O quão mais longe Delcy Rodríguez está disposta a ir? Eis a questão.

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O ano de 2026 está passando rápido. De fato, não falta muito para ele terminar. Ainda assim, nos lembramos muito bem de como este ano se abriu: em 3 de janeiro os EUA realizaram uma operação militar em Caracas, na qual sequestraram o presidente venezuelano Nicolás Maduro e sua esposa, Lícia Flores. Durante essa operação, boa parte dos guarda-costas de Maduro perdeu sua vida. Maduro estava próximo de um bunker, mas não conseguiu chegar e selar a porta a tempo antes de ser capturado.

Em seu lugar, assume Delcy Rodríguez, apoiada por seu irmão Jorge Rodríguez, que preside a Assembleia Nacional, pelo Ministro do Interior Diosdado Cabello, e por Vladimir Padrino López, que controla os militares. Longe de apostar em “eleições livres e democráticas”, os EUA referendaram a continuidade política bolivarianista, mantendo Delcy Rodríguez no poder. Maria Corina Machado, sucessora de Juan Guaidó no projeto de “revolução colorida” venezuelana, já caiu no esquecimento.

O que realmente aconteceu quando do sequestro de Maduro? As circunstâncias nunca ficaram suficientemente bem explicadas e seguimos nadando em meio a rumores e boatos. Ocasionalmente, emergem informações inverificáveis de que alguns elementos da equipe de segurança de Maduro teriam vendido-o em troca de compensação financeira, nunca paga pelos EUA. De fato, o governo interino da Venezuela fez diversas alterações na guarda presidencial após o sequestro, mesmo enquanto nega que tenha havido qualquer traição.

Mas a grande dúvida é o que aconteceu com todo o equipamento militar russo e chinês adquirido pela Venezuela. Por que ele não foi usado em 3 de janeiro? Estamos falando, por exemplo, de radares chineses JY-27A, JYL-1 e JY-11, alguns dos quais têm capacidade anti-stealth, bem como de caças russos Sukhoi Su-30 e de sistemas antiaéreos russos como o S300 e o Buk-M2. Nada disso parece ter utilizado durante o ataque dos EUA. Falta de manutenção? Falta de prontidão dos soldado venezuelanos? Não se sabe.

Desde então, Delcy Rodríguez tem sido extremamente criticada, por anti-imperialistas estrangeiros, por sua postura conciliacionista com os EUA. Sempre que aparecem notícias de uma reunião da presidente interina da Venezuela com algum representante dos EUA, tal como Dan Caine do Estado-Maior Conjunto dos EUA, com Marco Rubio ou, tal como recentemente, com Donald Trump, abundam as críticas. O mesmo quando o governo venezuelano emite as suas já agora típicas notas oficiais comemorando a “colaboração” com os EUA, a “melhora nas relações”, as “oportunidades de investimentos”, e assim por diante.

Agora, em alguma medida, é bastante fácil criticar o governo interino da Venezuela estando fora da Venezuela e sem ter que lidar com o mesmo tipo de pressão. Num sentido prático e material, de que opções a Venezuela dispõe hoje? Em que medida ela pode desafiar diretamente e abertamente os EUA?

A versão oferecida pelos apoiadores do atual governo venezuelano é de que a prioridade de Delcy Rodríguez é preservar o sistema político bolivariano e conseguir a devolução de Nicolás Maduro. A soberania econômica pode, até certo ponto, ser sacrificada no curto-prazo, a estrutura de poder não, já que está é mais difícil de reconstruir ou recuperar caso deixe de existir. Nesse sentido, Delcy Rodríguez estaria oferecendo concessões aos EUA visando ganhar tempo, aguardando até que mudanças políticas dentro dos EUA – como uma derrota de Trump nas midterms ou, talvez, nas próximas eleições presidenciais – tragam algum cenário mais favorável.

A narrativa é plausível e, sinceramente, no lugar da Delcy Rodríguez eu faria a mesma coisa. Não parece haver muitas outras opções, nesse momento, para a Venezuela, além do controle de danos.

Mas o quanto é possível ceder?

Em apenas 1 ano vimos o retorno da Embaixada dos EUA a Caracas, bem como o estabelecimento de um escritório da CIA no país e a restauração das relações com o Estado de Israel.

No plano econômico, os EUA passaram a se aproximar da receita de aproximadamente 1 milhão de barris diários exportados, cujo valor é apenas parcialmente devolvido ao governo venezuelano para a realização de investimentos e gastos autorizados pelos EUA. Boa parte do valor permanece com o governo dos EUA, e Trump se referiu diretamente a este valor como espólio de guerra.

Logo em seguida, a Venezuela concedeu à empresa estadunidense Trafigura o direito de comprar e exportar ouro venezuelano para ser refinado no exterior, com aproximadamente 400kg de ouro por mês sendo transferidos para os EUA.

E mais recentemente, a Venezuela cedeu aos EUA controle majoritário sobre reservas venezuelanas ainda não exploradas e que equivaleriam, em tese, a 65 bilhões de barris de petróleo. Trata-se de áreas nas quais os EUA fariam investimentos de 100 bilhões de dólares para extrair petróleo por 25 anos, o que renderia 200 bilhões de dólares em receita para a Venezuela, mas muito mais para as empresas envolvidas e para o governo dos EUA.

O quão mais longe Delcy Rodríguez está disposta a ir? Eis a questão.

Finalmente, é temerário acreditar que uma mudança na Casa Branca de um governo republicano para um governo democrata representaria uma virada de sorte para a Venezuela. Em tópicos estratégicos, há uma surpreendente continuidade de política externa entre diferentes governos, o que nos indica que talvez não seja a Casa Branca a ditar as diretrizes realmente. Ademais, não custa nada recordar que foi sob Barack Obama que o cerco contra a Venezuela realmente se iniciou, intensificando-se com cada presidência subsequente, fosse ela republicana ou democrata.

¿Hasta dónde más está dispuesta a llegar Delcy Rodríguez? He ahí la cuestión.

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El año 2026 está pasando rápido. De hecho, no falta mucho para que termine. Aun así, recordamos muy bien cómo se abrió este año: el 3 de enero los EE.UU. realizaron una operación militar en Caracas, en la cual secuestraron al presidente venezolano Nicolás Maduro y a su esposa, Lícia Flores. Durante esa operación, buena parte de los guardaespaldas de Maduro perdió la vida. Maduro estaba cerca de un búnker, pero no logró llegar y sellar la puerta a tiempo antes de ser capturado.

En su lugar, asume Delcy Rodríguez, apoyada por su hermano Jorge Rodríguez, que preside la Asamblea Nacional, por el Ministro del Interior Diosdado Cabello, y por Vladimir Padrino López, que controla a los militares. Lejos de apostar por “elecciones libres y democráticas”, los EE.UU. refrendaron la continuidad política bolivarianista, manteniendo a Delcy Rodríguez en el poder. Maria Corina Machado, sucesora de Juan Guaidó en el proyecto de “revolución de color” venezolana, ya cayó en el olvido.

¿Qué realmente aconteció cuando el secuestro de Maduro? Las circunstancias nunca quedaron suficientemente bien explicadas y seguimos nadando entre rumores y chismes. Ocasionalmente, emergen informaciones inverificables de que algunos elementos del equipo de seguridad de Maduro lo habrían vendido a cambio de compensación financiera, nunca pagada por los EE.UU. De hecho, el gobierno interino de Venezuela hizo diversas alteraciones en la guardia presidencial después del secuestro, incluso mientras niega que haya habido cualquier traición.

Pero la gran duda es qué pasó con todo el equipo militar ruso y chino adquirido por Venezuela. ¿Por qué no fue usado el 3 de enero? Estamos hablando, por ejemplo, de radares chinos JY-27A, JYL-1 y JY-11, algunos de los cuales tienen capacidad anti-stealth, así como de cazas rusos Sukhoi Su-30 y de sistemas antiaéreos rusos como el S300 y el Buk-M2. Nada de eso parece haber sido utilizado durante el ataque de los EE.UU. ¿Falta de mantenimiento? ¿Falta de preparación de los soldados venezolanos? No se sabe.

Desde entonces, Delcy Rodríguez ha sido extremadamente criticada, por antiimperialistas extranjeros, por su postura conciliacionista con los EE.UU. Siempre que aparecen noticias de una reunión de la presidente interina de Venezuela con algún representante de los EE.UU., tal como Dan Caine del Estado Mayor Conjunto de los EE.UU., con Marco Rubio o, tal como recientemente, con Donald Trump, abundan las críticas. Lo mismo cuando el gobierno venezolano emite sus ya ahora típicas notas oficiales celebrando la “colaboración” con los EE.UU., la “mejora en las relaciones”, las “oportunidades de inversiones”, y así sucesivamente.

Ahora, en alguna medida, es bastante fácil criticar al gobierno interino de Venezuela estando fuera de Venezuela y sin tener que lidiar con el mismo tipo de presión. En un sentido práctico y material, ¿de qué opciones dispone Venezuela hoy? ¿En qué medida puede desafiar directa y abiertamente a los EE.UU.?

La versión ofrecida por los partidarios del actual gobierno venezolano es que la prioridad de Delcy Rodríguez es preservar el sistema político bolivariano y conseguir la devolución de Nicolás Maduro. La soberanía económica puede, hasta cierto punto, ser sacrificada en el corto plazo; la estructura de poder no, ya que esta es más difícil de reconstruir o recuperar si deja de existir. En este sentido, Delcy Rodríguez estaría ofreciendo concesiones a los EE.UU. con el objetivo de ganar tiempo, aguardando hasta que cambios políticos dentro de los EE.UU. – como una derrota de Trump en las midterms o, tal vez, en las próximas elecciones presidenciales – traigan algún escenario más favorable.

La narrativa es plausible y, sinceramente, en el lugar de Delcy Rodríguez yo haría lo mismo. No parece haber muchas otras opciones, en este momento, para Venezuela, además del control de daños.

Pero ¿cuánto es posible ceder?

En apenas 1 año vimos el retorno de la Embajada de los EE.UU. a Caracas, así como el establecimiento de una oficina de la CIA en el país y la restauración de las relaciones con el Estado de Israel.

En el plano económico, los EE.UU. pasaron a acercarse a la recaudación de aproximadamente 1 millón de barriles diarios exportados, cuyo valor es apenas parcialmente devuelto al gobierno venezolano para la realización de inversiones y gastos autorizados por los EE.UU. Buena parte del valor permanece con el gobierno de los EE.UU., y Trump se refirió directamente a este valor como botín de guerra.

Poco después, Venezuela concedió a la empresa estadounidense Trafigura el derecho de comprar y exportar oro venezolano para ser refinado en el exterior, con aproximadamente 400 kg de oro por mes siendo transferidos a los EE.UU.

Y más recientemente, Venezuela cedió a los EE.UU. control mayoritario sobre reservas venezolanas aún no exploradas y que equivaldrían, en teoría, a 65 mil millones de barriles de petróleo. Se trata de áreas en las cuales los EE.UU. harían inversiones de 100 mil millones de dólares para extraer petróleo por 25 años, lo que rendiría 200 mil millones de dólares en ingresos para Venezuela, pero mucho más para las empresas involucradas y para el gobierno de los EE.UU.

¿Hasta dónde más está dispuesta a llegar Delcy Rodríguez? He ahí la cuestión.

Finalmente, es temerario creer que un cambio en la Casa Blanca de un gobierno republicano a un gobierno demócrata representaría un vuelco de suerte para Venezuela. En temas estratégicos, hay una sorprendente continuidad de política exterior entre diferentes gobiernos, lo que nos indica que tal vez no sea la Casa Blanca la que dicta las directrices realmente. Además, no cuesta nada recordar que fue bajo Barack Obama que el cerco contra Venezuela realmente se inició, intensificándose con cada presidencia subsequente, fuese republicana o demócrata.

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The EU’s delisting of two Russian oligarchs last week despite multiplying sabotage attacks in Europe was “regrettable”, while German-Russian talks at the UN ended in “ridicule”, EU foreign affairs chief Kaja Kallas has said.

“It is regrettable that this [delisting] was the decision,” said Kallas on Monday (28 September) in Brussels at a defence ministers’ meeting.

“We are putting forward more listings, targeting their military-industrial complex, also targeting the finances of Russia, because we want this war to stop,” she added, referring to the 22nd round of Russia sanctions, due on 12 October.

Lithuania’s defence minister Robertas Kaunas also called the delistings a “step backwards”, adding: “This is not the time to reduce sanctions. We have to strengthen the pressure on Russia and [Russian president Vladimir] Putin’s environs”.

This article continues, but the full version is available only to EUobserver.com subscribers. Visit account.euobserver.com/membership

“It takes years to sanction something that can be replicated in days—so what is the point of sanctions at all?”

This is a question we hear repeatedly in our work at the Independent Anti-Corruption Commission (NAKO) in Ukraine to close gaps in the sanctions regime.

And the frustration behind it is justified: several entities we submitted for designation years ago were added to the EU sanctions list only recently.

Since 2014, the European Union has sanctioned about 3,000 individuals and entities in relation to the war against Ukraine. The US has blacklisted over 7,000.

These lists include, among many others, third-country sanctions-evasion facilitators.

One such network exposed in late 2024 supplied microelectronics and British-made optical equipment later used in Russian military aircraft.

The UK sanctioned it nearly six months later; the EU took almost two years. It is one of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of such cases.

Sanctions take time: authorities must gather evidence, meet legal requirements, and assess their impact. Meanwhile, new companies can replace those under scrutiny, keeping the network running.

The British optics case shows how the main facilitator sourced goods from an alleged Hong Kong supplier of essential oils and confectionery flavourings — at an address shared with several companies already sanctioned for evasion.

(Almost) all roads lead to China

This essential-oils supplier was hardly an isolated curiosity.

It pointed to a wider infrastructure of shared addresses, corporate service providers, and unlikely businesses through which new suppliers can keep appearing as others are sanctioned.

Our study traced roughly 1,800 foreign suppliers and more than $800m [€702m] in trade in priority Western microelectronics—only a fraction of the true scale. Most passed through mainland China and, especially, Hong Kong.

China’s role in sanctions evasion — and the shell companies that help facilitate it — is hardly breaking news. But some suppliers in our dataset run very real businesses in rather unexpected fields.

Fuxin Pharmaceutical makes medicines and agrochemicals — and trades in Western microelectronics. Taibung Piping Equipment sells steel fittings for energy and petrochemical systems, alongside integrated circuits, semiconductors, and power electronics.

Shenzhen NuanQin Technology took things further.

It advertised “smart sex toys” but shipped to Russia no “Leopard Print Beginner’s Floggers” or “OMG! Feather Ticklers”.

Customs records show industrial electronics, integrated circuits, and other dual-use components instead.

Its corporate footprint is equally eclectic: NuanQin is also linked to an FPV drone retailer.

Many others have generic names, no websites, and almost no public footprint.

To a Western dual-use manufacturer, they may look like small retailers or freight forwarders — unremarkable enough to pass conventional sanctions screening and keep trading.

Shared addresses are a red flag

Their addresses can reveal what company-by-company screening misses. Sharing one with a sanctioned firm does not warrant automatic designation, but it is a strong signal of diversion risk.

The numbers speak for themselves.

One Hong Kong office unit housed at least 45 companies, with perhaps 20 more: 14 under sanctions or export controls, and 31 unrestricted. Together, they supplied Russia with over $16m in priority microelectronics—within our dataset alone.

Other obscure suppliers lead businesses to claim they sell hats, salon equipment, or even offer immigration services.

Such links may be unsurprising in a world of virtual offices and corporate service providers, but a simple sanctions check misses them, even as tens of millions of dollars in trade pass through.

Beyond the shopfront

Offshore links recur throughout the data. We found 33 addresses associated with offshore structures and used by 66 suppliers, fewer than half of them restricted. Together, those suppliers accounted for over $57m in shipments to Russia, including $26m from unrestricted firms.

A shared office in the British Virgin Islands or Seychelles may raise an obvious red flag. Other connections are much harder to spot.

Take another Hong Kong supplier linked to millions of electronics and microelectronics supplies to Russia. Its ordinary-looking office address has also been used by offshore service providers and operators of tankers linked to Russia’s shadow fleet.

A shared address does not prove a coordinated network, but it points to corporate infrastructure serving both chip procurement and oil-sanctions evasion.

An even more striking case leads to Liu Baoxia. The United States sanctioned her in 2017, and the FBI placed her on its wanted list in 2025. Her network smuggled US electronics to Iran for its missile and drone programmes through Hong Kong front companies in the Ho King Commercial Center.

NAKO identified at least 14 companies supplying microelectronics to Russia from those same offices. Only five have been sanctioned.

Follow the address, not the company

Every company in our dataset, sanctioned or not, supplied Russia with priority microelectronics. We found more than 200 addresses linked to restricted entities. Over 450 suppliers used them, accounting for nearly $380m in trade.

Since 2024, the US Bureau of Industry and Security has listed high-risk addresses alongside company names.

Yet address-based screening remains limited, especially outside the United States. The Common High Priority List shows that governments can agree on shared diversion risks.

They should now do the same for addresses, particularly as Russian and Iranian procurement networks appear to use overlapping corporate infrastructure.

A shared list would help governments and manufacturers scrutinise replacement companies before each requires a separate investigation.

An address does not make every tenant guilty by association. But it should stop an ostensibly clean supplier from getting an automatic green light. Sanctions target companies; evasion networks reuse the infrastructure behind them.

Le Conseil d'État a rejeté les recours d'une quinzaine de syndicats et d'associations contre le décret « sanctions » du 30 mai 2025. Ce texte autorise l'organisme payeur à suspendre le RSA d'un allocataire jugé défaillant, sans passer devant un tribunal. La haute juridiction administrative vient de considérer que cette confusion des rôles ne pose aucune difficulté.

Le dispositif, baptisé « suspension-remobilisation », marque une évolution importante du rapport entre l’administration et l’allocataire. Le pouvoir de déterminer l’obligation, de constater son non-respect et de décider de la suspension du revenu est désormais confié à la sphère administrative.

Un revenu suspendu par décision administrative

Le décret n° 2025-478 du 30 mai 2025 encadre les sanctions applicables aux demandeurs d’emploi, notamment aux bénéficiaires du RSA. En cas de refus d’élaborer ou d’actualiser le contrat d’engagement, ou de non-respect de certaines obligations, la suspension peut représenter au moins 30 % du revenu, pendant un à deux mois lors d’un premier manquement. En cas de persistance ou de réitération, elle peut durer jusqu’à quatre mois.

Contrôle des chômeurs : le nouveau dispositif de sanctions paru au Journal officiel

Le décret instaurant un nouveau régime de sanctions pour les demandeurs d’emploi, dont les bénéficiaires du RSA, avec un nouveau dispositif de « suspension-remobilisation » est paru samedi 31 mai 2025 au JO.

Mais lorsque l’intéressé se remet en conformité avant la fin de la suspension, celle-ci peut prendre fin et les sommes temporairement retenues peuvent être restituées. La décision reste donc administrative, même si elle produit immédiatement un effet financier sur le ménage concerné.

Syndicats et associations contestent, le juge administratif valide

Une quinzaine d’organisations, parmi lesquelles la LDH, la CFDT, la CGT, le Secours catholique, ATD Quart Monde, Emmaüs France et Solidaires, ont contesté le décret. Elles invoquaient notamment la proportionnalité des sanctions, les droits de la défense, le principe d’individualisation et le risque de priver les intéressés de moyens convenables d’existence.

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Le Conseil d’État, dans sa décision du 21 septembre 2026, n° 506563, a rejeté ces recours. Il valide ainsi le cadre réglementaire adopté après la loi du 18 décembre 2023 pour le plein emploi. L’enjeu dépasse le seul RSA. En 2023, le Conseil d’État avait lui-même relevé que la « suspension » avait une finalité punitive, puisqu’elle prive temporairement le bénéficiaire de revenus, tout en cherchant à provoquer sa remise en conformité.

Cependant, le juge n’est nullement absent : il conserve son pouvoir de contrôle sur les décisions administratives. Mais il n’intervient pas pour autoriser la suspension avant qu’elle produise ses effets. Pour l’allocataire, la réalité est claire : l’administration décide, le revenu peut être suspendu, puis le juge peut être saisi. C’est cette inversion temporelle, davantage que la disparition du juge, qui concentre l’enjeu du nouveau dispositif.

TCN: On top of hurting the US economy in the name of globalist aims, sanctions are often gravely immoral. The latest sanctions on Iran will deprive people of chemotherapy drugs, insulin, biologics for MS and rare diseases, vaccines, etc

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Read in English here

La 18va Cumbre del BRICS, celebrada en Nueva Delhi del 12 al 13 de septiembre, tuvo lugar en medio de una intensificación excepcional de las contradicciones internacionales. Las guerras en Asia Occidental, las sanciones unilaterales, las barreras arancelarias y el uso de las finanzas y la tecnología como armas han puesto de manifiesto el carácter fundamentalmente desigual del orden internacional dominado por el imperialismo. En este contexto, la continua expansión del BRICS refleja el deseo de los países en desarrollo de alcanzar una mayor autonomía estratégica y un sistema más democrático de gobernanza global. Al mismo tiempo, la cumbre demostró que el BRICS+ sigue siendo una agrupación heterogénea cuyos miembros difieren sustancialmente en sus alineamientos políticos e intereses económicos.

La Declaración de Nueva Delhi, resultado de la cumbre, reiteró la exigencia de una reforma de las Naciones Unidas, las instituciones financieras internacionales y el sistema comercial multilateral. Se opuso a las sanciones unilaterales no autorizadas por el Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas y abogó por un mayor comercio en monedas nacionales. La declaración también respaldó una mayor representación de los países en desarrollo en instituciones cuyas normas siguen siendo determinadas principalmente por los Estados Unidos y sus aliados. Estas posturas tienen una importancia objetiva en un momento en que Washington recurre cada vez más a sanciones, aranceles, controles a la exportación y control sobre los sistemas de pago para disciplinar a los países que se niegan a aceptar sus dictados.

Ambigüedad

Sin embargo, el lenguaje cuidadosamente negociado de la declaración también reveló las limitaciones de la formación ampliada. El BRICS+ incluye ahora a países sometidos a una presión occidental sostenida, como Rusia e Irán, así como a los Emiratos Árabes Unidos y otros Estados que mantienen amplios vínculos económicos y de seguridad con Occidente. En consecuencia, el consenso solo puede mantenerse mediante formulaciones que reconozcan los conflictos sin identificar siempre sus causas políticas. Esta ambigüedad fue especialmente evidente en el tratamiento que se dio en la cumbre a la guerra cada vez más extensa en Asia Occidental y a la postura adoptada por Irán.

El presidente iraní, Masoud Pezeshkian, aprovechó la cumbre para denunciar las sanciones unilaterales y la guerra de agresión contra Irán llevada a cabo por los Estados Unidos e Israel. Destacó acertadamente que la resiliencia económica no puede separarse de la paz, la soberanía y la seguridad. Irán también abogó por el comercio en monedas nacionales, un mayor uso del Nuevo Banco de Desarrollo y la construcción de corredores independientes de transporte y energía (tal como ya lo ha hecho a través de Pakistán, que ha proporcionado seis rutas terrestres para que las mercancías chinas y rusas ingresen a Irán). Para un país sometido a décadas de sanciones, a la exclusión de las redes financieras occidentales y a repetidas amenazas de cambio de régimen, la pertenencia al BRICS+ representa una importante oportunidad diplomática y económica.

La postura de Irán, sin embargo, presenta una marcada ambigüedad. Teherán presenta al BRICS+ como un instrumento para resistir el unilateralismo y defender la soberanía. Al mismo tiempo, debe buscar un acuerdo con los estados vecinos del Golfo, varios de los cuales están profundamente integrados con el capital occidental y los acuerdos de seguridad.

Irán firmó una declaración en la que se pedía moderación y desescalada, al tiempo que acusaba a los Estados Unidos e Israel de agresión y defendía sus propias acciones de represalia. Su postura combativa frente a la presión hiperimperialista se combina, por lo tanto, con un esfuerzo pragmático por evitar el aislamiento regional, asegurar el alivio de las sanciones y preservar los canales de negociación.

Esto no debe interpretarse simplemente como una inconsistencia. Irán se enfrenta a una coalición militar y financiera muy superior y debe maniobrar dentro de severas limitaciones. Pero también ilustra el problema más amplio al que se enfrenta el BRICS+. La oposición a la dominación occidental no genera automáticamente un programa antiimperialista coherente. Los Estados participantes son Estados capitalistas que persiguen sus respectivos intereses nacionales. Sus clases dominantes pueden resistirse a aspectos particulares de la hegemonía estadounidense, al tiempo que se mantienen dispuestas a llegar a acuerdos con las finanzas globales o con potencias reaccionarias regionales. En consecuencia, el BRICS+ es un escenario de lucha dentro del orden mundial en transformación, no una alternativa ya constituida al hiperimperialismo.

Socios

El acontecimiento político más trascendental de la cumbre para Asia fue la reunión entre el primer ministro Narendra Modi y el presidente chino Xi Jinping. La primera visita de Xi a la India en siete años confirmó la mejora gradual de las relaciones desde los acuerdos de retirada militar iniciados en 2024. Los dos líderes coincidieron en que la India y China deben considerarse socios en lugar de rivales y abordar las relaciones bilaterales desde una perspectiva estratégica a largo plazo. También discutieron la cuestión fronteriza, el comercio, el acceso a los mercados y los problemas de la cadena de suministro.

Cualquier mejora duradera en las relaciones entre la India y China debe ser bienvenida. La prolongada confrontación tras el enfrentamiento en el valle de Galwan de 2020 perjudicó a ambos países, aumentó el gasto militar y fortaleció los esfuerzos de los Estados Unidos por incorporar a la India a su estrategia indopacífica. Washington ha buscado constantemente convertir a la India en un contrapeso estratégico frente a China a través del Quad y la expansión de la cooperación militar y tecnológica. Por lo tanto, una confrontación continua entre la India y China beneficia mucho más a la estrategia de los Estados Unidos que a los intereses de los pueblos indio o chino.

La paz y la tranquilidad a lo largo de la Línea de Control Efectivo siguen siendo indispensables. Los acuerdos sobre la retirada deben ir seguidos de un compromiso sostenido a nivel diplomático y militar, la aclaración de las zonas en disputa y la observancia estricta de los acuerdos existentes. No se debe permitir que ni la retórica nacionalista ni la construcción competitiva de infraestructura desencadenen otra confrontación. Las diferencias sobre la frontera no pueden ignorarse, pero pueden y deben gestionarse sin subordinar toda la relación a una rivalidad militarizada.

Las relaciones económicas presentan una contradicción igualmente difícil. China es uno de los mayores socios comerciales de la India y una importante fuente de maquinaria, componentes electrónicos, productos químicos, equipos de energía renovable y otros insumos industriales. Sin embargo, el enorme déficit comercial de la India con China refleja tanto la debilidad del sector manufacturero indio como los obstáculos que enfrentan las exportaciones indias en el mercado chino. Para abordar este desequilibrio se requiere un mejor acceso al mercado, inversión china en condiciones transparentes y, sobre todo, una política industrial india capaz de desarrollar la capacidad productiva nacional. Durante los últimos seis meses, el comercio bilateral se ha disparado.

El enfoque del Gobierno de Modi ha alternado entre la dependencia de las importaciones chinas y las restricciones, motivadas políticamente, a la inversión y la tecnología chinas. Su retórica de “China más uno” no puede ocultar el fracaso de sus propias políticas para generar una industrialización de base amplia. Tampoco una alineación estratégica más estrecha con los Estados Unidos puede proporcionar a la India una base manufacturera independiente. Los Estados Unidos busca un acceso privilegiado al mercado indio, al tiempo que recurre a aranceles, restricciones tecnológicas y presión política cada vez que las políticas indias se apartan de sus intereses. La incoherencia del Gobierno de Modi se pone de manifiesto, sobre todo, en su incapacidad para elaborar realmente una agenda nacional de desarrollo que aproveche el dinamismo de la economía china y se distancie de unos Estados Unidos más orientados hacia el nacionalismo económico.

China, por su parte, debe reconocer que unas relaciones estables requieren sensibilidad ante las preocupaciones legítimas de la India. Entre ellas se encuentran la cuestión fronteriza sin resolver, el acceso desigual al mercado y el desequilibrio comercial. La considerable asimetría entre las dos economías hace que la reciprocidad sea particularmente importante. El llamado de Pekín a la colaboración solo cobrará sentido cuando vaya acompañado de medidas prácticas que permitan el ingreso de bienes y servicios indios al mercado chino y eviten que las tensiones fronterizas acaben repetidamente por opacar el diálogo político.

La cooperación entre la India y China otorgaría al BRICS+ un peso mucho mayor en la lucha por la democratización del orden internacional. Juntos, ambos países representan más de un tercio de la humanidad.

Su cooperación podría impulsar la reforma de las instituciones internacionales, el financiamiento climático, el intercambio de tecnología, las iniciativas de salud pública y un sistema comercial más justo. Por el contrario, una nueva confrontación paralizaría al BRICS+ y permitiría que potencias externas se aprovecharan de las divisiones en toda Asia. Por lo tanto, la India debe seguir una política exterior independiente basada en la coexistencia pacífica, y no participar en un proyecto estadounidense destinado a contener a China.

La cumbre de Nueva Delhi generó propuestas para la continuidad institucional, una cooperación financiera más sólida y una mayor resiliencia entre las economías en desarrollo. Sin embargo, las declaraciones tendrán un valor limitado a menos que se traduzcan en acuerdos concretos. El Nuevo Banco de Desarrollo debe ampliar los préstamos en monedas nacionales y dar prioridad a la infraestructura socialmente necesaria, en lugar de reproducir las condiciones y la orientación corporativa del Banco Mundial. Los mecanismos de pago transfronterizos deben desarrollarse de manera transparente, sin crear nuevas formas de dominación por parte de las economías más fuertes del BRICS. Las enérgicas declaraciones en apoyo de la Revolución Cubana y de las aspiraciones de autodeterminación del pueblo palestino deberán tener una aplicación práctica. ¿Encontrará el BRICS+ una manera de romper el cruel e ilegal embargo de Estados Unidos contra Cuba, y brindará el BRICS+ apoyo para la reactivación de la vida política palestina?

El BRICS+ encarna tanto el movimiento hacia un nuevo equilibrio mundial como todas las contradicciones de ese movimiento. El cauteloso acercamiento entre India y China es un ejemplo de dicha contradicción, ya que combina el reconocimiento de la dependencia mutua con una desconfianza estratégica sin resolver. El futuro del BRICS+ dependerá de si dichas contradicciones se gestionan de manera pacífica y de si la cooperación genera beneficios tangibles para los trabajadores, en lugar de limitarse a ampliar el margen de maniobra de las clases dominantes nacionales.

Para la India, el camino a seguir es claro: restablecer relaciones normales y pacíficas con China, resistirse a ser incorporada a la estrategia militar de los Estados Unidos, oponerse a la agresión y a las sanciones unilaterales contra Irán, y trabajar por un orden multilateral genuinamente democrático. Solo habrá un nuevo equilibrio mundial cuando se restrinja la dominación hiperimperialista y se amplíen la soberanía y las posibilidades de desarrollo de los pueblos. La cumbre de Nueva Delhi marcó un paso más en esa transición controvertida, pero la dirección y el contenido social del orden emergente siguen siendo objeto de lucha política.

Vijay Prashad es un historiador y periodista indio. Es autor de cuarenta libros, entre los que se incluyen Balas de Washington, Una estrella roja sobre el Tercer Mundo, Las naciones oscuras: una historia del Tercer Mundo; Las naciones pobres: una posible historia del Sur Global y How the International Monetary Fund Suffocates Africa, escrito con Grieve Chelwa. Es el director ejecutivo de Tricontinental: Instituto de Investigación Social, corresponsal jefe de Globetrotter, y el editor jefe de LeftWord Books (Nueva Delhi). También ha hecho apariciones en las películas Shadow World (2016) y Two Meetings (2017).

Este artículo fue elaborado por Globetrotter.

Lee en español aquí

The 18th BRICS Summit, held in New Delhi on September 12–13, occurred amid an exceptional intensification of international contradictions. Wars in West Asia, unilateral sanctions, tariff barriers, and the weaponization of finance and technology have exposed the fundamentally unequal character of the imperialist-dominated international order. Against this background, the continued expansion of BRICS reflects the desire of developing countries for greater strategic autonomy and a more democratic system of global governance. At the same time, the summit demonstrated that BRICS+ remains a heterogeneous grouping whose members differ substantially in their political alignments and economic interests.

The New Delhi Declaration, the outcome of the summit, reiterated the demand for reform of the United Nations, international financial institutions, and the multilateral trading system. It opposed unilateral sanctions not authorized by the United Nations Security Council and advocated greater trade in national currencies. The declaration also supported increased representation for developing countries in institutions whose rules continue to be determined primarily by the United States and its allies. These positions have objective significance at a time when Washington increasingly employs sanctions, tariffs, export controls, and control over payment systems to discipline countries unwilling to accept its dictates.

Read more: BRICS nations call for end of US blockade on Cuba, condemn Israeli and US violations in Iran

Ambiguity

Yet the declaration’s carefully-negotiated language also revealed the limitations of the expanded formation. BRICS+ now includes countries subjected to sustained Western pressure, such as Russia and Iran, as well as the United Arab Emirates and other states retaining extensive economic and security ties with the West. Consensus can consequently be maintained only through formulations that acknowledge conflicts without always identifying their political causes. 

This ambiguity was especially apparent in the summit’s treatment of the widening war in West Asia and the position adopted by Iran.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian used the summit to denounce unilateral sanctions and the war of aggression against Iran carried out by the United States and Israel. He correctly stressed that economic resilience cannot be separated from peace, sovereignty, and security. 

Iran also advocated trade in national currencies, greater use of the New Development Bank, and the construction of independent transport and energy corridors (as it has already created through Pakistan, which has provided six roadways for Chinese and Russian goods to enter Iran). For a country subjected to decades of sanctions, exclusion from Western financial networks, and repeated threats of regime change, membership of BRICS+ provides an important diplomatic and economic opening.

Iran’s position, however, contains a marked ambiguity. Tehran presents BRICS+ as an instrument for resisting unilateralism and defending sovereignty. Simultaneously, it must seek accommodation with neighboring Gulf states, several of which are deeply integrated with Western capital and security arrangements. Iran signed a declaration calling for restraint and de-escalation even while accusing the United States and Israel of aggression and defending its own retaliatory actions. Its militancy against hyper-imperialist pressure is therefore combined with a pragmatic effort to avoid regional isolation, secure sanctions relief, and preserve channels of negotiation.

Read more: No new talks with the US until the previous conditions are met, says Iran

This should not be understood simply as inconsistency. Iran confronts a vastly superior military and financial coalition and must maneuver within severe constraints. But it also illustrates the broader problem facing BRICS+. Opposition to Western domination does not automatically produce a coherent anti-imperialist program. The participating states are capitalist states pursuing their respective national interests. Their ruling classes may resist particular aspects of US hegemony while remaining prepared to reach accommodations with global finance or with regional reactionary powers. BRICS+ is consequently an arena of struggle within the changing world order, not an already constituted alternative to hyper-imperialism.

Partners

The summit’s most consequential political development for Asia was the meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping. Xi’s first visit to India in seven years confirmed the gradual improvement in relations since the military disengagement arrangements initiated in 2024. The two leaders agreed that India and China should regard each other as partners rather than rivals and approach bilateral relations from a long-term strategic perspective. They also discussed the boundary question, trade, market access and supply-chain problems.

Any durable improvement in India–China relations must be welcomed. The prolonged confrontation following the Galwan Valley clash of 2020 damaged both countries, increased military expenditure and strengthened the efforts of the United States to incorporate India into its Indo-Pacific strategy. Washington has consistently sought to turn India into a strategic counterweight to China through the Quad and expanding military and technological cooperation. A continuing India–China confrontation therefore serves US strategy far more than it serves the interests of the Indian or Chinese peoples.

Peace and tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control remain indispensable. Agreements on disengagement must be followed by sustained diplomatic and military-level engagement, clarification of disputed areas and strict observance of existing arrangements. Neither nationalist rhetoric nor competitive infrastructure construction should be allowed to trigger another confrontation. Differences over the boundary cannot be wished away, but they can and must be managed without subordinating the entire relationship to militarised rivalry.

Economic relations present an equally difficult contradiction. China is one of India’s largest trading partners and an important source of machinery, electronic components, chemicals, renewable-energy equipment and other industrial inputs. India’s enormous trade deficit with China, however, reflects both the weakness of Indian manufacturing and the obstacles faced by Indian exports in the Chinese market. Addressing this imbalance requires improved market access, Chinese investment under transparent conditions and, above all, an Indian industrial policy capable of developing domestic productive capacity. Over the past six months, two-way bilateral trade has soared.

The Modi government’s approach has alternated between dependence on Chinese imports and politically motivated restrictions on Chinese investment and technology. Its “China-plus-one” rhetoric cannot conceal the failure of its own policies to generate broad-based industrialisation. Nor can closer strategic alignment with the United States supply India with an independent manufacturing base. The US seeks privileged access to the Indian market while using tariffs, technology restrictions and political pressure whenever Indian policies diverge from its interests. The incoherence of the Modi government is best demonstrated in its inability to actually produce a national development agenda that takes advantage of the buoyancy of the Chinese economy and disengages from a United State more geared towards economic nationalism.

China, for its part, must recognize that stable relations require sensitivity to India’s legitimate concerns. These include the unresolved boundary, unequal market access and the trade imbalance. The considerable asymmetry between the two economies makes reciprocity particularly important. Beijing’s call for partnership will acquire substance only when accompanied by practical measures enabling Indian goods and services to enter the Chinese market and preventing border tensions from repeatedly overwhelming political dialogue.

Cooperation between India and China would give BRICS+ far greater weight in the struggle for democratization of the international order. Together, the two countries represent more than a third of humanity. Their cooperation could advance reform of international institutions, climate finance, technology sharing, public-health initiatives, and a fairer trading system. Conversely, renewed confrontation would paralyse BRICS+ and permit outside powers to exploit divisions throughout Asia. India must therefore pursue an independent foreign policy based on peaceful coexistence, not participate in a US project to contain China.

The New Delhi summit produced proposals for institutional continuity, stronger financial cooperation, and greater resilience among developing economies. But declarations will have limited value unless translated into material arrangements. The New Development Bank must expand lending in national currencies and prioritize socially necessary infrastructure rather than reproduce the conditionalities and corporate orientation of the World Bank. Cross-border payment mechanisms must be developed transparently, without creating new forms of domination by the strongest BRICS economies. The strong statements on behalf of the Cuban Revolution and the Palestinian people’s aspirations for self-determination will need practical application. 

Will the BRICS+ find a way to break the cruel and illegal US embargo on Cuba, and will the BRICS+ provide support for the revival of Palestinian political life?

BRICS+ embodies both the movement towards a new world equilibrium and all the contradictions of that movement. The cautious India–China rapprochement is one example of the contradiction, combining recognition of mutual dependence with unresolved strategic distrust. The future of BRICS+ will depend upon whether such contradictions are peacefully managed and whether cooperation delivers tangible gains to working people rather than merely expanding the room for maneuver of national ruling classes.

For India, the necessary course is clear: restore normal and peaceful relations with China, resist incorporation into the United States’ military strategy, oppose aggression and unilateral sanctions against Iran, and work for a genuinely democratic multilateral order. A new world equilibrium will only be when it restricts hyper-imperialist domination and enlarges the sovereignty and developmental possibilities of peoples. The New Delhi summit marked another step in that contested transition, but the direction and social content of the emerging order remain matters of political struggle.

Vijay Prashad is an Indian historian and journalist. He is the author of forty books, including Washington Bullets, Red Star Over the Third World, The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World, The Poorer Nations: A Possible History of the Global South, and How the International Monetary Fund Suffocates Africa, written with Grieve Chelwa. He is the executive director of Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research, the chief correspondent for Globetrotter, and the chief editor of LeftWord Books (New Delhi). He also appeared in the films Shadow World (2016) and Two Meetings (2017).

This article was produced by Globetrotter.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte Photographer: Dati Bendo © European Union
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said on Wednesday (2 September) that Europe and NATO would increase pressure on Russia after Germany attributed an attempted attack on cargo planes at Leipzig/Halle Airport to Moscow, calling the incident a “new escalation” on European Union soil, writes Catherine Feore.

“This was an attack using military-grade material, carried out by Russian operatives on European Union soil. We will not tolerate it,” von der Leyen said alongside NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte in Brussels.

The German government said on Tuesday (1 September) that its investigation and intelligence findings established Russian responsibility for the attempted attack at Leipzig/Halle Airport last month. Russia has denied responsibility.

The meeting took place as foreign ministers and the EU's High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy were meeting to discuss Russia and Ukraine among other issues.

“Had this attack succeeded, this would have resulted in enormous damage and possibly even loss of life,” von der Leyen said. “We stand in full solidarity with Germany.”

“If the intention was to make us think twice about supporting Ukraine, I can tell you it has only strengthened my resolve. Intimidation will not work.”

Von der Leyen said the Leipzig incident was part of a wider pattern of Russian activity confronting Europe, including airspace incursions, drones disrupting airports and interference with critical infrastructure.

“Leipzig marks a new escalation on European Union soil, directly attributed to Russia,” she said. 

Von der Leyen outlined three areas for a stepped-up European response: stronger protection of European infrastructure backed by additional sanctions on Russia, increased air-defence support for Ukraine, and an acceleration of Europe’s own defence build-up in close cooperation with NATO.

Infrastructure and sanctions

First, von der Leyen said Europe must strengthen the protection of infrastructure that could be targeted by Russian hybrid operations and be prepared to respond more quickly when attacks occur.

“We must treat our everyday infrastructure as frontline targets, and protect them accordingly,” she said.

The EU already has rapid response teams that can assist member states faced with such attacks, she said, arguing that Europe’s ability to prepare and respond would itself act as a deterrent.

Von der Leyen also said the EU was ready to intensify economic pressure on Moscow through sanctions. “Our sanctions have weakened Russia’s economy. We can use more sanctions and have them ready to impose as soon as such dangerous, life-threatening acts are attributed,” she said. “Every loophole Russia exploits is one we must close.”

European foreign ministers were discussing new listings in Ireland on Wednesday, she said, while the Commission was examining further ways to “cut deeper into Russia’s war chest”.

More air defence for Ukraine

Von der Leyen said her second priority was strengthening support for Ukraine, announcing that the EU had received a new request worth several billion euros for air-defence capabilities.

“Today, I can confirm that we have received a new payment request,” she said. “It is worth several billion euro, and would cover Ukraine’s air defenses, including the highly advanced PAC-3 Patriot air defense systems.”

Member states were considering the request, she said.

“I can say that it’s going in the right direction.”

Von der Leyen also pointed to European work with Ukraine on the FRIO project to develop anti-ballistic missile defences, as well as the EU’s €90 billion support loan.

“Since June, we have issued €8.5 billion for drones and missiles for Ukraine from this loan,” she said, adding that the funding could also be used to buy fighter aircraft from European industry.

Faster European defence build-up

Von der Leyen’s third priority was to accelerate Europe’s defence build-up alongside NATO, with air defence at the centre of the effort.

“Air defenses are critical,” she said. “We need a faster, more integrated alert system across Europe, and then we must intercept the threats faster.”

She pointed to the EU’s €800 billion defence investment plan, including €150 billion through the SAFE instrument, as a way for European countries to increase defence investment jointly.

“We are in a new era of European security,” von der Leyen said. “European investment in defense strengthens NATO and re-energizes our industrial base.”

Rutte backed von der Leyen’s assessment of the threat, saying Russia had become “increasingly reckless” as its war against Ukraine continued.

“We have seen more drones and missiles crossing into our airspace along our eastern flank, creating increased risk,” Rutte said.

“And we have also seen an increase in malign activities targeting our territory directly, whether it is fires set in factories producing defense equipment for Ukraine, or indeed the Russian hybrid attack in Leipzig.”

“The examples are many. The dangers Russia poses are clear,” he added.

Rutte said NATO was working “around the clock” to ensure it could protect its population and said Moscow would fail if it hoped attacks such as Leipzig would undermine Western backing for Kyiv.

“If Russia thinks we will be divided by the threat, or if they think we will be deterred from supporting Ukraine, they are mistaken,” he said. “Our unity is unshaken. Our support to Ukraine is clear.”

Rutte said NATO allies had agreed to provide at least €70 billion to support Ukraine this year and the same amount next year, with the EU loan forming a “crucial element” of that support.

The NATO chief also backed the push for additional air defence and increased defence production, saying higher spending had to translate into additional military capabilities and greater industrial capacity.

Von der Leyen said the EU and NATO would not be intimidated into reducing their support for Ukraine. “Europe and NATO will not just maintain our pressure on Russia; we will increase it,” she said. “We will not stop — not until Russia stops bombing and killing innocent children, men and women in Ukraine. We will continue, we will prevail, and we will deter anyone who attacks our freedom and our security.”

The RCMP and Canadian military were among the agencies that hired companies run by Edmonton resident 'Sal Ghafouri,' a Global News investigation has found.

The RCMP and Canadian military were among the agencies that hired companies run by Edmonton resident 'Sal Ghafouri,' a Global News investigation has found.

ISLAMABAD: Pakistan is set to sign long-delayed agreements with five oil refineries, unlocking more than $6 billion in planned upgrades to modernize aging plants and cut reliance on fuel imports, officials said. But industry warnings that changes to the financial framework could derail the projects overshadowed the announcement. The agreements with Pak-Arab Refinery Ltd., Pakistan ... Read more

The post Pakistan to sign long-delayed refinery deals unlocking more than $6 billion in planned upgrades appeared first on BOL News.

Oil prices rose more than 2% Monday after the United States attacked an Iranian island in the Strait of Hormuz and drew retaliation from Tehran, as the six-month-old conflict between the two countries showed no signs of easing. Brent crude futures climbed $2.21, or 2.51%, to $90.31 a barrel as of 0436 GMT. U.S. West ... Read more

The post Oil prices jump more than 2% after US and Iran trade strikes appeared first on BOL News.

“The Strait of Hormuz cannot be separated from the broader regional conflict,” Rezaei said.

The post Iran links Hormuz Strait reopening to end of Mideast wars appeared first on BOL News.

The United Kingdom has taken over the presidency of the Financial Action Task Force, the global standard-setter on tackling money laundering, and seems determined to keep calm and carry on despite the gigantic Donald Trump-sized hole being blasted in everything it’s trying to do.

The new president of the Financial Action Task Force is Giles Thomson, a career civil servant and archetypal safe pair of hands, who’s declared that the organisation’s priority for the next two years is fighting fraud. He estimated the global cost of fraud at $500 billion, which — if compared to the standard estimates of the volume of global money laundering as making up 2 to 5% of everything — means it contributes between a tenth and a quarter of all profits from financial crime.

Fraud is clearly thus a Very Big Deal, and therefore a well-chosen target for Thomson because everyone (including me) agrees that we need to hit it. However, I think I saw a hint of other perhaps more controversial tasks in the rest of his proposed priorities. The suggestion, for example, that the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) will conduct “proportionate assessments of lower capacity countries” looks to me like a recognition that it needs to stop criticising poorer countries that don’t actually launder money just because their legislation isn’t perfect.

This has been a weighty accusation in the past, not least because of the implicit suggestion of racism, made by, among others, regulator Charles Littrell, who summarised the FATF’s great flaw in 2022 thus: “the vast majority of dirty money and assets resides in, passes through, or is facilitated by the world's largest and richest countries. How then do the world's main [anti-money laundering] risk rankings invariably centre blame upon small, relatively poor, and nonwhite jurisdictions?”

This is not an academic question. Being blacklisted by the FATF is serious, and there has been definite unfairness in the past in which countries have ended up being singled out for a punishment beating. Hopefully a recognition of this reality is hidden somewhere inside Thomson’s rather gnomic utterance that “the FATF will support countries and the private sector to focus effort where the threat is greatest.”

Fortunately, the FATF will have an immediate opportunity to demonstrate that it shows neither fear nor favour when it comes to doing the right thing when it publishes the results of the ongoing evaluation of the United States. 

The U.S. was last evaluated in 2016, and the FATF made various recommendations, which Washington was supposed to have implemented within three years, and sort of did. With the passage of the Corporate Transparency Act in 2020, some progress was made, but since Donald Trump returned to the White House that has gone into screeching reverse.

Prosecuting foreign corrupt practices is “not a priority, ”transparency around residential ownership has been suspended, the Corporate Transparency Act  has been gutted, and crypto is everywhere. Above all, of course, the president himself has been making money at a rate that even Vladimir Putin would have to admire. His headline earnings figure —  $2.2 billion in the first year of his second term —  is clearly unprecedented, but so are the details. 

What for example will future historians make of the fact that the president declared his ownership of the trademark for “THINK BIG AND KICK ASS”? Ha, trick question, there won’t be any historians. They’ll have been replaced by AI.

Tether watch

Talking of history, I had slightly been hoping that the U.S. dollars in circulation might hit the appropriately round number of $2.5 trillion to mark the round 250th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, but it was not to be. If only the Fed had launched the $250 bill in time, perhaps it would have got there, but we’ll just have to wait.

Meanwhile, there’s an interesting time ahead for Tether, this newsletter’s favourite cryptocurrency, which is sailing into choppy waters. It has decided to pull its USDT out of the European Union rather than to comply with the Markets in Crypto Assets regulations on stablecoins, which is a boost for its great rival Circle (USDC), which is very much available in Europe. 

The two big stablecoins have markedly different strategies: Tether is dismissive of regulators, while Circle cosies up to them. And now here comes a new rival in Open USD, which is backed by many of the world’s largest banks and tech firms, and which also promises to abide by everyone’s regulations. Is Tether at risk of becoming irrelevant?

Congo’s conflict coltan

Huge credit to the good folks at Global Witness for this report from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where coltan smuggling is helping to perpetuate the grim conflict in the east of the country. It is the kind of methodical, thorough research that really helps open your eyes to how grim things can be, and how complicit the rest of us are in a global supply chain forged from conflict. 

Congolese people hack coltan out of the ground under the eyes of M23 guerrillas, who then smuggle it into Rwanda, where it is repackaged as Rwandan and given certification intended to show it’s not from a war zone. It is then shipped to refiners in China or Kazakhstan to be processed into tantalum, which is in turn sold to leading companies to be incorporated in the phones, tablets, jet engines, and other products that we all rely on for our lovely modern lives.

“Rwandan official figures show that coltan exports have increased more than 2.5 times between 2021 and 2025,” the report notes. “Coltan is an important revenue stream for Rwanda, which levies a 5% tax on exports. Since 2023, it has become the country’s second-largest export earner, after gold.”

And where does the gold come from? Also from the Congo, which is why the U.S. Treasury sanctioned a Rwandan gold refiner last month, following action taken by the European Union against the same company last year, but it has done little to rein in M23.

A version of this story was published in this week’s Oligarchy newsletter. Sign up here.

The post Holding the U.S. to account, Tether exits EU & Congo’s conflict coltan appeared first on Coda Story.

I was listening to Ezra Klein interviewing a left-wing Democratic Party strategist the other day about what a post-Trump U.S. foreign policy might look like, and it was a pretty striking demonstration of Europe’s irrelevance right now that the only Western European country mentioned in the 90 minutes of the chat was the UK, and that was solely in the context of how it helps kleptocrats.

But aha, a notional Brit might have replied, at least we are about to convict Diezani Alison-Madueke, former head of OPEC, ex-Nigerian oil minister, for her alleged egregious corruption. That notional Brit would be feeling pretty foolish right now though, because this was yet another flop, with her being acquitted on all charges. 

Britain has a dire record both when it comes to enabling corruption and when it comes to successfully investigating it, as the failure of yet another high-profile prosecution shows. This latest fiasco should be the impetus the country needs to at last provide the resources and officers that its law enforcement agencies require.

Alison-Madueke saw the hand of divine providence in her acquittal. “It has been a hard journey,” she said, “but I tell you this, God will always do as he will. God will be God and God is not a man that he should lie; when he promises you something, he will see it through” — and who am I to say that she’s wrong? However, there are other potential explanations for what has happened beyond the Almighty manifesting at Southwark Crown Court to give instructions to the jury, including the entrenched incompetence of British police agencies.

It’s hard not to see a parallel with the failed attempt six years ago to investigate Dariga Nazarbayeva, daughter of the former president of Kazakhstan and possessor of a reasonable-to-large London property portfolio, which saw the National Crime Agency (NCA) being comprehensively outwitted by defence lawyers, just as it has been again.

“Today’s verdict is a major blow for the NCA who have come away empty-handed in one of their highest-profile corruption cases, which took over a decade to progress to trial,” said Zainab Saleem, Legal Fellow at Spotlight on Corruption. "It is vital that the UK government properly resources law enforcement agencies tasked with investigating complex bribery and corruption cases and does not take this defeat as grounds for rowing back on anti-corruption enforcement.”

It will be interesting to see what, if anything, results from the suggestions that the new Supreme Leader of Iran has been moving his wealth merrily around with the help of various Western banks, all of it now being investigated by the U.S. Department of Justice. “Funds for the transactions have been routed through financial institutions in the UK, Switzerland, Liechtenstein and the UAE,” reports Bloomberg.

What is the answer? Whatever it is, it will be even more embarrassing for the UK if it doesn’t come up with something plausible by the time it convenes its Illicit Finance Summit in December. (Unless it ends up being rescheduled again, like one of those meetings that no one actually wants to attend but also no one wants to be responsible for cancelling.)

Still, credit where it’s due, at least efforts to improve Companies House — the UK’s formerly-disastrous corporate registry — appear to be finally bearing fruit. It has sent almost a million enforcement letters to people who haven’t verified their identity, which must have been — at the very least — a useful money-spinner for the post office.

The idea of increasing funding to law enforcement agencies is something that Americans would do well to consider too, particularly when it comes to the Internal Revenue Service. “In 2022, under President Joe Biden, Congress approved an $80 billion increase in IRS funding over a decade, with more than half of it slated to restore the agency’s ability to go after the super-rich. This victory was short-lived. By March 2025, Republicans had slashed that $45.6 billion enforcement budget to just under $4 billion — “a 91% decrease,” it notes in this fascinating book excerpt.

I have been interested for a while in the idea of government’s being engaged in “legalisation by under-enforcement,” which is something we see with tax evasion, pollution of waterways, and almost anything else when the rules not being enforced benefit the kind of people who donate money to political parties. But I need a better name for the phenomenon, so please help me out and send one in.

Talking of phenomena that we need a new name for, Elon Musk’s wealth is doing weird things to the Forbes billionaires list. Whoever runs it appears to have decided to only display his net worth to two significant figures. That means that, while we can see an assessment of the wealth of relative paupers like Sergey Brin to the nearest $100 million ($277.6 billion, as I write), we only get a round $1.2 trillion for Musk. Or a round $1. 4 trillion, depending on what day it is, which means his wealth jumps up and down in a minimum increment that, on its own, would be sufficient to make its possessor the richest person in every country in the world except Spain, Canada, Mexico, the United States or France.

And talking of France, the G7 summit in Evian is over. It was of course at a previous French G7 summit when participants created what became the Financial Action Task Force. That was the 1980s and they were concerned about the spread of illegal drugs, the harm they were causing, and the fact that more countries were producing them, and wanted to stop drug dealers being able to keep their profits. Among other things they committed — in the words of the 1989 communiqué — “to prevent the utilization of the banking system and financial institutions,” which is part of the clause that gave birth to the entire global anti-money-laundering system. Well, 37 years have passed, so let’s check in on how that’s going. 

This year the G7 communiqué expressed concern about the spread of illegal drugs, about the harm they’re causing, and about the fact that more countries are producing them. “We emphasize the continued need to strengthen the global anti-money laundering architecture to prevent financial crime and improve enforcement and asset recovery outcomes, in line with the Financial Action Task Force standards,” this year’s summit document states. 

Plus ça change. Maybe in another 37 years, they’ll look up and wonder whether they should try something else, and indeed whether the FATF standards aren’t ripe for reconsideration.

A version of this story was published in this week’s Oligarchy newsletter. Sign up here.

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