yemenis through air strikes and a blockade on humanitarian needs.

The European Union remained largely silent for seven years. No protests were made to Washington, Paris or London. Ambassadors were not summoned, sanctions were not imposed.

The return to hostilities that began with Saudi air strikes on Sanaa in July have been enabled by U.S. and Britain supplying warplanes, military advisors and intelligence.

None of the European governments have bothered to condemn this recent U.S. and UK-backed slaughter.

So, it is nauseating when one hears British Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband saying he is “appalled” by the strike on Riyadh airport. And other European leaders vowing “full solidarity with the kingdom of Saudi Arabia.”

Germany’s Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul condemned Yemen’s “terrorist act.”

His French counterpart said France stood with Saudi Arabia “in defending its territory and infrastructue.” (No mention of what the Saudis have been doing for years to Yemen’s territory.)

Referring to the strike on Riyadh without any context, Italy’s Giorgia Meloni said: “Attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure are unacceptable and must cease.” (Yes, indeed, so why not tell that to the Saudis who are doing it deliberately on a massive scale with support from Washington and London?)

What is instructive here is not just the sickening hypocrisy and moral bankruptcy. It is the manifestation of a systematic corruption and criminal responsibility. This is not just one more example of a flawed European political class whose judgement is suspect. What is increasingly apparent is the totality of the corruption.

The same European supporters of Saudi monarchs waging a genocidal war on Yemen are also contemporaneously supporting the Israeli Zionist regime in its extermination of Palestinians. They are complicit in enabling the U.S. aggression against Iran, Cuba and Venezuela. They are sponsors of the NeoNazi regime in Kiev to keep fighting a proxy war against Russia despite more than one million Ukrainian military casualties and the risk of nuclear conflagration.

The death cult of Western capitalism is on full display in multiple theaters, exposing the organic evil at work. There is sense that all of Western imperialist history is now on display in one final orgy of barbarity.

In previous times, the death cult operated discreetly in seemingly disparate conflict scenarios. Wars on different continents seemed somehow unconnected. The Western media would in the past reliably cover up the crimes by distorting the motives and objectives with false narratives and (laughable) claims of noble purpose. The West was “defending democracy,” “fighting communism,” “protecting human rights,” or “waging war on terrorism,” or some other pretext that in isolation and with loads of media propaganda managed to fool a lot of people as somehow plausible.

What’s happening now, it seems, is a concatenation of wars that ultimately exposes the essential system that drives the violence, and its insatiable lust for human suffering.

It is impossible to work for such a vile system, the death cult of capitalism, without also being oblivious to its evil ways. To remain oblivious necessitates denial or lies. That deception might be tenable for occasional and seemingly disparate scenarios. But not when the system is exposed in its infernal entirety.

American and European wars in the past might have succeeded in being sold to the Western public as one-off wars and misadventures. We think of the wars in Korea, Vietnam, Latin American, Africa, former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and more recently Libya.

In more recent years, as consciousness evolved, the public began discerning and decrying “endless wars”.

But now the world is witnessing a totalizing of the war machine that goes by the name of “Western democracy”.

What’s happening in Ukraine, Gaza, Iran and Yemen is not coincidence. It is the death cult on display and unable to hide itself. It manifests too in attacking and locking up Western citizens who condemn genocide or who simply call for peace.

Capitalism, fascism, wars, the Epstein class, endemic poverty and suffering – it’s a death cult in a theater near you.

The politicians, governments, media and pundits who promote it or serve it are seen for what they are.

Il Comitato militare della NATO al completo si è appena recato a Kiev. Sta analizzando la guerra in Ucraina come se fosse il proprio banco di prova.

Segue nostro Telegram.

Il 6 ottobre l’ammiraglio Giuseppe Cavo Dragone, presidente del Comitato Militare della NATO, è arrivato a Kiev con i rappresentanti militari di tutti e trentadue gli Alleati. Lo ha scritto lui stesso su X: la delegazione era lì per ribadire un «sostegno incondizionato» all’Ucraina. ANSA ha registrato la notizia come visita ufficiale. Un segnale strategico rivolto anche a Mosca.

I fatti, anzitutto. Il Comitato Militare assiste e consiglia il Consiglio Atlantico, il Comitato di pianificazione della difesa e il Gruppo di pianificazione nucleare; il suo compito è l’indirizzo di politica e strategia militare. È stato invitato dal nuovo comandante supremo delle forze armate ucraine, Mykhailo Drapatyi. Il Comitato tornava a Kiev al completo dopo otto anni e che gli incontri con Drapatyi e con lo Stato Maggiore ucraino servivano a ricevere la valutazione diretta del campo di battaglia, a discutere le priorità militari di Kiev e a portare nell’Alleanza le lezioni di oltre quattro anni di guerra ad alta intensità. Dragone parla di priorità militari e di insegnamenti utili alla prontezza operativa degli Alleati davanti alle minacce di oggi e di domani.

Ora l’interpretazione, che va tenuta distinta dai fatti. Un organo che consiglia il Gruppo di pianificazione nucleare non attraversa un paese in guerra per fare gesti di solidarietà. Va a raccogliere informazioni e a tararci sopra la propria preparazione. Il flusso descritto dalle fonti corre nei due sensi: dall’Ucraina all’Alleanza come esperienza operativa, dall’Alleanza all’Ucraina come indirizzo di priorità. Quando i vertici militari di trentadue Stati si siedono con lo Stato Maggiore di uno dei belligeranti per misurare la propria prontezza sulla guerra in corso, quella guerra ha smesso di essere un fatto esterno. È diventata il banco di prova dell’Alleanza.

La sequenza conferma la direzione. Il 3 giugno il Consiglio Nord Atlantico si era riunito a Kiev, e lì si era tenuto per la prima volta il Consiglio NATO-Ucraina. A ottobre tocca al livello militare. Prima la cornice politica, poi la struttura che la riempie di contenuto operativo, non è una cortesia di passaggio,  è una presenza istituzionale che si ispessisce a ogni tappa.

C’è poi la frase che sposta il discorso fuori dall’Ucraina. A chi ritiene che sabotaggi, attacchi informatici e violazioni dello spazio aereo possano incrinare il sostegno occidentale, Dragone risponde: «State fallendo». Attribuisce alla Russia la piena responsabilità di quei comportamenti e dice che l’unità alleata non è mai stata così salda. Il fronte ucraino e la pressione sotto soglia sul territorio degli Alleati finiscono nello stesso quadro, pronunciati dallo stesso uomo e dalla stessa sede. La distinzione su cui poggia la formula «Ucraina contro Russia», quella tra una guerra là e una tensione qui, viene cancellata dal presidente del Comitato Militare in persona.

Immagini, simboli e significati

Resta l’immagine. Nel video-messaggio registrato a Kiev l’ammiraglio parla con due bandiere alle spalle e lo sfondo, nella comunicazione istituzionale, non si improvvisa, dice chi parla e a nome di chi. Chi si presenta sotto quei simboli non è un mediatore né un osservatore. Le bandiere raccontano la stessa storia delle parole, parole che sono quelle di una scelta precisa e consapevole, ovvero la guerra-per-Kiev, la dedicazione totale ad una causa che con l’Europa non dovrebbe averci niente a che fare.

L’obiezione seria è un’altra, e va accolta. Nessuna delle tre fonti documenta truppe alleate in combattimento, e nessuno Stato membro ha dichiarato guerra alla Russia. La delegazione è venuta a consultarsi e a rendere omaggio al Muro della Memoria dedicato ai caduti ucraini. Il diritto dei conflitti armati distingue tra il sostegno a una parte e la partecipazione diretta alle ostilità, e su quel terreno la differenza esiste, ma la qualificazione giuridica non esaurisce l’analisi geopolitica. Gli Alleati non descrivono più il proprio ruolo come aiuto a un terzo: parlano di prontezza propria, di minacce proprie, di unità propria. Quando un’alleanza commisura la propria preparazione alla guerra di un altro e imputa allo stesso avversario i sabotaggi sul proprio suolo, il confronto ha due parti, e una non è l’Ucraina.

La valutazione, quindi. Sul piano politico-strategico il confronto tra NATO e Russia è diretto, e le fonti lo mostrano con sufficiente chiarezza. Sul piano cinetico le fonti non registrano un coinvolgimento alleato diretto, che viene però costantemente invocato e auspicato, quasi fosse il più grande desiderio della NATO. Il margine tra i due piani, però, si assottiglia a ogni visita di questo tipo. Gli indicatori da seguire sono due: l’eventuale insediamento stabile di strutture alleate sul territorio ucraino e il modo in cui verranno trattati i sabotaggi che l’Alleanza attribuisce a Mosca, mentre Zelensky ordina di bombardare altre raffinerie di petrolio russe e nuovi droni volano su Mosca, nonostante Donald Trump avesse detto di smetterla.

Tutto è fuori controllo, la NATO agisce indipendentemente dalla sfera americana perché ha sposato la causa ucraina come l’ultima guerra mondiale, quella in cui l’Alleanza o vincerà, o non vi sarà più niente da fare.

La formula «Ucraina contro Russia» serviva a contenere la guerra in una cornice rassicurante per le opinioni pubbliche europee. Con 32 rappresentanti militari nella capitale ucraina, e un ammiraglio italiano a guidarli, quella cornice regge sempre meno.

Sia ben chiaro che questa scelta non è casuale, non è una trappola politica e non è nemmeno un errore di valutazione, ma è una dichiarazione di guerra, l’ennesima, ibrida e stilisticamente pietosa dichiarazione contro la Russia. Ce lo stanno dicendo a viso scoperto, mentre siamo distratti a pensare ad altro.

Resta da vedere se i governi lo diranno ai propri elettori. E resta da vedere anche se i coraggiosi generali a quattro stelle si renderanno conto di una saggia verità che il generale prussiano Carl von Clausewitz scriveva nei suoi manuali: “L’errore non consiste nel fare un passo falso, ma nel non saperlo riconoscere e nel volerlo difendere a tutti i costi”.

Non vi è però ragione per rompere l’incantesimo di Kiev, che in questo momento ammalia l’Europa intera, perché come diceva Napoleone – per fare una seconda citazione – “Non bisogna mai interrompere il nemico mentre sta facendo un errore”.

Drawing on dozens of interviews with intelligence and police officers across two continents, a Guardian investigation reveals the murderous cost of our insatiable appetite for cocaine

Read more: Latin American organised crime ‘may operate in 16 European countries’
Explainer: What is state capture and why does it matter?

As abductions go, few have been more brazen. Alan Jalloh was with two friends outside Goodies supermarket, frantic as usual with late afternoon shoppers. Rush hour in downtown Freetown, Sierra Leone’s capital, was under way with familiar gusto.

A black Toyota Rav4 forced its way through the Peninsula highway traffic. Witnesses describe burly white men leaping out, yanking on balaclavas. Jalloh, 40, seemed to freeze. As did his two friends, one a famous Freetown footballer. All three were dragged into the waiting SUV. None of them have been seen since.

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© Composite: Guardian Design

© Composite: Guardian Design

© Composite: Guardian Design