Dallo “Shanghai Spirit” alla Dichiarazione di Bishkek, questa organizzazione, che pone la sicurezza al primo posto, privilegia il pragmatismo rispetto all’ideologia.

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La sicurezza prima di tutto

Il recente vertice dell’Organizzazione per la Cooperazione di Shanghai (SCO), tenutosi a Bishkek, ha segnato il venticinquesimo anniversario della nascita di quella che, nel panorama delle istituzioni internazionali, rappresenta un caso di studio particolarmente interessante. Nata dalle ceneri delle misure di fiducia sovietico-cinesi e trasformata in organizzazione a tutti gli effetti nel 2001, la SCO ha attraversato un quarto di secolo consolidando un’architettura istituzionale che oggi funziona in modo efficace: riunioni annuali del Consiglio dei Capi di Stato, incontri regolari a livello interministeriale, e una cooperazione quotidiana che si sviluppa su binari sempre più articolati.

Tuttavia, l’anniversario offre l’occasione per una riflessione che va oltre la mera celebrazione. La domanda che emerge con forza è: quale ruolo giocano i valori all’interno della SCO? E come si rapporta questa dimensione valoriale con quella, apparentemente più pragmatica, della sicurezza e della cooperazione funzionale? L’analisi dei documenti fondativi e delle dichiarazioni successive rivela una traiettoria complessa, che merita di essere esaminata in profondità.

Fin dalle sue origini, la SCO ha posto la cooperazione in materia di sicurezza come una delle sue priorità principali. Questa scelta non è casuale: la preistoria dell’organizzazione affonda le radici nelle misure di fiducia sovietico-cinesi, sia sulle questioni di confine che sugli aspetti più ampi della sicurezza reciproca. Il “Shanghai Five”, gruppo informale che precedeva la nascita ufficiale dell’SCO, aveva proprio nella gestione delle questioni di sicurezza e nella costruzione di fiducia tra i membri il suo collante principale.

Questa specializzazione originaria ha avuto conseguenze durature. Anche quando, nel corso degli anni, l’SCO ha ampliato il proprio raggio d’azione a settori sempre più diversificati, la sicurezza è rimasta il fulcro attorno al quale si è sviluppata l’intera architettura organizzativa. In un certo senso, come nota acutamente l’analisi, l’SCO può ancora essere definita un’organizzazione internazionale specializzata, focalizzata su una singola priorità principale, nonostante la sua evoluzione verso forme di cooperazione più comprensivo.

Il confronto con i BRICS, struttura di cooperazione genuinamente omnicomprensiva che opera in un’ampia gamma di campi, risulta particolarmente illuminante. Mentre i BRICS hanno sviluppato nel tempo una piattaforma valoriale sempre più articolata, con dichiarazioni che dedicano ampio spazio a questioni di valori comuni e condivisi, l’SCO ha mantenuto un approccio più marcatamente operativo e meno declamatorio sul piano assiologico.

La Carta dell’SCO: principi senza valori

Un dato particolarmente significativo emerge dall’analisi del documento fondativo dell’SCO. La Carta, firmata il 7 giugno 2002 ed entrata in vigore il 19 settembre 2003, non menziona affatto il termine “valori”. Al suo posto, troviamo un articolo dedicato, l’articolo 2, intitolato significativamente “Principi”. È su questi principi che l’SCO basa la propria attività.

Questi principi includono: rispetto reciproco per la sovranità, l’indipendenza, l’integrità territoriale e l’inviolabilità dei confini statali; non aggressione; non interferenza negli affari interni; non uso della forza nelle relazioni internazionali; uguaglianza di tutti gli Stati membri; risoluzione pacifica delle controversie tra Stati membri; non targeting dell’SCO contro altri Stati. Un principio particolarmente rivelatore è quello dell’attuazione graduale delle azioni congiunte in aree di interesse comune.

Quest’ultimo principio, quello della “phased implementation”, spiega molto del funzionamento dell’SCO e delle aspettative, talvolta eccessive, che si generano attorno alla sua attività. La delusione che talvolta accompagna il giudizio sull’organizzazione — quel “nulla accade oltre i vertici” che circola in certi ambienti — trova proprio in questo principio la sua spiegazione. Non si tratta di un difetto, ma di una scelta deliberata e costitutiva: procedere per gradi, consolidare i risultati raggiunti, evitare passi falsi.

L’assenza del termine “valori” dalla Carta dell’SCO è perfettamente spiegabile e non diminuisce affatto il livello di fiducia reciproca tra gli Stati membri. Vale la pena ricordare che, anche nel caso dei BRICS, il termine “valori” non fu una caratteristica immediata delle dichiarazioni finali, affermandosi stabilmente solo a partire dalla metà degli anni 2010. Prima di allora, il termine utilizzato per caratterizzare la coesione interna dei BRICS era, tra gli altri, proprio “principi”, esattamente come per l’SCO.

Il contesto storico e l’evoluzione del lessico valoriale

Nel 2002, il termine “valori” non era ancora politicamente di moda come lo è oggi, ed era usato piuttosto raramente nei documenti dei principali Paesi del mondo non occidentale. In quel periodo, in questi Paesi — Russia inclusa — la parola “valori” era più spesso postulata nel lessico politico in senso negativo, come “valori imposti dall’Occidente”, e quindi come qualcosa che richiedeva resistenza.

La consapevolezza che questo è un gioco che si può giocare in due, e che per rafforzare efficacemente la solidarietà tra i Paesi non occidentali era necessario formulare una propria piattaforma di valori condivisi, arrivò molto più tardi. E il lavoro per garantire che i valori non occidentali siano percepiti come comprensibili, attraenti e allo stesso tempo non banali — non semplicemente nello stile “siamo per tutte le cose buone e contro tutte le cose cattive” — continua ancora oggi, con successi alterni.

Questo ritardo nell’elaborazione di una piattaforma valoriale esplicita non significa però che l’SCO sia priva di una dimensione assiologica. Al contrario, essa esiste, ma si esprime attraverso categorie diverse da quelle del lessico valoriale occidentale: i “principi” e, soprattutto, lo “spirito”.

Un dato cronologicamente significativo emerge dall’analisi comparata dei documenti dell’SCO e dei BRICS: rispetto a un termine particolare — e alla sua rilevanza sostanziale — l’SCO ha notevolmente anticipato i BRICS. Si tratta del termine “spirito”.

Nelle dichiarazioni dei vertici annuali dei BRICS, il termine “spirito dei BRICS” e i suoi elementi costitutivi apparvero per la prima volta durante la presidenza cinese del 2017. Lo “spirito” scomparve poi dai documenti dei BRICS per diversi anni. Il termine ritornò nel 2022, ancora una volta durante la presidenza cinese. Ma successivamente, in tutte le dichiarazioni dei vertici BRICS del 2023-25, i cui progetti iniziali furono preparati da altri Paesi, il termine “spirito dei BRICS” fu costantemente presente.

Nel caso dell’SCO, invece, il termine “spirito” apparve nella primissima dichiarazione successiva al vertice di Shanghai del 15 giugno 2001, quando lo “Shanghai Five”, precedentemente esistente come raggruppamento informale, fu trasformato in un’organizzazione internazionale a tutti gli effetti. In questa dichiarazione, lo “spirito di Shanghai” fu menzionato come punto separato, caratterizzato da fiducia reciproca, beneficio reciproco, uguaglianza, consultazione reciproca, rispetto per la diversità culturale e aspirazione allo sviluppo condiviso.

È evidente che il termine “spirito” affonda le sue radici, innanzitutto, nella tradizione politica cinese contemporanea, poiché in ogni caso è apparso per la prima volta in documenti di anni in cui i vertici si tenevano in Cina. Questa è, in un certo senso, una peculiarità cinese. Detto questo, il termine “spirito”, anche se non immediatamente, si è poi stabilmente affermato nelle dichiarazioni dei BRICS; e nel caso dell’SCO, un anno dopo, nel 2002, quando il vertice si tenne non in Cina ma a San Pietroburgo, il termine “spirito” entrò nel preambolo della Carta dell’SCO.

Nella Carta, tuttavia, l’epiteto “Shanghai” scomparve in relazione allo spirito; lì si fa riferimento semplicemente allo “spirito di fiducia reciproca, beneficio reciproco, uguaglianza, consultazione reciproca, rispetto per la diversità culturale e aspirazione allo sviluppo condiviso”.

L’approccio civilizzazione e la sua evoluzione

Di particolare rilevanza per l’ideologia politica odierna è l’approccio civilizzazionale riflesso nella Dichiarazione di Shanghai del 2001. Essa notava specificamente il “rispetto reciproco e la fiducia reciproca tra Stati appartenenti a civiltà diverse e portatori di tradizioni culturali differenti”. Un anno dopo, tuttavia, la menzione delle civiltà scomparve dal preambolo della Carta dell’SCO.

Questo movimento di apparizione e scomparsa del lessico civilizzazionale è significativo. Da un lato, riflette la sensibilità cinese per le questioni di identità culturale e di diversità; dall’altro, mostra la cautela degli altri membri nell’adottare un linguaggio che potesse essere percepito come troppo marcatamente ideologico o potenzialmente divisivo.

Se esaminiamo il preambolo dell’attuale Dichiarazione di Bishkek del Consiglio dei Capi di Stato dell’SCO del 1° settembre 2026, troviamo che essa enfatizza il “fermo impegno verso gli obiettivi e i principi sanciti nella Carta dell’SCO, nonché verso il ulteriore rafforzamento del buon vicinato, dell’amicizia e dell’efficace cooperazione multilaterale”. Inoltre, questa dichiarazione impiega ancora una volta proprio il termine “spirito di Shanghai”, che è incarnato nei principi esposti nel preambolo della Carta dell’SCO.

È chiaro che, poiché gli elementi costitutivi di questo spirito dell’SCO sono fissati nel testo legale della Carta, le loro formulazioni rimangono incrollabili anche a venticinque anni di distanza. Qui sta la differenza tra lo spirito dell’SCO e lo spirito dei BRICS, dove, di anno in anno, vari elementi di questo spirito vengono aggiunti o rimossi dai Paesi che esercitano la presidenza, a seconda delle loro particolarità nazionali. E la definizione dello spirito dei BRICS risulta, ogni anno, almeno leggermente diversa.

Nel caso dell’SCO, invece, è significativo che l’epiteto “Shanghai” sia ritornato — un epiteto che, a differenza dello spirito stesso, non è legalmente fissato. Questo ritorno segnala una volontà politica di rivendicare l’eredità originaria dell’organizzazione, in un momento in cui la competizione tra potenze per la definizione dei valori globali si fa sempre più intensa.

Quanto pesa questo anniversario

Se rileggiamo passo passo le dichiarazioni dei vertici dell’SCO rivela variazioni significative nel trattamento della dimensione valoriale. L’attenzione particolare dedicata nella Dichiarazione di Bishkek all’impegno dell’SCO verso lo spirito di Shanghai e i principi dell’SCO non è particolarmente tipica delle altre dichiarazioni dei vertici degli ultimi anni.

Per esempio, nelle dichiarazioni successive ai vertici “non anniversari”, il preambolo è praticamente assente, e la descrizione della situazione internazionale e delle sfide alla sicurezza inizia fin dall’inizio. Nelle dichiarazioni emesse ad Astana nel 2024, a Delhi nel 2023 e a Mosca nel 2020, né lo “spirito di Shanghai” né semplicemente lo “spirito” sono menzionati (sebbene la dichiarazione di Mosca contenga il termine “spazio SCO”). Nelle dichiarazioni emesse a Tianjin nel 2025 (naturalmente), a Samarcanda nel 2022 e a Bishkek nel 2019, c’è una menzione dello “spirito di Shanghai”, ma essa è collocata non all’inizio del testo ma in profondità nella prima sezione.

È chiaro che il carattere specifico dell’attuale dichiarazione è spiegato dalla sua natura anniversaria; la dichiarazione emessa a Dushanbe per il precedente anniversario — il ventesimo, nel 2021 — fu composta esattamente allo stesso modo, con un lungo preambolo che menziona lo spirito di Shanghai e l’impegno verso i principi. Questo è altamente significativo: gli anniversari offrono l’occasione per un’affermazione più esplicita dell’identità valoriale dell’organizzazione, mentre nei vertici ordinari prevale un approccio più pragmatico e orientato alle questioni contingenti.

Il contributo indiano e la prospettiva dei “4 M”

In questo quadro, assume particolare interesse la prospettiva indiana sull’SCO. Le iniziative dell’India nell’Organizzazione per la Cooperazione di Shanghai si sono concentrate su questioni economiche, riflettendo il desiderio di costruire cooperazione economica con gli Stati dell’Asia Centrale al fine di migliorare il proprio posizionamento regionale e rafforzare il multilateralismo.

Secondo Anil Trigunayat, l’SCO può senza dubbio contribuire alla collaborazione regionale aderendo al principio delle “4 M”: i membri devono abbracciare il Rispetto Reciproco (Mutual Respect), l’Interesse Reciproco (Mutual Interest), la Sensibilità Reciproca (Mutual Sensitivity) e il Beneficio Reciproco (Mutual Benefit) affinché il gruppo possa emergere più forte e più rilevante.

Questa formulazione è significativa perché mostra come, dal punto di vista indiano, la dimensione valoriale dell’SCO non risieda tanto in una piattaforma ideologica esplicita, quanto in un insieme di principi operativi che guidano la cooperazione quotidiana. L’India, con la sua tradizione di non allineamento e la sua sensibilità per la sovranità nazionale, si trova naturalmente a proprio agio in un’organizzazione che privilegia i principi sui valori, e che evita di imporre una visione ideologica comune.

 Verso un prospero futuro

L’analisi della dimensione valoriale dell’SCO a venticinque anni dalla sua fondazione rivela un quadro complesso e sfumato. Da un lato, l’organizzazione non ha mai sviluppato una piattaforma valoriale esplicita paragonabile a quella dei BRICS o di altre strutture di cooperazione. Dall’altro, essa possiede una solida base di principi, sanciti nella Carta, e uno “spirito” che, pur non essendo definito in termini valoriali, costituisce un potente collante identitario.

Questa configurazione non è un caso, ma riflette la storia e la natura dell’organizzazione. Nata come strumento di costruzione di fiducia in materia di sicurezza, l’SCO ha privilegiato la concretezza dei principi operativi rispetto all’astrattezza delle dichiarazioni valoriali. La sua specializzazione funzionale, il suo carattere istituzionalizzato, e il principio della attuazione graduale hanno contribuito a mantenere l’organizzazione ancorata a una dimensione pragmatica, evitando le derive ideologiche che talvolta caratterizzano altri consessi internazionali.

Tuttavia, il ritorno dello “spirito di Shanghai” nella Dichiarazione di Bishkek, in occasione del venticinquesimo anniversario, segnala una crescente consapevolezza dell’importanza della dimensione identitaria e valoriale. In un’era di competizione globale sempre più intensa, in cui la definizione dei valori e dei principi che devono guidare l’ordine internazionale è essa stessa oggetto di contesa, l’SCO si trova a dover bilanciare la sua tradizionale prudenza con la necessità di affermare con maggiore chiarezza la propria identità.

L’analisi terminologica dei testi, e delle piattaforme valoriali che essi riflettono, non è che un tassello del quadro molto più ampio della cooperazione pratica tra i Paesi dell’SCO realizzata in questi venticinque anni. Ma è un tassello significativo, perché rivela come un’organizzazione nata per la sicurezza sia progressivamente divenuta anche un laboratorio di elaborazione di un linguaggio comune, di principi condivisi e di uno spirito collettivo. E in un mondo in cui la battaglia per la definizione dei valori globali è destinata a intensificarsi, questo laboratorio potrebbe rivelarsi più importante di quanto non appaia a prima vista.

La sfida per l’SCO, nei prossimi venticinque anni, sarà quella di preservare la propria specificità — la concretezza dei principi, la gradualità dell’azione, la centralità della sicurezza — senza rinunciare a elaborare una visione del mondo che, senza essere ideologica, sia capace di attrarre e di unire. Un compito non facile, ma che l’organizzazione ha dimostrato, in questi primi venticinque anni, di poter affrontare con successo.

par Guan Jianbin

La réunion annuelle du Club de discussion de Valdai constitue depuis longtemps une tribune importante permettant au président russe Vladimir Poutine d’expliquer la logique qui sous-tend la politique étrangère de la Russie et de faire connaître les intentions stratégiques du pays. Le «discours de Valdai» de cette année s’est révélé moins passionné et plus mesuré, alliant un récit historique de grande envergure à des limites stratégiques clairement définies.

En lisant entre les lignes des remarques soigneusement calibrées de Poutine, on peut discerner son évaluation stratégique de l’avenir des relations de la Russie avec l’Occident et de l’évolution de l’ordre géopolitique mondial — un équilibre entre la dissuasion par la force et une ambiguïté diplomatique délibérée.

Depuis la création du Club de discussion de Valdai en 2004, Poutine y a participé presque chaque année, que ce soit pour prononcer un discours, assister à un déjeuner, prendre part à une séance de questions-réponses ou participer à des tables rondes. Ses interventions sont devenues une tradition importante de la diplomatie russe et une fenêtre essentielle permettant au monde extérieur de mieux cerner sa pensée stratégique. Un examen des différents «discours de Valdai» prononcés par Poutine révèle l’évolution de la stratégie de politique étrangère de la Russie sur plus de deux décennies, retrace les contours changeants de son analyse des affaires étrangères et met en lumière la trajectoire de l’évolution de sa perception de «l’Occident».

De «l’Occident unique» aux «deux Occidents»

L’un des messages importants véhiculés par le discours de Poutine en 2026 a été la définition d’une ligne rouge claire face à la volonté de l’Occident de parvenir à la «défaite stratégique» de la Russie. Il a averti que la poursuite d’une telle défaite serait extrêmement dangereuse et pourrait faire basculer le conflit russo-ukrainien dans une phase encore plus brutale et incontrôlable. Il ne s’agissait pas simplement d’une intimidation verbale ; cela représentait la ligne rouge que Poutine a fixée pour la survie du pays.

Selon la logique des dirigeants russes, l’usure sur le champ de bataille, les sanctions prolongées et la pression géopolitique sont des coûts qu’une grande puissance peut supporter dans un affrontement stratégique. Mais la «défaite stratégique» — c’est-à-dire un changement de régime, la désintégration de l’État ou la perte de la position géopolitique de la Russie — constitue une ligne rouge intangible. En tant que puissance nucléaire, une fois que la Russie sera acculée, il n’y aura plus aucune marge de manœuvre pour faire reculer une nouvelle escalade. La position exprimée par Poutine était claire : la Russie peut accepter une impasse prolongée et supporter les sanctions et l’endiguement occidentaux, mais elle n’acceptera jamais d’être vaincue de manière totale ni contrainte à la soumission. Si l’Occident insiste pour franchir cette ligne rouge, il portera la responsabilité de toutes les conséquences catastrophiques qui s’ensuivront.

Le recours continu de Poutine au concept des «deux Occidents», qu’il avait pour la première fois mis en avant en 2022, revêt une importance particulière : il distingue les forces de l’élite néolibérale, qui poursuivent une nouvelle forme de colonialisme, de la sphère civilisationnelle occidentale traditionnelle. Lors de la réunion de Valdai en 2022, il avait affirmé qu’«il existe au moins deux Occidents différents : l’un est traditionnel, doté d’un patrimoine culturel très riche ; l’autre est agressif et néocolonial». En réitérant cette distinction, Poutine a cherché à préciser que la Russie n’est pas en guerre contre la civilisation occidentale dans son ensemble. Son opposition vise plutôt les forces qui mènent des politiques d’endiguement, d’encerclement et de coercition hégémonique. De cette manière, Moscou tente de se créer un espace diplomatique et de préserver une marge de manœuvre stratégique.

Cette déclaration visait également à contester le discours, cultivé en Occident depuis de nombreuses années, selon lequel la Russie serait «en guerre contre le monde entier». La Russie identifie soigneusement ses adversaires et limite sa confrontation aux forces hégémoniques occidentales qui prônent l’unilatéralisme et le monopole géopolitique — et non aux citoyens occidentaux ordinaires. D’une part, cette stratégie vise à diviser le camp occidental et à affaiblir le consensus interne contre la Russie. D’autre part, elle laisse la porte ouverte à un futur dialogue entre la Russie et l’Europe ainsi qu’à un éventuel apaisement des tensions russo-américaines, offrant ainsi à Moscou une plus grande souplesse dans ses calculs diplomatiques.

De «l’intégration à l’Occident» à «l’équilibre face à l’Occident»

Un examen des discours successifs de Poutine à Valdai montre clairement que, durant les premières années de son règne, la Russie a activement envoyé des signaux de coopération aux États-Unis et à l’Europe et cherché à s’intégrer au système occidental. Elle n’a pas reçu la réponse qu’elle attendait. Au contraire, elle a été confrontée à des pressions géopolitiques persistantes, à des confrontations militaires, à des sanctions économiques et à ce qu’elle percevait comme une infiltration idéologique. À mesure que les attentes russes restaient les unes après les autres insatisfaites, sa perception de l’Occident a évolué, passant de l’espoir et de la confiance à la déception, puis finalement vers un équilibre stratégique et la confrontation.

De 2004 à 2012, Poutine a accepté l’ordre international existant et a activement recherché la coopération avec l’Occident, tout en défendant la souveraineté de la Russie et son statut de grande puissance. Il s’est opposé à l’élargissement de l’OTAN, à l’ingérence de forces extérieures dans les affaires intérieures de la Russie et à la propagation des «révolutions de couleur». Il a présenté la Russie comme une puissance eurasienne, soulignant qu’elle ne souhaitait ni dépendre de l’Occident ni s’y opposer. Il cherchait plutôt à établir une relation de partenariat entre égaux, fondée sur le respect mutuel.

Dans le même temps, Poutine a insisté sur le fait que l’Europe de l’Est et les anciennes républiques soviétiques constituaient la sphère d’intérêts principale de la Russie. Il a averti que l’élargissement effréné de l’OTAN vers l’Est saperait l’architecture de sécurité européenne, a critiqué l’unilatéralisme et les deux poids deux mesures, et a remis en question la légitimité d’un système de règles dominé par l’Occident. Pour autant, la Russie n’avait nullement l’intention de servir de fer de lance à un mouvement «anti-occidental». Poutine a présenté des propositions visant à créer un espace européen commun et à développer un partenariat modernisé avec l’Occident.

De 2013 à 2017, dans un contexte de troubles en Ukraine et d’annexion de la Crimée par la Russie, l’opposition de Moscou à l’élargissement de l’OTAN est passée de la dénonciation verbale à la confrontation géopolitique. Lors du Forum de Valdai de 2013, Poutine a attribué le désordre des affaires internationales à l’arrogance institutionnelle des vainqueurs de la Guerre froide et a critiqué ce qu’il a qualifié de déclin moral de certains pays occidentaux. Dans son discours de 2016, il a réaffirmé que la Russie n’avait aucune intention de rivaliser pour l’hégémonie mondiale et a appelé à une sécurité égale et indivisible pour tous les pays. En 2017, Poutine a tiré les leçons des relations entre la Russie et l’Occident, affirmant que la plus grande erreur de la Russie avait été sa «confiance excessive» envers l’Occident, qui avait interprété cette confiance comme une faiblesse et en avait tiré parti.

De 2018 à 2021, l’ordre du jour du Forum de Valdai s’est élargi, passant du «désordre de l’Occident» à la «montée de l’Orient» et à la «transformation mondiale». Il ne s’agissait pas simplement d’un déplacement du centre de gravité géographique du monde. Cela reflétait également la tendance croissante de la Russie à considérer l’Orient comme un centre de pouvoir et un point de référence civilisationnel, tout en affirmant son identité en tant que civilisation indépendante.

À mesure que les contradictions entre la Russie et l’Occident s’intensifiaient, le ton des discours de Poutine est passé de la «recherche de la coopération» à la «reconnaissance de la confrontation et à l’établissement de lignes rouges». En 2021, il a fait valoir qu’après la fin de la Guerre froide, certains pays avaient tenté d’exclure complètement la Russie, alors même que sa puissance nationale globale n’avait pas décliné. La Russie ne se contentait plus d’accepter passivement les arrangements imposés par l’ordre international ; elle souhaitait participer à l’élaboration des règles. Poutine a déclaré sans détour que le monde unipolaire dominé par l’Occident avait pris fin, et que des notions telles que les «valeurs universelles» et un «ordre fondé sur des règles» étaient des instruments d’hégémonie. Il a proposé un «système eurasien de sécurité égalitaire et indivisible» et a souligné que la Russie ne se faisait plus d’illusions quant à son intégration à l’Occident.

Le thème de la réunion annuelle de Valdai de 2022 était «Un monde post-hégémonique : justice et sécurité pour tous». Poutine a déclaré que l’humanité traversait la décennie la plus dangereuse, la plus imprévisible et la plus lourde de conséquences depuis la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, et que le monde se trouvait à un tournant historique, dans la transition d’un ordre à un autre. Il a dénoncé l’«ordre fondé sur des règles» comme un prolongement de la pensée coloniale, arguant que l’Occident lui-même était une entité complexe et diversifiée en son sein et que le système néolibéral était entré dans une crise théorique et systémique profonde. Dans le même temps, il a réaffirmé que la Russie ne remettait pas en cause la civilisation occidentale légitime et ne cherchait pas la confrontation avec l’Occident pour elle-même. Toutes les actions de la Russie, a-t-il soutenu, étaient motivées par la nécessité de défendre son droit à la survie et au développement.

De 2023 à 2024, Poutine a déclaré que la Russie avait définitivement rompu avec sa dépendance vis-à-vis de l’Europe, accéléré son recentrage vers l’Est, reconstruit des chaînes d’approvisionnement industrielles autonomes et élargi son réseau géopolitique de partenaires. Selon l’évaluation de Moscou, la puissance globale de l’Europe était en déclin et son autonomie stratégique restait insuffisante. La Russie devait donc se tourner de plus en plus vers des plateformes de coopération émergentes telles que les BRICS et l’Organisation de coopération de Shanghai.

En 2023, puis à nouveau en 2024, Poutine a systématiquement exposé six principes régissant le nouveau type de relations internationales prôné par la Russie : la coopération ouverte ; la diversité des civilisations ; une large représentation dans la gouvernance mondiale ; une sécurité égale pour tous ; l’équité et la justice internationales ; et le respect du droit de chaque pays à choisir sa propre voie de développement. Il a également fait valoir que les sanctions, l’isolement et l’endiguement ne pourraient pas freiner le développement de la Russie et que les instruments traditionnels de l’hégémonie occidentale perdaient progressivement de leur efficacité.

Lors de la réunion de 2025, le ton de Poutine est devenu plus rationnel et plus modéré, mettant davantage l’accent sur la gestion des risques et la désescalade. Il a déclaré que la normalisation des relations entre les États-Unis et la Russie servirait les intérêts nationaux de cette dernière et que Moscou n’avait pas complètement fermé la porte au dialogue. Dans le même temps, il a averti que les livraisons européennes de missiles à longue portée à l’Ukraine ne feraient qu’accroître les risques d’escalade et ne changeraient en rien la situation sur le champ de bataille. Il a appelé l’Europe à renoncer à la confrontation entre blocs et à rétablir un équilibre sécuritaire sur l’ensemble du continent eurasien.

De «se tourner vers l’Ouest» à «se tourner vers l’Est»

Dans l’ordre international, l’Orient s’oppose à l’Occident. Depuis des siècles, la Russie est engagée dans un débat de longue haleine sur son identité civilisationnelle : est-elle occidentale ou orientale ? La Russie occupe une position géopolitique et civilisationnelle particulière. Du point de vue occidental, elle appartient à l’Orient ; du point de vue oriental, elle appartient à l’Occident. Pendant la majeure partie de son histoire, elle a oscillé entre ces deux sphères civilisationnelles.

Comme l’a écrit Surkov, ancien conseiller principal de Poutine et penseur conservateur, dans Les cent ans de solitude de la Russie :

«La Russie a passé quatre siècles à se diriger vers l’Est et quatre siècles à se diriger vers l’Ouest. Elle n’a jamais pris racine ni à l’Est ni à l’Ouest. Ces deux voies ont désormais été parcourues. La Russie doit explorer une troisième voie, une troisième civilisation, un troisième monde, une troisième Rome…»

L’attirance de la Russie pour l’Occident a constitué un projet identitaire poursuivi à travers les générations successives. L’intégration à l’Occident fut autrefois une aspiration historique chère aux Russes. Des efforts de Pierre le Grand pour «apprendre de l’Europe occidentale» aux premières tentatives de Poutine pour «se rapprocher de l’Occident», l’occidentalisation est restée un fil conducteur central du développement de la Russie. Pourtant, l’histoire a montré à maintes reprises qu’un ralliement total à l’Occident a peu de chances d’aboutir à une véritable égalité ou acceptation. À l’époque d’Eltsine, la Russie a adopté les modèles occidentaux presque dans leur intégralité, pour finalement voir son espace géopolitique progressivement restreint par l’expansion continue de l’OTAN vers l’Est.

Au cours de son premier mandat présidentiel, Poutine considérait la Russie comme faisant partie de la civilisation européenne et avait fait de «l’intégration à l’Occident» une priorité de sa politique étrangère. Il a toutefois systématiquement rejeté l’idée de remodeler le système politique russe selon les normes occidentales. Les attentes diplomatiques ayant été déçues à maintes reprises, la perception que la Russie avait de l’Occident est devenue de plus en plus négative.

Lors du Forum de Valdai de cette année, on a demandé à Poutine si l’Union européenne devait être démantelée. Sur un ton taquin, il a répondu : «Ce n’est pas nécessaire. Elle s’effondrera d’elle-même». Cette remarque reflétait l’analyse russe selon laquelle les difficultés actuelles de l’Occident n’étaient pas simplement des crises locales ou temporaires, mais la preuve d’un déclin systémique au niveau institutionnel. L’angle d’analyse de Moscou s’est élargi, passant du «déclin de la puissance américaine» au «déclin du camp occidental dans son ensemble».

Depuis le déclenchement de la crise ukrainienne, les relations entre la Russie et l’Occident sont plongées dans une atmosphère de «nouvelle guerre froide». Les deux parties se considèrent de plus en plus comme des menaces pour leur sécurité, tandis que leurs liens économiques traditionnels continuent de s’affaiblir. La Russie en est venue à reconnaître que la possibilité réaliste de s’intégrer à l’Occident a pratiquement disparu. Des termes tels que «non-occidental» et «post-occidental» ont par conséquent pris une place de plus en plus importante dans le vocabulaire politique russe.

Aujourd’hui, une réorientation stratégique globale est devenue une caractéristique déterminante de la politique étrangère russe. Dans un contexte de tensions persistantes dans les relations de la Russie avec les États-Unis et l’Europe, Moscou développe vigoureusement sa coopération avec la région Asie-Pacifique et les pays émergents. Concrètement, elle a choisi de se tourner vers l’Est après s’être heurtée à des obstacles en Occident, dans l’espoir de parvenir à un résultat diplomatique où «lorsque l’Occident n’offre pas de lumière, l’Orient le fait».

Cependant, même si le centre de gravité stratégique de la Russie se déplace vers l’Est, l’Occident reste une question que Moscou ne peut éviter. Se tourner vers l’Est ne signifie pas abandonner complètement l’Occident. Les liens géopolitiques, énergétiques et historiques entre la Russie et l’Europe continuent d’exister en tant que réalités objectives.

Les discours successifs de Poutine à Valdai donnent un aperçu de l’incertitude et des questionnements de longue date du pays quant à son identité nationale. De la «recherche d’une intégration avec l’Occident» à «l’équilibre stratégique face à l’Occident», et du «non-occidental» au «post-occidental», la quête d’identité du pays entre l’Orient et l’Occident continuera d’influencer l’évolution de l’ordre mondial.

Dans les années à venir, la stratégie hybride de la Russie en matière de politique étrangère — alliant dissuasion vis-à-vis de l’Occident et expansion vers l’Est — ainsi que sa diplomatie flexible orientée simultanément dans ces deux directions, continueront de façonner les arrangements de sécurité eurasiens et l’avènement d’un monde davantage multipolaire.

Publié à l’origine par China Beyond the Wall.
Traduction: Reseau International

A diferença entre um ateu sóbrio e um ateu New Age parece ser mais uma questão de temperamento do que de filosofia, assim como a diferença entre ateu e agnóstico no século XIX.

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Amigos estranharam a minha qualificação de Darwin como único grande cientista inequivocamente ateu, pois ele se considerava agnóstico. Eu confesso que tendo a apagar esse rótulo da minha cabeça, porque a distinção formal entre ateísmo e agnosticismo presumida por ele – a saber, que o agnóstico não sabe se Deus existe, enquanto o ateu sabe que Deus não existe – não tem correspondência na realidade, pois não tenho notícias de um único ateu famoso que pretenda provar a inexistência divina. Nem Dawkins, o ateu mais caricato da mídia, diz que isso é possível. Em Deus, um delírio, cap. 2, ele se consideram um ateu de facto, definido pelo mote: “Eu não tenho como saber com certeza, mas acho que Deus é muito improvável, e vivo segundo a premissa de que ele não existe.” Assim, se levarmos em conta a distinção tradicional, o ateu mais famoso do mundo não é ateu, mas agnóstico.

Outra figura com postura similar é a de Bertrand Russell, com sua famosa analogia do bule voador. Podemos provar que não há um bule em órbita dando voltas ao redor do planeta? Não. Mas não temos nenhum motivo para acreditar que tal bule exista. Deus é como esse bule: não dá para provar que ele não existe, mas não é razoável acreditar que exista. Por isso, Russell se considerava agnóstico na teoria e ateu na prática.

Darwin

Se o termo “agnóstico” tem serventia, é para descrever as pessoas que de fato vivem em estado de dúvida quanto à existência de Deus. Charles Darwin (1809 – 1882) era filho de pai deísta e de uma unitarista. O deísmo consiste em negar toda religião institucionalizada e afirmar que Deus existe, porém não se importa com a humanidade. Sendo um inglês do século XVIII, o pai de Darwin muito provavelmente acreditava no Grande Arquiteto de Newton e dos maçons. O unitarismo é um novo sabor do arianismo, pois nega a divindade de Jesus e tem-no como um grande reformador moral, equiparável a Sócrates. Os unitaristas tomaram Harvard no século XIX, e Newton era secretamente arianista. Podemos então dizer que Darwin não teve um lar propriamente cristão; ainda assim, ele pensou muito em ser pastor anglicano e se casou com uma cristã fervorosa. Sem dúvida, Darwin passou por crises de fé, o que fez dele um agnóstico nesse sentido que descreve o estado psicológico.

Até onde se sabe, primeira vez em que ele se descreve como agnóstico é em 1879, aos 70 anos, numa carta privada a John Fordyce. Segundo relatos, em 1881 ele afirmou a um grupo de livres pensadores que nunca abandonou o cristianismo até os quarenta anos de idade (o que seria o ano de 1849). Teria ele abandonado o cristianismo e adotado as crenças do pai e depois abandonado até mesmo ela? Não conheço a resposta, mas é uma questão vital para a trajetória científica de Darwin, pois pelos rótulos de hoje Newton seria um criacionista ou defensor do design inteligente pelos rótulos de hoje.

O depoimento mais iluminador é o da sua autobiografia, redigida entre 1876 e 1881 para a sua família. Cito James Moore em “Mito 16: Que a evolução destruiu a fé de Darwin – até que ele se converteu novamente no leito de morte”: “Não disposto a abrir mão do cristianismo, ele havia tentado ‘inventar evidências’ para confirmar os Evangelhos, o que prolongou sua indecisão. Assim como sua carreira como ministro religioso havia sofrido uma lenta ‘morte natural’, sua fé também foi mirrando gradualmente. Mas não houve retorno após o golpe de morte. Sua hesitação se cristalizou em uma convicção moral tão forte que ele não via como alguém – nem mesmo [a esposa] Emma – ‘pudesse desejar que o cristianismo fosse verdade’. Pois se fosse, ‘a linguagem pura e simples’ do Novo Testamento ‘parece mostrar que os homens que não creem, e isto incluiria meu pai, irmão e quase todos os meus amigos, serão punidos por toda a eternidade. E esta é uma doutrina maldita.’ Em anos posteriores o teísmo original evidente em As Origem das Espécies se desgastou, e agora, ‘sem crença segura e persistente na existência de um Deus pessoal ou na existência futura como retribuição e prêmio’, Darwin sentia que deveria ‘se contentar em permanecer agnóstico’.” O pai de Darwin, marco para a crise de fé, morreu em 1848, um ano antes dos quarenta anos.

Darwin não morreu indeciso; ele morreu decidido de que o cristianismo era imoral porque mandaria seus entes queridos para o inferno. Se o termo “agnosticismo” se aplica, é para estabelecer um estado de ignorância após a negação de Deus tal como as religiões abraâmicas o reconhecem. Darwin sabe que a Bíblia está errada e que seu Deus não existe. Mas o que é Deus ou qual a verdade, ele não sabe.

Por certo, o descobrir o estado final de Darwin não é suficiente para descobrir o impacto de suas cambiantes convicções religiosas sobre seu pensamento, já que a redação de A origem das espécies (1859) durou duas décadas.

A origem do termo “agnosticismo”

Entre o início da descrença de Darwin e sua primeira autodeclaração como agnóstico, passaram-se nada menos que trinta anos. Uma razão simples para ele não ter usado esse termo cedo é que ele não tinha sido inventado. Pouco se menciona isso, mas “agnosticismo” é um termo com inventor e data de nascimento: em 1869, quando Darwin tinha já 60 anos, Thomas Henry Huxley (vulgo “Buldogue de Darwin”, avô de Aldous, o escritor apologista de abertura da mente via drogas, e de Julian, o eugenista fundador do WWF e primeiro UNESCO), inventou o termo numa reunião da Sociedade Metafísica, uma sociedade algo secreta da qual só participavam membros convidados. Darwin não era membro. O supracitado Bertrand Russell tinha um parente deísta que era membro: Lord Arthur Russell, sobrinho do Conde John Russell, avô de Bertrand. Arthur Balfour, da Declaração Balfour, também era membro. Eu não podia estar lá porque eu não era nascida, mas a Enciclopédia Britânica diz que a invenção ocorreu em tais circunstâncias, então eu acredito.

Uma definição pública do agnosticismo pelo vovô Huxley foi oferecida ao público pela primeira vez em 1889, na revista Popular Science (ou Pop Science), que existe até hoje. Ei-la: “O agnosticismo, de fato, não é um credo, mas um método, cuja essência reside na rigorosa aplicação de um único princípio. Esse princípio é de grande antiguidade; é tão velho quanto Sócrates; tão velho quanto o escritor que disse ‘Examinai tudo, retende o que é bom’ [1 Tess. 5,21]; é a fundação da Reforma, que simplesmente ilustrou o axioma de que a todo homem deveria ser dada uma razão para a fé que está nele; é o grande princípio de Descartes; é o axioma fundamental da ciência moderna. Positivamente, o princípio pode ser expresso assim: Em questões intelectuais, siga a razão até onde ela lhe levar, sem se preocupar com nenhuma outra consideração. E negativamente, assim: Em questões intelectuais, não ter a pretensão de que as conclusões que não são demonstradas ou demonstráveis são certas. Isto eu tenho por fé agnóstica, que, se o homem mantiver íntegra e incorrupta, não há de se envergonhar em olhar o universo face a face, independente do que o futuro lhe reserve.”

Por essa definição, não há nenhuma relação óbvia com uma postura perante à questão da existência divina, mas o conjunto do texto deixa implícita da negativa: de cabo a rabo, Huxley diferenciar a si próprio de Comte, e o agnosticismo da Religião da Humanidade comteana. Ele precisa se diferenciar porque são iguais a descrença em um Deus abrâmico, o cientificismo e o triunfalismo à la Fim da História. As diferenças, que Comte e os positivistas eram cientistas medíocres e criaram uma igreja de estrutura inspirada no catolicismo, ao passo que os agnósticos ingleses do XIX eram brilhantes e não tinham nenhuma intenção de fundar uma igreja.

Cabe apontar o sabor unitarista da retórica, que visa a traçar uma linhagem racionalista e contestadora que surge em Sócrates, atravessa a Bíblia e chega ao seu pináculo na atualidade, destituída de sobrenaturalidade. Outra figura importante do XIX inglês que a adotava era John Stuart Mill, em Sobre a liberdade. A esposa e colaboradora dele era unitarista.

E, é claro, vemos aí a oposição – talvez, sem precedentes históricos – entre ter espírito científico e crer em Deus. Podemos dizer que o Buldogue de Darwin, durante a vida de Darwin, ostracizou o deísmo da ciência, já que a Evolução era apresentada como refutação da existência do Arquiteto newtoniano.

Questão de termos

No frigir dos ovos, Thomas Huxley era o que hoje entendemos por ateu – e provavelmente também Darwin, já que ele escolheu o termo criado pelo amigo para designar a própria posição. O engraçado é que nem mesmo Comte se dizia ateu. Ao que parece, o espírito do ateísmo e do cientificismo eram generalizados na intelectualidade do XIX, mas a disposição a assumir o rótulo se limitava a radicais como Friedrich Engels, Karl Marx (cuja dissertação, de 1841, foi sobre Demócrito e Epicuro, pais do materialismo) e Mikhail Bakunin. Provavelmente, a diferença entre os termos “ateu” e “agnóstico” naquela época se limitava à disposição de chocar a sociedade. Nem os positivistas franceses, nem os evolucionistas ingleses, queriam chocar. Já os comunistas e anarquistas queriam.

Com o tempo, no XXI, ser ateu não choca mais ninguém; nos círculos mais estudados, é a norma. Daí a disposição a enterrar o termo “agnóstico”, ou reservá-lo às pessoas que estejam num real estado de dúvida.

Outra questão semântica é o que entendemos por Deus. Há quem diga coisas como “para mim, Deus é energia” – daí a gente se pergunta se faz sentido dizer que Deus é isso que faz o meu ventilador girar e depois aparece na conta de luz. Nos Estados Unidos, um dos poucos países ocidentais no qual ainda é possível chocar dizendo-se ateu, é comum as pessoas se rotularem como “spiritual, but not religious” (espiritual, mas não religiosa), e tipicamente essas pessoas vão atrás de esoterismos – cristais, horóscopo, meditação zen, gurus tão feios quanto tarados etc. – sem aderir a nenhuma religião particular. Isso só pode ser herança do deísmo, até porque a maçonaria tem uma grande importância na formação do país e é deísta. Não à toa, esse deísmo do século XXI pode se confundir com o ateísmo, como os seus predecessores renascentistas, os libertinos. Sam Harris mesmo é um ateu adepto do New Age.

Agora, não deixa de ser uma ironia histórica que um dos inventores do termo “psicodelia” (do grego, “revelação mental”) seja neto do inventor do termo “agnosticismo”. Parece que uma parcela da humanidade não desiste de experiências extáticas e de revelações mesmo quando abandona a transcendência divina e, assim passa a procurá-la na matéria. A diferença entre um ateu sóbrio e um ateu New Age parece ser mais uma questão de temperamento do que de filosofia, assim como a diferença entre ateu e agnóstico no século XIX.

No hay forma de luchar contra el Imperio sin eludir su control sobre el sistema financiero internacional.

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Ya se ha desatado el caos a la hora de investigar qué está ocurriendo exactamente en relación con los últimos movimientos, sin duda turbios y vinculados a EE. UU., en territorio y aguas pakistaníes. Tras una evaluación inicial en Transition Protocol —que, como se reconoció, no proporcionó todas las respuestas necesarias—, profundizamos en un análisis mucho más exhaustivo respaldado por varias fuentes.

Lo que estamos observando en varios puntos clave de la conexión terrestre entre Irán y Pakistán, de extrema sensibilidad, no es un cierre total de la frontera, sino un delicado equilibrio de doble vía por parte de Islamabad entre la tremenda presión financiera de Washington y el salvavidas estratégico de Teherán.

Así que esta es la situación actual, combinando los datos contrastados con nuestras últimas consultas.

El punto clave: el detonante normativo fue una medida de sanciones bancarias, no solo la seguridad fronteriza.

Aunque los responsables provinciales de Baluchistán justificaron públicamente el sábado el cierre de dos puntos clave —Taftan y Gabd–Rimdan— alegando motivos de seguridad, lucha contra el terrorismo y lucha contra el contrabando, lo que más importa es el mecanismo exacto en torno a un memorándum emitido el viernes pasado por el Ministerio de Comercio pakistaní.

Dicho memorándum revocó de inmediato una prórroga, concedida el 3 de octubre, de la exención del Formulario Electrónico de Importación (EIF, en inglés) para mercancías importadas de Irán, y coincidió con la orden de Islamabad de cerrar el puesto de inmigración de la Agencia Federal de Investigación (FIA, en inglés) en Taftan.

Lo fundamental es que, sin la exención del EIF, los importadores pakistaníes deben tramitar las compras iraníes a través de los canales bancarios oficiales de Pakistán —lo que, por supuesto, las sanciones estadounidenses hacen absolutamente imposible.

Peyman Sanandaji, presidente de la Comisión de Transporte de la Cámara de Comercio de Teherán, confirmó oficialmente que ha sido el cumplimiento de las sanciones bancarias (el abandono del EIF) lo que ha paralizado las exportaciones iraníes a Pakistán.

El impacto inmediato en los pasos fronterizos oficiales fue considerable: están en peligro más de 4.000 toneladas de importaciones diarias de GLP iraní a través de Gabd–Rimdan. El expresidente de la Cámara de Comercio de Quetta, Ayoub Miryani, informó de que solo en Gabd–Rimdan hay más de 2.000 contenedores varados, con cientos de camiones de mercancías más atascados en Taftan.

¿Por qué está ocurriendo esto ahora? Debido a la nefasta coincidencia entre el pago del tramo del FMI del 7 de octubre que Pakistán tenía que abonar y la «Operación Economic Outcast» del Tesoro imperial estadounidense.

En el marco de la «Operación Economic Outcast», Washington dio a terceros países un «plazo definido para cerrar» las vías de suministro comerciales relacionadas con Irán o enfrentarse a la expulsión del sistema financiero estadounidense. A esto le siguieron las designaciones de la OFAC del 1 de octubre contra las redes ferroviarias terrestres e industriales de Irán y las medidas del 8 de octubre contra 17 petroleros de la «flota en la sombra».

Pero entonces, el 7 de octubre —solo nueve días antes de que el Ministerio de Comercio revocara la exención del EIF—, Islamabad llegó a un acuerdo con el FMI sobre la cuarta revisión de su Servicio Ampliado del Fondo para desbloquear 1.210 millones de dólares. Esto aún requiere la aprobación del Consejo Ejecutivo del FMI.

Por supuesto, no existe ningún documento público que demuestre una orden directa de EE. UU. o del FMI para cerrar las fronteras entre Irán y Pakistán. Pero fuentes de Islamabad subrayaron que mantener vigente una exención de instrumentos bancarios de duración indefinida antes de la votación del Consejo del FMI se había convertido en una vulnerabilidad insostenible para Pakistán en materia de sanciones.

Las fuentes de Islamabad insisten en que la medida vino acompañada de auténticas preocupaciones por el contrasabotaje y se coordinó discretamente entre Islamabad y Teherán (cursiva mía) para que la pausa no rompiera las relaciones bilaterales.

El portavoz del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores iraní, Esmaeil Baghaei, calificó públicamente la interrupción como una pausa temporal debida a «problemas técnicos» y «medidas de precaución».

Las fuentes oficiales pakistaníes, por su parte, insistieron en que el endurecimiento de los controles es una medida conjunta de lucha contra el terrorismo que refleja un «entendimiento mutuo» con Teherán tras un repunte de los atentados en Sistán-Baluchistán; las emboscadas en autopistas; y un ataque marítimo perpetrado el 11 de octubre contra embarcaciones de la Guardia Costera de Pakistán frente a Jiwani —que las autoridades pakistaníes atribuyeron a «actores extranjeros» que pretendían sabotear la mediación de Pakistán en el acuerdo de paz con Irán—.

Vuelta al mismo patrón de siempre: yihadistas salafistas utilizados como arma y manipulados por los sospechosos habituales.

La única llamada telefónica confirmada públicamente entre el viceprimer ministro Ishaq Dar y el ministro de Asuntos Exteriores Abbas Araghchi tuvo lugar el domingo 18 de octubre —dos días después del memorándum del 16 de octubre— y sus comunicados oficiales solo mencionan la diplomacia regional y la reunión de la OCI en Bagdad.

Por lo tanto, la coordinación previa a nivel de los ministros Dar y Araghchi y las detenciones específicas por sabotaje forman parte de nuestra propia información.

Exportaciones asimétricas de alimentos y rutas informales

En resumen, los productos siguen cruzando las fronteras. Islamabad ha permitido deliberadamente que sigan circulando los productos perecederos y las exportaciones alimentarias pakistaníes hacia Irán. Los productos perecederos esenciales —entre ellos, tomates, patatas y cebollas— siguen circulando, junto con los flujos tradicionales de petróleo y combustible, a través de la porosa frontera de 909 km.

El registro normativo explica el motivo: hace ocho meses, Pakistán promulgó una exención bancaria específica para diez productos alimenticios exportados a Irán por vía terrestre (en la que se enumeraban explícitamente el arroz, las patatas, las cebollas, los tomates, la carne y la fruta), además de productos farmacéuticos.

La Cámara de Comercio de Teherán confirmó el pasado sábado que, si bien las exportaciones iraníes a Pakistán se ven paralizadas por la normativa del EIF, las importaciones de Pakistán a Irán continúan, y el comercio informal de combustible y el comercio fronterizo a través de Baluchistán ya alcanzan un volumen estimado de entre 800 millones y más de 1 000 millones de dólares anuales al margen de los controles aduaneros oficiales.

Debe prestarse especial atención a los puertos de Gwadar y Karachi, así como a la arquitectura general de tránsito entre China e Irán. Según nuestras fuentes, el tránsito de terceros países y el tránsito entre China e Irán a través de Pakistán sigue estando protegido.

A nivel jurídico, un documento que detalla el tránsito de mercancías por Pakistán estableció seis corredores de tránsito terrestre designados que unen Gwadar, Karachi y Port Qasim con Gabd y Taftan para la carga de terceros países con destino a Irán bajo una garantía bancaria.

Además, una notificación de la Junta Federal de Ingresos del pasado mes de junio designó formalmente la estación de ferrocarril de Taftan como puesto aduanero terrestre, y los ministros iraníes y pakistaníes han promovido el corredor ferroviario para conectar China con Irán y Europa.

Sin embargo, siguen existiendo dos limitaciones operativas muy complicadas.
La modernización de la línea ferroviaria Quetta-Taftan sigue figurando oficialmente como una mejora prevista; y la designación por parte de la OFAC, el 1 de octubre, de la Compañía Ferroviaria de la República Islámica de Irán (RAI) tenía como objetivo explícito frenar el cambio de Teherán de las rutas marítimas bloqueadas al ferrocarril.

En resumen: se necesita una habilidad extraordinaria para enfrentarse al Imperio de la Piratería.

Islamabad ha llevado a cabo una maniobra clásica y calculada: revocar de forma visible la exención formal de importación del EIF en Taftan y Gabd-Rimdan para proteger su próximo tramo del FMI, de 1.210 millones de dólares, y a los bancos paquistaníes de las sanciones secundarias del Tesoro de EE. UU.

Y todo ello sin dejar de mantener vivas las exportaciones alimentarias paquistaníes, las vías fronterizas informales y los marcos de tránsito de terceros países con Teherán.

Que esto siga siendo un breve reajuste administrativo o se consolide en un cuello de botella más prolongado lo decidirán tres indicadores durante las próximas quince días:

1. Una notificación modificada del EIF o del trueque por parte del Ministerio de Comercio.
2. Despacho de aduanas independiente para la carga en tránsito por Gwadar/Karachi.

Movimientos de mercancías documentados a través del enlace ferroviario Taftan-Zahedan.

Que la lección quede grabada en las tierras raras para que todo el Sur Global reflexione: no hay forma de luchar contra el Imperio sin eludir su control del sistema financiero internacional.

By Tings Chak

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On Oct. 25, Brazilians will return to the polls to choose between President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Flávio Bolsonaro, son of former president Jair Bolsonaro, who was sentenced to 27 years in prison for his role in an attempted coup.

The first round gave Flávio 47.03 percent of valid votes against Lula’s 45.16 percent, revealing the enduring strength of the far right four years after its electoral defeat.

The runoff takes place as President Donald Trump seeks to restore U.S. domination over Latin America, with Brazil emerging as a consequential battleground in Washington’s campaign to contain China’s growing relations with the region.

Over the past two decades, Brazil and China have built a political partnership that has expanded the space for independent action among countries of the Global South. Under Lula and China’s President Xi Jinping, this relationship has deepened through cooperation in industrial development, infrastructure, science and technology.

The election will determine whether this project advances or Brazil’s international orientation is subordinated to Washington’s renewed Monroe Doctrine as part of the continent’s rightward shift.

Since Lula’s return to the presidency in 2023, the two governments have connected Chinese cooperation with Brazil’s development programmes, including Nova Indústria Brasil, the Growth Acceleration Programme (PAC) and the Ecological Transformation Plan. Lula’s May 2025 visit to Beijing produced 36 agreements covering infrastructure, finance, artificial intelligence, public health and industrial cooperation.

Behind these agreements is a long-standing challenge: overcoming Brazil’s dependent position in the international division of labour, where commodity exports continue to outweigh advanced industrial and technological development.

This cooperation has also reached Brazilian popular movements. Through the International Association for Popular Cooperation (Baobab), Brazil’s Landless Rural Workers’ Movement (MST) and other organisations have worked with Chinese institutions on agricultural mechanisation, bioinputs and digital technologies for family farming.

These initiatives include the Digital Family Farming and Agroecology Laboratoryand IARAA, an artificial intelligence project for agroecology and agrarian reform developed by Brazilian popular movements using Chinese open-source models.

In a countryside marked by extreme concentrations of land, machinery and capital, such cooperation offers new tools to peasant organisations fighting for agrarian reform and the production of healthy food.

Brazil’s relationship with China also reveals the different class interests at work in the country, with contradictions particularly visible in the countryside.

Massive exports of soybeans, meat and minerals have continued under both Bolsonaro and Lula, but their governments have pursued very different political relationships with Beijing.

While Jair Bolsonaro attacked China and aligned himself with Washington, Lula has sought to deepen strategic cooperation, including in industrial development, technology and agrarian reform.

Flávio Bolsonaro now promises an “economically pragmatic” relationship with China while cultivating close ties with Trump. For sectors of Brazil’s ruling classes that profit from commodity exports, continuing to sell to China while embracing Washington’s political agenda presents little contradiction. For Brazil’s efforts to rebuild its industry and develop technological sovereignty, the consequences are far greater.

Return of the Monroe Doctrine

Washington’s ambitions were made explicit in its December 2025 National Security Strategy, which announced a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, seeking to restore U.S. pre-eminence in the Western Hemisphere and deny outside powers control over strategic resources and infrastructure.

Five days later, China published its third Latin America policy paper, reaffirming sovereignty, non-interference, regional integration, technological cooperation and support for the region as a Zone of Peace. The two documents reveal fundamentally different approaches to the political future of the continent.

Brazil’s position is decisive. As Latin America’s largest economy, a founding BRICS member and a leading participant in Mercosur, it possesses industrial, scientific and political capacities that could strengthen independent development across Latin America and beyond.

The emergence of a new technological era makes this struggle particularly consequential. Brazil is among the few countries of the Global South capable of pursuing digital and technological sovereignty that could benefit its neighbours and parts of Africa.

Its roughly 23 percent share of global rare earth reserves is an important starting point, but control over minerals alone is insufficient. The greater challenge is developing the capacity to process them, manufacture advanced components and build the digital infrastructure, artificial intelligence systems and technologies that will shape future production.

Flávio has made his orientation clear. Speaking at the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in the United States in March, he offered Brazil as the “solution” to Washington’s dependence on China for critical minerals, explicitly linking rare earths to artificial intelligence and U.S. military superiority.

Chinese economic reporting has also described proposals from his team to exclude China from rare-earth supply chains. Rather than using Brazil’s resources to develop its own industrial and technological capacities, this agenda would place them at the service of U.S. technological and military power.

The same political orientation extends to digital sovereignty. In July, Flávio’s campaign submitted proposals to U.S. trade authorities that included preventing Brazil’s Pix payment system from connecting to non-Western international payment networks and loosening commitments within Mercosur.

These proposals converge with a wider U.S. campaign involving tariffs, digital regulation, strategic minerals and attempts to influence Brazil’s electoral process.

Meanwhile, Washington’s January bombing on Venezuela and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores demonstrated how far it is prepared to go to impose its will on the continent.

BRICS & the Struggle for Independent Foreign Policy

Brazil, particularly under Lula, has helped build institutions through which countries of the Global South can reduce their dependence on Western-dominated structures.

At the July 2025 BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro, the group advanced cooperation on development finance, local-currency transactions, and international institutional reform.

The New Development Bank, headed by former Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff, is an important expression of this effort.

The BRICS cannot automatically overcome economic dependency or guarantee sovereignty for working people. Yet its expansion offers greater room for independent development, provided that participating governments have the political commitment to use these possibilities.

Brazil’s history reveals how difficult that independence has been to defend. In 1961, Vice President João Goulart became the first high-ranking representative of a Latin American government to visit the People’s Republic of China, meeting Mao Zedong when revolutionary China remained diplomatically isolated and subjected to U.S. sanctions. Three years later, Goulart was overthrown in a U.S.-backed civil-military coup that inaugurated a 21-year dictatorship.

The early history of China–Brazil friendship was inseparable from struggles over national sovereignty, agrarian reform and the forces determined to suppress them.

The international material conditions for South–South cooperation are considerably more favourable today, but political direction remains decisive.

Former President Jair Bolsonaro hosted the 2019 BRICS summit in Brasília while pursuing close alignment with Washington. A government can weaken institutions from within by abandoning the commitments that give them political substance.

The far right’s resurgence also reflects the enduring power of Brazil’s own ruling classes. Bolsonarismo has a domestic base among sections of agribusiness, finance, the security apparatus, militias, conservative religious networks and major media.

These forces, whose electoral and institutional advances have continued, were strengthened by the 2016 parliamentary coup against Dilma Rousseff and the judicial persecution of Lula. They possess their own organisations, material interests and sources of power, which do not disappear when an election is lost. Their economic dependence on Chinese markets has not prevented their support for Washington’s political agenda.

Beyond the Election

Beijing has followed the Brazilian election closely, reflecting the importance of the political relationship built between Lula and Xi over years of cooperation.

In July, Xi reaffirmed China’s support for Brazil against external interference during a conversation with Lula, which also covered cooperation in artificial intelligence, satellites, mineral processing and relations between China and Mercosur.

In September, Foreign Minister Wang Yi received Lula’s adviser and former foreign minister Celso Amorim in Beijing, reaffirming the bilateral strategic partnership.

China’s principle of non-interference means that the choice of Brazil’s government belongs to the Brazilian people, but Beijing’s diplomatic restraint should not be confused with an absence of political interests or an assumption that all governments would pursue the same relationship. Chinese analysts have described the possible outlook under Flávio as one of “cold politics, hot economics”: commodity trade would likely continue, but the political relationship and cooperation in strategic sectors could deteriorate. The experience of Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency has already shown the limits of commercial interests in sustaining a broader political partnership.

For the Brazilian people, the consequences extend well beyond foreign policy. The election will also shape the struggles over labour rights, public services, agrarian reform and the defence of democratic space.

Brazil’s renewed role in South–South cooperation under Lula has opened possibilities for a development project that responds to the needs of its working people, but realising those possibilities depends on the political and social forces capable of carrying it forward.

The Brazilian people have fought through dictatorship, neoliberal restructuring, parliamentary coups and the rise of the far right to defend their political and social gains.

This election is another moment in that longer struggle, now unfolding amid renewed U.S. imperial intervention and a transformation of the world’s technological foundations. The future of China–Brazil cooperation will depend on the capacity of organised popular forces to build a sovereign national project and turn international cooperation into lasting changes in people’s lives.

Original article: consortiumnews.com

By Larry C. Johnson

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Saudi Arabia went looking for allies against Ansar Allah, and so far it has gotten statements of support. Egypt has declared its readiness to back the Kingdom, but its statement does not commit to any military involvement. Pakistan and Turkey have pledged troops under the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement signed in August, but both governments say their forces will play “a supportive rather than active combat role” against the Houthis. I have watched coalition pledges like these for decades. Cairo has not forgotten its war in Yemen in the 1960s. Islamabad has its own border with Afghanistan and a restless India to think about. Neither is going to send its soldiers into the mountains of Saada, so Riyadh will be fighting this one essentially alone.

That matters because Ansar Allah has shown it can reach the Kingdom’s economic core. In the past two weeks the Houthis have struck at Aramco facilities near Riyadh, the Shedgum gas plant in the Ghawar corridor, and the Tanajib oil facility on the Gulf coast. They hit an administrative building at Aramco’s Dhahran headquarters, the company’s historic nerve center. Now they are reportedly targeting Yanbu.

Riyadh says little about the damage, and Aramco’s chief executive insists the company’s system is intact and can be restored to its full 12 million barrels a day within days. I don’t believe it. Karl Miller, who is on the ground in the region, tells me the Saudis have suffered significant damage. That matches what we can see from the outside: a coalition that keeps announcing interceptions while fires keep burning at the targets. Repairing gas-processing trains, stabilization units and refinery components is not a matter of days. After the 2019 Abqaiq-Khurais strike, Saudi output fell by 5.7 million barrels a day, and it took about two months to recover from a single attack on an undefended site. This time the attacks are sustained and repeated, and the repair crews are working under fire.

Yanbu is the crucial target. With Iran’s navy declaring the Strait of Hormuz closed except to vessels it authorizes, Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea terminal at Yanbu, fed by the East-West Pipeline, is the Kingdom’s escape route to world markets. Flows through Hormuz fell to 11.62 million barrels a day in the week to October 13, against a baseline of 17.15 million. That bypass is already badly damaged. The East-West Pipeline is designed to carry up to 7 million barrels a day across the peninsula, pushed along by 11 pumping stations. According to my sources in the region, four of those 11 stations have been severely damaged and are not functioning. This did not come out of nowhere. In September, an attack damaged pumping facilities and knocked the pipeline largely out of service, and regional officials told the Associated Press repairs would take three to five weeks. Aramco got the line back up, and it has been hit again. A pipeline missing more than a third of its pumping stations cannot move anything close to its rated volume, however much crude is waiting in the Eastern Province.

Meanwhile Ansar Allah has seized Greater and Lesser Hanish islands and Perim inside the Bab al-Mandab, putting it astride the very sea lanes that tankers leaving Yanbu must use. Damaged production, a crippled pipeline and a contested Red Sea together mean the world loses Saudi barrels three times over: some cannot be produced, some cannot reach the coast, and what reaches the coast cannot be shipped safely.

Diesel is where this hits hardest. Diesel moves the trucks, tractors, trains and ships that carry everything else, and Europe is one of the world’s dominant diesel importers. The International Energy Agency’s October report is blunt. Middle Eastern fuel exports are below half of pre-war levels, and diesel markets “will remain tight well into 2027.” The IEA does not expect lost diesel stocks to be replenished before the second half of 2027. Diesel benchmarks topped $200 a barrel in September and remain nearly double the price of crude, which is itself around $108 for Brent, up more than 75 percent from a year ago. Ukrainian drones keep hitting Russian refineries and export terminals, so Europe’s other traditional source of middle distillates is also impaired.

So when people ask me when diesel supply returns to normal, my answer is not soon. The IEA’s timeline, which does not account for sustained damage to Saudi facilities, points to the second half of 2027 at the earliest. A real recovery is at least a year away, and probably longer.

Don’t expect the Trump-Putin diesel deal to change that. As I have argued before, the Russian barrels are a rounding error. Moscow has cleared 500,000 tons for export, roughly 3.7 million barrels, with no shipping timeline. Even if every tranche Trump announced is delivered, about 4.8 million tons in total, that comes to roughly 36 million barrels spread over months. The first 300,000 tons equals less than one day of American transport diesel demand, and the full program equals less than four. Measured against the world’s lost Middle Eastern distillate exports, it is negligible. It also depends on Russian refineries that Ukrainian drones continue to hit, and on sanctioned tankers to carry it. The deal may make for a good headline. It will not move the supply curve, and so it will not bring down the price of diesel.

Europe is already paying the political price. On Saturday, France saw its worst rioting in years. The CGT union estimated more than 500,000 people in the streets protesting the cost of gasoline, energy and food, and more than 270 were arrested. In Milan, a demonstration against wars and rising living costs ended with barricades on fire and shops looted. Protests over the cost of living have spread to Belgium and Portugal. Albania has had five straight days of violent clashes in Tirana. The immediate trigger there is anger at Prime Minister Edi Rama, but it is part of the same continental mood of people who feel their governments have stopped listening.

This is the context in which Washington is considering new strikes on Iran. The ceasefire collapsed in July and has not been rebuilt. Every round of escalation since then has raised the price of oil, and each one has given Tehran a reason to tighten its grip on Hormuz and its allies in Yemen a reason to widen their target list. Another U.S. campaign will not reopen the Strait. It will further close it. It will push diesel prices back toward their September records just as Europe heads into winter, when heating oil demand peaks.

American policymakers seem to believe the costs of this war can be exported. They cannot. Europe’s economies were already weak before the war. Factories that run on diesel-powered logistics, farmers who need diesel for the harvest, and households that heat with fuel oil cannot absorb another price spike. The riots in Paris and Milan are a warning of what a long diesel shortage does to a society. If Washington widens this war, it will be choosing to make that shortage longer and deeper, and Europe will pay the bill on its streets.

Original article: ronpaulinstitute.org

Deutschland steht vor einer sicherheitspolitischen Frage, die weit über den Krieg in der Ukraine hinausreicht: Wie viel militärische Stärke braucht das Land – und welches politische Ziel soll mit dieser Stärke eigentlich verfolgt werden?

Der frühere Brigadegeneral und langjährige militärpolitische Berater Angela Merkels, Erich Vad, stellt dabei eine Position zur Diskussion, die in Berlin inzwischen beinahe ungewöhnlich klingt. Er bestreitet nicht die Notwendigkeit von Verteidigungsfähigkeit. Im Gegenteil. Aber er warnt davor, Aufrüstung mit einer Politik dauerhafter Konfrontation gegenüber Russland gleichzusetzen. Deutschlands Interesse, so seine Argumentation, müsse vor allem darin bestehen, einen großen Krieg in Europa zu verhindern und deshalb die politischen Gesprächskanäle nach Moskau wieder ernsthaft zu öffnen.

Gerade dieser Unterschied ist entscheidend. Ein Staat kann militärisch stark sein und dennoch Diplomatie betreiben. Er kann seine Verteidigungsfähigkeit erhöhen, ohne daraus die politische Doktrin abzuleiten, dass Sicherheit nur noch gegen einen bestimmten Gegner organisiert werden könne. Genau darin liegt der Kern der von Vad geforderten Neuorientierung: Deutschland müsse seine eigenen Interessen definieren, statt sich immer tiefer in eine Eskalationslogik hineinziehen zu lassen, deren Endpunkt niemand seriös benennen kann.

Vad verweist dabei ausdrücklich auf deutsche historische Erfahrungen. Das ist keineswegs nostalgische Rückschau. Konrad Adenauer war alles andere als ein russlandfreundlicher Romantiker. Er band die junge Bundesrepublik fest an den Westen, setzte auf NATO-Mitgliedschaft und transatlantische Partnerschaft. Und dennoch reiste derselbe Adenauer 1955 nach Moskau. Die Verhandlungen waren hart, die politischen Gegensätze fundamental, und doch nahmen die Bundesrepublik und die Sowjetunion diplomatische Beziehungen auf. Zugleich erreichte die deutsche Delegation die Zusage zur Heimkehr Tausender noch in sowjetischem Gewahrsam befindlicher Deutscher.

Gerade dieser Vorgang zeigt, wie verkürzt die heutige Vorstellung ist, Dialog sei automatisch ein Zeichen von Schwäche.

Adenauer hatte wenige Monate zuvor die Westbindung der Bundesrepublik institutionell gefestigt. Trotzdem behandelte er den Gesprächskanal nach Moskau nicht als Verrat am eigenen Bündnis, sondern als Teil verantwortlicher deutscher Außenpolitik. Stärke und Verständigung waren für ihn keine Gegensätze.

Noch deutlicher wurde diese Logik später unter Willy Brandt. Die neue Ostpolitik entstand nicht aus der Illusion, alle Konflikte mit der Sowjetunion seien verschwunden. Sie entstand gerade deshalb, weil sie existierten. Brandt und Egon Bahr gingen davon aus, dass dauerhafte Blockkonfrontation Europa nicht sicherer machte und dass Veränderung nur durch Kontakte, Verhandlungen und schrittweise Entspannung möglich war. Die Bundesregierung setzte auf Gewaltverzicht, geregelte Beziehungen und politische Kommunikation über die Blockgrenzen hinweg. Der Bundestag erinnert bis heute daran, dass die Ostpolitik ausdrücklich darauf zielte, die starre Konfrontation zwischen Ost und West aufzubrechen.

Man muss diese Politik nicht idealisieren, um ihre strategische Bedeutung zu erkennen. Weder Adenauer noch Brandt bauten ihre Außenpolitik auf Vertrauen im naiven Sinn. Sie handelten aus Interessen. Sie wussten, dass Deutschland geografisch in der Mitte Europas lag und dass eine stabile Friedensordnung auf diesem Kontinent nicht allein durch militärische Abschreckung geschaffen werden konnte.

Genau hier setzt Vads Kritik am heutigen Kurs an. Dass Außenminister Johann Wadephul erklärt, Deutschland sei grundsätzlich weiterhin offen für Gespräche mit Russland, reicht aus seiner Sicht nicht. Das jüngste Treffen Wadephuls mit Sergej Lawrow bezeichnete er als eine Art widerwillige Pflichtübung. Formale Gesprächsbereitschaft ersetzt eben keine Diplomatie, wenn beide Seiten im Grunde nur noch ihre bekannten Positionen vortragen und anschließend auseinandergehen.

Das Problem ist größer. In Deutschland hat sich seit Beginn des Ukraine-Krieges ein politisches Verständnis etabliert, in dem militärische Stärke und politische Härte immer stärker miteinander verschmelzen. Wer mehr Verteidigungsfähigkeit fordert, landet fast automatisch bei der Forderung nach noch härterer Konfrontation mit Moskau. Wer für Verhandlungen plädiert, gerät umgekehrt schnell unter Rechtfertigungsdruck, als müsse Diplomatie zwangsläufig Kapitulation bedeuten.

Historisch war deutsche Außenpolitik gerade dann erfolgreich, wenn sie solche falschen Gegensätze vermied. Adenauer konnte NATO-Kanzler sein und nach Moskau fahren. Brandt konnte fest im westlichen Bündnis verankert bleiben und gleichzeitig eine Politik der Entspannung beginnen. Das eine schloss das andere nicht aus.

Auch heute müsste eine eigenständigere deutsche Politik nicht bedeuten, auf Verteidigungsfähigkeit zu verzichten. Vad fordert das ausdrücklich nicht. Sein Argument ist vielmehr, dass Aufrüstung ohne politische Strategie am Ende selbst zum Risiko werden kann. Wenn jede Seite nur noch militärisch denkt, jede Bewegung des Gegners als Vorbereitung auf den nächsten Angriff interpretiert und Gesprächskanäle verkümmern lässt, entsteht Sicherheit irgendwann nur noch auf dem Papier.

Deutschland hat dabei besondere Interessen. Ein großer europäischer Krieg würde nicht in Washington geführt. Wie Vad zugespitzt formuliert, würde in den Vereinigten Staaten dabei keine Fensterscheibe zu Bruch gehen. Deutschland dagegen läge mitten im Zentrum einer solchen Eskalation. Es wäre logistischer Knotenpunkt, wirtschaftlicher Hauptbetroffener und im Ernstfall selbst Kriegsschauplatz. Genau deshalb müsste Berlin ein größeres Interesse an Deeskalation haben als weit entfernte Mächte, die ihre eigenen geopolitischen und wirtschaftlichen Ziele verfolgen.

Das bedeutet auch, die amerikanische Politik nüchtern zu betrachten. Vad beschreibt Trumps Außenpolitik als „doppelzüngig“ und weist darauf hin, dass Washington keineswegs ausschließlich das Ende des Krieges im Blick habe. Die USA verfolgen gegenüber Russland, China und der Ukraine eigene strategische und wirtschaftliche Interessen. Für eine deutsche Politik wäre es daher fahrlässig, die eigenen Sicherheitsinteressen einfach mit denen Washingtons gleichzusetzen.

Die eigentliche Frage lautet deshalb nicht, ob Deutschland stark oder schwach sein soll. Natürlich braucht ein souveräner Staat Streitkräfte, die zur Verteidigung fähig sind. Die Frage lautet vielmehr, wofür diese Stärke eingesetzt wird.

Dient sie dazu, politische Handlungsspielräume zu schaffen und aus einer Position der Sicherheit heraus wieder verhandeln zu können? Oder wird sie selbst zum Ersatz für Politik?

Die Geschichte der Bundesrepublik liefert zumindest genügend Beispiele dafür, dass militärische Einbindung in den Westen und Verständigung mit Moskau gleichzeitig möglich waren.

Gerade verantwortliche deutsche Politiker des Kalten Krieges wussten, dass man sich seine Gesprächspartner nicht aussuchen kann. Diplomatie beginnt nicht dort, wo ohnehin Einigkeit herrscht. Sie wird dort notwendig, wo Interessen aufeinanderprallen.

Eine künftige europäische Sicherheitsordnung wird deshalb auf Dauer kaum stabil sein, wenn sie ausschließlich auf Abschreckung und gegenseitiger Isolation beruht. Sie muss die Sicherheitsinteressen aller beteiligten Staaten berücksichtigen, ohne deren politische Systeme oder Entscheidungen deshalb gutzuheißen.

Das wäre keine Rückkehr zu irgendeiner romantisierten Vergangenheit und auch kein Verzicht auf deutsche Stärke. Es wäre vielmehr die Rückkehr zu einem Prinzip, das Adenauer, Brandt und andere deutsche Staatsmänner in sehr unterschiedlichen historischen Situationen verstanden haben: Sicherheit in Europa entsteht langfristig nicht dadurch, dass man Russland aus Europa hinausdefiniert.

Sie entsteht durch eine Ordnung, in der Verteidigungsfähigkeit und Diplomatie einander ergänzen – und in der Sicherheit gemeinsam organisiert wird, nicht dauerhaft gegeneinander.

Mohammed bin Salman is learning a lot about being a leader, although it is the Houthis who are giving him the lessons.

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Mohammed bin Salman is learning a lot about being a leader, although it is the Houthis who are giving him the lessons. The first one is that in the Arab world all promises of military support from neighbours are worthless. The second: only Iran has the power to stop the war in Yemen.

It’s hard to define Donald Trump’s legacy in the Middle East when, since the end of February this year, everything seems to point to him and the U.S. being a huge loser in a war against Iran. But one decision he did make more recently can be considered quite smart: not to hit the Houthis.

This group in Yemen has cultivated the model of how to stay in power even in the face of airstrikes from the U.S. They remain in mountainous regions, scattered as much as possible, and are the toughest fighters in the entire region. Trump’s decision in March 2025 to halt his own bombing campaign against them was probably the smartest thing the Donald has done in the region. He knew that they were just too tough, too resilient, and the price of U.S. shipping being hit in the Red Sea was just too great.

Tough times now for Saudi Arabia’s young crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, who can’t be sleeping very well at night – if he is getting any sleep at all. His own decision back in 2015 to launch a bombing campaign against civilians mainly in Sanaa (and often wedding ceremonies) might be one he is regretting now. The Crown Prince’s own air force is still bombing the Houthis, but this time along the coastline in a bid to break their stranglehold on the Bab el-Mandeb straits. But the response by the Houthis – to bomb the living daylights out of Saudi Arabia’s main airport in Riyadh – has not only shocked leaders of the entire region but underlines a point that media based in Dubai, too used to writing flattering copy about the Crown Prince, might not make: the fate of this young country, with its young leader, is balancing on the edge of a knife. Many experts point out why the Crown Prince is so paranoid about security and the threat of a coup d’état by pointing out that it is only a matter of time before one of these Saudi pilots drops his payload on the Crown Prince’s palace instead – which would be the tinderbox moment for a regime to fall, for a leader to slip away in the dead of night and arrive perhaps somewhere in London, Tangiers or even California. While MbS is fretting about the state of the war with the Houthis, which is not going at all well, his main worry is not that this group enters KSA and does anything politically to destabilise the country. It is rather that the lack of confidence within the royal family – by enough princes – reaches a tipping point and he is either assassinated or given the opportunity to flee at a moment’s notice. The attack on the airport was really such a tipping point, as it showed not only how MbS’s leadership and the poor decisions he makes are evident (the airport should have been closed months ago, but it would look like a defeatist move) but also how vulnerable the entire country is to any attack by the Yemeni group. Such a vulnerability is the issue, given that it was the young Crown Prince himself who upped the ante with the conflict with the Houthis – and he has hundreds of princes whom he locked up in a five-star hotel and held hostage while extracting huge amounts of money from, as one of his first policy initiatives as leader, who all hold mock reverence to him as the country’s leader. But for how long?

“This could turn out to be existential for Bin Salman,” argues London-based MENA commentator Sami Hamdi. “UAE and Houthis are hammering him in Yemen, Trump has taken his money and turned his back on him, Netanyahu is violating him by insisting on an official invite for help (normalisation), his best friend Turki Al Sheikh continues to fleece him with unprofitable boxing matches and never-ending raves, and his international allies refuse to fight for him and are pushing him towards a deal that will be interpreted by all as a humiliation for him.”

Solitude seems to come with the job of being MbS in Saudi Arabia – a country always appearing to be on the cusp of being great and significant but never quite managing it. Recently MbS carved out the reputation of being a dynamic regional leader who allowed pop concerts with scantily clad Western performers, while his own mega-projects in the desert quietly get wound down, barely leaving the drawing board.

The real lesson of the Houthis for MbS is that they are simply too tough – and even Turkey and Pakistan, who presented themselves as allies for Riyadh militarily, are remarkably quiet. Some would even go as far as to call it a betrayal of the Arabs.

“Why does Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman ‘rightfully’ live in a state of disappointment and betrayal from his Arab and American allies?” asks the legendary Egyptian journalist and geopolitical hack Abdel Bariatwan. “Where is Turkey and Pakistan, and where is the Mecca alliance? Isn’t it a disgrace that Iran is the only one volunteering to mediate to stop the war?” he asks.

Without becoming official, BRICS’ role in resolving conflicts remains reduced.

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Recently, I delivered a presentation at the Russian Academy of Sciences on the role of BRICS in addressing the conflict in the Middle East. The discussion raised a fundamental question about the group’s international relevance: to what extent can an increasingly influential association of emerging powers contribute to resolving a major geopolitical crisis when its members hold divergent positions and maintain competing regional interests?

The answer requires a realistic assessment of BRICS’ institutional character and the political considerations shaping its members’ foreign policies.

The expansion of BRICS has increased its economic weight and diplomatic reach. Nevertheless, the group remains primarily a platform for intergovernmental coordination rather than a formal international organization equipped with binding decision-making mechanisms and a unified foreign policy. Its members maintain regular consultations, pursue economic cooperation, and issue joint declarations, but these activities do not automatically translate into coordinated action during armed conflicts.

The Middle East illustrates this limitation particularly clearly. Iran and the United Arab Emirates belong to BRICS while occupying opposing positions in the current military confrontation. Tehran considers American military infrastructure in the region a central element of the threat it faces, while the UAE seeks to protect its territory and critical infrastructure from Iranian missiles and drones. The presence of American forces on Emirati soil places Abu Dhabi in a particularly sensitive position, regardless of whether Iran considers the country itself its principal adversary.

Other members face similarly complex calculations. Egypt maintains important relations with Israel, while India combines longstanding ties with Iran with a strategic partnership with Israel. Meanwhile, China’s rivalry with India remains an important feature of Asian geopolitics, despite diplomatic efforts to stabilize bilateral relations. These differences prevent BRICS from adopting a common strategic position on every major international crisis.

The frequently invoked objective of establishing a multipolar world order does little to eliminate these contradictions. Multipolarity itself carries different meanings across the group’s membership. Brazilian foreign policy discourse often associates it with multilateral institutions and international governance, including the United Nations. Russia, China, and Iran, however, place greater emphasis on redistributing global power and reducing the capacity of Western states to impose their strategic preferences on other countries.

Consequently, BRICS lacks a fully shared geopolitical doctrine. Its cohesion rests primarily on the combined economic and political weight of its members and their recognition that the international system cannot be transformed without their participation. This common interest provides a foundation for cooperation, although it remains insufficient to establish a unified approach to every regional conflict.

These structural limitations define what BRICS can realistically accomplish in the Middle East. The group cannot be expected to endorse Iran’s military position collectively, nor is it likely to become a unified negotiating intermediary. The interests of its Arab members, particularly the UAE, make such an arrangement politically implausible. Likewise, most BRICS countries do not support eliminating the State of Israel.

However, significant opportunities for coordinated diplomatic action remain. Members can oppose attacks against civilians, condemn violations of international humanitarian law, and demand accountability for the destruction affecting Palestine, Lebanon, and Iran. Such positions can establish common ground without requiring every member to adopt identical strategic objectives.

Joint declarations at BRICS summits have already provided a framework for expressing humanitarian concerns. The challenge is to translate diplomatic language into practical measures, including coordinated initiatives for humanitarian assistance, sustained international pressure against violations of international law, and diplomatic efforts to prevent further escalation.

Whether BRICS can pursue these objectives effectively depends on decisions about its institutional future. If its members want the group to exercise greater influence over international crises, they will need to develop clearer procedures, establish more concrete long-term priorities, and identify areas where collective action is possible despite strategic disagreements.

The Middle East conflict therefore presents BRICS with a significant test. Its capacity to influence the international order will depend not only on the combined power of its members, but also on their willingness to convert shared interests into sustained political action.

In a Europe preparing for war, entering the market means entering the battlefield where the great battle will take place.

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Sovereignty built by subtraction

On October 19, 2026, at the Berlaymont Building, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Luca Beccari and Commission Vice-President Maroš Šefčovič signed the agreement establishing an association between the European Union and its member states, on the one hand, and the Republic of San Marino and the Principality of Andorra, on the other. On Mount Titano, the ceremony was watched live at the Kursaal, and the tone of the day was one of celebration: 11 years of negotiations, 4 governments, a “historic turning point” hailed by the majority parties, the Emilia-Romagna Region, and the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Almost no one asked the question that such a transition inevitably raises for a republic that has built its survival on seventeen centuries of exceptional status: what does San Marino cease to be the moment it enters the single market?

The argument put forward in these pages is that the agreement, whatever commercial advantages it may bring, brings an era to a close. San Marino’s uniqueness – political, legal, and strategic – was not a folkloric relic. It was a source of power, the only one available to a state of sixty-one square kilometers. Exchanging it for market access means transforming San Marino from a space sheltered from conflict into a periphery of a bloc that wages those very conflicts: on the economic front today, and with increasing likelihood on the military front tomorrow.

San Marino’s longevity can be explained by a simple rule: never become part of what could destroy it. In 1797, the Republic declined Napoleon’s offer of territorial expansion, aware that a larger territory would merely be a larger target. In 1849, it granted refuge to Garibaldi without being drawn into the Risorgimento, and in 1862, it regulated its relations with the new Kingdom of Italy through a friendship treaty rather than annexation. In the 20th century, its neutrality held firm – at great cost – even when, in June 1944, Allied bombers struck a territory teeming with displaced persons.

This policy of withdrawal has produced a form of state that classical geopolitics struggles to classify. San Marino has no strategic depth, no resources, and no armed forces in the strict sense; yet it does have a position – that of an entity that no one has an interest in involving because it belongs to no camp. Its sovereignty is measured not by capability but by distance. It is a sovereignty by statute, which holds as long as the rules of Mount Titano remain Mount Titano’s own, as long as its foreign policy choices are not dictated elsewhere, and as long as its law does not become a reflection of an external legal system.

Until recently, even relations with Brussels adhered to this framework. The customs union and the monetary convention were sector-specific instruments: they regulated goods and currency while leaving the political architecture of the state intact. The agreement on cooperation and a customs union with the European Economic Community dates back to 1991 and entered into force in 2002; the Monetary Agreement with the European Union dates from 2012 and makes the use of the euro contingent upon the transposition of the banking acquis. When, in 2013, the people of San Marino were called upon to vote on the application for EU membership, the referendum did not even reach the quorum. The agreement signed in Brussels circumvents that limit: it does not bring San Marino into the EU, but brings the EU into San Marino.

The document marking the end of the privilege

When read in its entirety, the text refutes the notion that this is merely a trade agreement. The framework agreement consists of 112 articles, plus 7 protocols, a country-specific protocol with 6 appendices, and 25 annexes that list, act by act, the European law that the Republic will be required to apply. It is also a mixed agreement: in addition to the Great and General Council, it requires the consent of the European Parliament and ratification by the 27 national parliaments, while the San Marinese government aims for provisional application as early as the beginning of 2027. Three elements define the Republic’s new status.

The first is dynamic alignment. The annexes capture the acquis as it stood at the beginning of 2023; anything Brussels has produced since then – from crypto-assets to artificial intelligence to the new anti-money laundering package – will be incorporated through the Joint Committee, which is required to decide within six months of a proposal, failing which a dispute resolution procedure will be initiated. San Marino will sit on the councils of European authorities without voting rights and will be consulted by the Commission on the same basis as Member States. In the literature on differentiated integration, this condition has a specific name: “rule taker.” The associated state receives rules it did not draft, within timeframes it does not control, on matters that expand every time the Union broadens its own competences.

The second aspect is the transfer of decision-making authority. With regard to state aid, San Marino’s new regimes cannot take effect before the Commission’s decision – and the Commission may directly refer the matter to the Court of Justice – and the entire inventory of existing incentives must be brought into line with European criteria within two years. In the financial sector, European supervisory authorities will be granted direct powers, including the authority to request the suspension of an intermediary’s license – with decisions enforceable without San Marino’s approval – and market access will be subject to a binding bilateral agreement with Italy on supervision. The two levers with which San Marino has negotiated its autonomy for decades – favorable tax treatment and its financial center – are thus brought under control residing in Brussels, Frankfurt, and Rome.

The third element, the most political one, is Article 103, which obligates San Marino to prevent the rights arising from the agreement from being used to circumvent the Union’s restrictive measures. On paper, it is an anti-circumvention clause. In essence, it is the gateway through which European foreign policy – which San Marino has never endorsed – enters its legal system via the market. To put it simply, this marks the end of San Marino itself, not just the end of its privileges.

From active neutrality to the sanctions framework

To gauge the scope of Article 103, we must go back to March 2022. With Decree-Law No. 27 of March 4, the Republic adopted restrictive measures for the first time that differed from those decided by the United Nations, implementing the European sanctions regime against the Russian Federation. After the Crimea crisis in 2014, San Marino had chosen not to follow Brussels’ lead and, over the following decade, maintained close economic and diplomatic ties with Moscow, even resorting to the Sputnik V vaccine in 2021 while doses expected via Italy were slow to arrive. The 2022 shift was presented as “active neutrality,” but in the chamber, some acknowledged that part of that neutrality had been lost by adhering to the sanctions. Moscow, for its part, added San Marino to its list of hostile countries.

However, the 2022 decision was a sovereign and revocable choice, made through acts of the Great and General Council. The Association Agreement transforms it into an international obligation, and the EU’s sanctions regime effectively extends to San Marino. Furthermore, that regime no longer concerns Russia alone. European restrictive regimes cover Iran, Belarus, North Korea, human rights violations, and cyberattacks, and the Commission has equipped itself with anti-coercion tools designed for trade disputes with major powers, including China. Every new regime decided in Brussels – by states among which San Marino has no vote – will become a constraint on San Marinese banks, businesses, and professionals.

This is where the loss of uniqueness becomes vulnerability. A small state uninvolved in economic conflicts is not a target for retaliation; a small state integrated into the market of a bloc that imposes sanctions becomes one. Countermeasures by Moscow, Beijing, or Tehran do not distinguish between members and associates; they target the jurisdiction that enforces the measures. The same applies to transatlantic trade wars: with the new customs union – where customs clearance takes place at Italian offices and duties are collected on behalf of the Republic – San Marino’s tariff policy remains aligned with that of the European Union. The Titano is relinquishing the neutrality that once made it a partner to all.

The union arms itself

The most sensitive aspect remains the military one. The agreement contains no defense clauses or mutual assistance commitments, and it would be incorrect to attribute such provisions to it. The problem lies elsewhere. Through dynamic alignment, San Marino is linking itself to a legal framework that is changing in nature. Since 2022, the Union has progressively transformed the internal market into a security instrument: programs supporting the defense industry, joint loans for arms purchases, control of foreign investments, dual-use goods regimes, and rearmament plans presented as a condition for European competitiveness. It is likely that the single market of the coming decade will resemble a low-intensity war economy, and that the law called upon to regulate it will bear the marks of this reality.

An associated state that transposes that acquis does not thereby become a belligerent, but it ceases to be an outsider. Its companies can enter European defense supply chains, its intermediaries can join rearmament financing networks, and its territory can be incorporated into export control systems. In a hybrid conflict, where financial and IT infrastructure are considered legitimate targets, the distinction between member states and associated states narrows until it disappears. Over the next ten years, it is likely that external actors will treat San Marino as part of the European framework, without the Republic having access to the protections or voting rights reserved for member states.

Andorra and San Marino assume the obligations of membership without the powers that come with it: they remain outside the Council, the Parliament, and the Commission, but within the scope of the decisions those institutions make. It is no coincidence that the Principality of Monaco, which was negotiating within the same framework, suspended talks as early as 2023, and in Andorra, a labor union withdrew from the national pact on Europe, objecting to the lack of a referendum.

What remains to be decided

If we wish to maintain a positive outlook, the signing does not mean the matter is settled. The agreement must still be ratified by the Great and General Council. The key indicators to watch are concrete: the timing and procedures for ratification, any request for a referendum, the content of the bilateral agreement with Italy on financial supervision, and, above all, the first implementation – through a joint committee – of a sanctions regime adopted after the signing. That step will reveal how much of its autonomy of judgment the Republic has retained, even though rumors suggest there is boisterous enthusiasm within the halls of the small city-state.

San Marino has weathered the Roman Empire, the Papal States, Napoleon, the Risorgimento, and two world wars while remaining true to itself – and it has done so by refusing, time and again, to become part of something larger. On October 19, it made the opposite choice. Opportunities for businesses exist. The price – which the press releases deliberately omit – is the surrender of the exceptional status that for seventeen centuries has been its sole defense.

In a Europe preparing for war, entering the market means entering the battlefield where the great battle will take place.

Le mobilitazioni del 17 ottobre e le violenze che ne hanno accompagnato la fase finale mostrano una Francia attraversata da una crisi sociale e politica profonda. Mentre il macronismo entra nel suo ultimo semestre, Marine Le Pen e Jean-Luc Mélenchon incarnano due risposte radicalmente opposte alla domanda di rottura.

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Le immagini degli incendi, delle barricate e degli scontri che hanno attraversato la Francia nelle giornate del 17 e 18 ottobre rischiano di nascondere il dato politicamente più importante: centinaia di migliaia di francesi sono scesi in strada contro il carovita, la crisi dei servizi pubblici e il progressivo deterioramento delle condizioni materiali di vita. Il ministero dell’Interno ha contato circa 550.000 partecipanti alla giornata nazionale del 17 ottobre, mentre gli organizzatori ne hanno rivendicati circa 800.000. Una mobilitazione di dimensioni tali da costituire la più importante esplosione di protesta sociale dai tempi della battaglia contro la riforma delle pensioni del 2023.

Il fenomeno sarebbe tuttavia incomprensibile se venisse ridotto ai disordini che hanno segnato la conclusione di numerosi cortei. Lungi dall’essere nata il 17 ottobre, la protesta rappresenta il risultato di un processo cominciato settimane prima nelle scuole e nelle università, quando studenti e liceali hanno iniziato a denunciare classi sovraffollate, carenza di personale, precarietà e progressivo impoverimento dell’istruzione pubblica. Alle mobilitazioni giovanili si sono poi aggiunti sindacati, lavoratori, pensionati e settori del movimento dei gilets jaunes, mentre il rincaro dei carburanti ha agito da detonatore di un malessere sociale molto più ampio.

Tale convergenza conferisce agli avvenimenti un significato politico ben superiore a quello di un’ennesima fiammata di protesta francese. L’Humanité ha descritto il corteo parigino come l’incontro tra generazioni differenti accomunate dalle rivendicazioni sui salari, sul futuro della gioventù e sulla difesa dei servizi pubblici, ma soprattutto dal rifiuto delle politiche seguite dal 2017. In questo senso appare particolarmente significativa l’immagine proposta dal quotidiano della sinistra francese: il macronismo rischia di terminare così come era cominciato, in mezzo ai lacrimogeni e a un conflitto sociale che il potere politico sembra incapace di ricomporre.

Nel tentativo di distogliere l’opinione pubblica dalle ragioni concrete delle proteste, il primo ministro Sébastien Lecornu ha accusato gruppi dell’ultrasinistra di avere deliberatamente organizzato gli incidenti, arrivando a contrapporre il “campo della Repubblica” a quello dei “casseurs” e indirizzando buona parte delle proprie accuse contro La France Insoumise (LFI), nonostante lo stesso leader Jean-Luc Mélenchon avesse invitato esplicitamente i propri sostenitori a non partecipare a saccheggi e devastazioni. Il Rassemblement National (RN), dal canto suo, ha rapidamente trasformato le immagini dei disordini in materiale di propaganda, cercando di associare la protesta sociale a una crisi dell’autorità e alla necessità di restaurare l’ordine.

È una dinamica che rischia di favorire l’estrema destra, ma che non deve far perdere di vista l’origine della crisi. L’aumento del costo della vita, la stagnazione dei salari, il deterioramento dei servizi pubblici e la nuova impostazione austeritaria del bilancio per il 2027 rappresentano il terreno materiale sul quale la protesta è cresciuta.

La risposta televisiva di Emmanuel Macron del 18 ottobre ha mostrato una volta ancora la difficoltà dell’Eliseo a uscire dalla contraddizione che accompagna ormai l’ultimo periodo della sua presidenza. Il capo dello Stato ha riconosciuto la legittimità delle preoccupazioni espresse dai manifestanti, ma ha a sua volta concentrato una parte importante del proprio intervento sulla condanna delle violenze e sulle questioni di ordine pubblico. Ha annunciato consultazioni con studenti, insegnanti, sindacati, parlamentari e rappresentanti delle imprese, senza però indicare immediatamente una svolta economica capace di rispondere alle cause sociali della protesta.

Messi insieme, tutti questi elementi fanno emergere in modo chiaro la dimensione strutturale della crisi del macronismo. Quando Emmanuel Macron conquistò l’Eliseo nel 2017, promise di superare la tradizionale divisione tra destra e sinistra. La sua formula politica avrebbe dovuto sostituire il conflitto ideologico con una gestione pragmatica, europea e modernizzatrice della società francese. Quasi dieci anni dopo, il risultato appare paradossalmente opposto: la Francia non è meno polarizzata, anzi risulta essere molto più polarizzata di quanto fosse all’inizio della presidenza Macron.

La dissoluzione dell’Assemblée nationale nel 2024 aveva già distrutto l’illusione di una maggioranza presidenziale stabile. Da allora la Francia è entrata in una lunga sequenza di governi minoritari, crisi parlamentari e negoziati sul bilancio. Il governo Lecornu resta privo di una maggioranza autonoma, mentre il progetto finanziario per il 2027 è stato accolto con ostilità dalle opposizioni e con crescente nervosismo dai mercati. All’inizio di ottobre i rendimenti del debito francese avevano raggiunto livelli che non si vedevano dai primi anni Duemila, mentre il debito pubblico ha superato il 119% del prodotto interno lordo e la crescita resta debole.

Ma sarebbe riduttivo interpretare questa situazione come una semplice “crisi del debito”. Il problema fondamentale riguarda piuttosto la distribuzione dei costi della crisi. Il governo continua a presentare l’austerità come una necessità tecnica, mentre la sinistra francese sottolinea come essa rappresenti piuttosto una scelta politica precisa: ridurre la spesa sociale e comprimere i servizi pubblici anziché intervenire sulle grandi fortune, sui profitti e sulle ingenti sovvenzioni concesse alle imprese. Da qui nasce la domanda che attraversa una parte consistente delle piazze francesi: chi deve pagare la crisi?

La risposta del RN è radicalmente diversa. Marine Le Pen tenta di trasformare la crisi del macronismo in una crisi dello Stato, dell’immigrazione e dell’ordine pubblico. Il suo partito cerca di intercettare lo stesso malcontento che alimenta le proteste, ma di orientarlo verso una soluzione nazionalista e securitaria. Sul terreno economico, inoltre, il RN sta tentando di rassicurare i mercati: Le Pen ha recentemente promesso forti riduzioni della spesa pubblica qualora conquistasse l’Eliseo, mentre Jordan Bardella ha difeso un piano volto a tagliare circa 140 miliardi di euro di spesa e a ridurre rapidamente deficit e debito. La pretesa dell’estrema destra di rappresentare una rottura sociale con il macronismo entra quindi in contraddizione con un programma economico che contiene anch’esso una pesante componente austeritaria.

Ad ogni modo, i dati demoscopici mostrano quanto questa contrapposizione stia modificando la politica francese. Le rilevazioni pubblicate nelle ultime settimane indicano Marine Le Pen come candidata nettamente più forte al primo turno, ma contemporaneamente mostrano una crescita di Mélenchon e soprattutto una straordinaria solidità della sua base. Un’indagine Ipsos BVA-Cevipof attribuiva in settembre al candidato di LFI tra il 15,5 e il 17% delle intenzioni di voto, ma con livelli molto più alti tra i giovani: fra i 18 e i 24 anni Mélenchon raggiungeva addirittura il 40%. Un sondaggio successivo, riportato da Reuters, ha delineato perfino scenari nei quali Le Pen e Mélenchon si qualificherebbero insieme per il ballottaggio, estromettendo completamente i candidati dell’area centrista.

Naturalmente manca ancora molto alla primavera del 2027 e ogni previsione resta fragile. Marine Le Pen deve inoltre affrontare ancora l’incognita del proprio contenzioso giudiziario, mentre a sinistra rimangono divisioni profonde tra LFI, socialisti, comunisti ed ecologisti. Ma il dato politico è già evidente: il successore di Macron non sembra destinato a provenire dal blocco che ha governato la Francia nell’ultimo decennio.

La battaglia per l’Eliseo sarà quindi molto più di una competizione tra candidati. Sarà uno scontro attorno all’interpretazione stessa del fallimento macronista. L’estrema destra sostiene che la Francia soffra soprattutto per un deficit di autorità, sovranità e controllo. La sinistra radicale individua invece il problema nella crescente disuguaglianza, nell’austerità, nell’indebolimento dei servizi pubblici e nella subordinazione delle scelte economiche agli interessi del grande capitale. Il campo macronista, nel frattempo, fatica sempre più a convincere che la continuazione delle politiche degli ultimi dieci anni possa rappresentare una risposta alla crisi prodotta proprio durante quel decennio.

Nel Landtag della Sassonia-Anhalt in Germania si è verificato un passaggio politico fondamentale che potrebbe segnare una svolta duratura per l’intero panorama politico tedesco e che, forse, potrebbe insegnare qualcosa anche nel resto d’Europa

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Con l’approvazione di una mozione presentata dal BSW insieme all’AfD – rispettivamente il partito della sinistra patriottica fondato da Sahra Wagenknecht e il partito nazionalista di destra accusato di “fascismo” – il parlamento regionale ha formalmente impegnato il governo del Land a farsi promotore nel Bundesrat di una netta svolta strategica: lo stop all’invio di armi al regime golpista di Kiev, la fine delle sanzioni economiche alla Russia e l’avvio immediato di trattative diplomatiche.

SPD, Verdi e CDU per la guerra, contro il buon senso

L’iniziativa ha scatenato la reazione indignata dei partiti tradizionali, soprattutto i socialdemocratici di SPD, i Verdi e i democristiani di CDU, pronti a denunciare la presunta violazione del cosiddetto “Brandmauer”, il cordone sanitario istituzionale eretto verso la destra giudicata “fascista”. Tuttavia, la linea argomentata dalla marxista Sahra Wagenknecht dimostra come questa scelta non rappresenti una provocazione, bensì un atto di responsabilità democratica e di pragmatismo politico. AfD avrà al suo interno anche degli estremisti di destra, ma è un partito di massa votato perlopiù dalla classe operaia, e pur di fermare l’entrata in guerra della Germania contro la Russia, BSW è disposta a tutto.

Le sanzioni anti-russe distruggono l’industria tedesca

Come evidenziato dalla leader del BSW, le decisioni di politica estera prese a Berlino non sono astrazioni teoriche, ma incidono direttamente sulla vita quotidiana dei cittadini e sulla tenuta del tessuto produttivo locale. La Sassonia-Anhalt ospita poli industriali di prim’ordine, come il distretto chimico di Leuna, oggi messi a dura prova dall’esplosione dei costi energetici e dall’interruzione dei rapporti commerciali con l’Est. Le sanzioni contro la Russia hanno già provocato molti fallimenti aziendali, ma non in Russia, bensì in Germania, mettendo a rischio migliaia di posti di lavoro qualificati. A ciò si aggiunge l’invio continuo di ingenti risorse, fra soldi e armi, in Ucraina, a fronte di dolorosi tagli alla sanità, alla scuola, alle pensioni e ai servizi sociali, che rendono i lavoratori tedeschi sempre più insofferenti.

L’anti-fascismo usato come scusa per giustificare la NATO e la guerra

In questo scenario, BSW rifiuta la logica difensiva dell’establishment borghese, appoggiato dalla sinistra egemone, tanto nella sua versione moderata di SPD quanto in quella liberal più massimalista della LINKE. Questi partiti insistono che il pericolo principale non è la guerra voluta dalla NATO, ma i “fascisti” di AfD, che occorre isolare, benché votati democraticamente, impedendo qualsiasi accordo o alleanza. L’analisi di Wagenknecht, retta dal metodo del materialismo dialettico tipicamente marxista, individua invece una profonda frattura nella società tedesca: da un lato il campo di chi intende conservare il potere (“Machterhaltendes Lager”), rappresentato dai partiti di governo e dai ceti più benestanti che difendono la linea dell’escalation militare agli ordini della NATO e dell’UE contro la Russia e domani contro la Cina; dall’altro il campo del dissenso (“Lager der Unzufriedenen”), formato da lavoratori, pensionati e famiglie schiacciate dall’inflazione e preoccupate dal pericolo di un coinvolgimento diretto dei loro figli nel conflitto attraverso il nuovo servizio militare obbligatorio, contro cui i liceali tedeschi continuano regolarmente a scioperare. Per troppo tempo la retorica del “Brandmauer” (il muro anti-fuoco che dovrebbe isolare AfD dal dibattito politico) è servita alle forze governative tedesche per squalificare il dissenso e isolare le proteste popolari sotto l’etichetta dell’estremismo. Per il BSW, il dovere prioritario di una forza politica d’opposizione è rispettare la volontà degli elettori, dialogare nell’alveo delle regole parlamentari e sfruttare ogni maggioranza utile per raggiungere obiettivi concreti: fermare la spirale bellica, proteggere l’industria nazionale e tutelare i redditi dei lavoratori. E per fare questo Wagenknecht vuole superare i veti incrociati e la politica dei blocchi: il BSW dimostra che la vera priorità deve tornare a essere la difesa della pace, della neutralità militare, del lavoro e della sovranità popolare.

La fase storica impone il coraggio di rompere gli schemi

Di fronte all’accusa di agire come gregari del “fascismo”, l’antifascista Wagenknecht risponde che la strategia del “Brandmauer” è fallita nei fatti e ha ottenuto l’effetto opposto, alimentando la rabbia popolare e rafforzando proprio l’AfD. Al contrario BSW vuole dialogare con tutte le forze parlamentari e sfruttare le maggioranze d’azione per mantenere le promesse elettorali (come la pace e la calmierazione dei prezzi). La Wagenknecht spiega che i partiti del sistema, siano essi di destra o di sinistra, usano la retorica dell’antifascismo solo per delegittimare il dissenso, sospendere le regole democratiche e conservare il potere nonostante politiche fallimentari. Questo atteggiamento, secondo la leader del BSW, banalizza in modo irresponsabile la reale tragedia della dittatura nazista. Wagenknecht sottolinea infatti come i diritti democratici fondamentali e la libertà di stampa siano stati compressi negli ultimi anni non dall’AfD, ma dai partiti liberali, democristiani e socialdemocratici al governo, gli stessi che inviano decine di miliardi di euro a un regime ucraino che ha messo al bando i partiti d’opposizione e tollera la glorificazione di collaboratori nazisti.

Basta guerra alla Russia: questa è la sola priorità oggi!

Rispetto alla tesi secondo cui negoziare con Mosca sia impossibile perché l’ultra-demonizzato Vladimir Putin rifiuterebbe il dialogo, Wagenknecht non concorda: il Cremlino si era mostrato disponibile a discutere, ma i tentativi di trattativa sono stati chiusi dalla leadership ucraina e dai governi europei spinti dalla NATO e dall’industria delle armi a continuare la guerra. La narrazione, poi, secondo cui l’invio continuo di armi porterebbe alla vittoria dell’Ucraina è una finzione a cui per BSW “non crede più nessuno” e anzi l’escalation bellica – comprese le incursioni su Mosca condotte con tecnologia e droni tedeschi – è una strategia che rasenta la follia, rischiando di trascinare direttamente la Germania in un conflitto nucleare. Su questo aspetto anche il Partito Comunista Tedesco (DKP) denuncia l’ipocrisia dei partiti di governo (SPD, Verdi, CDU), che sfruttano la retorica del “cordone sanitario” antifascista con la scusa di frenare l’estrema destra eversiva, quando il vero obbiettivo è delegittimare qualsiasi mozione pacifista, indipendentemente da chi la voti in aula, contro l’escalation della NATO e contro le sanzioni.

Articolo originale  politicanuova.ch

Frédéric DELORCA

Avec son climat subtropical qui permet d’avoir plusieurs récoltes de fruits par an et ses plages de sable fin sur les bords de la Mer Noire, et ses chemins de randonnée à travers les forêts profondes et les sommets enneigés du Caucase, l’Abkhazie, ancien lieu de villégiature de la nomenklatura soviétique, pourrait être un paradis touristique inscrit au catalogue de toutes les agences de voyage comme la Thaïlande et Acapulco.

Elle l’est chaque année pour plus d’un million de touristes russes (surtout depuis que la guerre d’Ukraine complique leurs voyages à travers le monde). Mais pour les médias mainstreams d’Europe occidentale, ce petit pays de 250 000 habitants, qui a fait sécession de la Géorgie en 1993 au terme d’une guerre de libération de David contre Goliath, n’est qu’une enclave qui serait purement et simplement annexée par les Russes et vouée à l’isolement et à l’embargo, jusqu’à ce qu’il ait retrouvé le giron de ses anciens maîtres à Tbilissi.

Pourtant l’hypothèse d’une réunification relève de la pure politique fiction. Ni les 50 % d’abkhazes ethniques qui ont payé le prix du sang pour s’opposer à la politique assimilationniste des Géorgiens, ni les autres communautés (Arméniens, Russes, Grecs, Mingréliens) n’aspirent au retour de la Géorgie. Plus de trente ans de séparation entre les deux pays, l’Abkhazie s’est habituée à vivre loin de Tbilissi. Et les fièvres anti-russes attisées par l’Union Européenne et l’Amérique qui périodiquement enflamment Tbilissi (comme lorsqu’en 2008 le nationaliste Saakachvili, l’ex-patron de Raphaël Glucksman, avec le soutien de Washington, avait lancé ses troupes contre l’Ossétie du Sud, une autre entité qui s’était séparée de son pays) ne sont pas de nature à combler le fossé.

La question aujourd’hui pour le peuple abkhaze est de savoir comment construire un avenir pour soi-même quand on n’est reconnu que par quatre Etats : la Russie, le Nicaragua, le Vénézuéla et la Syrie… Si Taiwan n’est pas membre de l’ONU, cela n’empêche pas les Taiwanais de voyager à travers le monde, de même les Kosovars dont le pays n’est pas reconnu par l’Espagne ou par la Roumanie peuvent quand même se rendre dans l’Union européenne. Les Abkhazes ne bénéficient pas de ce genre de facilité. Car à l’absence de reconnaissance de leur Etat au niveau international s’ajoute une double peine liée au fait qu’ils sont assimilés par la propagande occidentale à une sorte d’axe du mal pro-russe. Du coup, non seulement leurs passeports ne sont pas reconnus (à tel point qu’ils ne peuvent même pas se rendre dans la Turquie voisine), mais ils subissent de plein fouet les sanctions économiques ciblées vers leur grand frère du Nord.

L’équation sommaire « Abkhazes = alliés des Russes », est pourtant plus complexe qu’il n’y paraît. En 1996 Eltsine avait placé l’Abkhazie sous embargo, et si Poutine se pose plutôt en protecteur, les Abkhazes veillent à ce que cela ne se fasse pas au détriment de leur souveraineté. En novembre 2024 par exemple, les manifestants à Soukhoumi étaient parvenus, en mode « gilets jaunes » à renverser le gouvernement jugé trop pro-Russe en envahissant le siège de ses institutions. Dans ce pays où tout le monde est prêt à défendre sa liberté avec les armes, l’achat des terres reste interdit aux étrangers, ce qui le préserve aussi de la spéculation et des excès du capitalisme cynique qu’il soit russe ou globalisé.

Avant de définir quel degré de proximité les Abkhazes doivent entretenir avec leur protecteur russe et avec les autres pays de la région, l’urgence première pour ce peuple est de desserrer sur un plan strictement humanitaire l’étau qui les étrangle, et qui fait que, par exemple, même le fait d’aller se faire soigner à l’étranger pour des soins médicaux (quand le système sanitaire local est largement défaillant) peut relever du casse-tête (car même la détention d’un passeport russe ne vous garantit pas un droit d’être soigné gratuitement à Sotchi).

D’une façon très significative, l’initiative pour desserrer cet étau a été prise par un collectif citoyen ancré dans la diaspora abkhaze en Turquie, une communauté issue de l’exil d’Abkhazes qui ont fui au XIXe siècle les massacres tsaristes. Cette communauté, qui compte environ 500 000 membres a progressivement repris conscience de ses racines caucasiennes dans les années 1990. En son sein l’avocat communiste Anit Baba a lancé en juin dernier une pétition pour convaincre le gouvernement turc d’autoriser les ressortissants d’Abkhazie à venir dans ce pays, et en vue du rétablissement de la liaison maritime entre Soukhoumi et les ports turcs.

Cette campagne a connu un succès immédiat dans les partis de gauche turcs, et même au sein de mouvements de droite, ainsi que dans les diverses communautés ethniques minoritaires comme les Kurdes et les Arméniens. Même la parti kémaliste qui dirigeait le pays dans les années 1990 a signé son soutien, sans oublier des organisations professionnelles comme l’union des barreaux de Turquie (les avocats), divers intellectuels et artistes etc.

Le succès de cette campagne est tel que le collectif « Fin de l’Isolement de l’Abkhazie » souhaite aujourd’hui étendre sa dynamique au monde entier en lançant un appel international contre l’enclavement de l’Abkhazie. Des comités en ce sens se constituent en Europe, en Asie, en Afrique, aux Etats-Unis. Le soutien à la pétition Ouvrez les portes verrouillées de la Mer Noire – mettez fin à l’isolement ! doit être l’occasion à la fois de tendre la main à ce courageux petit peuple qui depuis des siècles a résisté à toutes les tentatives d’asservissement et d’assimilation, et un moyen de dénoncer la politique occidentale qui applique un deux poids deux mesures entre les peuples « alliés » et les peuples « ennemis », en condamnant sans état d’âme ces derniers à l’oubli et à l’étranglement. Plutôt que de servir de supplétif à l’impérialisme de l’Union européenne en Géorgie, la France et les autres pays francophones s’honoreraient de plutôt choisir dans le Caucase le non-alignement et aider les Abkhazes à sortir du blocus économique et administratif. C’est ce que les citoyens doivent demander en signant cette pétition.

Lien pour la pétition (en français) : https://atlasalternatif.over-blog.com/2026/10/petition-pour-la-fin-de-l-isolement-de-l-abkhazie.html

Publié à l’origine par  Le Grand Soir

Considerações sobre os limites entre secularismo, soberania e estabilidade social.

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A controvérsia envolvendo o uso do hijab nas escolas do Azerbaijão ganhou novas dimensões em outubro, após a aplicação de regras de vestimenta que resultaram no impedimento de entrada de alunas e professoras em instituições públicas. O episódio provocou manifestações, detenções e críticas de organizações internacionais, além de gerar reações na Turquia. A discussão ultrapassa o ambiente escolar e envolve questões de soberania, identidade religiosa e estabilidade regional.

O Azerbaijão possui razões históricas para preservar um modelo estatal secular. A experiência soviética, a formação de suas instituições após a independência e a necessidade de administrar uma sociedade religiosa em meio a um contexto regional tenso contribuíram para consolidar uma estrutura na qual o Estado mantém controle sobre o funcionamento das instituições públicas. Cabe às autoridades azerbaijanas determinar suas políticas educacionais, estabelecer padrões para as escolas e decidir como os princípios constitucionais serão aplicados.

Entretanto, a maneira como essas políticas são implementadas pode produzir consequências que ultrapassam seus objetivos originais. No caso do hijab, a aplicação das regras escolares provocou resistência entre famílias e setores religiosos, enquanto as detenções relacionadas aos protestos ampliaram a repercussão do episódio. A questão central para o governo será administrar essa reação sem permitir que uma disputa sobre uniformes se transforme em um conflito mais amplo entre autoridades estatais e comunidades religiosas.

O cenário possui implicações internacionais importantes. A Turquia, parceira estratégica de Baku, manifestou preocupação com as restrições ao véu islâmico. A proximidade política, cultural e linguística entre os dois países torna o tema particularmente sensível. Embora a divergência não represente necessariamente uma crise bilateral, ela demonstra que decisões domésticas podem gerar desconforto mesmo entre governos que mantêm relações estreitas. Ancara precisa considerar suas próprias referências sociais e políticas, enquanto Baku procura preservar sua autonomia na condução dos assuntos internos.

A dimensão iraniana também merece atenção. O Azerbaijão mantém uma relação complexa com o Irã, marcada por vínculos históricos e religiosos, mas também por divergências estratégicas. Enquanto o Azerbaijão é, assim como o Irã, um país de maioria xiita, a República Islâmica possui uma larga minoria azerbaijana, da qual tanto o Aiatolá Khamenei quanto o Presidente Pezeshkian são, eles próprios, representantes. Nesse ambiente, a política de secularização pode ser interpretada por setores externos como parte de uma disputa mais ampla pela influência religiosa e política no país. Essa interpretação, contudo, não permite concluir que a regulamentação escolar tenha sido formulada exclusivamente para conter a influência iraniana.

Existe ainda um risco interno que merece consideração. Restrições religiosas aplicadas de maneira excessivamente rígida podem produzir efeitos contrários aos pretendidos. Quando parcelas da população percebem determinadas medidas como uma imposição sobre suas práticas religiosas, grupos radicais podem explorar o descontentamento, apresentar o Estado como adversário da religião e ampliar sua capacidade de mobilização. Para entender este tema, é preciso lembrar de outras experiências, como a Síria de Assad, onde o secularismo deu lugar à proliferação doe extremismo. Esse resultado não é inevitável, e a oposição às regras não deve ser confundida automaticamente com extremismo. Ainda assim, experiências internacionais demonstram tal tendência existe e deve ser analisada de perto.

Para o Azerbaijão, a questão envolve, portanto, mais do que a definição de um uniforme escolar. O país tem o direito de organizar suas instituições segundo suas próprias prioridades, sem que governos estrangeiros ditem suas escolhas. Ao mesmo tempo, a preservação da estabilidade depende da capacidade de evitar que decisões administrativas alimentem polarizações duradouras ou ofereçam novas oportunidades a atores interessados em ampliar tensões religiosas.

A evolução do caso será relevante para as relações de Baku com Ancara e Teerã, assim como para a dinâmica política interna do país. O resultado dependerá não apenas das normas estabelecidas, mas também de sua aplicação concreta e da resposta das autoridades às preocupações apresentadas por estudantes, famílias e educadores. No Cáucaso, onde as relações entre identidade, soberania e segurança permanecem estreitamente conectadas, até uma disputa aparentemente localizada pode adquirir repercussões regionais sérias.

Ehsan MOVAHEDIAN

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La advertencia de Aliyev contra la influencia extranjera llega en medio de una disputa con los círculos políticos turcos sobre la religión, Karabaj y las relaciones de Azerbaiyán con Israel.

En el octavo congreso del Partido del Nuevo Azerbaiyán, celebrado en Bakú el 2 de octubre, el presidente Ilham Aliyev ofreció una descripción inusualmente directa de lo que denominó la «seguridad ideológica» de Azerbaiyán. Era tan importante como la seguridad física, afirmó, ya que las amenazas ideológicas podían traspasar las fronteras a través de Internet, los ciberataques y la inteligencia artificial (IA).

Hizo un llamamiento a la educación y al patriotismo para defender el espacio político del país, al tiempo que insistió en que Azerbaiyán no necesitaba «ayuda ni patrocinio» extranjeros. Añadió que otros Estados no debían interferir en sus asuntos ni decirle cómo vivir.

Estas declaraciones las realizó el presidente y líder del partido gobernante en un congreso en el que se definió su rumbo político. Aliyev situó el control de la esfera ideológica de Azerbaiyán al mismo nivel que el poder militar, la independencia económica y la toma de decisiones soberana.

No mencionó a Turquía como fuente de ninguna amenaza. Sin embargo, sus palabras se produjeron en medio de críticas en los círculos políticos y mediáticos turcos hacia las políticas internas de Azerbaiyán, especialmente su trato a las estudiantes que llevan hiyab. El 26 de septiembre, el Consejo de Medios de Comunicación y Radiodifusión de Azerbaiyán acusó a círculos no identificados de llevar a cabo una campaña contra el país en los medios turcos y en las redes sociales.

Ese enfrentamiento agudiza aún más la fórmula «una nación, dos Estados». La proximidad política nunca ha eliminado las diferencias en los intereses nacionales. A medida que Ankara y Bakú se han ido acercando, la cuestión de quién define su identidad común —y qué influencia permite— se ha vuelto más difícil de eludir.

Los analistas que hablaron con The Cradle consideran que el discurso de Aliyev es un intento de renegociar la relación, más que de romperla. Azerbaiyán no tiene ninguna intención aparente de renunciar a su asociación militar, económica y cultural con Turquía. Sin embargo, Bakú quiere dejar claro que el parentesco no otorga a Ankara ninguna autoridad sobre la política interna azerbaiyana.

Una advertencia que se ha escuchado en Ankara

Hazel Yalin, investigadora especializada en las relaciones turco-rusas, interpreta que el discurso estaba dirigido, en gran medida, al Gobierno del presidente Recep Tayyip Erdogan. El analista turco Aydin Sezer también percibe un mensaje diplomático indirecto. Según Sezer, Aliyev se dirigió a varios públicos, entre ellos Occidente, Armenia, Rusia e Irán, pero es posible que Ankara se encontrara entre sus principales destinatarios.

El contexto inmediato es la controversia sobre la religión en las escuelas de Azerbaiyán. Una enmienda de septiembre a las normas de vestimenta de las escuelas públicas prohíbe prendas adicionales consideradas incompatibles con la educación laica. La decisión no menciona el hiyab por su nombre, pero las noticias de que se ha impedido a algunas niñas asistir a clase por llevar pañuelo en la cabeza han suscitado objeciones por parte de críticos turcos.

Ankara no ha abordado públicamente el tema con Bakú. Sezer interpreta la exhortación de Aliyev a que otros países se ocupen de sus propios asuntos como una advertencia contra convertir el lenguaje de la hermandad en un derecho a supervisar a Azerbaiyán.

La propia alianza reconoce este límite. La Declaración de Shusha de 2021 celebra «una nación, dos Estados» y formaliza una amplia cooperación, pero también compromete a Ankara y Bakú a respetar la soberanía y la no injerencia en los asuntos internos de la otra parte. La disputa actual ha puesto en contacto esas dos partes de la declaración.

Si los actores políticos turcos reclaman voz en la política religiosa y educativa de Azerbaiyán alegando una nacionalidad compartida, el margen de soberanía ideológica de Bakú se reduce. Si esas cuestiones pertenecen exclusivamente a Azerbaiyán, el lema sigue siendo una expresión de afinidad cultural y solidaridad política, sin otorgar a ninguna de las dos capitales un mandato sobre la otra.

¿A quién pertenece la victoria en Karabaj?

Yalin afirma que los canales de noticias y las cuentas en redes sociales pro-Erdogan han acusado a Bakú de presionar a los musulmanes en materia de prácticas y organización religiosas. Algunos también han presentado la victoria de Azerbaiyán en la Segunda Guerra de Karabaj como algo que debía a Turquía, calificando las políticas laicas de Aliyev de ingratas y exigiendo respeto por las sensibilidades religiosas turcas.

«Este argumento también se ha esgrimido basándose en el lema “dos Estados, una nación”: si los turcos y los azerbaiyanos son miembros de la misma nación, entonces, según este razonamiento, el Gobierno azerbaiyano también debería tener en cuenta la voz de esa nación».

El discurso de Aliyev en el congreso apuntaba en la dirección opuesta. Afirmó en repetidas ocasiones que Azerbaiyán había actuado por su cuenta, había pagado sus armas y se había impuesto sin ningún patrocinador externo. Esta fue su interpretación política de la guerra; no debe interpretarse como una conclusión de que el apoyo turco no desempeñó ningún papel.

De hecho, la Declaración de Shusha recoge explícitamente el agradecimiento de Bakú por el apoyo moral y político de Turquía. La controversia gira en torno a quién puede atribuirse el mérito político del resultado y qué derechos podría otorgarles ese mérito para exigir algo posteriormente.

Para Aliyev, la victoria militar forma parte de un proyecto más amplio de construcción del Estado. Describió la independencia, la fortaleza económica, el poderío militar y la confianza en las capacidades azerbaiyanas como la línea de actuación duradera de su Gobierno. Cuanto más se convierte esa narrativa en el eje central de su legitimidad, menos margen queda para que otra capital se presente como la artífice del éxito de Azerbaiyán.

La implicación es significativa: no se puede permitir fácilmente que un actor externo —ni siquiera uno amigo— se convierta en el artífice político del éxito de Azerbaiyán.

Jafar Haghpanah, profesor de la Universidad de Teherán, sostiene que Bakú ya no quiere ser tratado como un socio subordinado de Turquía. Yalin identifica tres elementos en la postura de Aliyev.

El primero es la preocupación por la presión ideológica: según la interpretación de Yalin, el intento de golpe de Estado de 1995 contra el padre de Aliyev, Heydar Aliyev, dejó una advertencia duradera sobre las posibles consecuencias de la actividad política vinculada a Turquía.

El segundo es la resistencia a las descripciones nacionalistas turcas de Azerbaiyán como un «hermano pequeño». El tercero es la creciente confianza de Aliyev en que Azerbaiyán puede ejercer su propia influencia política en toda la región. Las acusaciones relativas a figuras turcas en el episodio de 1995 no deben confundirse con la responsabilidad por parte del actual Gobierno turco.

Bakú tiene ahora un mayor peso militar y económico que a principios de la década de 2000. La Compañía Estatal de Petróleo de la República de Azerbaiyán (SOCAR) ha ampliado el alcance energético de Azerbaiyán; el país ha establecido profundos lazos con Israel, relaciones estratégicas con China y Estados Unidos, y ocupa un lugar destacado en la Organización de Estados Turcos (OTC). Esas conexiones le dan más margen para rechazar una jerarquía dentro de su alianza más estrecha.

Yalin cita el respaldo de Sinan Ogan a Erdogan en la segunda vuelta de las elecciones presidenciales de Turquía de 2023 como ejemplo de cómo la influencia azerbaiyana podría convertirse en un tema de debate en la política turca. A Ogan se le preguntó si Aliyev había influido en su decisión y lo negó explícitamente, afirmando que Aliyev no le había llamado. La acusación no puede demostrar que Bakú dirigiera su elección. No obstante, su difusión muestra la rapidez con la que la cuestión de la influencia funciona en ambos sentidos.

El alcance de la seguridad ideológica

La advertencia de Aliyev fue más allá de la controversia sobre los uniformes escolares. Su respuesta consistió en reforzar la educación y el patriotismo y, con ellos, el control del Estado sobre cómo se interpretan su historia y sus victorias.

Turquía dispone de medios inusualmente potentes para llegar a ese público: la televisión, las redes sociales, las universidades, las redes religiosas, la cultura popular, las empresas y las instituciones del mundo turco en general. Esas conexiones han ayudado a mantener la alianza. También pueden inquietar a Bakú cuando los debates políticos turcos comienzan a moldear las expectativas sobre el orden interno de Azerbaiyán.

El problema para Aliyev no es que la influencia turca sea uniformemente hostil. Es que incluso una influencia amistosa puede seguir desafiando la autoridad de un Gobierno para definir la identidad y la política nacionales. Su énfasis en la seguridad ideológica sugiere que pretende proteger esa autoridad incluso dentro de la asociación más estrecha de Azerbaiyán.

El lugar de Israel entre los aliados

La relación de Azerbaiyán con Israel añade otra fuente de tensión. Ankara ha condenado la guerra de Israel contra Gaza, mientras que Bakú ha mantenido estrechos vínculos en materia de seguridad y energía con Tel Aviv. Las armas israelíes han constituido una parte importante del arsenal de Azerbaiyán, y el crudo azerbaiyano ha seguido llegando a Israel a través del puerto de Ceyhan, en Turquía, a pesar de las restricciones comerciales declaradas por Ankara. The Cradle ha informado sobre la relación en materia de armas y petróleo y sobre los continuos flujos de petróleo.

El analista del Cáucaso Ahmad Kazemi no considera que las diferencias entre Ankara y Bakú sean lo suficientemente profundas como para amenazar su alianza. No obstante, cree que la confianza de Aliyev se basa en parte en el apoyo israelí.

Según la valoración de Kazemi, «si Bakú se viera obligada a elegir entre Ankara y Tel Aviv, elegiría a Israel». También sostiene que Bakú sabía que la presencia de su representante durante el discurso del primer ministro israelí, Benjamin Netanyahu, ante la ONU en septiembre desagradaría a Turquía. Un análisis de la Agencia Anadolu reveló que Turquía se sumó a la protesta contra el discurso, mientras que Azerbaiyán siguió estando representado.

Kazemi ve otra consecuencia para el Cáucaso. Sostiene que la preocupación compartida por Turquía e Irán respecto a la posición de Israel en Azerbaiyán podría acercar a Ankara y Teherán en algunas cuestiones, incluidos los corredores de transporte regionales. Dicha convergencia tendría que lidiar con la amplia cooperación estratégica y de defensa de Turquía con Bakú.

Haghpanah ofrece una interpretación más contundente del discurso pronunciado en el congreso:

«Aliyev pretendía con su discurso indicar a Turquía que Azerbaiyán es el principal aliado de Israel y que Ankara debería moderar su tono hacia Tel Aviv y evitar adoptar una postura dura contra este país. Predice que Turquía e Israel entrarán en conflicto por los recursos energéticos del mar Mediterráneo, así como por sus intereses geoeconómicos y geopolíticos».

Yalin interpreta de manera similar las referencias de Aliyev a la producción y venta de petróleo de Azerbaiyán como una respuesta a las críticas a su comercio con Israel. Esas observaciones por sí solas no permiten determinar las intenciones de Bakú. Por su parte, Dariush Safarnejad, un destacado experto en el Cáucaso, señala la relación «petróleo por armas», pero espera que la influencia israelí en Azerbaiyán se reduzca en cierta medida si la cooperación directa de Bakú con Washington se intensifica tras la iniciativa de paz con Armenia. También hace referencia al debate sobre unos lazos más estrechos con la OTAN.

Los demás socios de Bakú

Aliyev aprovechó el congreso para describir a China y a EE. UU. como las dos superpotencias mundiales y para destacar las alianzas estratégicas de Azerbaiyán con ambas. El esfuerzo de Bakú por establecer vínculos con centros de poder rivales le proporciona alternativas a la dependencia de un único socio, ya sea turco, ruso, chino u occidental.

Sus comentarios sobre Armenia y Rusia encajan en ese contexto. Yalin llama la atención sobre la afirmación de Aliyev de que Armenia reconoció la integridad territorial de Azerbaiyán en octubre de 2022, con el consiguiente reconocimiento de la soberanía azerbaiyana sobre Karabaj.

Aliyev presentó el restablecimiento del control azerbaiyano como un logro conseguido frente a la presión de las grandes potencias. Yalin considera que esto forma parte del intento de Bakú de reposicionarse tras la guerra.

Azerbaiyán y Armenia rubricaron un borrador de acuerdo de paz en Washington en agosto de 2025, aunque aún no se ha firmado el tratado definitivo. Safarnejad sostiene que unos lazos más estrechos con Washington podrían dar a Bakú más margen para tratar directamente con EE. UU. y, con el tiempo, reducir su dependencia de Israel.

Hermandad sin un socio dominante

Ninguno de los cinco analistas sugiere que sea inminente una ruptura entre Ankara y Bakú. Safarnejad destaca la profundidad de su interdependencia: la cooperación militar, las infraestructuras energéticas, los corredores de transporte, la inversión, las industrias de defensa y las instituciones culturales confieren a la alianza una base sólida.

La OTS refuerza esos lazos. En septiembre, funcionarios turcos y azerbaiyanos seguían debatiendo una cooperación más profunda en materia de defensa y seguridad.

Azerbaiyán sigue queriendo a Turquía a su lado en materia de seguridad, comercio y diplomacia regional. Aliyev marca el límite en lo que respecta a la influencia de Ankara sobre la política religiosa de Bakú, sus vínculos con Israel y sus relaciones exteriores en general. Para él, el lema «una nación, dos Estados» otorga a Azerbaiyán la última palabra sobre sus propios asuntos.

Hasta qué punto Bakú podrá hacer valer esa reivindicación dependerá, en parte, de la política interna de Turquía tras Erdogan, de la durabilidad de la relación de Azerbaiyán con Israel y de su capacidad para gestionar las relaciones con Washington, Moscú, Pekín y Teherán sin perder el apoyo de Ankara.

Para Irán, un Bakú más seguro de su independencia pero más dependiente de Israel difícilmente resultaría tranquilizador. La alianza puede perdurar; la discusión sobre quién establece sus límites ya está en marcha.

By Peter VAN BUREN

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Critics of Trump’s diplomatic staffing don’t address why it’s important to have a top man on the ground in the Zoom era.

During my more than two decades at the State Department as a diplomat, my well-meaning mother often asked what I’d have to do to make ambassador. The answer was simple: Dad would have to die young, and Mom would then have to donate the whole estate to the winner of the next presidential election. Then I’d get appointed ambassador to a small, unimportant country. For so many reasons, I am glad Dad lived to a ripe old age, and that Mom looks forward to taking care of the Humane Society in her will instead. I would have made a terrible ambassador.

Since 1960, 72 percent of America’s ambassadors to desirable posts in Western Europe and the Caribbean have been political appointees like the recently departed Kimberly Guilfoyle, as I might have been if the plan with Mom had worked out. Their primary and often only qualification is spending big on the guy who won the presidency. Career diplomats on the other hand are often promoted as ambassador into politically less important hardship posts, no donation required. All must be confirmed by the Senate. The United States is unusual among developed democracies in the scale of political ambassadorial appointments. Unlike the U.S., most developed democracies, including Britain, Germany, Japan, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, reserve ambassadorships almost entirely for career diplomats.

So while the debate over political ambassadors versus career diplomats has gone on for more than a century, in 2026 the more interesting question may be whether we need ambassadors in every capital at all. What useful and productive thing was Guilfoyle doing in Greece anyway?

It is important to have a good person in the role; he acts as the personal representative of his country’s leader, in America’s case, answerable to the Oval Office. He receives confidential instructions from the White House before taking up his job abroad, and for many political ambassadors, can often pick up the phone and call the president and cabinet officials directly. I was in the room as a subject matter expert when ambassador Howard Baker simply picked up the phone and dialed Vice President Dick Cheney at his ranch in Wyoming and untied a significant bureaucratic knot that was burdening our relationship with Japan. This demonstrates something well-connected political ambassadors can uniquely do. On the other hand, communication inside an embassy can be problematic for political appointees; many Foreign Service Officers (FSO) see them as outsiders come to mess up their way of doing things and slow-walk ambassadorial initiatives because they are sure they know better. Political appointees, especially those taking leave from large businesses to serve, also tend to spend a lot of their time back in the U.S., creating friction with the staff.

In the American system, because most career ambassadors owe their own bottom-line allegiance (and pension) to the State Department, communication is often not that close and friendly with the Executive under most circumstances. A White House unsure of whether the State Department is even on its side will be unlikely to be reassured by a career ambassador in place, not to mention State’s long-standing institutional resistance to too many political appointees in general. Careerists usually do have strong host-country knowledge and maybe language skills. Some, however, can get too deep into the weeds on administrative, visa, or personnel matters a political appointee usually leaves to subordinates, and some use their new-found authority to settle old scores or pursue personal projects adjacent to core foreign policy.

The ambassadorial title remains the profession’s highest achievement. It would be surprising if ambitious FSOs did not aspire to it. But just being the most qualified for anything inside State is rarely enough. That leaves plenty of careerist yes-men around looking to get into an ambassador’s chair.

The struggle over who is better at the job, political appointees or careerists, will never conclusively end. It has been a factor of American diplomacy for decades, under all flavors of administrations. The mainstream media negatively focus on some of Trump’s ambassadorial choices, but to anyone familiar with diplomacy it is nothing more than another round in a century-old political argument.

The new question, unique to the second Trump administration, is whether or not the president should appoint anyone at all, career or political, to a particular ambassadorial job. Trump currently has 92 ambassadorial seats empty, with either the candidate stuck in the Senatorial confirmation process or the chair simply left vacant by Trump’s choice. The same number of empty offices at comparable points of their presidencies was only 54 under Biden, and 55 under the first Trump administration. A lot of the empties are in smaller countries of lesser political importance, but a few larger embassies stand out, including Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Germany. Some have pending nominees, some do not. Senate intransigence aside, this seems to be by choice. The real question is, however, how much it matters.

Any American embassy without an ambassador is led by a charge, someone temporarily in the ambassadorial role, typically the embassy’s deputy chief of mission (DCM). The DCM is usually a State Department career FSO, typically the most experienced and senior one at post, and often has done multiple tours in the country in subordinate roles. This seems like the kind of person State would want in charge, yet the American Foreign Service Association and most rank-and-file FSOs curiously complain about not having enough career officers in leadership roles. One wonders whether for some critics the temporary nature of the title itself has become too much the issue.

Things are complicated by the fact that until something goes wrong, most ambassadors work without real oversight. One of the criticisms in Dennis Jett’s excellent book American Ambassadors is the lack of standards and definitions of success for an ambassador. They report to the president after all, who is usually too busy to pay much attention to things on a day-to-day basis in Lesotho, no matter who the ambassador is. Underlings in the embassy by culture and negative experience tend to be sparse in their suggestions upward, and State has little of the military’s tradition of after-action summaries, tough lessons-learned reports, and sincere historical evaluation of mistakes. Ambassadors tend to choose their own path. Some try to be local celebrities, scoring photo-ops and ribbon-cuttings and hosting VIPs. Others focus near-exclusively on American business promotion abroad, while others remember their own days in the bureaucracy and dive deep into political or economic reporting. This all further complicates what is and is not a “good” ambassador. So do we really need them?

Some Democrats think so. Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s top Democrat, accused the administration of retreating from the world stage by leaving ambassadorial postings vacant. “China has ambassadors in nearly every country it has diplomatic relationships with, advancing its interests at the expense of America’s,” she said in a statement. Yet she and others rarely provide specific examples of what America’s ambassadors are doing or might be doing. Critics rarely identify policy outcomes that required a Senate-confirmed ambassador rather than a competent charge. That is the problem in these discussions, an unwavering belief that diplomatic presence is inherently valuable, even when its measurable effects are difficult to identify, and that if we’re not careful China will do it better. Remember of course the exact argument was made during the Cold War about the Soviet Union, leading the U.S. to open embassies in countries with little global importance, only to close them when priorities changed.

Ambassadors are increasingly curiosities left over from the 19th century, a past when Washington, DC, needed trusted representatives empowered to make decisions a world away. Embassies as they exist today were created for a world without Zoom, encrypted messaging, presidential and cabinet travel, celebrity special envoys, global media reporting, and easy direct leader-to-leader calls. It raises the question in 2026 that few people are willing to ask: If 92 embassies can function for months without ambassadors, how indispensable were those ambassadors in the first place?

Original article:  www.theamericanconservative.com

By Jonathan COOK

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Andy Burnham’s government is rolling out a new “Centre for Information Defence”. But the outside actors most aggressively undermining what little remains of British democracy are nowhere in its sights

Russia “interfered” in the 2016 Brexit vote by running some “anti-EU” articles on its RT channel and promoting a few internet trolls. Even MI5 has to admit that this activity had no tangible impact on the referendum campaign.

No matter. British prime minister Andy Burnham has once again revived the incendiary claim that Russian disinformation is an especial threat to British democracy. At the United Nations a few weeks ago he announced plans for a National Centre for Information Defence “to detect, attribute and disrupt these kinds of hostile state information attacks”.

For the new British prime minister, as for his predecessors, this is all about Moscow and the UK’s favourite bogeyman, Vladimir Putin. At the UN, Burnham promised British expertise to other European nations to protect them from Kremlin disinformation.

Meanwhile, evidence continues to mount that another foreign actor is meddling even more aggressively in British politics – and neither Burnham nor MI5 have a word to say about it.

Any evidence of Russia disinformation-peddling in the UK pales in comparison to Israeli influence operations – and that’s just the ones we know about. The head of MI5, Ken McCallum, noted that Russian disinformation was neither sophisticated nor successful. The same cannot be said for Israel’s handiwork.

Israel has been using “hasbara” trolls on social media platforms to manipulate public debates in Britain for years – the thrust of the accusation against Russia. But in Israel’s case, it goes much further than that.

This year the Israeli state massively increased its public diplomacy budget to $730 million to expand its influence operations. That includes flying even more politicians, clergy, academics and influencers to bombard them with pro-Israel propaganda they are then likely to spread back home. According to foreign minister Gideon Saar, Israeli advocacy should be treated “like investing in jets, bombs, and missile interceptors”.

There was already plenty of evidence through the late 2010s, as I reported at the time, that Israel was helping to organise, stoke and amplify a campaign to smear its arch-critic, Jeremy Corbyn, as an antisemite, in order to prevent him from reaching No 10 Downing Street.

Not least, Israel did so by advancing a new, bogus definition of Jew hatred through the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA). Usefully, for Israel, that definition largely ignores hatred of Jews to focus instead on criticism of Israel.

That was the most blatant meddling possible in what remains of Britain’s democratic processes. UK politicians and media not only failed to oppose it, but actively sought to amplify the smears.

Civil war

Chris Menahan 🇺🇸@infolibnews

🚨 ADL CEO Jonathan Greenblatt reveals in Israel that he’s been working with all the top AI Frontier Labs to push them to suppress “anti-Semitism.” “We’ve been working with the Frontier Labs—OpenAI, Anthropic, Alphabet, the company that runs Gemini, Google, Meta, who runs Muse, …

10:32 PM · Oct 13, 2026 · 447 ТЫС. Views

CEO Jonathan Greenblatt observed: “We’ve had excellent collaboration with Silicon Valley.” The platforms, he said, would tackle content the ADL doesn’t like “right in the source code” – that is, before users can see it.

That is likely not only to remove criticism of Israeli atrocities and criticism of western governments, such as the UK’s, for colluding in Israel’s genocide but turn social media into a playground for bots and Israel apologists, giving them free reign to spread their propaganda without challenge.

We also know, thanks to the work of the French security services – maybe MI5 was too busy chasing Russian bots to notice – that an Israeli cyber agency called Blackcore targeted the SNP in May’s Scottish elections, as well as meddling in elections in France and New York.

Israeli tech firms, especially those dealing in spyware, intelligence and influence operations, are typically closely aligned with the Israeli state and its military. Most of the founders of tech start-ups are alumnae of the Israeli army’s 8200 intelligence unit.

Alongside the SNP, New York mayoral candidate Zohran Mamdani and a leftwing French party headed by Jean-Luc Melenchon were targeted. Why? Because, unlike their political rivals, all had dared to speak out against Israel’s genocide in Gaza.

With echoes of what happened to Corbyn, Blackcore’s campaigns were designed to smear candidates. In the case of the French elections, fake accounts were created to accuse one candidate of rape and another of paedophilia.

A new documentary, NAZA, shows how Israel has paved the way in using AI in pioneering new ways to kill on a mass scale in Gaza. It selected banks of targets for assassination, often by murdering those “suspects” when they are in family compounds, slaughtering large numbers of bystanders in the process.

It is therefore hardly surprising that tech firms in Israel have been caught using AI in similarly innovative and indiscriminate ways online, to target western publics with disinformation.

In the summer it emerged that the Israeli government had created a website for a fake “scholarly” think-tank. In a short period of time, it produced prodigious quantities of AI-generated content on Israel, optimised for common search terms, that promoted Israeli talking points and constantly suggested criticism of Israel risked fuelling antisemitism.

It was set up not only to influence internet chatbots into echoing its pro-Israel disinformation but also to integrate its content into what experts call the “underlying training data”: that is, the unquestioned assumptions on which chatbots operate.

Back in May 2024 Meta identified fake Israel-based accounts, “posing as Jewish students, African Americans and other concerned citizens”, peddling pro-Israel content in the US and Canada in support of Israel’s slaughter of Palestinians in Gaza.

Two months ago, Meta again found the same kind of dirty tricks emanating from Israel, this time targeting Britain, France and Australia among other countries. The AI-generated accounts posed “as local, civically-engaged brands, news sources, religious organizations, and political activists”.

Notably in the case of the UK and France, the influence campaigns were designed to stoke “anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim” sentiment. Israel has been critically involved in advancing Islamophobic content, fuelling fears of a supposed “Muslim takeover” of Europe to mobilise support for Israel as a bulwark in the Middle East against Islam, and thereby encourage sympathy for its genocidal attacks on Gaza.

As a consequence, the political landscape in Britain has been disfigured. Support for the far-right has been artificially inflated, polarising British society. The path is being paved towards deeper authoritarianism and the possibility of civil war.

Death knell

But it isn’t just the influence of Israel we should be worried about. The problem runs much deeper, with a host of other noxious outside actors trying to warp and disfigure British politics in ways that closely accord with Israel’s malign intent. Burnham’s Centre for Information Defence will do precisely nothing to tackle any of it.

Here are two other powerful external actors aligned with Israel in distorting British politics.

The billionaire class, a transnational elite that has no loyalty to Britain, interfere in our politics by making our political parties dependent on their donations. They use their money to buy influence with the main parties – which is why for decades it has made little difference whether we vote for the Conservatives or Labour. We get austerity either way, while the billionaires get permission for their forever wars, directing public wealth away from public services into the arms industries and resource grabs.

Jeremy Corbyn tried to break with this model by funding Labour with small donations from ordinary people instead of the billionaires. As a result, he was destroyed by a confected campaign run by the billionaires, in association with Israel and its trolls, to smear him as an antisemite.

Sir Keir Starmer, Corbyn’s successor, went right back to begging for money from Big Business, got the billionaires behind him, and rolled on with the austerity programme.

Is Nigel Farage’s Reform different? Of course, not. Even before reaching power, he’s dependent on crypto-billionaires living in Thailand and Hong Kong.

Meanwhile, the sometime US trillionaire Elon Musk is busy rallying Britain’s new blackshirts, led by serial fraudster Tommy Robinson, to chase after a few “illegal” migrants rather than identifying the real criminals tearing apart Britain: the super-rich like Musk.

The billionaires both wield and conceal their influence through their ownership of the corporate media. They use the media to aggressively promote their own causes – political and economic policies ensuring their further enrichment – by normalising the extreme ideology of neoliberal capitalism, with its promotion of endless resource extraction through forever wars and the fuelling of needless consumption.

The consequence is the destruction of the conditions for human life on the planet. The billionaires hope they can ride out the catastrophe in their bunkers, or cryogenically freeze their bodies until a point in the future when they can be uploaded to the cloud.

One of the media’s most important jobs is to use smear campaigns to destroy anyone, such as Corbyn and now Zack Polanski, who threatens the billionaires’ privileged position by offering a mildly socialist programme of wealth redistribution.

Vassal state

The recent claims of a supposed “terrorist plot” outside RAF Fairford – really a US airforce base pretending to be a British base and one from which the US has waged an illegal war of aggression against Iran – should have reminded us that the Pentagon is largely in charge of UK foreign policy.

The US has some 15 major military bases on British soil, plus half a dozen smaller intelligence sites. As the rightwing US podcaster Tucker Carlson recently observed, the fact that Britain has foreign troops crawling all over it makes us little more than an occupied “vassal state”.

The US recently announced a $4 billion upgrade of its UK bases, including establishing storage sites for its nuclear arsenal. The plan caused barely a ripple of interest among British politicians or the media .

Although our political and media class pretend the UK is an equal partner in a western defence alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the reality is very different. Nato takes its orders from the US, doing Washington’s bidding. That’s why Nato has been pivoting towards America’s biggest economic rival, China, which is, of course, nowhere near the North Atlantic.

When the US snaps its fingers, Britain stands to attention and hikes its spending on the war industries. Along with European governments, the UK is willing to drain its national coffers and scythe through public spending with yet more austerity cuts to support Washington’s military agenda for “full-spectrum global dominance”.

Hidden influence

In the early 2010s, the US was desperately seeking a pretext to extradite Julian Assange from the UK and lock him up in a super-max jail, hiding him out of sight after his organisation Wikileaks revealed US and British war crimes in Afghanistan and Iraq. It was during this period that Starmer, as the director of public prosecutions, repeatedly jetted off to Washington for secret meetings with US officials.

We will never know what was discussed. Freedom of information requests discovered that his own officials destroyed all records of those meetings.

Once he became a politician, Starmer was recruited to the shadowy Trilateral Commission, originally founded in the 1970s by officials in Jimmy Carter’s administration to deal with the supposed problem of “an excess of democracy” in the US. The commission’s view was that voters were becoming dangerously less passive, at that time over the Vietnam war, and ways needed to be found to return them to docility.

There are a plethora of other “respected’ think-tanks and organisations whose chief role is to embed US policy ideas, especially those relating to foreign policy, in the thinking of British elites. They include the Bilderberg Group, Chatham House, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Atlantic Council, The British-American Parliamentary Group, and BritishAmerican Business.

The US uses its financial muscle through these organisations and many others to manufacture consent for its extreme neoliberal and neoconservative ideologies. The latest example are massive grants to organisations willing to export Trump’s MAGA ideology to the UK, masquerading as a “public education” initiative.

There is plenty of evidence to show that it was pressure from the Trump administration that led to the unprecedented decision by Starmer’s government to proscribe a civil disobedience group, Palestine Action, for the first time in Britain’s history as a terrorist organisation.

Palestine Action had incensed Israel by targeting its weapons factories on UK soil, highlighting another aspect of British collusion in the Gaza genocide, and had infuriated Trump personally by spraying one of his golf courses in Scotland with the words “Gaza is not 4 sale”.

In truth, the ways that the US meddles directly in British politics are so numerous it is virtually impossible to quantify them. Britain is little more than a colony of the US, receiving diktats on important foreign policy issues – especially regarding US and Israeli interests – that the UK is invariably too frightened to oppose.

Burnham is already rolling over to reverse the UK’s decision to honour a ruling from the International Court of Justice and other international tribunals that Britain has no claim to sovereignty over the Chagos Islands and must return them to Mauritius. The UK has faced a temper tantrum from Trump on the matter because the US operates an illegal military base on one of the islands.

Disobedience by the UK is the exception, not the rule. Which makes Burnham’s exclusive focus on Russian influence almost laughably beside the point. This furious finger-pointing at the Kremlin is designed with one purpose in mind only: to distract the British public from where the real external meddling in our politics is coming from.

Original article:  jonathancook.substack.com

If the State considers itself to be at war, why does it not state so where the Constitution requires it to do so?

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The Ravenna case

It all begins in Ravenna, a historic city and major Italian port on the Adriatic coast. The port of Ravenna is a civilian port: bulk cargo, fertilizers, containers, cruise ships. Yet in a brief filed this summer with the Council of State, the State Attorney General’s Office attributed “military significance” to it within the country’s maritime defense system. The reason lies in a single sentence: making certain data public would pose an unacceptable risk because “a ‘piecemeal’ and ‘hybrid’ world war is underway, involving, among others, Italy as well.”

The data did not consist of routes, schedules, or ship names. They were aggregate figures: the amount of military equipment that left the port in 2025, broken down by four-month period and categorized as exports or transit. Journalist Linda Maggiori had requested this information in January under the general right of access to public information—Italy’s equivalent of the FOIA—which does not require justification. On October 13, Il Fatto Quotidiano turned the statement into a national issue. On October 16, the Sixth Section of the Council of State rejected the Customs Agency’s appeal.

In February, the Customs Agency, which reports to the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), denied the request entirely, citing national security, public order, and commercial confidentiality. Maggiori, represented by attorney Andrea Maestri, filed an appeal with the Emilia-Romagna Regional Administrative Court (TAR), which on July 1 partially upheld the appeal: the quantities must be made public because the numerical data is “neutral,” while the destinations may remain confidential. Customs, represented by the State Attorney’s Office, filed an appeal. The Council of State upheld the Regional Administrative Court’s ruling: the administration failed to demonstrate either the necessity or the concrete nature of the harm. It also noted “apparently contradictory” conduct, as the Livorno Customs Office had previously provided similar data without objection.

In February 2025, approximately 13 metric tons of forged parts bound for an Israeli defense company were seized in Ravenna without export authorization; the proceedings are ongoing, and the presumption of innocence applies. It appears that on October 14 of this year, another 4 metric tons were at the port.

What does “war” mean, who decides, and the arms law

The word has three meanings, and memory confuses them. The first is constitutional. Article 11 establishes that Italy “rejects war as an instrument of aggression against the freedom of other peoples and as a means of resolving international disputes.” Article 78 entrusts the Chambers with the authority to declare a state of war and to grant the necessary powers to the government; Article 87 assigns the declaration of war to the President of the Republic. In the history of the Republic, a state of war has never been declared: neither in 1991, nor for Kosovo, Afghanistan, or Libya.

The second meaning is international: under international humanitarian law, armed conflict exists de facto, but supplying weapons to a belligerent party—according to prevailing legal opinion and that of the International Committee of the Red Cross—does not make one a party to the conflict. The third issue is political-strategic. “Hybrid warfare” (cyberattacks, sabotage, disinformation below the threshold of armed conflict) and “proxy war” are analytical tools, not legal categories. In a judicial ruling, therefore, a political term was used to justify an exception to a legal right. The Council of State rejected the postponement.

Parliament declares a state of war, authorizes missions (Law 145/2016), and receives the annual report on exports. The government authorizes exports through the UAMA of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Prime Minister is the sole custodian of state secrets (Law 124/2007), under the oversight of COPASIR. The President of the Republic chairs the Supreme Defense Council. The Ministry of Defense signs the classified aid packages for Ukraine. The State Attorney’s Office, which reports to the Prime Minister’s Office, defends government agencies in court: its briefs are legal documents, not foreign policy statements. No minister has yet clarified whether they agree with the statements made therein.

Moreover, the information has never been classified as a state secret. Customs authorities have invoked the relevant provisions of Article 5-bis of the Transparency Decree (Legislative Decree 33/2013), which allow for a refusal only if necessary to avoid “concrete harm” to national security, defense, or international relations.

Law No. 185 of 1990 prohibits the export and transit of arms to countries engaged in armed conflict in violation of Article 51 of the UN Charter, to countries whose policies conflict with Article 11, to countries under embargo, or to those responsible for serious human rights violations. However, it excludes government-to-government transfers and transits for NATO forces. The annual report to Parliament (Art. 5) lists authorizations by country and company, not by port: no public document specifies how much passes through a single port. This is the gap that the Ravenna petition sought to fill. According to the Peace and Disarmament Network, the government’s reform bill, approved by the Senate in 2024 (A.C. 1730), would reduce the data included in the report; based on the sources consulted, it has not yet been definitively approved.

Those who defend confidentiality argue that harmless data—aggregated and cross-referenced with maritime tracking data—could reveal supply routes: this is the argument used by the Trieste Customs Office to deny an identical petition. Also important are obligations to allies and corporate confidentiality. Those advocating for transparency point out that Law 185 stems from the idea that arms require more public oversight, not less, because they pertain to Article 11 and, in the case of free transfers, involve public funds. An annual total does not enable hostile actions, and data published in Livorno does not become dangerous simply because it is in Ravenna.

Secrecy has a legitimate place. The Constitutional Court has linked it to national security since Ruling 86/1977 and reaffirmed this in the Abu Omar case (106/2009). Secrecy becomes problematic when it loses its criteria: concrete evidence of harm, proportionality, a time limit, consistency among agencies, and oversight by a judge or Parliament. The argument of a “piecemeal world war” failed on all counts. It did not identify any harm, rejected the Regional Administrative Court’s (TAR) compromise solution, treated data from a past year as if it were an ongoing operation, and contradicted the Livorno ruling. If merely invoking a widespread conflict suffices, then that justification applies to any data and indefinitely: hybrid wars, as described in official documents themselves, have no declared beginning nor anticipated end.

That language has a specific origin: the Ministry of Defense’s non-paper from November 2025, according to which Italy is already embroiled in a hybrid conflict. Committees and unions believe that part of Ravenna’s cargo is destined for Haifa and Ashdod: the withheld data would make it possible to verify this.

The political paradox

The government states in Parliament that Italy is not at war; one of its agencies writes the same in court to conceal a figure. The case was successfully closed, but only thanks to a journalist willing to pursue the matter through two levels of appeal. Yet, even with the case closed, the gravity of what was stated remains.

If the state deems the international situation serious enough to restrict the right to information, that assessment cannot be confined to a customs office or a legal brief. The logic of Article 78 applies even on a small scale: whoever invokes the exception must answer for it before Parliament. All that is needed is the uniform publication of quantities for each port—as requested by the Ravenna Region and Municipality—their inclusion in the report on Law 185, and a review of the classifications by COPASIR, with predefined deadlines.

An emergency becomes permanent when no one declares it and no one revokes it. One question remains for Parliament: if the State considers itself to be at war, why does it not state so where the Constitution requires it to do so? And if it does not consider itself to be at war, by what authority does one of its bodies write as much?

The realities obscured by the “One Nation” narrative intersect with broader imperialist power struggles, extending from the energy resources of the Caspian Basin to the trade routes of Eurasia.

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Although Ankara and Baku maintain a strong partnership spanning Karabakh, energy corridors, the defence industry and the Organization of Turkic States, the 2009 rapprochement with Armenia, the natural gas dispute of 2010 and the political tensions that have resurfaced today show that the two countries have long been engaged in a relationship marked by rivalry as well as cooperation.

Relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan have evolved since the dissolution of the Soviet Union through numerous partnerships in the political, economic and security spheres.

Turkey was the first country to recognise Azerbaijan’s independence. Its support for Baku during the Karabakh conflicts, joint oil and natural gas projects, and increasingly close military cooperation in recent years have all been presented through the political slogan “One Nation, Two States.” Yet several episodes have demonstrated that the two states do not necessarily interpret this supposed unity in the same way.

The tensions that have recently emerged over dress regulations and debates about secularism in Azerbaijan are particularly revealing in this respect. The responses from senior Azerbaijani officials to criticism originating in Turkey have exposed significant differences in how the two countries perceive their relationship.

While the Turkish side has promoted a vision of a “Greater Turkic World” under Ankara’s leadership through the “One Nation, Two States” narrative, the Azerbaijani side has responded with a different emphasis: “One nation, but two states.”

From 1991 to the present: How the foundations of the relationship were laid

Turkey recognised Azerbaijan’s independence on 9 November 1991, becoming the first country to do so. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were established on 14 January 1992. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a new era of interstate relations between Ankara and Baku began.

For Turkey, Azerbaijan was more than a country linked to it through a shared Turkic identity. The relationship also provided a strategic gateway to the Caspian Basin, Central Asia and the South Caucasus—an objective that aligned with the broader strategic interests of the United States as well. For Azerbaijan, meanwhile, Turkey was an important partner capable of providing political support on the international stage, facilitating access to Western markets and cooperating on security matters.

The famous slogan “One Nation, Two States,” popularised by former Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev, came to express a degree of closeness that went beyond ordinary diplomatic relations between the two countries.

One of the most important issues on the agenda in the early 1990s was the Karabakh conflict. In 1993, Turkey closed its land border with Armenia after Armenian forces took control of the Kelbajar district. This decision marked a defining moment in Ankara’s diplomatic position on the Karabakh conflict.

Turkish-Armenian relations thus became an integral part of Ankara’s relationship with Baku. Turkey’s policy towards Armenia began to be shaped not only by the dynamics of bilateral relations but also by its strategic partnership with Azerbaijan.

The first major tension: The rapprochement with Armenia

The problems that have periodically emerged in Turkey–Azerbaijan relations are not new. A closer look at the 2008–2010 period reveals how disagreements in both diplomacy and economics brought underlying tensions between the two countries into the open for the first time.

In 2008, Turkey and Armenia launched a renewed initiative to normalise relations. On 6 September 2008, then-Turkish President Abdullah Gül travelled to Yerevan at the invitation of Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan to watch a football match between the national teams of the two countries. The visit became one of the symbolic moments in the normalisation process between two countries pursuing different paths towards transatlantic integration. The initiative would subsequently become known as “football diplomacy.”

Following negotiations, Turkey and Armenia signed protocols in Zurich in October 2009 aimed at establishing diplomatic relations and developing bilateral ties.

The Azerbaijani leadership, however, viewed the process with considerable reservations. Baku regarded any normalisation between Ankara and Yerevan conducted independently of the Karabakh issue as contrary to its core foreign policy interests. Such moves raised concerns in Azerbaijan that Turkey’s political support could weaken.

The protocols signed by Turkey and Armenia never entered into force. The process failed to advance through the parliamentary ratification stages and eventually came to a standstill. Lobbying efforts by pro-Baku circles, drawing heavily on Azerbaijani financial resources, are also understood to have influenced the process.

This first major test therefore became an illustration of Azerbaijan’s ability to exert influence over Turkish policy.

Partnership and bargaining

During the same period, the two countries experienced a serious dispute over natural gas prices and energy transportation.

Natural gas produced at Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz field was becoming an important source of supply for Turkey. However, when negotiations to renew earlier agreements began in 2008, disagreements emerged over gas prices, the recalculation of past purchases, Turkey’s ability to resell the gas to third countries, and transit fees.

At this point, Ankara’s ambition to establish itself as a central energy corridor to Europe intersected with Baku’s efforts to secure more direct commercial arrangements for its natural gas exports.

The dispute between the two supposed partners lasted approximately two years. Azerbaijan sought to strengthen its bargaining position against Ankara by drawing on its relations with alternative partners, including Russia and Iran.

Agreements signed in June 2010 ultimately resolved the disagreements over natural gas prices, sales and transit conditions.

This dispute was a clear indication that relations between the two countries were shaped by far more complicated dynamics than the rhetoric of “brotherhood” suggested.

Turkey offered a critical transit route for Azerbaijan’s access to European markets, while Azerbaijan used its energy resources to gain leverage over Ankara’s strategic objectives.

“Blood brothers” or energy partners?

Energy cooperation can be seen as one of the most important long-term foundations of Turkey–Azerbaijan relations. Energy projects have not only tied the two countries’ economic interests together; they have also influenced Turkey’s position in the European energy market and Azerbaijan’s ability to bring Caspian resources to international markets.

From the Caspian to the Mediterranean: The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline

One of the clearest manifestations of this partnership is the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline. Beginning full-capacity operations in 2006, the pipeline transports Azerbaijani oil through Georgia to the Turkish Mediterranean terminal at Ceyhan. The project was implemented under agreements signed by Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia in 1999.

The significance of BTC extends beyond oil transportation. Most importantly, it enables Caspian energy resources to reach global markets through routes that bypass Russia. Azerbaijan has thus expanded its export options, while Turkey has become a major energy transit hub. At the broader geopolitical level, the project also represented an important step in the Atlantic alliance’s strategy to reduce Russia’s influence over regional energy routes.

Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum and TANAP

Natural gas cooperation between the two countries developed along similar lines. The Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum pipeline began transporting gas in 2007, facilitating the delivery of Azerbaijani natural gas to the Turkish market.

The Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) subsequently became one of the most important projects in the bilateral partnership. The first gas flowed through TANAP in June 2018. The pipeline delivers Azerbaijani natural gas to Turkey and contributes to its transportation to European markets through the Southern Gas Corridor.

A turning point for Azerbaijani capital: SOCAR

Energy relations are not limited to pipelines. Investments by the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) in Turkey have become one of the largest components of the two countries’ economic relationship.

SOCAR Turkey operates in sectors including refining, petrochemicals, logistics and port management. In a statement concerning 2024, the company said its total investments in Turkey had exceeded $18 billion and described itself as the country’s largest foreign direct investor. The STAR Refinery in Aliağa, İzmir, is another major Azerbaijani investment in Turkey.

The economic relationship, therefore, is not simply a matter of Turkey gaining access to Azerbaijan or Azerbaijan reaching European markets through Turkey. Azerbaijani capital has also established a significant presence in Turkey’s industrial and energy infrastructure.

Why is bilateral trade falling short of its target?

Despite close political ties and major investment projects, bilateral trade remains below the target set by the two countries’ leaders.

According to figures published by the Azerbaijani Embassy in Turkey, bilateral trade reached $5.72 billion in 2025. Of this total, $3.38 billion consisted of Azerbaijani exports to Turkey, while $2.34 billion represented Turkish exports to Azerbaijan.

The two governments aim to increase bilateral trade to $15 billion. Achieving this target would require the current volume to grow by approximately 2.6 times.

Although energy, defence industry cooperation and major infrastructure projects keep bilateral relations at a strategic level, a comparable leap in trade has yet to materialise.

Transport corridors, Eurasia and rivalry within the OTS

Following the development of energy corridors, transport projects became another major dimension of relations between the two countries.

The Baku–Tbilisi–Kars (BTK) railway, inaugurated on 30 October 2017, connected Azerbaijan to Turkey’s railway network through Georgia. The project forms an important part of a route through which goods from China and Central Asia can travel across the Caspian Sea and the South Caucasus towards Turkey and Europe.

These interests have gained further importance in recent years within the framework of the international transport route known as the Middle Corridor.

The 2020 Karabakh War

One of the most important turning points in Turkey–Azerbaijan relations was the Second Karabakh War in 2020.

During the 44-day war, Turkey emerged as one of Azerbaijan’s most important political and military supporters. Military training, defence industry cooperation and security ties between the two countries had deepened considerably. For Turkey, the conflict also provided an environment in which its defence industry—regarded in recent years as one of the country’s most important export sectors—was put to the test on the battlefield.

Azerbaijan’s use of Turkish-made unmanned aerial vehicles, including the Bayraktar TB2, and the depth of military cooperation between the two countries were among the key issues highlighted in assessments of the war.

The Shusha Declaration: Relations elevated to an alliance

It was in 2021 that relations between the two countries were formally elevated to the level of an alliance. On 15 June 2021, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed the Shusha Declaration on allied relations in Shusha.

The declaration provided a more comprehensive political framework for the strategic partnership, incorporating military and security cooperation.

It stipulates that the parties will hold consultations if either country faces a threat or attack by a third state against its independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity or security. The document also provides for expanded defence cooperation, modernisation of the armed forces, joint military exercises and coordination between security institutions.

In other words, the agreement further facilitated access for Turkish defence companies to the Azerbaijani market and for Azerbaijani capital to the Turkish economy.

The Karabakh victory and shifting balances of power

Azerbaijan’s re-establishment of control over Karabakh in September 2023 did more than alter the course of the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict. It also ushered in a new phase in the political psychology of relations between Ankara and Baku.

Turkey continued to support Azerbaijan’s position on territorial integrity. But the picture in Baku began to change. Having strengthened its military and diplomatic position, Azerbaijan increasingly pursued regional policies independently of Ankara, including in areas where its preferences might diverge from those of Turkey.

Both sides continued to tell their own story of “brotherhood,” but their relative leverage varies depending on the issue. Turkey has greater overall military and economic capacity, yet Azerbaijan possesses instruments of influence—particularly in the energy sector—that can affect Ankara’s decisions.

Nakhchivan and the Zangezur issue

Transport connections and the status of Nakhchivan are becoming increasingly important to the future of Turkey–Azerbaijan relations.

The absence of a direct land connection between mainland Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic is one of the region’s fundamental transport challenges. Turkey’s border with Nakhchivan and its connections to the exclave therefore occupy a special place in Ankara–Baku relations.

The Iğdır–Nakhchivan natural gas pipeline, inaugurated on 5 March 2025, contributes to diversifying Nakhchivan’s energy supply. With an announced initial capacity of 730 million cubic metres per year, the pipeline delivers natural gas to Nakhchivan through Turkey.

The main dispute, however, concerns road and railway routes that would connect mainland Azerbaijan directly to Nakhchivan.

The joint declaration signed by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in Washington on 8 August 2025 included efforts to establish unimpeded connectivity between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan through Armenian territory. Subsequently, the United States and Armenia developed an implementation framework for a project known as the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP).

This route is not merely about Azerbaijan gaining access to Nakhchivan. For Turkey, it also promises easier access to the Caspian Basin, Central Asia and other countries in the Turkic world.

This is precisely where Turkish, Azerbaijani and Armenian companies are preparing for new battles over contracts and tenders associated with the Trump corridor.

As of October 2026, however, a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan has yet to be formally signed. Despite significant progress in the process, the final text remains to be brought into force.

Although Ankara’s and Baku’s interests appear to overlap substantially on this issue, competition over contracts, commercial opportunities and the distribution of the spoils could generate new sources of tension.

The Organization of Turkic States: Partnership or rivalry?

Another source of tension in Turkey–Azerbaijan relations is the Organization of Turkic States (OTS).

The organisation aims to strengthen transport connectivity, expand trade, promote economic cooperation and improve coordination on security issues. For Turkey, however, it also represents a means of expanding access to Central Asia and projecting an image of leadership over the “Turkic world” to its domestic audience. For Azerbaijan, the critical objective is to preserve its dominant position along the Trans-Caspian route.

The adoption of the Karabakh Declaration at the OTS informal summit held in Shusha on 6 July 2024 was also followed by an increase in Azerbaijani media narratives promoting Baku’s leadership of the “Turkic world.”

In other words, political leadership within the Turkic world, the form of economic integration and the distribution of influence among member states are all arenas of ongoing competition concealed beneath the rhetoric of a “single nation.”

The OTS summit that Turkey is expected to host in Ankara on 29–30 October 2026 is significant in this context. Ankara and Baku can be expected to emphasise the language of “brotherhood” at the summit, but it remains unclear whether they will offer concrete solutions to the issues dividing them.

The Israel question: Do Ankara and Baku have different priorities?

Relations with Israel are sometimes described as a major point of disagreement between Turkey and Azerbaijan. Contrary to this assumption, however, cooperation with Israel is one of the areas in which the two countries’ interests overlap most significantly.

Turkey continues to express opposition to Israel in its public rhetoric while also making statements about having halted trade with the country. Yet the continuation of trade through other channels is no secret. On the Azerbaijani side, critics of Baku among supporters of the ruling AKP in Turkey are accused of hypocrisy over the issue.

In a statement dated 10 November 2024, Turkey’s Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources argued that BOTAŞ International had no authority over the buying and selling of oil transported through BTC and maintained that no cargoes destined for Israel were being loaded. According to the ministry, the oil companies using the pipeline were complying with Turkey’s decision to halt trade with Israel.

In contrast, a Reuters report published in January 2026, citing data from the ship-tracking company Kpler, stated that Israel’s imports of Azerbaijani crude oil from Ceyhan averaged 94,000 barrels per day in 2025, a 31 per cent increase compared with the previous year.

Why did the headscarf debate become a diplomatic issue?

The immediate trigger for the latest tensions between Turkey and Azerbaijan was a set of dress regulations governing state schools in Azerbaijan.

On 21 September 2026, Azerbaijan’s Cabinet of Ministers amended the dress code rules for state schools. Although the regulation did not explicitly mention headscarves, reports and footage showing students wearing headscarves being denied entry to schools provoked a backlash in Turkey.

Oktay Saral, a chief adviser to President Erdoğan, and several AKP lawmakers spoke out against the obstruction of headscarved students’ right to education. The debate quickly expanded beyond school regulations in Azerbaijan to encompass the two countries’ differing understandings of secularism and the limits of one state’s right to comment on another’s domestic affairs.

On 13 October, the ruling New Azerbaijan Party (YAP), led by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, issued a statement directly targeting the AKP. YAP described the statements coming from Turkey as irresponsible and argued that the principle of “One Nation, Two States” could not legitimise interference in the domestic affairs of one country by the other.

The controversy thus brought tensions between Turkey and Azerbaijan into the open, with the headscarf issue serving as the immediate point of contention.

While Azerbaijan has delivered particularly strong messages on the matter, Ankara has maintained institutional silence, despite statements from individual figures.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s remarks during his visit to Baku on 15 October emphasised that the two countries had weathered numerous tests in the past, that the relationship between their leaders remained strong, and that the “Two States, One Nation” principle continued to manifest itself across all areas of cooperation.

What does the overall picture reveal?

Relations between the two countries have long been shaped by a combination of rivalry and cooperation. Yet the relationship is generally treated as an almost untouchable domain, with both sides behaving as though no tensions exist.

The slogan “One Nation, Two States” does less to explain the actual nature of Turkey–Azerbaijan relations than to conceal the conflicts of interest embedded within them. It functions as a nationalist political narrative that obscures the competing interests of the two states.

The decisive factors in bilateral relations, however, are energy resources, transport corridors, the defence industry, capital investments and the struggle for influence within the Organization of Turkic States.

Despite the many sources of tension, the economic ties and agreements established between the two countries’ business interests have helped sustain the rhetoric of “brotherhood.” This is because nationalist discourse can place these relationships behind a shared identity narrative, rendering the interests of big capital operating in the name of “Turkic unity” and serving US strategic interests largely immune from scrutiny.

Moreover, this partnership is not confined to the independent choices of the two countries. The realities obscured by the “One Nation” narrative intersect with broader imperialist power struggles, extending from the energy resources of the Caspian Basin to the trade routes of Eurasia.

There’s no way to fight the Empire without bypassing its control of the international financial system.

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All hell is already breaking loose when it comes to probing what is exactly taking place related to the latest, definitely murky U.S.-linked movements in Pakistani land and sea. After an initial assessment at Transition Protocol – which avowedly did not provide all the necessary answers – we dug deeper into a way more comprehensive examination supported by several sources.

What we are watching across several nodes of extremely sensitive Iran-Pakistan overland connectivity is not a blanket border shutdown; but a surgical, two-track balancing act by Islamabad between Washington’s tremendous financial vise and Tehran’s strategic lifeline.

So here’s where it all stands – compounding the verified record with our latest consultations.

The key point: the regulatory trigger was a banking sanctions move, not just border security.

While provincial officials in Balochistan publicly framed Saturday’s halt at two key nodes, Taftan and Gabd–Rimdan, around security, counterterrorism, and anti-smuggling, what matters most is the exact mechanism around a memorandum issued last Friday by the Pakistani Ministry of Commerce.

That immediately revoked an October 3 extension of the Electronic Import Form (EIF) waiver for goods imported from Iran, and coincided with Islamabad’s instruction to close the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) immigration gate at Taftan.

What is key is that without the EIF waiver, Pakistani importers must process Iranian purchases through formal Pakistani banking channels – which U.S. sanctions, of course, make absolutely impossible.

Peyman Sanandaji, head of the Transportation Commission at the Tehran Chamber of Commerce, confirmed on the record that it is banking sanctions compliance (ditching the EIF) that halted Iranian exports into Pakistan.

The immediate shock at the formal gates was quite something: more than 4,000 tons of daily Iranian LPG imports through Gabd–Rimdan are at risk. Former Quetta Chamber of Commerce president Ayoub Miryani reported that over 2,000 containers are stranded at Gabd–Rimdan alone, with hundreds more freight trucks backed up at Taftan.

So why is this happening now? Because of the nasty convergence between the October 7 IMF tranche Pakistan had to pay, and the imperial U.S. Treasury “Operation Economic Outcast”.

Under Operation Economic Outcast, Washington gave third countries a “defined timeline to shut down” Iran-related commercial lifelines or face expulsion from the U.S. financial system. That was followed by OFAC’s October 1 designations against Iran’s overland rail and industrial networks and October 8 actions against 17 shadow-fleet tankers.

But then, on October 7 – only nine days before the Ministry of Commerce revoked the EIF waiver – Islamabad reached an agreement with the IMF on the Fourth Review of its Extended Fund Facility to unlock $1.21 billion. That still requires IMF Executive Board approval.

Of course there is no public document showing a direct U.S. or IMF order to close Iran-Pakistan borders. But sources in Islamabad stressed that leaving an open-ended banking-instrument waiver on the books ahead of the IMF Board vote had become an untenable sanctions vulnerability for Pakistan.

Islamabad sources are adamant that the move was paired with genuine counter-sabotage concerns and quietly coordinated between Islamabad and Tehran (italics mine) so the pause would not rupture bilateral ties.

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei publicly called the disruption a temporary pause due to “technical issues” and “precautionary measures”.

Pakistani official sources, for their part, insisted that the tightened controls are a joint counterterrorism measure reflecting “mutual understanding” with Tehran after a spike in Sistan-Balochistan attacks; highway ambushes; and an October 11 maritime attack on Pakistan Coast Guard boats off Jiwani – which Pakistani officials attributed to “foreign actors” seeking to sabotage Pakistan’s mediation of the Iran peace deal.

Back to the same old pattern of Salafi-jihadis weaponized and manipulated by the usual suspects.

The only publicly confirmed telephone call between Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi took place on Sunday, October 18 – two days after the October 16 memorandum – and its official readouts mention only regional diplomacy and the Baghdad OIC meeting.

So prior coordination at the Dar–Araghchi Foreign Minister level and specific sabotage arrests therefore are part of our own reporting.

Asymmetric food exports and informal routes

In a nutshell, stuff is still moving across borders. Islamabad deliberately left alive Pakistani perishables and food exports to Iran. Essential perishables – including tomatoes, potatoes, and onions – continue to move, alongside traditional oil and fuel flows across the porous 909-km border.

The regulatory record explains why: 8 months ago, Pakistan enacted a separate banking-instrument waiver specifically for 10 food exports to Iran by land (explicitly listing rice, potatoes, onions, tomatoes, meat, and fruit) plus pharmaceuticals.

Tehran’s Chamber of Commerce confirmed this past Saturday that while Iranian exports to Pakistan are stalled by the EIF rule, imports from Pakistan into Iran are continuing, and informal fuel and border trade across Balochistan already operates at an estimated $800 million to over $1 billion annually outside formal customs.

Special attention should be placed on the ports of Gwadar and Karachi, and the overall China–Iran Transit Architecture. Third-country and China-Iran transit through Pakistan, according to our sources, remains protected.

On a legal level, a document detailing Pakistan’s transit of goods established six designated overland transit corridors linking Gwadar, Karachi, and Port Qasim to Gabd and Taftan for third-country cargo bound for Iran under a bank guarantee.

And a Federal Board of Revenue’s notification this past June formally designated Taftan railway station as a Land Customs Station, with Iranian and Pakistani ministers pitching the rail corridor to link China to Iran and Europe.

However, two very complicated operational constraints remain in place.

The Quetta-Taftan rail modernization is still listed officially as a planned upgrade; and OFAC’s October 1 designation of the Islamic Republic of Iran Railway Company (RAI) was explicitly designed to choke Tehran’s shift from blockaded sea lanes to rail.

To sum it all up: it takes supreme skill to face The Empire of Piracy. Islamabad has executed a classic, calibrated maneuver: visibly revoking the formal EIF import waiver at Taftan and Gabd–Rimdan to insulate its pending $1.21 billion IMF tranche and Pakistani banks from U.S. Treasury secondary sanctions.

And all the while keeping Pakistani food exports, informal border valves, and third-country transit frameworks alive with Tehran.

Whether this remains a brief administrative reset or hardens into a longer choke point will be decided by three indicators over the next fortnight:

1. A modified EIF or barter notification from the Commerce Ministry.
2. Separate customs clearance for Gwadar/Karachi transit cargo.
3. Documented freight movements across the Taftan–Zahedan rail link.

May the lesson be imprinted on rare earths for the whole Global South to ponder: there’s no way to fight the Empire without bypassing its control of the international financial system.