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The U.S. Navy has given us the first look at Blackbeard hypersonic strike missiles under the wings of F/A-18E/F Super Hornets during actual flight testing. The Navy is hoping to have Blackbeard in at least limited service no later than 2028, giving its carrier air wings an all-new fast-flying standoff weapon, particularly for engaging enemy ships. The missile is also being designed to be relatively cheap and quick to manufacture.

The Navy’s Office of the Portfolio Acquisition Executive for Aviation (PAE-A) has released a video montage of Blackbeard undergoing flight testing, seen in the social media post below. The service confirmed that it had at least begun test-loading the missiles onto F/A-18E/F Super Hornets in a presentation at the Tailhook Association’s annual convention last month. Now we know the program has moved ahead substantially from that point.

Coming soon to a theater near you…BLACKBEARD!@USPACOM @CENTCOM @PAEAviation pic.twitter.com/KgBtIqdf8I

— NAVAIR (@NAVAIRNews) September 25, 2026

The company behind Blackbeard, defense start-up Castelion, has received several multi-million-dollar contracts from the Navy just this year explicitly to support integration of the weapon onto the Super Hornet, as well as otherwise accelerating its development. In its daily contracting on September 14, the Pentagon announced the Navy had struck yet another deal with Castelion, valued at $43.65 million, “for the manufacturing, assembly, testing, and delivery of the first production lot of 444 All-Up Rounds (AURs), defined as fully functional tactical missiles packaged within specialized shipping and storage containers.”

In terms of what we know today about Blackbeard’s design and capabilities, as we have previously written:

“A profile photo [seen below] at the company’s headquarters reveals a weapon with a ballistic missile-like booster, on top of which is mounted what could be an unpowered hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV). A booster brings an HGV to the desired velocity and altitude before releasing it toward its target. The concept is in contrast to air-breathing cruise missiles capable of traveling at hypersonic speeds. Hypersonic speed is generally defined as anything above Mach 5, which larger ballistic missiles also reach in the course of their flights. More precise performance figures for Blackbeard are lacking, but Castelion has previously hinted it could hit targets out to just under 500 miles. Alternatively, the second stage may also have its own motor, allowing it to continue accelerating or sustain high-speed flight. A similar arrangement has been suggested as the propulsion system for the Russian Zircon missile.”

“Both stages of the weapon have cruciform fins, while the upper one features a prominent ‘chine’ line along the length of its body, and a slightly beaklike nose. The trolley on which the weapon is mounted provides some idea of its overall size. The blue stripes seen on each stage normally signify that a munition is an inert, non-explosive round utilized for training or tracking purposes. This would indicate a real (unarmed) missile rather than a dummy or mockup.”

A picture shown at Tailhook had also offered a new look at the front of the missile, exposing what looked to be an aperture on one side of the design’s wedge-shaped nose. As we wrote after that image emerged:

“The apparent apertures are also seen pointed up, but many air-launched munitions do flip down after release.”

“How exactly Blackbeard is guided remains unknown, but a downward-angled aperture at the nose end for a seeker system would make sense for this weapon, which the Navy is pursuing primarily as a new way to target enemy ships. In particular, a wide array of existing anti-ship and land attack missiles, as well as certain anti-air types, have variously shaped apertures in their noses for imaging infrared seekers. Imaging infrared has the benefit of being immune to radio frequency electronic warfare jamming. In addition, it is a passive capability that does not send out signals that can give an opponent advance notice of an incoming attack. Blackbeard’s full guidance package very likely also includes some means of navigating to a target area first, and it could have multiple modes of operation.”

MACE is Project Alpha https://t.co/YatJzd7NDR https://t.co/EjrgMhEdsB pic.twitter.com/IOzpmwsTJ2

— 笑脸男人 (@lfx160219) August 26, 2026

The new flight testing footage released today also underscores the relatively small size of Blackbeard overall. While the Super Hornet is set to be the first operational launch platform, it is very likely to be integrated on other aircraft quickly thereafter. The Navy is acquiring Blackbeard under a program called the Multi-mission Affordable Capacity Effector (MACE).

Requirements for MACE that the Navy put out previously explicitly called for a design compact enough for carrier-based F-35C (and land-based F-35A) Joint Strike Fighters to carry four of them internally. Whether that remains a goal in any way is unclear. Still, being able to carry some number of Blackbeards internally would not only give those jets a hypersonic strike weapon, but one that they could carry in the most stealthy configuration. The Navy also notably does operate the F-35A outside of the test and evaluation community, which might point to air-launched Blackbeards entering service elsewhere in the future. As an aside, the U.S. Army is pursuing a ground-launched version of this missile, as well.

Another critical aspect of Blackbeard is the emphasis on lower cost and the ability to produce the missiles readily at scale. The conflict with Iran has fully driven home long-standing concerns about the depth of U.S. stockpiles of various critical munitions, as well as its ability to replenish them quickly. Blackbeard reflects a larger push across America’s armed forces to add more cost-effective weapons that can be acquired on faster timetables to their arsenals. Bringing in new, smaller companies like Castelion to develop and build these munitions has also been a major point of focus. To put this all in immediate context, in May, the Pentagon announced a framework agreement to buy 12,000 Blackbeards over the next five years.

As mentioned, the Navy’s stated goal now is to reach an early operational capability with Blackbeard by 2028, if not sooner. What the exact fielding plan for those missiles might be is unclear. PAE-A did write “Coming soon to a theater near you” in its post on X containing the video montage, and tagged the official accounts for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). CENTCOM oversees U.S. military activities in and around the Middle East, including ongoing operations against Iran. U.S. military officials have also long touted hypersonic weapons, in general, as key to success in any future conflict in the Pacific, especially a high-end fight against China.

It’s also worth noting here that U.S. military hypersonic missile programs across the services have faced repeated setbacks and delays over the years. This, in turn, has prompted discussion about a worrisome gap emerging in this arena between the United States and its chief global competitors, especially China. It is very possible now that Blackbeard could be the first operational air-launched type in American inventory, depending on how the U.S. Air Force does or does not proceed with its Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM) program. The Air Force has said previously that it is aiming for HACM to be operational, at least on a limited level, before the end of Fiscal Year 2027, which begins next month.

If nothing else, we have clear evidence that the air-launched version of Blackbeard is now deep in flight testing for the U.S. Navy.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post Blackbeard Hypersonic Missile Seen Flying On F/A-18 Super Hornet For The First Time appeared first on TWZ.

NATO member Latvia is moving toward acquiring Anduril Industries’ Barracuda family of long-range strike missiles, with Latvian President Edgars Rinkēvičs highlighting the effort during a visit to the U.S. defense technology company and a series of new defense-industry cooperation agreements involving Latvia. If the acquisition goes through, Latvia would be the first of the Baltic states to field a strike weapon in this category.

“It was great to visit Anduril to meet with Palmer Luckey and to witness signing of memoranda of cooperation with MOD of Latvia and Origin Robotics,” Rinkēvičs said in a post on X. “Looking forward to complete acquisition of Barracuda long-range missiles and [Latvian-U.S.] defense industry cooperation.”

It was great to visit @anduriltech to meet with @PalmerLuckey and to witness signing of memoranda of cooperation with MOD of Latvia and @OriginRobotics. Looking forward to complete acquisition of Baracuda longe range missiles and defense industry cooperation pic.twitter.com/JafnNy5RAe

— Edgars Rinkēvičs (@edgarsrinkevics) September 25, 2026

The statement does not specify the precise Barracuda variant involved, the number of missiles Latvia intends to acquire, the expected delivery schedule, or the value of the prospective purchase. We have reached out to Anduril for more details.

A likely candidate weapon is the Barracuda-500M, one member of Anduril’s family of autonomous, jet-powered cruise missiles, alongside the Barracuda-100M and -250M variants. Official descriptions put its range at more than 500 nautical miles, with a stated speed range of approximately 190 to 500 knots. The missile can be air-launched, for which it has received the official U.S. military designation AGM-189A. But with only a handful of utility biplanes and helicopters in its inventory, Latvia would acquire the surface-launched version, designated SLB-500M.

The announcement points to a potentially significant expansion of Latvia’s precision-strike capabilities as NATO’s eastern flank continues to build out longer-range conventional fires.

Latvia has already ordered the U.S.-made Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS, which will be fired from M142 HIMARS launchers. The system is expected to enter Latvian service in 2027 and has a maximum range of about 186 miles.

Latvia’s ATACMS capability will give the country a foundation for ground-launched precision fires, but the broader European trend is toward significantly greater reach.

Ground- and sea-launched cruise and ballistic missile systems capable of hitting targets at between 1,000 and 2,000 kilometers (620 and 1,242 miles) or more are an emerging target for several European NATO members. France, Germany, Poland, Italy, Sweden and the United Kingdom are pursuing combinations of indigenous development and foreign procurement to address this requirement.

Latvia’s neighbor Poland, for example, has been building a layered long-range strike architecture combining JASSM/JASSM-ER air-launched cruise missiles with HIMARS and ATACMS. Warsaw’s ambitions are extending toward ground-launched weapons with ranges potentially reaching 3,000 kilometers (1,864 miles) and the country has previously expressed openness to hosting U.S.-owned nuclear weapons on its territory, too.

Latvian interest in Barracuda fits into the same larger transformation in European conventional strike capabilities.

For NATO’s Baltic members, the logic is particularly straightforward, with mobile, ground-launched weapons providing an additional means of striking military targets at depth without requiring control of the air over the launch area.

The potential Barracuda acquisition would represent another step in a broader European shift toward deep precision strike, a term increasingly used to describe conventional weapons capable of holding targets hundreds or thousands of miles away at risk.

Deep precision strike is widely acknowledged as an increasingly important European capability gap. European NATO members have historically relied heavily on air-launched cruise missiles and other aircraft-delivered weapons, while ground-launched long-range systems have been comparatively scarce.

The deterioration of the European security environment following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, together with the 2019 collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, are important factors behind renewed European interest in long-range conventional strike.

A key driver behind Europe’s push for longer-range conventional strike is the desire to build a credible deterrent capable of holding targets deep inside Russia at risk, potentially including Moscow. Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign has demonstrated the strategic value of being able to impose costs at significant distances, while also underscoring the importance of having sufficient stocks of precision weapons. For NATO’s eastern flank, systems such as the ground-launched Barracuda could therefore provide not just another fires capability, but an additional means of imposing costs on an adversary without relying exclusively on airpower.

Importantly for Latvia, the emerging European approach is not limited to large air forces. NATO’s prospective deep-strike requirements are likely to place significant emphasis on mobile ground-launched systems because they can be dispersed and offer survivability advantages while avoiding the cost and vulnerability associated with relying exclusively on aircraft or ships as launch platforms.

That makes systems such as the surface-launched Barracuda particularly relevant to countries on NATO’s eastern flank.

Anduril has positioned Barracuda as part of an effort to address what it describes as a shortfall in affordable, producible long-range precision weapons. A prototype surface-launched Barracuda-500 successfully demonstrated its launcher, missile, and booster concept in testing in 2025. Anduril has emphasized that the family is intended to be more producible and affordable than many existing “exquisite” long-range weapons.

The emphasis on production capacity is notable in light of lessons emerging from the war in Ukraine, where both sides have demonstrated the importance of maintaining substantial stocks of precision weapons and relatively inexpensive one-way attack systems.

European governments are increasingly wrestling with the same issue. However, there is a fundamental tension between rapidly filling capability gaps through off-the-shelf purchases and developing indigenous European weapons that can strengthen the continent’s defense-industrial base, which is also a critical political consideration.

Latvia’s emerging relationship with Anduril appears to combine elements of both approaches, by acquiring an American-developed strike capability while simultaneously pursuing industrial cooperation with U.S. defense companies.

There is also a recent European precedent for combining Barracuda procurement with local industrial participation.

In July 2026, Anduril signed a strategic agreement with Polish national maintenance, repair and overhaul provider Wojskowe Zakłady Lotnicze Nr 2 (WZL-2) to establish production of the Barracuda-500M at WZL-2 facilities in Bydgoszcz, Poland. Polish state-owned defence group Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa said Poland was the first European country to sign such an agreement with Anduril.

Bezpieczeństwo zaczyna się od silnych sojuszy.

Dziś została podpisana umowa o współpracy @PGZ_pl i WZL-2 z firmą Anduril Industries, która umożliwi utworzenie w Polsce miejsc montażu i produkcji autonomicznych rakietowych pocisków manewrujących dalekiego zasięgu… pic.twitter.com/JnmM6lQZ7L

— Ministerstwo Aktywów Państwowych (@MAPGOVPL) July 6, 2026

Polish officials have also emphasized the missile’s intended low production cost relative to higher-end U.S. cruise missiles. The planned Polish program is expected to progressively increase Polish content and eventually incorporate broader European elements, including software solutions from Anduril.

Latvia has not publicly detailed whether any Barracuda-related production, assembly, or other industrial work would be conducted in the country.

However, Latvia’s Investment and Development Agency says the country’s defense-technology delegation in the United States is seeking opportunities involving joint development, testing, manufacturing, system integration and supply chains. Origin Robotics is among the Latvian companies participating in that effort.

The broader Latvian delegation includes companies working across unmanned and counter-unmanned systems, communications, electronics, sensors, software, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and manufacturing.

Exactly how Latvia intends to employ Barracuda, how many missiles it plans to acquire, and whether any portion of the system will eventually be produced or integrated in Latvia remain unclear from the president’s announcement.

For now, the development marks another indication that long-range precision fires are moving from a capability concentrated among Europe’s largest military powers toward a broader requirement across NATO’s highly strategic eastern flank.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Latvia To Order Anduril’s Barracuda Cruise Missile For Long-Range Strike Capability appeared first on TWZ.

On September 7, 2026, a landmark event in the history of bilateral relations between Russia and the DPRK took place: the first automobile bridge across the border Tumen River was opened, linking the Russian settlement of Khasan with the North Korean city of Rason. Opening Ceremony The implementation of this project the necessity of which […]

For the past six months or so, a curious-looking vessel with a very boxy superstructure has been taking shape at a shipyard in the Chinese city of Shanghai. A new satellite image lends credence to an earlier assessment that this is a mothership to support China’s growing fleets of ever-larger submersible drones, though it could also have other roles.

TWZ obtained the image of the ship in question, which was taken on September 10, from Vantor. Since then, it has also received an overall coat of gray paint, pointing to future service with the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). It is some 669 feet (204 meters) long and around 98 feet (30 meters) at its widest. In terms of basic length and width, the vessel being built now is very roughly comparable to China’s Type 071 amphibious warfare ship. However, it appears to be much taller overall than the Type 071.

The new ship has been under construction at the Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard on Changxing Island in Shanghai since at least April. This yard produces a variety of naval vessels, including surface combatants and amphibious assault ships, as well as commercial designs.

The September 10 image, which shows the ship from the stern, is interesting for a number of reasons. It notably confirms that the design not only has a well deck, but that it is sized around what looks to be a large cradle-like platform visible in the shot. The very roughly 164-feet (50-meter) long rectangular platform has an arch-shaped structure at one end and two teardrop-shaped ones at the other, as well as six pillars, three on each side, in between. The teardrop-shaped structures, in particular, point to the platform being at least a semi-submersible, as they would help with stability and otherwise guide the flow of water while being pulled along.

The satellite image also clearly shows six large struts extending from the top of the stern end of the superstructure, each one which is paired with a shorter strut, for a total of 12. Earlier this month, independent naval analyst H.I. Sutton, who tracks undersea warfare developments in particular, posited that these struts could be used to lower a platform or some other similar structure below the hull of the ship. He also assessed that they could be used as part of a larger system capable of moving payloads between decks internally. This would help account for the configuration of the core superstructure, especially how high it is all the way from the front to the back. Overall, signs point to the inside of the superstructure being largely hangars and other open work spaces, allowing for multiple large UUVs to be carried and supported. Individual UUVs would be launched and recovered, one at a time, via the cradle.

In making his assessment, Sutton drew specific attention to a previously shown rendering of a proposed Chinese scientific research vessel with a roughly similar strut-based system at the stern for deploying submersibles and other large payloads. However, on that design, the system was entirely exposed rather than contained with an extended superstructure.

The platform seen immediately behind the ship being built at the Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard aligns with Sutton’s assessment about the purpose of the struts. At the same time, launches and recoveries could also be conducted in a more traditional manner via the well deck. The design of the cradle-like platform would seem to suggest the latter option is at least part of the plan.

The general idea of launching and recovering payloads through the bottom of the hull of a ship, including through moon pools, is hardly new. As another point here, Russia is known to have highly specialized mothership submarines that can carry crewed midget submarines and large uncrewed submersibles attached underneath their hulls, and that are also capable of launching ultra-long-range nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed torpedoes. The idea of deploying and retrieving large UUVs via well decks using cradle-like systems is something being explored by other navies globally, including in the United States. All that being said, a large specialized ship built for the purpose of launching and recovering very large underwater vehicles in an operational capacity is unique.

The image from September 10, as well as other recent views of the ship, highlight other features that are now taking shape. This includes a large opening on the starboard side, which could be for launching and/or recovering lifeboats or other watercraft, or moving payloads to and from the pier while docked, as well as a multi-pronged mast on top of the bridge. An additional part of the ship’s superstructure extends behind the bridge area, and there is what looks to be a hangar inside. There is no attached helipad present now, but one could well be added later on somewhere on top of the superstructure. Many naval auxiliaries, as well as commercial ships designed for offshore support and other specialized tasks, have open helipads on raised frames attached to different parts of the superstructures.

Though there is growing clarity about the ship’s design, many questions do remain about the full breadth of its intended purpose. In Sutton’s view, the PLAN has a need, just in general, for a dedicated mothership to support its growing uncrewed underwater vehicle (UUV) fleets. The PLAN is pursuing various tiers of UUVs to perform a host of different missions, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), as well as mine-laying, special operations support, and even launching direct attacks on enemy vessels. Larger and larger UUV designs have been steadily emerging in China, which could require more specialized launch and recovery options to be feasibly employed operationally, especially from other vessels at sea. Deployment and retrieval at sea could, in turn, support very long duration missions far from China’s own shores.

“With smaller UUVs, even up to 20 meters like the AJX-002 and HSU-100 paraded in Beijing last year, they are road mobile. Truck mounted cranes should be sufficient for getting them in and out of the water making operations much simpler. With these latest, much larger XXLUUVs [extra-extra large uncrewed underwater vehicles] however, China will start to need dedicated port facilities,” Sutton wrote previously on his website. “Until now China has been using floating docks to house the two XXLUUV prototypes being tested on Hainan. One of these docks was purpose built while the other may have been taken up from general use.”

China's naval unmanned systems.

Consisting of (in order), AI enabled unmanned submersible (HSU-100), used for detection and attack.

Unmanned patrol boat.

Unmanned mine-laying/attack submersible (AJX-002), this was previously mistaken for a nuclear powered torpedo.
Because the… pic.twitter.com/Mlj55XLNBH

— Zhao DaShuai 东北进修 (@zhao_dashuai) September 3, 2025

“This arrangement also has a significant drawback: each floating dock can only carry a single XXLUUV,” Sutton added. “Or if more than one, then they both need to be placed in the water at the same time. Because the whole dock floods, there cannot be one undergoing maintenance while another is being launched or recovered.”

A mothership vessel able to discreetly deploy and recover large uncrewed and crewed submersibles and other large payloads underwater could be tasked with more specialized missions, including cutting cables, retrieving objects from the seabed, and other kinds of undersea espionage. There is overlap here with more benign roles, such as submarine rescue, salvage, and even deep-sea scientific research. There is also the matter of servicing an expanding array of Chinese underwater infrastructure, including sensor and communications networks. As something of a corollary, Russia’s spy ship Yantar is officially described as an oceanic research vessel. In China, the line between military and non-military assets and capabilities, including ships, is often very blurry, to begin with, as TWZ regularly highlights. This dichotomy was observed right at the Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard around the end of last year after pictures of a commercial cargo ship being used to showcase a new family of containerized weapons, sensors, and other systems went viral online.

It is also worth pointing out that the boxy and largely enclosed design of the ship now being built at Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard will inherently make it difficult to observe any activities onboard. This will have the additional knock-on effect of helping keep any payloads, as well as the crew, shielded from the elements. This could be valuable for operations in harsher locales, including waters in and around the Arctic, an ever-more strategic part of the world where China is working to be more engaged.

We also do not know if the apparent mothership vessel is intended to be a one-off or part of a larger class. It could be a stepping stone to broader plans or be part of an already extensive fleet of bespoke naval auxiliaries, as well as unique ostensibly commercial vessels, in service in China today. The PLAN’s aforementioned UUV ambitions will bring along significant test and evaluation requirements, as well as the need to support actual future operations.

If nothing else, evidence is only growing that the new ship under construction at the Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard is intended to serve, at least in part, as a mothership for large submersible drones.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post China Appears To Be Building A Mothership For Large Uncrewed Submarines appeared first on TWZ.

The crew of the USS Abraham Lincoln touched American soil for the first time in nine months, when the strike group pulled into Apra Harbor, Guam, for a brief logistics stop and on-base liberty. The supercarrier, alongside guided-missile destroyer USS Frank E. Petersen Jr., arrived on September 19 and left the next day. Lincoln is 307 days into her deployment, 19 short of the record set earlier this year by the USS Gerald R. Ford, and is now just weeks away from San Diego. Meanwhile, two flattops are on station in the Middle East supporting blockade operations, and the USS Ronald Reagan has rejoined the fleet after an extended maintenance availability.

Here’s TWZ’s weekly carrier tracker monitoring America’s flattop fleet, including deployed Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) and Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG), using publicly available open-source information. Check out our last report here.

Abraham Lincoln Departs Guam, Continuing Her Journey Home

The USS Abraham Lincoln is currently conducting routine operations at an undisclosed location in the U.S. 7th Fleet area of responsibility (AOR), presumably steaming east en route to her homeport at Naval Air Station North Island in San Diego. After leaving Thailand on September 6 following a five-day liberty port call, Lincoln topped off the Petersen Jr. in the Gulf of Thailand and linked up with two Royal Australian Navy frigates for joint training in the South China Sea. Publicly available flight tracking data shows the carrier transited the Balabac Strait eastbound around September 13, and the Surigao Strait northbound two days later to enter the Philippine Sea. After going dark for a few days, she resurfaced in Guam and moored at Kilo Wharf over the weekend.

“Due to the brief nature of the logistics stop, the crew were afforded on-base liberty to access base services and attend a Navy Entertainment-sponsored concert,” CSG-3 spokesman Lt. Cmdr. Tyler Barker wrote in an email to Stars and Stripes. The carrier took on stores, mail, and equipment, according to Barker, and 13 Fleet and Family counselors are now aboard to run return-and-reunion classes but “the crew and ship remain focused and ready.”

A homecoming date has not been announced publicly. Unless Lincoln makes another stop (in Hawaii, for example) or conducts additional training on the way, she should arrive in early October just shy of Ford’s record. The Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Daryl Caudle, said in June that Lincoln would likely shift her homeport to Naval Base Kitsap-Bremerton in Washington state, which aligns with TWZ’s reporting that she is expected to begin a Drydocking Planned Incremental Availability (DPIA) after returning stateside. The timeline for the DPIA is unclear.

George Washington and George H.W. Bush Project Power In The Middle East

The American public got a rare look at ongoing combat operations aboard the USS George Washington when two reporters embarked earlier this month. Fox News’ Trey Yingst and CBS News’ Tom Hanson reported live from the flight deck, as F-35C Lightning IIs and F/A-18E/F Super Hornets launched behind them, in hits that aired September 11 to 14. The only other publicized media embark since the war began on February 28 went to CNN’s Pamela Brown, who reported on the conditions aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln while the flattop was still in theater.

“Last weekend, the aircraft carrier came under Iranian missile attack; the first of three attacks on US warships in the last week alone,” Yingst said, indicating it was the USS George Washington, and not the USS George H.W. Bush, that was targeted by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in early September. The Navy declined to comment when TWZ asked which carrier was targeted after Iranian state media claimed the strike had been successful. “We’re pretty much employing all our capabilities right now,” Washington’s commanding officer (CO), Capt. Nicholas DeLeo, told Yingst.

“The GW is surrounded by four to five guided-missile destroyers at any moment,” Yingst also reported. He flew out to USS Shoup, positioned off the starboard side at the time, to make the point and speak with the warship’s CO. Shoup is the only destroyer officially confirmed to be part of CSG-5. “My ship is in charge of coordinating defense amongst the various other units, allocating defensive assets to it, be it potentially a missile to shoot something down or just aircraft to go identify and monitor the picture,” Capt. William Buford said. Based on that description, Shoup’s CO appears to be coordinating Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) for the strike group, a question we’ve been asking the Navy to confirm. TWZ understands additional destroyers operating in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) AOR are also escorting Washington, but a U.S. official declined to say which ones.

Hanson asked DeLeo about the recent IRGC ballistic missile threat targeting Navy ships in the region. “We have a variety of ways to protect, both offensively and defensively, a Navy ship, and we employ all these methods,” he told the network. “It’s something that we train to.” Hanson also pressed the commander of CSG-5, Rear Adm. Jeff Heames, on whether he was concerned about the munitions stockpile, a dynamic TWZ detailed in a special feature yesterday. “Of course we’re concerned about the expenditure to some degree, but I have no concerns locally at my level here,” Heames replied.

In addition to Washington, Bush is still working the blockade from the Arabian Sea, nearly six months into her deployment. As of CENTCOM’s latest social media update on September 21, U.S. forces in the region had redirected 110 commercial vessels to ensure “total compliance” with the blockade. More than 50 ships “supporting humanitarian efforts” have been allowed through, according to the command. CENTCOM recently stopped publishing the number of ships boarded, seized, or disabled kinetically.

Ronald Reagan Rejoins the Fleet

The USS Ronald Reagan is officially back. The Navy, in a recent statement, confirmed the flattop “returned to the fleet capable and mission-ready.” The carrier had been out of action since March 2025 for a DPIA at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard in Washington state and completed four days of sea trials in early September. While the Navy does not comment on upcoming deployments due to operational security, current speculation points to a spring 2027 deployment, but that is not confirmed.

Reagan is the only carrier currently homeported at Naval Base Kitsap-Bremerton in Washington. Previously, she was America’s only forward-deployed carrier based in Yokosuka, Japan, until swapping hulls with the USS George Washington in 2024. USS Nimitz was stationed at Naval Base Kitsap-Bremerton before circumnavigating South America to Naval Station Norfolk this summer, where she is being used primarily for training before deactivation in 2027. The yet-to-be-commissioned PCU John F. Kennedy, the second and newest Ford class supercarrier, is slated to homeport in Washington state no earlier than 2029.

U.S. Navy Big Deck Fleet At A Glance

Overall, three U.S. carriers are deployed (with one heading home), one is preparing to deploy in the near term, three are working up in various states of readiness, three are in current or upcoming maintenance, and one is being used primarily for training before deactivation next year. One amphibious ready group is deployed, one is forward-stationed and in port, four are working up or in port, and three are in maintenance.

Note: Positions are general approximations. Non-deployed LHA/LHD amphibious warships are not shown.

Contact the author: ian.ellis-jones@recurrent.io or @ianellisjones

The post Where Are The Aircraft Carriers?: September 23, 2026 appeared first on TWZ.

The Russia-North Korea strategic partnership is reshaping Northeast Asian security through growing political, military and economic cooperation, while also highlighting Russia’s expanding strategic role and the emergence of a more multipolar Eurasian security environment. 7th September 2026 marked the opening of the first dedicated road bridge between Russia and North Korea across the Tumen River. […]

La Commissione europea propone una riforma degli appalti pubblici. Tra i criteri di aggiudicazione dà più peso a economia circolare e innovazione sostenibile. Il rischio è che procedure più complesse penalizzino le microimprese. Ecco come salvaguardarle.

L'articolo Appalti pubblici più green, ma senza escludere le Pmi proviene da Lavoce.info.

A French Navy Mistral class amphibious assault ship has been photographed carrying Naval Group’s new Rampart modular launcher, a system designed to allow a single weapon station to employ different types of rockets, missiles, and other effectors against a wide range of threats.

The imagery, captured off Toulon during training on September 21, reveals the launcher installed on the ship’s forward starboard sponson. While the specific identity of the vessel is unclear, this represents the first publicly observed evidence that Rampart has moved into shipboard testing.

https://t.co/l9f8uOi1w3 pic.twitter.com/9efp3C8glH

— PEtienne (@_PEtienne_) September 22, 2026

French Navy Mistral-class amphibious assault ship and French Navy Suffren (Barracuda)-class nuclear-powered attack submarine off Toulon, France – September 21, 2026.@WarshipCam pic.twitter.com/6xYm6E5J9R

— G.GYSSELSSHIPCOLLECTION (@GGYSSELSSHIPS) September 22, 2026

Naval Group announced in June that the first at-sea firing campaign for Rampart was planned for October aboard a Mistral class ship during the French Navy’s Wildfire counter-drone exercise.

What makes Rampart unusual is its modular architecture. Rather than being built around one missile or rocket, the system uses interchangeable launch modules that can accommodate different weapons. This allows a ship to carry large numbers of relatively inexpensive guided rockets for counter-drone work while retaining the option of using larger and more capable short-range missiles against more challenging targets.

Because the launch modules are interchangeable, the mix can theoretically be changed as the mission or threat environment changes.

The approach is aimed squarely at a problem that has become increasingly important for naval forces: defending expensive ships against potentially large numbers of inexpensive uncrewed systems and missiles without relying exclusively on high-cost interceptors.

Rampart was previously known as the Multi-purpose and Modular Launching System (MPLS). Naval Group unveiled the concept in 2023 as a self-funded development effort and formally presented the Rampart earlier this year.

The launcher uses four interchangeable ammunition modules. Depending on the configuration, Naval Group says that the system can accommodate up to 80 Thales 68mm laser-guided rockets or 48 NATO-standard 70mm laser-guided rockets. Other configurations can carry smaller numbers of short-range missiles (four to six per module, depending on type) or other effectors, including decoys.

The system has already been demonstrated with guided rockets. A January 2026 test involved a Thales 68mm guided rocket, followed by a series of firings at the Canjuers range in southern France in May. Those trials, seen in the video below, included engagements against targets at roughly two miles and a five-rocket salvo.

The relatively small guided rockets are particularly relevant to counter-drone operations. They offer a way of engaging aerial targets with a weapon substantially smaller than a conventional surface-to-air missile, while still providing precision guidance.

As well as rockets, Naval Group has been working with Thales on the Lightweight Multirole Missile (LMM). Also known as Martlet, the LMM is intended to tackle a range of challenging airborne and surface targets, as you can read about here.

The company has also explored integration of loitering munitions and other missiles, while a separate agreement with the UAE-based EDGE Group covers trials of the SkyKnight surface-to-air missile.

The company has also pursued integration of Poland’s Piorun short-range air-defense missile. This may well be with a view to a potential Polish purchase of Rampart to arm its forthcoming frigates, which you can read about here.

This means the launcher is effectively being developed as an open weapons-integration platform, rather than as a dedicated launcher for one or a small set of particular munitions.

That openness could make Rampart attractive to a wide range of navies. Instead of requiring customers to adopt a completely new missile family, the launcher can potentially be configured around weapons already in their inventories or sourced from their domestic defense industries. A country could therefore buy the common Rampart launcher while retaining control over the effectors it wants to integrate, whether those are guided rockets, short-range missiles, loitering munitions or other systems. At the same time, when it comes to air threats, this is very much a point defense system for close-in engagements, and a last line of defense to complement longer-range and more capable systems.

Naval Group has described the system as capable of operating either autonomously or as part of a ship’s combat system, with a stabilized turret and integrated fire-control equipment.

That integration will be particularly important during the upcoming sea trials. A launcher that works against stationary or land-based targets still has to contend with ship motion, vibration, sea spray, sensor integration, and the compressed timelines involved in defending a moving vessel.

France operates three Mistral class amphibious assault ships, which serve as major aviation, command, and amphibious warfare platforms. Their size and mission make them high-value assets that could face a broad range of aerial threats during operations. Another two vessels were built to the same design for Russia, before being placed under embargo, and then sold to the Egyptian Navy.

Naval Group’s choice of a Mistral for the initial at-sea campaign provides an opportunity to test Rampart under realistic operational conditions while integrating it with an existing French naval combat system.

In its basic form, each Mistral is armed with a pair of Simbad launchers, each of which is fitted with two Mistral short-range surface-to-air missiles. In terms of guns, each of the vessels is armed with two 30mm and two 20mm cannons, two 7.62mm M134 Miniguns, and four 12.7mm machine guns. Adding even a single Rampart launcher provides considerably more options against aerial targets across a wide range of threats — depending on the effectors that are included.

Recent U.S. and allied operations in the Middle East have highlighted the problem of large-scale missile and drone attacks causing forces to expend substantial numbers of interceptors, raising concerns about both magazine depth and the cost of using high-end missiles against lower-cost threats. Directed-energy weapons could eventually provide a way out of that cost-exchange problem, but shipboard laser systems remain in the early stages of operational development. Navies cannot simply wait for them to mature, creating an immediate requirement for lower-cost, high-capacity kinetic options. Rampart’s large guided-rocket capacity and ability to mix different effectors are aimed at exactly that gap.

If Rampart can reliably engage drones with inexpensive guided rockets while retaining the ability to employ more capable missiles from the same launcher, it could offer navies an additional defensive layer between conventional guns and high-end surface-to-air missile systems.

Critically, new effectors could potentially also be integrated as they become available, allowing the system to evolve without replacing the entire turret.

Reflecting the urgency of the requirement, Naval Group’s development path for Rampart has been relatively rapid.

Naval Group has also demonstrated a ground-based Rampart, mounted on a high-mobility truck chassis. This configuration is intended for mobile air defense missions as well as protection of fixed sites, giving the system a role beyond ship self-defense. The truck-mounted version could provide a rapidly relocatable launcher for counter-drone and short-range air-defense missions, while retaining the same basic modular architecture and ability to employ different effectors.

Sur le stand John Cockerill, un châssis Zetros équipé du Rampart (ex lanceur modulaire polyvalent, ou LMP) de Naval Group. Avantage : un seul système de lancement pour des armements divers (roquettes, missiles, grenades, leurres, drones…) pic.twitter.com/6v4R93HGsj

— Vincent Lamigeon (@VincentLamigeon) June 16, 2026

The photographs from Toulon indicate that the Rampart concept is now moving from the range to the French fleet, albeit on an experimental basis. The forthcoming sea campaign will be an important milestone and should provide a better idea of how this system works at sea.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

 

The post France’s Modular Rampart Point Defense Launcher Has Gone To Sea appeared first on TWZ.

North Korea has released imagery of what appears to be a flight test of an updated version of its Hwasong-11Ma hypersonic missile, nearly a year after the weapon first appeared publicly at a military technology exhibition in Pyongyang.

The September 20 test involved a short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) booster fitted with a hypersonic glide vehicle, according to photographs released by North Korean state media. A display screen visible in the imagery identifies the weapon as the Hwasongpho-11Ma-1, or Hwasong-11E-1 in the equivalent English-language designation.

The test was conducted from the east coast near Anbyon County, south of Wonsan, an area North Korea has repeatedly used for missile testing. The launch site allows missiles to be fired eastward over the Sea of Japan, providing a relatively controlled area for testing short- and medium-range systems.

South Korean and Japanese authorities say they detected two launches on September 20, with the first occurring at approximately 3:00 p.m. local time and the second several hours later.

North Korean photographs show the missile being launched from a coastal location, with Kim Jong Un and senior missile officials observing the test. Kim’s daughter, Kim Ju Ae, also appears in the imagery.

North Korea displayed a mock-up of what it called the Hwasong-11Ma at its Defense Development-2025 exhibition in October 2025. The design uses the basic architecture of the Hwasong-11 family, known in the West as the KN-23 family, but substitutes a distinctive glide wedge-shaped vehicle for the conventional warhead arrangement.

North Korea claimed another hypersonic missile test that same month, but did not release launch imagery clearly connecting that test to the Hwasong-11Ma. The missile was subsequently shown again during a military parade in Pyongyang.

The latest “-1” designation suggests an iterative evolution of the Hwasong-11Ma, although Pyongyang has not explained what modifications it represents.

Based on the imagery, the new configuration also includes a modified launcher, with the missile carried on a six-axle transporter-erector-launcher (TEL). When the Hwasong-11Ma was first shown, it was mounted on a five-axle TEL. The latest vehicle also appears to incorporate modified retractable covers around the missile.

It remains unclear whether the new TEL represents a standardized operational vehicle or a test configuration.

Preliminary illustration of the new launch vehicle for North Korea's hypersonic missiles. pic.twitter.com/dZ31LA1cbn

— Tal Inbar (@inbarspace) September 22, 2026

As with previous North Korean weapons announcements, the country’s state media claims need to be treated very cautiously. Pyongyang has a long record of publicizing weapons systems and test results that cannot be independently verified, while some of its purported hypersonic tests have left outside analysts unable to determine whether the advertised maneuvering performance was actually demonstrated.

Perhaps the most revealing test-related imagery comes from a display screen photographed at the launch site.

Kim Jong Un and his daughter can be seen watching the screen, which shows the apparent flight trajectory of the Hwasong-11Ma-1. The displayed path initially follows a ballistic trajectory before descending and then performing a pull-up maneuver, regaining altitude before continuing toward the target area.

That type of trajectory is consistent with the basic concept behind a hypersonic glide vehicle. The booster provides the initial velocity and altitude, after which the unpowered glide body follows a relatively shallow, atmospheric flight path at hypersonic speeds, while maneuvering rather than following a simple ballistic path.

The graphic is useful for understanding what Pyongyang says the weapon is designed to do, but it does not independently demonstrate that the missile actually followed the depicted trajectory.

The flight data visible on the display provides some unusually specific figures.

Enhancing the original image released by North Korea allows for an excellent view of the HS-11Ma hypersonic glide missile trajectory, providing altitude and speed data. Note: Slight inaccuracies in the numbers may occur due to the use of AI tools. pic.twitter.com/M4LkfF5VYu

— Tal Inbar (@inbarspace) September 22, 2026

According to the North Korean imagery, the missile traveled 908.2 kilometers (564.3 miles), reached an altitude of 35.8 kilometers (22.2 miles), and remained in flight for approximately 445 seconds, or 7.4 minutes.

The display gives a velocity of 2,146 meters per second, equivalent to roughly 4,800 mph. That is hypersonic velocity in the aerodynamic sense, but speed alone is not what makes a hypersonic glide weapon particularly challenging to defend against. More consequential parameters include sustained controlled flight, maneuverability, guidance, and accuracy.

Other portions of the display appear to show additional points along the flight, including different times, altitudes, and speeds. None of these figures have been independently verified.

The claimed range is particularly noteworthy because it does not match the publicly reported tracking data from South Korea and Japan.

South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said North Korea launched two SRBMs from the Wonsan area on September 20. The missiles were assessed to have traveled approximately 450 and 600 kilometers, respectively.

Japan similarly reported two launches, assessing the first at approximately 440 kilometers and the second at approximately 590 kilometers, with maximum altitudes of roughly 60 and 70 kilometers.

Those figures are substantially different from the 908.2-kilometer distance shown on North Korea’s display.

The discrepancy does not necessarily establish that either side’s data are incorrect. The North Korean figure could represent a different measurement of the flight path, or could correspond to a portion of the test that was not reflected in the public South Korean and Japanese assessments. It is also possible, if not highly probable, that Pyongyang selectively presented or altered the data.

South Korean analysts have already raised questions about the unusually long distance displayed by North Korea. Yonhap reported that experts suggested Pyongyang may have altered the figure to portray the test as more successful.

Regardless of the range actually achieved in this test, the Hwasong-11Ma/Ma-1 is significant because it represents an attempt to combine a relatively compact SRBM with a maneuvering hypersonic glide vehicle.

The underlying Hwasong-11 family is a well-established North Korean missile design. In its KN-23 configuration, members of the family have also been used by Russia against Ukraine. By placing a glide vehicle on this type of booster, Pyongyang could potentially give a regional strike weapon a flight profile substantially different from that of a conventional ballistic missile. The Hwasong-11Ma/Ma-1 also uses a solid-fuel booster, allowing for faster launches than earlier liquid-fuel designs.

In principle, the Hwasong-11Ma/Ma-1 could give North Korea an additional hypersonic strike option against more heavily defended targets in South Korea. Having road-mobile TELs would also provide greater operational flexibility despite their relatively limited range, while making it more difficult for adversaries to locate and track the launchers.

A genuine boost-glide weapon creates significant challenges for defending forces since the sheer speed of the weapon bypasses most air defenses. Its trajectory can also become less predictable after the boost phase. Maneuvering at lower altitudes could also reduce the time available to detect, track, and engage the weapon.

However, the available imagery does not establish the extent of the vehicle’s maneuverability, its ability to maintain controlled flight, its accuracy, or the reliability of the complete missile system.

North Korea has made similar claims about its hypersonic weapons in the past.

Pyongyang says it has flight-tested multiple hypersonic boost-glide vehicle designs since at least 2021, but there continue to be questions about what degree of actual capability the country has achieved in this regard. Viable wedge-shaped boost-glide vehicles have historically been extremely difficult to design and then bring to an operational state.

The challenge is not simply reaching hypersonic speed. A weapon has to sustain controlled flight and maneuverability under extreme thermal loads, while also overcoming demanding materials-science, guidance, and navigation requirements. The terminal phase is harder still. Accurately finding and striking a moving target, particularly a ship, requires a highly capable seeker and guidance system. Integrating a nuclear warhead introduces another layer of engineering and weapons-design challenges.

Those demands have made hypersonic weapons a major technological challenge for the United States and other major powers. China is currently widely regarded as the leading country in deploying and developing operational hypersonic systems, although important questions remain about the capabilities and maturity of individual weapons.

Pyongyang said it first flight-tested a wedge-shaped hypersonic glide vehicle in 2021 aboard the liquid-fuel Hwasong-8, before pairing a similar-looking vehicle with the solid-fueled Hwasong-16B intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) in 2024.

VIDEO: Korean Central Television (KCTV) broadcasted footage of North Korea successfully testing the new "Hwasong-16B" hypersonic intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) on Tuesday. pic.twitter.com/VNdhLAeyyK

— NK NEWS (@nknewsorg) April 3, 2024

In its coverage of the latest test, North Korean state media initially avoided identifying the weapon, describing the event as a successful trial of a “new-type weapon” that it said was significant for the rapid development of weapons technology.

Kim said the development would give adversaries an “incurable headache” and deliver what he described as a “cruel and unavoidable blow.”

Tal Inbar, the head of the Space and UAV Research Center at Israel’s Fisher Institute for Air and Space Strategic Studies identifies the Hwasong-11Ma/Ma-1 as a “very significant weapon, bringing hypersonics to the operational/tactical arena and [posing] a challenge to … air and missile defense systems.”

Whatever the exact achievements of the test, the imagery points to continued development of a weapon North Korea first publicly displayed nearly a year ago. The appearance of a new, six-axle TEL, a potentially modified missile, combined with the apparent flight test, suggests that the Hwasong-11Ma/Ma-1 program has progressed since its initial public unveiling.

What remains uncertain is how much of that progress represents a genuine improvement in operational capability.

The latest test therefore provides another indication of the resources and attention Pyongyang is devoting to hypersonic weapons, but the available evidence is still insufficient to determine how closely the Hwasong-11Ma-1’s actual performance matches the capabilities depicted by North Korean state media.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post North Korea Tests New Hwasong-11Ma Hypersonic Missile appeared first on TWZ.

A British Excalibur uncrewed underwater vehicle (UUV) has fired a U.S. Mk 48 heavyweight torpedo in what is said to be a first-of-its-kind test for both countries. Though just a proof-of-concept so far, this is a significant new step for the United States and the United Kingdom toward future operational fleets of armed UUVs.

The U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy conducted the armed UUV test at the British Underwater Test & Evaluation Center (BUTEC), a maritime test range in Scotland, on September 13. Personnel from the Pentagon’s Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) and the Naval Undersea Warfare Center Keyport Division (NUWC Keyport), as well as unspecified industry partners, also took part, per a U.S. Navy press release.

U.S. NAVY UPDATE: U.S. Navy and Royal Navy Successfully Test Fire Torpedo from Unmanned Undersea Vehicle

WASHINGTON – On September 13, 2026, the U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy successfully conducted the proof-of-concept launch of an exercise U.S. Mk 48 Heavyweight Torpedo… pic.twitter.com/lVB4wYSwC0

— Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (@USNavyCNO) September 22, 2026

The test was also carried out under the umbrella of Pillar 2 of the trilateral Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) defense cooperation agreement, which was first announced in 2021. AUKUS’ Pillar 2 covers a wide range of advanced technology cooperation, with particular focus on uncrewed platforms and autonomy. Pillar 1 of the agreement centers on support for Australia’s establishment of a nuclear submarine force.

For the September 13 test, the Mk 48 torpedo was slung under the Excalibur UUV. The nearly 40-foot (12-meter) long, 19-metric-ton submersible drone has a large internal payload bay, but it is reportedly not large enough to accommodate the Mk 48, which is the standard heavyweight torpedo in U.S. Navy service today. The 19-foot-long, 21-inch-diameter weapon has been successively upgraded over the years to expand its capabilities and improve its resistance to enemy countermeasures.

The Royal Navy officially unveiled Excalibur, which was developed by U.K.-based MSubs under Project Cetus, last year. The external torpedo launch capability was the result of two additional efforts, called Project Broadsword and Trial Iron, according to the U.S. Navy release.

The September 13 test “successfully validated the mechanical, electrical, and software integration of a U.S. kinetic payload onto an allied autonomous vessel, proving that allied forces can rapidly achieve weapon interchangeability,” the Navy’s release adds. “Approved in February 2026 by the Department of the Navy Rapid Capabilities Office (DONRCO), the project was executed in less than seven months.”

How the Excalibur UUV was controlled during the test and whether the torpedo was launched at a test target of some kind are unknown. TWZ has reached out for more information.

“BROADSWORD is a great example of how AUKUS Pillar II drives interoperability in across the alliance. Demonstrating the launch of a US torpedo from a UK extra-large unmanned underwater vehicle (XLUUV) is an important early step in developing lethality in our undersea autonomous systems,” U.S. Navy Vice Adm. Robert Gaucher, Director of Submarine Programs, did say in a statement. “We look forward to continuing to leverage the AUKUS partnership to keep pushing the potential warfighting advantages of unmanned undersea systems.”

“This successful test marks a historic first for allied undersea warfare,” U.S. Navy Adm. Daryl Caudle, Chief of Naval Operations, also said in a statement. “Proving that we can seamlessly launch a U.S. heavyweight torpedo from a Royal Navy autonomous underwater vehicle validates our shared vision for true interchangeability.

“This is a really important moment in our journey towards building a hybrid navy, which is where the Royal Navy will sail with crewed ships and submarines alongside uncrewed and autonomous vessels,” Luke Pollard, U.K. Minister of State for Defence Readiness and Industry, separately said in an interview with LBC radio. “It is a substantial increase in our lethality, to show that torpedoes can be fired not just by the Astute class hunter-killer submarines that we have in the Royal Navy, but also now by our uncrewed systems.”

The U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy employ various tiers of UUVs operationally today, but primarily for mine-sweeping and reconnaissance and surveillance missions. Future fleets of submersible drones capable of carrying out attacks on other vessels will create entirely new operational possibilities. Operated closely together with crewed surface warships and submarines, torpedo-toting UUVs could be sent ahead into riskier environments and offer an immediate option for engaging any threats they might find. Even a bigger UUV like Excalibur would also be more challenging for opponents to spot and track than a traditional attack submarine.

Excalibur is also in a category of larger and more capable submersible drones that offer significant endurance and higher degrees of autonomy. Adding in the ability to launch torpedoes, in turn, then opens the door to new concepts for employing these UUVs in groups more independently of crewed companions. In the future, for instance, armed Excaliburs or similar UUVs might be deployed to a particular maritime choke point to not just monitor for enemy movements, but actively hold them at risk.

In addition, in general, UUVs offer a way to expand total undersea warfare capacity in a more cost-effective manner compared to acquiring and fielding more traditional submarines. The ability to have more presence below the waves at a lower price point also translates to more persistence across large areas, something that could be especially valuable across the broad expanses of the Pacific, as well as other bodies of water globally. This presents additional targeting challenges and uncertainty for opponents.

“In securing the North Atlantic, especially against those nations that wish to do us harm, like Russia, the ability for us to now say it’s not just where our submarines are that you need to worry about – it is about how we create greater deterrence and question marks in the eyes of our adversary, with uncrewed systems there as well,” U.K. Minister Pollard said in speaking with LBC.

Pollard’s remarks here speak to particular considerations the British government is faced with just in its backyard. This includes the so-called Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap, which is the main path through which Russian Navy submarines transit to and from bases in the northwestern end of that country and the Atlantic proper. There is also the English Channel and the nearby Baltic Sea. The Royal Navy has limited capacity with its crewed submarines to monitor this and other critical regional chokepoints. UUVs could then help take pressure off its fleet of just five (of a planned seven) Astute class submarines, helping free those boats up for the myriad other missions they are tasked with, including carrier escort and special operations support.

“By converting commercial and allied uncrewed undersea hulls into high-end strike assets, the partnership drastically alters the cost-exchange ratio in contested maritime environments,” the U.S. Navy’s press release today notes, as well.

There are still many questions still to be answered about future larger UUV operations, including just how they will be deployed and recovered. Video the U.S. Navy released today shows that the torpedo-armed Excalibur was launched into the water in Scotland using a commercial truck-mounted crane. U.S. shipbuilders Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII) and General Dynamics National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (NASSCO), among others, have been working on new options for launching and retrieving larger drone submersibles from surface warships. External carriage on the hulls of ships and/or submarines might also be an option in the future.

Additional torpedo and other munition options for UUVs beyond the full-size Mk 48 could also be on the horizon. The U.S. Navy has invested heavily in compact and lightweight torpedo designs that could be well suited for employment from underwater drones like Excalibur.

The U.S. Navy says it is working with its international partners on another similar UUV capability demonstration, but this time involving an Anduril Dive-XL, under what is dubbed Project Cutlass. This effort “will tackle advanced payload integration data, command and control architectures, and tactical employment scenarios to further mature uncrewed undersea capabilities,” according to the U.S. Navy’s release.

The Royal Australian Navy is already in the process of acquiring and fielding a militarized version of the Dive-XL, called Ghost Shark. It’s also worth noting that the Dive-XL evolved from the earlier Dive-LD design. The Dive-LD is in at least limited operational U.S. Navy service now, a fact that was revealed by Iran’s capture of one of these submersible drones earlier this month, as you can read more about here.

The U.S. Navy is also continuing to push ahead with plans to field a force of Orca XLUUVs from Boeing. In August, the service announced that an Orca had conducted a 1,000-nautical-mile transit in the Pacific the preceding month as part of the ongoing development of that design.

Other countries are pursuing larger UUVs, as well. China has been making strides in this regard and is in some ways ahead of other competitors globally.

Excalibur’s ability to launch a standard Mk 48 heavyweight torpedo is already an important show of progress now toward a shared goal of a future underwater ecosystem that includes submersible drones that are able to attack other vessels.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post Torpedo Fired From Uncrewed Submarine For The First Time By U.S., U.K. appeared first on TWZ.

The reduction in the scale of US-South Korean military exercises is not a gesture of goodwill toward the DPRK, but rather an instrument of Donald Trump’s political pressure on Seoul aimed at forcing it to support US foreign policy in the Middle East and to block South Korea’s ambitions to gain operational control over its […]

Nel 2024 la Germania ha erogato circa un quarto del totale degli aiuti di stato dell’Ue. Imitare le grandi economie su questo terreno è per i piccoli una strategia costosa. Servono politiche orizzontali, interventi verificabili e più coordinamento europeo.

L'articolo Nella gara dei sussidi i paesi piccoli perdono* proviene da Lavoce.info.

Em Castro Marim a Câmara Municipal foi visitar o traçado da Rede Rega da Várzea de Odeleite, que estará em testes no próximo mês de Outubro, depois de décadas à espera e uma conturbada obra, assumida pelo município

O Município de Castro Marim realizou recentemente uma visita técnica ao terreno para acompanhar o progresso de duas infraestruturas hídricas decisivas para o futuro do concelho e para a sustentabilidade da agricultura local.

A comitiva municipal esteve a inspecionar o traçado da Rede de Rega da Várzea de Odeleite. Este projeto, aguardado há décadas pela população e pelos produtores locais, entra finalmente na sua fase final de concretização. Após um processo complexo e uma empreitada conturbada — que o próprio Município assumiu para garantir a sua conclusão —, o sistema estará em fase de testes já no próximo mês de outubro. O arranque deste regadio representa uma conquista histórica para o concelho, permitindo otimizar o aproveitamento da água, apoiar os agricultores e revitalizar a economia rural da Várzea de Odeleite.

No âmbito desta mesma deslocação, a comitiva visitou a localidade da Tenência para observar no terreno os locais onde está prevista a implantação do paredão da futura Barragem da Foupana. Esta infraestrutura estratégica é considerada fundamental para reforçar a resiliência hídrica e o armazenamento de água no Algarve.

O processo da Barragem da Foupana encontra-se atualmente numa fase determinante, estando em discussão pública até ao próximo dia 16 de outubro. O Município de Castro Marim sublinha a importância da participação de toda a comunidade, agricultores e entidades locais nesta consulta pública, garantindo que as necessidades do concelho e da região sejam devidamente acauteladas.

Com a entrada em testes da Rede de Rega de Odeleite e o avanço do projeto da Barragem da Foupana, Castro Marim reafirma o seu compromisso direto e empenho na gestão inteligente da água, no combate à escassez hídrica e na valorização do seu território.

Recent satellite imagery of a shipyard in northeastern China offers interesting new insights into the country’s next-generation submarine developments. The images notably show a pumpjet propulsor and other features worth examining on an example of what is generally described as a new class of nuclear-powered attack submarine, or SSN.

TWZ has obtained a new image taken on September 18 of the submarine in question, which is being built at the Bohai Shipyard in Huludao, from Vantor. Janes reported on this submarine earlier today, based on a separate Vantor image from September 1. The outlet also described the boat as a Type 095, a commonly used, but still unofficial designation. This is something we will come back to later on.

As mentioned, the pumpjet propulsor immediately stands out in both images. This is also understood to be a feature on the Type 093B nuclear-powered attack submarine, a significantly improved variation on that earlier design, which first emerged in the early 2020s. Compared to traditional exposed propellers and more basic shrouded types, pumpjets offer benefits for quieter operation and efficiencies, especially at higher submerged speeds.

The recent imagery also highlights the submarine’s X-shaped stern plane arrangement. This is not found on the Type 093B, which is considered to be something of a bridge between that class and the next-generation design. Broadly speaking, an X-shaped configuration offers advantages when it comes to enhanced maneuverability, efficiency, and safety, which can be particularly useful in littoral environments. It can also provide benefits when it comes to acoustic signature reductions across significant parts of the submarine’s operating envelope compared to the cruciform stern planes.

Another Chinese submarine design that emerged in 2024, currently referred to as the Type 041 or Zhou class, and that is understood to feature a hybrid nuclear/conventional propulsion system, also has an X-shaped stern configuration. The first known example of the Type 041 came to light after it appeared to have sunk in a shipyard.

An X-shaped stern arrangement also looks to be a feature on yet another new class of submarine that appeared at the JN (Jiangnan) Shipyard in Shanghai earlier this year. Initial reports also suggested that the design lacked a traditional sail. However, it has been confirmed that it has a sail, but that is very small proportionally to the overall size of the boat. Truncated sails can offer performance and other advantages, but there are trade-offs.

The image of the submarine that Janes obtained also notably shows an open rectangular-shaped section aft of the sail. The September 18 image that we received from Vantor shows a structure placed over that section of that submarine, obscuring ongoing work on that part of the boat. The Type 095 is widely expected to feature some type of vertical launch system (VLS) array able to accommodate a variety of anti-ship and land-attack cruise missiles, as well as potentially hypersonic types. The Type 095 is also sometimes referred to as a guided missile submarine, or SSGN, as a result. The open area seen in the September 1 shot could be where the VLS array is set to be fitted. It might also provide access to the reactor compartment or another area of the submarine.

The clearest photos we have on the Type 095 SSN!

As we can see, there is one confirmed chamber than could physically fit about 18-24 VLS Cells. There is a big chance that more than one VLS Chamber exists, with an estimate VLS count from 24-48+ VLS pic.twitter.com/0ZJ8gsl4su

— PLA Military Updates (@PLA_MilitaryUpd) September 21, 2026

Interestingly, the September 18 image also shows what look to be at least two relatively large circular openings, side-by-side, at the bow end of the submarine in front of the sail, the purpose of which is not immediately clear. There is a possibility these could also be for vertically launching munitions or other payloads. As a point of comparison, U.S. Virginia class nuclear attack submarines, starting with the Block III version, have two large-diameter Virginia Payload Tubes (VPT), one in front of the other, in the bow in front of their sails. At the same time, the openings on the submarine in Huludao also appear to be in a position that is very close to where the submarine’s main sonar array would be installed, and they could be tied to that aspect of the design, too.

“I think it’s too early to be sure about the VLS configuration from publicly available imagery. I realize people assume the large rectangular space halfway behind the sail is the VLS, but I am not sure this is the case and I’d caution to jump to conclusions. The space could also be related to work on the reactor compartment,” Alex Luck, a naval analyst who closely tracks submarine and Chinese navy developments, told TWZ. “With Type 093B, the VLS after launch was initially covered with a tarp, and then the installed launchers were readily visible quite quickly during the fitting-out process. The work process may change with these newer boats, but the different appearance during launch and fitting out needs to be considered in that regard.”

“I do expect Type 095 to have a VLS of some sort, but I am not sure as of yet what the configuration would look like, or where exactly it is located,” he added.

The bigger outstanding question may be exactly what type of submarine is currently being built now at the Bohai Shipyard. Based on a review of additional imagery from Planet Labs’ archive, the boat appears to be around 394 feet (120 meters) long. When the first example of what was assessed to be a Type 095 emerged in Huludao in February, it was estimated to have a length of roughly 361 feet (110 meters). The ‘small sail’ design that broke cover earlier this year in Shanghai is also estimated to be some 394 feet/120 meters long based on available imagery, but also looks to be narrower than the boat presumed to be a Type 095 in February.

“One significant question is the nature and difference between the boat launched by Bohai in February, and the two newer hulls launched in late May/early June both by Bohai and at Jiangnan in Shanghai,” Luck, the naval analyst, also told TWZ. “Specifically, we do not quite know whether they are for different operational roles, or rather a two step development for one final configuration of a new SSN. I think the latter is at least plausible.”

“A related question then is what boat we are looking at now with the new imagery, i.e. the February boat or the newer hull Bohai had launched,” he continued. “Without exact and reliable measurements that question for now is unresolved in the public discourse. For now we need more, and more detailed imagery, including of the different boats together, to clarify these aspects.”

“This [September 1] image reinforces my impression that the boat launched in February may have been a one off not including the full spec featured on the notional 095A launched by Bohai and Jiangnan in late May. We’ve already seen both versions side by side in Bohai,” Luck also wrote on X after Janes‘ published its report.

This image reinforces my impression that the boat launched in February may have been a one off not including the full spec featured on the notional 095A launched by Bohai and Jiangnan in late May. We've already seen both versions side by side in Bohai. https://t.co/wBMkB1gmSQ

— Alex Luck (@AlexLuck9) September 21, 2026

Regardless, the emergence in recent years of so many new, more modern submarines, and across what appear to be several distinct classes, is significant. It is no secret that China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is working to significantly expand the size and capabilities of its submarine force with a clear eye toward extending operations further and further out in the Pacific, at least. In the past, U.S. officials have publicly said the overall quality of newer Chinese submarines has been getting closer in parity to American designs.

“The PLA Navy is executing a significant strategic shift from diesel-electric to all-nuclear construction, representing a fundamental departure from historical construction patterns,” U.S. Navy Rear Adm. Mike Brookes, head of the Office of Naval Intelligence, wrote in prepared remarks ahead of a hearing before members of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission in March.

In particular, the Type 095, as well as the new Type 096 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, “represent next-generation platforms expected to enter service during the late 2020s through 2030s,” Brookes also wrote at that time. “These submarines will incorporate substantial advancements in nuclear reactor design, sensor performance, weapons integration, and noise quieting technologies.”

Submarine modernization efforts are just one aspect of a larger effort by the PLAN to expand its capabilities above and below the waves. Chinese shipyards have also been producing ever-more capable aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships, destroyers, frigates, and more in recent years, as well. The pace of China’s construction of new surface ships and submarines has also been growing, creating a particularly significant and still-widening disparity in this regard with the U.S. Navy. This is something that has become increasingly concerning, as TWZ routinely highlights.

Work in Huludao, as well as shipyards elsewhere in China, is certainly already revealing interesting new insights into China’s next-generation submarine efforts.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post Chinese Next-Generation Submarine Developments Spotted In New Satellite Imagery appeared first on TWZ.

Un equipo internacional de astrónomos ha publicado un estudio detallado sobre VT J1906+0849, una fuente de radio descubierta en el sondeo VLASS (Very Large Array Sky Survey) que no se parece a ningún otro objeto conocido en la Vía Láctea. El trabajo, liderado por Jessie M. Miller, del Instituto de Tecnología de California, y publicado […]

Par Vincent Clairmont

La médiation de l'Autorité des marchés financiers a traité 462 dossiers relatifs au PEA en 2025, contre 185 en 2024 — une hausse de près de 150 % qui fait du plan d'épargne en actions le premier motif de saisine du médiateur, devant l'épargne salariale et les SCPI. Le mouvement ne ralentit pas : 1 865 dossiers tous produits confondus au premier semestre 2026, en progression de 31 % sur un an, le PEA conservant la tête. Près des trois quarts de ces dossiers portent sur un seul acte : le transfert d'un établissement à un autre. Et 92 % des propositions du médiateur ont été acceptées par les deux parties en 2025 — autrement dit, dans la quasi-totalité des dossiers instruits, le tort n'était pas du côté de l'épargnant.

Ces chiffres ne décrivent pas un produit défaillant. Ils décrivent un produit dont l'avantage fiscal repose entièrement sur une variable administrative — la date d'ouverture du plan — que le titulaire ne détient pas lui-même. Ce que vous protégez dans un PEA n'est pas votre capital : c'est un compteur, tenu par un tiers, et que trois ou quatre gestes mal exécutés suffisent à remettre à zéro. Je reprends le cycle de vie du plan étape par étape, avec à chaque étape le geste défensif correspondant.

1. À l'ouverture : démarrer le compteur avant d'avoir l'argent

Un contribuable ne peut détenir qu'un seul PEA. Le plafond de versements est de 150 000 euros, porté à 225 000 euros en cumulant avec un PEA-PME, et limité à 20 000 euros pour le PEA jeunes ouvert par un majeur de moins de 25 ans rattaché au foyer fiscal de ses parents. Un couple marié ou pacsé dispose donc de deux plans, soit 300 000 euros de versements.

Le point décisif est ailleurs : l'antériorité fiscale — les cinq années au terme desquelles les gains sortent exonérés d'impôt sur le revenu — court à compter de la date du premier versement, quel qu'en soit le montant. Un plan ouvert avec dix euros et laissé dormir cinq ans est fiscalement mûr ; un plan ouvert aujourd'hui avec 150 000 euros ne l'est pas.

Je préconise d'ouvrir un PEA dès aujourd'hui avec le versement minimal accepté par l'établissement — de 10 à 500 euros selon les enseignes — si vous n'en détenez pas encore, y compris si vous n'avez aucune intention d'investir en actions dans l'immédiat. Le coût est nul, le gain est de cinq ans d'antériorité. Et archivez immédiatement l'avis d'opération du premier versement en PDF, hors de l'espace client de la banque : c'est la seule preuve d'antériorité que vous détiendrez en propre, et vous en aurez besoin.

2. Au fil des versements : le plafond n'est pas ce que vous croyez

Les 150 000 euros plafonnent le cumul des versements, pas la valeur du plan. Un PEA alimenté à hauteur de 150 000 euros et qui en vaut 400 000 après quinze ans

Raffinerie, l’Italia decida di essere un Paese
di Margherita Furlan
19 settembre 2026

Aramco compra gasolio nel Mediterraneo dopo gli attacchi alle sue raffinerie. In quella stessa finestra di mercato si forma il prezzo che paghiamo alla pompa. L’Italia ci arriva senza impianti e senza bandiera
La fila di Aramco
Da alcune settimane Saudi Aramco presenta offerte d’acquisto nella finestra di contrattazione gestita da Platts per carichi di gasolio nel Mediterraneo. Secondo gli intermediari che seguono quella piattaforma, la società statale saudita cerca migliaia di tonnellate di prodotto raffinato; altri operatori riferiscono che sta sondando anche il mercato della benzina in Europa. L’azienda ha rifiutato di commentare.1
Conviene soffermarsi su cosa significhi. Aramco estrae, raffina e vende: è strutturalmente venditrice di distillati, non compratrice. Nel luglio 2025 l’Arabia Saudita aveva toccato il massimo storico delle esportazioni di gasolio, con una media mensile di 611mila barili al giorno, e Aramco si presentava come fornitore quasi solitario nelle finestre di valutazione del Nord Europa e del Mediterraneo, spesso a prezzi inferiori a quelli degli altri.2 Quattordici mesi dopo si mette in fila dall’altra parte del banco.
Il motivo non è un capriccio commerciale, sono gli impianti. Gli Houthi hanno rivendicato l’attacco alla raffineria di Yanbu, sul Mar Rosso, e nel corso dell’estate hanno colpito ripetutamente il centro di trattamento di Jazan, più a sud. Poi, il 10 settembre, droni partiti dall’Iraq hanno incendiato le stazioni di pompaggio dell’oleodotto Est-Ovest nelle aree di Riad e Medina: il ministero dell’Energia saudita ha confermato l’attacco e la chiusura «precauzionale» della conduttura, mentre le immagini satellitari mostravano il pennacchio di fumo sopra la linea e i danni estesi a una stazione vicino ad Al Mesba’ah.
Quella conduttura non è un’infrastruttura qualunque. Con lo Stretto di Hormuz sostanzialmente sbarrato dallo scoppio della guerra tra Stati Uniti, Israele e Iran nel febbraio 2026, l’oleodotto Est-Ovest è diventato la via di fuga del petrolio saudita: milleduecento chilometri dai giacimenti orientali al porto di Yanbu, con circa cinque milioni di barili al giorno dirottati su quella direttrice. Lo aveva detto l’amministratore delegato di Aramco, Amin Nasser: nel contenere la crisi di approvvigionamento il tubo aveva pesato più del rilascio delle riserve strategiche.3 Gli attacchi dell’aprile precedente avevano già sottratto al regno circa 600mila barili al giorno di capacità produttiva. Ad agosto l’estrazione saudita era scesa a 6,24 milioni di barili quotidiani, un livello che nessuno si aspettava di vedere dal principale produttore dell’OPEC.4
Nel frattempo si chiudeva anche l’altra uscita. Gli Houthi hanno proclamato a luglio un blocco marittimo contro le navi saudite, hanno preso il porto yemenita di Mokha e si sono avvicinati alle isole Hanish, cioè alla soglia di Bab el-Mandeb; il traffico attraverso quello stretto è calato di circa il sessanta per cento. Hormuz da una parte, Bab el-Mandeb dall’altra, l’oleodotto in mezzo è fermo: il regno che ha costruito la propria centralità mondiale sulla capacità di consegnare greggio ovunque si è ritrovato con tre porte socchiuse e un ordine d’acquisto da firmare nel Mediterraneo.
Il resto è politica. Nei giorni dell’avanzata su Mokha il principe ereditario Mohammed bin Salman avrebbe telefonato due volte a Donald Trump per chiedere raid contro il movimento yemenita, secondo funzionari statunitensi citati dalla stampa americana.5 Riad, per ora, ha evitato la rappresaglia diretta contro l’Iraq e Baghdad ha condannato l’attacco e apprezzato la scelta di non reagire.6 Il petroliere più potente del pianeta ha scoperto che la sua potenza dipendeva da cose fragili: una stazione di pompaggio, una colonna di distillazione, una rotta.
Il bersaglio non è più il pozzo
C’è una regolarità, in questi mesi, che i comunicati non dicono e le mappe sì. Nessuno bombarda i giacimenti. Si colpiscono le stazioni di pompaggio, le raffinerie, i terminali, i tubi. Il giacimento è profondo, disperso, difficile da distruggere e costoso da presidiare; l’impianto che trasforma il greggio in qualcosa di utilizzabile è invece un oggetto concentrato, visibile dal satellite, vulnerabile a un drone che costa quanto un’utilitaria. La stessa grammatica si legge sul fronte opposto dell’Eurasia, dove da due anni le raffinerie russe sono bersaglio sistematico dei droni ucraini, con fermate di impianti e contrazioni della produzione di carburante. Non è una coincidenza tecnica: è una dottrina che si è diffusa perché funziona.
Clausewitz aveva chiamato centro di gravità il punto da cui dipende la coesione dell’intera forza avversaria, quello contro cui vanno concentrate tutte le energie.7 Per un secolo si è creduto che nel settore energetico quel centro fosse la risorsa: chi possiede il sottosuolo comanda. La stagione che stiamo attraversando dice il contrario. Il centro di gravità è la catena di trasformazione e di trasporto e chi la colpisce ottiene con mezzi minuscoli effetti che nessun esercito convenzionale potrebbe produrre a quel costo. Un movimento armato yemenita, senza marina né aviazione, ha ridotto le esportazioni del primo produttore mondiale e ne ha fatto un compratore di gasolio sul mercato libero.
Ne discendono due conseguenze che riguardano direttamente l’Europa. La prima è che il vantaggio difensivo è scomparso: proteggere una rete di impianti e di condutture costa incomparabilmente più che attaccarla e nessuna quantità di navi in scorta può cambiare questa aritmetica. La seconda è che la sicurezza energetica ha smesso di essere un problema di contratti di fornitura per diventare un problema d’infrastrutture fisiche. Si può avere il barile e non avere il litro. Si può avere il litro e non avere il modo di farlo arrivare. Chi ha smontato pezzi della propria capacità di trasformazione pensando che il mercato avrebbe sempre provveduto ha fatto una scommessa sulla stabilità permanente delle rotte altrui. Quella scommessa, nell’anno in cui il re del greggio si mette in fila per comprare carburante, si sta rivelando per quello che era.
Il prezzo non nasce alla pompa
Qui il ragionamento smette di essere mediorientale e diventa italiano perché il collegamento fra Yanbu e il distributore sotto casa non è una metafora, ma un meccanismo documentato e pubblico.
Il prezzo industriale dei carburanti in Italia, cioè quel che resta una volta tolte accisa e imposta sul valore aggiunto, non segue il costo di produzione delle raffinerie nazionali. Segue la quotazione internazionale dei prodotti raffinati nel bacino mediterraneo, il cosiddetto Platts CIF Med, rilevato dall’agenzia che pubblica le valutazioni giornaliere sulla base delle contrattazioni fisiche. Lo scrive senza giri di parole l’associazione delle aziende petrolifere italiane nella propria nota metodologica sui prezzi: la materia prima del prezzo alla pompa è la quotazione Platts, e il margine lordo è la differenza fra il prezzo di vendita al netto delle tasse e quel valore. Lo ripete la stessa associazione quando deve spiegare perché il greggio scende e i carburanti no: il riferimento non è il Brent, sono le valutazioni dei raffinati.8
Vale la pena fermarsi su cosa sia quella finestra. Non è una borsa regolamentata con un’autorità di vigilanza pubblica: è un processo di valutazione gestito da una società privata di informazione sui mercati, alimentato dalle offerte che gli operatori presentano in un intervallo di tempo definito. L’Autorità garante della concorrenza e del mercato, in un’indagine del 2023 sui prezzi dei carburanti, ha osservato che i riferimenti internazionali dei prodotti petroliferi, Platts compreso, sono esposti a rischi di opacità, e lo ha argomentato richiamando da un lato procedimenti per sospette manipolazioni conclusi in giurisdizioni extraeuropee, dall’altro l’adozione di apposite linee guida da parte delle autorità internazionali di regolamentazione.9 È un’istituzione italiana che dice, in punta di diritto, che il termometro del nostro prezzo alla pompa non è un oggetto neutro.
In quella finestra, da alcune settimane, compra Saudi Aramco.
Il risultato lo hanno letto tutti sui cartelloni. Il 16 settembre 2026 il gasolio in modalità self service ha toccato il massimo storico italiano a 2,246 euro al litro, quasi due centesimi sopra il precedente primato del 17 marzo 2022, con 2,326 euro sulla rete autostradale e la quotazione all’ingrosso oltre i milleduecento euro per mille litri; il giorno seguente il servito viaggiava a 2,376.10 Senza il taglio dell’accisa il prezzo medio nazionale sarebbe stato di 2,416 euro.11
Nessuno impone a Roma cosa pagare. Semplicemente, il quadro dentro cui quel prezzo si forma è stato costruito da altri, si aggiorna ogni giorno in una finestra di mercato dove lo Stato italiano non siede, e il nostro margine di azione si è ridotto a decidere se restituire ai cittadini qualche centesimo di accisa. Non è dipendenza dal barile: è dipendenza dalla struttura.
Il mercato si era già ristretto
C’è un antefatto che rende il gesto di Aramco molto più pesante di quanto appaia e che riguarda l’Europa da vicino: la riserva di gasolio del Mediterraneo si era assottigliata per decisione politica mesi prima che i droni arrivassero su Yanbu.
Fino al 2022 circa il quaranta per cento del gasolio importato dall’Unione europea veniva dalla Russia. L’embargo ha chiuso quel canale ma non ha ridotto la domanda: l’ha deviata. Si è aperta così la scappatoia della raffinazione, il cosiddetto refining loophole, per cui India, Turchia e in parte Cina compravano greggio russo a prezzi scontati proprio grazie alle sanzioni occidentali, lo lavoravano nei propri impianti e rivendevano all’Europa prodotti formalmente non russi, perché la nazionalità di un carburante, nel diritto commerciale, è quella del Paese in cui avviene la trasformazione, non quella del pozzo. Non era un traffico clandestino: era legale, pubblico e quantificato. Nel giugno 2025 l’Europa ha ricevuto 124mila barili al giorno di gasolio dall’India e 94mila dalla Turchia, pari rispettivamente al sette e al cinque per cento delle importazioni totali; secondo le stime di Kpler, che includono anche il carburante per aerei, l’India, fino a pochi anni prima inesistente come esportatore verso il nostro continente, ha coperto nel 2024 il sedici per cento dell’import europeo, in un anno in cui il greggio russo rappresentava il trentotto per cento degli acquisti indiani.12
Per tre anni, insomma, l’Europa ha continuato a bruciare molecole di origine russa passate per Jamnagar o per İzmir, dichiarando di non comprare più dalla Russia. Poi, nel luglio 2025, il diciottesimo pacchetto di sanzioni ha chiuso anche quella porta: dal 21 gennaio 2026 è vietato importare nell’Unione prodotti petroliferi ottenuti in Paesi terzi a partire da greggio di origine russa, con esenzione per alcuni partner e per i Paesi esportatori netti di greggio.13 La misura ha due caratteristiche che meritano di essere dette. La prima è che nessuna analisi di laboratorio può stabilire l’origine di una molecola dopo la raffinazione, tanto più che si lavorano miscele di greggi diversi: l’applicazione dipende quindi da autocertificazioni e da tracciamenti documentali, e già al momento dell’annuncio gli operatori prevedevano un carosello di trasbordi destinato a confondere le carte. La seconda è che quel divieto ha ristretto l’offerta disponibile nel bacino mediterraneo in un momento in cui l’Europa non aveva ricostruito un grammo della capacità di raffinazione che aveva dismesso.
Ora si guardi la sequenza per intero, perché è la cosa più istruttiva di tutta questa vicenda. Il 21 gennaio 2026 l’Unione europea restringe per via normativa il proprio accesso al gasolio. A febbraio la guerra tra Stati Uniti, Israele e Iran sbarra lo Stretto di Hormuz. Durante l’estate gli attacchi degli Houthi mettono fuori uso a intermittenza gli impianti sauditi sul Mar Rosso. Il 10 settembre saltano le stazioni di pompaggio dell’oleodotto Est-Ovest. E in quel bacino ristretto, dove l’Europa deve comprare per forza, entra come acquirente anche il maggiore produttore mondiale. Nessuno di questi eventi, preso da solo, era imprevedibile; il loro sovrapporsi era un rischio di sistema che qualcuno avrebbe dovuto valutare prima di firmare i provvedimenti e prima di autorizzare le conversioni di impianti. Il differenziale fra il prezzo del gasolio e quello del greggio, che è la misura esatta della scarsità di capacità di raffinazione, aveva già superato i ventisei dollari al barile nell’estate 2025, il massimo dal febbraio 2024. Era un segnale, ed era leggibile da chiunque.
Va detto con chiarezza quel che l’Unione ha deciso senza dotarsi degli strumenti per reggerne le conseguenze non lo pagano le cancellerie, bensì chi mette il gasolio nel furgone alle sei del mattino.
La deindustrializzazione ha un indirizzo
A questo punto la domanda giusta non è perché il gasolio costi tanto, ma perché l’Italia sia arrivata a questo appuntamento in queste condizioni. E la risposta ha una data d’inizio, una sequenza e dei documenti.
Fra il 2000 e il 2024 il Paese ha perso il 12,7 per cento della propria capacità di raffinazione.14 Non è stata un’emorragia improvvisa: è stata una successione di decisioni aziendali, ciascuna ragionevole dal punto di vista di chi la prendeva, che sommate hanno prodotto un risultato che nessuno ha mai deliberato in Parlamento.
La raffineria di Cremona della Tamoil ha chiuso nel 2011 ed è stata convertita in deposito: l’amministratore delegato della società lo raccontò ai deputati della Commissione Attività produttive, spiegando che un impianto nella pianura padana, senza sbocco al mare, non riusciva più a collocare l’eccesso di olio combustibile e di benzina.15 La Raffineria di Roma, a Pantano di Grano, comunicò nel giugno 2012 l’intenzione di trasformare, a decorrere dal 30 settembre di quell’anno, lo stabilimento di lavorazione e stoccaggio in mero deposito di oli minerali: la dismissione dell’attività di raffinazione è scritta negli atti autorizzativi.16 La IES di Mantova, comprata quattro anni prima dal gruppo ungherese MOL, annunciò nell’ottobre 2013 la trasformazione graduale in deposito a partire dal gennaio successivo, con 350 esuberi su 390 dipendenti. Nel frattempo Eni fermava per sei mesi Porto Marghera e metteva in cassa integrazione a zero ore cinquecento persone a Gela.
Il Parlamento lo sapeva. Nel 2012 la Camera svolse una indagine conoscitiva specifica sulla crisi della raffinazione, con audizioni di aziende e sindacati, e il documento conclusivo registrava il rischio di chiusura di almeno quattro o cinque siti e la necessità di interventi a tutela del settore.17 Gli interventi non sono arrivati. È arrivata, invece, una narrazione più comoda.
Perché la seconda ondata è stata raccontata in tutt’altro modo. Porto Marghera è diventata bioraffineria nel 2014, Gela nel 2019, Livorno è in conversione con completamento previsto fra la fine del 2026 e l’inizio del 2027. Ogni annuncio è stato presentato come transizione ecologica e sul piano delle emissioni ha una sua logica difendibile. Sul piano della sicurezza degli approvvigionamenti, però, i numeri raccontano un’altra storia, perché le scale non sono paragonabili: Livorno, che sta completando il passaggio alla bioraffinazione, trattava quattro milioni di tonnellate di greggio l’anno e nessun impianto a scarti e oli vegetali lavora volumi simili. Un litro di gasolio idrogenato da scarti alimentari non è un litro di gasolio fossile in meno da importare: è un’altra filiera, con materie prime diverse, volumi diversi e limiti propri. La colonna di distillazione che smetti di far girare non torna.
Pasolini aveva coniato, per descrivere l’Italia che si trasformava sotto i suoi occhi, la formula dello «sviluppo senza progresso»: un Paese che si modernizza nelle forme e si impoverisce nella sostanza, perché il criterio della trasformazione non è il bene comune ma la convenienza di chi la guida.18 Non è un’analogia forzata. La dismissione della raffinazione italiana è stata razionale per ogni singolo azionista e distruttiva per l’interesse nazionale e nessuno, in vent’anni, si è preso la responsabilità politica di dire che quelle due razionalità non coincidevano.
Oggi restano poco più di dieci impianti attivi, di cui tre convertiti o in conversione alla bioraffinazione. È il patrimonio con cui l’Italia si presenta al mercato in cui, da alcune settimane, compra anche Saudi Aramco.
Il cambio di bandiera
Gli impianti sopravvissuti hanno cambiato proprietario, e la geografia di quei passaggi dice più di qualsiasi dichiarazione programmatica.
La ISAB di Priolo Gargallo, il complesso di raffinazione più grande del Paese, è passata in dieci anni dalla genovese Erg alla russa Lukoil, da questa al fondo cipriota G.O.I. Energy nel 2023, sotto la pressione delle sanzioni e con accordi decennali di fornitura e di ritiro affidati alla società di intermediazione Trafigura, e infine, nella primavera del 2026, a un gruppo italiano. È la vicenda più istruttiva dell’intero dossier e merita un capitolo a sé.
Sarroch, in Sardegna, è la seconda gamba del sistema: trecentomila barili al giorno, oltre un quinto dei carburanti italiani, in gran parte gasolio, cioè esattamente il prodotto di cui l’Europa non è autosufficiente. Era la Saras della famiglia Moratti; dal 2024 è di Vitol, il maggiore operatore mondiale indipendente nel commercio di petrolio. Augusta, centosettantamila barili al giorno, è della algerina Sonatrach, che l’ha rilevata nel 2018 da Esso Italia. Milazzo è per metà kuwaitiana, joint venture paritaria fra Eni e Kuwait Petroleum. Già nel febbraio 2024, facendo i conti con l’ingresso di Vitol in Saras, Il Sole 24 Ore osservava che circa metà della capacità di raffinazione italiana passava sotto controllo straniero.19
Poi è arrivato il passaggio più grande, e quasi nessuno se n’è accorto. Nel settembre 2025 la famiglia Brachetti Peretti ha firmato l’accordo vincolante per cedere il 99,82 per cento di Italiana Petroli, il gruppo Api, alla SOCAR, la compagnia petrolifera di Stato dell’Azerbaigian. Nel pacchetto, valutato attorno ai tre miliardi di euro, ci sono la raffineria di Falconara Marittima, quella di Trecate e oltre quattromilacinquecento stazioni di servizio a marchio IP. Il perfezionamento è arrivato nella primavera del 2026, dopo le autorizzazioni in materia di concorrenza, sovvenzioni estere e poteri speciali dello Stato. Non è più solo la raffinazione: è la rete capillare attraverso cui gli italiani fanno il pieno.
Sia chiaro cosa si sta dicendo e cosa no. Non c’è nulla di illegittimo in queste operazioni e nulla da eccepire sui compratori: un trader olandese, un fondo cipriota, una compagnia di Stato algerina e una azera hanno fatto quello che è nel loro mandato, cioè comprare beni che rendono. Il punto è l’altro lato del tavolo. Una raffineria per un operatore di mercato è un margine fra il costo del greggio e il valore dei prodotti e se quel margine si assottiglia la si spegne; per uno Stato è la differenza tra avere il petrolio e il carburante. Sono due criteri diversi e l’Italia ha lasciato che prevalesse il primo senza mai dichiarare di averlo scelto. La normativa sui poteri speciali è stata applicata come procedura di controllo su singole operazioni, non come strumento di una politica industriale: ha accompagnato i passaggi di proprietà, non li ha orientati.
È un mutamento reale dei rapporti di potere travestito da ordinaria amministrazione. La cessione dell’apparato di raffinazione italiano ne è un caso quasi scolastico. Nessun voto parlamentare ha mai stabilito che il Paese rinunciasse al controllo della propria capacità di trasformazione. È accaduto in quindici anni, un atto societario alla volta, e ogni singolo atto era legittimo.
Priolo, quattro proprietari in dieci anni
Se si vuole capire che cosa accade a un’infrastruttura strategica quando la si affida integralmente al mercato dei capitali conviene guardare da vicino Priolo Gargallo, provincia di Siracusa: le due raffinerie riunite sotto la sigla ISAB valgono circa un quinto della capacità di raffinazione nazionale, coprono una quota consistente della domanda elettrica siciliana, occupano attorno a mille persone in via diretta e ne sostengono diverse migliaia nell’indotto. Non è uno stabilimento, è un pezzo dell’ossatura del Paese.
La sequenza dei proprietari, in poco più di dieci anni, è questa: il gruppo genovese Erg esce dalla raffinazione, l’impianto passa alla russa Lukoil attraverso la controllata Litasco e nel 2023, quando le sanzioni rendono impossibile sia importare greggio russo che ottenere credito bancario per comprarne altrove, viene ceduto al fondo cipriota G.O.I. Energy. La cessione, secondo il Financial Times, fu agevolata dal gruppo di intermediazione Trafigura e da un investitore privato, e fu approvata dal governo italiano con l’esercizio dei poteri speciali; i dettagli delle condizioni imposte non sono stati resi pubblici. Lo Stato, in altre parole, ha scelto e autorizzato il compratore, e lo ha fatto in forza di un decreto legge concepito proprio per proteggere l’impianto durante l’uscita dei russi.
L’assetto era questo: la proprietà al fondo, il capitale circolante a Trafigura, che avrebbe fornito il greggio e ritirato i prodotti raffinati per dieci anni. Poi è arrivato il conto. Nel gennaio 2025 la società apre una procedura di composizione negoziata della crisi per gestire tensioni finanziarie; secondo il Financial Times l’azionista di controllo indiretto avrebbe cercato di usare quella procedura per rinegoziare o risolvere il contratto decennale con il trader, giudicato penalizzante per l’impianto, e l’esistenza di quel vincolo avrebbe ostacolato le trattative con possibili acquirenti. Nell’autunno 2025 emerge in sede giudiziaria che il prezzo di acquisto non sarebbe stato integralmente saldato al venditore russo, con un debito indicato fra i 150 e i 190 milioni di euro, e il tribunale apre alla possibilità di pignoramento delle quote. Nel febbraio 2026 la procedura di crisi si chiude con esito positivo; nella primavera il fondo firma la cessione a un gruppo italiano, con un’operazione articolata in due fasi, la prima relativa al 51 per cento. Il via libera dell’Autorità garante della concorrenza è arrivato; il vaglio dei poteri speciali, mentre scriviamo, è ancora davanti al governo, e i sindacati territoriali chiedono di essere coinvolti in quel passaggio.
Bilancio di dieci anni: quattro assetti proprietari, due procedure straordinarie, un contenzioso internazionale, perdite per centinaia di milioni nel 2023 e nel 2024 e un ritorno all’utile nel 2025 grazie a condizioni di mercato favorevoli. I lavoratori hanno attraversato l’intero percorso senza mai sapere chi fosse davvero il loro datore di lavoro l’anno successivo, e il sindacato, al primo tavolo con la nuova proprietà, ha dovuto porre come condizioni non negoziabili cose che in un Paese con una politica industriale sarebbero ovvie: salvaguardia dei livelli occupazionali, tutela dell’indotto, un cronoprogramma certo d’investimenti a partire dalla manutenzione di un impianto che tratta idrocarburi in un sito di interesse nazionale per le bonifiche.
David Harvey ha chiamato accumulazione per spoliazione quel meccanismo per cui il capitale, quando il profitto ordinario si comprime, torna a guadagnare non producendo di più ma appropriandosi di beni già esistenti, spesso pubblici o socialmente costruiti, e rimettendoli in circolo come attività finanziarie. La vicenda di Priolo non è la sua illustrazione perfetta, e sarebbe scorretto presentarla come tale: qui il rischio industriale c’è stato davvero e le perdite pure. Ma il nucleo del ragionamento tiene. Un impianto che vale un quinto della capacità nazionale è stato trattato per un decennio come una partecipazione da acquistare, da rifinanziare e da rivendere, mentre la sua funzione, per il Paese, era un’altra: garantire che ci fosse carburante. Quando il criterio finanziario e quello della sicurezza divergono, non è il primo a cedere.
Il ritorno dell’impianto sotto controllo italiano è una buona notizia e va detto. Ma è avvenuto per iniziativa di un gruppo privato al termine di una crisi, non per effetto di una strategia nazionale ed è ancora una volta lo Stato a doversi limitare a dire sì o no a un’operazione decisa da altri. Il golden power è solo un semaforo: regola il traffico, non decide dove si va.
Il fornitore diventa concorrente
L’Italia è un Paese che produce gasolio. Secondo i dati del ministero dell’Ambiente e della Sicurezza energetica relativi al 2025, il fabbisogno nazionale di gasolio si aggira sui 23,3 milioni di tonnellate e la produzione delle raffinerie italiane sfiora i 25 milioni: siamo esportatori netti, con circa 7,9 milioni di tonnellate vendute all’estero contro 5,2 importate. Chi racconta un Paese incapace di raffinare dice una cosa falsa.
E allora perché il prezzo alla pompa tocca il massimo storico proprio mentre a migliaia di chilometri saltano le stazioni di pompaggio saudite? Perché l’esposizione italiana non è fisica, è di posizione. Due numeri lo spiegano meglio di un saggio. Il 60 per cento del gasolio che importiamo proviene dall’area del Golfo, e il 47 per cento arriva dalla sola Arabia Saudita. Il nostro primo fornitore di gasolio è esattamente il soggetto che da alcune settimane presenta offerte d’acquisto nella finestra mediterranea dove si forma il nostro prezzo industriale. Non ha smesso di venderci: ha cominciato a comprare dove compriamo noi. Il fornitore è diventato concorrente, e ci è arrivato nel giro di un trimestre, senza che nessuno decidesse nulla.
Immanuel Wallerstein descriveva l’economia mondiale come un sistema unico articolato in centro, periferia e semiperiferia, dove la posizione di ciascuno non dipende dalla ricchezza assoluta ma dal punto che occupa nella divisione del lavoro e nella catena del valore.20 L’Italia energetica sta esattamente lì, nel mezzo: trasforma molto, decide poco, non controlla né la risorsa a monte né le regole di formazione del prezzo a valle. È una posizione che funziona benissimo quando il sistema è stabile e diventa una trappola nel momento in cui qualcuno, in Yemen o in Iraq, scopre che una stazione di pompaggio si buca con un drone.
L’accisa come anestetico
Lo Stato italiano f l’unica cosa che gli è rimasta da fare, e la fa in entrambe le direzioni nello stesso anno.
Il primo movimento è strutturale. Il decreto legislativo 43 del 2025 avvia il riavvicinamento graduale fra l’accisa sulla benzina e quella sul gasolio, e il decreto ministeriale del 14 maggio 2025 lo mette in pratica: un centesimo e mezzo in meno al litro sulla benzina, un centesimo e mezzo in più sul gasolio.21 Poi la legge di bilancio per il 2026 accelera bruscamente: dal primo gennaio le due aliquote sono parificate a 672,90 euro per mille litri, il che significa 4,05 centesimi in meno sulla benzina e 4,05 in più sul gasolio, senza gradualità, con la motivazione esplicita di superare un sussidio ambientalmente dannoso censito nel catalogo del ministero dell’Ambiente.22 La logica ambientale è comprensibile. L’effetto sociale, in un Paese dove il gasolio muove l’autotrasporto, l’agricoltura e la quota maggioritaria del parco veicoli, è una tassa che colpisce chi lavora. E c’è un precedente che nessuno ha chiarito: dopo il riequilibrio del maggio 2025 il rincaro sul gasolio si è trasferito ai prezzi quasi integralmente, mentre lo sconto sulla benzina, almeno sulla rete autostradale, si è visto in misura ridicola, tanto che un’associazione di consumatori ha depositato un esposto all’Antitrust.23 La partita di giro, sulla carta a somma zero, è diventata un aumento netto per il cittadino.
Il secondo movimento è d’emergenza, e va nella direzione opposta. Da quando il prezzo internazionale del gasolio ha cominciato a correre, il governo taglia la stessa accisa che ha appena aumentato: l’aliquota viene ridotta in via temporanea a 532,90 euro per mille litri, cioè quattordici centesimi al litro, più tre centesimi di minore imposta sul valore aggiunto, per uno sconto complessivo di diciassette centesimi.24 E lo fa per periodi brevissimi, rinnovati di decreto in decreto: dal 28 luglio al 6 agosto, dal 27 agosto al 5 settembre, poi fino al 10, poi fino al 17 con una copertura di circa 85 milioni di euro, poi con uno sconto dimezzato e infine ridotto a poco più di sei centesimi. Sedici proroghe, circa due miliardi di euro in sette mesi, e un prezzo che nel frattempo ha toccato comunque il massimo storico.
Messi in fila, i due movimenti raccontano meglio di qualunque analisi lo stato della politica energetica italiana. A gennaio lo Stato alza l’accisa sul gasolio di quattro centesimi per ragioni ambientali; da luglio la taglia di quattordici per ragioni sociali; a settembre torna a ridurre lo sconto perché non ci sono più coperture. È l’unica leva rimasta a un Paese che ha perso il controllo di tutto il resto della catena, e viene azionata avanti e indietro come il volante di un’automobile che ha i freni altrove. Ogni proroga dura una settimana o dieci giorni, esattamente la durata dell’attenzione mediatica che la accompagna.
Due miliardi sono una cifra seria. Sono circa quanto il Paese avrebbe speso per costituire una riserva strategica di prodotti finiti di dimensioni significative, o per finanziare la quota pubblica di un piano di ammodernamento della capacità di raffinazione residua. Sono stati spesi, invece, per ridurre di qualche centesimo e per qualche giorno un prezzo che si forma in una finestra di contrattazione privata nel Mediterraneo, dove nel frattempo è entrata a comprare Saudi Aramco. Un Paese senza controllo sulla catena può soltanto anestetizzare il dolore, mai curarlo.
Riprendersi la catena: i tre anelli
Mattei non aveva pozzi. Aveva capito che il potere non stava nel giacimento ma nella catena che porta il greggio dal sottosuolo al serbatoio e che quella catena si poteva costruire anche partendo da un Paese sconfitto e privo di risorse. A Tunisi, il 10 giugno 1960, nel giorno in cui firmava con il governo tunisino l’intesa per costruire una raffineria, spiegò che quelle intese nulla avevano a che vedere con «il modello obsoleto del capitalismo coloniale del XIX secolo», perché prevedevano compartecipazione finanziaria e cogestione fra Paesi produttori e Paesi consumatori, in condizioni di eguaglianza.25 Negli appunti preparati per quel viaggio, rimasti inutilizzati e conservati nell’archivio storico dell’Eni, la formulazione era ancora più tagliente: la condizione coloniale, annotava, esiste quando il gioco della domanda e dell’offerta di una materia prima vitale è «alterato da una potenza egemonica: anche privata, di monopolio o di oligopolio», e nel settore petrolifero quella potenza aveva un nome, il cartello.26 Sessantasei anni dopo, l’incontro fra domanda e offerta del nostro gasolio si decide in una finestra di contrattazione privata che l’Autorità garante della concorrenza definisce esposta a rischi di opacità. La definizione di Mattei non è invecchiata: si è solo spostata di soggetto.
Che cosa vuol dire, in concreto, riprendersi la catena nel 2026? Tre anelli, e per ciascuno una cosa che si può firmare.
La raffinazione. Dichiarare gli impianti infrastrutture strategiche a tutti gli effetti, sottoporne ogni passaggio di proprietà e ogni riconversione a un vaglio che non sia solo di legittimità ma di merito, e vincolare le conversioni a bioraffineria a un piano nazionale che stabilisca prima quanta capacità fossile il Paese deve conservare e per quanti anni. Non si tratta di fermare la transizione: il punto è smettere di affidarne il calendario ai margini industriali di operatori privati esteri. Sul fronte delle scorte l’architettura esiste già e va usata: il decreto legislativo 249 del 2012, che recepisce la direttiva europea sull’obbligo di mantenere una riserva minima, ha istituito l’Organismo centrale di stoccaggio italiano, le cui funzioni sono affidate ad Acquirente Unico sotto vigilanza ministeriale, e ha stabilito che le scorte specifiche siano di proprietà pubblica e conservate sul territorio nazionale.27 Il punto è la composizione: in una crisi come quella di questo settembre a mancare non è il barile, è il litro raffinato. Servono scorte di prodotti finiti, in quantità dichiarate e verificabili.
La logistica. Abbiamo i rigassificatori, il terminale di Trieste con l’oleodotto transalpino che rifornisce anche Austria, Germania e Repubblica Ceca, il gasdotto adriatico che porta in Puglia il gas del Caspio, le condutture dall’Algeria e dalla Libia. Quello che manca non è l’infrastruttura, è la regia: un soggetto pubblico che tratti direttamente con i produttori, come faceva l’Eni delle origini, invece di comprare da intermediari che lucrano sulla differenza. Il Piano Mattei del governo ha preso il nome; il metodo era un altro, e consisteva in contratti diretti, condizioni migliori per il Paese produttore e controllo italiano dell’infrastruttura di trasporto.
La rotta. Il 17 settembre, al forum Risorsa Mare della Spezia, il ministro della Difesa ha annunciato di avere deciso con il capo di Stato maggiore di attivare la Marina per garantire il transito delle navi di interesse nazionale attraverso Bab el-Mandeb, aggiungendo di non voler aspettare che sia la missione europea Aspides a stabilire se le navi possano passare. L’Italia è il primo contributore navale di quella missione, e questo rende la frase più interessante di quanto sembri: non è un atto di forza verso lo Yemen, è la constatazione che la cornice europea non decide. Una scorta, però, è una toppa. Una rotta si tiene aperta prima di tutto con la diplomazia: con l’Egitto, che vive di Suez ed è il primo interessato alla riapertura del traffico, con i Paesi rivieraschi del Mar Rosso e del Golfo, e con chi controlla militarmente la costa yemenita, perché la storia dei passaggi obbligati insegna che si negoziano prima di essere scortati. È la lezione mediterranea di Moro, che cercò nel dialogo con il mondo arabo una posizione autonoma per l’Italia, e di Craxi, che a Sigonella dimostrò che rivendicare la giurisdizione nazionale di fronte all’alleato non significa uscire dall’alleanza.
Chi esegue e chi decide
I fatti di questi giorni, non le opinioni, dicono dove siamo. Dal 31 luglio 2026 l’Italia guida la missione di sorveglianza aerea della NATO nei cieli baltici, con quattro Eurofighter e un centinaio di uomini a Šiauliai: primo decollo su allarme il 3 agosto, drone non identificato abbattuto il 15 settembre dopo essere entrato dalla Bielorussia. Il 17 settembre la Marina viene attivata per Bab el-Mandeb. Sul fronte finanziario, il Paese ha chiesto accesso ai prestiti europei del programma per l’industria della difesa, con una dotazione indicativa di 14,9 miliardi notificata dalla Commissione, da restituire in quarantacinque anni. Alla pompa, il gasolio sta a 2,25 euro al litro.
È un profilo riconoscibile: un Paese che presidia i cieli di altri, scorta le proprie navi in un mare che non controlla, s’indebita per armamenti decisi altrove e resta fuori dai tavoli dove si tratta di ciò che paga. Ma questo profilo non è un destino, è una serie di scelte, e chi lo definisce inevitabile sta spacciando per realismo una scelta. L’Italia una politica estera l’ha avuta, quando ha deciso di averla, e non l’ha mai avuta contro l’America: l’ha avuta accanto all’America, con la schiena dritta.
Un governo che volesse cominciare a riprendersi la catena non avrebbe bisogno di una legge di bilancio. Avrebbe bisogno di tre firme. Un provvedimento che dichiari le raffinerie infrastrutture strategiche e subordini conversioni e cessioni a un piano nazionale della raffinazione. Una richiesta formale, a Bruxelles e a Washington, perché l’Italia sieda al tavolo in cui si discute dell’energia che arriva nelle case degli italiani. Una convocazione dei Paesi rivieraschi del Mediterraneo e del Mar Rosso, con l’Egitto in testa, per una rotta negoziata invece che soltanto pattugliata.
Nessuna delle tre costa un euro. Costano una cosa sola, ed è la sola che in questi anni è mancata: decidere di essere un Paese.
Perché la fila in cui si è messa Aramco dice esattamente questo. Chi controlla la trasformazione e il trasporto detta le condizioni a chi possiede la materia prima, e non il contrario. Il regno che ha il più grande giacimento del mondo lo ha imparato in una settimana, con tre stazioni di pompaggio in fiamme. Noi abbiamo avuto quindici anni per impararlo e abbiamo usato quel tempo per vendere gli impianti, chiamare transizione le chiusure e ridurre le accise di sei centesimi.
La guerra è il prodotto. Il caos è la materia prima. E la sovranità, quando non la si difende, è la merce.

 

L'articolo Raffinerie, l’Italia decida di essere un Paese proviene da Casa del Sole TV.

Swedish and German forces are conducting what appears to be the first joint rehearsal of their rapid-reinforcement plans for the Baltic island of Gotland. The exercise is another step in Sweden’s defense planning for an island whose position in the middle of the Baltic gives it an outsized strategic importance for controlling access, protecting the Baltic states, and maintaining NATO’s freedom of movement in a region where Russian military activity remains a persistent concern.

The exercise, Silver Wotan 2026, running between September 14-23, brings together Swedish and German forces across the land, maritime, and air domains. The scenario is built around a Swedish request for allied assistance, with German forces moving personnel and equipment across the Baltic before integrating with Swedish units already defending the island. The operation is testing the entire process of getting allied combat power to Gotland, protecting it during the movement to Visby, and rapidly incorporating it into the island’s existing defensive network.

A video shows troops coming ashore on Swedish CB90 fast assault craft, a type that German soldiers are also trained to operate:

A rapid deployment of German and Swedish forces to Gotland island is being carried out today. Units from and are rehearsing the swift reinforcement of the strategic island in order to ensure the security of the Baltic Sea.#SilverWotan#NATO pic.twitter.com/A0r3LF8XUP

— Försvarsmakten (@Forsvarsmakten) September 18, 2026

The strategic importance of Gotland has grown considerably following Sweden’s accession to NATO in March 2024, which was a direct response to the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Located approximately halfway between mainland Sweden and the Baltic states, the island occupies a central position in the Baltic Sea, close to the maritime approaches to the Gulf of Finland and within reach of the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. Its location gives forces operating from Gotland a potentially significant position from which to conduct surveillance, air defense, and maritime operations, while also making the island an important part of the wider network connecting NATO’s northern and eastern members.

At the same time, Gotland sits within an extremely complex littoral environment, where shallow waters, islands, narrow maritime approaches, and the proximity of multiple states can make both offensive operations and defensive planning more difficult. The region has also been shaped by longstanding Swedish concerns about Russian clandestine activity, including intelligence gathering and other forms of covert or deniable activity. The complexity of the Baltic operating environment can make such activities harder to detect and attribute, adding another layer of uncertainty alongside the more conventional military challenges facing the region.

Geography has long made Gotland important to Swedish defense planning, but its significance has taken on a broader dimension since Sweden joined the alliance. NATO has described the island as strategically important to its freedom of maneuver in the Baltic, while Swedish officials have highlighted its potential role as a hub for military operations and logistics in the region.

The current exercise is designed around the practical difficulties of reinforcing such a position.

Military equipment is being transported by sea to Visby, Gotland’s principal port, including by commercial ferry. In Visby, Swedish and German personnel are securing the harbor and conducting the reception of the arriving force. Among the equipment being moved are air defense systems, while Swedish forces are also operating coastal defense systems armed with anti-ship missiles.

Meanwhile, publicly available flight-tracking data showed German Luftwaffe transport aircraft, including at least one Airbus A400M airlifter, apparently involved in the effort. The commercial airport at Visby has long also been used for military activities related to Gotland and the wider Baltic region.

”A rapid deployment of German and Swedish forces to Gotland island is being carried out today” https://t.co/z6oLs1LCT4 pic.twitter.com/n18MdST6r1

— Jamming (@balticjam) September 18, 2026

The movement is supported by Swedish and German naval forces and other aircraft, creating a scenario in which the maritime transit, protection of the port, air operations, and subsequent movement of troops and equipment ashore all form part of the same military problem. Once ashore, the arriving forces have to be moved into position and integrated with Swedish units already responsible for defending the island.

The Swedish Gotland Regiment, P 18, provides the core of the island’s permanent military presence. The regiment, Sweden’s youngest and smallest, has been rebuilding its capabilities since Sweden began expanding its military presence on Gotland. Its forces form the basis of the ground-defense structure into which allied reinforcements would be incorporated.

Swedish coastal defense capabilities are another important element of the drill. Land-based anti-ship missiles provide the island with a means of threatening hostile surface vessels operating in the surrounding waters, giving the defense of Gotland a direct connection to the wider maritime battle for the Baltic. During Silver Wotan, Swedish and German forces are also conducting anti-surface warfare activities alongside the broader reinforcement operation.

Germany is contributing more than 500 troops to the exercise, part of approximately 2,000 Bundeswehr personnel involved, including elements from the army, navy, and air force. The German Luftwaffe has deployed Panavia Tornado aircraft for surveillance, while German naval forces are participating in the maritime component, and German ground personnel are involved in the reinforcement and security activities on Gotland.

The exercise scenario is particularly relevant against the backdrop of Russia’s continuing military presence in the Baltic region.

Russia maintains major military infrastructure in Kaliningrad, including naval, air, missile, and air defense capabilities, while the Russian Baltic Fleet operates from bases in the region. Kaliningrad’s position between Poland and Lithuania gives Moscow a significant military foothold inside the NATO area, while Russian forces and military infrastructure elsewhere along the Baltic add to the complexity of operating and reinforcing allied territory in the region.

The security environment around the Baltic has also deteriorated considerably since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. NATO has increased its surveillance and military activity in the region, including the launch of Baltic Sentry in January 2025 following a series of incidents involving critical undersea infrastructure. The alliance has subsequently expanded efforts to monitor maritime activity and protect infrastructure and sea lines of communication.

Swedish authorities have stressed that Silver Wotan was planned in advance and is not being conducted in response to a specific imminent Russian threat. The exercise nonetheless reflects the operational environment in which Swedish and NATO planners now have to consider the possibility that maritime and air movements across the Baltic could be monitored, disrupted, or contested.

The exercise also builds on a series of increasingly large Swedish-led activities designed to test the reception of allied forces on Swedish territory. During Aurora 26 earlier this year, more than 18,000 troops from 13 countries participated in operations across Sweden, including the deployment of allied forces to Gotland alongside the Gotland Regiment and Swedish Home Guard. NATO described that activity as an emergency deployment intended to test the reinforcement of the island.

Silver Wotan places a more concentrated emphasis on the Swedish-German relationship and on the movement of an allied force into the island’s existing defensive structure.

Germany’s participation is also consistent with its growing military role in the Baltic and along NATO’s northeastern flank. Berlin is already providing forces for NATO’s forward defense in Lithuania and has increasingly emphasized the ability to move German forces rapidly across northern Europe in support of allied operations.

For Sweden, meanwhile, Gotland has become one of the clearest examples of how NATO membership has changed the country’s defense planning. The island remains a Swedish responsibility, but its location means that what happens there has consequences well beyond Sweden’s territorial defense.

A defended and adequately supplied Gotland provides NATO with a strategically positioned base for surveillance and defensive operations in the Baltic, while the ability to reinforce it demonstrates that the alliance can maintain access to the island even as the surrounding maritime and air environment becomes more contested.

The exercise comes as European allies are being forced to plan for a NATO in which the United States may provide less of the conventional military weight it has supplied for decades. The Pentagon is reviewing the size and posture of U.S. forces in Europe, including the forces and capabilities Washington would make available in a European crisis, while NATO’s top commander has said further U.S. troop withdrawals should be expected as European allies build up their own conventional capabilities.

At the same time, the alliance now describes Russia as its most significant and direct security threat, citing military activity alongside airspace violations, sabotage, cyber operations, and other forms of hybrid pressure. There are also growing concerns that Russia could try something in the Baltics, while it continues to step up its gray-zone activities regardless. NATO officials have warned that Russia could rebuild enough military capacity to pose a more serious conventional challenge to the alliance before the end of the decade.

There are escalating warnings from Poland that Russia is preparing to widen its war against Ukraine, with "accidental" missile and drone strikes on NATO territory.

Such a move – Russia falsely claiming air strikes that hit NATO allies happened by accident – would be designed to…

— Deborah Haynes (@haynesdeborah) September 18, 2026

For Sweden and Germany, the Silver Wotan exercise is a practical test of how quickly European forces can reinforce and defend one of the Baltic’s most strategically important positions. As the security environment grows more contested and Europe prepares for a future in which U.S. forces may not be as readily available, the ability to move allied combat power across the region and integrate it into existing defenses is becoming an increasingly important part of NATO’s deterrence.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

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