SpaceX chief Elon Musk says the version of Starlink that Ukraine’s military uses, StarShield, is owned and controlled by the US government rather than by his company. His claims come amid a storm over Ukrainian reports that a speed cut had broken their frontline operations.

Ukraine’s drones and air defenses rely on Starlink to steer and strike, so a limit on the network hits combat directly. Ukrainian troops reported that overnight into 14 October, the faster military package they depend on was throttled, halting a series of missions. Musk’s answer shifts the decision and the blame from SpaceX to the US government and, ultimately, to the president.

“Any limits on speed or usage are decided by the US military and ultimately POTUS. StarShield systems are owned and controlled by the US government,” Musk says.

He draws a line between the two services. Ordinary Starlink is a commercial product owned by SpaceX, limited to civilian or defensive use and not for offensive military action, which he called inappropriate for a commercial company.

Their conversation took place the same week that Washington pressured Kyiv over its strikes on Russian oil refineries amid US President Donald Trump's diesel deal with Moscow.

The exchange that forced Musk to answer

The statement followed a direct appeal. Former Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov told Musk on X that Starlink connectivity at speeds of up to 160 km/h was being restored, and pressed for more.

“Removing StarShield’s speed limit entirely is now critical for Ukraine’s defense. Thank you, Elon Musk. We hope for your continued support,” Fedorov wrote, framing the cap as a direct constraint on the war.

The faster package Ukraine cannot do without

The ordinary Starlink Mini mounted on drones is capped at about 160 km/h, which is too slow for some missions, so faster flight requires access to the military version, StarShield, Ukrainska Pravda notes. Ukraine has used StarShield since 2024.

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US Senator Richard Blumenthal, a co-author of the Russia sanctions law named after Lindsey Graham, has issued a sharp statement on the latest developments in Ukraine. He says that President Donald Trump and SpaceX chief Elon Musk should be held accountable for reported Starlink failures that could cripple Ukraine’s defense.

On 14 October, Ukraine’s military reported a Starlink disruption that halted its operations. It happened at the same time the country’s air defense stopped receiving intelligence on a Russian ballistic strike that killed three people in Kyiv. Both failures came right after the US struck a diesel deal with Russia, letting low volumes of fuel into global markets and America while pressure grew on Ukraine to stop hitting the Russian oil refineries that raise the cost of the war.

"Reports of Starlink failing in Ukraine are deeply alarming— potentially crippling air defense against Russia’s murderous missiles & drones. Trump & Musk must be held accountable," he says.

When the network falters, the war feels it

The alarm rests on how completely Ukraine leans on the system. SpaceX has reportedly throttled the StarShield military package Ukrainian drones use, with connections dropping once the drones move at speed, and breaking a series of missions.

Ukraine neither owns nor controls Starlink, and the latest limits revived long-running fears that its battlefield lifeline can be dialed down from outside the country.

Blumenthal’s demand sits inside a broader revolt in Congress. A bipartisan group of 12 senators wrote Trump on 13 October urging him to rescind his deal letting Russian diesel back to market, calling the Treasury’s General License No. 135 a gift to Moscow that should be withdrawn.

They pressed him instead to use the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act he signed in September to squeeze Russia and its enablers, above all, China.

"If there's one lesson from Trump's mindless warmongering, it's that we need to break our dependence on foreign imports of fossil fuels & embrace alternate sources of energy," he said.

One of Ukraine’s most prominent drone volunteers, Serhii Sternenko, says that Starlink terminals have been restricted overnight, with connectivity beginning to drop out at speeds exceeding 160 km/h. As a result, several critical missions were disrupted.

Sternenko heads a charitable foundation that has purchased 291,502 FPV drones, which have helped the Ukrainian military shoot down more than 12,954 aerial targets. He has also served as an adviser within the team of former Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov.

Sternenko suggests that SpaceX may have introduced the restrictions at the request of the Trump administration. He adds that Ukraine had refrained from striking Russian oil refineries and energy infrastructure in recent days, as Trump had requested.

“But Trump was looking for any opportunity to undermine our defense capabilities, and he did so despite the fact that we had complied with his demands,” Sternenko says.

The limit landed the same night Russian ballistic missiles struck Kyiv’s Desnianskyi district, killing three women and injuring 24, including a seven-year-old girl.

Rescuers evacuated people covered in blood

The strike on a nine-story residential building set it ablaze, burning out apartments from the first floor to the ninth, with rescuers pulling bloodied residents from the flames and leaving survivors without power, water, or gas, according to Suspilne.

During the night’s first ballistic launches, partners did not alert Ukraine, but for the three later waves the warnings did come through, Air Force communications chief Yurii Ihnat says. The cause of the first lapse is still being established, per Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

The early warnings help Ukrainian civilians quickly find a place to hide from such strikes, leaving up to 3 minutes to do so. Without it, people are left entirely helpless in the face of the aggression.

Further Starlink restrictions have reportedly been introduced

Later, Sternenko wrote that reports were "coming in from military personnel that restrictions on the use of Starlink satellite communications terminals for our operations have just been tightened.

"The speed at which the connection starts dropping out is now 60–70 km/h,” he added.

Poland’s Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski has publicly criticized SpaceX chief Elon Musk over the latest disruptions in Starlink's operation in Ukraine. Poland is the largest supplier of Ukraine’s terminals, having provided about 29,500, roughly half the network. It also has a Starlink ground station in Wola Krobowska that provides connectivity for much of Central and Eastern Europe, including Ukraine, RMF24 reports.

On 13 October, SpaceX imposed a 100 mph (160 km/h) speed limit on the StarShield military package that Ukrainian forces use, disrupting drone missions without warning. Poland, which pays about $50 million a year for Ukraine’s Starlink terminals, told Musk it is watching.

“Hey, @elonmusk, big man, are you playing politics with your products again? As your European customers, we are watching you,” Sikorski wrote on X.

The “big man” jab echoed their 2025 clash, when Musk told Sikorski to “be quiet, small man” after the minister noted that Warsaw, not SpaceX as charity, pays for the service.

Be quiet, small man.

You pay a tiny fraction of the cost.

And there is no substitute for Starlink.

— Elon Musk (@elonmusk) March 9, 2025

Meanwhile, presidential adviser Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov said that this could not be a coincidence and was most likely tied to the current political situation.

When a drone outruns its own signal

The cap bites exactly where Ukraine’s drones do their work. The StarShield package had previously carried no data speed limit, and the change directly affected drones that use Starlink to steer in flight, the 7th Air Assault Corps said.

“During flights, the connection could drop for 10 to 20 seconds at speeds of just 110 to 120 kilometers per hour. The drones kept moving, but these interruptions made them harder to control,” the corps said, describing problems that now start well below the new ceiling.

A dependence Kyiv has feared for years. The limit revives an old worry. Ukraine neither owns nor controls Starlink, and the restriction follows fresh fears of a shutdown after Musk backed US President Donald Trump’s call for Zelenskyy to resign.

Gas, clothes, and air fares got more expensive, evidence that rising prices remain an economic challenge just a few weeks before the midterm elections that have focused heavily on issues related to affordability.

Trump scheint seine Forderung, die Ukraine solle ihre Angriffe auf russische Raffinerien einstellen, ernst zu meinen und lässt dem, nachdem Selensky Trumps Forderungen offen ignoriert hat, nun Taten folgen. Die USA haben Kiew schon die zweite Nacht infolge keine Aufklärungsdaten über russische Raketenangriffe geschickt und dann SpaceX den Zugang des ukrainischen Militärs zum Satelliteninternet Starlink […]

Ukraine’s presidential adviser Serhii Beskrestnov said SpaceX had imposed a 100 mph (160 km/h) speed limit on its military Starshield service overnight into 14 October, disrupting several missions without warning Ukraine’s defense forces.

Ukraine’s forces use Starlink-connected drones to strike Russian positions and logistics, including targets behind the front line. Unlike earlier restrictions introduced at Kyiv’s request to stop Russian forces from exploiting Starlink, the latest change reportedly targets the military Starshield service and was imposed without warning Ukraine’s military.

What the new restriction covers

Beskrestnov wrote that the restriction applies to the “military package” of Starshield services. He said the move “obviously cannot be a coincidence” and was connected with the “current political situation,” but did not explain what he meant.

Activist Serhii Sternenko, a former adviser to Ukraine’s defense minister, reported that connections began disappearing at speeds above 160 km/h. He suggested SpaceX had acted at the Trump administration’s request but provided no evidence. Starlink does not work inside Russia, and the drones hitting Russia’s oil industry use other means of communication, Reuters noted. Sternenko added that the ordinary satellite terminals were still working.

Later on 14 October, Sternenko wrote that, according to military reports, restrictions had been tightened further, with connections starting to drop at 60–70 km/h. Beskrestnov later warned that the restriction also hits Starlink-linked interceptor drones, which he called Ukraine’s most effective current defense against jet-powered Shaheds.

Front-line units report dropped connections

Ukraine’s 7th Rapid Reaction Corps confirmed the disruptions in a statement to Reuters. The corps’ press service told Novynarnia that its units on the Huliaipole front began experiencing problems overnight. The corps said the change affected drones controlled through Starlink in flight and concerned Starshield’s data-transmission speed, which it said had previously been unrestricted.

The corps said connections could disappear for 10–20 seconds at movement speeds of 110–120 km/h, complicating drone control. Flying slower creates its own risk, it said, because “slower targets become more vulnerable to being hit by the enemy.”

Some high-speed drones, particularly mid-range strike models, must reach high speed quickly, the corps said. An unstable connection “will make it impossible to launch such aircraft or use them as intended.” Since the start of the day, one unmanned systems unit on the Huliaipole front had to cancel some missions because of connection problems, the corps said.

Earlier limits came at Kyiv’s request

In late January, SpaceX began restricting Starlink in Ukraine at Kyiv’s request after Russian forces started mounting terminals on strike drones. After Russian drones struck a passenger train in Kharkiv Oblast on 27 January, Beskrestnov, then an adviser to the defense minister, suggested one of them may have been controlled via Starlink. In early February, Ukraine introduced a whitelist under which only registered terminals could continue operating. Beskrestnov called the earlier countermeasures “temporary” and “emergency.”

SpaceX had not publicly commented on the restriction, and Ukraine’s Defense Ministry was looking into its cause, Radio Svoboda reported. Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski asked Elon Musk on X whether he was “playing politics with your products again,” adding: “As your European customers, we are watching you.”

Ukrainian forces have reported the sudden loss of satellite communications during high-speed drone operations after SpaceX imposed new restrictions on its military-grade Starshield service. The disruption revives questions over American control of Ukraine’s battlefield communications and follows earlier controversies involving Elon Musk’s intervention in Ukrainian military operations.

Ukraine’s armed forces have reported serious disruptions to drone operations after Elon Musk’s SpaceX introduced new restrictions on its Starshield satellite communications service overnight on 13–14 October. The changes reportedly caused Ukrainian unmanned aircraft to lose connectivity when travelling faster than 160 kilometres per hour, forcing the abandonment of several military missions.

The restrictions were confirmed by Serhiy Beskrestnov, an adviser to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on defence technologies, who said Ukrainian forces had received no advance warning. According to his account of the disruption, the new limit of 100 miles per hour applies to Starshield, the military communications service developed by SpaceX for government and defence applications.

Serhiy Sternenko, a prominent Ukrainian volunteer and former adviser to the defence minister, was among the first to report the problem. In a statement published on Wednesday morning, he said satellite connections had begun disappearing once drones exceeded the new speed threshold, disrupting several important missions. Sternenko suggested that the decision might have been taken at the request of President Donald Trump’s administration, although no evidence establishing such an instruction has been made public.

Four Ukrainian military personnel speaking to Ukrainska Pravda independently reported problems with Starshield. One commander provided footage purportedly showing two Ukrainian drones losing their satellite connections during flight and becoming unable to complete their missions.

The restrictions do not appear to affect ordinary Starlink terminals operating within their existing speed limits. However, military-grade Starshield connectivity allows Ukraine to operate certain unmanned systems at considerably higher speeds, including aircraft conducting long-range missions against Russian military and industrial targets.

Previous disputes over Starlink access

The latest interruption is not the first occasion on which SpaceX has limited Ukraine’s military use of its satellite network. Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022, Starlink has become an essential component of Ukrainian battlefield communications, supporting frontline command systems, artillery coordination and unmanned operations.

In September 2022, during Ukraine’s counteroffensive in the south, Starlink communications failed in areas where Ukrainian forces were attempting to advance against Russian positions. A subsequent investigation published in July 2025 reported that Musk had personally ordered the suspension of service across parts of the battlefield, including areas around Kherson.

The interruption reportedly affected reconnaissance, artillery targeting and communications between military units at a critical stage of the operation. The investigation raised questions about the ability of a private technology provider to influence military operations through decisions governing access to its infrastructure.

Another controversy emerged in September 2023, when Musk acknowledged refusing a Ukrainian request to activate Starlink coverage near Sevastopol in Russian-occupied Crimea. Ukrainian forces had intended to use unmanned naval vessels against Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.

Musk argued that enabling the operation could have made SpaceX complicit in a major escalation of the war. His explanation also challenged earlier accounts suggesting he had actively switched off an existing connection, rather than declined to activate coverage in the requested area.

In February 2023, SpaceX president Gwynne Shotwell had already confirmed restrictions on Ukrainian drone operations, explaining that the company had not intended its commercial communications network to be used directly as a weapon.

Military dependence and American leverage

The Pentagon attempted to establish a more formal relationship with SpaceX in June 2023, contracting the company to provide satellite communications to Ukrainian forces. However, the contractual arrangements and the extent of American government authority over operational restrictions have never been fully disclosed.

Ukraine subsequently gained access to Starshield, which SpaceX describes as a secure satellite network intended specifically for national security applications. Unlike the commercial Starlink service, Starshield is designed to support government communications and other sensitive operations.

The latest restrictions therefore concern a service intended for military use rather than the civilian network at the centre of earlier disputes. Their introduction without advance notification has renewed concerns about Ukraine’s dependence on communications infrastructure controlled outside the country.

The timing is particularly sensitive as Washington and Kyiv continue to disagree over Ukrainian strikes against Russian energy facilities and the terms of a possible ceasefire. Ukraine has maintained that attacks against Russia’s oil industry are part of its campaign to reduce Moscow’s ability to finance and sustain the invasion.

Nevertheless, there is currently no independently established connection between those diplomatic disagreements and SpaceX’s decision to impose the new speed restriction. Neither a technical explanation nor evidence of an instruction from Washington had been publicly established when the disruption was reported.

For Ukrainian commanders, the immediate problem is operational. High-speed unmanned aircraft depend on reliable communications for navigation, mission management and the transmission of information. A restriction introduced without warning can render previously functioning systems ineffective in the middle of an operation.

The incident has exposed a persistent vulnerability in Ukraine’s military communications arrangements: even where the necessary aircraft, operators and mission capabilities are available, their employment may remain subject to restrictions imposed by an external satellite operator.

Launch of Russian ballistic missiles on Ukraine, with no US warning, coincides with outage of Starlink managed by Musk’s SpaceX

Ukraine’s military has suddenly had its access to Starlink satellite internet terminals restricted as the Trump administration has increased pressure on Ukraine to halt long-range strikes on Russia’s oil industry immediately.

The terminals, which are produced by Elon Musk’s SpaceX but managed by the US government, are a key component of Ukraine’s military operations and the sudden restrictions on the terminals travelling at high speeds on Tuesday evening led to the failure of several combat missions, said an adviser on military technology to Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

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© Photograph: Reuters

© Photograph: Reuters

© Photograph: Reuters

Ukraine relies on Starlink to operate its mid-strike drones in Russian-occupied Ukraine. SpaceX CEO Elon Musk said that only the U.S. president has the right to determine speed and usage restrictions for Starlink military systems.

The claim that strikes on Russian tech giant Yandex thinned out social media bots finds no support in the networks tracked by Ukrainian disinformation-monitoring company LetsData, co-founder Ksenia Iliuk told Euromaidan Press on 13 October. She cautioned that the strikes may still have affected networks outside the company’s view.

At the Warsaw Security Forum, Lithuania’s prime minister suggested allies should ask Ukraine to strike more Russian data centers because that might help protect European elections from foreign interference. Bot networks are one tool of that interference, so whether the strikes mute them carries weight well beyond Ukraine.

No drop in the networks LetsData tracks

Drones hit Yandex data centers in Sasovo and Vladimir between 8 and 11 October. Ukrainian drone maker Fire Point said its FP-1 drones struck Yandex’s Kaluga site in between. On 12 October, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told the Warsaw Security Forum that once Ukraine’s response reached Yandex, social media had fewer bots.

LetsData checked X and Facebook, where bot networks usually stand out clearly, Iliuk said. Its analysts looked at networks attributed to Russia’s influence ecosystem. Among them are groups of X accounts spreading domains from what she called a new wave of Doppelgänger, a Russian campaign that clones real news sites.

Those networks look unaffected, Iliuk said. None of them has stopped posting or broken its usual rhythm, she added. Some are slightly less active, but LetsData’s analysts say that is typical for them. The networks run on a weekly cycle, and the check fell in the part of the week when they post less.

A network that jumped from Germany to Ukraine

LetsData worked with two samples. One covers accounts that systematically target Ukraine, Moldova, and Armenia. The other covers bot networks the company has followed for some time that keep changing their target audience, so they have no fixed country.

About two weeks ago, one network from that second sample wrote about elections in Germany and spread fake Die Welt sites, she said. It now posts about mobilization in Ukraine and shares a fake site of Ukrinform, Ukraine’s state news agency.

What the check can’t see

The company can compare only within networks whose usual behavior it knows, Iliuk said. Checking the whole internet is impossible because the scale is colossal, she said. A Cloudflare chart that circulated as evidence counted automated web requests from Yandex’s network, including its search crawlers, not social media posts, Cybernews reported.

So the networks LetsData follows show no impact, Iliuk said. That does not mean the strikes had no effect at all, she noted. They may have shown up in networks the company isn’t tracking now. LetsData will keep watching and report other signals if they appear.

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Nel dicembre 2021, la Russia presentò agli Stati Uniti e alla NATO due bozze di accordi formali per ottenere garanzie di sicurezza legalmente vincolanti, facendo intendere che se non fossero state accolte ci sarebbero state delle conseguenze.

Segue nostro Telegram.

In effetti, dopo il rifiuto di Washington di prenderle in considerazione, il 24 febbraio 2022 la Federazione Russa intraprese l’Operazione Militare Speciale in Ucraina, ancora in corso.

Tra le richieste avanzate allora da Mosca sottolineiamo:

• Blocco dell’allargamento della NATO: l’impegno formale a impedire ulteriori espansioni dell’Alleanza Atlantica, escludendo esplicitamente l’adesione dell’Ucraina.
• Limitazioni alle Forze Militari: il divieto per la NATO di dispiegare truppe o armamenti nei Paesi entrati a far parte dell’Alleanza Atlantica dopo il maggio 1997.
• Basi negli ex Stati sovietici: il divieto per gli Stati Uniti di stabilire basi militari o sviluppare cooperazione bilaterale nei Paesi dell’ex URSS che non fanno parte della NATO.
• Missili a raggio intermedio e corto: il divieto reciproco di dispiegare missili a raggio intermedio e corto in aree da cui possano colpire il territorio dell’altra parte.
• Attività militari: la limitazione delle esercitazioni e delle attività militari della NATO in Europa orientale, nel Caucaso e in Asia centrale.

Stati Uniti e NATO nel 2021 rifiutarono le richieste principali (in particolare il veto sull’allargamento della NATO e il ritiro delle infrastrutture militari ai confini del 1997), offrendo invece di negoziare su temi specifici come il controllo degli armamenti e la trasparenza delle esercitazioni.

Perciò, il 17 febbraio 2022 Mosca consegnò una contro-risposta formale agli Stati Uniti, lamentando la mancanza di disponibilità a fornire garanzie vincolanti e preannunciando la necessità di adottare misure ‘tecnico-militari’: pochi giorni dopo ci fu l’invasione dell’Ucraina.

La Russia aveva fondati motivi per ritenere che Kiev stesse per entrare nella NATO e uno dei bersagli inziali dei suoi missili balistici (13 marzo e 17 maggio 2022) furono proprio i centri di addestramento ucraini di Yavoriv (nella zona di Leopoli, vicino al confine polacco ma all’interno dei confini ucraini), a tutti gli effetti infrastrutture della NATO, come visibile nelle mappe della stessa Alleanza Atlantica (1).

Tralasciando le questioni diplomatiche e l’auspicata volontà comune di riaffermare i principi delle Nazioni Unite che venivano espressi nel documento presentato da Mosca e sui quali l’Amministrazione Trump ha tirato oggi una riga definitiva, è interessante capire se siano stati compiuti dei passi da parte dell’attuale presidenza statunitense per venire incontro alle richieste russe (2).

All’art. 1: Russia e U.S.A. non intraprenderanno azioni né parteciperanno o sosterranno attività che pregiudichino la sicurezza dell’altra Parte; non attueranno misure di sicurezza – adottate da ciascuna Parte individualmente o nell’ambito di un’organizzazione internazionale, di un’alleanza militare o di una coalizione – che possano compromettere gli interessi fondamentali di sicurezza dell’altra Parte.

Sul supporto decisivo dell’intelligence USA e dei grandi gruppi tecnologici statunitensi (da Starlink a Palantir, entrambi vicini all’Amministrazione Trump) all’Ucraina al fine di colpire il territorio della Federazione Russa ho già ampiamente scritto in precedenza e perciò non mi soffermo (3).

Articolo 2

Le Parti si adopereranno affinché tutte le organizzazioni internazionali, le alleanze militari e le coalizioni a cui partecipa almeno una delle Parti si attengano ai principi sanciti dalla Carta delle Nazioni Unite.

Abbiamo assistito recentemente alla doppia aggressione condotta dalla “Coalizione Epstein” all’Iran, senza alcun fondamento nel diritto internazionale e senza alcuna considerazione dei “principi sanciti dalla Carta delle Nazioni Unite”. Per non parlare del supporto statunitense ai bombardamenti israeliani su Siria, Libano e Yemen (aggressione alla quale contribuisce in gran parte l’Arabia Saudita) o del rapimento illegittimo del Presidente venezuelano Maduro.

Articolo 3

Le Parti non utilizzeranno i territori di altri Stati allo scopo di preparare o compiere un attacco armato contro l’altra Parte o altre azioni che pregiudichino gli interessi fondamentali di sicurezza dell’altra Parte.

Naturalmente, la violazione di questo articolo non avviene solo utilizzando il territorio ucraino per colpire la Russia; recentemente, sul sito del Ministero della Difesa di Mosca è comparso un elenco di venti aziende europee accusate di essere parte integrante dell’apparato militare-industriale ucraino. Quattro hanno sede in Italia, tre in Germania, due in Gran Bretagna, due in Polonia, due in Turchia, due in Repubblica Ceca, poi sono rappresentate anche imprese con basi in Israele, Spagna, Paesi Bassi, Lituania e Lettonia. Tutto ciò avviene con il consenso implicito degli Stati Uniti. Anche le infrastrutture della NATO e le basi militari statunitensi in Europa (Sigonella ad esempio in Italia nel 2022) contribuiscono così ad alimentare questo conflitto (4).

Articolo 4

Gli Stati Uniti d’America si impegneranno a impedire un’ulteriore espansione verso Est dell’Organizzazione del Trattato del Nord Atlantico e a negare l’adesione all’Alleanza agli Stati dell’ex Unione delle Repubbliche Socialiste Sovietiche. Gli Stati Uniti d’America non stabiliranno basi militari nel territorio degli Stati dell’ex Unione delle Repubbliche Socialiste Sovietiche che non siano membri dell’Organizzazione del Trattato del Nord Atlantico, né utilizzeranno le loro infrastrutture per attività militari di alcun tipo, né svilupperanno con essi una cooperazione militare bilaterale.

Senza trascurare l’immediato ingresso di Svezia e Finlandia nella NATO all’inizio dell’Operazione Militare Speciale, l’attuale Amministrazione a Washington ha annunciato l’invio di ulteriori 5.000 soldati statunitensi in Polonia e l’istituzione di una nuova base militare permanente nel Paese (ridenominata “Fort Trump”). Ma gli U.S.A. non si sono fermati qui; in Armenia, nazione che fa ancora formalmente parte dell’Organizzazione per il Trattato di Sicurezza Collettiva e dell’Unione Economica Eurasiatica, lo scorso settembre Washington e Erevan hanno tenuto un nuovo ciclo di consultazioni bilaterali sulla difesa e firmato un verbale congiunto d’intesa (jointly agreed minutes) per dare seguito alla Charter on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership sottoscritta nel maggio 2026. Gli accordi discussi riguardano:

Supporto alla trasformazione e riforma delle Forze Armate armene.

Addestramento di sottufficiali (NCO), istruttori, comandanti junior e personale per il mantenimento della pace (peacekeeping).

Istruzione militare ed esercitazioni congiunte.

Sviluppo delle capacità industriali della difesa e potenziale fornitura di equipaggiamenti tramite il programma Foreign Military Sales (FMS) e programmi educativi come l’IMET, orientando l’Armenia verso una progressiva modernizzazione degli standard militari occidentali.

Articolo 5

Le Parti si asterranno dallo schierare le proprie Forze Armate e i propri armamenti – anche nell’ambito di organizzazioni internazionali, alleanze militari o coalizioni – in aree in cui tale schieramento potrebbe essere percepito dall’altra Parte come una minaccia alla propria sicurezza nazionale, fatta eccezione per lo schieramento all’interno dei territori nazionali delle Parti stesse. Le Parti si asterranno dal far volare bombardieri pesanti equipaggiati con armamenti nucleari o non nucleari, o dallo schierare navi da guerra di superficie di qualsiasi tipo – anche nell’ambito di organizzazioni internazionali, alleanze militari o coalizioni – in aree situate rispettivamente al di fuori dello spazio aereo nazionale e delle acque territoriali nazionali, dalle quali sia possibile colpire obiettivi nel territorio dell’altra Parte.

Poco più di un mese fa, si è tenuta un’esercitazione aerea della NATO nel nord-est della Polonia, nelle vicinanze di Kaliningrad con alcune decine di velivoli. All’esercitazione hanno partecipato caccia statunitensi e norvegesi, un aereo di sorveglianza NATO E-3A Sentry AWACS, velivoli per il rifornimento in volo e un aereo statunitense EA-37B per la guerra elettronica: Mosca teme che si tratti di manovre preparatorie all’isolamento dell’enclave russa dal resto della Federazione e ha risposto duramente ma soltanto sul piano diplomatico.  Inoltre, la NATO Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), la difesa antimissile balistica dell’Alleanza Atlantica, è una rete costituita da sensori e da sistemi missilistici che i Paesi Membri offrono quale contributo nazionale alla struttura, i cui punti di riferimento in Europa sono lo European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), statunitense, con il sistema americano Aegis Ashore schierato in Romania e Polonia e le navi Aegis per la BMD, stazionate nelle acque spagnole. Il sistema radar della IAMD si trova in Turchia, mentre l’infrastruttura di comando e controllo in Germania (5). Nel 2016 (grazie all’annullamento del Trattato ABM deciso da Trump) gli Stati Uniti hanno prima messo in funzione una base ABM in Romania, un sistema che utilizza lanciamissili Aegis potenzialmente in grado di lanciare Tomahawk con testata nucleare ad oltre 2400 chilometri di distanza, successivamente nel 2022 hanno costruito un sito Aegis in Polonia, ancora più vicino ai confini russi. Gli Stati Uniti hanno sempre sostenuto che i siti ABM hanno lo scopo di fermare le testate puntate sull’Europa dall’Iran o dalla Corea del Nord. Mosca ovviamente non la pensa così; François Geleznikoff, direttore delle applicazioni militari presso la Commissione per l’energia atomica e le energie alternative, intervenne nel marzo 2019 in audizione presso l’Assemblea Nazionale francese sull’argomento contraddicendo Washington: “Negli Stati Uniti, la Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) non si rivolge realmente alla Corea del Nord (gli americani hanno armi che permetterebbero loro di vetrificare il Paese più volte) ma piuttosto alla Russia, in risposta alle dichiarazioni del presidente Putin” (6).

Articolo 6

Le Parti si impegnano a non dislocare missili a raggio intermedio e a corto raggio lanciabili da terra al di fuori dei propri territori nazionali, né in aree dei propri territori nazionali dalle quali tali armi possano colpire obiettivi situati nel territorio nazionale dell’altra Parte.

Il 22 settembre 2026, Stati Uniti, Danimarca e Groenlandia hanno firmato a New York un accordo di sicurezza trilaterale che prevede l’apertura e la gestione di due nuove basi militari americane e la modernizzazione di quella esistente. Gli Stati Uniti ottengono ampie libertà di movimento (aria, terra e mare) per collegare le basi e la possibilità di utilizzare l’isola per il sistema di difesa missilistica (la Pituffik Space Base – ex Thule Air Base – nel nord-ovest dell’isola, ospita sistemi radar d’allerta precoce per i missili balistici). Il sistema difensivo pensato dagli Stati Uniti si evolverà da una presenza concentrata in un unico punto a una rete di strutture distribuite su tutta l’isola. Anche perché le due nuove basi non saranno le uniche installazioni militari che si insedieranno sull’isola (7).

Articolo 7

Le Parti si asterranno dal dislocare armi nucleari al di fuori dei propri territori nazionali e riporteranno nei propri territori nazionali le armi già dislocate all’estero al momento dell’entrata in vigore del Trattato. Le Parti elimineranno tutte le infrastrutture esistenti per il dislocamento di armi nucleari al di fuori dei propri territori nazionali. Le Parti non addestreranno personale militare o civile proveniente da Paesi non dotati di armi nucleari all’uso di tali armi. Le Parti non condurranno esercitazioni o attività di addestramento per forze convenzionali che prevedano scenari di impiego di armi nucleari.

A partire dal 13 ottobre 2026, si svolgerà in Italia Steadfast Noon, ‘Mezzogiorno risoluto’, l’esercitazione che l’Alleanza atlantica svolge ogni anno e che coinvolgerà le basi aeree di Aviano, in provincia di Pordenone, e Ghedi, nel Bresciano, oltre a diverse località in tutta l’area di responsabilità ben oltre il Nord del Paese. “È necessario il contributo congiunto di tutti gli Alleati: si tratta di un’iniziativa che non può limitarsi a un singolo Paese”, ha riferito il colonnello David Bull, capo delle operazioni nucleari della Nato, facendo riferimento al fatto che anche lo spazio aereo dei Paesi limitrofi potrebbe essere coinvolto. Vi parteciperanno velivoli in grado di svolgere missioni convenzionali e nucleari, anche se l’esercitazione non prevede l’impiego di armi atomiche. “Ma siamo in sintonia con Roma sul fatto che si tratti di un’esercitazione nucleare”, ha poi precisato Barrows. Gli Stati Uniti saranno presenti con equipaggi di volo e personale addetto alla manutenzione. Secondo gli stessi documenti del Pentagono, in Italia sarebbero dislocate circa 80 ordigni nucleari sotto controllo statunitense nelle basi militare italiane a Ghedi e Aviano (8).

Conclusioni

Il sintetico panorama offerto da questo articolo vuole dimostrare che la Russia non potrà cantare vittoria nemmeno dopo aver completato la conquista del Donbass, perché l’inizio dell’Operazione Militare Speciale in Ucraina è legato a considerazioni di sicurezza geopolitica tuttora irrisolte se non addirittura aggravatesi rispetto al 2022.

Se qualcuno al Cremlino crede che dopo un eventuale accordo con l’attuale Amministrazione U.S.A., la Russia verrà lasciata stare si sbaglia di grosso, perché l’Occidente collettivo si sta già preparando non solo al dopo Putin ma anche al dopo Trump.

L’obiettivo degli Stati Uniti non è altro che prendere tempo in attesa del verificarsi di almeno una delle due condizioni: l’allontanamento di Mosca dalla partnership strategica con Pechino e il conseguente rallentamento della dedollarizzazione – gli Stati Uniti non pagheranno di certo il diesel russo in rubli – e la fine della preparazione da parte della NATO ad un conflitto diretto contro la Russia – termine individuato nel 2030, quando sicuramente Trump non sarà più alla Casa Bianca.

Dal punto di vista occidentale la considerazione della Russia non è cambiata molto da quando il direttore della rivista “Foreign Policy”, l’israelo-statunitense John Feffer, la definì una “Nigeria con le armi nucleari”; secondo questa visione, Mosca deve tornare ad essere una sorta di ‘colonia estrattiva’ o ‘appendice di materie prime’ a esclusivo vantaggio delle industrie euro-statunitensi. A maggior ragione nel momento in cui la competizione tecnologica con la Cina necessita da parte degli Stati Uniti di quelle risorse strategiche di cui la Federazione Russa è ricca.

Pochi giorni fa, i 32 membri del Comitato Militare della NATO (quello statunitense in primis), erano a Kiev per ribadire il loro sostegno incondizionato all’Ucraina “rimasta costantemente al centro delle valutazioni, delle decisioni e della pianificazione futura dell’Alleanza”. Prima di fare qualsiasi altra concessione a Washington, Vladimir Putin dovrebbe pensarci bene: passare da una vittoria tattica ad una sconfitta strategica potrebbe essere più semplice di quanto sembra.

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(1) https://www.nato.int/structur/nmlo/links/yavoriv-training-centre.pdf. Il sito internet è oggi irraggiungibile (forse per mascherare le prove?), ma la sua presenza come infrastruttura dell’Alleanza Atlantica era rintracciabile ancora nel giugno 2024. Come ammise anche il “Corriere della Sera”, i morti furono più di 300 e tra di essi numerosi soldati e addestratori della NATO: Giulia Fasano, Nella base militare di Yavoriv i morti sono stati trecento, 26 marzo 2022. Anche secondo il quotidiano “Repubblica”: “Il ‘Centro internazionale per la pace e la sicurezza’ di Yavoriv ospitava istruttori occidentali, come conferma il Ministro della Difesa di Kiev”.

(2) Il documento completo è stato pubblicato sul sito internet del Ministero degli Esteri della Federazione Russa: Treaty between The United States of America and the Russian Federation on security guarantees, 17 dicembre 2021.

(3) Ad esempio, cfr. Le basi della CIA in Ucraina: chiave del contenimento anti-russo in Europa, “Strategic Culture Foundation”, 11 aprile 2026.

(4) Nel contesto del conflitto in Ucraina e della postura di deterrenza della NATO, le basi militari presenti sul territorio italiano (gestite sia dalle Forze Armate italiane che dagli Stati Uniti) svolgono funzioni chiave di sorveglianza aerea, intelligence, logistica e comando, cfr. ad esempio Federico Petrangeli, Supporting Kyiv: Italy’s Military Assistance between Strategic Continuity and Political Division, IAI, 11 giugno 2026.

(5) Senato della Repubblica italiana, Schema di decreto ministeriale di approvazione del programma pluriennale di A/R n. SMD 32/2025, relativo all’ammodernamento, al rinnovamento e al potenziamento della capacità nazionale di difesa aerea e missilistica a protezione del territorio nazionale e dell’Alleanza Atlantica, alla protezione di teatro delle forze schierate in aree di operazione, inclusa la componente navale (n. 377), Resoconto sommario del 4 febbraio 2026.

(6) Stefano Vernole, La forza di dissuasione nucleare francese, Focus CeSEM, 3 maggio 2022.

(7) Stefano Vernole, Gli Stati Uniti hanno messo le mani sulla Groenlandia dimostrando la totale irrilevanza dell’Unione Europea, “Strategic Culture Foundation”, 5 ottobre 2026.

(8) Redazione Peacelink, L’esercitazione nucleare della NATO Steadfast Noon 2026 comincerà sui cieli italiani il 13 ottobre.

Ukraine wants the EU to force Moscow into a ceasefire with frozen Russian assets, trade and transit embargoes, maritime bans, and entry bans, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha wrote on X after the EU Foreign Affairs Council in Luxembourg on 12 October 2026. He also welcomed new EU sanctions listings adopted that day and progress in Ukraine’s EU accession talks.

Kyiv has spent this month laying out truce formats it would accept while awaiting Russia’s position on talks, and the levers it is pressing the EU to use include frozen Russian assets that EU leaders failed to agree on tapping last December.

The pressure Kyiv wants from the EU

Sybiha called it “devastating pressure.” He also wants Russian combatants and their families barred from the EU, maximum visa restrictions, and Russia’s isolation in culture and sports.

I was pleased to attend the EU Foreign Affairs Council today.

It is time for Europe to define its strong role. Our future and our security are in our hands.

Now is the time for real European pressure on Moscow. Not half-measures, but devastating pressure: frozen assets, trade… pic.twitter.com/AnI8h6HXbs

— Andrii Sybiha (@andrii_sybiha) October 12, 2026

His post named three types of ceasefire—energy, food security, and a full ceasefire—without saying whether Kyiv would accept them separately. Earlier this month, he told journalists Ukraine was ready for an energy and Black Sea ceasefire “but only in such a combination.”

New sanctions listings and two more accession clusters

The minister welcomed the EU’s 12 October adoption of new sanctions listings against Russia—the largest single expansion of the bloc’s blacklist. EU ambassadors agreed on the 1,646 names on 7 October. They include 1,569 tied to Russia’s military industry and 77 to its so-called State Duma elections. The listings are separate from the EU’s 22nd sanctions package, which the EU has yet to adopt.

He also welcomed the EU’s “green light” for opening two more clusters in Ukraine’s EU accession talks: Internal Market, and Competitiveness and Inclusive Growth. The formal opening was scheduled for an intergovernmental conference on 13 October.

Front-line briefing and aid requests

Sybiha said he briefed European colleagues on the front-line situation, Russia’s plans, and ways to deprive it of its advantages, and that he passed partners specific requests for aid. He reaffirmed Ukraine’s commitment to reforms.

The EU adopted its largest-ever round of sanctions listings on 12 October, targeting the suppliers behind Russia’s war industry, the Council of the EU announced. The bloc acted as Russia keeps killing Ukrainian civilians every day, while US President Donald Trump eases sanctions on Russian diesel.

Russia’s planned winter campaign against Ukraine’s infrastructure depends on arms factories fed by a web of component suppliers and on oil revenue that still flows despite Ukraine’s refinery strikes, so every supplier cut off from that web raises the cost of waging it. As Washington eases off, Europe’s own pressure has a gap: its ports still take record volumes of Russian Arctic gas, and a full ban on long-term contracts starts only in 2027.

Missile suppliers top the list

More than half of the new listings hit the supply chain for ballistic missiles that Russia “uses to kill Ukrainian civilians every day,” EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said in the statement. Russian attacks killed more than 150 people in the past week, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on 11 October.

The list names 826 Russian companies, mid-level firms the Council calls the “core” of Russia’s arms industry, with at least €20 billion in yearly turnover, and 743 people who run them. They make parts for missiles, drones, and military aircraft, from semiconductors and radars to explosives and navigation systems. Their assets are frozen, EU firms may not finance them, and the executives may not enter the EU.

Foreign ministers ratified a deal EU envoys reached on 7 October. Ukraine’s sanctions commissioner Vladyslav Vlasiuk said 60% of the listings came from Ukrainian proposals.

Ministers reject the diesel deal

EU foreign ministers in Luxembourg vowed to keep the sanctions despite Trump’s diesel deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Euronews reported. Kallas addressed Washington directly as she arrived.

“The US is our biggest ally, but our message is clear: if we want to end this war, the only way we can do this is (by) putting more pressure on Russia,” Kallas said.

Irish Foreign Minister Helen McEntee called the deal “concerning,” and Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys said it was “not the European way.” Kallas warned that an energy truce covering only refineries would favor Russia, since Ukraine has one refinery and Russia “plenty.”

Trump announced the diesel deal on 9 October, and the US Treasury waived sanctions on Russian diesel until April 2027. Zelenskyy said the EU would provide about €3 billion more in military aid this week.

Washington presses Kyiv

Trump expects Ukraine to stop hitting Russian refineries under his proposed energy ceasefire, a White House official told Axios. Zelenskyy said Kyiv would halt such strikes if Moscow did the same. On 10 October, Trump told reporters it was time for Ukraine to get a new president. Germany’s foreign minister, Britain’s defense secretary, and a senior lawmaker from Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s party backed Zelenskyy, while the Kremlin sided with Trump.

Zelenskyy offered to hold elections after a 60-day ceasefire, and Kallas said elections are impossible while the war goes on. The Institute for the Study of War assessed that Russia exploits Ukraine’s legal ban on wartime elections to drag out the war.

Ukraine’s drone strikes on Russian tech giant Yandex thinned out social media bots, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on 12 October. Network data do show Yandex’s automated traffic collapsing after the strikes. Disinformation researchers say that traffic is search crawling, not trolls. A Ukrainian social media monitor told Euromaidan Press its own data show no clear drop in bot activity either.

Russian influence operations are a live threat to European votes. In August, the Matryoshka network fabricated news clips aimed at Sweden’s general election. German and French authorities flagged the same network targeting Germany’s local votes and French presidential hopeful Gabriel Attal. A way to switch such networks off would hand allies a new tool, which is why the claim needs testing.

The president’s claim

Addressing the Warsaw Security Forum by video link, Zelenskyy said that once Ukraine began answering Russia’s operation against Ukrainian data centers and its strikes reached Yandex, many social media platforms suddenly became a little easier to breathe on.

Many people noticed less hatred, discord, and provocation because there were fewer bots, he said. It was quite clear where those bots came from, he noted. Their disappearance once Yandex went down proves again that Europe is not the source of the problems, he added.

Lithuanian Prime Minister Mindaugas Sinkevičius said at the same forum that allies should ask Zelenskyy to strike more data centers in Russia, answering a question on how to protect their elections from interference.

Three data centers in four days

Drones first hit Yandex’s data center in Sasovo, Ryazan Oblast, on 8 October. Yandex said it shut the site down completely. The next day, a strike on its Kaluga site completely disabled several modules, the company said. Yandex calls Kaluga its largest data center, Russian science outlet T-Invariant noted.

Ukrainian drone maker Fire Point said its FP-1 long-range drones carried out that strike.

After the first strike, on Sasovo, a source at Yandex summed up the mood for The Bell: “Things are rotten. We keep working.”

Overnight on 11 October, drones hit the third site, in Vladimir. Yandex said it fully halted that data center too. Vladimir Oblast Governor Aleksandr Avdeev acknowledged an attack on “infrastructure” near the city. It started a fire and cut power to two substations serving 5,000 residents, he claimed.

Dima, have you tried turning it off and on again?

— Fire Point (@FirePointUA) October 11, 2026

What the traffic data show

Automated web requests from Yandex’s network fell to 0.4% of their two-week peak after the third strike, Cloudflare Radar data showed, Cybernews reported. That chart counts automated requests to websites, mostly from Yandex’s own search crawlers. It does not count social media posts.

The chart “has nothing to do with social media,” the Russian opposition analysis group Antibot4navalny wrote.

To those implying that Kremlin-controlled social media bot/troll farms became silent after Ukraine hit a Yandex data center, posting this CloudFare chart ( radar.cloudflare.com/bots/as13238 ):Hate to disappoint you all

— antibot4navalny | bot blocker | блокировщик ботов (@antibot4navalny.bsky.social) 2026-10-11T20:54:52.717Z

Russia’s overall bot traffic last week looked much like any other week. Yandex’s own figure began recovering on Sunday. Covert troll farms usually hide behind residential proxies, hacked devices, virtual private networks (VPNs), and Western cloud providers, the outlet added.

What Ukrainian social media shows so far

Yevhen Luzan tracks Ukrainian social media sentiment as an analyst at the Ukrainian nonprofit CAT-UA. Its daily reviews sample about 500 random posts. On 11 October, that sample showed an unusually small share of posts criticizing Ukraine’s authorities, he told Euromaidan Press. Accounts showing signs of bot activity made up only a few tenths of a percent of that criticism. That is within the margin of error.

The same day, though, US President Donald Trump’s deal for Russian diesel supplies dominated Ukrainian feeds. Luzan said a rally-around-the-flag effect could explain the shift, as outrage at Washington crowded out domestic stories.

“To state it definitively and draw a cause-and-effect link from this correlation would be too bold,” he said.

Across the wider pool of about 10,000 daily mentions, CAT-UA sees no significant drop in posting activity in recent days. The curve shows only the usual rises and dips around the start and end of the week, Luzan said.

“For now, even a hypothetical drop in bot farm activity dissolves entirely in the natural fluctuations of the information space,” he said.

How a crawler chart became a bot story

The claim that Russian social media bots fell by half is unproven and built on a misread chart, disinformation analyst Joohn Choe concluded in a fact-check. It traces back to an 8 October post by security researcher Jeremiah Fowler. That post said Russian bot traffic had dropped to 49%. On 11 October, radio reporter Jamie Dupree spread it on X. Tom’s Hardware then ran it under a headline calling the crawler traffic “Russian disinformation bot traffic,” wording it has since changed.

According to Cloudflare Data Explorer the amount of russian bot traffic has dropped to 49% after Ukraine struck a yandex data center. Could this disrupt the midterm elections in the US? pic.twitter.com/SRtMyjaV22

— Jeremiah Fowler Security Researcher (@yoda69) October 8, 2026

Ukrainian military analyst Tatarigami claimed that Texas separatist accounts with identical “Veteran, Christian, Father, MAGA” bios had gone quiet. He said Quebec separatists and Polish anti-EU accounts went quiet alongside them.

Polish military analyst Jarosław Wolski claimed that AfD’s online support fell 56%, posting a chart without naming its source. Another X user said “Polish” bots had vanished.

Zderusyfikowany internet (ukraińskie trafienia w centra Yandexa) nagle objawia cuda w socjalach: poparcie dla AfD w socjalmediach spadło o 56%. Mniej "polskich" kont szczujących na Ukraińców, mniej "ukraińskich" szczujących na Polaków, poparcie w sieci dla MAGA gwałtownie spadło… pic.twitter.com/zi4rwqNR9I

— Jarosław Wolski (@wolski_jaros) October 11, 2026

SpaceX will not cut Ukraine off from Starlink satellite communications, Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov, presidential adviser on defense technology, says. The reason is that the company could lose a large share of its revenue.

Ukraine’s troops and drones lean heavily on Starlink, a network Kyiv neither owns nor controls, and Elon Musk has used that control against it before. The latest shutdown fears spread after Elon Musk supported US President Donald Trump's criticism of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

“Not a year goes by without it coming up again: ‘They’ll cut off our Starlink.’ The enemy’s Telegram channels fuel these rumors. We have good and stable partner relations with SpaceX,” Flash writes.

Musk is first of all a businessman, and Ukraine brings SpaceX significant profit, so he is sure no one will switch Starlink off in Ukraine, Flash said. Unexpected moves are possible, he added, but of a different kind, such as turning Starlink on for Russia inside its own territory.

The rumors come amid real US pressure

The fears did not appear in a vacuum. After Trump allowed Russian diesel back to US markets, talk spread of "sanctions" on Ukraine if it keeps hitting the Russian refineries that fund Moscow, with the Financial Times reporting, citing European officials, that Trump’s administration has threatened to halt the mechanism for buying US weapons for Ukraine, known as PURL.

Axios has also reported, citing a Ukrainian and an American official, that Washington has threatened to stop sharing intelligence with Ukraine if it continues striking Russian refineries.

Ukraine is building a backup

The scare feeds a longer effort to reduce dependence. Ukraine is working on a satellite system of its own, something similar to Starlink but beyond Musk’s control, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on 4 October.

The timing is the reason, he said: some states will share the technology with Russia late this year or early next, and the Chinese are among them. Moscow is already fielding its own Starlink-style constellation, Rassvet, though for now it reaches Ukraine only in brief passes.