President Donald Trump has waived sweeping sanctions and tariffs targeting Russia’s energy revenues, invoking national interest provisions in legislation passed only last month. The decision follows his controversial diesel agreement with Vladimir Putin and threatens to deepen divisions with Congress and European allies over economic pressure on Moscow.

President Donald Trump has suspended the implementation of sweeping American sanctions against Russia, using presidential waiver powers to prevent penalties approved by Congress from taking effect just weeks after he signed them into law.

The executive order issued by the White House on Friday, 16 October, suspends tariffs of up to 500 per cent on Russian imports, alongside penalties targeting major purchasers of Russian oil and gas. It also waives numerous financial and commercial restrictions intended to reduce Moscow’s ability to finance its war against Ukraine.

The decision comes two days before the 18 October deadline for implementing key provisions of the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, which Trump signed on 18 September. The legislation was named after the late Republican senator Lindsey Graham, who had championed tougher economic measures against Russia.

Sanctions established but immediately suspended

The presidential order formally establishes the tariff increases required by the legislation while simultaneously suspending their application.

Under the law, Russian imports into the United States would face additional duties of 500 per cent. A separate provision would impose 100 per cent tariffs on goods imported from the five largest purchasers of Russian crude oil and natural gas if those countries knowingly made new purchases from 18 October, subject to specified conditions and exemptions.

Another provision targets countries identified as leading facilitators of Russian oil sanctions evasion, potentially exposing their exports to similar American penalties.

Trump invoked Section 115 of the legislation, which permits the president to waive sanctions and tariffs after certifying to Congress that doing so serves the national interests of the United States.

The order confirms that the certification and an accompanying explanatory report have been submitted to Congress. However, the publicly released document provides no detailed justification for suspending the measures.

The waivers will remain in effect until the president or designated senior officials decide that further action is appropriate. Existing sanctions imposed under earlier executive orders are explicitly preserved, meaning the decision does not remove all American restrictions against Russia.

Nevertheless, the order prevents the new legislation’s principal economic penalties from operating at a time when Congress had sought to intensify pressure on Moscow.

Diesel agreement shapes Washington’s decision

The suspension follows Trump’s agreement with Putin to facilitate renewed Russian diesel exports, announced on 9 October as part of an effort to reduce international fuel prices.

As EU Today previously reported, the agreement envisages an immediate release of more than 300,000 tonnes of Russian diesel, followed by additional shipments in November and subsequent months. Washington also authorised certain transactions involving Russian diesel until April 2027.

The arrangement has raised questions about the relationship between the administration’s energy policy and sanctions intended to constrain Russia’s war economy.

Diesel prices have become an increasingly important domestic political issue ahead of the American congressional elections on 3 November. The war involving Iran and disruptions to international energy supplies have contributed to exceptionally high fuel costs, creating additional pressure on the administration.

The White House hopes additional Russian supplies will relieve pressure on international markets. However, energy analysts have questioned whether the quantities involved will materially affect American prices, particularly before the elections.

The latest waiver also removes the immediate threat of punitive tariffs against major Russian energy customers, including China and India, which had objected to the proposed measures.

Congressional opposition and European concerns

The decision is likely to intensify opposition within Congress, where the sanctions legislation attracted substantial bipartisan support.

Earlier this week, 12 senators, including six Republicans, called on Trump to reverse his diesel agreement, arguing that allowing Russian fuel back onto international markets would provide Moscow with additional revenue for its military operations.

Democratic Senator Richard Blumenthal, who helped develop the sanctions legislation, criticised the diesel arrangement as contrary to Congress’s intention to strengthen economic pressure on Russia.

The decision also exposes a widening divergence between Washington and Brussels.

At the European Council meeting on Friday, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa reaffirmed that EU sanctions against Russia would remain in place until Moscow ended its war against Ukraine.

Costa declared that the present circumstances required increased pressure on Moscow rather than a relaxation of existing restrictions. The European Union is also preparing a 22nd sanctions package while considering additional financial support for Kyiv.

For Ukraine, the decision means that Russia will continue to benefit from energy exports and the international trade that helps finance its war. Instead of tightening restrictions on these revenues, Washington has suspended measures specifically intended to cut them.

The timing is particularly significant. While Trump is pressing Kyiv to halt attacks on Russian oil refineries and other energy facilities, Moscow continues its strikes against Ukrainian cities and civilian infrastructure. Zelenskyy has argued that Ukraine cannot be expected to stop targeting Russia’s energy sector while Russian attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure continue.

Although Trump can reinstate the sanctions, his decision removes the immediate threat of additional penalties against Russia and its principal energy customers. It also places Washington increasingly at odds with its European allies. Brussels remains committed to maintaining and expanding sanctions against Moscow, while the White House is now giving priority to reducing American fuel prices, even if that means easing economic pressure on Russia.

A new exhibition in Belgium brings together a 1956 painting by Paul Delvaux and its original preparatory drawing, revealing how the artist transformed his composition and concealed elements beneath the finished work.

Scientific examination of a painting by Belgian surrealist Paul Delvaux has revealed significant changes to its original composition, including figures and other details concealed beneath layers of paint. The findings are being presented in a new exhibition opening on 16 October at Musée L in Louvain-la-Neuve.

The exhibition, La Ville lunaire II: The Hidden Side of Paul Delvaux’s Painting, examines a work completed in 1956 and held in the museum’s permanent collection. Through X-ray imaging, infrared reflectography and ultraviolet examination, researchers have been able to investigate the artist’s working methods and compare the finished painting with an original preparatory drawing.

The exhibition, which runs until 7 February 2027, follows the acquisition of the drawing by the King Baudouin Foundation in 2024. Its subsequent deposit at Musée L has made it possible to examine the two works together and reconstruct the development of a composition that underwent substantial alterations.

A Painting Concealing Its Own History

Completed in June 1956, La Ville lunaire II depicts a mysterious nocturnal landscape, with a long avenue, buildings, streetlamps and figures arranged within an unsettling architectural setting.

The painting measures approximately 89 by 139 centimetres and was executed in oil on a fibreboard panel. It entered the museum’s collection in 1990 through a bequest from Dr Charles Delsemme.

Its carefully constructed perspective and unusual treatment of space reflect Delvaux’s interest in creating scenes that appear familiar while remaining detached from ordinary reality.

The museum’s collection records describe the work as a strange nocturnal landscape, with wooden barriers and a sequence of streetlamps establishing its distinctive spatial arrangement.

Yet the painting visible today differs considerably from the composition Delvaux originally envisaged.

Earlier technical examinations had already established that important details were covered during the painting process. The new exhibition brings those findings into direct comparison with the preparatory drawing, enabling visitors to see how the artist’s intentions changed.

An auction catalogue published in 2024 identified several elements present in the drawing and concealed in the painting, including a moon in the right-hand sky, a seated figure on the right and two figures wearing robes near the centre.

These changes are significant because they suggest that Delvaux did more than adjust minor details. He altered the population and lighting of the scene, potentially changing how the composition would be experienced by the viewer.

The reasons for those decisions remain uncertain.

How Scientific Technology Reveals Hidden Paintings

Modern conservation techniques allow researchers to examine works of art without removing the paint that covers earlier stages of their creation.

Infrared reflectography can reveal underdrawings and certain changes concealed beneath surface paint, depending on the materials used by the artist. X-ray imaging can detect differences in the composition of pigments and structures below the visible surface.

Ultraviolet examination provides further information about surface materials and alterations, including some later interventions.

When combined with documentary evidence, these methods help researchers distinguish between an artist’s initial design, revisions made during painting and changes introduced after completion.

The Musée L exhibition uses these techniques to investigate what art historians call pentimenti — visible or detectable alterations that record an artist changing their mind during the creative process.

The preparatory drawing, measuring approximately 28 by 45 centimetres, provides an additional reference point. Executed in ink and pencil, it contains elements that were subsequently revised or painted over in the final composition.

Displayed alongside the finished work, it allows visitors to follow the artist’s decisions from the preliminary design to the version that eventually entered the museum’s collection.

The technical findings also demonstrate the importance of preserving preparatory studies, which can contain information absent from completed paintings.

Paul Delvaux and the Belgian Surrealist Tradition

Born in Antheit in 1897, Paul Delvaux became one of Belgium’s best-known twentieth-century painters, developing a distinctive artistic language associated with surrealism.

His paintings frequently depict classical buildings, railway stations, deserted streets and solitary figures, often arranged in environments where architectural precision contrasts with an atmosphere of uncertainty.

He was influenced by the Italian painter Giorgio de Chirico, whose deserted urban spaces and dramatic perspectives helped establish the visual language of metaphysical painting.

Delvaux’s relationship with de Chirico has been examined extensively by art historians, including Joël Roucloux, whose study of La Ville lunaire II analysed its architectural perspective, shadows and the psychological effect of its composition.

The painting’s apparently moonlit setting is particularly interesting in light of the concealed moon identified by technical examination.

The absence of that celestial body from the final visible composition changes the relationship between the painting’s title and its visual content, leaving the viewer to interpret the source of its unusual illumination.

This approach distinguishes Delvaux from other Belgian surrealists, including René Magritte, whose work frequently relied on recognisable objects placed in logically contradictory situations.

For Delvaux, architecture, perspective and the arrangement of human figures were equally important in constructing a world that appears coherent but resists conventional interpretation.

A New Examination of a Familiar Work

The exhibition forms part of Musée L’s programme devoted to research into its permanent collections, rather than a conventional retrospective of the artist’s career.

Its central purpose is to explain how a single painting developed, from its first drawn composition through successive revisions to its completed form.

The research has been supported by the Jacqueline Delcourt-Nonkels Fund, managed by the King Baudouin Foundation.

For visitors, the opportunity is to examine not only a painting by one of Belgium’s leading surrealists, but also the evidence of the artistic decisions that shaped it.

The exhibition is open at Musée L in Louvain-la-Neuve from 16 October 2026 to 7 February 2027. By presenting the original drawing, technical images and finished painting together, the museum offers a detailed examination of Delvaux’s methods and the changes he made to one of his most carefully constructed nocturnal scenes.

Italy and five other member states have failed to secure a further postponement of the EU’s new carbon market for heating and transport fuels, although European leaders have ordered a fresh assessment of its impact on households and businesses.

European Union leaders have resisted demands for another postponement of carbon pricing for road transport and building fuels, exposing deep disagreements over climate policy, industrial competitiveness and the burden of energy costs on European households.

At the European Council summit in Brussels on 15–16 October, the Visegrad countries — Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic — pressed for the second European Emissions Trading System, known as ETS2, to be delayed until 2030. Italy and Greece joined calls for greater flexibility over carbon costs, although Rome also sought a national exemption from aspects of the energy-price regime rather than simply a uniform delay. No further postponement was agreed.

The European Council conclusions call on the European Commission to update its assessment of ETS2, particularly its design and safeguards. Leaders also demanded action to reduce volatility in the existing carbon market and limit the effect of carbon prices on electricity costs.

The outcome stops short of the further postponement sought by several governments, but demonstrates how far energy affordability has moved towards the centre of European climate negotiations.

The growing rebellion over ETS2

ETS2 is designed to extend the principle of carbon pricing to fuels used for heating buildings, road transport and certain smaller industrial activities. Unlike the existing Emissions Trading System, which covers large industrial installations and power generation, the new mechanism reaches sectors closely connected to everyday household expenditure.

Under the scheme, fuel suppliers must purchase allowances corresponding to the emissions associated with the fuels they sell. Households and motorists will not buy allowances themselves, but suppliers may pass those additional costs through to customers.

That distinction is fundamental. A policy designed to encourage investment in cleaner heating systems and vehicles may initially appear to consumers as an increase in petrol, diesel and domestic heating bills.

The current legislative timetable provides for ETS2 to become operational in 2028, following an earlier one-year postponement. The latest demands from several Central European governments would push that date back to 2030.

Their argument is that consumers and smaller businesses cannot reasonably be expected to absorb another source of energy-price pressure while European economies continue to contend with geopolitical uncertainty, expensive fuel and comparatively weak industrial competitiveness.

Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš has been particularly outspoken in his criticism, arguing that carbon pricing risks weakening Europe’s industrial base and making everyday life more expensive.

Italy has supported calls for greater flexibility, with Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni presenting the discussion as part of a wider attempt to restore competitiveness and make the transition more affordable.

Why other governments opposed another delay

The initiative encountered resistance from governments concerned that repeatedly postponing established climate legislation would weaken investment certainty and reduce confidence in European policy.

The Nordic member states have been particularly reluctant to reopen the timetable. Their position reflects a broader concern that businesses investing in clean technologies need credible long-term rules, rather than legislation liable to be revised whenever political opposition intensifies.

Carbon pricing is intended to change economic incentives gradually. Higher costs for carbon-intensive fuels are supposed to make alternatives such as better-insulated buildings, electric vehicles and cleaner heating more financially attractive.

Critics of further postponement argue that delaying implementation would also delay those incentives, potentially increasing the eventual cost of reaching the Union’s emissions-reduction targets.

Yet the opposition has exposed a weakness in that argument: consumers cannot always respond quickly to price signals. A household relying on an older heating system or a worker with no practical alternative to driving may face higher costs long before affordable low-carbon options become available.

That issue has been central to earlier discussions over ETS2. EU Today reported on stronger carbon-price safeguards in June, when European institutions moved to provide additional market intervention if allowance prices rose sharply.

Commission ordered to reassess the economic impact

Rather than endorsing a new delay, European leaders have asked the Commission to review ETS2’s economic impact and safeguards.

The summit also urged faster progress on adjustments to the Market Stability Reserve, the mechanism intended to help manage the supply of carbon allowances and prevent excessive price volatility.

Under the existing scheme, market interventions can increase or reduce allowance availability in response to defined conditions. For ETS2, safeguards are especially politically sensitive because the cost of carbon allowances may ultimately be reflected in household transport and heating expenditure.

The European Commission’s updated auction arrangements already envisage auctions of ETS2 allowances beginning in 2027, ahead of the system’s operational launch in 2028.

That timetable gives governments a relatively narrow window to settle the remaining political disputes and put protective measures into effect.

A central part of the response is the Social Climate Fund, intended to support vulnerable households, transport users and small businesses through investments in energy efficiency, cleaner heating, improved transport and temporary financial assistance.

EU Today previously examined the European Investment Bank’s €3 billion advance financing initiative, which aims to accelerate support for households before the new carbon market becomes fully operational.

The central practical question is whether such assistance reaches consumers quickly enough to offset rising costs, particularly in member states where incomes are lower and households remain heavily dependent on fossil fuels.

Climate commitments meet industrial reality

The ETS2 dispute is connected to a broader argument over Europe’s existing carbon market and its effects on energy-intensive industries.

Manufacturers already face substantial costs arising from electricity, fuel, regulatory requirements and international competition. Governments concerned about deindustrialisation argue that European climate policy must account more directly for these pressures.

The summit conclusions acknowledged those concerns by demanding a predictable carbon market that limits price volatility and protects industry against the relocation of production to jurisdictions with less demanding environmental rules.

At the same time, leaders reaffirmed the importance of maintaining carbon pricing as an incentive for investment and emissions reduction.

For the governments seeking a postponement, the Commission’s new assessment offers an opportunity to maintain pressure for further concessions. For governments defending the existing timetable, it provides an alternative to another politically damaging delay.

The immediate result is therefore a compromise over scrutiny rather than a change in law. ETS2 remains scheduled for 2028, while Brussels must demonstrate that its safeguards can withstand both market volatility and political opposition.

The next phase will be determined less by arguments about long-term emissions targets than by the ability of EU institutions and national governments to show households and businesses how the transition can be financed without placing disproportionate costs on those least able to adjust.

Excavations at the ancient Roman city of Altinum have revealed the probable remains of an early Christian cathedral and bishop’s palace, offering new evidence about the origins of Venice and the transformation of its lagoon settlements.

Archaeologists working near Venice have identified what they believe to be the remains of a 1,600-year-old cathedral and an adjoining episcopal palace, resolving a longstanding question about the location of one of the region’s earliest Christian centres.

The discovery was announced on 15 October by Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, following excavations at Altinum, an important Roman settlement on the mainland near the Venetian lagoon. The foundations of a substantial religious complex have emerged from an area where ancient written accounts had long indicated the existence of a cathedral, although its precise location had remained unknown.

The findings suggest that the church was constructed between the late fourth and early fifth centuries AD, making it the earliest Christian church so far identified archaeologically in the Venetian territory. The researchers believe the complex provides physical evidence of the period when Christianity was becoming an important political and administrative force in the declining Roman Empire.

A Cathedral Hidden Beneath a Roman City

The newly identified church was a rectangular structure approximately 30 metres long and 20 metres wide, without an apse and orientated towards the east. Its layout differs from the surrounding Roman street grid, reflecting the religious requirements of the early Christian community.

The architectural arrangement resembles early churches in the northern Adriatic region, particularly those associated with Aquileia, which was an important centre of Christianity during late antiquity.

An adjoining building, distinguished by its substantial foundations and a complex arrangement of internal rooms, has been provisionally identified as the bishop’s palace. Archaeologists believe it may have stood two storeys high, with residential accommodation for senior clergy above rooms potentially associated with privileged burials.

Among the most revealing discoveries is the extensive reuse of stone paving blocks taken from the Roman streets. These materials were incorporated into the foundations of the ecclesiastical buildings, providing evidence of how the city was being physically reorganised during the transition from Roman to Christian administration.

The university’s researchers suggest that the removal of public paving materials may also indicate the authority exercised by the bishop over urban infrastructure. This interpretation would place the emerging Church at the centre of the city’s political transformation.

Ancient Written Accounts Supported by Archaeology

The existence of an early Christian cathedral at Altinum had been documented in letters written by Saint Jerome, one of the most influential Christian scholars of the late Roman period.

Writing in AD 396, Jerome referred to the religious activities of Nepotian, a priest associated with Heliodorus, the first bishop of Altinum. His descriptions included the maintenance of church furnishings, walls, floors and sacred vessels, suggesting an established and relatively prosperous Christian institution.

Until now, however, archaeologists had struggled to connect those accounts to a particular building.

The latest excavations, combining evidence collected during the 2025 and 2026 campaigns, have provided what researchers consider a convincing identification of the ecclesiastical complex.

The excavation is directed by Diego Calaon of Ca’ Foscari University and co-directed by Elisa Possenti of the University of Trento. Their work has brought together earlier archaeological records and newly examined foundations, including sections exposed during investigations in previous decades.

Researchers have also identified a burial area dating from the sixth and seventh centuries. Many graves were disturbed when construction materials were removed from the abandoned complex, but surviving human remains offer opportunities for further scientific investigation.

Radiocarbon dating, anthropological examinations and additional geophysical surveys are planned to establish a more detailed chronology and search for other elements of the religious complex, including its baptistery.

What the Discovery Reveals About Venice’s Origins

The historical importance of Altinum extends beyond the cathedral itself.

The ancient settlement was an important Roman commercial centre with connections to the waterways of the northern Adriatic. As political, environmental and demographic conditions changed during late antiquity, its population and institutions gradually shifted towards settlements within the lagoon.

One of the most important destinations was Torcello, which later became an early centre of Venetian civilisation.

Traditional accounts have often portrayed the creation of lagoon settlements as a response to barbarian invasions, with mainland inhabitants fleeing to isolated islands for protection.

The latest archaeological findings support a more complicated process.

Research at Altinum and Torcello indicates that the movement of people, religious institutions and construction materials was gradual and organised rather than the consequence of a single catastrophic event.

The cathedral appears to have been systematically dismantled during the first half of the seventh century, with substantial quantities of its stone and brick transferred to developing lagoon communities.

A surviving inscription records the establishment of Torcello’s cathedral in AD 639, providing an important chronological reference for the movement of ecclesiastical authority.

The findings add to the wider study of Europe’s surviving archaeological and architectural heritage, particularly the transformation of Roman settlements into medieval urban centres.

They also demonstrate how archaeological evidence can challenge historical narratives constructed centuries after the events they describe.

Much of the late-antique landscape at Altinum disappeared because of centuries of agricultural activity and the systematic removal of reusable building materials. In many cases, the excavators are studying trenches left by the extraction of foundations rather than surviving walls.

Further investigations may determine the complete extent of the episcopal complex and clarify the chronology of its abandonment.

For the first time, however, researchers can locate the religious buildings associated with Altinum’s earliest Christian bishops and trace their connection to the communities from which medieval Venice eventually emerged.

Excavations in Germany’s Ruhr region have uncovered evidence of a substantial underground mining operation that predates the area’s industrial expansion. The discovery is providing new clues to the origins of European coal mining.

Archaeologists have identified a previously unknown coal-mining tunnel stretching at least 130 metres beneath woodland near Sprockhövel in western Germany. The remains provide evidence of coordinated underground construction at a time when the Ruhr’s mining industry was still developing, long before the region became synonymous with heavy industry.

The discovery was announced on 15 October by the Westphalia-Lippe Regional Association (LWL), whose archaeologists are working alongside the German Mining Museum in Bochum and GeoPark Ruhrgebiet. The team says its findings shed light on tunnelling techniques used before the eighteenth century, although the newly identified passage has not yet been given a precise scientific date.

At Haßlinghausen, a forest floor conceals old shafts, spoil heaps and depressions left by abandoned mining operations. Researchers did not enter an intact underground gallery. Instead, they identified the location of a collapsed passage by excavating at two former shaft sites and drilling into the surrounding spoil. Subsidence created by the collapse left a recognisable trace above ground.

How Early Miners Organised Underground Work

The evidence suggests a more complex operation than miners simply following exposed seams into the earth. Construction shafts were sunk at intervals along the proposed tunnel. Workers descended through them and excavated separate stretches underground, later joining those sections into a continuous passage.

This method allowed several groups to work simultaneously rather than advancing from a single entrance. It also demanded planning and considerable labour. The filled-in shafts and disturbed soil are still visible in the excavated sections, enabling specialists to reconstruct the miners’ methods even though much of the original tunnel has collapsed.

Till Kasielke of GeoPark Ruhrgebiet explained that the construction shafts were located beside the underground route and then filled after the gallery was completed. Jennifer Garner, an archaeologist at the German Mining Museum, said the excavations would provide material for scientific dating and a better understanding of the effort required to build the structures.

The latest work follows a 2025 investigation of a separate, approximately 70-metre tunnel nearby. That earlier feature reached a coal seam some ten metres below ground. Researchers suspected it might predate the seventeenth century because it appeared to have been overlooked during later mining activity. The newly identified 130-metre passage is a distinct discovery.

The chronology matters because horizontal tunnels changed the possibilities of coal extraction. Early miners could reach seams by digging pits or inclined shafts, but groundwater increasingly obstructed work at depth. Drainage galleries allowed water to escape, making deeper workings more practical and potentially extending the life of individual mining sites.

An Industrial Region’s Earlier History

The Ruhr is usually associated with the vast collieries, factories and transport infrastructure that drove Germany’s expansion in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Yet coal was extracted locally during the Middle Ages. The transition from small workings to organised subterranean networks remains poorly documented, partly because written records from the earliest periods are scarce.

The archaeological research programme, which began with related investigations in 2024, is intended to address that gap. The team has excavated soil layers associated with old shafts, and the recovered material may help establish when specific construction techniques were introduced. For now, it would be premature to assign the new passage a medieval date.

At Essen, the UNESCO-listed Zollverein Coal Mine Industrial Complex preserves the architecture and machinery of the Ruhr’s later industrial era. The remains at Sprockhövel represent a different historical record: temporary shafts, collapsed passages and waste deposits left by miners whose operations preceded industrial-scale coal production.

Across Europe, such landscapes have become an important part of cultural heritage. EU Today has previously reported on the preservation of Belgium’s Bois du Cazier colliery, where 262 people died in the 1956 mining disaster. In Sprockhövel, the focus is on a much earlier workforce, whose organisation and technical knowledge must be reconstructed from the ground itself.

Further dating and analysis will determine whether the newly identified tunnel pushes back the known chronology of organised drainage and gallery construction in the Ruhr. The excavations have already established that a substantial underground project once operated beneath a forest whose surface retains remarkably little indication of the work carried out there.

Image credit: LWL-Archäologie für Westfalen / Manuel Zeiler

Twice in four months, Egyptian warplanes have bombed Sudanese miners inside their own territory, and dozens of bodies have failed to draw from Abdel Fattah al-Burhan a stance worthy of his citizens’ blood. Cairo, for its part, justifies its military operations, while Port Sudan hides behind a fact-finding committee, a cable of condolences and talk of contact between the two leaderships, without daring to name the party accused of killing its citizens.

This is the scene before us: a state acting on the Sudanese border by force of arms, and an army commander who avoids naming the party accused of killing Sudanese, for fear of losing an ally whose approval seems to matter more to him than their lives. On the morning of 10 October 2026, the mining site at Jabal al-Uqaydat in the Shamal al-Wadi area inside Sudan turned into a killing field after it was struck by five consecutive airstrikes, according to the testimony of a survivor relayed by Agence France-Presse. Thousands of miners had been searching for gold in a land exhausted by war; some ended up under the rubble, while others fled to the mountains without water or supplies.

In a significant pinpointing of the site of the bombing, The New York Times, in its report published on 12 October 2026, stated that the targeted mine is located in Sudan’s Red Sea State, about 25 miles from the Egyptian border, or roughly 40 kilometres inside Sudanese territory. Al-Hurra, in its coverage of the June attack, had cited an estimate placing Jabal al-Uqaydat about 20 kilometres inside Sudan; the forty-kilometre distance is cited here as attributed to the American newspaper’s determination of the location of the October strike, which keeps the question of sovereignty and the protection of civilians at the heart of the matter.

Agence France-Presse relayed from survivors that thousands of miners were working at the site, and “Emergency Lawyers” counted 72 dead according to preliminary information, while witnesses told the BBC of more than 60 dead and about 150 wounded. Survivors told Sudan Tribune that the dead numbered at least 200, with more than 15,000 workers fleeing, while the Sudan Doctors Network recorded a preliminary toll of 13 dead and 28 wounded, warning that it could rise.

Cairo Justifies the Bombing While Burhan Avoids Naming the Perpetrator

The “Emergency Lawyers” organization accused the Egyptian air force of targeting civilian miners, considering the attack a violation of international law. When Reuters asked Egyptian security officials about the raid, they did not deny the operation but justified it as ending what they described as border chaos and preventing Egyptian and Sudanese groups from taking control of mining areas.

Two days later, the Egyptian military spokesman announced the continuation of the “third phase” of the campaign, noting that warning leaflets had been dropped on those he described as criminal elements. However, the statement placed the operations inside Egyptian territory and did not include an explicit acknowledgment of carrying out a raid inside Sudan or of the killing of the miners.

Thus Cairo has a military justification for bombing a Sudanese site, while Burhan’s authority is incapable of issuing an explicit condemnation of the party that human rights organizations accuse of killing its citizens. The irony is that the state that is supposed to demand the victims’ rights appeared more concerned about its relationship with Cairo than about naming the party responsible for their blood.

From June to October: The Victims Change, the Silence Remains

The October raid was preceded by a strike that targeted the area on 16 June 2026. Agence France-Presse reported 23 dead, while Sudanese platforms estimated the toll at around one hundred. According to the testimonies received, the operations extended to Jabal al-Uqaydat, the Red Mountain and the area around Souk al-Ansari, and included raids by warplanes and drones followed by a ground incursion. The organization “Darfur Victims Advocacy” relayed from witnesses that an Egyptian force of about sixty armed vehicles had surrounded the miners and detained civilians, some of whom were beaten.

In the days following the June attacks, Radio Dabanga reported the arrival of about two thousand deported miners via the Argeen crossing, according to a local activist, while the crossing’s director spoke of more than three thousand over the preceding days, and the Egyptian army announced the arrest of 223 people, including 136 foreigners. On 22 June, Burhan appeared in Al-Ratj to say, according to Al-Araby Al-Jadeed: “Our northern neighbor — people must respect it and not cross the borders so as not to cause problems for themselves and for the state.”

Sudanese had been waiting for their army’s commander to defend their blood, but they heard him urging them to respect the borders of the neighbor accused of bombing them. When the raid was repeated in October, the Sovereignty Council repeated the scene: condolences over the “painful incident,” a fact-finding committee, and an assurance that the two countries’ leaderships are in contact.

Burhan’s adviser, Amjad Farid, described the bombing as an unjustified and unacceptable crime, noting that border violations could be addressed without warplanes, but his position did not translate into an announced official protest or a clear path to accountability.

Sudan’s Gold: A Wealth Guarded by Force

Al-Uqaydat lies within the gold-rich Nubian Shield belt, and the Chatham House institute estimated that about 60% of gold production in the Northern, River Nile and Red Sea states is smuggled to Egypt, in quantities exceeding one hundred kilograms per day, and more than sixty tonnes since the outbreak of the war through the end of 2024.

By contrast, official gold exports to Egypt in 2024 did not exceed about 16 million dollars, roughly 1% of Sudan’s total gold exports, according to Central Bank of Sudan data cited in the Chatham House report.

Miners told Sudan Tribune that they had observed drilling machinery and trucks carrying rocks across the border into Egypt, and that an Egyptian patrol had previously warned them against approaching a site it said lies inside Egyptian territory. Al-Hurra relayed testimony about friction between workers and personnel of an Egyptian mining company operating near them.

Egyptian Law No. 193 of 2020 authorizes contracting with the Egyptian Company for Mining and the Management and Exploitation of Quarries and Salt Works, affiliated with the National Service Projects Organization, to exploit the quarries and salt works specified by the law for a period of thirty years, while the state-owned Shalateen Mineral Resources Company is active in the south of the Eastern Desert. The businessman Naguib Sawiris also praised the June operation and linked it to investors’ confidence in the Egyptian mining sector.

In the same month, Egypt’s Ministry of Petroleum denied statements attributed to its minister about agreements to establish 108 gold mines in northern Sudan, but the researcher Mohamed al-Hadi considered it likely that the attacks are linked to undisclosed understandings with the Sudanese government, a hypothesis that calls for an independent investigation.

Burhan: When the Ally Becomes More Precious Than the Citizen

The website Al-Hurra relayed from a miner that a group of pro-government joint forces withdrew from the mountain a day before the June raid, and that the Sudanese army did not arrive to evacuate the wounded and collect the bodies until the third day. The testimony raised workers’ suspicions about possible coordination between the two governments, without establishing that it took place.

But Burhan’s silence does not need those suspicions to be proven in order to become a matter of political accountability. Cairo supports the commander of the Sudanese army and considers the war on its borders a threat to its security. Agence France-Presse has verified satellite images showing the repeated presence of Turkish Bayraktar drones at an Egyptian base near Sudan, while reports spoke of facilitating the delivery of drones to the Sudanese army and training its crews inside Egypt, alongside broader military and intelligence cooperation.

An analysis published by the Horn Review in June held that the army’s silence over the raids is linked to Egyptian support for it.

Yet this relationship does not absolve Burhan of responsibility; it multiplies it. Whoever relies on another state’s support in his war cannot make the protection of his citizens a negotiable item, and his need for weapons and political backing must not become an immunity he grants to Cairo at the expense of Sudanese blood.

Sovereignty Tested With the Blood of the Poor

The raids reopen the wound of Halayeb and Shalateen, the disputed triangle under Egyptian control. Sudanese administrative maps confirm that the targeted mining sites lie inside Sudan, while Cairo treats them as part of the border area adjoining the triangle.

Human rights, political and trade union forces have called for an independent international investigation, and the “Sumud” alliance led by Abdalla Hamdok held the Egyptian side directly responsible.

Today, Egypt is required to answer for the bombing and the fall of civilians, not merely to classify them as criminal elements and offer security justifications, and Burhan is required to announce the results of the investigation, determine responsibility, demand compensation and accountability, and take the necessary diplomatic and legal measures.

As for settling for condolences, it is not a defense of sovereignty; it is a declaration that the alliance with Cairo is more precious to the authorities than the Sudanese people’s right to life and justice. At Jabal al-Uqaydat the bill is clear and admits no doubt: the gold crosses the border, the dead remain under the rubble, and Burhan guards his silence.

French authorities are preparing for hundreds of demonstrations on Saturday, 17 October, as student unrest converges with protests over living costs, public spending and government policy. Up to 40,000 demonstrators are expected in Paris, where police and organisers remain divided over march routes.

France is preparing for a nationwide wave of demonstrations on Saturday, 17 October, with approximately 500 protest actions under consideration and more than 90 marches being organised, according to the Interior Ministry. The mobilisation brings together high-school students, trade unions, farmers and supporters of the Yellow Vest movement, raising the prospect of further confrontation after nearly a month of unrest.

Police estimates suggest that around 40,000 demonstrators could gather in Paris, with approximately 150,000 more expected elsewhere in France. The figures remain preliminary, while authorities warn that some protests could involve road blockades, disruption to essential infrastructure and violent clashes.

Interior Minister Laurent Nuñez initially outlined preparations for 250 gatherings and 80 marches on Friday morning. Subsequent assessments from his office indicated that as many as 500 actions were being considered, although not all had been formally organised.

Paris Faces Dispute Over Demonstration Routes

The authorities are particularly concerned about developments in the capital, where negotiations between police and protest organisers have failed to produce agreement over the proposed routes.

Paris police prefect Patrice Faure has rejected proposals for marches terminating near the Opéra district or Place de la Concorde, citing security concerns surrounding central government institutions.

According to details of the security preparations, police have proposed an alternative route between Place de la Bastille and Place de Clichy. The CGT trade union and climate campaigners have accepted the proposal, but student organisations and Yellow Vest representatives continue to oppose it.

Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu has convened an interministerial crisis unit to coordinate the government’s response. Security officials have warned that attempts to obstruct major transport routes or critical infrastructure will not be tolerated.

The Interior Ministry has also indicated that stun grenades, whose use was suspended during the student protests, could again be deployed in cases of particularly serious urban violence.

Yellow Vests Return Amid Rising Living Costs

Saturday’s demonstrations are being promoted as a revival of the Yellow Vest movement, which emerged in 2018 following opposition to fuel taxation before developing into a broader protest against living costs, economic inequality and government policy.

The latest mobilisation has gathered support from organisations demanding measures to address rising fuel, energy and food prices. Campaigners are also challenging the government’s proposed 2027 budget and its implications for public services.

The agricultural union Confédération paysanne has called on farmers to join the demonstrations, arguing that rising agricultural fuel costs and deteriorating conditions in rural communities have increased pressure on producers.

The union has also linked its demands to environmental policy, public-service provision and access to affordable food.

The CGT, student unions and climate organisations have similarly expressed support for the protests, while political backing has come from La France Insoumise and the French Communist Party.

Student Protests Enter Their Fourth Week

The mobilisation follows weeks of demonstrations involving secondary-school pupils, teachers and public-sector workers. What began as protests over shortages of teachers, overcrowded classrooms and deteriorating school buildings has developed into a nationwide confrontation over education policy and policing.

As EU Today previously reported, between 400 and 500 secondary schools faced partial or complete disruption earlier this month as students organised blockades and demonstrations.

The movement has subsequently expanded beyond its original educational demands, with student organisations raising concerns about university admissions procedures, police tactics and government spending priorities.

The scale of the unrest has placed considerable pressure on French authorities. According to figures from the Justice Ministry, 6,877 people were placed in police custody during the protests between late September and 8 October, approximately 86 per cent of them minors.

Violence during the demonstrations has resulted in injuries among police officers, students and educational staff. Clashes on 8 October led to 504 arrests and injuries to 48 police officers, according to Interior Ministry figures.

Education Minister Édouard Geffray has announced emergency measures to address teacher shortages, including the deployment of replacement teachers. The ministry says 2,000 of the 3,000 promised replacements have already been assigned, but student organisations maintain that the measures are insufficient.

Growing Pressure on the French Government

The planned demonstrations come as France faces a difficult debate over public spending, taxation and the 2027 budget. Lecornu’s government must balance demands for higher salaries and increased investment in education against mounting pressure to reduce the deficit.

France’s deteriorating public finances have already attracted scrutiny from eurozone partners, while domestic opposition to spending restraint has become a central issue ahead of the 2027 presidential election.

The convergence of student organisations, trade unions and Yellow Vest campaigners could broaden the protests beyond the education sector, particularly if demonstrations over living costs attract participants who have not joined the recent school protests.

However, the extent of that mobilisation remains uncertain. Online protest maps contain substantially more proposed actions than the authorities’ estimates, and participation figures will not be established until Saturday.

For the government, the immediate test will be whether the demonstrations remain peaceful and whether the authorities can prevent disruption to transport networks and public services without provoking further confrontations with protesters.

Russia has placed five foreign-owned businesses under compulsory administration, including Belgian manufacturer Ontex and French flooring group Tarkett. The latest seizures deepen the confrontation over sanctions, frozen Russian assets and the future of European investment in Russia.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has ordered the transfer of five Western-owned businesses into compulsory Russian management, extending a campaign of asset seizures targeting European companies that continued operating in Russia after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The decree, signed on 15 October, affects businesses with combined annual revenues exceeding 53 billion roubles, approximately €530 million. They include French flooring manufacturer Tarkett, Belgian hygiene products group Ontex, German packaging producer Menshen, Kappa Rus and Eviosys Packaging Kuban, now linked to American group Sonoco.

Under Presidential Decree No. 738, operational control has been transferred to Centre Capital, a little-known Moscow company established in February 2026 with registered share capital of just 10,000 roubles.

The decision follows similar interventions against Nestlé, Auchan, FM Logistic and Metro in September. Together, the measures demonstrate how Moscow is using foreign-owned businesses as instruments of economic retaliation against countries supporting Ukraine.

Foreign businesses placed under Russian control

Centre Capital is headed by Marat Mirkhaydarov, a former senior official in Russia’s Zabaykalsky region who reportedly served with the Akhmat military formation during Russia’s war against Ukraine.

The scale of the companies placed under his management contrasts sharply with the financial standing of the administrator.

Tarkett’s Russian operations generated approximately 19.3 billion roubles in revenue during 2025, while Kappa Rus recorded 16.5 billion roubles and Ontex RU another 10.3 billion. Eviosys Packaging Kuban and Menshen Packaging CIS reported approximately 6.1 billion and 1.4 billion roubles respectively.

The decree does not formally transfer ownership of the companies to Centre Capital. It does, however, remove the foreign shareholders’ effective control over management, operations and commercial decisions.

For Belgian manufacturer Ontex, the consequences are immediate.

In an official statement issued on 16 October, the Aalst-based company confirmed that a government-appointed administrator had assumed operational control of its Russian subsidiary.

Ontex Russia employs approximately 350 people, operates a manufacturing facility in Noginsk and maintains a sales office in Moscow. The subsidiary accounts for around five per cent of the group’s total revenue and between seven and eight per cent of adjusted EBITDA.

The company said it was examining measures to protect its assets and maintain business continuity.

Tarkett likewise confirmed that it was losing effective control of its Russian operations.

A mechanism established in 2023

The legal framework for such interventions dates to April 2023, when Putin introduced Decree No. 302, allowing the Russian authorities to place assets associated with countries designated as unfriendly under temporary external management.

The appointed administrator can exercise extensive ownership-related powers, although the formal right to dispose of the assets remains excluded.

Crucially, the arrangement can be terminated only by presidential decision. There is no automatic deadline for returning operational control to the original owners.

Moscow maintains that the measures are reversible. Nevertheless, the loss of management authority raises questions about whether businesses could eventually be returned with their financial position, organisational structure and commercial value intact.

The latest decree extends the process already documented by EU Today following the September takeover of Nestlé and Auchan’s Russian operations.

The Kremlin’s approach also serves domestic economic objectives. Keeping factories, retail networks and distribution facilities operating under Russian management helps preserve employment, production capacity and established supply chains.

At the same time, appointing Russian administrators allows the authorities to exercise greater influence over businesses originally developed through foreign capital, technology and expertise.

European companies caught in sanctions confrontation

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov has explicitly linked the seizures to the nationality of the affected companies and the policies of their governments.

He accused European states of participating in the unlawful seizure of Russian property through sanctions and financial restrictions.

Moscow’s argument centres partly on approximately €210 billion in Russian sovereign assets immobilised in the European Union, most of them held through Belgium-based securities depository Euroclear.

The European Union has used extraordinary revenues generated by those assets to support Ukraine, while further proposals involving the underlying funds remain subject to legal and political debate.

Belgium has been particularly concerned about potential financial exposure and legal claims. As EU Today reported in September, a Belgian Council of State judgment raised additional questions about the administrative procedures governing certain frozen assets.

The dispute has also moved into the European courts, with the Bank of Russia challenging EU measures intended to protect Euroclear against the enforcement of Russian judgments.

Moscow’s treatment of European businesses adds another dimension to this confrontation. By retaining control over foreign-owned industrial and commercial assets, Russia possesses a means of exerting pressure on companies whose governments support sanctions and military assistance to Ukraine.

The implications are particularly serious for Western banks that still maintain substantial Russian operations.

Austria’s Raiffeisen Bank International and Italy’s UniCredit remain exposed to Russia through local subsidiaries. Any extension of compulsory administration to financial institutions could create additional difficulties involving deposits, capital and banking supervision.

The cost of remaining in Russia

The seizures also expose the financial risks faced by Western companies that delayed their withdrawal after February 2022.

Many initially sought to protect their investments, employees and commercial infrastructure. Others reduced operations but retained ownership, expecting that conditions might eventually permit an orderly sale or renewed business activity.

Russian restrictions have progressively complicated that calculation, requiring foreign investors from designated countries to accept substantial discounts on asset sales and obtain official approval for transactions.

Companies remaining in the country now face the additional possibility that the government will appoint administrators without their consent.

The consequences extend beyond the businesses immediately affected. Russia is establishing a precedent under which foreign investment can remain legally owned by its original shareholders while its economic benefits and operational management are placed beyond their control.

For European governments, the latest decree illustrates the increasing connection between commercial interests and geopolitical decisions.

The Kremlin has demonstrated that sanctions imposed over its invasion of Ukraine can be answered not only through diplomatic or financial measures, but also through direct intervention in European-owned businesses operating on Russian territory.

Any eventual negotiation over sanctions relief and the restoration of economic relations will consequently have to address the status of these assets, the rights of their original shareholders and the question of compensation.

Until then, Western companies remaining in Russia face an investment environment in which the ultimate authority over their businesses rests increasingly with the Kremlin rather than their shareholders.

Ukraine was prepared to suspend attacks on Russian oil refineries if Washington supplied anti-ballistic missile systems to protect its energy infrastructure, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has revealed. The proposed compromise was not accepted, despite American pressure on Kyiv to halt its strikes.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has disclosed that Kyiv offered to suspend attacks on Russian oil refineries in exchange for temporary American anti-ballistic missile protection for Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. Washington did not provide the requested systems, leaving Ukraine exposed to continued Russian missile strikes while the United States sought to restrict Ukrainian operations against Russia’s oil industry.

Speaking at a press conference in Brussels on Friday, 16 October, Zelenskyy said the proposal had been presented to Washington as a compromise following President Donald Trump’s agreement with Vladimir Putin on Russian diesel supplies and restrictions on attacks against energy facilities.

The Ukrainian president confirmed that Kyiv had not been consulted before Washington reached its understanding with Moscow. He described the diesel agreement as a surprise and objected to arrangements determining Ukraine’s military actions without its participation. Any agreement concerning Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory, he argued, required consultation with the Ukrainian government.

Nevertheless, Zelenskyy said Ukraine had been willing to accommodate American demands, even under an arrangement that did not require Russia to suspend its own attacks. Instead of insisting on reciprocal restrictions, Kyiv proposed receiving sufficient anti-ballistic missile systems to protect its electricity network for the duration of the requested suspension.

The proposal reflected Ukraine’s immediate security requirements. Russia has repeatedly targeted power stations, substations and other critical infrastructure, while Ukrainian forces have attacked Russian refineries to disrupt fuel production and reduce revenues available to Moscow. Halting the Ukrainian campaign without additional defensive capabilities would have left Kyiv surrendering one means of economic pressure while remaining vulnerable to Russian bombardment.

Zelenskyy said he had asked Washington for a limited number of systems, rather than a substantial new military commitment. The proposed deployment would have lasted only as long as the United States required Ukraine to refrain from attacking Russian refineries. However, according to the president, no such assistance was provided.

US diesel agreement deepens dispute

The disagreement follows the diesel arrangement announced by Trump on 9 October, under which Russia agreed to resume substantial petroleum product exports to American and international markets. Washington also authorised certain transactions involving Russian diesel, easing restrictions previously intended to reduce Moscow’s energy revenues.

The agreement created a direct conflict between American energy policy and Ukraine’s strategy of targeting Russian refining capacity. Washington wants additional diesel supplies to ease pressure on fuel markets, while Kyiv regards attacks on oil infrastructure as a means of weakening Russia’s ability to sustain its invasion.

That disagreement intensified after Ukraine resumed attacks on Russian refineries, including a strike against a facility in the Ryazan region. Trump criticised the operations, accusing Kyiv of contributing to higher global oil prices. Zelenskyy, meanwhile, argued that increased Russian diesel revenues would provide Moscow with additional resources to finance its military campaign.

The Ukrainian president’s proposal also exposed the limitations of the temporary energy ceasefire promoted by Washington. Russia continued attacks against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure, including electricity facilities, despite the American initiative. Kyiv’s proposed compromise would have addressed the resulting imbalance by providing defensive protection rather than relying on Russian restraint.

Russian strikes underline Ukraine’s defensive requirements

The urgency of Ukraine’s request was illustrated by renewed Russian attacks during Zelenskyy’s visit to Brussels. According to the Ukrainian presidency, strikes on 15 October damaged energy infrastructure in several regions, leaving almost 15,000 people without electricity in Volyn and disrupting supplies in parts of Kyiv and the surrounding region.

Ukraine continues to face shortages of the interceptors required to defend against ballistic missiles. Zelenskyy has identified anti-ballistic capabilities as an immediate priority, particularly as Russia intensifies attacks ahead of winter. During talks with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, he stressed the need for additional missile interceptors and other air defence equipment.

The president also raised these requirements during Friday’s meeting with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa. Discussions covered air defence, protection of energy infrastructure and financial assistance needed to sustain Ukraine’s resistance to Russian aggression.

European leaders support Kyiv’s position

Zelenskyy said European leaders had supported Ukraine’s position in the dispute with Washington. His remarks came as the EU reaffirmed its intention to maintain economic pressure on Moscow despite the Trump administration’s decision to facilitate Russian diesel exports.

As EU Today reported earlier on Friday, von der Leyen and Costa rejected any relaxation of European sanctions while Russia continues its war. The Commission is preparing a further sanctions package, maintaining a policy intended to restrict Moscow’s ability to finance its military operations.

The contrasting American and European positions have become increasingly significant for Kyiv. Washington is seeking to stabilise fuel markets through arrangements with Moscow, while European governments remain committed to reducing Russian energy revenues and strengthening Ukraine’s military and economic resilience.

For Zelenskyy, the unresolved question is whether Ukraine can be expected to limit attacks on Russian oil infrastructure while receiving neither reciprocal guarantees from Moscow nor additional protection against Russian ballistic missiles. His account of the unsuccessful American negotiations indicates that Kyiv was prepared to compromise, but only if its immediate defensive needs were addressed.

For more than four years, Ukraine has been living through a war that destroys homes, businesses, and infrastructure. People need compensation for the damage and regularly file claims with the authorities. This raises a question: how can citizens exercise their right to compensation, and who can act as the go-between connecting Ukrainians with national and international bodies?

The fifth Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment put direct war damage at $195.1 billion (€173.4 billion) as of the end of 2025. Recovery and reconstruction needs over the next ten years are estimated at $587.7 billion (€522.3 billion), almost three times Ukraine’s nominal GDP for 2025.

Compensation goes to those whose damage has been documented, properly filed, and accepted by an international mechanism. One person working on this problem is Andriy Yermak, Chair of the UNBA Committee for the Protection of Victims of Armed Aggression against Ukraine, Compensation Mechanisms and European Integration Legal Support for Recovery. He is also the initiator of “Advokat+”, a nationwide legal support initiative for Ukrainian service members and their families. His position rests on a simple premise: an unproven right doesn’t pay, and proving it takes lawyers.

Compensation starts with documents

Individuals and companies follow roughly the same process. The claimant must attach proof of ownership and confirmation of value, gather photo and video evidence of the damage, and prove that the military aggression specifically caused it. The required documents depend on the claim category, and, as Andriy Yermak points out from his professional experience, this is where people most often make mistakes. In such matters, a lawyer’s help is often more than necessary.

Businesses face the same questions on a larger scale. Kyiv’s first McDonald’s, opened in 1997, has been damaged by Russian strikes, and the Coca-Cola plant near Kyiv, in operation since 1998, was recently hit by a Russian drone. A company in this position must decide what was lost, how to prove it, and which mechanism to use: the international register, a national program, or a court.

Which mechanisms exist and which are being developed

The international and national Ukrainian compensation system has several components.

The Register of Damage for Ukraine (RD4U). It has accepted claims since April 2024 and operates under the Council of Europe, headquartered in The Hague. As of 30 September 2026, all 43 claim categories are open: 21 for individuals, 11 for legal entities and 11 for the State of Ukraine. By early September, the register had received almost 190,000 claims: about 58,000 were recorded, while the rest were under review. Claims can be submitted through the Diia portal. Yermak stresses that the register records damage but does not pay compensation.

The International Claims Commission. About 40 states and the EU signed the convention establishing it in The Hague in December 2025, and ten have ratified it. Twenty-five ratifications are needed for the commission to begin work. The Verkhovna Rada ratified the convention on 30 April 2026. The commission will review the claims from the register on their merits and determine the amount of compensation in each case.

National programs. Individuals have eRecovery (єВідновлення), which covers owners of homes damaged or destroyed in hostilities after 24 February 2022. Owners of damaged homes get money for repairs, minor or major. Owners of destroyed homes get a housing certificate to buy a new one. Applications go through Diia, an administrative services centre, or a notary, and a commission decides within 30 calendar days. As of 10 October 2026, 273,169 families had received UAH 160.9 billion in total, according to the Ministry for Communities and Territories Development.

Businesses have had a war risk insurance program since 1 January 2026. It rests on Government Resolution No. 1541 and is run by the Export Credit Agency (ECA), whose mandate has already been expanded to cover insurance for domestic investments against war risks. Enterprises in high-risk regions can receive direct compensation for destroyed or damaged assets, such as buildings and equipment, up to UAH 10 million at launch. Businesses that buy war risk policies in Ukraine get part of their premiums back, up to UAH 1 million a year. Only property already enrolled in the program on the date of damage qualifies.

The courts. The Supreme Court has established a practice that allows Ukrainian courts to hear individual claims against Russia for damage caused by armed aggression, without applying state immunity. However, enforcing such judgments is difficult, so victims often turn to state and international mechanisms.

What the system lacks

Yermak says:

“We need lawyers who can work across several levels of law at once: Ukrainian legislation, European regulation and international procedures. And this is where we run into the reform of the legal profession. Under the Rule of Law Roadmap, the Law on the Bar and Legal Practice must be adopted by the end of 2026. How it is written will determine whether the profession gets the independence, legal privilege, and training standards it needs to do this work. At the same time, in a government working group of 27 people, the UNBA holds only one seat.”

Independence plays an important role here: in compensation cases, individuals or companies face official bodies. The lawyer’s role is to challenge a decision without fearing for their own position. In Yermak’s view, this requires upholding legal privilege and adherence to credible professional standards.

The register contains around 190,000 claims, each with supporting documents. Andriy Yermak notes that at this scale, legal practice can be transformed by modern technology. AI, which is now spreading into almost every area of life, can reshape legal analysis and the review of large volumes of data. Today’s lawyers are expected to work properly with data summaries, protect their clients’ confidential information, and keep professional judgment in their own hands. Looking ahead, Yermak believes this raises questions about training the next generation of lawyers: for them, professional standards will cover this practice in both compensation cases and other areas of legal work.

The experience of “Advokat+”

The “Advokat+” initiative, created by Yermak, shows that the profession can scale up quickly. Ukrainian attorneys, often pro bono, help service members and their families with procedures, applications, and complaints. Yermak is convinced that if the profession could organize mass assistance for service members, it can do the same for those affected by destruction. All it needs is training and clear rules.

In the lawyer’s view, several steps are worth taking in this direction:

1. Create training programs for lawyers on working with international compensation mechanisms, including filing claims with the register and working with the future commission.
2. Develop standards for handling evidence: how to document damage, store materials, and prepare a document package that meets international bodies’ requirements.
3. Ensure the UNBA participates in drafting the bar law so the profession’s institutional experience is reflected in the final text.
4. Enshrine legal privilege and the lawyer’s independence in law. A claimant gives a lawyer information about their property, income, and the circumstances of the loss. Without a guarantee of confidentiality, this kind of trusting work is impossible.

The result would be a system in which the scale of damage has been measured, the register accepts claims, and the commission is created. But between an entry in the register and an actual payout lies a path every claimant must walk. Without a trained, independent, and protected profession, the right to compensation will remain formal.

Belgian investigators have searched properties associated with relatives and associates of Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi in an inquiry into alleged laundering of mining revenues, bringing renewed scrutiny to financial links between the two countries.

Belgian police have conducted searches at several properties in Brussels and its surrounding areas as part of an investigation into allegations that money diverted from the Democratic Republic of Congo’s mining sector was laundered through Belgium.

The searches, carried out on 15th October, reportedly involved homes associated with relatives and individuals close to Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi. Belgian prosecutors confirmed that searches had taken place but did not publicly identify those concerned, while the Congolese presidency declined to comment.

The investigation follows a complaint lodged in Belgium in 2025 by civil society organisations from Katanga, the mineral-rich region of south-eastern Congo. Their lawyers, Bernard Maingain and Hervé Diakese, allege that mining revenues which should have benefited Congolese communities were instead diverted and channelled through financial arrangements involving individuals with connections to Belgium.

The allegations have not been established in court. The searches form part of an investigation, and their execution does not establish criminal responsibility on the part of the individuals or organisations whose premises were examined.

Mining revenues under scrutiny

Congo is one of the world’s most important suppliers of copper and cobalt, minerals essential to electric vehicles, batteries, electronics and other advanced industrial products. Its mineral resources also occupy an increasingly important position in the European Union’s effort to diversify strategic supply chains.

Yet the financial arrangements surrounding mineral extraction have repeatedly generated controversy over public accountability, the distribution of revenues and the relationship between political authorities and commercial interests.

The Belgian inquiry concerns an especially sensitive question: whether funds originating from Congo’s mining economy were transferred into the European financial system under circumstances that could constitute money laundering.

According to the details of the investigation published on Thursday, the original complainants maintain that money linked to mining operations was diverted from its intended beneficiaries and used to benefit people connected to the Congolese leadership.

The proceedings are particularly significant because Belgian courts can investigate alleged laundering through Belgian financial structures even when the suspected underlying misconduct occurred abroad, subject to the applicable jurisdictional requirements.

Investigators will need to establish the origin of the funds, the route they allegedly followed and whether those involved knew or should have known that the money represented proceeds of criminal activity.

Belgium’s relationship with Congo

The investigation also has a diplomatic dimension. Belgium ruled Congo until independence in 1960, and the countries retain extensive commercial, political and personal connections.

Brussels remains an important centre for Congolese political and business networks, making Belgium a potentially relevant jurisdiction when investigators examine suspected financial movements connected to the country.

At European level, the inquiry comes as the EU attempts to strengthen relationships with mineral-producing countries while reducing its dependence on concentrated supply chains.

The European Commission’s cooperation programme with the Democratic Republic of Congo specifically identifies responsible sourcing, transparency, due diligence and action against illegal trafficking in raw materials as areas for cooperation.

These commitments have practical consequences for European businesses seeking greater access to copper and cobalt. Investment and supply arrangements depend not only on access to mineral deposits but also on the reliability of commercial records, ownership structures and the institutions responsible for supervising mining revenues.

A money-laundering investigation involving politically connected individuals therefore raises questions extending beyond Congo’s internal affairs.

Implications for European financial supervision

Belgium has recently joined other EU member states in adopting additional measures intended to recover criminal assets and strengthen cross-border cooperation against illicit financial activity.

As EU Today reported on 14th October, European governments have endorsed new international arrangements designed to improve their ability to trace and recover assets associated with serious crime.

The Congo investigation concerns an existing criminal inquiry rather than the application of those newly agreed arrangements. Nevertheless, both developments illustrate the importance of financial intelligence, access to ownership records and cooperation between prosecutors when suspected proceeds move across jurisdictions.

For investigators, the central task will be tracing the alleged flow of money and determining whether financial transactions in Belgium conceal proceeds unlawfully obtained elsewhere.

For Congo, the proceedings arrive during a period of serious domestic instability, including renewed armed confrontation in the east of the country and growing political uncertainty surrounding its leadership.

Former president Joseph Kabila’s involvement in a new opposition alliance has intensified that confrontation, complicating Tshisekedi’s political position as his administration faces continuing security and economic pressures.

The Belgian authorities have not announced any findings establishing that President Tshisekedi personally participated in wrongdoing. The next important developments will be whether investigators identify specific transactions, bring charges or expand the inquiry to additional individuals or corporate structures.

Main Image: Kremlin, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=84821955

Ursula von der Leyen and António Costa said the EU would maintain pressure on Moscow, after the United States eased restrictions linked to Russian diesel exports. The statements came as Volodymyr Zelenskyy joined EU leaders in Brussels for talks on Ukraine.

The EU will not lift sanctions on Russia while its war against Ukraine continues, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa said on Friday. Their statements came ahead of discussions at the European Council, where leaders were due to consider further support for Ukraine and the needs of its critical infrastructure before winter. The assurances followed Washington’s move to ease sanctions pressure in connection with a deal involving Russian diesel supplies.

Von der Leyen said the EU had supported the energy truce announced by US President Donald Trump, but accused Russia of failing to observe it. “We have seen that Russia did not respect it. Not a single minute. Instead, Russia escalated. We have to increase the pressure on Russia,” she said. She added that the Commission was working on a 22nd sanctions package and that the bloc would not lift any sanctions unless Russia stopped the war.

Costa also rejected any reduction in pressure. “We will not cancel any sanctions until Russia stops the war,” he said, calling for stronger support for Ukraine and increased pressure on Moscow to secure a genuine ceasefire. The statements set out the position of the Commission and European Council presidents; they were not, in themselves, a new sanctions decision by EU member states.

The US and EU sanctions regimes are separate. Washington’s decision concerns US restrictions associated with Russian diesel exports, while EU measures are adopted by the member states. Moscow said it had resumed diesel exports under the arrangement with the Trump administration, a development that has prompted concern in Kyiv and European capitals. The reported resumption of Russian shipments has brought renewed attention to the effect of energy revenue on the Kremlin’s ability to finance its war.

The Commission describes EU sanctions as a means of reducing Russia’s capacity to fund the war, imposing costs on its political leadership and weakening its economic base. The measures cover energy, trade and finance, alongside listings of individuals, companies and organisations. The EU’s sanctions framework against Russia has been expanded through successive packages since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The leaders’ statements came as Ukraine prepared for another winter of Russian attacks on energy infrastructure. The European Council meeting agenda included continued support for Ukraine and the operational needs of its critical infrastructure. Von der Leyen said the EU would continue to support Ukraine through the winter. She also referred to progress on Ukraine’s accession process, saying the remaining negotiation clusters should be opened by the end of the year.

The EU has recently added measures targeting Russia’s military-industrial sector. In October, it adopted a package of listings aimed at companies and individuals connected to the country’s war effort, as covered in EU Today’s report on the latest sanctions. The diesel arrangement has also followed earlier tensions over the use of sanctions and energy policy, including the US deal with Moscow.

The EU’s stated position is that its sanctions will remain in place until Russia ends the war. The Commission is preparing further measures, while any new package will require agreement among member states. Friday’s statements did not change the existing regime, but made clear that the US decision on Russian diesel would not, by itself, prompt Brussels to ease EU restrictions.

A European Commission survey has found widespread adoption of artificial intelligence among smaller businesses, but considerable reluctance to allow automated systems to make decisions about employees. The findings expose a growing divide between technological investment and confidence in workplace automation.

Artificial intelligence is becoming established across European businesses, but almost half of companies remain unwilling to trust automated systems when decisions concern their employees, according to a European Commission survey published on 14th October.

The Eurobarometer findings show that 42 per cent of the small and medium-sized enterprises and mid-cap companies surveyed already use artificial intelligence or algorithmic management systems, although most deployment remains limited or experimental. A further 21 per cent intend to introduce such technologies in the future.

Despite this expanding adoption, 49 per cent of respondents said they did not trust artificial intelligence or automated systems to make staff-related decisions. The figures suggest that companies increasingly distinguish between using technology to improve business processes and delegating managerial responsibility to software.

The Commission’s survey of European businesses was conducted between March and April 2026, involving approximately 12,826 telephone interviews with company leaders across the EU’s 27 member states.

Businesses prefer assistance to automation

The survey provides a more detailed picture of workplace AI than conventional statistics measuring whether companies have adopted the technology.

Among the businesses interviewed, customer service and client relations were the most commonly reported areas of application, accounting for 47 per cent. Monitoring employee performance and productivity accounted for 36 per cent, while logistics, planning and staff scheduling represented 30 per cent.

These functions differ substantially in their consequences for workers and managers.

A system that helps organise deliveries or forecasts customer demand may improve efficiency without directly determining employees’ working conditions. Software that evaluates performance, allocates shifts or recommends staffing changes can influence employment decisions and requires a different level of organisational supervision.

The survey found that 61 per cent of companies considered AI useful in supporting decisions. However, human involvement remained central: 90 per cent of respondents reported that people continued to make decisions, while fully automated decisions accounted for only 2 per cent.

The results undermine the assumption that adopting AI necessarily means transferring control of business operations to autonomous systems.

For many companies, the immediate commercial value lies in processing information more rapidly, identifying patterns and reducing administrative workloads rather than removing human management entirely.

Investment costs remain a substantial barrier

Financial and organisational obstacles continue to limit adoption.

Half of the companies surveyed cited high investment costs, while 49 per cent identified legal uncertainty and 48 per cent pointed to insufficient expertise.

These findings are particularly relevant to small businesses, which frequently lack dedicated technology teams, extensive data infrastructure or the resources to evaluate complex software systems independently.

For such businesses, purchasing AI tools is only one component of the investment. Implementation can also require employee training, changes to internal procedures, data-security assessments and continuing technical support.

The findings add a workplace dimension to concerns raised in EU Today’s earlier examination of Europe’s AI productivity gap, which identified investment, computing capacity and organisational restructuring as obstacles to translating adoption into higher productivity.

A company may purchase sophisticated software without necessarily achieving corresponding improvements in performance. Those improvements depend on whether the technology is integrated into everyday operations and whether employees have the skills to use it effectively.

Brussels prepares further workplace legislation

The survey arrives while the European Commission is considering additional rules on algorithmic management through its proposed Quality Jobs Act.

The initiative is intended to address working conditions, workers’ rights and the increasing use of automated systems in managing employees.

A consultation launched in July asked European employers and trade unions to consider transparency in automated decisions, excessive workplace monitoring and the responsibilities of companies using AI.

The second consultation phase ended in September, allowing social partners to propose negotiated arrangements before the Commission determines its next legislative steps.

The broader regulatory framework is already changing. As EU Today explained when the AI Act entered a new enforcement phase, Brussels has begun enforcing certain obligations for general-purpose AI models, while important requirements for high-risk applications, including employment-related systems, follow a later timetable.

Stand-alone high-risk systems are scheduled to face the relevant obligations from December 2027, with another deadline in August 2028 for high-risk systems embedded in regulated products.

The distinction matters for employers planning investments today. Existing data-protection and employment obligations continue to apply, but some of the AI Act’s more specific compliance requirements remain subject to transition periods.

The Commission’s latest survey indicates that businesses are already exercising caution independently of these future obligations. Their reluctance to automate sensitive staff decisions suggests that accountability, reliability and employee confidence will remain important factors in determining how extensively artificial intelligence is deployed.

For Brussels, the challenge is to establish workable rules for that transition without making implementation prohibitively expensive for smaller companies, which account for much of Europe’s employment and commercial activity.

Eurozone industrial production contracted for a second consecutive month in August, with Belgium recording one of the steepest declines. The latest figures expose continuing weaknesses in Europe’s manufacturing sector as governments confront high energy costs and growing international competition.

Industrial production in the eurozone fell by 0.5 per cent in August compared with July, according to figures released by Eurostat on Thursday, adding to evidence that European manufacturers are struggling to sustain a recovery amid rising energy costs and uncertain demand.

The decline followed a revised contraction of 0.3 per cent in July, while output across the wider European Union fell by 0.3 per cent in August. Compared with the same month last year, eurozone production was down 1.1 per cent, against a decline of 0.2 per cent across the EU as a whole.

Belgium recorded the largest monthly contraction among the member states covered by the release, at 5.1 per cent, followed by Ireland at 3.1 per cent and Portugal at 2 per cent.

The latest industrial production figures underline the uneven performance of Europe’s factories, with losses concentrated in some economies and sectors while others continue to expand.

Manufacturing weakness spreads unevenly

The sectoral breakdown presents a particularly revealing picture of the pressures facing European industry.

Production of intermediate goods, which include materials and components supplied to other manufacturers, declined by 0.8 per cent across the eurozone in August. Energy production fell by 0.6 per cent, while output of non-durable consumer goods contracted by 2.7 per cent.

By contrast, capital goods production increased by 0.4 per cent, indicating that activity in equipment and machinery manufacturing remained comparatively resilient.

The divergence was also pronounced between member states. Industrial production increased by 6.5 per cent in Sweden, 4.3 per cent in Estonia and 2.6 per cent in the Netherlands.

On an annual basis, Ireland recorded a 15 per cent decline, followed by Belgium at 7.1 per cent and Bulgaria at 5.4 per cent. The Netherlands, meanwhile, registered growth of 9.8 per cent compared with August 2025.

These variations make it difficult to describe Europe’s industrial position as a single, uniform downturn. National production figures reflect different industrial structures, production cycles and exposure to particular markets.

Ireland’s figures, for example, can be influenced by changes in output among large multinational enterprises, while Belgium’s manufacturing economy is particularly exposed to developments in chemicals, pharmaceuticals and energy-intensive production.

Nevertheless, the simultaneous contraction of industrial output across the eurozone reinforces concerns about the strength of the European economic recovery.

Energy prices and industrial competitiveness

The continuing disruption of global energy supplies has complicated the position of European manufacturers, particularly businesses that depend on predictable electricity and gas prices.

The Middle East conflict has increased uncertainty over energy costs and transportation, making production planning more difficult for companies operating with substantial fuel, heating or electricity requirements.

As EU Today reported earlier this week, Brussels has already moved to delay certain methane requirements for energy imports as governments seek to limit additional pressure on gas supplies.

The decision reflects a wider debate over whether the EU’s existing regulatory framework adequately accounts for the international cost disadvantages facing European industrial producers.

Chemicals, metals, fertilisers and other energy-intensive industries must compete with manufacturers operating in markets where energy costs and regulatory requirements can differ considerably.

The problem extends beyond immediate profitability. Persistently unfavourable operating costs can affect decisions about new factories, maintenance, modernisation and the location of future investment.

Those decisions may have longer-lasting economic consequences than monthly fluctuations in production.

Industrial policy under political pressure

The figures arrive as EU governments debate the future of European industrial policy, including the treatment of imported products and the conditions under which companies should qualify for public support.

Recent disagreements over proposed European-content requirements have illustrated divisions between governments seeking greater protection for EU manufacturers and those concerned that restrictive rules could increase costs or disrupt supply chains.

In a recent warning over the proposed Made in Europe framework, Mercedes-Benz chief executive Ola Källenius argued against excluding Britain from industrial arrangements intended to strengthen European production.

The debate is particularly consequential for automotive manufacturers whose supply chains extend across EU borders and into neighbouring countries.

Meanwhile, the proposed EU budget for 2028–2034 has become another focus of disagreement, with member states questioning how much funding should be devoted to industrial competitiveness, strategic technologies and energy infrastructure.

The immediate economic issue is whether European factories can recover production as energy costs remain elevated and external demand fluctuates.

Eurostat’s August figures do not establish how individual government policies have affected output, nor do they determine whether the contraction will continue. They do, however, show that industrial activity entered the autumn with limited momentum.

The next industrial production release, covering September, is scheduled for 16 November and will provide an indication of whether the late-summer weakness persisted into the final quarter of the year.

Nearly 93 million EU residents were at risk of poverty or social exclusion in 2025, with the latest regional figures revealing sharp differences both between and within member states. The findings raise questions about how effectively European investment is addressing longstanding economic inequality.

More than one in five people living in the European Union remained at risk of poverty or social exclusion in 2025, according to Eurostat figures that reveal substantial differences in living conditions across the bloc’s regions.

Approximately 92.7 million people, representing 20.9 per cent of the EU population, fell into the category during the year. Although the total declined slightly from 93.3 million in 2024, regional data show that economic vulnerability remains heavily concentrated in particular areas.

In 26 of the 243 EU regions for which figures were available, at least 31 per cent of residents were at risk of poverty or social exclusion. At the opposite end of the distribution, 24 regions recorded rates below 13 per cent.

The regional figures published by Eurostat show that the highest rate was recorded in French Guiana, at 54.8 per cent, while Slovakia’s capital region, Bratislavský kraj, recorded the lowest at 2.9 per cent.

National averages conceal substantial differences

The contrast is not confined to richer and poorer member states. In several countries, internal regional disparities are more pronounced than comparisons of national economic performance might suggest.

Within Slovakia, the proportion of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion in Východné Slovensko was 9.1 times the rate recorded in the Bratislava region.

In Italy, the equivalent rate in Calabria was 8.1 times that of Valle d’Aosta, illustrating the persistent economic divide between parts of the country’s north and south.

These differences are recorded in Eurostat’s regional living-conditions statistics, which provide a more detailed picture than EU-wide or national averages.

The comparison requires care. Eurostat’s measure of poverty or social exclusion combines three indicators: relative income poverty, severe material and social deprivation, and very low household work intensity.

Consequently, the figures do not mean that every person included lacks sufficient income to meet basic needs. They identify people experiencing at least one of the defined forms of economic disadvantage.

Differences in income, employment, household composition and living costs can also influence the results, making direct comparisons between metropolitan areas, rural districts and overseas territories more complicated than a single percentage might imply.

Nevertheless, the scale of regional variation illustrates why national economic growth does not automatically produce equivalent improvements in living standards throughout a country.

Poverty reduction remains an EU commitment

The European Union has set a target of reducing the number of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion by at least 15 million by 2030, including at least five million children.

The limited annual reduction recorded in 2025 indicates that progress remains modest relative to the scale of that objective.

The problem has become increasingly important for European policymakers as housing costs, energy prices and employment insecurity affect household finances in different ways across member states.

In May, the Commission presented an anti-poverty and housing policy package, bringing together measures concerning social inclusion, housing exclusion and child poverty.

The regional figures indicate that such initiatives will need to account for considerable differences in local economic conditions.

Policies designed for prosperous urban economies may have limited relevance in regions characterised by low employment, weak infrastructure or dependence on a small number of industries. Conversely, economic activity and relatively high average incomes do not necessarily prevent serious poverty problems within major cities.

Cohesion funding becomes a central question

The findings have direct relevance to negotiations over the EU’s next long-term budget, covering 2028 to 2034.

The European Commission’s proposal envisages roughly €450 billion for economic, social and territorial cohesion under national and regional partnership plans, including at least €218 billion for less developed regions.

The proposed structure would combine several funding programmes within broader national plans, with the Commission arguing that the changes could improve coordination and make spending more responsive to local requirements.

However, regional authorities have expressed concern that greater national control over financial allocations could weaken their influence over investment decisions.

As EU Today reported earlier this week, representatives of European regions have warned that the proposed budget arrangements could concentrate decision-making in national capitals.

The latest poverty statistics provide a concrete context for that disagreement. Investment priorities may differ considerably between a region experiencing industrial decline, an agricultural area with limited employment opportunities and a metropolitan district facing severe housing affordability problems.

A central question for EU institutions is therefore how funding allocations will reflect measurable regional needs rather than being driven primarily by national political negotiations.

The Commission maintains that its proposed partnership arrangements will protect allocations for less developed regions and continue supporting social inclusion.

Negotiations over the financial framework will determine how those commitments are translated into enforceable rules, while Eurostat’s figures provide a statistical basis against which future claims of progress can be assessed.

With 92.7 million people still at risk, the debate is not simply about the overall size of the EU budget. It is also about whether spending reaches the communities where economic disadvantage remains most concentrated.

Brussels has criticised the Palestinian Authority’s decision to postpone presidential and legislative elections, warning that democratic legitimacy is essential to Palestinian state-building and institutional reform. The delay raises questions about the political conditions attached to substantial European financial assistance.

The European Union has expressed serious concern over the Palestinian Authority’s decision to postpone legislative and presidential elections until September 2027, placing renewed pressure on President Mahmoud Abbas over democratic accountability and the future of Palestinian political institutions.

In a statement issued on 14th October, the EU said it regretted the postponement of legislative elections previously scheduled for 28th November 2026 and a presidential contest expected in early 2027.

The decision extends an electoral impasse that has lasted for nearly two decades. Palestinians last voted in legislative elections in 2006, while Abbas was elected president in January 2005.

The EU’s formal statement called for both contests to be organised as soon as conditions allow, stressing that credible elections are necessary for representative institutions and political accountability.

 

The intervention is particularly significant because the EU remains one of the Palestinian Authority’s most important financial supporters and has made institutional reform a central element of its approach to Palestinian state-building.

Abbas cites obstacles to holding elections

The postponement was announced through the Palestine Liberation Organisation’s executive structures following consultations over the conditions necessary to conduct voting in Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem.

 

Palestinian officials have cited restrictions imposed by Israel, continuing insecurity and difficulties involving election materials, observers and access to voting locations.

Israel has disputed the suggestion that it was responsible for preventing the elections from proceeding.

The practical difficulties are substantial. The Palestinian Authority exercises limited administrative control in parts of the West Bank, while Hamas has maintained de facto control over Gaza since 2007, despite subsequent changes in the territory’s security and governance arrangements.

Holding elections across geographically separated territories under different political and security conditions would require agreements extending well beyond the Palestinian Authority’s existing administrative powers.

Those obstacles do not, however, resolve the separate question of democratic legitimacy.

Abbas’s original presidential term expired in 2009, and subsequent extensions of his authority have not been confirmed through a new presidential election. The absence of regular legislative elections has similarly weakened the representative basis of Palestinian governance.

The latest postponement means that Palestinians must wait at least another year for an opportunity to choose their national political leadership.

Brussels links financial assistance to reform

For the European Union, the delay raises questions about the relationship between political reform and financial support.

In April 2025, the European Commission announced a proposed multiannual programme worth up to €1.6 billion for Palestinian recovery and institutional development between 2025 and 2027.

The programme includes approximately €620 million in direct financial support to the Palestinian Authority, alongside assistance for reconstruction, public services and economic recovery.

European officials have repeatedly stressed that part of this support is linked to implementation of agreed reforms, including improvements in public financial management, transparency and administrative accountability.

Those priorities were central to the Brussels donor discussions previously examined by EU Today, where international partners considered how a reformed Palestinian Authority might assume a greater role in Gaza’s future governance.

The election postponement adds a political dimension to those financial arrangements.

The EU’s statement did not announce any suspension of funding, nor did it specify that electoral delays would automatically trigger financial penalties.

Instead, Brussels emphasised that continued assistance to the Palestinian Authority must accompany progress towards institutional reform and the development of credible representative structures.

That distinction matters because European financial assistance also supports public services and civilian needs, which could be affected by reductions in funding unrelated to the conduct of elections.

Elections and the two-state policy

The EU has consistently presented a functioning Palestinian administration as a necessary component of its support for a negotiated two-state settlement.

Its position depends on the existence of institutions capable of representing Palestinians, administering public services, exercising legitimate authority and negotiating internationally.

A prolonged absence of elections complicates that objective, particularly when Palestinian political factions remain divided over leadership and the future organisation of government.

The dispute also affects European discussions concerning Gaza’s reconstruction and its relationship with the West Bank.

Brussels has supported the eventual reunification of Palestinian governance under a reformed administration, but such arrangements face difficulties if the authority expected to assume responsibility lacks a renewed electoral mandate.

In its latest statement, the EU reiterated its willingness to support an eventual election process, including the deployment of an EU Election Observation Mission.

Such missions can provide independent assessments of electoral procedures, but their deployment depends on the necessary political arrangements, security conditions and access.

The European Union’s position now presents Abbas with a specific political demand: to establish conditions under which Palestinian voters can elect both a president and a legislature, rather than allowing temporary postponements to become a permanent substitute for elections.

For Brussels, the immediate question is how to pursue that demand while maintaining assistance to Palestinian institutions and civilians and supporting a diplomatic settlement.

The next test will be whether the Palestinian Authority produces a credible electoral timetable and the administrative arrangements needed to hold the postponed votes in September 2027.

Drone strikes against merchant vessels off Bulgaria have brought Russia’s war into waters bordering NATO and the European Union. With grain exports threatened, shipping costs rising and Sofia seeking allied protection, Moscow’s campaign against maritime trade risks becoming another instrument of economic and political pressure.

Russia’s expanding campaign against commercial shipping in the Black Sea is creating a security crisis that extends far beyond Ukraine. The latest drone attacks off Bulgaria’s coast have left 11 sailors missing, forced Sofia to seek assistance from NATO and the European Union, and raised concerns that Moscow is attempting to disrupt one of the world’s principal agricultural export routes.

On 13th October, the Guinea-Bissau-flagged HS Dignity sank after being struck by drones approximately 17 nautical miles east of the Bulgarian village of Krapets. Another vessel, the Ukrainian-owned, Maltese-flagged Chelsea 3, was attacked near Byala. All 15 crew members were rescued, although five sustained minor injuries. The incidents followed earlier attacks in Bulgaria’s exclusive economic zone on 6th October, when the ALFA WATAN sank and the grain-carrying ABLE was damaged.

The significance lies not simply in the destruction of merchant vessels but in the geographical expansion of the threat. Commercial routes previously regarded as comparatively safer alternatives to Ukraine’s exposed ports are now becoming operationally dangerous. Bulgaria and Romania, both NATO and EU members, face disruption to trade, maritime insurance and port operations as the conflict spreads across the western Black Sea.

Russia’s Campaign Against Maritime Trade

The latest attacks follow months of Russian strikes against Ukrainian ports, export terminals and civilian shipping. As EU Today previously reported, repeated attacks on Odesa have already reduced Ukraine’s grain-export capacity, while alternative routes through the Danube and neighbouring European countries cannot fully replace its major Black Sea terminals.

The extension of attacks towards Bulgaria changes the economic calculation. Ships carrying agricultural products, those approaching Danube ports and vessels operating between Black Sea countries now face greater uncertainty, regardless of whether they enter Ukrainian territorial waters.

Maritime security company Ambrey assessed the earlier October attacks as highly likely to have been conducted by Russian forces. Its assessment identified vessels associated with Ukrainian grain trade as the principal targets, rather than suggesting that every commercial ship was being attacked indiscriminately.

This distinction is important, but it offers little reassurance to international shipping companies. A campaign directed against Ukrainian trade can disrupt the wider maritime economy when insurers, shipowners and exporters cannot establish which routes remain safe.

The economic consequences are already becoming apparent. Shipowners must consider higher insurance premiums, additional security measures and the possibility of losing vessels and crews. Traders may redirect cargoes or withdraw from routes whose commercial returns no longer justify the risks.

Radev Confronts the Consequences of Moscow’s War

The attacks have also placed Bulgarian Prime Minister Rumen Radev in an increasingly difficult political position.

Radev has advocated renewed diplomatic engagement with Moscow and questioned the emphasis placed on military assistance to Ukraine. He has rejected accusations of being pro-Russian, presenting his approach as a pragmatic alternative to prolonged confrontation.

Yet the attacks have demonstrated the limitations of maintaining political distance from a war whose economic and security consequences are reaching Bulgarian waters.

After summoning Russian Ambassador Eleonora Mitrofanova on 13th October, Radev acknowledged that Bulgaria possessed no conclusive evidence establishing responsibility for the latest strikes. Nevertheless, he argued that their consequences benefited Russia and questioned why Ukraine would attack its own commercial vessels.

According to the Bulgarian News Agency’s account of the meeting, the prime minister also warned that higher insurance costs and shipping companies’ reluctance to serve Bulgarian ports were already damaging the national economy.

This is the fundamental change confronting Sofia. The conflict is no longer solely a question of Bulgaria’s position towards Ukraine or its diplomatic relationship with Russia. It is affecting the country’s commercial interests, energy supplies and responsibilities as a NATO member.

Radev’s response does not necessarily indicate a wholesale reversal of his previous political position. It demonstrates that the practical obligations of government can leave considerably less room for accommodation with Moscow than the arguments advanced from outside direct responsibility for national security.

Food Security Becomes Another Instrument of Pressure

The broader consequences may be felt most severely outside Europe.

Ukraine remains an important supplier of wheat, maize and vegetable oils to international markets, including countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. Interruptions to these exports affect more than Ukraine’s agricultural revenues. They can increase transport costs, delay deliveries and reduce the availability of competitively priced food in import-dependent countries.

Speaking at the Warsaw Security Forum on 12th October, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy warned of a possible agricultural crisis, arguing that Russian interference with Black Sea shipping could leave countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East facing serious supply difficulties within months.

The warning reflects a mechanism already familiar from the earlier stages of Russia’s invasion. Following Moscow’s withdrawal from the UN-brokered grain agreement in July 2023, Ukrainian agricultural exporters faced renewed attacks on port infrastructure and substantial uncertainty over maritime access.

The danger is not necessarily an immediate worldwide shortage of grain. Wheat prices remained relatively steady following the 13th October incidents. Rather, sustained disruption could progressively reduce available export capacity, increase costs and place vulnerable importing countries under greater pressure.

For Moscow, such disruption could serve several purposes simultaneously: weakening Ukraine’s economy, raising the costs of international support for Kyiv and creating additional pressures on governments concerned about food inflation and social stability.

Europe’s Black Sea Security Strategy Faces a Practical Test

The immediate challenge for Brussels and NATO is how to protect commercial navigation without allowing the conflict to expand into a direct military confrontation.

Bulgaria has requested stronger air and maritime surveillance and is seeking closer coordination with Romania and Turkey. Defence Minister Dimitar Stoyanov said on 14th October that Sofia expected to join a NATO counter-drone initiative by the end of the month.

The EU has already developed a framework for addressing precisely such threats. Its Black Sea strategy, announced in May 2025, proposed a maritime security hub integrating surveillance, intelligence-sharing, infrastructure protection and regional cooperation.

The attacks now expose the difference between developing a security framework and providing effective protection to merchant vessels. Better intelligence can identify threats, but preventing further sinkings requires detection systems, coordinated responses and sufficient defensive capabilities.

Turkey’s involvement is particularly important because of its control over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles and its established role in Black Sea maritime security. Any workable regional arrangement must therefore extend beyond cooperation between Bulgaria and Romania.

The incidents occurred outside Bulgaria’s 12-nautical-mile territorial sea, meaning they do not automatically constitute an armed attack on NATO territory under Article 5. Nevertheless, repeated strikes within the economic zones of alliance members pose a substantial challenge to maritime security.

Russia’s campaign against Ukrainian exports is increasingly imposing costs on neighbouring European states and international trading partners. The question facing the EU is whether it can secure the commercial routes on which both Ukraine’s economy and the food supplies of millions beyond Europe depend.

A former Ukrainian special forces officer has gone on trial in Hamburg over the 2022 Nord Stream explosions, with his lawyers arguing that Russian energy infrastructure used to finance aggression cannot automatically enjoy protection as a civilian installation.

The first criminal trial arising from the destruction of the Nord Stream gas pipelines has opened in Hamburg, confronting German judges with allegations against a former Ukrainian military officer and a dispute over whether Russian energy infrastructure constituted a legitimate wartime target.

Serhii Kuznietsov, 50, is accused of organising an operation that destroyed three of the four Nord Stream pipeline strands in the Baltic Sea in September 2022. German prosecutors have charged him with offences involving explosives, damage to infrastructure and participation in a war crime.

At the opening hearing on 14 October, Kuznietsov’s lawyers sought to have the proceedings dismissed, challenging both the evidence against their client and the prosecution’s classification of the pipelines as protected civilian infrastructure.

According to the account of the opening proceedings, the defence argued that the installations served Russia’s strategic interests and had been used to exert economic and political pressure on European countries.

Kuznietsov denies involvement in the explosions. His lawyers maintain that the prosecution has not established that he participated in, let alone directed, the operation.

German prosecutors allege Ukrainian involvement

The explosions occurred on 26 September 2022, approximately seven months after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Underwater detonations near the Danish island of Bornholm ruptured sections of Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2, releasing large quantities of natural gas into the Baltic Sea.

German investigators allege that a group of Ukrainians used a rented sailing yacht, the Andromeda, to transport divers, explosives and equipment to the pipelines.

According to the prosecution, the operation involved military-grade explosive devices and was organised with the knowledge or direction of Ukrainian state authorities.

These allegations remain to be tested in court. Ukrainian officials have denied state involvement, and no German judicial finding has established responsibility on the part of Kyiv’s political or military leadership.

The defendant was arrested in Italy in August 2025 and subsequently extradited to Germany following lengthy legal proceedings.

As EU Today reported following the Italian Supreme Court’s ruling, Kuznietsov’s defence had challenged the legality of his transfer and questioned the evidence underpinning the German investigation.

His appearance in Hamburg now moves the case from extradition disputes to direct examination of the prosecution’s allegations.

Can a gas pipeline be a military target?

The central legal controversy concerns whether the Nord Stream infrastructure was entitled to protection as a civilian installation during an international armed conflict.

Under international humanitarian law, civilian objects are generally protected against attack unless their nature, location, purpose or use makes an effective contribution to military action and their destruction offers a definite military advantage.

Kuznietsov’s defence argues that Nord Stream had served Russian strategic interests by generating energy revenue and providing Moscow with leverage over European governments.

Defence lawyer Nicola Canestrini has described the pipelines as an instrument of Russian economic coercion rather than infrastructure serving an exclusively civilian purpose.

German prosecutors reject the proposition that those circumstances automatically justified their destruction. They maintain that the operation involved attacks against civilian infrastructure and therefore constituted a war crime.

The legal assessment is more complicated than determining who owned the pipelines.

Financial benefits to a belligerent state do not necessarily make every commercial installation a military objective. Equally, civilian ownership or use does not automatically exclude infrastructure from becoming a military target if the conditions established under the laws of armed conflict are satisfied.

The operational circumstances in September 2022 could become important. Nord Stream 1 had already ceased delivering gas, while Nord Stream 2 had never received German certification to begin commercial operations.

The court will therefore have to consider both the pipelines’ strategic significance and their actual contribution to Russia’s military operations at the time of the explosions.

Defence raises questions about state secrecy

Kuznietsov’s lawyers have also argued that his military status restricts his ability to discuss information that could be covered by Ukrainian state secrecy obligations.

According to the opening-day court reporting, the defence contends that these restrictions undermine his ability to challenge the prosecution’s case.

The proceedings also raise questions concerning the legality of his extradition from Italy and the precise offences for which his transfer was authorised.

These are separate from the underlying question of responsibility for the explosions. A procedural objection could affect the conduct of the trial without resolving the factual allegations.

Berlin faces an uncomfortable political dispute

The case has implications for relations between Germany and Ukraine, although criminal responsibility must be determined independently of diplomatic considerations.

Germany remains a major supplier of military and financial assistance to Kyiv. At the same time, German prosecutors are pursuing allegations that Ukrainian personnel damaged infrastructure in which German companies had invested heavily.

The pipelines themselves remain politically contentious. As EU Today previously examined, the owner of Nord Stream 2 has separately challenged the EU’s plans to eliminate Russian gas imports, demonstrating that the commercial and legal consequences of Europe’s former energy relationship with Moscow remain unresolved.

The Hamburg trial will not determine the legality of Russia’s invasion, nor will it establish Ukrainian government responsibility merely because a former officer stands accused.

It will examine the evidence against Kuznietsov and the circumstances in which the destruction of infrastructure connected to an aggressor state can constitute a criminal offence.

Further hearings are scheduled, with the evidentiary proceedings expected to begin on 27 October. The outcome will depend on whether prosecutors can establish the defendant’s alleged role and overcome the legal challenges raised by his defence.

The European Commission has proposed postponing new methane reporting and verification obligations for fossil-fuel imports by one year, responding to pressure from energy suppliers and member states amid disruption to global oil and gas markets.

The European Commission has proposed delaying key methane emissions requirements for imported oil, gas and coal by one year, acknowledging that the present energy crisis could make the original timetable difficult to enforce without threatening Europe’s fuel supplies.

The legislative proposal presented on 14th October would postpone obligations requiring importers to demonstrate that their overseas suppliers meet monitoring, reporting and verification standards equivalent to those imposed on European producers.

The requirements were scheduled to take effect on 1st January 2027. Under the revised arrangements, compliance would begin in 2028, with the first annual demonstrations to national authorities due by 31st May 2029.

The decision follows months of pressure from European governments, American energy companies and importers concerned that the regulation could complicate contracts and restrict access to alternative supplies during a period of exceptional international disruption.

Energy security takes precedence

The Commission’s explanatory memorandum places the decision directly within the consequences of the Middle East conflict, which has disrupted trade through the Strait of Hormuz since February.

According to the Commission, approximately 20 per cent of global liquefied natural gas supplies and 25 per cent of seaborne oil trade have been affected. Alternative producers have only partially compensated for the interruption, leaving European buyers competing for increasingly expensive supplies.

Brussels acknowledges that the disruption is likely to continue affecting energy markets after the immediate crisis subsides, partly because damaged infrastructure will require time to repair and restart.

Under these circumstances, importers have warned that they may be unable to obtain sufficient fuel meeting the original compliance requirements by January.

The Commission’s formal amendment to Regulation 2024/1787 responds to these concerns by extending deadlines rather than cancelling the legislation.

The development follows wider discussions about Europe’s energy costs. As EU Today reported during the Brussels summit, high energy prices have become a central concern for governments attempting to protect European industrial competitiveness.

Washington presses for regulatory relief

The United States has been particularly concerned about the effect of the methane rules on transatlantic energy trade.

American producers have become increasingly important suppliers of liquefied natural gas to Europe since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 accelerated the diversification of European energy imports.

According to the reporting on the Commission’s decision, American companies, including ExxonMobil, have raised objections to the requirements, while Washington has pressed Brussels to provide additional flexibility.

French President Emmanuel Macron has also expressed concern about the legal risks facing importers attempting to demonstrate compliance across complicated international supply chains.

The problem involves obtaining reliable emissions measurements from production facilities that may be located thousands of miles from Europe and operate under different regulatory systems.

European importers must then establish whether the information satisfies EU standards, even when the companies operating those facilities are not themselves subject to European jurisdiction.

For suppliers with several production sites, transport arrangements and intermediary contracts, collecting consistent and independently verified information can be a substantial undertaking.

Climate legislation remains in force

The Commission insists that the postponement does not represent an abandonment of its methane reduction objectives.

The original EU methane regulation entered into force in August 2024. It introduced requirements covering methane measurement, leak detection, reporting and restrictions on routine venting and flaring.

Methane is a powerful greenhouse gas, and emissions from oil and gas operations can arise through equipment leaks, deliberate releases and incomplete combustion.

The International Energy Agency estimates that more than 350 billion cubic metres of gas were lost globally through flaring, venting and leakage in 2024. Reducing those losses could increase the quantity of gas available for commercial use.

The Commission is therefore attempting to preserve its environmental objectives while allowing additional time for verification systems and national enforcement arrangements to become operational.

The proposal also postpones methane-intensity reporting obligations for EU producers and importers from August 2028 to August 2029. Requirements to demonstrate compliance with maximum methane-intensity values would move from August 2030 to August 2031.

Existing obligations to provide information about overseas emissions, in force since May 2025, would remain unaffected.

Parliament faces another regulatory confrontation

The proposed changes require approval from the European Parliament and the Council under the ordinary legislative procedure.

That process could expose differences between governments seeking greater flexibility and lawmakers concerned about weakening the timetable for reducing fossil-fuel emissions.

Industry representatives have sought longer extensions, while environmental organisations argue that delaying methane reductions will not resolve the structural causes of Europe’s energy problems.

Brussels is also confronting the consequences of its decision to phase out Russian gas imports. As EU Today’s examination of the Nord Stream 2 legal challenge explained, the Union’s efforts to eliminate dependence on Moscow have already generated disputes over energy security and European regulatory authority.

The Commission now faces two competing requirements: maintaining a common environmental standard for imported fossil fuels while ensuring that suppliers remain willing and able to serve the European market.

Whether the proposed one-year extension proves sufficient will depend on the recovery of international energy supplies and the ability of producers, importers and national authorities to establish reliable verification arrangements before the revised deadlines.