In this personal essay at The New Yorker, Anna Holmes writes about growing up in Davis, California, a college town near Sacramento; the financial challenges her mixed-race family faced; and what it means to come from a family without the generational wealth that can make homeownership, and the financial security that comes with it, possible.

It’s hard to hear people who own property grumble about how little money they have. One friend who regularly moans about money has a four-bedroom home on the West Coast and a vacation house in New England. I’m unmoved by the financial lamentations of another friend, who owns a town house in New York with an apartment for a nanny or an in-law. Stuff like this makes me want to scream. Demonstrate some modicum of self-awareness! Read the fucking room! When a friend told me that her parents were going to help her buy a second home, I made a pointed remark that it must be nice to have access to that sort of capital. She conceded the point, graciously, and we moved on.

Greece’s National Meteorological Service EMY issued a weather warning on Monday, September 21, 2026. Heavy rainfalls, storms and and lightning are forecast to affect several regions in the country as of Tuesday, September 22. The weather deterioration is forecast to be of short duration, starting from the early hours of Tuesday, September 22, through the early […]

The post Greece Weather Warning: Heavy rainfalls, thunderstorms and lightning appeared first on Keep Talking Greece.

Assinala-se dia 21 de setembro, o Dia Mundial do Alzheimer, uma data que pretende reforçar a consciencialização sobre a doença de Alzheimer e outras formas de demência, combater o estigma e promover uma melhor compreensão das necessidades das pessoas que vivem com estas condições e das suas famílias. Os dados mais recentes ajudam a dimensionar […]

Na próxima terça-feira, 22 de setembro, o presidente Lula, candidato à reeleição pelo Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), participa da 81ª Assembleia Geral da Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU), em Nova York, Estados Unidos. Conforme protocolo, Lula abre a Assembleia, seguido pelo presidente norte-americano Donald Trump. A aposta é que Lula discorra sobre soberania em seu discurso e um encontro extra-oficial com Trump, em meio às negociações dos dois países sobre tarifas, também é possível. 

O tema deste ano da assembleia é “Restaurar a confiança, gerenciar a transformação: uma Organização das Nações Unidas que atenda a todas as pessoas”. Líderes dos 193 Estados-membros da ONU estarão presentes no fórum. Também nos Estados Unidos, nesta segunda-feira, 21 de setembro, Lula deve comparecer a um encontro bilateral com o prefeito democrata de Nova York, Zohran Mamdani. 

Faltando 13 dias para o primeiro turno das eleições, candidatos ao Palácio do Planalto reforçam as campanhas pelo país. Flávio Bolsonaro (PL) tem agenda nesta segunda-feira no Rio Grande do Norte, onde participa do comício no centro de Parnamirim. Em Santos, SP, no mesmo dia, Ronaldo Caiado (PSD) vai ao projeto Sabatina ACS – Eleições 2026, promovido pela Associação Comercial de Santos (ACS), às 11 horas. 

Já Renan Santos (Missão) participa de sabatina apresentada pela emissora Record nesta terça-feira, 22. Augusto Cury (Avante) estará em Porto Velho, Rondônia, nesta quinta-feira, 24, para uma carreata e adesivaço na capital. 

Caso Master

As repercussões do relatório da Polícia Federal (PF) divulgado pelo ministro do Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF) André Mendonça com as mensagens de Daniel Vorcaro chegam ao Ministério Público Federal na próxima sexta-feira, 25 de setembro. O Conselho Superior do Ministério Público Federal (CSMPF) analisará a conduta do Procurador-Geral da República, Paulo Gonet considerando o caso Master e as mensagens de Vorcaro que citam o PGR. A relatoria da apuração ficou a cargo do subprocurador-geral Francisco de Assis Sanseverino.

Em manifestação de 35 páginas enviada ao CSMPF, o PGR afirmou “em termos bastante diretos e simples” não ter “relação de amizade alguma” com Daniel Vorcaro, ou “interesse pessoal nos processos em que ele conste como parte ou investigado”. 

Gonet ainda afirmou não ter negligenciado as investigações sobre as fraudes do Banco Master, além de falar que as acusações feitas pelo Partido Novo alegando que não deveria atuar nas investigações do Banco Master são “descabidas e estapafúrdias”. 

Segundo o documento, Paulo Gonet afirma que seus dois únicos contatos com o ex-banqueiro foram durante um evento em Londres em abril de 2024. O outro momento foi em março de 2025, quando, a pedido do advogado Ciro Soares, participou de uma ligação com Vorcaro, considerada, por ele, “uma conversa breve e sem assuntos relevantes”. 

Após o ministro Edson Fachin cancelar a análise da conduta do ministro André Mendonça como relator do Caso Master e das fraudes do INSS, que ocorreria na próxima quarta-feira, 23 de setembro, o STF deve ter uma semana menos agitada. No lugar da Petição 16.704, serão realizados, na quarta,  julgamentos sobre licença-maternidade a mães adotivas, custos judiciais e sistema previdenciário de servidor público federal.

Estão na agenda da semana de 21 a 26 de setembro:

TSE

• Informações à eleitores (24/9): Tribunais Regionais Eleitorais realizam ações para esclarecer a população do que é preciso para votar;
• Teste de Integridade (24/9): Data limite para definir locais onde serão realizados os testes de integridade das urnas eletrônicas com biometria, para o primeiro turno.

STF

• Licença-maternidade para mães adotivas (ADI 7495, 23/9, 14h): Ação discute se a licença-maternidade entre mães adotivas e mães biológicas deve ser unificada, independentemente do regime do trabalho.
• Custas judiciais no Espírito Santo (ADI 7935, 23/9, 14h): Conselho Federal da Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil (OAB) entra com ação direta de inconstitucionalidade sobre os novos valores fixados das custas judiciais no Espírito Santo, alegando que custos impedem garantia de direitos fundamentais. 
• Fim da isenção do ICMS (ADI 7822, 7830, 7844 e 7848, 23/9, 14h): Ações Diretas de Inconstitucionalidade sobre o Decreto 65.255/2020 do Estado de São Paulo, que acaba com a isenção do ICMS para envio de mercadorias industrializadas às chamadas Áreas de Livre Comércio na Região Norte.  
• Escolha do regime previdenciário (RE 1050597, 23/9, 14h): Recurso extraordinário discute se o servidor público federal, que entrou pelo cargo municipal ou estadual, pode optar pelo sistema previdenciário anterior assim que a mudança para o federal. 
• Correção Monetária (RE 1141156, 23/9, 14h): Recurso avalia se atualização do dinheiro depositado na Justiça deve incluir as perdas causadas pela inflação no passado.

Agenda da semana da Pública é um serviço apresentado aos leitores, concebido com base nas informações dos portais da Câmara, Senado e STF. 

A 21 de setembro assinala-se o Dia Mundial da Pessoa com Doença de Alzheimer, data que pretende sensibilizar para uma doença degenerativa que afeta cada vez mais pessoas, em todo o mundo. Hoje é dia de refletir para um problema de saúde que não pode cair no esquecimento. Atualmente, cerca de 55 milhões de pessoas […]

Um decreto publicado no início deste ano pelo então governador de Minas Gerais e candidato à presidência, Romeu Zema (Novo), beneficiou a Cedro Mineração Mariana, empresa que faz parte do grupo Cedro, fundado por Lucas Prado Kallas. O empresário da mineração tem conexões com ministros do Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF) e com o ex-banqueiro Daniel Vorcaro, envolvidos no escândalo do Master.

O ato de Zema, publicado em de 6 de fevereiro, determinou que duas fazendas na cidade de Mariana podem ser usadas pela Cedro Mineração Mariana para atividades minerárias. O então governador cita nominalmente a empresa ao dizer que a medida é necessária “à expansão de atividades do empreendedor Cedro Mineração Mariana S.A”.

O decreto, porém, é alvo de ação na Justiça, segundo documentos obtidos pela Agência Pública, pois na área em disputa já existe alvará de pesquisa mineral em favor de outra empresa, a Rio Abaeté Minerais. Além disso, a ação judicial diz que a região “alcança ou tangencia outros 14 títulos minerários, todos submetidos ao regime federal da ANM [Agência Nacional de Mineração].”

As ligações com André Mendonça e Daniel Vorcaro

Lucas Kallas ganhou o noticiário nesta semana porque o grupo Cedro repassou, em 2024, mais de R$ 5 milhões ao instituto educacional ligado ao ministro do STF André Mendonça e contratou no início deste ano o escritório da mulher do também ministro Alexandre de Moraes. As informações foram confirmadas pela assessoria de imprensa do escritório Barci de Moraes à Pública e pelo CEO do instituto Iter à Folha.

Kallas também aparece mencionado em mensagens do grupo que atuava para proteger Vorcaro de investigações, o “A Turma”, segundo apuração do Metrópoles. Nas mensagens, Manoel Rodrigues, preso em maio por suspeita de ameaçar pessoas a mando de Vorcaro, chama Kallas de “sócio” do ex-banqueiro.

O megaempresário da mineração também tem conexões com Daniel Vorcaro. Em 2024, investimentos de Kallas e do ex-banqueiro foram para a farmacêutica Biomm, que disputa vender uma versão brasileira do Ozempic. Parte das ações da empresa estava nas mãos do Fundo Cartago ligado ao Master e que foi liquidado após a falência do banco. A Biomm admitiu, em comunicado no fim do ano passado, que o Cartago, do Master, passou a deter ações da farmacêutica em 2024, alcançando 25,9% de participação em dezembro de 2025.

Após o escalonamento das investigações sobre o Master e a rede de Vorcaro, o grupo Cedro vendeu sua participação na farmacêutica Biomm em abril deste ano. Três meses depois, Kallas também saiu da presidência do conselho de administração da Cedro Participações apesar de permanecer como acionista majoritário do grupo, que tem receita anual de R$ 2,5 bilhões. Ele anunciou sua mudança para os Estados Unidos para a expansão internacional de seus negócios depois de ter sido indiciado pela Polícia Federal por extração irregular de minério na Serra do Curral.

Antes dessas reviravoltas, no entanto, o empresário da mineração tinha bom trânsito entre autoridades e também no governo federal. Ele fez parte, por exemplo, do o chamado “Conselhão” (Conselho de Desenvolvimento Econômico Sustentável da Presidência da República) do governo Lula, e teve encontros com o presidente – que chegou a elogiá-lo publicamente em 2025.

Procurada, a Cedro disse que Lucas Kallas “não participou das negociações, não discutiu valores e não assinou o instrumento” com o Instituto Iter, do ministro Mendonça, e que o acordo foi celebrado entre duas pessoas jurídicas.

O grupo disse ainda que Kallas “jamais foi sócio de Daniel Vorcaro”, como vem sendo veiculado em algumas reportagens. “A aquisição de participações em companhias de capital aberto diretamente no mercado secundário — das quais diversos fundos e instituições, como BNDES e BDMG, também são acionistas – não configura sociedade comercial”, conclui a nota. Leia a nota na íntegra aqui.

A reportagem procurou a campanha de Zema e o governo de Minas Gerais para se posicionarem sobre o decreto que beneficiou a Cedro, mas não houve resposta. O espaço segue aberto.

Mineradora quer triplicar capacidade de produção em Minas Gerais

Uma publicidade do grupo de Kallas publicada na Folha de S.Paulo em abril afirma que a Cedro Mineração tem capacidade de produzir atualmente cerca de 7 milhões de toneladas de minério de ferro por ano, principalmente em Minas Gerais. Mas que, “sob a liderança de Kallas, a meta é ambiciosa: saltar para 12 milhões de toneladas em Nova Lima, atingir 3 milhões em Mariana e chegar a 20 milhões de toneladas anuais até 2030”. O cenário também é repetido em comunicado da própria empresa feito neste ano.

Dentro desta meta de crescimento, a ampliação da área de atuação em Mariana, respaldada por decreto de Zema, enfrenta questionamentos e sobreposições que estão sendo debatidas na Justiça.

Ação judicial com pedido de liminar ingressada pela Rio Abaeté Minerais, detentora de alvará de pesquisa mineral na região em disputa, processa a Cedro, o governo de Minas e a ANM. A advogada da empresa diz que “sem a preservação dessas áreas, o título federal [da ANM] permanece formalmente existente, mas perde utilidade prática”.

O processo destaca ainda que “é importante registrar a desproporção material do ato [de Zema]”. Isso porque, segundo o documento, a Cedro possui área de exploração estimada em 47 hectares em Mariana, “mas o decreto coloca ao seu alcance área mais de dez vezes maior, próxima de 300 hectares, sob a justificativa formal de disposição de detritos, apoio operacional ou expansão”.

A história se complica porque servidores da ANM da gerência regional de Minas Gerais emitiram, em maio, um laudo que reconheceu a necessidade técnica de acesso à área para explorar a mina, conforme demanda da Cedro. Entretanto, os servidores inseriram a ressalva de que a utilização efetiva da área dependeria de acordo amigável ou judicial com os proprietários do solo e com os titulares dos direitos minerários – o que não teria sido cumprido, segundo a Rio Abaeté.

Por conta disso, a mineradora Rio Abaeté acionou a ouvidoria da agência em Brasília pedindo investigações de dois servidores da ANM em Minas Gerais. O Ministério Público Federal também foi acionado e pediu, em junho, explicações formais à ANM, bem como apurações sobre suposta ingerência indevida do estado de Minas Gerais em direitos minerários que são da União.

O pedido de liminar foi aceito, em 9 de julho deste ano, pelo juiz de primeira instância, que estabeleceu multa de R$ 50 mil por dia em caso de descumprimento. Determinou ainda que o estado de Minas Gerais e a Cedro Mineração Mariana não tomem, nas áreas em disputa, nenhuma medida que impeça, limite ou atrapalhe o uso do alvará de pesquisa, “como entrar no terreno, instalar estruturas, desmatar, abrir acessos, registrar restrições no cartório ou limitar a circulação”. O juiz pede também que a ANM seja notificada.

A Cedro recorreu, pedindo segredo de Justiça no processo e também a suspensão da liminar. Ambos foram negados pelo juiz em 13 de agosto.

Em nota, a Cedro Participações disse que “o decreto está em consonância com o posicionamento da ANM , que também concedeu a servidão minerária na mesma área.” E que a declaração de utilidade pública pela administração estadual seguiu “estritamente todos os ritos legais, regulatórios e ambientais, fundamentada no interesse público e na relevância socioeconômica do empreendimento para a região”. O grupo acrescentou que a companhia “respeita a Justiça e cumpre toda decisão transitada em julgado.”

Após a publicação da reportagem, a Agência Nacional de Mineração disse que “não concedeu à Cedro Mineração autorização de pesquisa ou de lavra sobre essa mesma área. O ato praticado pela Agência foi a aprovação de laudo técnico destinado a possibilitar eventual acordo, amigável ou judicial, para posterior constituição de servidão minerária”. A entidade afirmou ainda que o título minerário da Rio Abaeté permanece ativo.

A mineradora Rio Abaeté não foi encontrada.

As irregularidades na Serra do Curral

Neste ano, a Polícia Federal pediu indiciamento do empresário da mineração Lucas Kallas por irregularidades na extração de minério de ferro na Serra do Curral, patrimônio histórico de Belo Horizonte, conforme revelou a Pública em abril, informação depois confirmada por outros veículos. Deflagrada em março, a Operação Parcours apura irregularidades nas atividades da Empresa de Mineração Pau Branco (Empabra), ligada a Kallas.

À época, o empresário disse que sua inclusão no inquérito era “completamente descabida”. Ele ressaltou que a operação “tem como principais fundamentos fatos relacionados aos anos de 2023-2025”, oito anos após ter encerrado sua relação com o Grupo empresarial Green Metals/Empabra.

A PF relatou que a Empabra, sob o subterfúgio de recuperação ambiental, retirou minério da área sem autorização prévia, causando impactos irreversíveis ao meio ambiente, com prejuízo estimado de R$ 832 milhões. Além disso, a empresa deixou de arrecadar cerca de R$ 11 milhões em Compensação Financeira pela Exploração Mineral (CFEM). O caso é descrito no relatório pela PF como uma “distopia ambiental”.

Além do empresário, a PF investigou dois servidores da ANM em Minas Gerais – mesma superintendência envolvida no embate sobre a expansão da Cedro em Mariana. Ambos foram exonerados do cargo.

Desde que assumiu o governo de Minas em janeiro de 2019, Romeu Zema triplicou o uso de dois instrumentos, os termos de ajustamento de conduta (TACs) e os termos de compromisso (TCs), que permitem que mineradoras flagradas operando sem licença ambiental continuem funcionando mediante acordo com o estado, em vez de serem suspensas.

Conforme revelou a Pública em abril deste ano, esses acordos favoreceram diretamente as quatro mineradoras que atuavam irregularmente na Serra do Curral: Tamisa, Empabra, Fleurs e Gute Sicht (todas com TACs ou TCs assinados entre 2020 e 2022).

Kallas admitiu ter investido em empresas que fizeram negócios com a Empabra. Já a Tamisa tinha ligações com o Banco Master de Vorcaro. A mineradora tinha entre suas acionistas a WJ Consultoria, administrada pelo cunhado de Vorcaro, Fabiano Zettel. Além disso, o Victoria Falls Fundo de Investimento, controlado pelo Banco Master, é sócio majoritário da mineradora.

Com o pai, Henrique Vorcaro, o irmão, Daniel Vorcaro, um primo, Felipe Cançado Vorcaro, e o marido, Fabiano Zettel, todos presos sob suspeita de fraude no Banco Master, Natália Vorcaro Zettel se mantém ativa no mundo dos negócios, com 54 empresas ligadas a ela, que somam mais de R$ 796 milhões. 

Deste total, 37 estão sem anotação judicial, ou seja, livres para realizar movimentações financeiras. Natália aparece como representante legal ou administradora em 33 delas, como diretora em outras 13 e como presidente em 8.

A principal atividade das empresas é a participação em outras empresas, além de holdings não financeiras, investimentos, gestão de negócios e o mercado imobiliário. Natália é casada com Fabiano Zettel em regime de separação total de bens. Além dela, seu pai, Henrique, aparece como participante em 22 das empresas. O irmão Daniel Vorcaro, ex-dono do liquidado Banco Master, não consta oficialmente das sociedades, e Fabiano é sócio em apenas uma delas.

Deste total de empresas, 35 funcionam oficialmente no mesmo endereço: uma sala comercial em Nova Lima, na região metropolitana de Belo Horizonte, em Minas Gerais. Outras sete estão registradas no mesmo andar de um prédio na capital mineira. Algumas delas aparecem como sócias de outras.

Outros empresários também aparecem como sócios ou dirigentes das empresas listadas, tais como Francisco Stehling Bisneto, Pedro Henrique Barbosa da Cruz, Fernando Alves Vieira e Thiago Assumpção Henriques. Eles já foram citados em investigações sobre irregularidades do Banco Master.

Henriques também teve seu nome levantado como possível depoente na CPI das Bets, como diretor da Viacap, uma empresa de capitalização, que faz rifas e contratou diversos influenciadores. Vieira apareceu como garantidor em negócios relacionados às Sociedades Anônimas do Futebol (SAFs).

Representação criminal no MPF

Os negócios fizeram com que a pastora se tornasse alvo de uma representação criminal à Procuradoria Regional da República em São Paulo, proposta pelo deputado federal Kiko Celeguim (PT-SP) e por seu pai, o deputado estadual paulista Maurici (PT). Os parlamentares apontam indícios de lavagem de dinheiro e de ocultação de bens na atuação empresarial de Natália, com base na movimentação financeira e nos negócios imobiliários do conjunto de empresas a ela interligadas.

O Ministério Público Federal (MPF) em São Paulo confirma que a representação foi protocolada e segue em andamento. Em resposta à solicitação da Agência Pública, a assessoria de imprensa da Procuradoria afirmou que não pode fornecer mais informações sobre a tramitação do caso, por se tratar de segredo de Justiça.

Os parlamentares apontam que as empresas realizaram uma série de operações, principalmente na área imobiliária, em São Paulo e, por isso, a investigação dos negócios pode ser conduzida pela regional paulista. Em uma apuração prévia, eles teriam identificado uma série de suspeitas de irregularidades. No total, analisaram a compra de 13 imóveis por Natália, sendo cinco em São Paulo e os demais na região metropolitana de Belo Horizonte, e de 15 imóveis da Ephesus, sendo um em São Paulo e os demais em Minas Gerais. A Ephesus Empreendimentos e Participações é uma peça importante na teia formada em torno de Natália Vorcaro. A pastora aparece como representante legal da empresa, que é, ao mesmo tempo, sócia de outras empresas do grupo e tem outras empresas ligadas à Natália como sócias.

Os parlamentares citam como exemplo quatro terrenos adquiridos em Sete Lagoas (MG), cujo valor de compra foi de R$ 2,5 milhões e que, posteriormente, alcançaram R$ 10 milhões no leilão. Eles foram negociados pela Mirante Fidalgo Empreendimentos Imobiliários, pertencente a Aroldo Rodrigues da Silva. O empresário já foi citado outras vezes no caso do Banco Master, como na utilização de terrenos superfaturados para a compra do banco por Vorcaro e também em movimentações financeiras antes da liquidação do banco, para dificultar o pagamento aos credores.

As aquisições foram realizadas pela Superávit Participações, representada por Natália, diretora da empresa. Posteriormente, a empresa passa a se chamar Athenas Participações e tem como único sócio Márcio Alexandre Saito. Ele também foi citado no caso Master como ex-administrador da Entre Investimentos, que foi liquidada pelo Banco Central.

No negócio também aparecem a Entre Investimentos e Participações como devedora fiduciária e o Banco Master como credor. A Entre é representada no negócio por Antonio Carlos Freixo Junior, conhecido como “Mineiro”, cuja delação premiada foi recentemente homologada.

Freixo é citado em outros escândalos envolvendo Daniel Vorcaro e o Banco Master, inclusive no envio de R$ 61 milhões a um fundo ligado a Eduardo Bolsonaro, para supostamente bancar o filme Dark Horse, sobre o ex-presidente Jair Bolsonaro. Foi o ministro André Mendonça quem homologou o acordo de delação premiada firmado entre Freixo e a Procuradoria-Geral da República (PGR).

Procurada, a Polícia Federal (PF) não informou à reportagem se Natália Vorcaro Zettel é investigada. Natalia também não retornou os contatos da reportagem.

O que pesa contra a família de Natália Vorcaro Zettel

I’m not a fan of improv. I’ve even walked out of a class before—being told to pretend to give birth just wasn’t for me. But its popularity was once never in doubt: people were all too willing to shell out hard‑earned cash to watch performers fumble through impromptu sketches. Nowadays, the form has lost its shine, and Dennis M. Hogan traces whether it still has a place in today’s culture. The inspired title alone means this is a read you should say “yes” to.

During the boom years of the late 2000s and 2010s, improv persuaded many people that it was not just a wacky gimmick but, as I believed, an art in itself. The rise of stars like the improv-trained Steve Carell, Tina Fey, and Amy Poehler convinced casting directors and network executives that improvisers had graduated from sideshows to being bankable talents in their own rights. Performances were packed with newbies and aficionados alike. Major theaters added classes and facilities to meet growing demand, allowing many improvisers who never made it big to eke out livings as teachers and theater staff. The gospel of improv spread to those far outside the comedy world, from self-improvement seekers hoping to level up their interpersonal abilities to corporate suits eager to take advantage of the latest team-building and soft skill-optimization fad.

This story moves chronologically through a marriage that begins to unravel—with fatal consequences. The victim is Dan Markel, the ex-husband of Wendi Adelson, but it’s the involvement of Wendi’s domineering mother, Donna, and her brother, Charlie, that leads to his tragic end. Katherine Laidlaw shows how there were far more than two people in this marriage—and far more than two lives destroyed when it fell apart.

Harvey was nominally the breadwinner, but Donna ruled the family. She had strict ideas about how her children should live, pushing them to earn advanced degrees and build prestigious careers. Rob became a doctor, and Charlie became a periodontist, eventually buying his father’s dental practice. Donna obsessed, too, about her children’s love lives, scrolling through online dating profiles and sending them lists of promising candidates. When Rob started seeing a woman who wasn’t Jewish, Donna interfered so aggressively that he eventually broke it off and briefly married someone else. (He has since married his original non-Jewish girlfriend.) At first, Donna was thrilled that her daughter was seeing Dan, then a lawyer at a boutique firm. She was less thrilled when he left to pursue academia, a path that she felt paid poorly and lacked cachet.

Problem

European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen’s offer this week of “associate membership” for Canada was received rapturously in the European Parliament. But member states, noting that the EU treaties say nothing about “associate membership”, have already tempered expectations, as has the Canadian ambassador to the EU. Make no mistake, “associate membership” does not mean that Canada will join the single market or become bound by EU directives anytime soon. The offer is currently a rhetorical gesture that, without a legal definition, risks meaning nothing at all, or becoming an expanded version of CETA, the EU-Canada trade deal in force since 2017, rather than a genuine new form of partnership.

Solution

As the United States estranges its allies, the EU has an opportunity to position itself as an alternative geopolitical anchor. New forms of association could help the EU build the capacity to act as a genuine world power. But to succeed, “associate EU membership” must be narrow but deep. Narrow in that it stops short of single market access or freedom of movement (not because it is undesirable but because it is currently unworkable); deep in that it can provide the basis for a unique alliance on security, defence and resilience—and offer a template for co-operation with other allies.

To prevent the proposal from landing dead on arrival, the commission should quickly define what associate membership means, with a timetable and clear objectives. This would also reassure candidate countries that others are not jumping the queue, and distinguish the offer from the “associate membership” Friedrich Merz, Germany’s chancellor, has pitched for Ukraine as a waiting room for accession.

To carry real weight, associate membership must address the pressures driving Canada into the EU’s arms in the first place. Security, defence and resilience are where both sides depend the most on America, where both sides face similar threats, and for which they can get public buy-in. Easy wins exist in low-friction defence-institutional steps, such as deeper Canadian participation in PESCO, the EU’s defence-cooperation scheme; an administrative arrangement with the European Defence Agency; and a role in future EU security missions.

But the boldest step would be to make Canada a full member of the EU’s defence technological and industrial base. This would bind Canada into Europe’s security architecture and give EU members access to Canadian expertise and industrial capacity for joint development and procurement. France’s protectionist zeal will be an obstacle; its EU ambassador this week pushed for tougher “Made in Europe” rules that would restrict non-EU firms’ access to defence funding. However, if Germany, the Nordics and the Baltics put their combined weight behind associate memberships, they might just bring the French on board.

Context

The war in Ukraine, America’s treatment of its allies and rising global instability have prompted EU states to explore association models that offer their neighbours and allies closer ties without watering down EU membership itself. In her State of the European Union speech, von der Leyen invited Canada to become the bloc’s first “associate member”, but the commission has yet to explain what that would mean in practice.

Source

Showcasing stories from J.B. MacKinnon, Daniel Kolitz, Daniel Shailer, Justin Neuman, and Hanif Abdurraqib.

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On Wednesday (16 September) Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney had a good day at the EU Parliament in Strasbourg. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen indicated that she would like to work with Mr Carney “on opening the door for Canada to be the first associate member of the European Union", writes Dick Roche.

Prime Minister Carney was given a standing ovation by the Parliament’s Members. While it is not clear  what ‘associate EU Membership’ means, the offer from the Commission President and the welcome by MEPs was a plus, of sorts, for Mr Carney in his battle with President Trump.

A bumpy relationship

The relationship between Prime Minister Carney and President Trump was always destined to be a bumpy one. Days before President Trump was sworn in for his second term Justin Trudeau stepped down as Prime Minister of Canada. As Trudeau was leaving office the president-elect repeated comments that he had made during the 2024 US elections about Canada becoming the 51^st US State.

On 1 February 2025, as the contest to replace Mr Trudeau as the Liberal Party leader was getting underway President Trump, announced a 25% tariff on imports from Canada, Mexico and Canada: Canadian energy exports were subject to a 10% tariff. Trump explained the tariffs were intended to address the emergency related to fentanyl trafficking and illegal immigration.

Nine days later Trump announced a blanket 25% tariff on all imported steel and aluminium to “protect US industry and national security.” This hit Canada the biggest foreign supplier of steel and aluminium into the US market badly.

The pain for Canada did not stop there, on 26^th March Trump announced his 25% tariff on all automobile imports into the US. Again, another bad hit on - most Canadian vehicle production is destined for the US market. The impact on Canadian auto producers was somewhat ameliorated by the fact that the tariff applied only to non-US content vehicle imports from Canada.

The stream of tariff announcements from the US while hurting Canada played to Mark Carney’s advantage in the race for leadership of Canada’s Liberal Party. While a "political ingénue" never having held political office or been a Member of a Member of Canada’s Parliament Mr Carney brought deep economic experience to the contest. He won almost 87% of the votes cast in the leadership election.

Mr Carney was sworn in as Prime Minister of Canada on 14^th March 2025 - seven weeks into President Trump’s second term. Six weeks after his swearing in Mark Carney was elected to the Canadian House of Commons in the General Election of 28^th April 2025.  

Placating a cranky neighbour

From the outset  Prime Minister Mark Carney invested considerable effort in improving relations with President Trump. The two leaders met in the White House on 6^th May. The meeting, reportedly, went well.

Asked at the press briefing after the meeting about Trump’s suggestions that Canada should become the 51^st US state, Carney responded humorously. He recalled that during the recent elections he had met the owners of Canada. They were not he said interested in ‘selling the property’, something that Mr Trump as a property man would understand. Smiling President Trump responded ‘never say never.’

At the G7 meeting held in Kananaskis, Alberta, in June President Trump and Mr Carney had another cordial meeting.  

The cordiality  did not last long. At the end of June the first payments on Canada’s Digital Services Tax (DST) were due to be made.  The DST legislation enacted during the Trudeau Government, hit US tech companies causing fury in the White House. Trump called the tax a "direct and blatant attack on our country" and announced all trade talks with Canada would cease immediately.

Within days Carney announced that his administration would rescind the DST and halt the collection of the tax to advance negotiations with the US.

There was another flashpoint in January when President Trump reacted to reports that Canada and China were pursuing a comprehensive free trade deal. Prime Minister Carney defused the situation by explaining the talks with China were focused on adjusting existing arrangements.

While Carney faced criticism for ‘climbing down’ on the DST issue and for being too eager to placate the White House on China, his approach got US-Canada trade talks back underway.

By August 2025 there was some optimism that a breakthrough trade talks was close.  On August 18^th President Trump announced that a tentative understanding had been reached and as a result he was prepared to push back on the late August deadline for US tariff increases. 

The talks came to an abrupt halt three days later when Carney instructed Canada’s negotiating team to return to Ottawa.

That decision came as a surprise. Walking away risked incurring the wrath of President Trump. That was a risk that the Canadian PM had clearly calibrated.

When the US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer sought to blame Canada for the breakdown Carney responded that it was the US United States that made last-minute demands which Canada considered unacceptable, including efforts to introduce provisions that would impact Canada's trade autonomy and sovereignty.

President Trump  reacted immediately to Canada’s decision.  Using  a section of the Tariff Act 1930 that had never been used previously Trump imposed 50% tariffs across US$20 billion worth of Canadian products exported to the US.  

Carney announced that Canada would hit US exports to Canada with “dollar for dollar” retaliatory measures. These would come into  effect immediately after Labour Day 7^th September –the day when the starting gun for US mid-term elections is ‘fired’ to get into full swing.

Asked at the press conference whether Canada was starting a trade war with the United States, Mr. Carney responded: “you’re at war when you get attacked—we got attacked.”

In a televised address, Carney acknowledged that the steps he was taking  would come at a cost but argued that U.S. actions had left him with little alternative. He characterized the measures being taken by the United States as an attempt to hurt and divide Canadians. That, he suggested, was a miscalculation. Rather than weakening Canada, U.S. pressure would, he said, bring Canadians closer together.  

Backing Carney

All of indications suggest that Prime Minister Carney was correct in his assessment.

The leader of the Conservative Party Canada, Pierre Poilievre who previously accused Carney of being too willing to concede to Trump, strongly supported the decision to walk away from those trade talks.

Mr Poilievre  was not alone, with one exception the Premiers of Canadian Provinces publicly supported Prime Minister Carney’s stance.

The Premier of Ontario Canada’s most populous province, Doug Ford, an open critic of the US President, encouraged PM Carney to respond to Trump “tariff for tariff, dollar for dollar.”

The Quebec Premier, Christine Fréchette, was particularly supportive  of Carney’s refusal to make concessions to Trump on Quebec’s cultural protections.

Other Premiers have encouraged Carney to “fight back,” praised “team Canada,” criticised US tariff threats as unjustified, promised “full support,” and urged that Canada not accept a ‘subordinate economic relationship’ to the US.  

The Premier of Alberta where a referendum on a range of questions including Alberta’s future within Canada is to be held on 19^th October was the lone outrider,  cautioning against celebrating retaliatory tariffs and expressed the hope that negotiations be resumed.

Public support in Canada for the position taken by Carney has been positive. Reuters referred to  the tariff dispute encouraging a ‘rally around Canada’ effect that will likely dampen support for Alberta separation from Canada.

Ten days after the Canadian negotiating team abandoned the trade talks in Washington Carney’s Liberal Party received a very tangible indication of voter support when it won three by-elections for seats in the Canadian House of Commons including a seat in Quebec that had previously been held by a Conservative Party Member.

Opinion polls since the Canadian team walked away from the negotiations also show strong support for the position taken the Carney government.  

An Ipsos poll taken on August 26-27 indicates support across party lines for Canada standing up to the US - even if it resulted in higher costs and job losses: 63% of those surveyed felt Canada was right to stand firm in the negotiations.  Just 18 per cent said Canada should have made additional sacrifices to get a deal.

An Angus Reid Institute poll taken on 22 and 23 August immediately after the talks were ended found that 76% supported the line taken by the Canadian government.

A third poll by Abacus Data one of Canada’s most cited polling firms found that 60% approved of how the Carney government had handled the dispute while  18% disapproved.

Negatives for Trump

In the US, unsurprisingly, positions on the trade war with Canada splits along party lines. Democrats overwhelmingly oppose the Trump’s position arguing that tariffs cost consumers and businesses.

On 9^th September a group of nine Democrat Senators from states with close business ties with Canada issued a joint statement attacking President Trump’s “senseless trade war” with a key trading partner, primary export market and most enduring defence partner, pointing out that the President’s actions would force Canada to “diversify away from the US and deepen trade ties with other countries including China.”

Republicans generally, but not universally, support Trump’s position, arguing that Trump’s tariff stance is ‘putting America first.’ Concerns have been flagged in the Republican ranks that the tariffs will be an issue in the November mid-terms, particularly in competitive Senate and House races.  

Senator Susan Collins of Maine, the US state most exposed to the tariff dispute with Canada, who is facing a tough re-election contest in November has labelled the tariffs on Canada ‘a mistake’ pointing out that Canadian retaliation could cost Maine up to $170 million in export losses.  The Republican governor of Vermont has also been openly critical.    

The position for President Trump is considerably less positive than that of Prime Minister Carney. The Canadian Prime Minister enjoys the public and political support that President Trump conspicuously lacks. As this week's appearance in the European Parliament demonstrated Mr Carney’s support is not confined to Canada; he has international support which, President Trump again conspicuously lacks.

At the moment there is no obvious ‘off ramp’ to facilitate  a return to the negotiating table. Politically and temperamentally it will be harder for President Trump to pull back from the position he has taken in the tariff war than it will be for Mark Carney. Mr Carney has more political support for his position, at home and internationally than President Trump. He has also  played an infinitely better game than Mr Trump. For the moment the ball is very much in Mark Carney’s court. 

Dick Roche is a former Irish Minister for European Affairs and former Minister for the Environment. 

The most recent winner of the National Magazine Award for feature writing describes his turn to payday lending apps when AI gobbled up his livelihood (aka penning promotional web content for business clients). Sharp and darkly funny, the essay chronicles yet another nail in the coffin of the American dream:

Albert founder Yinon Ravid has said that he chose his app’s name for its suggestion of the kind of “smart, unassuming friend” you might come to for financial advice, but today, when I hear the name Albert, I am far more likely to picture an overwhelming force bent on my total destruction, a figure you might spot while being burned alive in a dream—black-robed, pale, teeth bared. When I first joined the app, about eighteen months ago, Albert offered me $25.00. To acquire this loan, I was required to pay an additional fee: A $6.99 instant deposit charge plus the cost of a $19.99-per-month subscription to Albert’s Standard plan, due in one week’s time alongside the full loan repayment. (If I really wanted to make the most of my $25.00, I also had the option of Albert’s $39.99-per-month Genius plan, which, among a very small handful of other talents, can “find restaurants based on your location, or in a specific area.”) On its own, this might’ve been manageable, but, true to the CRL’s findings, Albert’s offerings alone couldn’t keep me afloat, and so I soon signed up for the rest of the payday apps, each one toting its share of instant deposit and subscription fees. (Gallingly, Dave—the only publicly traded company of the bunch, valued at $4.72 billion as of this writing—has the nerve to ask for a tip after each transaction, a move that I suspect even the flintiest strip mall grift artists would dismiss as gauche.)

Enquanto a sessão histórica para apurar a conduta do ministro Alexandre de Moraes ocorria no Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF), nesta terça-feira, 15 de setembro, a campanha do senador Flávio Bolsonaro (PL-RJ) à Presidência da República montou uma força-tarefa para tentar associar as acusações contra o magistrado ao presidente Lula (PT), candidato à reeleição. Manifestos, audiências públicas e até ameaças de obstrução do Congresso Nacional fizeram parte das ações. O fato do ex-banqueiro Daniel Vorcaro, nome central das investigações da Polícia Federal no caso Master, ter realizado pagamentos a Flávio Bolsonaro para patrocinar o filme ‘Dark Horse’, no entanto, foi ignorado. 

Na tarde de segunda-feira (14), o senador Rogério Marinho (PL-RN) se reuniu com colegas da oposição no gabinete de uma das principais aliadas, a senadora Tereza Cristina (PP-MS). No mesmo dia, os parlamentares deram uma coletiva de imprensa para reforçar apoio irrestrito às ações do ministro André Mendonça, o “terrivelmente evangélico” indicado por Jair Bolsonaro em 2021. Ele é o responsável pela quebra de sigilo das mensagens entre Daniel Vorcaro, dono do banco Master, e Alexandre de Moraes.

Na terça-feira, dia da sessão no STF, a oposição se reuniu na Comissão de Direitos Humanos (CDH) do Senado para assistir e reagir à transmissão ao vivo da TV Justiça. Os parlamentares refutaram as falas dos ministros Alexandre de Moraes, Flávio Dino e Gilmar Mendes. Eles defenderam uma votação em conjunto com o caso de André Mendonça sobre possíveis irregularidades à frente da relatoria do Caso Master. 

Nada ficou decidido na sessão porque o ministro Flávio Dino pediu vistas do processo, após bate-boca entre os ministros Gilmar Mendes e André Mendonça. Com isso, os ministros da Corte terão mais tempo para analisar o caso. Antes do encerramento, Cármen Lúcia, a única mulher integrante da Corte, manifestou voto favorável ao julgamento de Moraes de forma isolada, pediu desculpas ao povo brasileiro por não ter ajudado a resolver a crise institucional antes e ainda classificou como “espetacularização” as discussões protagonizadas pelos magistrados. 

Os milhares de reais de Vorcaro a Alexandre de Moraes e a Flávio Bolsonaro

Segundo a suspeita apresentada ao plenário do STF pelo ministro André Mendonça, Daniel Vorcaro teria enviado 52 mensagens a Moraes, incluindo questionamentos sobre iminentes operações policiais e a respeito de possíveis mandados de busca, apreensão e bloqueio de bens. Moraes também supostamente atuou na edição de um contrato de R$ 130 milhões firmado entre Daniel Vorcaro e o escritório advocatício da esposa do ministro, Viviane Barci de Moraes. O valor se aproxima dos R$ 134 milhões pedidos ao ex-banqueiro por Flávio Bolsonaro para financiar o filme Dark Horse, sobre o ex-presidente Jair Bolsonaro (PL), preso em regime domiciliar, condenado por tentativa de golpe de Estado. 

Rogério Marinho conversou com a imprensa após o encerramento da sessão no STF. Inicialmente, tentou não associar a campanha eleitoral às ações no parlamento – em recesso eleitoral, para que os senadores deem atenção às bases eleitorais nos respectivos estados. Porém, após ser confrontado por jornalistas, Marinho disse que o desgaste de Lula com o julgamento de Moraes seria uma “consequência” dos acontecimentos. Ele ainda fez referência às ações de Moraes contra os presos pela tentativa de golpe de Estado, em 8 de janeiro de 2023, para dizer, sem provas, que o ministro e o presidente Lula mantêm relação de amizade. 

O senador reforçou o discurso de Flávio Bolsonaro sobre a relação com o empresário Daniel Vorcaro, do banco Master. Segundo ele, tudo não passou de uma relação contratual privada. As investigações da PF apontam, entretanto, para uma interlocução direta entre o filho 01 de Jair Bolsonaro e o ex-banqueiro para a obtenção de um patrocínio velado, sem qualquer divulgação no filme. Além disso, o candidato ao Planalto admitiu ter visitado Vorcaro no final de 2025, após a primeira prisão de Vorcaro, que já cumpria medidas cautelares e utilizava tornozeleira eletrônica. 

Ian Parker does not hold back in painting the egos of the characters in this horse‑world scandal, clearly growing tired at times of the pomposity of Michael Barisone, a U.S. dressage trainer and former Olympian who shot his student, Lauren Kanarek, after an escalating feud. Claiming that Kanarek’s online taunts and complaints drove him insane, Barisone was eventually found not guilty, though later banned from his sport by the U.S. Center for SafeSport. Tread carefully as you enter this arena; narcissism lurks everywhere.

The first time I called him, he said, of the case, “You’re going to find it is a John Grisham novel combined with ‘Fatal Attraction’ combined with ‘Yellowstone.’ ” Barisone’s story has its evident hero, and its villain is Kanarek, his victim. In this presentation of events—a “scum of the earth” client, in his words, and a terrific guy who snapped, as anyone would have—Barisone has enjoyed near-universal support from the dressage community, and beyond. In much of the online discussion about the case, including in the forums of The Chronicle of the Horse, a long-established magazine, commenters have identified two victims, not one, and have almost always found Barisone’s victimhood the more compelling. A woman was shot, but a man was driven to shoot her, because she was annoying, and at times belligerent, in person and on social media. Kanarek has been widely scorned as a dressage interloper and as an embodiment of contemporary ills: a bullshitter, an entitled troll.

Summary

• Europe still expects Turkey to pick a side. It has refused, and a post-Erdogan government would refuse too.
• Turkey has become an embedded outsider: a middle power that builds strategic autonomy from inside the Western system—because that is where its leverage comes from.
• Ankara has now tools of its own: troops abroad, a $10bn arms industry, partners in the global south, a geography everyone needs and channels to actors Europeans cannot reach.
• Yet it still needs NATO for its security, Europe to buy its exports and fund its factories, and Western technology to power its best weapons.
• Europe should stop trying to resolve the contradiction and learn to capitalise on it. It should deepen cooperation where interests converge, tie benefits to reciprocal obligations and withhold access when Ankara acts against fundamental European interests.

At the NATO summit he hosted in Ankara this July, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish president, gifted visiting heads of state a peculiar souvenir: a Turkish-made revolver, loaded with live ammunition. Several delegations were left wondering how one declares an unregistered firearm at customs.

It was a fitting emblem: a gift no one could quite accept, from an ally no one can quite place. At the summit itself, Turkey had never looked more central to the alliance. The Ankara Summit Declaration called for “a stronger Europe in a stronger NATO”, reaffirmed Article 5 and placed European support for Ukraine at the heart of the alliance’s future. With NATO’s second-largest armed forces, an expanding defence industry and control of the Black Sea’s southern gateway, Turkey looked indispensable.

Look closer though and the picture is less tidy. This is still the NATO ally that bought Russia’s S-400 air-defence system, the EU candidate country whose membership negotiations have effectively collapsed, and the Black Sea power that arms Ukraine while maintaining extensive ties with Moscow. It is also, thanks to Erdogan’s close relationship with US president Donald Trump, an ally with unusual leverage over Washington at a time of strained transatlantic relations.

Turkey is neither drifting away from the West nor it is coming home. It has become an embedded outsider: a middle power that has learned to build strategic autonomy from inside the Western system rather than by leaving it. NATO still guarantees its security, Europe still buys its exports and funds its factories, and Western technology still powers its best weapons. But none of that buys alignment with Western preferences any more.

European policymakers have often treated this contradiction as a problem to solve. Their debate has revolved around whether Turkey can be “anchored” in the West or prevented from “drifting” towards Russia, China or the Middle East. Both approaches assume that Ankara must eventually pick a geopolitical home. It has chosen not to. Nor is this likely to change after Erdogan. A post-Erdogan government could be more democratic and predictable, but it would still be unlikely to abandon defence autonomy, regional activism or Turkey’s desire to balance among larger powers.

This paper argues that Europe should stop trying to resolve this contradiction and instead learn to capitalise on it. Turkey’s autonomy can frustrate Europeans, but it has also produced capabilities and relationships that Europe itself lacks. Its ability to maintain channels to Moscow helped it broker the Black Sea Grain Initiative and prisoner exchanges while continuing to arm Ukraine. Its military presence and political networks in Syria give it influence that few European states can match. Its growing defence industry could also make it an important partner in Europe’s rearmament.

It is true that the same autonomy sometimes works against European interests. In the eastern Mediterranean, Turkey’s assertiveness has brought it into direct conflict with EU member states Greece and Cyprus. Elsewhere, its balancing between Russia and the West has sometimes undermined European objectives.

The more useful question for Europe therefore is not whether Turkey can ever be a reliable ally, but when its autonomy serves Europe and when it cuts against it. The answer is managed interdependence: deepen cooperation where interests converge, tie the benefits of cooperation to clear and reciprocal obligations and withhold these benefits when Ankara acts against fundamental European interests. The aim is not obedience. It is to make Turkey’s autonomy pay for Europe more often than it costs.

Under Erdogan: An old instinct transformed

Turkey’s pursuit of greater foreign-policy autonomy did not start with Erdogan. Since the early republic, Turkey’s Western alignment has coexisted with suspicion of Western intentions.

The young republic pursued Westernisation after fighting a war of independence against European powers. It developed close ties with Soviet Russia after the war, but Soviet pressure later helped justify Turkey’s integration into the US-led Western bloc, culminating in NATO membership in 1952. But alliance membership did not end tensions with the West. The Cyprus crisis, the 1974 military intervention and the subsequent US arms embargo reinforced Turkey’s conviction that it could not always rely on its allies.

Erdogan inherited this impulse, but he also transformed it. Over more than two decades, his governments have expanded Turkey’s geographical ambitions and given them a neo-Ottomanist flavour at home. Turkey has become more willing to use force abroad and built the institutions needed to sustain a more autonomous foreign policy. Erdogan has also added a personal style of decision-making and an ideological vocabulary. His slogan “the world is bigger than five” calls for reform of the UN Security Council. The term “precious loneliness”, coined in 2013 by his then foreign policy adviser Ibrahim Kalim, casts Turkey’s regional isolation as the price of moral consistency.

This transformation unfolded in four broad phases:

European integration

In the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) first years in power, from 2002 to roughly the end of that decade, Erdogan and his government were celebrated in the West as reformists. They used the EU accession process to modernise the economy, pursue political reforms and curb the military’s influence over civilian politics. Ankara also expanded trade and diplomacy across its neighbourhood, presenting this activism as complementary to its Western orientation.

Closer ties with Europe accompanied an economic boom. Turkey’s GDP rose from roughly $241bn in 2002 to $775bn in 2008, while GDP per capita tripled. Foreign investment surged after accession talks opened in 2005, from about $900m in 2002-04 to nearly $12bn a year in 2005-08. EU member states accounted for roughly three-quarters of inflows by 2008.

Regional ambitions and civilisational mission

From the late 2000s through the Arab uprisings, Ankara became more ambitious in its neighbourhood. Foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s “zero problems with neighbours” doctrine reflected a growing belief that Turkey’s history, location and political model gave it a distinctive regional role. Economic growth and mediation underpinned this confidence, while construction companies, television dramas, Turkish Airlines, diplomats, religious institutions and development agencies extended the country’s soft power.

However, the Syrian civil war, Egypt’s military coup and the regional backlash against the Arab uprisings upended this strategy. Soft power gave way increasingly to hard power and regional rivalry.

“Precious loneliness”

The decisive turn came between 2015 and 2020. The collapse of the peace process with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and a failed coup attempt of July 2016 fed a sense of geopolitical isolation and a more combative foreign policy. As Turkey grew more authoritarian, with executive power consolidated in the presidency, the country launched several external military operations in Syria, Iraq and Libya, and expanded its overseas military presence across the Middle East. It also cultivated closer economic and defence ties with Russia to reduce dependence on the US and Europe, both of which were becoming increasingly concerned about Turkey’s democratic backsliding and regional activism.

Turkey’s purchase of Russia’s S-400 systems in 2017 became the clearest symbol of this rupture. It led to Turkey’s removal from the F-35 programme—the US-led fighter-jet project for which Turkish firms were supplying components—in 2019 and to American sanctions in 2020. This purchase showed that Ankara was prepared to defy its allies when it believed core security interests were at stake.

Anti-Western sentiment rose significantly during this period. Many Turks blamed the US for the failed coup attempt and for supporting Kurdish forces in Syria affiliated with the PKK. The post-coup crackdown, along with the 2017 constitutional referendum, helped create a national security state and concentrated decision-making even more in the presidency.

Military interventions in Syria and elsewhere during this period also created their own momentum. The armed forces, intelligence services, defence companies and the state bureaucracy acquired the skills and experience to sustain overseas operations, cooperate with non-state partners and convert military involvement into diplomatic leverage.

Transactional re-embedding

By the end of 2020, Ankara concluded that its assertive posture had become counterproductive—it had alienated Western allies and Middle Eastern governments alike, thereby helping create an anti-Turkey alignment across multiple fronts. Intensifying great power rivalry and the fragmentation of the West also made Turkish leaders more anxious about being left out in the cold in a tumultuous world. The recalibration was also economic: a currency crisis at the end of 2020 left Ankara in acute need of external capital—Western and Gulf alike—and de-escalation on both fronts was the price of access to it.

From 2021, Ankara therefore sought to repair ties with former regional rivals, from Saudi Arabia to Greece, and pursued a pragmatic reset with Europe and America—while preserving its autonomy.

Turkey’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine captured this shift. Ankara condemned the invasion, supplied Kyiv with drones that proved highly effective early on, refused to recognise Moscow’s annexations, and invoked Montreux’s wartime provisions to close the Straits to belligerents’ warships, which mainly constrained Russia’s Black Sea fleet. It saved its neutrality for the economic sphere, declining to join Western sanctions and casting itself as mediator, keeping Moscow close.

Donald Trump’s return to the White House created another opportunity to reboot ties with the Western system. Erdogan and Trump share a disdain for liberal Europe and a preference for flexible, transactional and personalised diplomacy. Close ties between the two presidents and their inner circles also facilitated dialogue on Gaza, Caucasus, Ukraine and Syria, with a surprising degree of alignment on many of these files.

Ankara increasingly saw its military leverage and geography as the basis for strategic autonomy—a foreign policy built on cultivating ties across rival centres of power so that no single relationship became indispensable and none foreclosed another. It sought closer defence-industrial ties with European states without abandoning its domestic production. It normalised relations with Gulf monarchies while retaining military or political networks in Libya, Syria, Palestine and Somalia. It renewed dialogue with the EU while prioritising bilateral ties with individual member states. Even as a NATO member, it flirted with membership of BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.

In August 2026, Turkey joined Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement—a trilateral mutual-defence pact dubbed in the media as a “Muslim NATO” that commits the three states to Article 5-like security guarantees. Building on a 2025 Saudi-Pakistani accord, the pact signals Turkey’s ambition to make regional security arrangements of its own, even as it remains in NATO. However, the new pact so far lacks the integrated command, joint planning and shared threat perception that would make it a functioning alliance rather than a political declaration.

The Mecca agreement aligns with Turkey’s ambition to keep a foot in several camps. Many in the country’s ruling elite see a larger role in the Middle East and on the world stage as Ankara’s natural destiny. Meanwhile, where previous US presidents saw Turkey’s regional ambitions as disruptive, the Trump administration came to view Ankara as a useful and capable regional partner.

Turkish foreign policy under Erdogan has not travelled a simple path from pro-Westernism to anti-Westernism and back again. Ankara has rebuilt its foreign policy repeatedly around the needs of the ruling far-right nationalist coalition at home and what a changing international order permits abroad. The re-embedding since 2021 is no exception: it did not reverse Turkey’s pursuit of strategic autonomy, but relocated it. Ankara now seeks that autonomy from inside Western structures, because that is where the leverage lies.

Beyond Erdogan: Different versions of autonomy

Although Erdogan’s dominance at home is a reality, in 2024, the opposition alliance led by the Republican People’s Party swept local elections, taking Istanbul, Ankara and most major cities—its best showing since 1979. The following March, Istanbul’s mayor Ekrem İmamoglu, the opposition’s presidential candidate and the man most likely to beat Erdogan, was arrested on corruption charges widely seen as politically motivated. Two decades of Erdogan rule have narrowed political space, but they have not closed it.

So what would change in foreign policy in a post-Erdogan Turkey? A successor could reset relations with the West and rebuild institutions. But a new government would not rethink the fundamentals—that Turkey must keep its freedom of action, arm itself and depend on no single power. Those assumptions no longer rest on one man’s decisions. They rest on an elite consensus, underpinned by a domestic defence industry, bases across three continents and Turkey’s own geography—and reinforced by a fragmenting international order that makes autonomy look like a necessity.

Public sentiment also seems to embrace an independent foreign policy. Turks might be split over Erdogan and domestic governance, but they largely agree on autonomy and avoiding unconditional alignment with any single outside power. Ukraine makes this point clearly. In a 2022 Kadir Has University survey, 52% of respondents wanted Turkey to remain impartial and 50.7% wanted it to mediate. Only 21.5% backed sanctioning Russia and 20.8% backed supporting it. In spring 2024 polling by Pew Research Center, a plurality of Turks (46%) said Turkey was providing the right amount of support to Ukraine.

The Iran war reveals a similar picture. A MetroPoll survey in March 2026 found that 68.1% wanted Turkey to remain neutral between Iran and the US, compared with 22.6% favouring support for Iran and 2.1% for the US and Israel. Neutrality won among the voters of every major party. This was no affection for the mullahs; rather, Turks fear a collapsing Iran would send refugees across the border, give the Kurdish insurgency new momentum, disrupt the Turkish economy and embolden Israel.

The argument at home is therefore about the methods, not autonomy itself. The opposition parties criticise the AKP-MHP government’s rhetoric and self-inflicted isolation, yet they treat maritime jurisdiction, the Aegean and Cyprus as national issues. In the 2022 Kadir Has survey, half or more of every major party’s supporters named maritime jurisdiction and the militarisation of Aegean islands among Turkey’s main problems with Greece.

A 2022 Carnegie study that interviewed opposition foreign-policy figures found the same. Most favoured repairing relations with the US and EU, restoring the foreign ministry’s authority, reducing personal diplomacy, and resolving the S-400 dispute to reopen the path to the F-35 programme. They also wanted no confrontation with Russia, no concessions on Turkey’s maritime claims, and no American weapons for Syria’s Kurds.

A post-Erdogan Turkey would therefore be a different kind of embedded outsider, not a former one. Democratisation and a return to institutional decision-making would make Turkey more predictable. But Ankara would still likely pursue diversified partnerships, its own arms industry, regional influence and the ability to say no to allies.

Turkey no longer treats the West as a complete strategic home or a reliable guarantor of its interests. Yet Russia, China, Iran and the Gulf cannot replace the security, markets, technology and institutional ties it draws from NATO, Europe and America. Turkey thus hedges from the inside. Europe cannot end that, and no Turkish government would tolerate the attempt. Its only realistic aim is to keep the hedge bending westward.

What Turkey is embedded in

Turkey today is rarely described as a European power. Yet it is still a NATO member and, technically, an EU candidate. It is also a partner for Europe and the US on critical regional issues ranging from containment of Iran to counter-terrorism and support for Ukraine.

But Turkey’s Western embeddedness goes much deeper than institutions. Its economy, private sector, defence industry and society are tightly integrated with the West, particularly Europe. These connections constrain Turkish autonomy, but they also enable it: the markets, technology, capital and security relationships Turkey draws on to project power remain disproportionately Western.

Economic embeddedness: Europe as market and regulatory ecosystem

The EU remains the centre of gravity of the Turkish economy. The customs union, in force since 1996, goes far beyond an ordinary free-trade agreement. It removed tariffs and quantitative restrictions on industrial goods and required Turkey to align with important parts of EU customs, commercial, competition, intellectual-property and technical legislation.

The numbers remain striking despite political tensions. The EU accounts for 42.7% of Turkey’s goods exports and 35.3% of its imports, with volume reaching €217.6bn in 2025. Services trade added €42.1bn in 2024.

Trade volumes understate the depth of integration. Turkish factories are embedded in European production networks, supplying the automotive, appliance, machinery, textile and electronics industries while relying on European capital goods, technology, standards and intermediate inputs. By mid-2025, Turkey reported that it had aligned 24,597 national standards with European standards, a harmonisation rate of 99.5% with the European Committee for Standardisation and the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation systems.

European capital has been equally important. Turkey received roughly $200bn in foreign-equity inflows between 2003 and 2025, with around 60% originating in the EU. The West as a whole, including the US, UK and Canada, supplies roughly 70% of Turkey’s foreign direct investment.

Ankara has tried to diversify, towards Russia, the Gulf and, above all, China. It joined the Belt and Road Initiative in 2015, applied to BRICS in 2024 and courted Chinese manufacturing, including electric vehicle manufacturer BYD, whose $1bn plant in Turkey will benefit from access to the EU market. But China has not emerged as an alternative to the EU. Chinese firms treat Turkey as high-risk and stayed out of the top 20 sources of foreign investment in 2024. Turkey runs a large trade deficit with Beijing and competes with it for influence in Africa and Central Asia, while Beijing’s treatment of its Uyghur population remains a source of tension.

No partner has been able to match Europe’s market, investment stock and dense supply chains. Ankara’s economic autonomy therefore has limits. It can diversify eastwards, but the capital, technology and markets on which much of its industry depends remain Western. That dependence is sharpened by chronic macroeconomic fragility—high inflation, a weak lira and reliance on external financing—which has repeatedly forced Ankara to seek Gulf and Western capital, setting a hard ceiling on its autonomy.

This dependence also comes with a political irritation. Through the customs union, Turkey aligns with relevant EU regulations but has no say in making them. The agreement is also outdated, excluding services, digital commerce, public procurement, agriculture and climate regulation. The European Commission proposed negotiations to modernise it in 2016, but the European Council has yet to approve a mandate.

This captures a contradiction in Turkish foreign policy. Ankara seeks privileged access to the EU economy while demanding political distance from Brussels. Yet much of its industrial power, export capacity and ability to attract investment still depends on its position at the edge of Europe.

Security embeddedness: Inside NATO’s architecture

Turkey’s security ties with the West are deep. A NATO member since 1952, Turkey has the alliance’s second-largest military after the US and critical infrastructure including the Incirlik air base, where US nuclear weapons are widely believed to be stored; the Kurecik early-warning radar system that covers the Middle East; the Allied Land Command headquarters in Izmir; and forward bases at Konya and Istanbul. Turkey and its territory are therefore woven into a NATO security architecture that stretches from the Middle East to Europe’s eastern flank.

Despite the on-and-off crises with America and a more ambivalent policy towards Russia than most European allies, Turkey’s relationship with NATO is not dormant. Not only has Ankara recently hosted the NATO summit, it has also continued to support NATO’s collective defence missions, including participating in the Baltic Air Policing in 2006 and 2021. After the summit, Turkey agreed to do so again in 2026, even as it maintains cordial relations with Moscow. And while Turkey has worked hard to reduce its military dependence on its allies, many of its high-end programmes still depend on Western engines, components, certification, financing and export access.

Yet embeddedness has not meant deference or loyalty. For example, when Sweden and Finland sought to join NATO, Ankara used its veto in the alliance as leverage—delaying ratification until it had extracted commitments on the PKK and, from the US, approval of a major F-16 sale. Turkey capitalises on its position in NATO as much as it upholds the alliance.

Social and political embeddedness: A diaspora and a stalled accession

Turkey’s political relationship with Europe is weakest precisely where its institutional ties are deepest. Ankara applied to the European Economic Community in 1959, signed the Ankara Agreement in 1963, became an EU candidate in 1999 and opened accession talks in 2005. Those negotiations have now effectively collapsed: only 16 of 35 chapters were opened and just one closed before the process froze. In 2018, the EU General Affairs Council noted that accession talks had come to a standstill, stopping short of formal suspension, but freezing the opening or closing of any new chapters. In 2025, the European Parliament reaffirmed this, on the grounds that Turkey’s strategic importance cannot offset its democratic backsliding and divergence from European norms.

Yet neither side has formally ended the process. Turkey remains a candidate, receives pre-accession funding and participates in EU programmes like Erasmus and Horizon Europe. It is also in the European Political Community and has expressed a desire to be part of a future European security architecture.

Turkey’s European embeddedness is also demographic. Since the 1960s, migration has created communities whose lives span Turkey and Europe. At the end of 2024, around two million Turkish citizens held valid residence permits in the EU, excluding naturalised citizens and second generation Turks born in Europe. Germany alone is home to about 2.6 million people of Turkish background, the country’s largest single-origin immigrant community. Belgium, Britain, France, the Netherlands and Sweden also have sizeable Turkish communities.

Turkey’s European diaspora connects Turkish cities and regions to European labour markets, schools, businesses, media and political parties. They also make Europe an arena of Turkish domestic politics: governments and opposition parties campaign among overseas voters, while disputes about nationalism, religion, Kurdish identity and democratic rights spill into European public life. Europe is therefore not just an external actor but an extension of the political debate in Ankara.

Turkey’s political estrangement from the EU can also obscure the continued attraction Europe holds for many Turks. In a spring 2025 survey commissioned by the EU delegation to Turkey, 58% said they would support EU membership in a referendum and 66% said membership would bring more advantages than disadvantages. Visa-free travel, higher living standards and employment opportunities were the most frequently cited benefits. Similarly, Pew found in 2024 that 56% supported EU membership, rising to 66% among those under 35. Polls show mixed motivations for supporting Turkey’s accession to the EU, with younger, urban and educated Turks consistently aspiring to European legal and political standards even as faith in accession has eroded.

Migration creates another form of interdependence between Turkey and Europe. Turkey hosts a large refugee population and sits on major migration routes from the Middle East and Asia into Europe. European governments have relied on Turkey as a buffer, most explicitly through the 2016 EU-Turkey migration deal. Meanwhile, Ankara has periodically used refugee flows as political leverage, but it has also come to rely on EU funds to manage migration. Neither side can manage migration sustainably without the other.

The instruments of autonomy

Turkey’s distinctive position among middle powers lies not only in its aspiration to act independently but in the tools it has built to do so. It is one of the few middle powers that treats military force as a routine instrument rather than an exception, and the only one that has turned the resulting hardware into a diplomatic currency.

Five tools carry Turkish influence abroad: an expeditionary military, a strong arms industry, a geography that charges rent, an apparatus for soft power and a habit of brokering other people’s wars. Each has widened Ankara’s room for manoeuvre, but each also reveals the limits of Turkish autonomy.

An expeditionary military

What changed under the AKP was less Turkey’s appetite for military activism abroad than how it used force. Before the Arab uprisings, Turkish deployments took place largely within NATO and UN frameworks. But over the past decade, Ankara has increasingly acted unilaterally to advance its own security interests, using forward bases, long-term deployments and partnership with local armed actors. Syria, Libya, Iraq and the Caucasus region each show a version of the method.

In Syria, four cross-border operations between 2016 and 2020 created a belt of Turkish-controlled territory in the north, governed through the Turkey-backed Syrian National Army. Ankara’s presence also helped preserve an opposition-controlled enclave in Idlib, from which Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) emerged and eventually overthrew Bashar al-Assad, in December 2024. Turkey has since become the most important external backer of Syria’s new government, signing a defence accord in August 2025 to train, equip and advise the army Damascus is rebuilding out of former rebel factions. Ankara’s leverage nonetheless has limits: it has not yet converted this partnership into permanent bases beyond the north, constrained by Israeli red lines and Damascus’s own wariness of overdependence.

Turkey has similarly intervened militarily in Libya since 2020, when it helped prevent warlord Khalifa Haftar’s forces overrunning the internationally recognised government in Tripoli. The intervention has shifted the military balance and entrenched a Turkish security presence, which Ankara subsequently converted into economic and political leverage—against the will of competitors like Cyprus, Egypt, Greece and the UAE. However, Turkey has recently repaired relations with Egypt and opened channels to actors in eastern Libya.

In Iraq, Ankara’s footprint has proved more durable, driven primarily by its campaign against the PKK. A network of forward operating bases across the north has hardened into a de-facto security belt along the border. And despite renewed efforts to resolve the Kurdish question—such as PKK founder Abdullah Ocalan’s 2025 call to disarm and the party’s subsequent dissolution—Ankara is unlikely to dismantle that presence in the near future.

Beyond those, Turkey maintains bases in northern Cyprus, facilities in Qatar, and a training base in Mogadishu. Turkey’s regional footprint today is far larger than it was two decades ago.

Defence

Turkey’s expanding defence industry provides the material foundation for this more assertive foreign policy. Once a buyer of US weapons systems, Turkey has spent the last three decades building its capacity to produce a range of high- and low-end systems, from armed drones and navy vessels to armoured vehicles, missiles, tanks and artillery shells.

Defence and aerospace exports reached $10.05bn in 2025, a dramatic hike from $248m in 2002. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute ranked Turkey the 11th-largest exporter of major arms for 2021-25, with five Turkish firms—MKE, ASELSAN, Turkish Aerospace, Baykar and Roketsan—entering its global top 100 in 2025. Many of their systems have been battle-tested in Karabakh, Libya, Syria and Ukraine. In the early phase of the Ukraine war, Baykar’s TB2 “Bayraktar” drones gained particular prominence and have since become a symbol of Turkey’s defence-industrial rise. This transformation in the defence industrial base has given Ankara capabilities and relationships in Africa, Central Asia and Europe it did not possess two decades ago.

Greater autonomy, however, is not self-sufficiency. Turkish officials boast that the domestic share of defence production has risen from about 20% in the early 2000s to roughly 80%. But that figure conceals continued dependency on imported technology in propulsion, power transmission, advanced materials and aviation components. For example, Turkey’s flagship fifth-generation fighter-jet, the KAAN, relies on imported engines, as its indigenous turbofan is still in development. Altay tanks entered production with a South Korean power pack, pending integration of the domestic BATU engine and transmission. Imported engines and export licences have also complicated both production and sales of systems such as the Firtina howitzer.

One way Turkey has sought to overcome these constraints has been by embedding itself into the European defence base. In 2025, Baykar and Italy’s Leonardo formed LBA Systems, a fifty-fifty joint venture headquartered in Italy to build unmanned systems, while Baykar outright bought Italian aerospace company Piaggio Aerospace, with its production lines inside the EU. Also in 2025, Turkish Aerospace agreed to supply Spain with Hürjet trainer jets in a €2.6bn deal, which includes substantial production in Spain. These are co-production arrangements inside European supply chains.

Turkey’s defence-industrial autonomy is therefore uneven. It is strongest where companies have accumulated design experience and domestic supply chains, and weakest where production depends on complex propulsion or externally controlled components. And while the industry’s rise has reduced the ability of any single country or supplier to block Turkish military action, its most ambitious programmes still depend on Western technology, certification, finance and markets. This captures the logic of the embedded outsider. Turkey has built greater autonomy not by leaving Western industrial networks, but by using domestic production, offset agreements and selective partnerships to improve its bargaining position within them.

Connectivity

Ankara has not created its own geography, but it has learned to monetise it. Turkey sits between Central Asia, Europe, the Middle East and Russia, astride important trade and energy routes. It is crisscrossed by several energy pipelines despite producing little energy itself. And regional disorder only makes Turkey’s location more valuable.

Azerbaijani oil and gas cross Anatolia through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and the Southern Gas Corridor. Russian gas reaches Turkey and south-eastern Europe through Blue Stream and TurkStream, while Iranian gas enters from the east. Expanding liquefied natural gas terminals give Ankara access to seaborne supplies from America, Qatar and elsewhere.

Turkey has also invested in logistics and connectivity. The Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway connects Turkey to the trans-Caspian Middle Corridor, linking Central Asia and China westwards. Ankara regards the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, which bypasses Turkey, as a geopolitical challenge. It has instead backed the $17bn Development Road, linking Iraq’s al-Faw Grand Port through Turkey to Europe. Instability in the Strait of Hormuz has given a boost to this project. This eastward reach also has an institutional home: Turkey leads the Organization of Turkic States, a bloc spanning Azerbaijan and Central Asia that hopes to turn the corridor’s unique geography and ethnic ties into standing political influence.

Soft power

Turkey’s ambitions are also supported by an extensive cultural and diplomatic network. It now operates 255 diplomatic missions, up from 163 in 2002, with the number of African embassies rising from 12 to 44 in this period.

In addition to its diplomatic corps, there is the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, the Turkish Maarif Foundation, the Presidency of Religious Affairs, the Yunus Emre Institute and the state broadcaster TRT World. All of those are active in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Turkish Airlines has also become an unusually effective instrument for connectivity and visibility. The Antalya Diplomacy Forum now serves as a flagship venue to showcase Turkey’s ambition to convene international actors, modelled after the Munich Security Conference, India’s Raisina Dialogue and Russia’s Valdai Discussion Club.

Perhaps Turkey’s most effective soft power, however, is one the state neither built nor controls. In 2024, Turkish producers exported more than 300 television dramas to over 150 countries, earning over $500m a year and reaching close to a billion viewers. They have made Turkey’s language, cities and lifestyle familiar across the Balkans, Middle East, Latin America and parts of Africa. The state has since moved to harness this success: TRT’s own historical epics carry a more explicit neo-Ottoman message abroad, while per–episode export subsidies introduced in 2026 aim to bend the commercial sector toward promoting Turkey’s image.

Meanwhile, humanitarian aid, education, religion, media, commerce and defence partnerships reinforce the conservative government’s “civilisational” narrative, placing Turkey at the centre of a wider historical and cultural world. Turkey’s overseas network promotes Palestinian rights and positions Turkey as a natural leader of Muslim nations. Erdogan’s slogan that “the world is bigger than five”, referring to the UN Security Council, captures this ambition.

Yet Turkey’s economic fragility sets a hard limit on its ambitions. Inflation peaked at 85.5% in October 2022 and, despite the return to orthodox monetary policy after the 2023 election, remained above 32% in mid-2026. A volatile lira and persistent inflation make it harder to finance reconstruction in Syria, sustain long-term influence in Africa and compete with other powers. Technological dependence, weak institutions and personalised decision-making reinforce these constraints.

Mediation

Mediation became a signature of Turkish foreign policy in the mid-2000s. Under the Davutoglu doctrine of “zero problems with neighbours”, Ankara presented itself as a country able to speak simultaneously to the West, the West’s regional adversaries and the Muslim world. Ankara facilitated indirect talks between Syria and Israel in 2008, engaged in Balkan diplomacy and, alongside Brazil, negotiated a nuclear fuel-swap with Iran in 2010. Also that year, Turkey and Finland launched a UN Friends of Mediation group.

That premise collapsed with the Arab uprisings. Ankara’s support for Syrian opposition and the Muslim Brotherhood, along with its feuds with the Arab Gulf monarchies, Egypt and Israel, made Turkey increasingly party to the region’s conflicts rather than a neutral mediator. As it expanded its regional entanglements, the nature of its mediation efforts changed. From 2017, Ankara worked with Russia and Iran through the Astana process on ceasefires and de-escalation deals in Syria even while backing the opposition on the ground. In Libya in 2020, Turkey participated in the Berlin process as a stakeholder while its troops were deployed in Tripoli. Ankara was not mediating because it stood outside these conflicts, but because it was embedded in them.

From the 2020s, Turkey’s mediation rested on a different foundation. Its leverage came from its higher international profile and its unique access to regional conflicts, such as in Gaza and Ukraine.

Since the start of the war in Ukraine, Turkey has hosted several rounds of negotiations between Russian and Ukrainian officials, facilitated prisoner exchanges and, with the UN, brokered the Black Sea grain deal in 2022. None ended the war, but the grain agreement kept a critical maritime trade route open for almost a year and demonstrated the value of Ankara’s working relationships with both Moscow and Kyiv.

In the final round of negotiations leading to the Gaza ceasefire, Turkey used its relationship with Hamas to convince the armed group to sign the US-brokered agreement with a specific clause for disarmament. Ankara provided political guarantees that helped bring Hamas to the table, but its involvement also led Israel to veto a greater Turkish role in a multinational peacekeeping force in Gaza.

Turkey’s comparative advantage in mediation therefore does not come from neutrality but access. Its willingness to maintain relationships across geopolitical divides can make Ankara frustrating for its Western allies. But it is also precisely what allows Turkey to reach actors that Europeans and Americans sometimes cannot.

What it means for Europe

For Europe, the instruments described above could be assets or liabilities, depending on where and how Turkey uses them. The three case studies that follow trace that variation. In Ukraine and Syria, autonomy generates outcomes Europe wants—grain corridors, prisoner exchanges, a check on Russian and Iranian influence—that a more compliant ally could not have delivered. In the eastern Mediterranean, the same autonomy cuts the other way, pitting Turkey directly against two member states. Together, the three cases leave Europe with a question: how to channel an autonomy it can influence but cannot switch off.

Ukraine: Pro-Kyiv, but not anti-Moscow

Ankara’s position is often summarised as “pro-Ukraine without being anti-Russia”—a formulation that frustrates European allies but has proved durable. Turkey recognises Ukraine’s territorial integrity, including Crimea, and built a substantial defence relationship with Kyiv before the full-scale invasion, selling it Bayraktar TB2 drones and agreeing joint production. It was also among the few NATO states willing to provide strategically significant military technology before February 2022.

At the same time, Ankara refused to join Western sanctions, kept extensive ties with Moscow and described Russia’s aggression in cautious language. After the invasion, it invoked the wartime provisions of the Montreux Convention, closing the Straits to belligerent warships—a move that limited escalation while also constraining NATO’s naval access.

Ankara’s access to both capitals produced results, though not a ceasefire. In 2022, Turkey brokered the Black Sea grain deal with the UN and has facilitated several prisoner exchanges. But it has also been a key conduit for trade with Russia, the flipside of its balancing act.

Ukraine shows the embedded outsider at work: Turkey supports the principles and institutions that protect its own security while reserving the right to diverge from the broader Western strategy. While this balancing is self-interested, it has at times served Ukrainian or European interests.

Syria: Access without capital

Syria offers the clearest demonstration of Turkey’s embedded-outsider role in practice. After more than a decade of cross-border operations, troop deployments, intelligence work and local patronage, Ankara entered the post-Assad period with leverage few external powers could match: close access to President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government, influence over armed groups in the north, control of border routes, a substantial military presence, and a strong hand in debates about reconstruction and refugee returns. Assad’s fall also weakened Turkey’s rivals, Iran and Russia, and opened up space for Ankara to expand its political and economic influence.

Yet Syria remains a work in progress. Turkey met its core security objective—blocking a PKK-linked autonomous zone along its border—and deepened its leverage in Damascus, but it has neither established a new order nor reaped the economic benefits of its patronage.

Syria’s battered economy is one constraint. Ankara can reopen trade routes, repair energy links and position its companies for reconstruction, but it cannot finance Syria’s recovery alone; that will depend on external capital, European and Gulf support and governance reforms.

Israel is another problem. It remains deeply suspicious of an enlarged Turkish role and has attacked sites earmarked for Turkish military installations. Turkey, in turn, views Israeli support for Syria’s Druze and Kurdish minorities as an obstacle to state consolidation. The Turkish-Israeli rivalry, sharpened since 2024 by Gaza and in the contest for Syria’s new government, increasingly structures the regional order into rival camps: Ankara’s Sunni grouping on one side and an Israel-Greece-Cyprus bloc on the other.

Syria is therefore where Turkey’s embedded-outsider status could pay off most—and where its limits show most clearly. Ankara has access, military leverage and relationships Europe cannot easily reproduce, but not the financial resources and institutional capacity to rebuild Syria on its own. Its ability to shepherd the transition depends, paradoxically, on the very Western relationships it has sought to loosen.

The eastern Mediterranean: Autonomy that backfires

The eastern Mediterranean shows the other side of bounded autonomy. Turkish hydrocarbon exploration in waters claimed by Greece and Cyprus triggered EU sanctions in 2020, and contested maritime claims between the three countries remain. This is potentially the most dangerous flashpoint in Turkey’s relations with the EU.

The dispute predates Erdogan. It is rooted in the unresolved conflict in Cyprus and competing interpretations of maritime jurisdiction in the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean. Ankara rejects Greek claims that islands close to the Anatolian coast should generate extensive maritime zones, and resists any arrangement it sees as restricting Turkey’s access to the open sea. Successive rounds of UN-led negotiations—including a 2004 referendum and the 2017 talks at Crans-Montana—have failed to produce a settlement.

These longstanding trilateral disagreements have sprawled into a regional confrontation. Offshore gas exploration around Cyprus has repeatedly stoked tensions over the past decade, while closer defence and energy ties between Cyprus, Greece and Israel have reinforced Ankara’s sense of encirclement.

Tensions peaked in 2020, when Turkish and Greek vessels came close to direct conflict. The EU subsequently imposed targeted sanctions linked to Turkish drilling activities. At that time, the German former chancellor Angela Merkel became personally involved in shuttle diplomacy between Ankara and Athens and helped avert a military confrontation. But since Merkel left office, no European leader has had the same standing with Erdogan or mounted a comparable sustained effort to address the underlying political dispute.

As long as Cyprus remains divided, Ankara is unlikely to abandon its insistence that Nicosia cannot unilaterally develop the island’s hydrocarbon resources without agreement on how Turkish Cypriots will share in them. Ankara is also unlikely to accept any Greek extension of territorial waters from six to twelve nautical miles in the Aegean—a step the Turkish parliament declared a casus belli in 1995—on grounds that it would sharply curtail its own access to the open sea. That suggests a limit to punitive conditionality by the EU. Targeted sanctions may raise the price of Turkish actions, but by themselves they are unlikely to change Ankara’s position on an issue it regards as a core national interest.

But Europe has not yet seriously tested sustained diplomacy aimed at the source of the dispute. The EU should invest political capital in a renewed Cyprus settlement process, working alongside the UN and encouraging a negotiated arrangement between the island’s two communities. It should not approach the conflict simply as a dispute between a member state and an outside power. The EU cannot easily present itself as a neutral actor when Cyprus is itself a member state, but it can provide incentives, pressure Nicosia into talks, and use diplomatic weight and the prospect of deeper Turkey-EU integration, with security guarantees for Cyprus, to support a settlement. Without progress on Cyprus, the island will remain a perennial obstacle to a more functional relationship between Turkey and Europe.

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The three case studies show the uses and limits of Turkish autonomy. In Ukraine, Ankara worked both sides without breaking with either, creating access Europe could use. In Syria, Turkish power created leverage but not the resources to consolidate it. In the eastern Mediterranean, autonomy produced confrontation, while European sanctions contained some of the immediate costs without resolving the political dispute that generated them.

A European strategy for the embedded outsider

Europe’s Turkey policy swings between two illusions: that Ankara can be brought back to the Western alignment of the 1990s, or that it is lost and can only be contained. A country this entangled with Europe yet so determined to act alone fits neither.

The alternative is managed interdependence. It begins from two facts: first, Turkish autonomy is here to stay—no future government will return to unquestioned Western alignment; second, autonomy stops well short of independence—Turkey still relies on NATO for ultimate security, Europe for markets, capital, technology and regulation, and America for advanced defence cooperation and regional deterrence.

Europe should use that dependence without trying to eliminate Turkish autonomy. It should make Western cooperation valuable enough that Ankara keeps its forces interoperable, honours common rules and avoids partnerships that damage allied security.

There are limits to this policy. Ankara is unlikely to agree to Greek or Cypriot maritime claims, but it could be open to a UN-led settlement or a deal dividing hydrocarbon resources. Europe should push for that instead of settling for the status quo, even at the cost of having to pressure Cyprus into a new framework or resumption of UN-led talks.

The reality is that European leverage on the eastern Mediterranean is limited, and punitive measures will not change the Turkish calculus. In order to build leverage, Europe first has to define a credible endgame in the conflict and try something new: positive engagement with Ankara aimed at a durable settlement to the frozen conflict. A good place to start would be a pan-Mediterranean conference, inviting Turkey, to set out the disputes and the case for diplomacy. Following that, the EU could work with the UN to push Cyprus and Turkey back to the table, either for a final settlement on Cyprus or a resource-sharing deal on hydrocarbons. 

On the broader agenda with Turkey, the EU should pursue separate, self-contained deals across defence, trade, regional security, migration and mobility. Cyprus can block some of these deals, but in the end can be persuaded by other member states to agree to a more pragmatic approach in return for security guarantees. Each deal should exchange concrete benefits for defined obligations with clear monitoring so that cooperation no longer rests on personal ties between leaders.

The return of Donald Trump somewhat complicates this strategy. Erdogan’s direct relationship with Washington can reduce the immediate cost of ignoring Brussels by giving Ankara another route into the Western system. But transatlantic uncertainty also cuts the other way. Turkey likes to hedge and understands that Trump’s America is a risky player—and that Europe is a good hedge against US volatility. As Europe assumes more responsibility for its own defence and Washington becomes less predictable, Turkey’s military capacity, geography and defence industry become more valuable to Europeans. The result is mutual leverage rather than European dependence alone. Ankara has alternatives to Brussels, but Europe also has assets—market access, industrial integration, finance and regulation—that Washington cannot replace.

Integrate Turkey into European defence

This is where Turkish and European interests overlap most obviously. Europe is rearming; Turkey has factories, a fast-growing arms industry and capabilities relevant to Europe’s eastern and southern flanks. Excluding Turkey entirely from emerging defence-industrial arrangements would be self-defeating.

Yet that is roughly what has happened. In 2025, the EU launched its most ambitious defence effort to date—ReArm Europe, including SAFE, a €150bn joint-procurement instrument. SAFE is open in principle to candidate countries such as Turkey, but deeper participation requires a separate bilateral agreement with the EU, and Turkey has yet to conclude one. Cyprus and Greece have made clear that they view such access through the prism of their own security disputes with Ankara, and this is another way unresolved conflicts in the eastern Mediterranean constrain Europe’s ability to draw Turkey more deeply into its emerging defence architecture.

Turkey should be let in. Europe should use the linkage constructively: greater Turkish access to European defence programmes should accompany sustained de-escalation with Greece and progress on Cyprus, rather than being treated either as an unconditional entitlement or as a permanent exclusion.

EU institutions and member states should pursue this at different levels. The Commission and Council should create pathways for Turkish participation in EU-level defence instruments where political and security conditions are met. Meanwhile, individual member states should expand bilateral procurement, co-production and supply-chain partnerships with Turkish firms on a project-specific basis. Access should be conditional: tied to end-use guarantees, IP protection, sanctions compliance and limits on transferring jointly developed technology to third countries. Kept modular and reversible, such projects give Ankara a stake in interoperability and give Europe access to Turkish capacity without waving away its political and security concerns.

Modernise the customs union

Economic interdependence is Europe’s strongest lever and Turkey’s main reason to stay close. Yet the existing customs union is outdated and ill-suited to a world of supply chain fragmentation, US tariffs, Chinese overcapacity, digital trade and climate regulation. It covers goods and little else—no services, no digital trade, no public procurement and almost no agriculture—besides having weak dispute mechanisms.

Modernisation of the customs union should be at the centre of the Turkey-EU relationship. An expanded agreement would deepen supply-chain integration, attract investment, support green and digital transitions, and pull Turkish regulation closer to that of the EU. And by helping the EU’s industrial competitiveness, it would strengthen its hand against both China and America.

Modernisation should proceed in stages, with access to new sectors tied to measurable compliance and stronger dispute settlement. The objective is not more trade for its own sake. It is to make the dependence run in both directions.

Build coalitions in the neighbourhood

Turkey is now central to many crises in the Middle East, and there is room for Ankara and Brussels to work together more closely. But this does not have to be a single regional bargain. A more realistic model is a portfolio of issue-based coalitions.

In Iraq, both want stronger state institutions, better energy and transport links, reduced dependence on the Strait of Hormuz and Iranian-backed militias out of the military and politics. In Lebanon, both want functioning state institutions and reconstruction while containing escalation with Israel. In Libya and Somalia, maritime security, migration, energy and political stabilisation all provide areas for cooperation.

In the South Caucasus, Europe should continue to support Turkish-Armenian normalisation, the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process and the east-west transit corridor. On Iran, Ankara’s rivalry with Tehran and diplomatic access to it are useful: both Europe and Turkey want neither an Iranian hegemon nor an Iranian collapse.

Cooperate on migration

The 2016 migration deal reduced a complicated relationship to cash for border control, punctuated by political threats. Europe treats Turkey as a wall; Turkey periodically opens a door in it to make a point. This has delivered no more than short-term containment.

A more durable framework should distribute responsibilities more evenly between Turkey and Europe. It should combine joint border management with sustained refugee protection, greater EU financial support for Turkish municipalities and host communities and expanded resettlement from Turkey to EU member states. Any large-scale return to Syria should be voluntary and depend on improvements in security, housing, documentation, ability to earn a living and protection from persecution. Achieving that will require the EU to do more than simply leave returns for Turkey to manage: it should jointly monitor conditions on the ground, while helping finance reconstruction of civilian infrastructure Syria needs to improve those conditions.

The EU should also make legal travel easier for Turkish citizens: faster visa processing for students, academics, businesspeople, and families, alongside expanded educational and professional exchanges. The point is to replace money-for-containment with better mobility, giving Turkish citizens a reason to care about Europe while reducing Ankara’s ability to weaponise migration.

Make conditionality targeted, not existential

Managed interdependence cannot ignore Turkey’s authoritarian turn. Politicised courts, jailed political opponents and hollowed-out institutions render commercial deals less reliable and foreign policy less predictable.

But Europe’s response has often produced the opposite of what it intended. Keeping Turkey at political distance has not reversed democratic backsliding. It has instead weakened constituencies invested in European integration, reduced the EU’s influence over domestic reform and recast the relationship as an increasingly transactional exchange between governments. The lesson is not to abandon conditionality, but to use it more precisely and consistently.

Europe’s experience with Viktor Orban’s Hungary offers a partial lesson. It demonstrates the value of linking material benefits to specific institutional and rule-of-law conditions, and that different policy areas can be treated separately. But Turkey is not an EU member. It has an independent, regional presence, relationships beyond Europe and no obligation to submit to European courts. The EU’s leverage therefore is much narrower.

Conditionality should therefore be specific, proportionate and tied to the area of cooperation concerned. Instead of making the broader relationship contingent on an open-ended judgment about Turkey’s political trajectory, the EU should tie access to particular benefits to transparent and measurable commitments. Serious rule-of-law violations might affect access to EU financing or progress in areas requiring high levels of regulatory and judicial trust. Coercive actions abroad might trigger restrictions on particular defence-industrial partnerships or targeted measures against the individuals and entities responsible. Measures should have clearly defined triggers and, equally importantly, a clear route to reversal when the triggering behaviour stops.

This approach also requires distinguishing between the Turkish government and Turkish society. Measures intended to constrain the government should not unnecessarily restrict students, researchers, businesses, municipalities or civil society organisations whose interaction with Europe sustains the social foundations of the relationship. Visa access, academic cooperation, municipal partnerships and civil society programmes should therefore be insulated, as far as possible, from political disputes between Ankara and European governments.

Conditionality also has limits when disputes concern interests that Ankara defines as fundamental to sovereignty or national security. In such cases, increasing the cost of Turkish behaviour may signal European resolve without producing a change in policy. Conditionality works best when it creates incentives for a negotiated adjustment, not when it becomes a substitute for diplomacy. Europe therefore needs to pair credible costs with equally credible benefits and a political route back to cooperation.

Keep the accession question open

Managed interdependence is not a substitute for democracy, nor does it require pretending that Turkish accession is imminent. It is a framework for organising relations in the space between joining and walking away. But that raises the question of what should happen to Turkey’s candidate status. Three options are on the table.

Re-opening accession negotiations is unrealistic: the talks have been at a standstill since 2018 and there is neither consensus for a fresh start nor much value in pretending membership is approaching. Formally closing the process would be worse. It would remove one of the last institutional links between the two, weaken pro-European constituencies inside Turkey and make cooperation harder without resolving a single underlying dispute.

The better course is to leave candidate status legally intact but politically dormant and build the cooperation around it. However, the relationship should not be called a “privileged partnership”. This term, floated in some European capitals in the past, remains toxic in Turkey as Ankara sees it as a demotion that in practice would close the accession door forever. The substance is more important: a deep and differentiated partnership of managed interdependence that both sides have reason to maintain, with the formal question left open.

Turkey would remain outside the EU’s political core but get closer where interests align: NATO planning, Ukraine and Black Sea security, defence production, trade, energy, migration, mobility and Syria. In return, Europe would demand greater predictability, sanctions compliance, institutional accountability and adherence to agreed rules.

Disagreement would persist over Cyprus, the eastern Mediterranean, Israel, aspects of the regional order, and Turkey’s continued relations with Russia and China. Managed interdependence is not designed to erase those differences, but to prevent them from bringing down the wider structure of cooperation.

Europe’s choice is not between restoring the Turkey of the past and accepting permanent divergence. It is between an interdependence left hostage to crises and personal bargains, or one organised around common projects, reciprocal obligations and enforceable conditions. A successful strategy would give Turkey room to act as a middle power while making Western cooperation more valuable than the alternatives.

Neither home nor away

Over the past two decades, Turkey has gone from aspiring to regional influence to building the capabilities to exercise it—military deployments, overseas bases, defence exports, economic networks and diplomatic channels. The paradox is that much of this autonomy rests on continued integration with the West. Turkish embeddedness is the platform Turkish autonomy runs on. Ankara has learned to operate in the space between alliance and independence, sufficiently autonomous to shape regional crises, yet sufficiently embedded that the West cannot easily exclude it.

There are limits to this model. Turkey might be able to disrupt arrangements it opposes, but it has been less successful at building durable regional arrangements of its own. That asymmetry is the opening for Europe. A Turkey that can obstruct but not construct needs partners for what it wants to achieve—reconstruction money in Syria, advanced technology for its defence programmes and markets for its exports. Europe has been slow to use this leverage because it keeps looking for a different kind of relationship: an ally that agrees, or an adversary it can hold at arm’s length. Turkey is neither.

Europe needs to stop waiting. It should start using the interdependence that already exists around common projects and enforceable terms. This will not eliminate the contradictions at the heart of the relationship. It will instead turn those contradictions into a framework for bargaining, making cooperation possible without requiring alignment and disagreement manageable without producing rupture.

Acknowledgments 

We are grateful to Jana Puglierin and the Re:Order team at ECFR for encouraging us to take on this project and for helping shape the original idea, and to Angela Mehrer for her coordination throughout. Thanks also to Jeremy Cliffe and the ECFR publications team for their guidance on the initial proposal and outline, and to Nastassia Zenovich whose work on the maps was essential. We would also like to thank the many officials, experts and practitioners who shared their insights with us on an off-the-record basis; their perspectives informed the argument in important ways. Finally, we are especially grateful to Taisa Sganzerla for her thoughtful and incisive editing, which sharpened both the structure and the argument of the paper. 

About the authors

Aslı Aydıntaşbaş is an associate senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) and a fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC, where she also directs the Turkey Project. Before joining the foreign policy community, Aydintasbas had a long career in journalism, including writing a Global Opinions column for the Washington Post. She has covered wars in the Middle East and lived in New York and Istanbul, holding positions at Milliyet, Cumhuriyet, and CNN Turk. She is a regular commentator on the Middle East and Turkey and her work has appeared in the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, Foreign Affairs, among others. Her recent publications include “Turkey’s search for a new Middle East order” and “Turkey’s post-American hesitation” on the impact of the Iran war. She has also recently written “Here is how one country may have solved a violent uprising” and “Trump, don’t repeat Churchill’s mistake” for the New York Times. 

Evren Balta is a professor of international relations at Özyeğin University in Istanbul. She is also academic coordinator of the TÜSİAD Global Politics Forum, co-director of the Democracy Lab at Özyeğin University, a permanent member of the North South Futures Forum and a member of the Global Scholars Network on Identity and Conflict at Harvard University’s Weatherhead Center for International Affairs. She is also affiliated with the Middle East Institute in Washington, DC. She is the author or co-author of several books, including “The American Passport in Turkey: National Citizenship in the Age of Transnationalism”, which received a Best Book Award from the American Sociological Association. She holds a PhD in political science from The Graduate Center, City University of New York, an MIA from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs and an MA in sociology from Middle East Technical University.

This paper is part of the Re:Order project and was made possible with support from Stiftung Mercator, but does not necessarily represent its view.

Source

A sessão do plenário do Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF) realizada nesta terça-feira, 15 de setembro, deixou um certo amargo no paladar dos brasileiros. O desafio de decidir se o ministro Alexandre de Moraes poderia ser investigado em função do relatório da Polícia Federal (PF) apresentado ao presidente da Corte, Edson Fachin, pelo ministro André Mendonça, mostrou-se um fracasso.

Depois de muita troca de acusações entre os colegas de corte e falas com tom alterado, a conclusão foi que as teses de defesa de Moraes não convencem a maioria dos ministros do Supremo. Isso, entretanto, não foi suficiente para dar seguimento à análise, tendo em vista que o ministro Flávio Dino, aliado de Moraes, usando uma discussão entre Mendonça e Mendes como pretexto, pediu vista do processo.

A crise do STF, que chegou ao seu ápice nessa reunião, não começou agora. Para o historiador e professor de História pela Universidade de São Paulo (FFLCH/FE-USP) Caio Rubini, o que veio à tona na Corte expõe tensões acumuladas ao longo da última década, período em que o Supremo passou a ocupar o centro de algumas das principais disputas políticas do país.

“O STF se tornou um dos grandes centros do embate político brasileiro nos últimos anos, que foi acentuado fortemente após o julgamento da tentativa de golpe de Estado de 8 de janeiro de 2023, conduzido por Alexandre de Moraes”, avalia Rubini.

Acusações, enfrentamentos e questionamentos entre integrantes do próprio tribunal reproduzem, segundo Rubini, parte da polarização que se aprofundou no Brasil. Conflitos que há anos atravessam o Legislativo e o Executivo chegaram também ao STF.

A crise, no entanto, não se resume à disputa política. A relação entre integrantes dos poderes do Estado e a elite econômica brasileira ocupa lugar central na análise do professor e ajuda, segundo ele, a compreender o atual desgaste institucional.

É também por essa perspectiva que Rubini enxerga no episódio uma questão de economia política. Interesses privados e poder econômico se misturam às disputas que chegaram ao Supremo, deslocando a discussão para além das condutas individuais de seus ministros.

“Testemunhamos um embate majoritariamente político e de economia política, pois envolve grandes nomes da economia nacional, dentro do Supremo Tribunal Federal. A sensação de ‘ideias fora do lugar’, como diria Roberto Schwarz, faz todo o sentido aqui”, explica o professor.

O próprio ambiente da Corte mudou. O enfrentamento público entre ministros e a sobreposição de argumentos jurídicos e políticos contrastam, na avaliação do historiador, com o rigor e o decoro exigidos de integrantes da mais alta instância do Judiciário brasileiro.

Há ainda um efeito que ultrapassa os limites do tribunal. O desgaste da imagem do STF pode ampliar a desconfiança da população nas instituições e reforçar a personificação da política — quando o debate público passa a se concentrar mais em determinados líderes do que nos projetos, interesses e estruturas que eles representam.

O professor salienta que “a população passa a desconfiar e desqualificar aquela que deveria ser a instituição salvaguarda da nossa democracia, que é o Supremo Tribunal Federal. Com a imagem da Corte manchada, aumenta, e muito, o perigo para a democracia brasileira”. 

Para Rubini, recuperar a credibilidade do Supremo exigirá enfrentar questões que a crise colocou em evidência. Entre elas estão os conflitos de interesses, o alcance das decisões monocráticas, as relações entre autoridades e agentes econômicos e a transparência na atuação da Corte.

Nesta entrevista, Caio Rubini fala sobre as origens da crise, analisa os embates no Supremo e discute o que o atual episódio revela sobre as relações entre poder político, poder econômico e Judiciário no Brasil.

Leia os principais trechos:

Como avalia a sessão desta terça-feira no Supremo?

Acima de adjetivações exageradas e sensacionalistas, ocorridas principalmente pela manhã, a sessão é um reflexo do que a sociedade brasileira e suas instituições vêm construindo nos últimos anos: brigas, dedos em riste, acusações de todos os lados, desvio do assunto principal. Afirmações veementes que se colocam acima da dúvida, ausência de decoro, respeito e do rigor que o cargo de ministro do STF exige.

A Corte vive um momento de ‘hemorragia interna’. Dois de seus membros — [Alexandre de] Moraes e [André] Mendonça — podem ser investigados por envolvimentos com [o ex-banqueiro do Master, Daniel] Vorcaro e seu esquema de corrupção. Hoje podemos ver a abertura de uma investigação contra Moraes, algo sem precedentes. Porém, o que vimos até agora foi uma extensão das discussões e disputas políticas que se avolumam em Brasília há, pelo menos, dez anos.

Como o STF chegou a este ponto?

Não se chega a um caso tão caótico e inédito do dia para a noite. Há um histórico importante a ser considerado. O STF se tornou um dos grandes centros do embate político brasileiro nos últimos anos, que foi acentuado fortemente após o julgamento da tentativa de golpe de Estado de 8 de janeiro de 2023, conduzido por Alexandre de Moraes. O ministro, que ali cumpria seu papel enquanto defensor das instituições, do processo eleitoral legal e do julgamento de atos criminosos cometidos por alguns dos eleitores do ex-presidente Jair Bolsonaro, se colocou no meio da polarização política, cada vez mais extrema, que estamos testemunhando.

A partir disso, o Poder Legislativo, especialmente as bancadas de direita e centro, passou a atacar o ministro em todas as oportunidades. Por outro lado, os indícios de envolvimento entre Moraes e Vorcaro são fortes e foram produzidos pela Polícia Federal, órgão que, ao menos no atual governo, possui independência para investigar quem achar necessário.

Uma Corte cada vez mais política, cada vez mais envolvida com as questões do Legislativo e do Executivo, com ministros possivelmente envolvidos com esquemas duvidosos, em meio a uma década de acirramento das tensões entre as principais forças políticas do país. [Esse quadro] só poderia gerar um espelho dessa própria sociedade: Supremo dividido, que prefere acusar a ouvir, que toma suas decisões antes do julgamento, antes de ouvir as partes, e profundamente politizado, abandonando a própria honestidade intelectual, que seria tão necessária e urgente, tanto para este julgamento quanto para outros que virão.

Inclusive, na minha visão, honestidade intelectual é um conceito que deveria voltar a ser mais trabalhado. Nosso tempo tem abandonado esse conceito, cada vez mais relegado às ciências e esquecido pela sociedade, pelos poderes e pela comunicação de massa. Mas, ele é absolutamente essencial para o funcionamento saudável de uma democracia.

Retornando ao tópico, se compararmos a atual discussão entre ministros, como a que tivemos hoje entre Moraes e Mendonça, com argumentações de ministros do passado, já aposentados, podemos ver como o tom e a forma da retórica jurídica da Corte se alteraram profundamente. O Supremo é, hoje, um reflexo das disputas políticas decorrentes da polarização que vivemos.

Faz sentido a proposta de adiamento para o dia 23?

Acredito que sim, faz total sentido do ponto de vista institucional e jurídico. Como vimos nas movimentações da sessão, vários integrantes da Corte cobraram o acesso à íntegra dos dados extraídos do celular de Daniel Vorcaro, pois ainda há muito a ser estudado e descoberto.

Falando mais especificamente, este é um caso que pode resultar em medidas drásticas para os ministros e para o STF — como mencionei, não há precedentes para o acontecido. Assim, os demais magistrados precisam verificar demoradamente se houve quebra da cadeia de custódia das provas — como alega enfaticamente a defesa de Moraes — e se as diligências determinadas por André Mendonça foram inconstitucionais, se esse apelo de Mendonça tem fundamentação factual ou se é ataque político.

A proposta de adiamento se materializou por meio do pedido de vista do ministro Flávio Dino, o que suspendeu o julgamento. No momento dessa interrupção, o plenário discutia se a análise sobre Moraes deveria ser feita em conjunto ou separada da conduta de Mendonça, com um placar parcial de 4 a 3 para manter as questões separadas. Esse adiamento se justifica na necessidade de os ministros terem mais tempo para avaliar provas e os relatórios da PF, assim como julgar tanto as questões de ordem, como foi visto hoje, quanto o mérito central da questão a ser julgada.

O que o senhor destaca de relevante nas falas dos ministros?

O grande destaque ficou por conta das falas de Alexandre de Moraes, que sustentou uma incisiva linha de defesa, tentando desqualificar a apuração tanto na forma quanto no mérito. Ele argumentou que a investigação conduzida por André Mendonça é ‘absolutamente inconstitucional e ilegal’, por ter sido determinada de ofício em relação a um par da Corte, violando o sistema acusatório.

O tom político do discurso foi constante e Moraes, além de negar o envolvimento, atribuiu todo este episódio a uma “tentativa de vingança” contra ele, por ter sido o ministro que julgou o caso dos aliados de Jair Bolsonaro na tentativa de golpe de Estado em 2023.

Ou seja, Moraes politiza seu discurso para enfatizar que a presente sessão extraordinária e sua possível investigação só existem por conta de uma suposta perseguição política, que ele alega estar sofrendo desde o julgamento sobre o caso de 8 de janeiro de 2023. Neste ponto, fica cada vez mais difícil discernir onde começa e onde acaba o poder de uma instituição, pois elas se assemelham cada vez mais.

Na sua avaliação, o que levou a esta crise: a proximidade dos ministros com a elite econômica do Brasil — eventos, viagens, palestras — ou o compromisso político deles com os “padrinhos” que os colocaram no cargo?

Acredito que não é tanto uma relação de apadrinhamento entre políticos e juristas. Afinal, foi Michel Temer que colocou Alexandre de Moraes lá, e sob protestos de setores da esquerda e centro-esquerda.

Avalio que essa relação entre membros do Judiciário, Legislativo e Executivo com a elite econômica, ou melhor, com a burguesia brasileira, é a grande responsável pela crise dos três poderes, que não é de hoje. A independência de cada um dos três poderes é base de qualquer sociedade que pretenda se dividir dentro do molde pensado por Montesquieu [filósofo francês do séc. XVII] e adaptado às necessidades modernas.

Uma dessas adaptações parece ter sido esquecida: os poderes institucionais devem ser independentes, mas harmônicos. E essa harmonia não existe mais. E quem provocou essa desarmonia crescente foi a relação cada vez mais intrínseca entre a elite econômica e os poderes do Estado.

Ora, isso não é nada novo para a História. Poderia trazer vários exemplos de como essa relação é prejudicial para os interesses da sociedade como um todo. Entretanto, testemunhar isso ao vivo é diferente de apenas ler nos livros de história.

A política, o Supremo, a elite financeira e seus interesses privados colidiram dentro da Corte. Hoje [15 de setembro] testemunhamos um embate majoritariamente político e de economia política, pois envolve grandes nomes da economia nacional, dentro do Supremo Tribunal Federal. A sensação de “ideias fora do lugar”, como diria Roberto Schwarz, faz todo o sentido aqui.

Já dá para traçar algumas linhas gerais do que precisará ser analisado e corrigido para que a Corte recupere sua reputação institucional?

O STF precisará estabelecer balizas muito mais rígidas sobre conflito de interesses. Essa relação entre grandes nomes da política, da economia e do Supremo não pode ser tolerada, se o objetivo for criar uma relação independente, harmoniosa e de progresso real para nossas instituições.

Debates acerca do financiamento privado de campanha ou da relação entre empresas de parentes — de deputados, ministros, governadores etc. — com nomes como Vorcaro e outros da burguesia nacional acabam distorcendo a própria democracia e seus valores pétreos.

Assim, a população passa a desconfiar e desqualificar aquela que deveria ser a instituição salvaguarda da nossa democracia, que é o Supremo Tribunal Federal. Com a imagem da Corte manchada, aumenta, e muito, o perigo para a democracia brasileira. Se não é possível confiar nas instituições, nem nos ministros do STF, é possível que a população intensifique o processo de personificação da política, acreditando que tudo se resume a uma única figura — como a do presidente da República e do candidato de oposição —, como se essa figura estivesse isolada do todo.

O conteúdo é apagado em prol de uma forma superficial de debate. E hoje o STF protagonizou exatamente esse processo. Há muito trabalho a ser feito para reestruturar as instituições e recuperar a reputação do STF, mas vejo como algo a ser feito como um todo. Não apenas no Supremo, mas nos outros poderes, na comunicação social, na internet, na militância dos partidos, no discurso político. Essa reforma precisa ser feita na totalidade.

Questões como a definição de mandato para os ministros, a regulamentação mais rígida do que é cabível de decisão monocrática e outras estão sendo aventadas como importantes para a transparência do Supremo. O senhor concorda? Teria outras propostas?

Concordo. Há pelo menos dez anos vivemos de crise em crise, lembrando desde o golpe institucional — ou impeachment, se preferir — da presidenta Dilma Rousseff. Desde o caso de 8 de janeiro, a crise fez do Judiciário sua morada, sem deixar de aparecer semanalmente no Legislativo e no Executivo.

Mas, no que tange ao STF, a atual crise provou que decisões monocráticas podem ser usadas como armas políticas em disputas internas, esvaziando seu conteúdo jurídico, como seria o mérito do Supremo. Regulamentar e restringir o que um único ministro pode fazer sem o aval do plenário é uma reforma interessante para controlar os desmandos que testemunhamos.

A definição de mandatos com prazo fixo também é uma possibilidade, pois oxigena a Corte e impede o desgaste natural do acúmulo de poder por décadas. Porém, corre o risco de a Corte ser ainda mais usada politicamente: com mandatos mais curtos de ministros, seria mais fácil modificar os membros conforme o governo vigente.

Portanto, ao tentar impedir um acúmulo de poder e prestígio de ministros que permanecem no poder por décadas, como temos hoje, poderíamos cair numa variedade abundante de membros, mas que seriam colocados por motivos puramente políticos, alçados ao cargo de ministro para defenderem seus próprios lados políticos e de quem os colocou no poder.

Destacaria a necessidade de regras inegociáveis de impedimento automático em casos envolvendo, direta ou indiretamente, escritórios de parentes até terceiro grau.

Por fim, a transparência precisa ser real: cobertura massiva da imprensa, sem impedimentos; a possibilidade de a PF investigar qualquer ministro, político ou membro da elite financeira sem constrangimentos, ameaças ou demissões sumárias — como o ministro André Mendonça, que determinou erroneamente o afastamento do diretor-geral da PF, Andrei Rodrigues, que foi logo restaurado ao cargo pelo ministro Flávio Dino.

Além disso, é urgente exigir mais transparência dos três poderes em relação à população brasileira, que fica à mercê dos nomes citados, sem muitas vezes nem entender o papel de cada um dentro de uma República. Presa cada vez mais a uma política personificada, voltada ao culto de um nome ou outro, sem que a real função da política seja transposta e estruturada, o que continua a ameaçar nossa jovem — e ainda frágil — democracia.

A sessão histórica do Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF), marcada para analisar as mensagens trocadas entre o ministro Alexandre de Moraes e o ex-banqueiro Daniel Vorcaro, dono do Master, estava marcada para começar às 10h. Já passava das 16h20 desta terça-feira, 15 de setembro, e a reunião ainda não tinha alcançado a discussão do mérito da pauta – nenhum dos nove integrantes da mais alta Corte do país havia se manifestado sobre a abertura de uma investigação sobre a conduta de Moraes, exposta por outro magistrado do grupo, ministro André Mendonça. O debate, naquele momento, envolvia uma Questão de Ordem apresentada pelo decano Gilmar Mendes, que tentou suspender a reunião extraordinária e marcá-la para o próximo dia 23.

Duas horas depois, a sessão foi finalizada, e o mérito continuou sem análise. Ao longo de todo o dia, os ministros deliberaram apenas se Moraes deveria ter seu julgamento conjunto com o de Mendonça. No turbilhão da crise que assolou o Supremo desde o dia 2 de setembro, Moraes havia pedido ao presidente do Corte, Edson Fachin, a inclusão de Mendonça no inquérito das Fake News. A decisão foi baseada em relatórios de inteligência fornecidos pela Polícia Federal (PF), em que a corporação aponta um desequilíbrio na condução de André Mendonça no caso Master contra políticos, com indícios de “enviesamento”.

Prevaleceu no plenário, por quatro votos a três, a recusa à Questão de Ordem apresentada por Gilmar, de unir os dois casos. Foram favoráveis os ministros Gilmar Mendes, Alexandre de Moraes, Cristiano Zanin e Flávio Dino. Enquanto Fachin, André Mendonça e Luiz Fux e Cármen Lúcia foram contrários à união das duas análises. Houve, porém, o pedido de vista do ministro Flávio Dino. Isso significa que a sessão será interrompida por até 90 dias para que ele possa analisar melhor o caso e posteriormente devolver aos magistrados.

Única mulher a integrar a Corte, Cármen Lúcia só tomou a palavra às 17h56, após mais de sete horas do início do julgamento, em que permaneceu em silêncio, diferentemente de seus pares do gênero masculino. Em sua fala, ela declarou estar “profundamente consternada e triste” com a crise institucional do STF. Apontou, ainda, que a Corte provocou “intranquilidade” no país, que está a menos de 20 dias do primeiro turno das eleições presidenciais. Em seguida, pediu “desculpa” ao “povo brasileiro”. “Eu peço desculpa ao povo brasileiro por talvez ter esperado de mim uma postura diferente. Mas acho que todos nós aqui queríamos a mesma coisa, que era tentar resolver, e as questões não foram resolvidas e foram crescendo demais”, afirmou.

A ministra ainda criticou o que chamou de “espetacularização” dos julgamentos do STF. “Nós não garantimos o rigor e seriedade que deveríamos. Peço desculpas aos colegas e ao povo por não ter conseguido resolver essas questões de melhor modo. Houve uma espetacularização desses casos, dessa sessão, que não faz mal apenas ao Supremo, mas ao país. O país espera uma tranquilidade do Supremo que não conseguimos dar.”

A declaração da ministra ocorreu após uma série de embates entre os ministros durante a reunião desta terça-feira. O primeiro deles foi protagonizado pelo ministro Flávio Dino e o próprio presidente da Corte, Edson Fachin, que abriu a sessão centralizando em seu discurso a necessidade de preservar “sensatez, decoro e serenidade”. Ainda na primeira hora, porém, o equilíbrio entre os magistrados pareceu se desfazer. Dino pediu um aparte a Toffoli, que também esteve no epicentro do inquérito do Master, mas teve seu caso arquivado após uma reunião a portas fechadas entre os ministros.

Interrompendo Dino, Fachin respondeu que a palavra deveria ser sempre solicitada à presidência. Último ministro a compor a Corte, Dino retrucou que seguiria o regimento interno do Supremo, que, segundo ele, tem o aparte “dirigido ao relator”. A troca de farpas continuou, com direito a citação por Dino dos filósofos Thomas Hobbes e Aristóteles, além do cantor e compositor Chico César.

Antes mesmo do início da sessão, o ministro encaminhou um requerimento ao decano Gilmar Mendes, para que ele, na sua condição de substituto legal do Presidente e do Vice-presidente da Corte, restabelecesse o cumprimento da Constituição Federal, da lei e do Regimento Interno do STF. De acordo com Dino, há irregularidades na condução do processo por Fachin, que teria avocado para si, sem base legal, as petições que, para Dino, deveriam ter passado por redistribuição de relator.

A crítica ao presidente da Corte continuou ao longo do julgamento. “Temos uma situação complexa, tão complexa, que a pauta que nós recebemos traz como relator o ministro André Mendonça. Não houve redistribuição. Não houve publicação de pauta com a redistribuição feita. Quero dizer, presidente, teria que ser ele. Esse é o meu ponto. Vossa Excelência avocou cinco processos. Um meu, três do André [Mendonça] e um do Alexandre [de Moraes]”, afirmou Dino. Ainda segundo o ministro, ao aceitar a suposta avocatória de Fachin, a Corte estaria “abrindo uma avenida de autoritarismo, de despotismo, de tirania, nos tribunais”.

Ao pedir vista, no fim da sessão, o ministro Flávio Dino subiu o tom contra Fachin novamente. “Nós estamos em termos que degradam a imagem deste tribunal. Vossa Excelência está assistindo isso há horas e está transformando o Supremo, nas próximas semanas, quiçá meses, neste debate. Se Vossa Excelência vai assistir a isto, eu não vou”, concluiu.

Impedidos

No início da sessão, o ministro Kassio Nunes Marques, também presidente do Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE), se declarou impedido de julgar naquela situação porque, segundo ele, o TSE mantém uma “equidistância” do caso Master. Marques, no entanto, aproveitou a oportunidade de fala para citar indiretamente a conversa extraída do celular de Daniel Vorcaro, que mostraria que o advogado Kevin Marques, filho do ministro, teria recebido o valor de R$ 500 mil do ex-banqueiro. “Nunca prestou nenhum serviço”, afirmou o ministro sobre o filho durante seu pronunciamento. 

Na sequência, Dias Toffoli também tomou a palavra e, “para manter a coerência”, já que desde que saiu da relatoria do caso Master, de forma voluntária — ressaltou —, não tem votado em assuntos referentes a esse inquérito. Diferente de Nunes Marques, que se retirou do plenário, Toffoli declarou que, mesmo sem votar, seguiria na sessão e se manifestaria, caso sentisse necessidade. O ministro já esteve no epicentro de acusações de envolvimento com Daniel Vorcaro quando foi relator do inquérito. Na época, declarou suspeição por motivo de foro íntimo e desde então não participa de julgamentos relacionados ao banco Master. Entre as suspeitas que recaem sobre Tóffoli estão negócios imobiliários e aportes financeiros ligados ao Master.

Como ministros votaram na questão de ordem

Flávio Dino votou para que Alexandre de Moraes e André Mendonça fossem julgados juntos no dia 23. Ele falou num “combate seletivo” à corrupção no Brasil e apontou a existência de um “inquérito” contra Alexandre de Moraes e uma “inadequação procedimental” na apreciação do caso. Luiz Fux, por sua vez, rebateu: “nós temos uma apuração, isso não é inquérito”.

Fachin foi questionado por Dino sobre os motivos pelos quais o ministro Alexandre de Moraes estava sendo julgado de forma isolada. “Por que Elon Musk não gostou, porque Trump não gostou, porque os autores do homicídio de Marielle não gostaram?”, indagou.

Já o ministro Cristiano Zanin fez uma defesa mais curta e também acompanhou a proposta de Gilmar Mendes para votar o caso de Alexandre de Moraes e André Mendonça em conjunto. O presidente Fachin argumentou sobre o posicionamento de Zanin, afirmando que não houve diferença no tratamento dos casos em relação às datas dos julgamentos.

Como previsto, André Mendonça acompanhou Edson Fachin para julgar Alexandre de Moraes na sessão à parte da sua. Ele ainda refutou a acusação de que estaria atuando com parcialidade sobre a seletividade de nomes nas investigações da PF. “Entendo não haver as mesmas bases fáticas, como foram referidas. O que há em relação a mim é um suposto relatório de inteligência que a própria imprensa encara como fake. (…) são situações jurídicas totalmente distintas”.

Em 2 de setembro deste ano, Mendonça confirmou ter se encontrado com Daniel Vorcaro em março de 2025. Entretanto, o magistrado disse não ter conversado em momento algum sobre o banco Master com o ex-banqueiro, mas sim a respeito do pagamento de precatórios decorrentes de prejuízos de uma usina do setor sucroalcooleiro.

Em manifestação no momento da defesa do voto de André Mendonça, Alexandre de Moraes disse ser vítima de um “dossiê criminoso” montado contra ele para ser vazado à imprensa. Moraes ainda acusou Mendonça de realizar uma “investigação de ofício”. Em contrapartida, André Mendonça negou qualquer “juízo de valor” enquanto relator do caso Master e afirmou ter seguido os precedentes constitucionais do STF. “Ninguém foi buscar informação, nós temos os autos e os documentos”.

Mesmo após Flávio Dino pedir vistas, a ministra Carmen Lúcia manifestou voto no sentido de manter os casos de Moraes e de Mendonça separados. Ela também rebateu as declarações de Flávio Dino sobre uma possível pressão externa para influenciar nas condutas no STF. “Não é por pressão de fora ou de dentro, é porque é a nossa compreensão de que é o nosso dever”, declarou a ministra, que lamentou, mais uma vez, a situação que estava sendo analisada. “Essa é uma sessão que não é das páginas mais festivas [da Corte] de jeito nenhum, longe disso”.

A crise no STF

O estopim da crise no STF ocorreu após o então relator do caso Master, ministro André Mendonça, retirar o sigilo de conversas que envolveriam Daniel Vorcaro e o ministro Alexandre de Moraes. Mensagens de celular obtidas pela Polícia Federal mostram que o empresário teria enviado 52 mensagens ao magistrado, incluindo questionamentos sobre iminentes operações policiais e pedidos de informações sobre possíveis mandados de busca e apreensão e bloqueio de bens.

Moraes também atuou na edição de um contrato de R$ 130 milhões firmado entre Vorcaro e o escritório advocatício da esposa do ministro, Viviane Barci de Moraes. Após a revelação do acordo, o escritório Barci de Moraes divulgou uma nota alegando ter consultado o próprio ministro sobre a existência de impedimentos legais para a contratação, mas que nenhuma irregularidade teria sido identificada.

Uma possível seletividade intencional de André Mendonça na escolha dos documentos que teriam a quebra de sigilo divulgada deixou ainda mais à mostra a divisão interna no Supremo. Ao lado de Moraes: Flávio Dino, Gilmar Mendes e Cristiano Zanin. Um outro aliado é o ministro Dias Toffoli, que contou com o apoio dos ministros quando foi o alvo das suspeitas como relator do caso Master.

Campanha de Flávio aproveita julgamento de Moraes

Numa ação atípica para o período de campanha eleitoral, parlamentares da oposição se reuniram no Congresso Nacional para declarar apoio irrestrito às ações de André Mendonça e pedir o afastamento de Alexandre de Moraes do cargo ocupado no STF. À frente do grupo no parlamento, o senador Rogério Marinho (PL-RN), coordenador da campanha do também senador Flávio Bolsonaro (PL) à Presidência da República. 

O senador Carlos Viana (PSD-MG), que abriu uma frente de ataque contra o presidente do Congresso, Davi Alcolumbre (União-AP), chegou a afirmar que a oposição iria obstruir os trabalhos no parlamento caso Alexandre de Moraes não fosse afastado no julgamento do STF e nem fosse aberto um processo de impeachment contra o ministro no Senado – medida que depende do aval de Alcolumbre.

A young mother on the island of Crete confessed to judicial authorities on Tuesday that she had beaten her newborn baby. The 17-day-old infant is in critical condition and is struggling for its life with heave head injuries in the ICU of the Neonatal ICU in Heraklion. The 18-year-old mother apologized for beating her newborn […]

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