The MEPs steering the EU’s key industrial law want “Made in Europe” to mean that goods are actually produced in the EU.
Their draft report on the Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA), presented to three parliament committees on Monday (28 September), would reserve the label, and the subsidies and public contracts that come with it, for goods produced in the 27 member states.
Partner countries such as Japan or Korea could be added later, but only if they meet set criteria.
This is a break with the EU commission’s proposal, which would apply to virtually every country with a free-trade or procurement deal with the EU.
This article continues, but the full version is available only to EUobserver.com subscribers. Visit account.euobserver.com/membership
Vladimir Putin is in trouble. The war in Ukraine is not going well for him; casualties are mounting at an alarming rate; discontent in Russian society is growing amid serious economic hardships; and the Kremlin’s inner circle is becoming increasingly perplexed by their leader’s ineffectiveness. His response, for now, is the same as always: escalation. Against Ukraine, with more missiles; against his own citizens, with more repression; and against the EU, with attacks, threats, and provocations of various kinds — sabotage, cyberattacks, incursions — that are becoming increasingly bold and dangerous.
Commercial integration between Mexico and the United States, under the protection of the USMCA trade agreement, will first have to navigate a complicated customs issue: China. On the eve of the fourth round of talks, scheduled in theory for October, the economic rules that the Mexican government will impose on Chinese goods, investment and technology are of particular interest to the White House.
The Trump-Xi summit did not mark a US-China rapprochement, but it demonstrates that sustained diplomacy and strategic guardrails are essential to prevent intensifying competition from becoming direct conflict. The recent summit between Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump in Washington has demonstrated a significant paradox in contemporary international politics: the two superpowers […]
President Donald Trump rolled out the red carpet for Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state visit to Washington, greeting him in person at Joint Base Andrews, a rare gesture for an American president. Critics in both parties warned that the pageantry would reward a rival. However, the red carpet, the state dinner with its exquisite menu, […]
Torn between its Russian, Chinese, Iranian and North Korean issues, American foreign policy has nonetheless revealed, over the decades, a constant hierarchy: the Sino-American rivalry remains the major geopolitical issue that structures Washington’s Asian policy. With one month to go before the midterm elections, the American election campaign, despite being structured by deep partisan divides, […]
The following are excerpts from my speech in Istanbul on September 26, 2026.
The unipolar world order has collapsed, and we should conduct a post-mortem to reflect on what went wrong and to understand the current turbulent transition of the world. In 1989, Francis Fukuyama famously published his article on the ‘End of History,’ which was largely adopted as an ideological guide by the political West. The world only had one superpower and one ideology, and the expectation was that the world would unify under US leadership and liberal democratic values. The dominance of the US would end international anarchy and security competition, as there was only one centre of power, and the US hegemon would elevate the role of liberal democracy to form an inclusive community of universal values. For more than three decades, the West produced a new generation of politicians who believed that the collective hegemony of the West was for the benefit of all mankind, and they were the administrators who would manage the transition from the chaotic world of the past to perpetual peace. So what went wrong?
The Contradiction of Hegemonic Universalism
The unipolar moment was always destined to be a temporary phenomenon, as the US would predictably exhaust its resources and incentivise rising powers to collectively balance the US. However, there is also an inherent contradiction in hegemonic universalism, as universal values are linked to one entity of power. A hegemon claims to represent universal values such as freedom, democracy, and human rights, albeit this universalism is promoted through a particular historical, cultural, and geopolitical order.
Universal values advocating for equality are used to institutionalise a dominant position for the US. Universal values advocating for inclusion are used to build exclusive blocs such as NATO rather than developing an inclusive pan-European security architecture. John Herz noted as early as 1950 that the more democratic states were at home, the more they seemed to insist on a dominant position in international institutions to defend liberal values from the rule of the majority. Liberal values build on the idea that tolerance is imperative, as all people and states have different ideas about the good life and their own path to development, yet the universality of values suggests that all states must develop along the same path, and the political West, as the champion of liberal democracy, is the civilizational teacher seeking to “socialize” the rest of the world. Liberalism has subsequently been promoted as a hegemonic norm.
The Revisionism of Hegemonic Universalism
The modern world order was established with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, in which a hegemonic system legitimised with universalist claims was replaced with a multipolar system based on the cultural distinctiveness of states. The past 80 years have been a historical anomaly, with a bipolar system that collapsed and gave way to a unipolar system with one centre of power. The normal situation of the world has been a multipolar Westphalian system with a power equilibrium.
Over the past decades, hegemonic universalism transformed European states as national competencies were transferred to the US. US military dominance meant that Europe largely outsourced its security and foreign policy to the US within the format of the alliance system. US economic dominance meant that the international economic architecture, with banks, currencies, payment systems, and trade agreements, was largely administered by the US. Civil society in Europe and beyond has been managed by “non-governmental organizations” financed by the US government and cooperating closely with US intelligence services. The European political system is premised on the idea that loyalty to international institutions is more vital and moral than national interests, as Europe’s linkage to the US within the political West is the main source of stability and prosperity.
Return of Civilizational Distinctiveness
The hegemon is now gone, and the universal claims are rejected by the wider world. A multipolar world is already here, and the rising powers are demanding a return to a Westphalian world order of sovereign equals based on civilizational distinctiveness. As Xi Jinping insists, all civilizations have their own path to development, and no aspiring hegemon has the right to tell others how to develop. The return of rhetoric about civilizational states across the Eurasian continent signifies a rejection of unipolarity and universalism. New institutions such as the SCO and BRICS attempt to accommodate the multipolar world, yet new members are joining faster than institutional efficiency can adjust to.
The US has reluctantly already begun adjusting to these new realities, as it recognises it cannot be everywhere and must prioritise, while the language of liberal universalism is being replaced with national interests. New political forces are rising in the US that want to scale back the empire to save the republic, as a strategic retreat would allow the US to rebuild its strength and end the collective balancing by other great powers. What makes Europe so dangerous today is its weakness and panic due to the failure of finding a new role in the multipolar system. Security can no longer be based on the dominance of the collective West; there is no clear economic model; and the claims of representing universal values are no longer convincing. Yet the Europeans are not willing to recognise new realities and adjust accordingly by diversifying economic and political connectivity. The available evidence suggests that this will be a very turbulent transition from unipolar universalism to multipolar distinctiveness, and the new world will more likely be born through war than diplomacy
A mounting standoff over allegations of covert Chinese nuclear testing and rapid arsenal expansion has collided with an intensifying domestic debate within the US over whether it must abandon its decades-long test moratorium. US officials are pressing China in confidential diplomatic talks over suspected low-yield nuclear testing and a rapid strategic expansion across at least […]
Sandra Martinez Roe, a mother in Los Angeles, hopes that her son will never use artificial intelligence (AI) in school. “I’m not going to let my children be guinea pigs,” she tells EL PAÍS over the phone. The city’s school board granted her wish, at least temporarily, a couple of weeks ago: the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) has banned AI from public classrooms this school year.
China called on Saturday for an immediate end to the blockade on Cuba, in a speech to the UN General Assembly that stopped short of naming the United States.
Vice President Han Zheng urged the “relevant country” to “immediately stop using the threat of force against Cuba” and to “immediately and completely lift the blockade and sanctions.”
He also pushed back against the US on Iran, saying “China holds that the sovereignty and security of countries in the Middle East, including the Gulf, should be respected,” though he did not mention the US at any point in his remarks.
The comments come as a US pressure campaign has largely cut off oil supplies to Cuba. The US oil blockade began in January and has deepened blackouts, with the island’s electrical grid suffering a total collapse earlier this month that left millions without power.
Equality among states
Han said major countries carry special responsibility for international peace and security and should lead by complying with the rules, upholding the rule of law, and “doing what’s right.”
He also cast China as a reliable partner and a steadfast defender of developing nations, saying all countries, “big or small, are equal members of the international community” and that world affairs should be handled through consultation.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov spoke at the UN shortly after and made a similar appeal, urging Washington to end its siege of Cuba and ease trade restrictions on the island.
He also said the US should remove Cuba from its list of state sponsors of terrorism.
Trump-Xi summit
US President Donald Trump hosted Chinese President Xi Jinping at the White House earlier this week, welcoming him with military flyovers and a lavish state dinner, according to Reuters.
During the talks, Trump told Xi that China should refrain from providing support to Iran in the US war on Iran. The US ambassador to China claimed on Friday that Trump received assurances from Xi that Beijing would not do so.
This followed reports that China had supplied Iran with shoulder-fired air-defense missile launchers and that Tehran had found ways to evade sanctions on its oil sales with Chinese help.
Beijing has repeatedly rejected the US sanctions campaign against Iran. In August, the Foreign Ministry said that sanctions and pressure “will not help resolve the issue” and that China opposes “illegal unilateral sanctions” lacking a basis in international law.
Chinese support for Cuba
Cuba was the first Latin American country to establish diplomatic ties with the People’s Republic of China, and 2025 marked 65 years of relations.
China’s practical support has centered on energy. Reuters reported that Beijing financed 55 solar projects in Cuba in 2025, including a 21-megawatt plant near Jatibonico, with 37 more planned by 2028. Cuban media reported that a shipment of 5,000 solar panels arrived in September, the third of its kind in recent months.
Beijing has also committed 90,000 tonnes of rice to Cuba in 2026, of which 30,000 tonnes have been delivered and 60,000 tonnes pledged.
International flights from Iran to several destinations remain operational despite the expansion of US sanctions targeting the country’s aviation sector, according to Tehran’s Imam Khomeini International Airport.
The airport said Saturday that flights to Turkey, Malaysia, China, Pakistan, Vietnam, and Afghanistan were continuing according to their previously announced schedules.
The announcement comes as Washington escalates economic pressure on Iran and seeks to restrict the ability of Iranian airlines to maintain international operations.
Iranian flights continue despite sanctions
Imam Khomeini International Airport said that, aside from flights already canceled, no additional cancellations had been announced.
The canceled services include flights involving the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Oman, and Georgia.
The airport also said it was working to restore suspended air connections as soon as possible.
The continued operation of several international routes comes despite growing restrictions on Iranian aviation following a new round of US sanctions announced on September 8.
The measures have affected Iranian airlines as well as companies and intermediaries involved in providing services to the country’s aviation sector.
Recent reporting indicates that Iranian carriers have continued operating some international services despite the sanctions, including flights to China, Turkey, Thailand, and Afghanistan.
US measures target Iran’s aviation sector
The US Treasury Department announced sanctions on September 8 against 36 targets linked to Iran’s aviation sector, including 27 Iranian airlines. Washington described the measures as an effort to target what it considers Iran’s remaining unsanctioned carriers and the networks supporting them.
The sanctions form part of a broader US campaign to restrict Iran’s access to international financial and commercial networks.
The measures have also placed pressure on foreign companies providing Iranian carriers with fuel, ground handling, aircraft-related services, and other forms of support.
The consequences, however, have varied by country. While some governments and companies have restricted Iranian aviation connections, other countries have continued to facilitate flights.
Iraq restrictions trigger backlash
In Iraq, the suspension of Iranian flights, particularly through Najaf International Airport, has triggered criticism from official, political, factional, and religious quarters.
Several Iraqi parties and figures have called for the decision to be reversed and rejected what they described as US pressure on Baghdad.
The Iraqi government is also moving toward dialogue with Washington in an effort to secure an exemption that would allow air links with Iran to resume.
Ali Akbar Velayati, international affairs advisor to Iran’s Leader, said the restrictions on Iranian flights were part of an effort by Iran’s enemies to compensate for their battlefield defeat by attempting to dismantle the “unity of the fronts” from within.
The Iranian Ambassador to Iraq, Mohammad Kazem Al-Sadegh, further told Iran’s ISNA news agency that a new decision surrounding Iranian flights to Iraq is likely to be announced soon.
He added that Iran is in contact with Iraqi officials and proposals on the matter have been submitted.
Al-e Sadegh noted that roughly 12,000 to 13,000 people travel between Iraq and Iran via Iranian airlines.
China maintains air links with Iran
China has maintained its opposition to unilateral US sanctions and continued to receive Iranian flights.
Flight-tracking data cited in recent reports showed Iranian services continuing to operate to Chinese destinations after the latest US measures took effect.
The continued connections with China also reflect the broader geopolitical divide over Washington’s unilateral sanctions policy, with Beijing maintaining economic and diplomatic ties with Tehran despite US pressure.
Xi Jinping left Washington on Friday, September 25, bid farewell by a 21-gun salute and the administration’s top officials lined up at the airport. A three-day state visit organized with a level of attention to detail that the White House rarely reserves for a systemic rival: the welcome at the foot of the aircraft stairs, a three-hour meeting in the Oval Office, the state dinner, tea with the spouses, and a visit to the National Archives. A Schramsberg was chosen for dinner – the same winery that provided the wine for the 1972 toast between Nixon and Zhou Enlai. At the table sat half of the American business community: Musk, Jensen Huang, Zuckerberg, Tim Cook, Bezos, Pichai, Dimon, Fink, as well as three Supreme Court justices, the Federal Reserve chair, and half the Cabinet.
Then there is the real conversation, which must be read between the lines. Beijing immediately released its own account of the talks. On the American side, in the early hours, there was no official statement: only remarks from officials and a president who chose not to answer questions on the substance of the matter. This asymmetry in documentation alone reveals who wanted to set the terms of the meeting in writing.
On the Iran issue, administration sources presented an alignment on three points as “significant progress”: Iran must never acquire nuclear weapons; the Strait of Hormuz must remain open; and there must be no tolls in the strait. Taken one by one, these three points coincide with positions that Beijing had been advocating even before boarding the plane. China holds a permanent seat on the Security Council and is a signatory to the 2015 JCPOA: Iranian nonproliferation has been its official policy for over a decade. An open Strait of Hormuz is in China’s interest even more than it is in America’s, because East Asia consumes the largest share of the crude oil passing through the strait, and China pays more than anyone else for Brent crude that remains above $100 per barrel. As for tolls, a transit fee imposed by Tehran would hit oil tankers bound for Chinese ports first and foremost.
Washington has thus secured Xi’s signature on three statements that Beijing would have endorsed in any forum. The actual gain is more limited, but it exists. China’s distancing itself from Iran’s demand for tolls weakens a card that Tehran is playing in the New York negotiations, where discussions center on a phased exit from the crisis (reopening of the strait, simultaneous lifting of the U.S. naval blockade, followed by the unfreezing of frozen assets), and where the Iranian delegation is reportedly aiming to transfer the issue of transit rights to a separate annex.
Independent accounts fill in what the American version leaves out. Xi asked Trump for an immediate return to the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding and the resumption of negotiations “as soon as possible,” leading to a comprehensive agreement that includes the nuclear issue. Trump did not say yes. Rather than being resolved at the summit, the Iranian issue was kept off the summit agenda.
Tehran and Taiwan
Regarding Chinese support for Iran, the officials themselves admit that the picture is incomplete: “There has been indirect support, we believe, but no direct evidence.” The United States says it is “very concerned” but is unable to prove it. Trump reportedly told Xi in person, however, that any aid to Tehran – “whether direct or indirect, in the form of intelligence, components, or military equipment” – is “totally unacceptable.”
A warning is only as strong as the tool that backs it up, and here the tool is nowhere to be seen. During the same period, flight tracking data recorded a Mahan Air flight landing as scheduled in Guangzhou, and no measures were taken against Chinese airports or operators: the no-fly zone around Iran has failed precisely where it matters most. The term “indirect,” moreover, remains deliberately vague. If it included the purchase of Iranian crude oil, it would strike at the heart of Sino-Iranian trade; if it does not include it, it is reduced to military supplies that Washington, by its own admission, cannot substantiate. The ambiguity serves both sides: the Americans to keep the threat hanging in the air, and the Chinese to continue operating in the gray zone. My assessment is that action by the Treasury against Chinese entities linked to Iran is unlikely before the trade agreement is finalized, with a moderate degree of confidence.
Washington insists that pressure on Iran is a separate issue, unrelated to arms supplies to Taiwan or any other negotiations. This separation has its own domestic logic. With less than six weeks until the November 3 midterm elections, the administration cannot risk being accused of trading Taipei for Chinese cooperation in the Gulf.
The point is that this separation is unilateral. In the Chinese account, Xi described Beijing’s position on reunification and territorial integrity as clear-cut; he called on the United States to oppose Taiwan’s independence and to handle the issue with caution, noting that doing so would lay a solid foundation for strategic cooperation between the two countries. Taiwan is not just another issue among many; it is the condition underpinning them all, including Iran. Beijing will be watching to see how Washington translates its statements into concrete actions, and that response will remain the primary indicator of American seriousness. The result is a clear asymmetry: the United States is giving up using Taiwan as leverage, while China retains it as a precondition.
What about the option of a trade truce?
On the economic front, the summit resulted in the extension of the trade truce until January 10 – which averts an immediate return to much higher tariffs – and the announcement of a managed trade agreement, the details of which are expected on Monday following weeks of negotiations. No breakthrough on tariffs, rare earths, or technology controls. The very term echoes the “Phase One” model from January 2020: quantified purchase commitments – that is, managing the symptoms of a rivalry whose structural causes remain unchanged.
On artificial intelligence, the positions remained distinct. Xi proposed dialogue on risks, human oversight of technologies, and cooperation against abuses, inviting both sides to build on their respective strengths rather than monitor one another. Trump acknowledged that AI concerns the future of humanity, but made it clear that he prefers the current status quo to remain largely unchanged. No common rules, no mechanisms. The two capitals limited themselves to confirming mutual support for the APEC summit and the G20 summit they will host this year, thereby setting the schedule for upcoming meetings.
Taken together, the U.S. outcome consists of a declarative convergence on three already-shared principles, a verbal warning, and a trade agreement yet to be reviewed. Beijing takes home more: a truce until January, no new technological restrictions, Taiwan reaffirmed as the foundation of the relationship, and, above all, the U.S. adoption of the Chinese formula for a “constructive relationship of strategic stability,” agreed upon in May and now revived. Robert Lawrence Kuhn provided the most honest summary: the summit’s main outcome is a longer planning horizon. For a power convinced that time is on its side, that longer horizon is the reward.
There is one objection that must be taken seriously. Xi’s public distancing from the concessions isolates Tehran just as an internal front is opening up in Iran, with an impeachment motion filed in parliament against Foreign Minister Araghchi, accused of negotiating with the Americans without the green light from the Supreme National Security Council. But this very situation highlights the limitations of that gain. The question in Tehran is no longer just what to offer, but who has the authority to offer it; and on this point, Chinese pressure regarding the tolls changes nothing.
There are few but concrete indicators to watch in the coming weeks. The text of Monday’s agreement will reveal whether the trade deal extends to rare earths or is limited to agricultural and energy purchases. The New York channel will indicate whether the phased exchange – involving shipping through the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for the lifting of the blockade – becomes operational. The six ballistic missiles launched by Ansarallah toward Yanbu and Taif – targeting the terminal of the only major Saudi route bypassing the strait – demonstrate just how narrow the margin is before the price of crude oil pushes Trump, on the eve of the election, toward military options. Finally, a potential designation of Chinese entities by the Treasury would lend real weight to the warning from the Oval Office.
As long as none of these signals change, we can say that the summit has stabilized Sino-American relations without stabilizing the Gulf – and regarding the Gulf, Beijing has offered words, not leverage.
China’s President Xi Jinping concluded his three-day state visit to the US on Friday, September 25, with hopes of enhanced cooperation and partnership between the world’s two largest economies.
Xi arrived in the US on Wednesday and received a large-scale welcome from President Donald Trump. Though this was their third in-person meeting it was Xi’s first state visit to the US in over a decade.
On Thursday, the leaders had a long in-person conversation in the White House and finished the day with a state dinner with 130 guests, including tech executives. Though the US is yet to release its version of the official proceedings, reports indicate they discussed a range of outstanding issues such as the dispute over trade and tariffs, cooperation in Artificial Intelligence, the issue of Taiwan, and the US-Israeli war on Iran.
During the meeting with Trump, Xi called for strategic stability in the China-US relationship which will benefit both countries and the people around the world, Xinhuareported.
“China and the US should be partners, not rivals,” Xi said.
Xi’s statement comes at a time when the two countries are negotiating a longer trade deal after briefly facing each other in a tariff war last year. Both countries agreed to extend their temporary trade truce which halted the tariff war till January to give their negotiators more time.
The so-called Busan Trade Truce was set to expire in November this year.
Xi hoped that “both sides would stay committed to the principles of mutual benefit and win-win cooperation and promote the sustained, stable and sound development of China-US economic and trade relations.”
Technology and AI
Successive administrations in the US have characterized China’s advancements in technology and other economic sectors as a threat to American interests and have tried to curb them by restricting its access to technology.
In his attempt to address such apprehensions, Xi proposed that “both sides work towards a relationship featuring cooperation as the mainstay, moderate competition, manageable differences, and the promise of peace.”
Talking about the competition in the development of Artificial Intelligence (AI), Xi offered increased coordination and cooperation between the countries as a way of mutual benefit.
While emphasizing that “two sides should maintain human control over AI technologies, uphold people-centered approach and the principle of using AI for good” he proposed greater exchange of information to “prevent any misuse and abuse of AI.”
Xi also expressed hope that Chinese companies “are treated fairly in the US” while inviting more US companies to invest in China. “Working together, we can lengthen the list of cooperation and shorten the list of issues” he underlined.
The US has sanctioned or put a large number of Chinese companies, including its AI firms on various watch lists in recent years, after accusing them of working with the Chinese armed forces or being involved in the so-called technology theft.
Notably, however, major US tech and finance executives such as Jensen Huang of Nvidia, Mark Zuckerberg of Meta, Eric Yuan of Zoom, Kelly Ortberg of Boeing, Larry Fink of Blackrock, Sam Altman of OpenAI, Satya Nadella of Microsoft, Sundar Pichai of Google, Jeff Bezos of Amazon, and Elon Musk of SpaceX and Tesla, were present at the state dinner for Xi’s visit hosted at the White House on Thursday, September 24, though no details of cooperation between US and Chinese tech firms have emerged.
Taiwan
Reiterating China’s resolve to “safeguard national reunification and territorial integrity,” Xi expressed hope that the US will “adhere to the correct position on opposing ‘Taiwan independence’ and handle the Taiwan question with caution.”
China has repeatedly accused the US of promoting the separatist cause in Taiwan, despite officially adhering to “one China policy.” The US under Trump has sold or agreed to sell billions of dollars’ worth of weapons to Taiwan in complete disregard of China’s objections.
China has also accused the US and its allies in the region of promoting an arms race by deploying advanced weapon systems close to its borders.
Xi said if the US follows the correct position on Taiwan it “will enable both the countries to lay a solid foundation for their strategic cooperation and the development of their bilateral relationship.”
US-Israeli war on Iran
China has refused to intervene or get involved in the US-Israeli war on Iran, despite Trump’s repeated calls for them to do so. China has maintained the war was unnecessary and repeatedly warned against its prolongation. It has supported the interim peace deal signed in June under international mediation.
Xi reiterated this position during his visit to the US, expressing hope that both Iran and the US would soon return to the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and end the war.
Xi claimed that “China-US cooperation may not solve every problem in the world, but without it, it would be hard to solve many of the world’s problems” and proposed more dialogue and “mechanisms of crisis communication and prevention” between their armed forces.
TOKYO — The bond vigilantes are back — and now they’re patrolling every major debt market at once. As deficits balloon, spending runs unchecked and oil prices spike, investors are reasserting control over markets that once seemed shielded from shocks and sending yields skyrocketing. The revolt spans the US, Japan, Europe and beyond as a […]
US lawmakers and national-security experts are pressing President Donald Trump to take tougher action against Chinese entities accused of helping Iran with satellite intelligence, weapons components, and oil revenue.
Beijing has agreed to work with Washington to improve governance of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies and to enhance cooperation as Chinese President Xi Jinping and United States President Donald Trump met face-to-face at the White House on Thursday. Xi made the pledge in his speech at a morning welcoming ceremony, before the two leaders held […]
For the past six months or so, a curious-looking vessel with a very boxy superstructure has been taking shape at a shipyard in the Chinese city of Shanghai. A new satellite image lends credence to an earlier assessment that this is a mothership to support China’s growing fleets of ever-larger submersible drones, though it could also have other roles.
TWZ obtained the image of the ship in question, which was taken on September 10, from Vantor. Since then, it has also received an overall coat of gray paint, pointing to future service with the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). It is some 669 feet (204 meters) long and around 98 feet (30 meters) at its widest. In terms of basic length and width, the vessel being built now is very roughly comparable to China’s Type 071 amphibious warfare ship. However, it appears to be much taller overall than the Type 071.
The new ship has been under construction at the Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard on Changxing Island in Shanghai since at least April. This yard produces a variety of naval vessels, including surface combatants and amphibious assault ships, as well as commercial designs.
The September 10 image, which shows the ship from the stern, is interesting for a number of reasons. It notably confirms that the design not only has a well deck, but that it is sized around what looks to be a large cradle-like platform visible in the shot. The very roughly 164-feet (50-meter) long rectangular platform has an arch-shaped structure at one end and two teardrop-shaped ones at the other, as well as six pillars, three on each side, in between. The teardrop-shaped structures, in particular, point to the platform being at least a semi-submersible, as they would help with stability and otherwise guide the flow of water while being pulled along.
The satellite image also clearly shows six large struts extending from the top of the stern end of the superstructure, each one which is paired with a shorter strut, for a total of 12. Earlier this month, independent naval analyst H.I. Sutton, who tracks undersea warfare developments in particular, posited that these struts could be used to lower a platform or some other similar structure below the hull of the ship. He also assessed that they could be used as part of a larger system capable of moving payloads between decks internally. This would help account for the configuration of the core superstructure, especially how high it is all the way from the front to the back. Overall, signs point to the inside of the superstructure being largely hangars and other open work spaces, allowing for multiple large UUVs to be carried and supported. Individual UUVs would be launched and recovered, one at a time, via the cradle.
In making his assessment, Sutton drew specific attention to a previously shown rendering of a proposed Chinese scientific research vessel with a roughly similar strut-based system at the stern for deploying submersibles and other large payloads. However, on that design, the system was entirely exposed rather than contained with an extended superstructure.
The rendering of the proposed scientific research vessel with a system for deploying payloads at the stern that features four struts. Chinese internet via H.I. Sutton
The platform seen immediately behind the ship being built at the Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard aligns with Sutton’s assessment about the purpose of the struts. At the same time, launches and recoveries could also be conducted in a more traditional manner via the well deck. The design of the cradle-like platform would seem to suggest the latter option is at least part of the plan.
The image from September 10, as well as other recent views of the ship, highlight other features that are now taking shape. This includes a large opening on the starboard side, which could be for launching and/or recovering lifeboats or other watercraft, or moving payloads to and from the pier while docked, as well as a multi-pronged mast on top of the bridge. An additional part of the ship’s superstructure extends behind the bridge area, and there is what looks to be a hangar inside. There is no attached helipad present now, but one could well be added later on somewhere on top of the superstructure. Many naval auxiliaries, as well as commercial ships designed for offshore support and other specialized tasks, have open helipads on raised frames attached to different parts of the superstructures.
Though there is growing clarity about the ship’s design, many questions do remain about the full breadth of its intended purpose. In Sutton’s view, the PLAN has a need, just in general, for a dedicated mothership to support its growing uncrewed underwater vehicle (UUV) fleets. The PLAN is pursuing various tiers of UUVs to perform a host of different missions, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), as well as mine-laying, special operations support, and even launching direct attacks on enemy vessels. Larger and larger UUV designs have been steadily emerging in China, which could require more specialized launch and recovery options to be feasibly employed operationally, especially from other vessels at sea. Deployment and retrieval at sea could, in turn, support very long duration missions far from China’s own shores.
“With smaller UUVs, even up to 20 meters like the AJX-002 and HSU-100 paraded in Beijing last year, they are road mobile. Truck mounted cranes should be sufficient for getting them in and out of the water making operations much simpler. With these latest, much larger XXLUUVs [extra-extra large uncrewed underwater vehicles] however, China will start to need dedicated port facilities,” Sutton wrote previously on his website. “Until now China has been using floating docks to house the two XXLUUV prototypes being tested on Hainan. One of these docks was purpose built while the other may have been taken up from general use.”
A Chinese AJX-002 UUV, or a mockup thereof, seen ahead of a major military parade in Beijing in 2025. Chinese internet via X
China's naval unmanned systems.
Consisting of (in order), AI enabled unmanned submersible (HSU-100), used for detection and attack.
Unmanned patrol boat.
Unmanned mine-laying/attack submersible (AJX-002), this was previously mistaken for a nuclear powered torpedo. Because the… pic.twitter.com/Mlj55XLNBH
“This arrangement also has a significant drawback: each floating dock can only carry a single XXLUUV,” Sutton added. “Or if more than one, then they both need to be placed in the water at the same time. Because the whole dock floods, there cannot be one undergoing maintenance while another is being launched or recovered.”
A mothership vessel able to discreetly deploy and recover large uncrewed and crewed submersibles and other large payloads underwater could be tasked with more specialized missions, including cutting cables, retrieving objects from the seabed, and other kinds of undersea espionage. There is overlap here with more benign roles, such as submarine rescue, salvage, and even deep-sea scientific research. There is also the matter of servicing an expanding array of Chinese underwater infrastructure, including sensor and communications networks. As something of a corollary, Russia’s spy ship Yantar is officially described as an oceanic research vessel. In China, the line between military and non-military assets and capabilities, including ships, is often very blurry, to begin with, as TWZ regularly highlights. This dichotomy was observed right at the Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard around the end of last year after pictures of a commercial cargo ship being used to showcase a new family of containerized weapons, sensors, and other systems went viral online.
It is also worth pointing out that the boxy and largely enclosed design of the ship now being built at Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard will inherently make it difficult to observe any activities onboard. This will have the additional knock-on effect of helping keep any payloads, as well as the crew, shielded from the elements. This could be valuable for operations in harsher locales, including waters in and around the Arctic, an ever-more strategic part of the world where China is working to be more engaged.
We also do not know if the apparent mothership vessel is intended to be a one-off or part of a larger class. It could be a stepping stone to broader plans or be part of an already extensive fleet of bespoke naval auxiliaries, as well as unique ostensibly commercial vessels, in service in China today. The PLAN’s aforementioned UUV ambitions will bring along significant test and evaluation requirements, as well as the need to support actual future operations.
If nothing else, evidence is only growing that the new ship under construction at the Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard is intended to serve, at least in part, as a mothership for large submersible drones.
During an Oval Office meeting with President Trump in Washington on Thursday, Chinese President Xi Jinping conveyed China’s position on Taiwan and told the US president to approach the issue “carefully,” The South China Morning Post reported, citing the Chinese broadcaster CCTV. The report said that Xi, who is in Washington as part of an […]
China called the latest US threats of secondary sanctions on airline service-providing companies across the world an illegal unilateral measure without any basis in international law. The US said the sanctions would be applied if these companies do not stop providing services to Iranian airlines.
China said they “firmly oppose illicit unilateral sanctions that have no basis in international law and lack UN Security Council mandate,” Guo Jiakun, official spokesperson of its Ministry of Foreign Affairs said during a regular press conference on Wednesday, September 23.
China’s reaction came on the same day the latest US sanctions against Iran went into effect.
The US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has asked companies across the world who are involved in providing services such as refuelling, ticketing, and other kinds of ground support to stop serving Iranian airlines starting at midnight on September 23. If they fail to comply they will be “locked out of the dollar system,” Bessent threatened.
The latest sanctions against its airlines is part of the recently announced US attempt to completely isolate Iran from the global economy in order to pressure its government to re-open the Strait of Hormuz.
Iran has shut down the Strait of Hormuz following the resumption of US airstrikes as well as Washington’s attempts to bypass Iranian control over the waterway in the Persian Gulf since July. Iran has claimed that those American moves were in violation of the peace deal signed under international mediation in June.
The adoption of new sets of sanctions is widely seen as an indication of Washington’s failure to achieve its objectives in Iran militarily, even after seven months of war, which began on February 28.
Iran has reiterated that no amount of economic coercion will open the Strait of Hormuz. They listed the withdrawal of the US naval blockade, the unfreezing of its international assets, and an end of the war on all fronts in the region as preconditions for opening the Strait.
Air blockade
While some of the countries in the region cancelled Iranian flights to their airports in fear of US sanctions, Iran claimed most of its international flights remained scheduled and operational. Some countries also decided to close their airspace for Iranian airlines.
Iraq has diverted most of the Iranian flights from its Baghdad airport to Najaf.
If the flights remain suspended for a significant number of countries for a longer duration it would amount to an air blockade on Iran. This will have an effect on thousands of people employed in the aviation sector in the country which is already heavily facing tremendous economic troubles due to existing sanctions
A prolonged suspension of flights could also impact hundreds of thousands of Iranians who have to travel out of the country for medical or other reasons.
Iran has maintained that unilateral US sanctions are illegal and an “act of terrorism” against Iranian people. It has urged the nations across the world to not succumb to the unilateral actions of the US.
Chief of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Mohsen Rezaei, in an interview on Wednesday, warned neighboring countries against submitting to US pressure to shut down Iranian flights, claiming such acts will force Iran to retaliate.
Chinese authorities have reportedly taken possession of an F-35 cockpit canopy and weapons-bay door that were inexplicably diverted to Hong Kong while being shipped from Australia to the United States. The incident appears to have left physical components that incorporate aspects of the fighter’s low-observable design in the hands of a country that has spent years doing whatever it could to gain information on the aircraft and America’s stealth technology secrets in general.
So, what does all this mean? Let’s put it in perspective.
The parts in question were being shipped by UPS from Australia to the United States in late May, according to people familiar with the matter cited by Bloomberg. The components from a Royal Australian Air Force F-35A were being sent to the United States for inspection and possible repair or disposal.
A Royal Australian Air Force F-35A from 75 Squadron taxiing at RAAF Base Tindal, Northern Territory. Australian Defense Force
F-35 sustainment procedures explicitly cover the movement of F-35 parts, including unserviceable components, through the program’s logistics network. The U.S. Air Force’s transportation guidance directs F-35 shipments outside the Defense Transportation System to follow approved Joint Program Office procedures. In other words, moving an unserviceable Australian F-35 component to the United States for inspection, repair, or disposition is consistent with the normal sustainment process.
What is highly unusual is where this particular shipment ended up. F-35 components moving through an established international logistics system apparently stopped in South Korea, and were then routed to Hong Kong. Chinese authorities subsequently took possession of the parts and have not returned them, according to the sources cited by Bloomberg.
F-35 canopy component replacement at Luke Air Force Base, Arizona. U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Ridge ShanSecretary of War Pete Hegseth autographs the weapons bay door of an F-35 at Lockheed Martin Air Force Plant 4, in Fort Worth, Texas. DoW photo by U.S. Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Alexander Kubitza
“For security reasons, we can’t discuss the status of specific shipments or our shipping procedures,” Lockheed Martin told us in response to a request for clarification about the incident. The company added that it “follows all U.S. regulations established by the Department of War and regulated by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) regarding the shipment of aircraft components. Our teams handle every shipment with the utmost diligence and safeguards to ensure the integrity of the F-35 program and the security of our allied partners.”
The Pentagon’s F-35 Joint Program Office has acknowledged a “shipment issue” involving F-35 components and said U.S. authorities and industry partners are working to recover them and investigate what happened.
Lockheed Martin, UPS, and the Pentagon have not publicly provided a detailed account of how the shipment was diverted or what happened to the parts after they reached Hong Kong.
Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles also confirmed that Canberra was aware of the incident and was working with the United States and Lockheed Martin.
Acting Prime Minister and Minister for Defense, Richard Marles, accompanied by Chief of Air Force Air Marshal Stephen Chappell at RAAF Base Edinburgh, South Australia. Australian Defense Force
Marles has sought to play down the potential security implications of the components, saying his understanding was that the shipment did not contain sensitive equipment or sensitive parts. That does not by itself answer the more specific question of what could potentially be learned from these particular pieces of an F-35. After all, not every physical component of an F-35 is necessarily highly classified or capable of revealing meaningful information about the aircraft’s design. At the same time, a cockpit canopy and weapons-bay door involve structures, materials, interfaces, tolerances, and treatments that all have to work within the aircraft’s low-observable design. If radar-absorbing material or other specialized treatments remain on the components, that could potentially make them far more sensitive from a technological exploitation standpoint.
The condition of the parts is also unknown. We do not know how much of their coatings or other treatments remain intact, whether Chinese authorities have examined them, or what information could actually be extracted from them in their current state.
Above all else, there is little specific information in the public domain about what F-35-related technical information Chinese intelligence already has acquired over the years, what physical components or materials it may already possess, or what additional information could be gained through espionage, cyber operations, industrial access, observation of deployed aircraft, or other means.
Without these facts, it is impossible to gauge what damage could have been done by this loss. Still, viewed in a vacuum of those unknowns, simply having an F-35 canopy and weapons-bay door in Chinese possession represents a significant loss of control over sensitive physical hardware — there is no way around that reality — and the severity of that loss could be substantial depending on the physical state of the parts.
The circumstances are particularly sensitive because, as we mentioned in the opening of this article, China has pursued multiple avenues for acquiring information on the F-35 for many years, with publicly documented cases involving cyber operations, technical information, supply chains, and human expertise. Some aspects of China’s subsequent stealth aircraft designs have also prompted comparisons with U.S. aircraft, although claims that China simply ‘cloned’ entire aircraft are not supported by the available evidence.
China And The F-35: A History Of Espionage
In 2014, U.S. authorities charged Chinese businessman Su Bin with conspiring with two other Chinese hackers to break into the computer systems of U.S. defense contractors. Prosecutors alleged that the group targeted information on aircraft including the F-35 and F-22. The alleged hacking campaign ran from 2009 to 2013.
Su Bin later pleaded guilty and was sentenced to nearly four years in prison. The Justice Department’s 2026 case against former Air Force fighter pilot Gerald “Runner” Brown connects the two cases. Prosecutors allege that Brown used a co-conspirator to negotiate his work training Chinese military pilots with Su Bin.
Brown, a retired U.S. Air Force major who spent more than 24 years in the service, subsequently worked as a contract simulator instructor training U.S. military pilots on the A-10 and F-35. In February 2026, the Justice Department charged him with providing and conspiring to provide unauthorized defense services to Chinese military pilots.
According to the criminal complaint, Brown traveled to China in December 2023, where he allegedly began training People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) personnel. Prosecutors say he also answered questions about the U.S. Air Force for three hours on his first day in China. Brown has been charged, and the allegations have not been adjudicated. He is one of multiple former Western aviators alleged to have provided training services and/or intelligence to Beijing.
The Honeywell case provides yet another example, this time involving the defense industry’s supply of technical information.
In 2021, the State Department reached a $13-million administrative settlement with Honeywell over alleged violations of the Arms Export Control Act and International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). Honeywell had voluntarily disclosed alleged unauthorized exports and retransfers of ITAR-controlled technical data.
The case involved 71 engineering drawings containing dimensions, geometries and layouts for manufacturing castings and finished parts used across multiple aircraft, engines and military systems. The State Department said the unauthorized exports and retransfers involved Canada, Ireland, Mexico, China, and Taiwan.
Among the systems covered by the drawings were components associated with the F-35 and F-22. The case did not allege that Honeywell deliberately sought to provide China with sensitive military technology; rather, it concerned alleged violations of export-control requirements.
A U.S. Air Force F-22 (nearest camera) flies alongside an F-35A. U.S. Air Force photo by Lt. Sam Eckholm
There has also been a physical supply-chain precedent.
In 2022, F-35 deliveries were temporarily halted after the Pentagon discovered that a magnet in the aircraft’s Honeywell-built turbomachine pumps —which provide critical power functions to the jet — contained a cobalt and samarium alloy produced in China. The material itself was not considered a security or flight-safety threat, but the discovery demonstrated how difficult it can be to maintain complete visibility over a global supply chain involving thousands of companies and multiple tiers of subcontractors.
Taken together, these cases demonstrate several different pathways through which China has appeared in the F-35 security story: cyber theft, unauthorized technical-data transfers, supply-chain exposure, and alleged exploitation of former Western military expertise.
The Hong Kong incident would add another major category: physical access to actual F-35 components.
These are only some of the publicly documented examples. There is no public way to know the full extent of information or physical material Chinese intelligence may have acquired over the years, but is very likely far larger in scope than what is available in the open source.
Chinese Access Concerns Have Shaped F-35 Export Policy
The proposed sale of F-35s to the United Arab Emirates became deeply entangled in U.S. concerns about Abu Dhabi’s growing military and technology relationship with China.
A 34th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron F-35A conducts inflight refueling above the United Arab Emirates. U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Kat Justen
Washington had approved a potential package involving 50 F-35As, but U.S. officials and lawmakers expressed concerns about Chinese intelligence activity and technology in the UAE. Among the broader concerns were Chinese telecommunications infrastructure and the possibility of Chinese military or intelligence access to facilities associated with advanced U.S. weapons. A Congressional U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission report later cited the potential presence of Chinese intelligence collection capabilities and military facilities in the UAE as risks to the proposed F-35 sale.
The State Department recently approved a potential $24.3-billion sale to the Kingdom involving 48 F-35s and associated equipment. But U.S. intelligence agencies have reportedly warned that China’s military and technology relationship with Saudi Arabia could create opportunities for Beijing to obtain sensitive F-35 information.
According to reporting based on U.S. officials familiar with intelligence assessments, a Defense Intelligence Agency report raised concerns about Chinese military access to Saudi bases, Chinese technology in Saudi telecommunications infrastructure, and whether secure facilities could be maintained for F-35 operations. The assessments also questioned whether Saudi Arabia would limit contact between Chinese military and intelligence personnel and F-35-related sites.
What Could The Components Reveal?
As we noted earlier, there is no way to gauge the intelligence impact of the loss at this stage. The central unknown of what China already knows about the F-35, and what it may already have in its possession — especially related to these components — is the key variable here.
Regardless, an F-35 canopy and weapons-bay door can provide information that cannot otherwise be easily obtained and gives a different level of fidelity in terms of material exploitation than what construction data and blueprints alone could.
The F-35’s low observability is the product of an extremely complex combination of airframe shaping, construction materials, external coatings, manufacturing tolerances, speciality apertures, and more.
U.S. Air Force 325th Maintenance Squadron low-observable maintainers work on an F-35A at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, in August 2024. U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Victoria Moehlman
A canopy is a particularly demanding part of any stealth aircraft. It has to satisfy optical and structural requirements while also controlling radar reflections. The cockpit is historically a major source of radar reflectivity, including the pilot’s helmet. Therefore the canopy’s materials, construction, interfaces, and specialized treatments can be critical to the aircraft’s overall low-observable performance, and especially from the critical frontal aspect.
The F-35’s canopy has been an ongoing work in progress for many years. It has had chronic material issues, especially when it comes to delamination. Multiple iterations spread over two decades have recently resulted in a major improvement of the issue. The tight balancing act of keeping the canopy transparent enough, while controlling the F-35’s stealthy signature and having that mix of materials be robust enough to last for a reasonable amount of time has been a major investment for the program. If the canopy is of a later variation, that loss alone could be substantial and could help China with their own low-observable canopy development programs even if they already had original information on the F-35’s canopy original design dating back years.
Evidence of the F-35’s canopy delamination issue on an early example of the F-35B. Crown Copyright
The F-35’s canopy has been a notorious work in progress, specifically the low observable coating/delamination issue which has improved a lot in recent years with new materials and processes. So no, you do NOT want to lose that in to China! https://t.co/9V0jdRAiwA
The F-35’s weapons-bay door has its own sensitivity issues. It is effectively a major section of the aircraft’s outer shell, with its structure, edges, interfaces, tolerances and treatments all having to function without creating unacceptable radar signatures. Its construction and material attributes can be reasonably extrapolated for the rest of much of the F-35’s outer mold-line. Above all else, if the radar absorbent material remained intact on the door, that would signify a major loss when viewed without any understanding of what China already knows about the F-35’s radar absorbing surface treatments. Historically speaking, RAM technology is among America’s closely guarded material sciences secrets.
A Belgian Air Force service member inspects the open weapons bay of an F-35A at Luke AFB, Arizona. U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Tekorey Watkins
For the time being, Australian officials have said they do not understand the parts to be sensitive. The investigation will ultimately have to establish what the components actually contain and what could be learned from them.
The incident comes at a moment when China’s own stealth fighter efforts are undergoing an extraordinary expansion.
The PLAAF is now operating the J-20, China’s first operational fifth-generation stealth fighter, in increasingly large numbers. The smaller J-35 is also moving toward broader service, including a carrier role for the People’s Liberation Army Navy.
Aircraft maintainers clean the fuselage of a J-20 fighter during the Changchun Air Show in the Jilin Province of China, in September 2025. Photo by Zhang Xiangyi/China News Service/VCG via Getty Images
China has also moved into what Western observers generally describe as sixth-generation fighter development.
Two new tailless combat-aircraft designs emerged publicly in December 2024. One is the large Chengdu aircraft commonly referred to as the J-36, while the other is associated with Shenyang and is variously called the J-XDS or J-50. Both have continued flight testing and yielded several prototypes with individual refinements.
The exact capabilities and eventual operational roles of these aircraft remain uncertain. They are developmental designs, not established operational equivalents of the F-35 or other sixth-generation systems. However, China is clearly building an increasingly broad ecosystem of fifth- and next-generation low-observable combat aircraft, both crewed and uncrewed. In the latter category is a growing number of stealthy drones, including long-endurance types.
China didn’t likely need physical access to an F-35 canopy or weapons-bay door to develop the J-20, J-35, or its next-generation aircraft. But additional information about how a mature Western stealth aircraft handles materials, coatings, interfaces, manufacturing, and the integration of those elements can still have great potential value to an industry developing its own systems. This includes technologies intended to counter the U.S. combat aircraft and their low-observable characteristics.
The F-35 has been produced in large numbers, is operated by a growing coalition of countries, and has been subjected to years of testing and operational experience. Its low-observable design represents decades of accumulated U.S. research and industrial know-how. At the same time, the global scale of the program inevitably makes control over sensitive information more complicated. More aircraft, more maintainers, more industrial partners, and more international logistics mean more points at which information and physical hardware have to be controlled. Over time, a program of this size will see an erosion in its secrets, but a major loss can drastically accelerate what should be a more gradual and controlled decline in security.
The Lockheed Martin F-35 production line at Fort Worth, Texas. Lockheed Martin photo by Alexander H Groves
The potential intelligence value of the components also has to be considered in the context of foreign material exploitation, or FME. Major military powers maintain dedicated capabilities to recover, examine and characterize foreign weapons, aircraft, sensors, materials and other equipment. The objective is not necessarily to reproduce an entire system. More important is determining how something is built, what materials and manufacturing techniques are used, how individual components perform, and where industrial strengths or limitations may lie.
That is why countries have historically gone to extraordinary lengths to recover even crashed or damaged pieces of sensitive military hardware. The bigger the prize, the more risk an intelligence service would be willing to take in order to realize a recovery.
The sensitivity surrounding the physical remnants of an F-35 is not new. When a Japan Air Self-Defense Force F-35A disappeared over the Pacific in 2019, the search quickly became more than a rescue operation. U.S. and Japanese forces mounted an extensive effort to locate the wreckage, with U.S. Navy P-8A aircraft and a destroyer joining the search. TWZnoted at the time that even scattered F-35 wreckage could expose valuable technological secrets, while the aircraft’s location on the seabed raised the prospect of an underwater espionage and recovery operation.
That concern has also been evident in subsequent F-35 recovery operations. In 2022, the U.S. Navy recovered an F-35C from roughly 12,400 feet in the South China Sea after a carrier landing accident, removing the possibility that the aircraft could be accessed by another country.
At this point, there is no public evidence that the Hong Kong diversion was a deliberate Chinese intelligence operation, although it is certainly possible. It is also unclear whether Chinese authorities have examined the F-35 parts or what level of new and useful information has been recovered from them.
If, as reported, Chinese authorities have taken possession of the parts and have not returned them, that would be an extraordinary development. If the diversion was genuinely the result of a shipping or logistics error, the outcome would itself be extraordinary. It would raise serious questions about the security controls surrounding the movement of F-35 hardware even without evidence of deliberate interference.
The timing is also notable. Chinese President Xi Jinping arrived in Washington this week for a state visit with President Donald Trump, with the two leaders meeting amid broader disputes involving technology, security, and the future of U.S.-China relations. Whether the F-35 shipment comes up directly in those discussions is not known, but it would be an obvious subject for U.S. and Chinese officials to address through diplomatic channels.
"Ladies and gentlemen, the President of the United States Donald J. Trump and First Lady Melania Trump, accompanied by the President of the People's Republic of China Xi Jinping and Madame Peng Liyuan." pic.twitter.com/hyPHOBC99Q
For now, however, the central question remains how the parts got there. Until that is answered, we won’t know if this was a simple logistics failure or a deliberate intelligence operation. And beyond that, what China already knew about the components it now may have in its possession — a question we may never truly get an answer to.
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