RT | October 5, 2026

Swiss police are investigating a sprawling fraud operation with suspected links to Ukrainian scam call centers, an industry said to be worth billions to corrupt officials in Kiev, Neue Zurcher Zeitung (NZZ) has reported, citing law enforcement officials.

According to a report on Sunday, NEDIK, the police network coordinating Switzerland’s fight against digital crime, recently recorded an increase in fraud offenses suspected of having links to Ukraine. The network declined to provide nationwide figures “for tactical reasons,” but noted that at least four fraudulent call centers in Ukraine have been identified in international investigations involving Swiss authorities, with Swiss and German citizens among their main victims.

One investigation by Bern authorities, reportedly underway for years, concerns a man suspected of operating several call centers in Kiev. On just one platform allegedly linked to the operation, reported losses in Switzerland amounted to nearly 4 million Swiss francs ($4.8 million).

Several Ukrainian nationals have also recently been arrested in Swiss cantons for allegedly acting as cash collectors in telephone scams. In St. Gallen in early September, a person posing as a bank employee called a 93-year-old man and instructed him to withdraw and hand over a large sum of money. Police later arrested a 38-year-old Ukrainian who allegedly collected the cash.

Police in Aargau have similarly reported a growing number of suspected cash collectors holding Ukrainian citizenship. Authorities, however, have not established whether they are being directed by call centers in Ukraine or acting independently. NZZ noted that it remains unclear to what extent Ukraine-based operations are connected to fraud networks and cash collectors operating in Switzerland.

While Russians have long been portrayed as the main targets of Ukrainian scammers, sources cited by NZZ challenged that narrative. Brian Lee, head of the Eurasia Observatory at the Geneva-based Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC), said Russians accounted for just 10%-15% of targets even at the height of the so-called “patriotic fraud” narrative, under which young Ukrainians were recruited into scam networks on the pretext of taking revenge for Moscow’s military operation against the Kiev regime. Victims have been identified in at least 29 countries, with scam centers increasingly targeting Europe and the US, according to a GI-TOC report published earlier this year.

Lee also reported that bribing Ukrainian officials for protection is central to the business model, saying GI-TOC investigations found that criminal elements “operate seamlessly and efficiently alongside law enforcement agencies, public officials and the private sector.” Such protection reportedly costs scam operators $10,000-$15,000 per month.

Scam networks and state structures

Corruption has long plagued Ukraine, with high-level scandals including last year’s $100 million Energoatom kickback scheme, reportedly led by Timur Mindich, a former business partner of Ukrainian leader Vladimir Zelensky. Western-backed investigators have since uncovered further graft involving Ukrainian officials.

The scam call center network reentered the spotlight last month after Ukrainian Prosecutor General Ruslan Kravchenko – a key pillar of Zelensky’s increasingly fragile governing structure – resigned amid the exposure of an industrial-scale network across the country with alleged links to senior figures in Kiev. Ukraine’s Western-backed National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) accused Sergey Kropiva, head of the cybercrime unit at the Prosecutor General’s Office, of leading a ring that collected protection payments from notorious Ukrainian scam call centers. NABU said it identified assets worth almost $1 million allegedly purchased with proceeds from the scheme.

The sums involved in Ukraine’s wider scam industry are reportedly far larger. Ukrainian media earlier estimated that roughly 2,000 scam offices were operating nationwide as of early August, about half paying protection money to corrupt officials. Such payments were estimated at $240 million annually, while the industry itself has been valued at up to $1 billion a month.

The scam industry has also been linked to powerful security structures under Zelensky’s government. In September, personnel from the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and military intelligence (HUR) exchanged fire in Kiev in a confrontation that left three servicemen injured. The clash centered on Stepan Kaplunov, a member of an HUR-linked armed unit detained by the SBU. A law enforcement source cited by Ukrainian outlet Strana said Kaplunov may have been involved in operating scam call centers, pointing to a broader struggle between rival security agencies over the lucrative industry. Ukrainian journalists have also reported that proceeds from criminal operations help finance parts of the HUR’s activities.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has described phone scams as a key tactic employed by Kiev to extract money from Russian citizens, suggesting the practice has effectively become state policy. Moscow considers the industry a national security threat and claims Ukrainian scam networks operate in coordination with the country’s intelligence services.

Russian forces have recently intensified strikes on Ukrainian telecommunications infrastructure, mobile operators, and data centers in response to Kiev’s botched “pressure campaign” of drone attacks on civilian infrastructure deep inside Russia. The strikes have disrupted internet access, digital television, and other services, including by hitting data centers in Kiev that Moscow says were used by Ukrainian military and intelligence services. Media reports late last month also claimed a Russian strike hit one of the scam call centers in Dnepropetrovsk.

BND chief Martin Jaeger’s claim comes as his agency pushes for more funding and expanded powers

RT | October 5, 2026

Martin Jaeger arrives to speak in the annual open hearing of Germany’s three intelligence services at the Bundestag in Berlin, Germany, October 5, 2026 © Getty Images ; Sean Gallup

Germany could become “embroiled in a violent conflict with Russia,” the country’s foreign intelligence chief has warned, claiming that a mysterious drone incident at Leipzig airport is an example of the “real and imminent” threat posed by Moscow.

Speaking to lawmakers at a parliamentary hearing on Monday, Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) head Martin Jaeger declared that “the confrontation we are facing with Russia has taken on a new, more dangerous dimension.”

“Germany is in danger ​of becoming embroiled in a violent conflict with Russia – the attempted attack in Leipzig ⁠is just one example,” he continued, referring to the discovery of an explosive-laden drone next to a Ukrainian transport plane at the city’s airport in August.

German authorities have not released any evidence linking the incident to Russia, and Moscow has described the episode as a “hastily cobbled-together provocation” serving “exclusively the aims of Kiev and the militaristic wing of the European political class.” It is “obvious that Germany is pursuing a further course of escalation,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said last month.

Nevertheless, Jaeger claimed that Russia is “waging a shadow war,” and that there is a “real and imminent” threat of attacks against targets in Germany. “No other country currently poses such a direct, comprehensive, and concrete threat to Germany,” he added.

Jaeger is one of dozens of Western political, military, and media figures to accuse Russia of waging a “hybrid war” or “shadow war” against Europe in recent weeks. The accusations are, by their nature, impossible to verify, and Moscow has written them off as pretexts to deepen Western involvement in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, justify military spending hikes, and expand surveillance and persecution of domestic opponents.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has explicitly and without evidence described the country’s most popular political party, the right-wing AfD, as “Russia-backed.” Martina Rosenberg, the head of Germany’s Military Counterintelligence Service (MAD), alluded to this claim during Monday’s briefing, telling lawmakers that the country is “threatened by diverse dangers from both outside and within.”

Jaeger, Rosenberg, and domestic intelligence (BfV) chief Sinan Selen all praised Merz’s recent efforts to grant the BND greater offensive powers, and called for further strengthening of the MAD and BfV’s capabilities.

Despite their allegations of “hybrid war,” European leaders have repeatedly stressed that they do not believe Russia to be planning any actual attacks on NATO territory. The BND has seen “no indication of an imminent large-scale Russian attack on NATO territory,” Jaeger added on Monday.

Amid an unprecedented escalation in the West’s rhetoric toward Russia, RT is tracking the statements, accusations, and threats in our ongoing ‘Escalation Watch’ special. Keep an eye on it here as we sort the facts from the propaganda and debunk the psyops in real time.

Austrian remigration activist and CEO of the Institute for Remigration Martin Sellner stated on Sunday that a rap video circulating on Instagram calls for him to be hunted. He contrasted the clip’s availability online with restrictions he says platforms have placed on the accounts of those on the anti-immigration right.

Sellner posted the roughly 26-second clip on X. In the video, several migrant men stand in a graffiti-marked underpass under colored lights and make a number of threats and statements opposed to Germany

Mystery meat migrant rappers are calling to hunt me.

This song is not censored, while we are deplatformed everywhere.

The only thing more embarrassing than their "rap" is, that their corny radical chic is platformed by all media and indirectly funded by state money.

— Martin Sellner (@MartinSellner_) October 4, 2026

English text overlaid on the rap video includes, “Martin Sellner is in danger from today,” “We are shootin’ with AKs” and “I am hunting Martin Sellner.”

In addition, the rappers claim that “Germany has no right to exist,” 

Other on-screen text refers to streets burning and to bombs “like in Dresden ’45.” Dresden was firebombed by the Allies at the end of the Second World War, resulting in at least 25,000 German civilians losing their lives.

In response to the video, Sellner wrote: “Mystery meat migrant rappers are calling to hunt me. This song is not censored, while we are deplatformed everywhere. The only thing more embarrassing than their ‘rap’ is that their corny radical chic is platformed by all media and indirectly funded by state money.”

German criminal law treats certain public threats as offenses independent of whether they are carried out. Artistic freedom may not serve as a defense in this case when the threats are specific, directed at an individual, and describe violent acts.

German employee fired for attending Martin Sellner remigration reading reaches settlement in court

Section 241 of the German criminal code related to threats penalizes threatening a person with a crime against sexual self-determination, bodily integrity, personal freedom or property of significant value. The penalty rises if the threatened act is a felony or if the threat is made publicly or by distributing content, with maximum terms reaching three years in the aggravated public cases. 

Section 126 penalizes threatening specified serious crimes, including murder, aggravated assault or certain explosives offenses, in a manner capable of disturbing the public peace, with a maximum of three years’ imprisonment.

Austrian law contains a parallel offense of dangerous threat under Section 107 of the Austrian Criminal Code when a person is menaced with death, serious injury or other grave harm in a way that is capable of causing reasonable fear.

In recent years, German public figures and politicians have brought thousands of Germans into court for various statements online that were not direct threats, but instead mere insults. In some cases, these social media users only sharply criticized these politicians. 

After German house raids for ‘insults’ and ‘racist memes’ shock the world, Elon Musk responds: ‘Thank the Lord that America has freedom of speech’

Sellner, 37, led the Identitarian Movement of Austria for years and has promoted large-scale returns of migrants. Most recently, he founded the Institute for Remigration. Germany and Switzerland have at times imposed entry bans on him tied to public-order concerns. Some of those measures were later limited or overturned by courts. 

Austrian identitarian leader Martin Sellner calls for remigration after highlighting sex crimes committed by migrants

The post ‘Mystery meat migrant rappers are calling to hunt me’ – Austrian remigration activist Martin Sellner faces ‘hunting’ threats in new rap video appeared first on Remix News.

Merz caminó por Kiev. Hay una foto de él andando por ahí en una calle. Pero no es sólo él. En sus zapatos resopla toda la frustración de toda la Alemania neonazi.

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No hay mejor tranquilizante que un Martini seco. Lo leí en una revista femenina. […] Desafortunadamente estos vasos no son los correctos, los estilos cambian.

Para un Martini seco, lo ideal es una copa en forma de cono.

Obispo: He oído que es un país magnífico: la Gran Cordillera, las pampas…
Embajador: La pampa está en Argentina, monseñor.
Obispo: La pampa. Por supuesto. […] Había fotos de tus antiguas pirámides.
Embajador: No tenemos pirámides en Miranda.

Luis Buñuel 1972 “El discreto encanto de la burguesía” Fragmentos.

Friedrich Merz, actual canciller alemán, con lazos y devociones por el nazismo, -como su abuelo paterno Josef Paul Sauvigny, quien fuera afiliado al Partido Nacionalsocialista Alemán (National Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei NSDAP) del partido Nazi y que también estuvo en las S.A. (Sturmabteilung – sección de asalto) así como su padre, Joachim; soldado de la Wehrmacht- caminó por Kiev este pasado domingo cuatro de octubre, mismo día en que su país celebra ‘la unidad alemana’.

En un arrebato desesperado entre su propia realidad de fracaso en las urnas y el delirio de la revancha nazi que se le escapa de las manos en el frente ucraniano contra la Federación Rusa, heredera del triunfo soviético de 1945, Merz, uno de los peores políticos que riñe en mediocridad con otros como Macron, Meloni, Sánchez y los incontables primeros ministros ingleses, arribó a decirle a Zelensky que contara con Alemania, o sea, con el dinero de los alemanes en quiebra energética y que deben cumplir con el sagrado mandamiento dejado por Angela Merkel de pagar cuotas mensuales a migrantes africanos para que vivan mejor que los ciudadanos alemanes.

Pero, ¿contar con cuál Alemania? – se podría preguntar el propio Neonazi Zelensky. De hecho, de paso le dijo que solo podría entrar Ucrania a la Unión Europea en calidad de observador. Zelensky respondió que, o entran como socios con plenos derechos o no entran.

Merz viajó al menos dos veces como líder de la oposición a Kiev y tan pronto fue nombrado primer ministro -como lo hizo su par inglés, Andy Burnham- fue a Kiev en visita oficial a ofrecer más armas, dinero, cooperación industrial para desarrollo de drones y apoyo. Todo ello bajo el mantra de: ‘Rusia quiere invadir Europa’, o, ‘si no ayudamos a Ucrania, seremos los próximos’.

En otras ocasiones cuando iban de visita altos funcionarios europeos, Rusia mermaba las hostilidades y la capital ucraniana descansaba de los bombardeos; tal como señaló Zelensky durante la visita de Steve Witkoff y Jared Kushner en el mes de septiembre. Tales bombardeos intensificados como retaliación rusa a los ataques a civiles y centros energéticos en la Rusia profunda.

Es claro que los viajes a Ucrania de Merz, así como de otros europeos con herencias nazis, implica una peregrinación santa a esa punta de lanza que logrará, con la ayuda de las almas de todos los nazis bien muertos, sepultos e insepultos entre 1939 y 45, derrotar a los eslavos herederos soviéticos, a esos ‘orcos’ como suelen llamarles a los rusos.

Esta peregrinación es mística. Además, es el reto a ser un mártir por aniquilación de algún drone Geran, un misil Kinzhal, tal vez por un Skander M y por qué no, ser atomizado por un Oréshnik. Esto es una posibilidad latente. Los altos mandos rusos instaron a no viajar a Ucrania. Ya hay bombardeos a los puentes de Kiev. Quedará cerrada como una isla al otro lado del Dniéper. Es posible que esta sea la última vez que un europeo vaya a Kiev y salga vivo.

Así, Merz, un derrotado pronazi de hueso colorado se paseó una vez más por la capital ucraniana. La escena es tan absurda y cosmética como las escenas de la película de Buñuel, El discreto encanto de la burguesía, con las que inicio este escrito.

Aquella comedia hecha por un renombrado surrealista, utiliza la sátira y el refinamiento sobreactuado de burgueses que cada vez que intentan cenar juntos son interrumpidos por situaciones absurdas. Como señalan en el análisis crítico de la película:

Cada vez que están a punto de sentarse a la mesa, algo absurdo o inquietante interrumpe el acto: confusiones de horario, la muerte del dueño de un restaurante, un pelotón militar, un obispo que aparece de repente, sueños que se confunden con la realidad, etc.

La película no tiene una trama lineal clásica. Es una sucesión de intentos fallidos de cenar, intercalados con sueños de los personajes y situaciones cada vez más surrealistas. El acto de comer (símbolo de civilización, placer y status) se convierte en algo imposible. […]

Pero es precisamente esto lo que la obra señala en última instancia: la vida que llevan los individuos que forman parte de la alta burguesía es irreal, un espejismo, un islote en medio del océano de la verdadera realidad. A pesar de que su aislamiento propicia el empobrecimiento del resto del mundo, ni siquiera de este modo logran ser felices y esta frustración se ve reflejada en especial en la imposibilidad de conseguir lo que con más ímpetu desean, simbolizado aquí por la comida que no consiguen disfrutar nunca y por la inconveniencia de practicar sexo cuando y con quien desean.

Merz vive el discreto ‘desencanto’ de encarnar a un nazi de tercera generación sin chance de ganar lo que tampoco ganaron abuelo y padre. Merz es como una película que además de hablar de la mediocridad y la derrota, es de bajo presupuesto, reforzando por inercia la idea de derrota y mediocridad.

Se pasea por Kiev, una vez más, con el anhelo y el espejismo febril, nada discreto de triunfar sobre Rusia.

Lo que en la película es para los burgueses el deseo frustrado de ser felices en una cena, como hecho imposible lo es para Merz el no ser un nazi triunfando sobre un heredero de los padres y abuelos soviéticos. Además, Merz en realidad ha encarnado ya la personificación del desfase, de la ubicuidad errática: ¿Por qué sale de Alemania el día que allí celebran el día de la unidad alemana?

Merz sale de allí porque esa Alemania, esa que lo derrotó en las urnas hace unas semanas, no sustenta a la nación germana de su imaginación. Aquel campo onírico de Buñuel toma sentido en este ‘loco’ transeúnte por Kiev. Lo que danza en la amplia frente de Merz está hecho de esvásticas, columnas enormes, águilas imperiales, runas, antorchas, cuerpos esculpidos a imagen del ario que soñó su ídolo, Adolfo.

El día de la unidad alemana, habrá negros y musulmanes, quizá latinos, fornicando con las mujeres alemanas. Eso sí, a la luz de ‘antorchas’, debido a la crisis energética que asumieron Olaf Schulz y su gobierno de abyectos, al avalar el ‘Ka boom’ del Nord Stream.

Cada vez que quiere sentarse a la mesa con Zelensky, éste le recuerda que es el monstruo que creó la Unión Europea y EE.UU. y que le han subestimado como un simple histrión. Entonces, la cena fracasa. El ‘duende verde’ acosado por los neonazis de Azov sólo repite los mantras de ‘más dinero’, ‘pago a funcionarios’’, dinero para la guerra’, ‘escudo antimisiles’, ‘ingreso a la OTAN y a U.E.’ etc. La cena se frustra, pero es necesaria la esperanza para continuar con la trama, el anhelo por lograr la gran cena final: derrotar a Rusia.

Como en la descripción de la película, la vida de estos capitalistas, tecnócratas, burgueses neonazis empobrece a sus sociedades. Mientras, la cena anhelada que costará mucho dinero, se escapa entre el realismo de la incapacidad alemana por un rearme eficiente y donde sus jóvenes no desean prestar servicio militar, no hay dinero y su base industrial está rezagada al menos quince años detrás de la rusa.

Siempre que Merz se quiere sentar a cenar sabe que algo pasará y está pasando: Rusia sigue avanzando hacia occidente, para ubicarse allí, en esas calles donde aún él y el neonazi Volodómir caminan. Sólo queda un 9% del Donbás en manos de los ucronazis respaldados por la OTAN. El sueño húmedo de este nazi está por finalizar.

Al igual que la forma en que Buñuel dispuso ese ‘encanto’ burgués, la trama hecha por Merz, y toda su camarilla europea sufre de confusiones de horario, no linealidad y coherencia en el discurso, lo que deviene en la eterna frustración de no lograr lo que con tanto ímpetu desean.

Por ejemplo, el señor Friedrich ha señalado varias veces que Rusia es débil y va perdiendo la guerra y que por eso es clave apoyar a Ucrania. Por otro, dice que de ganar Rusia avanzará hacia Europa. Entonces, o es débil y puede ser derrotada o es fuerte y puede avanzar hacia Europa. No puede ser las dos cosas.

En cuestión de tiempos, tampoco le da o les da a los nazis y europeos colaboradores de éstos. No hace falta sino ver las más de treinta mil sanciones impuestas a Rusia para comprender cómo sus cálculos de tiempo sobre una Rusia que caerá, cada vez de manera definitiva, han fracasado. Más de veinte veces la cena surrealista, la cena antropofágica devoradora de rusos y Rusia se ha frustrado.

También han apostado a que, con el tiempo, el presidente Putin perdería apoyo de la sociedad y, por el contrario, su partido Rusia Unida, lideró y aumentó posiciones en la pasada jornada electoral, que fue acechada por drones y ataques ucronazis. De nuevo, el burgués nazi no comió.

Las declaraciones de Merz acerca de Rusia nunca han sido amables. El gobierno alemán se encuentra en pie de guerra con los puños apretados, impotente y alucinando. En la asamblea anual de Naciones Unidas, la parte alemana solicitó a los rusos una reunión. La misma duró veinte minutos, tiempo suficiente para insultar al canciller Lavrov y fijar ultimátum a Rusia:

El contenido de la conversación se centró en la guerra en Ucrania y las relaciones bilaterales. Wadephul exhortó al Kremlin a “abandonar la peligrosa senda de escalada frente a Alemania, Europa y la OTAN (Organización del Tratado del Atlántico Norte)”, citó una fuente alemana recogida por Reuters y AP. El ministro germano también insistió en que Rusia debe facilitar un acuerdo para reactivar las exportaciones de cereales por el mar Negro, afectadas por ataques a infraestructuras y barcos de ambos países.

No obstante, Lavrov aseguró que “no surgió nada nuevo” tras el diálogo, y posteriormente aprovechó su discurso ante la Asamblea General para reforzar la postura rusa sobre la guerra e intensificar las críticas contra Occidente, incluida Alemania. El ambiente previo al encuentro estuvo marcado por señalamientos bilaterales: Wadephul denunció crímenes de guerra rusos en Ucrania y abogó por incrementar la presión internacional sobre Moscú, al tiempo que expresó desconfianza sobre la voluntad real del Kremlin de negociar la paz.

Es una clara ofensa al canciller y el pueblo rusos, citar a éste a una reunión en donde le exige lo que se vio en los párrafos anteriores. Los alemanes neonazis quieren cenar y no pueden. Se frustran y explotan a su pueblo.

En contra eso sí de cualquier libreto surrealista de Luis Buñuel, quien no tuvo tanta creatividad o no conocía ni imaginaba este tipo de burgués, los alemanes mientras izan su brazo derecho con los dedos puestos como una saeta para saludar el alma de Hitler, de una esvástica o a la raza blanca superior, entregan los vientres de sus mujeres y los impuestos de sus ciudadanos a comensales no arios. Otra escena absurda de esta película de bajo presupuesto.

Merz caminó por Kiev. Hay una foto de él andando por ahí en una calle. Pero no es sólo él. En sus zapatos resopla toda la frustración de toda la Alemania neonazi; el discreto y terrible desencanto de ser perdedores, para fortuna del mundo una vez más en menos de cien años y nuevamente gracias a Rusia. Ojalá ahora desaparezcan para siempre. ‘Good Bye Merz’.

Merz è un uomo già condannato. La paura e il bellicismo non fanno guadagnare voti.

Segue nostro Telegram.

Dopo aver imparato a proprie spese cosa significa ricevere uno schiaffo in faccia alle elezioni in Sassonia-Anhalt, la CDU ha subito una vera e propria disfatta il 20 settembre nel Meclemburgo-Pomerania Anteriore (Meck/Pomm) e a Berlino.

Analizzando innanzitutto i dati del Mecklenburg/Pomerania Anteriore, l’affluenza alle urne è stata del 78,1%, circa la stessa registrata in Sassonia-Anhalt con il 77,8%.

Il risultato finale ufficiale, seppur ancora provvisorio, può essere considerato una piccola sorpresa rispetto a quello della Sassonia-Anhalt, ma comunque illuminante. Quattro partiti occuperanno dei seggi nel parlamento regionale.

AfD 38,2% = 32 seggi

SPD 35,5%, con il ministro-presidente uscente che punta a rimanere in carica = 29 seggi

Die Linke (Sinistra) 6,5% = 5 seggi

Die Grüne (Verdi) 5,7% = 5 seggi

Il parlamento statale è composto da un totale di 71 seggi.

Ora la parte interessante: CDU 4,9%, zero seggi grazie alla soglia del 5%; così come FDP 1,0%, anche in questo caso zero seggi.

Ora cerchiamo di inquadrare la situazione in una prospettiva più ampia.

L’AfD ha vinto le prossime elezioni, anche se non con un margine così ampio come in Sassonia-Anhalt, ma si tratta comunque di una vittoria.

Manuela Schwesig, attuale presidente del partito dal 2017, appartiene all’élite dell’SPD. In precedenza, dal 2013 al 2017, ha ricoperto la carica di Ministro dell’Istruzione, della Famiglia, degli Anziani, delle Donne e dei Giovani a livello federale, e un incarico analogo nel parlamento regionale del Mecklenburg dal 2008 al 2013. Ha attraversato un periodo difficile quando l’SPD si è allontanato dall’essere un partito dei lavoratori per intraprendere le cosiddette riforme sociali che hanno drasticamente ridotto il sistema di sicurezza sociale, cercando di attenuare il più possibile gli effetti negativi dei tagli. Il suo ruolo in politica è sempre stato caratterizzato da sincerità e attenzione, dando l’impressione di essere una persona onesta.

Lei appartiene alla ristretta cerchia di politici dell’SPD da cui ci si aspetta un futuro più roseo per il partito, ma sembra intenzionata a rimanere al suo posto nel Mecklenburg/Pommarding, almeno per il momento.

I Verdi e la Sinistra hanno ottenuto ciò che ci si aspettava da loro: i Verdi in difficoltà, e la Sinistra ancora impegnata a risollevarsi dopo un periodo di turbolenze interne seguito all’abbandono del partito da parte di Sahra Wagenknecht, che ha fondato il suo movimento, BSW, portando con sé alcuni elettori di sinistra.

I Verdi, nati come partito pacifista, si opposero al riarmo militare e al degrado ambientale. Dal 2022, tuttavia, sono diventati uno dei principali sostenitori del regime ucraino e del riarmo tedesco ed europeo, talvolta superando persino i conservatori tradizionali. Questo ha comportato una perdita di consensi tra gli ambientalisti, soprattutto tra i giovani elettori. I sostenitori della pace si sono rivolti all’AfD e, in una certa misura, alla Sinistra, gli unici partiti che propongono una soluzione più pacifica e diplomatica.

La vera sorpresa di queste elezioni non è l’FDP. Al momento non ha un ruolo di rilievo, essendo stato in numerosi governi di coalizione dal 1949, aiutando sempre i due partiti principali a raggiungere le maggioranze necessarie. Sembra aver perso la propria identità, cercando di allearsi con gli avversari in campagna elettorale e finendo per smarrire la strada.

Il problema principale è che la CDU, il partito di governo a livello nazionale, ha ottenuto un misero 4,9% ed è stata quindi estromessa dal parlamento statale. È una sconfitta enorme. Il signor Merz è praticamente un uomo morto che cammina, e il suo destino è segnato per tutti.

Gli ex stati della Germania dell’Est si sentono ancora abbandonati e traditi dopo la riunificazione. I programmi istituiti per modernizzare e risanare la vecchia DDR hanno beneficiato soprattutto aziende e istituzioni della Germania occidentale. Gli appalti furono truccati e centinaia di imprese finirono in amministrazione controllata, per poi essere vendute a prezzi stracciati a investitori occidentali.

Questo è uno dei problemi di fondo ancora presenti nella mente degli ex cittadini della DDR e viene spesso addotto come spiegazione di tali risultati elettorali. Tuttavia, questa giustificazione è valida solo come pretesto per nascondere le carenze dei partiti tradizionali, ignorando i veri problemi come lo spopolamento dei villaggi, la mancanza di infrastrutture adeguate per assistere una popolazione che invecchia, le scarse opportunità di lavoro, le problematiche legate ai migranti e la sfiducia nei confronti dei partiti al potere. La forza trainante al momento della riunificazione era la CDU, le cui promesse non si sono avverate. Pertanto, le opzioni disponibili all’epoca erano un programma socialista o, in alternativa, un programma conservatore.

A prima vista, le elezioni a Berlino non hanno colpito la CDU con la stessa intensità degli altri due Länder tedeschi. Tuttavia, essendo Berlino la capitale, i risultati assumono un’importanza particolare. Anche qui, i partiti di governo hanno subito perdite significative a favore dei partiti di sinistra, AfD e Linke. I risultati sono i seguenti, con l’aggiunta di guadagni e perdite a scopo di chiarezza:

Die Linke 25,7% 47 seggi +13,5%

CDU 18,8% 34 seggi −9,4%

AfD 16,3% 29 seggi +0,1%

Grüne 14,3% 26 seggi −4,1%

SPD 12,1% 22 seggi −10,1%

BSW 4,7% sotto la soglia del 5%, nessun seggio

FDP 2,5% sotto la soglia del 5%, nessun seggio

La partecipazione è stata del 74,2%.

Il parlamento statale ha 158 seggi e la maggioranza si ottiene con 80 seggi. Ciò significa che ci sarà sicuramente un governo di coalizione. Al momento, tutti gli indizi puntano a una coalizione tra Linke (Sinistra), SPD e Verdi.

L’AfD non è riuscita a ottenere gli stessi risultati delle precedenti elezioni. Ciò è dovuto principalmente a due fattori.

Berlino ha un ambiente urbano e, come tale, un elettorato più concentrato, con una popolazione più giovane e composta da molti nuovi residenti provenienti da altri stati tedeschi.

Il secondo problema riguarda le enormi difficoltà specifiche di tali contesti. La disponibilità di alloggi a prezzi accessibili è una delle questioni centrali. L’AfD non ha esperienza nella gestione urbana e non propone concetti innovativi sufficientemente diversi da convincere gli elettori a votare per l’AfD.

È sorprendente che partiti con perdite così ingenti come l’SPD riescano comunque ad arrivare al potere. A parte la CDU, i partiti che hanno subito le maggiori sconfitte in queste elezioni finiscono comunque al governo. Questa è la bellezza di una coalizione.

Il partito di sinistra Linke non gode di grande fiducia da parte dei partiti tradizionali e degli elettori conservatori, poiché aleggia ancora intorno ad esso un’aura di comunismo. Ciononostante, i risultati elettorali sono chiari e sarà interessante vedere come Linke riuscirà a tradurre in realtà i temi della sua campagna elettorale, incentrata principalmente sul problema abitativo. Gli altri partner della coalizione faranno del loro meglio, quindi non sono previsti cambiamenti troppo radicali.

Anche in questo caso si può constatare che i partiti al governo a livello federale hanno ricevuto un messaggio chiaro, e le sconfitte dipingono un quadro desolante. Sarà un’impresa ardua cambiare l’opinione pubblica in tempo per le prossime elezioni di aprile. Ascoltando le dichiarazioni di questi partiti, sembra più che probabile che questi risultati si ripeteranno nella primavera del 2027, e a quel punto governare la Germania diventerà un’impresa pressoché impossibile.

Qualunque cosa accada, una cosa è ormai chiara. Una politica di paura e guerrafondaia, di fronte a un futuro con tagli drastici ai sistemi sociali, alla sanità e alle pensioni, e a una situazione economica che sembra peggiorare costantemente, non porterà il consenso degli elettori. Soprattutto quando non c’è una nuova visione da affrontare e risolvere, ma solo tagli e riduzioni, spacciati per riforme.

Il cancelliere tedesco, subito dopo la chiusura dei seggi, si è presentato davanti alla stampa e ha dichiarato: la stagione elettorale del 2026 è finita. Sembrava sollevato.

In fin dei conti, la CDU ha poche alternative. Se Merz fa marcia indietro sulle sue “riforme”, sembrerà debole e si arrenderà all’SPD, rafforzandola ulteriormente.

Se si avvicinasse maggiormente all’AfD, cercando di sottrarre voti, non gli sarebbe d’aiuto, dato che l’AfD è nata inizialmente da membri scontenti della CDU.

Se continua così, è assolutamente chiaro che Merz e la CDU non vinceranno le prossime elezioni federali, e Merz avrà un compito arduo per far sì che il governo segua la linea della CDU. Se l’SPD non riuscirà a dimostrare quanto sia realmente diverso dalla CDU, anche loro andranno incontro al disastro. I pericoli di essere un partner minore nelle coalizioni. Una lezione che l’FDP ha imparato a sue spese.

Nascondere la mancanza di una visione o persino di un piano chiaro per il futuro non ha mai giovato a nessun partito al governo, soprattutto nel momento in cui idee alternative, proposte da un forte partito di opposizione, guadagnano terreno a ogni elezione.

Se le prossime elezioni dell’aprile 2027 dovessero avere lo stesso esito delle ultime due, all’interno della CDU la paura si trasformerebbe in panico, e si potrebbero persino tenere elezioni federali alla fine della primavera. L’esito è imprevedibile. Tuttavia, tentare di mettere al bando l’AfD significherebbe la fine di un partito politico un tempo glorioso e la fine della democrazia come la conosciamo in Germania.

Production: By Europod, in co-production with Sphera Network.

EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.

Find the full transcript below: 

Germany shut down its last nuclear power plants in 2023, bringing Angela Merkel’s nuclear exit policy to its conclusion. But now, nuclear power is making a strong comeback everywhere in Europe. Will Germany return to nuclear policy?

Until now, German chancellor Friedrich Merz had been reluctant to bring the nuclear topic on the table, partly because there was no agreement within his coalition. He has even said that Germany’s nuclear phase-out was irreversible. But that position is not shared by everyone in his own party.

And as support for the far-right AfD (Alternative for Germany) grows — a party that is strongly in favour of nuclear power — nuclear energy is becoming less politically taboo in Germany.

According to a non-public document sent by Berlin to other EU member states and reported by the media Euractiv (currently Rapporteur), the German government wants nuclear energy to be taken into account when the EU sets its climate targets for 2040.

For now, those discussions focus on renewable energy. Germany is not proposing to abandon renewable-energy targets, but rather to leave room for other low-carbon technologies, including nuclear power and carbon capture.

The logic is similar to the debate over the EU’s 2035 target for new cars: the overall objective remains, but countries could have more flexibility over how they achieve it.

And that proposal is likely to be welcomed in France. But could they convince a majority of EU countries? The picture across Europe is changing.

Many EU countries already operate nuclear power plants, while others are building new reactors or considering a return to nuclear. Italy, for example, is looking to revive a nuclear industry after abandoning nuclear power following the 1986 Chernobyl disaster.

Poland has never operated a nuclear power plant, but it is now developing its first one. And several other countries that currently have no reactors are seriously considering building them.

Only a small group of EU countries remain opposed to developing nuclear power, including Austria, Portugal, Luxembourg and Malta.

So why has nuclear power become more politically acceptable again? The legacy of Chernobyl and Fukushima still matters. But Europe’s energy crisis following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has also changed the debate.

The shock of soaring fossil-fuel prices has encouraged governments to look for energy sources that can provide electricity without relying on fossil fuels — and nuclear power is increasingly being presented as one of them. Although there are major questions around that argument.

Nuclear power can provide large amounts of low-carbon electricity once a reactor is operating. But building and renovating reactors is extremely expensive and can take decades.

Take France’s Flamanville reactor: its final cost has been estimated at around €23bn , compared with an initial estimate of around €3bn.

There are also questions over nuclear waste, the risk of accidents, and the security of uranium supplies. European countries remain partly dependent on foreign suppliers, including Russia, for uranium.

German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier has warned that political division and disinformation are placing growing pressure on the country’s democratic institutions after a succession of state elections weakened Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s Christian Democrats and strengthened parties outside Germany’s traditional political centre.

Speaking during German Unity Day celebrations, Steinmeier compared the present political climate with divisions associated with the Weimar Republic, while stopping short of saying that Germany had reached such a point.

His intervention follows a difficult September for Merz.

Alternative for Germany won 43.8 per cent in Saxony-Anhalt, while in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania the AfD finished first with 38.2 per cent. Merz’s CDU recorded just 4.9 per cent in the latter state, leaving it outside the regional parliament for the first time.

Berlin produced a different winner but a similar problem for the established parties, with Die Linke taking first place.

The combined results have accelerated the fragmentation of a party system that for much of the post-war period revolved around two large political blocs.

EU Today examined that shift after the September elections, arguing that Germany’s political centre was losing voters in several directions at once.

Steinmeier did not confine his warning to electoral arithmetic.

He criticised the use of political demagoguery and warned that organised disinformation was damaging democratic debate. He referred to material originating from Kremlin-linked actors, domestic extremists and other networks using digital platforms to amplify manipulated information.

The remarks come during an increasingly difficult period for Merz.

The Chancellor took office promising to restore economic momentum and political stability. Instead, Germany continues to face concerns about industrial competitiveness, living standards, energy costs and the ability of its political system to absorb an increasingly fragmented electorate.

The pressure is particularly evident in eastern Germany.

Before September’s elections, EU Today noted that Merz was approaching a political reckoning in the east, where the CDU was losing ground while the AfD converted dissatisfaction over migration, energy, economic policy and distrust of established institutions into electoral support.

The subsequent results were worse for the CDU than many in the party had anticipated.

In Saxony-Anhalt, the AfD finished more than 26 percentage points ahead of the CDU. In Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, the CDU failed even to cross the threshold for parliamentary representation.

The consequences extend beyond German domestic politics.

Germany remains the EU’s largest economy and one of the principal states shaping European decisions on Ukraine, defence, migration, fiscal policy and industrial competitiveness. Political instability in Berlin can therefore affect negotiations in Brussels as well as the domestic legislative programme.

Economic policy is central to the dispute.

Germany’s manufacturing sector has faced stronger competition from China, while the rupture of the previous economic relationship with Russia has increased costs for energy-intensive industries. Russia’s continuing war against Ukraine has simultaneously required Berlin to spend more on defence and provide substantial assistance to Kyiv.

The German cabinet’s 2027 budget reflects that change. The government has approved federal expenditure of €555.4 billion, including €109.7 billion for the Defence Ministry and €11.6 billion for continued support to Ukraine.

The political difficulty is that higher security expenditure comes alongside pressure to invest in infrastructure, public services and an economy struggling to recover stronger growth.

The rise of the AfD has consequently become more than a debate over whether other parties should maintain the so-called firewall preventing formal co-operation with it.

The more difficult question for Germany’s established parties is why voters are abandoning them and whether economic and political dissatisfaction can be reversed through government policy rather than coalition arrangements designed chiefly to exclude competitors from office.

Steinmeier’s intervention places that argument inside a historical frame familiar to Germans.

The Federal Republic’s post-war institutions were deliberately designed to avoid the failures of the interwar period. But constitutional safeguards alone cannot prevent political fragmentation if large groups of voters cease to regard established parties as capable of responding to the issues that concern them.

Germany enters the final months of 2026 with that question moving from the margins of its politics to the centre.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has announced a new package worth more than €1.3 billion for Ukraine during a visit to Kyiv, combining additional military assistance with support for the country’s damaged energy infrastructure as German-Ukrainian industrial co-operation expands.

Merz visited the Ukrainian capital on Sunday while Russian drone attacks continued against Kyiv.

According to the Ukrainian presidency’s account of the meeting, the package includes more than €1 billion for defence and additional financing for the energy sector ahead of winter. Separate reporting put the energy component at approximately €350 million.

The visit also produced an extensive group of bilateral agreements involving governments and companies.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Ukraine and Germany had concluded 15 agreements and documents, most concerning security co-operation, production, procurement, orders for German industry and joint projects in Ukraine. He put the total value of the agreements reached during the visit at more than €8.5 billion.

A narrower set of industrial agreements reported during the visit was valued at about €6.6 billion and included air-defence, radar and drone projects.

The visit went beyond another transfer of military aid.

Germany and Ukraine are increasingly constructing a defence relationship based on procurement, industrial production and the transfer of Ukrainian battlefield experience to European manufacturers.

At the Ukrainian-German Business Forum, Zelenskyy said the new security package would strengthen Ukraine’s armed forces immediately while industrial agreements were intended to build longer-term production capacity.

The direction corresponds with a wider shift in European support for Ukraine.

Military assistance is increasingly moving away from transfers of existing national stocks towards contracts financing new weapons production. In July, the EU released €3.47 billion for Ukrainian defence procurement, including financing intended for drones, missiles, air defence and combat aircraft requirements.

Kyiv has since asked European partners to accelerate further financing as the demands of the war outpace scheduled disbursements. EU Today reported in September that Ukraine was seeking early access to part of its 2027 EU funding to close a military budget gap.

The German agreements add a bilateral industrial track to that European system.

They also reflect changes on the battlefield.

Russia has continued to expand large-scale drone and missile attacks, increasing the importance of interceptor production, radar coverage and lower-cost methods of destroying unmanned aircraft. Ukraine’s air-defence problem is increasingly an industrial one: inexpensive attack drones cannot sustainably be countered only with scarce and costly surface-to-air missiles.

EU Today has previously examined how Ukraine’s air-defence battle has become an industrial equation, determined as much by production rates and cost ratios as by the technical performance of individual systems.

German-Ukrainian co-operation is increasingly being shaped by that requirement.

Merz has presented continuing support for Ukraine as a direct German and European security interest, rather than assistance based solely on solidarity with Kyiv.

The argument has acquired greater force as German authorities investigate Russian-linked sabotage and hybrid operations on German territory.

In September, investigators reportedly traced the attempted bombing of a Ukrainian cargo aircraft at Leipzig/Halle Airport to a suspected Russian military-intelligence organiser, with EU Today reporting details of the alleged GRU-linked logistics network.

For Berlin, support for Ukraine is now increasingly seen as part of Germany’s own security.

Merz’s visit also carries a domestic political dimension. His government is committing Germany to considerably higher defence expenditure at a time when the CDU has suffered severe electoral setbacks in eastern Germany and voters remain concerned over public finances and economic performance.

Yet Germany’s military and industrial engagement with Ukraine is continuing to expand.

The new package announced in Kyiv is important in itself, particularly as Ukraine prepares for another winter of Russian attacks on its energy infrastructure. The wider development, however, lies in the growing number of defence-production agreements accompanying it.

European governments have spent much of the war debating how to replenish their own weapons stocks while sustaining Ukraine.

The German approach increasingly points towards a different model: Ukrainian operational experience, Ukrainian procurement requirements and European industrial capacity being brought into the same defence-production system.

Germany and California parade as climate superpowers – yet both import energy, destroy industry and hand supply chains to Beijing. Western virtue, says Tilak Doshi, is made in Chinese coal-fired factories.

The post Beijing’s Useful Idiots: Germany, California and the Green Road to Chinese Supremacy appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.

Rekord-Spritpreise, Geheimdienst-Zugriff auf Krankenakten, Millionen für die NGO eines CDU-Abgeordneten – und immer derselbe Reflex: Verantwortung liegt stets woanders.

Es gibt Regierungspressekonferenzen, die sich um ein Thema drehen, und solche, die sich um ein Prinzip drehen. Die Sitzung vom Montag gehörte in die zweite Kategorie. Das Prinzip lautete: Verantwortung liegt stets anderswo – bei globalen Märkten, bei Moskau, beim Bundeskartellamt, bei der Europäischen Kommission, bei der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Lage.

Das Auswärtige Amt eröffnete mit der Reise des Außenministers nach München und Genf und nutzte die Gelegenheit für ein Bekenntnis zur Arbeit der Goethe-Institute in fast hundert Ländern. Die Schließung der Institute in Russland stellte die Sprecherin dabei als Bruch einer kulturellen Brücke dar, der in einem „sehr repressiven Raum“ geschlagen worden sei.

Nicht nur hier öffnete sich unmittelbar ein Raum für Nachfragen.

Schließung der Goethe-Institute: Reaktion ohne Ursache

Denn was in dieser Darstellung fehlte, war der Anlass. Diese Zeitung fragte nach, weshalb das Ministerium den Vorgang so präsentiere, als sei er einseitig von russischer Seite ausgegangen – obwohl ihm die Schließung des Russischen Hauses in Berlin vorausgegangen war. Die Antwort blieb bei der Formel, die Darstellung entspreche den Tatsachen; die russische Reaktion sei „ungerechtfertigt“, die deutschen Schritte hingegen „notwendig und maßvoll“ gewesen.

Damit bestätigte die Sprecherin implizit genau das, was sie zuvor nicht erwähnt hatte: dass es sich um eine Reaktion handelte. Auf die Nachfrage, ob das Amt von der Reziprozität überrascht worden sei, folgte keine Antwort, sondern eine Zurückweisung der Schlussfolgerung. Ob die Konsequenz antizipiert wurde, blieb offen – eine für die Bewertung der eigenen Entscheidung nicht unerhebliche Frage.

Explodierende Spritpreise: Ursachen ohne Urheber

Der zweite Schwerpunkt war der Rekordanstieg bei Diesel und Benzin. Der Regierungssprecher führte ihn auf die „Zuspitzung der Situation im Nahen Osten“, Angriffe auf Ölpipelines und die Blockade von Seewegen zurück – ausdrücklich nicht auf Entscheidungen der Bundesregierung.

Auf die Frage dieser Zeitung, welche Länder und Akteure hinter dieser Zuspitzung stehen und wen die Bundesregierung als Hauptverantwortliche benennt, verweigerte der Sprecher die Auskunft: Es sei „nicht mein Job, irgendwelche Verantwortlichkeiten zu verteilen“. Bemerkenswert ist die Selektivität dieser Zurückhaltung. In derselben Pressekonferenz benannte derselbe Sprecher Russland ausdrücklich als Urheber gezielter Angriffe auf das ukrainische Eisenbahnnetz. Die Zuschreibung von Verantwortung ist offenbar keine Frage des Amtsverständnisses, sondern der geografischen Richtung.

Auch die zweite Frage dieser Zeitung blieb faktisch unbeantwortet: Warum fallen die Preissteigerungen in Deutschland deutlich stärker aus als in den Nachbarstaaten? Das Wirtschaftsministerium verwies auf unterschiedliche Steuersysteme und Maßnahmen – ohne zu erläutern, warum Deutschland jene Maßnahmen, die 23 von 27 EU-Staaten ergriffen haben, nicht ergreift. Ein Kollege hielt den Vergleich mit Polen entgegen: rund 50 Cent Differenz pro Liter.

Hier wurde der zentrale Widerspruch der Sitzung sichtbar. Wenn die Preise, wie der Regierungssprecher betont, ausschließlich globalen Marktkräften folgen, lässt sich die erhebliche Spreizung innerhalb des europäischen Binnenmarktes schwerlich erklären. Wenn sie hingegen maßgeblich von nationalen Steuer- und Abgabenstrukturen abhängt – wie das Wirtschaftsministerium einräumt –, ist die Preisbildung sehr wohl politisch gestaltbar.

Das Finanzministerium löste dieses Dilemma rhetorisch, indem es den Schwarzen Peter an die Mineralölkonzerne weiterreichte: Von „Abzocke“ und „Krisenprofiten“ war die Rede. Das Instrument der Wahl ist eine europäische Übergewinnsteuer, für die sich der Minister beim Ecofin einsetzen will. Auf die Frage, warum keine nationale Lösung erfolge, hieß es, man wolle „kein komplexes juristisches Neuland betreten“. Dass ein Instrument, das eine Einigung aller Mitgliedstaaten und einen Kommissionsvorschlag voraussetzt, schneller wirkt als eine nationale Maßnahme, erschließt sich nicht ohne Weiteres. Der Direktauszahlungsmechanismus, über den Entlastungen ausgezahlt werden könnten, erreicht derzeit ohnehin nur 19 Prozent der Steuerpflichtigen.

Geheimdienste und das Arztgeheimnis: Anwälte bleiben tabu, Therapiegespräche nicht

Ein von der übrigen Presse kaum beachteter Aspekt der geplanten Reform des Nachrichtendienstrechts betrifft das ärztliche und psychotherapeutische Berufsgeheimnis. Während das Mandantenverhältnis bei Anwälten absolut geschützt werden soll, gilt für Ärzte und Psychotherapeuten lediglich eine Abwägungslösung – Verfassungsschutz und BND könnten künftig legal auf Krankenakten und vertrauliche Therapiegespräche zugreifen.

Auf die Frage dieser Zeitung nach dem sachlichen und verfassungsrechtlichen Grund dieser Ungleichbehandlung antwortete das Innenministerium mit drei Argumenten, die in unterschiedliche Richtungen weisen. Erstens: Die Regelung entspreche bestehenden Vorschriften der Strafprozessordnung und sei „nichts Neues“. Zweitens: Psychotherapeuten seien ohnehin „kein primäres Aufklärungsziel“, die Regelung habe daher „höchstwahrscheinlich nicht besonders viel Relevanz“. Drittens: Im Einzelfall werde zwischen Aufklärungsinteresse und Berufsgeheimnis abgewogen.

Eine Begründung für die Ungleichbehandlung enthält keines dieser Argumente. Der Verweis auf die Strafprozessordnung erklärt nicht, warum der Gesetzgeber die dortige Systematik auf Nachrichtendienste überträgt, die ohne Tatverdacht und ohne richterliche Anordnung im Einzelfall operieren. Und das Argument der geringen praktischen Relevanz wirft die naheliegende Gegenfrage auf, warum eine Befugnis geschaffen wird, die man kaum zu nutzen gedenkt.

Die Nachfrage dieser Zeitung, ob der Entwurf den Zugriff auf Praxisverwaltungssysteme und die elektronische Patientenakte eindeutig ausschließt, blieb unbeantwortet. Solange diese Frage offen ist, steht die Empfehlung der ePA als geschützter Raum für hochsensible Gesundheitsdaten auf tönernen Füßen.

KI: Paradigmenwechsel mit Selbstbeschränkung

Vergleichsweise auskunftsfreudig zeigte sich das Digitalministerium beim Thema Künstliche Intelligenz. Man nehme die Warnungen von KI-Entwicklern ernst; wenn Modelle aus Testumgebungen ausbrächen und eigenständig in andere Systeme eindrängen, liege ein „völlig neues Bedrohungsszenario“ vor. Das nationale KI-Sicherheitsinstitut habe die Arbeit aufgenommen, der Nationale Sicherheitsrat habe sich bereits zweimal befasst.

Eine Drosselung der Entwicklung lehnt die Bundesregierung ab – mit Verweis auf digitale Souveränität. Damit folgt sie genau derselben Argumentation wie US-Präsident Donald Trump, der Forderungen nach einer Verlangsamung oder strengeren Regulierung der KI-Entwicklung (wie sie etwa von Anthropic oder OpenAI gefordert wurden) strikt zurückweist. Ganz seinem Motto folgend: „Wer bei KI gewinnt, gewinnt.“

Eine NGO, die niemand kennt

Zum Schluss die Frage dieser Zeitung nach der erneuten Bundesförderung des Abrahams Accords Institute für 2026, dessen Trägerverein vom CDU-Abgeordneten Armin Laschet geführt wird und bei dem personelle Überschneidungen mit dem Abgeordnetenbüro dokumentiert sind. Aus der ersten Förderperiode in Millionenhöhe liegen verspätete und nach Einschätzung des Bundesverwaltungsamts nicht nachvollziehbare Abrechnungen sowie nicht umgesetzte Projektbestandteile vor.

Die Antwort der Bundesregierung: Weder der Vorgang noch die Vorhaltungen seien bekannt. Bei einer Förderung, die der Beauftragten für Kultur und Medien im Bundeskanzleramt zuzuordnen ist, ist das eine Auskunft, die den Vorgang nicht aufklärt, sondern lediglich verschiebt.

Die andere Hälfte

Vier Themen, vier Ressorts, ein Muster. Die Schließung der Goethe-Institute erscheint als Akt ohne Vorgeschichte, die Spritpreise als Naturereignis ohne Urheber, der abgeschwächte Schutz ärztlicher Gespräche als Regelung ohne praktische Bedeutung – und eine Förderung aus dem Kanzleramt als Vorgang ohne Zuständige. Nichts davon ist falsch im engeren Sinne. Es ist nur jeweils die Hälfte. Die andere Hälfte zu liefern wäre Aufgabe einer Regierungspressekonferenz; sie einzufordern bleibt Aufgabe derer, die dort fragen.

Originalbeitrag Berliner Zeitung

Wehretat, Wehrdienst und neue Kontrollbefugnisse verändern nicht nur die Bundeswehr, sondern auch die Republik. 

“Wir müssen bis 2029 kriegstüchtig sein.” Der Satz, mit dem Boris Pistorius seine Sicherheitspolitik begründet, ist im Wortlaut so unauffällig, dass sein historischer Defekt regelmäßig übersehen wird: Deutschland sei nicht kriegstüchtig, müsse es aber dringend werden.

Wer das ausspricht, behauptet im selben Atemzug, zwei Jahrzehnte Hindukusch, über 90.000 deutsche Soldatinnen und Soldaten in Afghanistan, 59 Gefallene, die Einsätze in Mali, im Kosovo, am Horn von Afrika und in Litauen sowie das Gefecht von Kundus, in dem die Bundeswehr unter Beschuss kam wie keine deutsche Truppe seit 1945 — all das sei keine Kriegstüchtigkeit gewesen.

Den Hinterbliebenen der Gefallenen ist man eine genauere Antwort schuldig. Sich selbst ist man die Frage schuldig, warum eine Behauptung, die einer historischen Prüfung nicht standhält, zur Voraussetzung einer Politik werden konnte, die das ganze Land verändern soll.

Die Erklärung liegt nicht in einer fehlerhaften Erinnerung des Verteidigungsministers, sondern in der Funktion seiner Sprache. “Kriegstüchtigkeit” ist kein deskriptiver Begriff, sondern eine rhetorische Maschine, die einen Ausnahmezustand erzeugt: Indem das Frühere als militärisch unzureichend disqualifiziert wird, wird das Spätere von demokratischer Rückfrage befreit.

Das Muster lässt sich an drei Indikatoren ablesen, die zusammen ein erstaunlich konsistentes Bild ergeben. Der zwanzigste Rüstungsbericht, der 2025 hätte erscheinen sollen, ist schlicht ausgeblieben.

Die neue Geheimschutzordnung des Bundestages vom 17. Oktober 2025 erklärt zentrale Angaben zu Rüstungsaufträgen zu Verschlusssachen. Und der Wehretat 2026 liegt bei 108,2 Milliarden Euro — gut die Hälfte davon kreditfinanziert über das Sondervermögen und die Schuldenbremsen-Ausnahme, mit einem Aufwuchspfad bis zu rund 153 Milliarden Euro im Jahr 2029.

Ein Staat, der so viel Geld bewegt und so wenig Rechenschaft ablegt, verwaltet nicht Verteidigung, sondern politische Unkenntnis.

Wer trägt die Last der Aufrüstung?

Die ökonomische Last dieser Architektur tragen, wie immer, nicht die Profiteure, sondern die Schwächsten. Am 25. März 2026 erklärte Lars Klingbeil bei der Bertelsmann Stiftung, die Gesellschaft müsse “insgesamt mehr arbeiten”, weniger Teilzeit, später in Rente, das Ehegattensplitting auf den Prüfstand, längere Befristungsmöglichkeiten, schwächere Transferentzugsraten.

Diese Aufforderung fiel in eben jene Woche, in der die Bundesregierung den höchsten Verteidigungshaushalt seit dem Ende des Kalten Krieges beschloss. Die Choreografie war perfekt: Der Vizekanzler bittet die Lohnabhängigen um Opfer, während sein Kabinett dem Rüstungssektor das größte Auftragsvolumen seit Generationen zuteilt.

Rheinmetall meldete 2025 einen Auftragsbestand von 63,8 Milliarden Euro; die US-amerikanische Rüstungsindustrie gab allein 2023 mehr als 139 Millionen Dollar für Lobbyarbeit aus und beschäftigte 904 registrierte Lobbyisten. Friedenspolitik verfügt über keine vergleichbare Infrastruktur — keine Werkshallen, keine Aktienkurse, keine regionalen Arbeitsplätze, keinen Bundesverband.

Friedenspolitik weist nur einige recht allgemein gehaltene Aussagen im deutschen Grundgesetz auf, deren Intention eigentlich das verhindern will, was zur Zeit passiert. Hinzu tritt das stille Interesse derselben Lobby an fossilen Energien, weil sich Diesel, Kerosin und Schweröl im Ernstfall logistisch robuster mobilisieren lassen als dezentrale Erneuerbare — eine Vorliebe, deren Preis die deutsche Handelsbilanz auf der Energieseite weiter verschlechtert.

Was als “Investition in unsere Zukunft” verkauft wird, ist eine Umverteilung im Tarnanzug: von oben investiert, von unten finanziert.

Medial erzeugte Narrationen der Kriegstüchtigkeit

Damit die Bevölkerung diese Differenz zwischen Pathos und Praxis nicht bemerkt, braucht es ein zweites Element: ein Narrativ, das jeden Zweifel in die Rechtfertigungsposition drängt. Das Muster war am 2. März 2026 bei “Hart aber fair” zu besichtigen, als Michael Wolffsohn dem SPD-Außenpolitiker Ralf Stegner mit jener kühlen Höflichkeit, die ein Gespräch ins Insinuierende zieht, mitteilte, seine Argumentation für das Völkerrecht sei “der AfD sehr ähnlich”.

Das ist die saubere Pointe des Kriegs-Hufeisens: Wer auf die UN-Charta verweist, gilt plötzlich als nützlicher Idiot der Autokraten; wer angesichts von 108 Milliarden Euro Wehretat nach Belegen fragt, stört den nationalen Ernst. Der Sicherheitsforscher Johannes Varwick, der von sich sagt, er sei kein Pazifist, beschreibt die Tonlage der Debatte als einen “Kriegstüchtigkeitsrausch”, der nicht auf Verteidigungsfähigkeit ziele; der Spiegel raunt in der Ausgabe 12/2026, die ganze Nation müsse kriegstüchtig gemacht werden.

Selbst Carlo Masala räumt auf Nachfrage ein, sein Russland-Invasions-Szenario stehe nirgendwo geschrieben, erscheine ihm aber wahrscheinlich, weil Putin gerne provoziere — eine empirische Grundlage für Milliardenbeschlüsse, die nüchtern betrachtet ein Offenbarungseid ist.

Dass die Nato Russland konventionell haushoch überlegen ist, dass Moskau seine Ziele in der Ukraine kaum erreicht, dass jede Aufrüstung ein Sicherheitsdilemma auslöst, in dem die unterlegene Seite zu nuklearer Kompensation getrieben wird — und dass Ramstein und Büchel dann zu den ersten Zielen zählen würden — wird in dieser Erzählung nicht erwähnt. Es passt nicht ins Genre.

Das Wehrdienst-Modernisierungsgesetz als Schleuse zur Militarisierung

Wer Wehrdienst-Modernisierungsgesetz, das seit dem 1. Januar 2026 gilt, nüchtern liest, erkennt schnell, dass es militärisch nicht aufgeht. In sechs Monaten Grunddienst werden alle Wehrdienstleistenden ausschließlich zu Wach- und Sicherungssoldaten ausgebildet; erst ab zwölf Monaten ist laut BMVg eine Verwendung “in der gesamten Breite der Streitkräfte” überhaupt möglich.

Für die Laufbahnen, die das einundzwanzigste Jahrhundert wirklich verlangt — IT-Spezialistinnen, Cyber-Analysten, Drohnenoperateure, Nachrichtentechniker — liegt die Mindestverpflichtungszeit bei sechs bis zwölf Jahren. Ein halbjähriger Kurzdienst ist für die moderne Kriegsführung mit unbemannten Systemen, Counter-UAS, elektronischer Kampfführung, Datenfusion und KI-gestützten Funktionen kaum mehr als ein folkloristisches Element.

Er ergibt aber sehr viel Sinn, sobald man fragt, was er nicht-militärisch leistet. Er ist die Einstiegsschleuse, die einen ganzen Jahrgang in Musterung und Uniform zieht und so jenes Reservepotenzial sichert, mit dem Generalinspekteur Breuer rechnerisch auf 460.000 Soldatinnen und Soldaten kommen will.

Was hier als Streitkräfte-Modernisierung firmiert, ist in Wahrheit ein Gesellschaftsprogramm, das Verfügbarkeit mit Fähigkeit verwechselt: Masse ist nicht Kompetenz, und Erfassung ist nicht Verteidigung.

Pistorius selbst beschreibt das Ziel mit einer Klarheit, die seine Apologeten ungern zur Kenntnis nehmen: Der Platz der Bundeswehr sei “in der Mitte der Gesellschaft”, sichtbar, präsent und getragen von ihr (Beförderungsappell zum ersten Veteranentag, 15. Juni 2025).

Der reaktivierte §3 des Wehrpflichtgesetzes verlangt für männliche Personen ab dem siebzehnten Lebensjahr — also vor der Volljährigkeit — eine Genehmigung der Bundeswehr für Auslandsaufenthalte über drei Monate; eingeführt per Generalverweisung im neuen Wehrpflichtgesetz, politisch verkauft als “freiwilliges Modell”, praktisch nur deshalb derzeit nicht angewendet, weil das Ministerium die Norm per Verwaltungsvorschrift “als erteilt geltend” aussetzt — eine Konstruktion, deren rechtsstaatliche Bedenklichkeit selbst wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiter führender Hochschulen offen aussprechen.

Hinzu kommen die verpflichtende Befragung des Geburtsjahrgangs 2008 mit Bußgeldandrohung, der schrittweise Wiederaufbau einer Pflichtmusterung zum 1. Juli 2027 in 24 neuen Musterungszentren, die automatische Einbindung der Wehrdienstleistenden in die Reserve und schließlich, am 16. Januar 2026, die Erweiterung der Befugnisse des Militärischen Abschirmdienstes zu Telekommunikationsüberwachung, V-Personen-Einsatz und Observation auch außerhalb militärischer Liegenschaften — gegen den dokumentierten Einspruch der Bundesrechtsanwaltskammer, die von einer massiven Beschädigung des Mandatsgeheimnisses sprach.

Wer dieses Bündel betrachtet — Datenregister, Verfügbarkeitserfassung, Genehmigungsvorbehalte, soldatisches Ethos als Normalform staatsbürgerlicher Haltung, ausgeweitete militärische Inlandsaufklärung —, erkennt eine Form von Staatlichkeit wieder, die in Deutschland bereits zweimal gescheitert ist.

Einmal im nationalen Heldenepos, das vom Hermannsdenkmal über das Niederwalddenkmal bis Tannenberg reicht und dann in der DDR mit ihrer Wehrerziehung, ihren vormilitärischen Laufbahnen und ihrem Kult um die Nationale Volksarmee.

Der neue Obrigkeitsstaat kommt nicht in Stiefeln. Er kommt im Fragebogen, im Datensatz, im Verschlusssachenstempel.

Militarisierung bereitet autoritären Kräften den Boden

Hier schließt sich die gefährlichste Schleife der ganzen Operation. Die Rechtsradikalen täuschen derzeit Pazifismus vor, weil sie wissen, dass man so schneller an die Macht kommt — kein deutsches Unikat, sondern derselbe Mechanismus, mit dem Donald Trump 2024 antrat, alle Kriege zu beenden, um wenige Monate später unter dem Codenamen “Epic Fury” ohne Kongressmandat, ohne völkerrechtliche Grundlage und nach Auskunft seiner Sprecherin “aus einem Gefühl heraus” einen Krieg gegen den Iran zu führen.

Hitler versprach Autobahnen und Arbeit, Trump versprach Frieden — die Macht wird über Wohlfühlversprechen erworben, der Krieg beginnt danach.

In den aktuellen Werten des Politbarometers (INSA, Stand 12.9.2026) liegt die AfD bei 28,6 Prozent und damit deutlich vor der Union (20,1 Prozent); in Sachsen-Anhalt erreichte sie 43,8 Prozent und ging als stärkste Kraft aus den Landtagswahlen hervor (CDU: 17,2 Prozent). Niemand kann seriös garantieren, dass sicherheitspolitische Schlüsselressorts auf Dauer ausschließlich in den Händen rechtsstaatlich sensibler Akteure verbleiben.

Genau deshalb ist es brandgefährlich, eine weitgespannte Wehrpflicht- und Erfassungsarchitektur zu errichten, ohne sich Rechenschaft darüber zu geben, wer sie eines Tages erbt.

Im Anschluss an die deutlich gewonnene Wahl der AfD in Sachsen-Anhalt im September 2026 äußerte sich deren Spitzenkandidat Ulrich Siegmund zur Frage, wie er zur Aufrüstung stehe, wie folgt: Er verteufele keine Aufrüstung, “weil wir bei (einer) späteren Remigrations- und Abschiebeoffensive natürlich auch entsprechende Hilfsmittel brauchen”.

Siegmunds Begründung für eine weitere militärische Aufrüstung beinhaltet also den Einsatz militärischer Waffengewalt für die Durchsetzung der Remigration. Zu remigrieren sind aber möglicherweise Millionen Menschen in Deutschland, Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund, insbesondere Asylbewerber, und diejenigen, die sie unterstützen.

Auch die SPD-Regierungsmitglieder Pistorius, Klingbeil und Bas verkennen den Charakter dessen, was sie bauen. Sie helfen dabei, die Verwaltungsarchitektur, die Datenregister, die Geheimschutzordnungen, die MAD-Befugnisse und die Kreditermächtigungen umzusetzen— und sie errichten sie in einer politischen Landschaft, in der sie nicht kontrollieren, wer sie eines Tages verwaltet. Die AfD wird möglicherweise dieses Geschenk dankend annehmen.

Militarisierung einer Gesellschaft bedeutet aber auch, dass die Bundeswehr in die Schulen gehen und für den Militärdienst werben kann. Militarisierung bedeutet ebenfalls die mediale Diskreditierung und öffentliche Zerstörung unliebsamer Personen, die hier Zweifel anmelden.

Originalbeitrag Telepolis

By Ricardo Martins – New Eastern Outlook – October 2, 2026

It was common practice during the Cold War to exaggerate the threat from the Soviet Union. Nowadays, Russia has assumed that role. Although the circumstances have changed, some of the political methods employed to create a sense of insecurity are still remarkably similar.

Europe is not formally engaging in preparations for war since it desires one. Instead, the governments of Europe and the institutions of the EU describe their rapidly growing defence policies and war preparedness as being aimed at deterrence, on the basis that Europe has to become strong enough to avoid a bigger conflict.
NATO does likewise, presenting itself as a defensive alliance whose role is to deter aggression. Nevertheless, the extent and the terminology used in Europe’s present military transformation should be examined. If preparedness becomes a top political concern, if huge amounts of public money are channelled into defence industries, and if support for Ukraine becomes more and more tied to Europe’s own security, then a significant question arises: where does deterrence cease and the political preparation for war begin?

The question is especially relevant to the EU, which has throughout its history been based on reconciliation, economic interdependence and a rejection of war.

From a peace project to a defence project

The European Union is experiencing a deep change in the way it views security. This change is no illusion. As part of the ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030 programme the European Commission plans to commit up to 800 billion euros towards defence spending, and the EU has set up a 150 billion euro SAFE lending facility to assist with military investment and joint procurement. The various EU institutions have made it clear that the aim is to eliminate capability gaps, boost the European defence industry and enhance deterrence.

The language that goes with this transformation is just as important. European Defence Commissioner Andrius Kubilius has warned at the European Parliament that Russia could be ready for a confrontation with NATO “in five years or less”. He has also invoked Jean Monnet’s wartime “Victory Programme” analogy, arguing that Europe needs a comparable transformation of its defence industry.

The official view of the Commission is that the issue is one of deterrence and not about starting a war. However, a military system which is intended to deter war needs to have weapons, logistical support, industrial capacity, troops and operational plans. As these capabilities increase, so too does the institutional ability to conduct war.

A paradox arises since Europe claims it is arming itself and preparing its hospitals to receive 2,000 wounds per day – as it is the case in Germany — in order to maintain peace while at the same time setting up a more and more integrated belligerent European defence structure. The EU is considering not just an increase in weapons but also the creation of a European Defence Union, a European Security Council, common procurement, military mobility and a closer relationship between European institutions and NATO.

The fact that this might constitute a necessary adaptation to a new security situation also brings up a more general issue concerning European identity: is the European Union still mainly a peace project which happens to have military capabilities, or is it instead becoming a geopolitical and military actor for which readiness for confrontation is becoming increasingly important?

Is Russia a threat, an adversary, or a permanent enemy?

Here, there is a mixture of perceived threats, old ressentiments and Russophobia in play. The threat perceptions are not the same throughout Europe. Because of historical reasons, such as foreign occupation and Soviet domination, Poland has long viewed Russia differently from countries such as France and Germany, which after the Cold War initially placed greater emphasis on economic engagement and interdependence with Moscow. But that distinction has changed dramatically.

Germany, in particular, has moved from the Ostpolitik-era logic of engagement towards a confrontational security posture. Under Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Berlin has described Russia as a serious threat, committed to a major expansion of defence spending, and taken a leading role in sustaining military support for Ukraine. Germany has also intensified defence cooperation with France, including discussions on nuclear deterrence and European capabilities. Germany has also established a permanent military presence in the Baltic States, with a brigade of around 5,000 soldiers being stationed in Lithuania.

The military buildup that Poland has since carried out has depended largely on the United States and South Korea, highlighting a further weakness: even though the EU has aimed at setting up a European defence industry, European manufacturers have not always been able to provide weapons at the speed and on the scale required by countries that have been rearming since 2022.

A more serious issue is that those who question the military escalation are seen as showing a lack of strength, a state of naivety or a failure to have sufficient solidarity with Europe — what then becomes of democratic debate? French Socialist Ségolène Royal.

The danger of making war readiness a political culture

That is exactly the reason why Europe’s present-day transformation should be subject to democratic scrutiny.

Deterrence becomes a politically dangerous thing when preparedness itself comes to be the main idea of security, when military expenditure starts to compete with other public priorities, and when diplomacy and negotiation are regarded as being of less importance than the building up of military power.

The proper European question therefore isn’t whether Europe is “strong enough” to fight Russia. It is rather what kind of security arrangement the Europeans would like to establish.

The present danger is that, as a result of years of confrontation, rearmament and politics based on the use of threats, Europe might slowly create a political and institutional setting in which war seems ever more certain and peace ever more unrealistic.

Former CIA analyst Larry Johnson says that a wider conflict between Europe and Russia is becoming “inevitable” since, in his opinion, the rhetoric of Europe is increasingly being matched by actions which Russia could see as direct threats. He highlights Germany as especially important, stating that Berlin’s more confrontational rhetoric, its military preparations and its demands on Moscow are leading to a dangerous escalation.

Johnson also sees the capture of Russian ships as a key point of escalation. He maintains that Moscow might view any attempt by Europe to seize its ships as an act of war and could then retaliate against the ships or military assets in question. He also mentions the collapse of diplomatic relations, the rearmament of European forces, preparations for a possible future confrontation, and the increasing pressure surrounding Kaliningrad as factors which reduce the room for de-escalation. In his view, the real danger is not that Russia is seeking war but that European actions are gradually making a direct confrontation inevitable.

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Ricardo Martins – Doctor of Sociology, specialist in European and international politics as well as geopolitics

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36 Jahre nach der Eingliederung der DDR in die BRD stellen sich viele Deutsche die Frage, ob es Deutschland tatsächlich gelungen ist, eine echte Einheit zu erreichen. Die jüngsten Landtagswahlen in Sachsen-Anhalt, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern und Berlin zeigen deutlich, dass Deutschland in politischer Hinsicht nach wie vor gespalten ist.

Aus sozialer Sicht schien die Nation einst geeinter zu sein als heute. 40% der befragten Ostdeutschen sehen heute mehr Unterschiede als Gemeinsamkeiten zwischen den beiden Teilen des Landes. Vor zehn Jahren lag dieser Wert bei nur 23%, wie aus einer im vergangenen Jahr durchgeführten Langzeitstudie der Technischen Universität Dresden hervorgeht.

Was die Politik betrifft, so sind die Folgen des Wahlschocks der letzten Wochen nach wie vor spürbar. Für die Bewohner des Westens ist es schwer zu erklären, dass in den ehemaligen neuen Bundesländern die Parteien der politischen Extreme zusammen die absolute Mehrheit der Stimmen auf sich vereinen. Dort machten die Wahlergebnisse der Parteien AfD, Die Linke und BSW in letzter Zeit zusammen ein Viertel der Stimmen aus.

In der Gesellschaft entstehen Risse. Im politischen System zeichnen sich nicht nur entlang der Achse «Ost–West», sondern auch an verschiedenen anderen Stellen Bruchlinien ab. Die drohende politische Destabilisierung durch den Zerfall der bisherigen Stützen des Staates hebt die Kontraste entlang der ehemaligen Grenze noch deutlicher hervor.

Die Unterschiede zwischen Ost und West werden sich in den kommenden Jahrzehnten wahrscheinlich noch erheblich verschärfen. Der Grund dafür liegt weniger in unterschiedlichen Lebenswegen, der Überheblichkeit der «Wessis», dem «Unverständnis» der Ostdeutschen für demokratische Prinzipien oder der vielbeschworenen «Ostalgie».

Obwohl Ost- und Westdeutsche ihre Lebensbedingungen heute in vielerlei Hinsicht gleich bewerten, sind Ostdeutsche in Führungspositionen der höchsten Bundesbehörden nach wie vor unterrepräsentiert. Seit 2022 ist ihr Anteil zwar von 13,9% auf 16,3% gestiegen.

Besonders deutlich wird der Unterschied im Bereich der Erbschaft und Schenkung: Laut dem Statistischen Bundesamt entfielen im Jahr 2025 95% des Gesamtwerts der bei den Steuerbehörden gemeldeten Vermögensübertragungen auf Westdeutschland.

Einer der Gründe für die bis heute spürbaren Unterschiede sind die Folgen der wirtschaftlichen und demografischen Umbrüche nach der Wiedervereinigung. Nur 17% der ehemaligen DDR-Bürger behielten nach dem Umbruch ihren Beruf, die übrigen mussten ihre Pläne ändern.

In den 1990er Jahren verloren viele Unternehmen in der ehemaligen DDR ihre Absatzmärkte oder wurden geschlossen, während vor allem junge und gut ausgebildete Menschen in den Westen abwanderten. Infolgedessen ist in einigen Regionen bis heute ein Mangel an Einwohnern und Unternehmenszentralen zu beobachten.

Der demografische Abwärtstrend in Ostdeutschland

Ein wesentlicher Grund für die strukturelle Schwäche liegt jedoch in der Demografie. Ostdeutschland hat sich nie ganz von den Folgen des Zweiten Weltkriegs erholt. Dies war auch in der DDR spürbar. Mit der deutschen Wiedervereinigung und der Abwanderung von Millionen Ostdeutschen in den Westen auf der Suche nach Arbeit hat sich diese Situation noch weiter verschärft. So ist die Einwohnerzahl Ostdeutschlands von 1990 bis 2026 um 6 Millionen Menschen zurückgegangen.

Ballungsräume sind jedoch eine Grundvoraussetzung für wirtschaftliche Dynamik. Größe und Bevölkerungsdichte erhöhen die Attraktivität einer Region. Bei günstiger Entwicklung setzt ein sich selbst verstärkender positiver Kreislauf ein: Dort, wo viele qualifizierte Fachkräfte leben, investieren Unternehmen. Das regt den Zuzug neuer mobiler Fachkräfte an, was wiederum weitere Investitionen anzieht – und so weiter.

In Ostdeutschland werden voraussichtlich nur Berlin mit seinen Vororten sowie Leipzig und Dresden einen Bevölkerungszuwachs verzeichnen. In anderen Regionen wird die Bevölkerung weiter schrumpfen. So hat Sachsen-Anhalt beispielsweise seit 1990 bereits rund 25% seiner Bevölkerung verloren und könnte bis zur Mitte des Jahrhunderts weitere 20% einbüßen. Ein solcher Bevölkerungsrückgang zieht fast zwangsläufig einen wirtschaftlichen Niedergang nach sich.

Demografische Prognosen zufolge wird die Bevölkerung im Osten bis zum Jahr 2045 im Szenario ohne Zuwanderung um mehr als ein Fünftel schrumpfen – deutlich stärker als im Westen.

Politik ist der konzentrierte Ausdruck der Wirtschaft

Laut einer Studie des Instituts der deutschen Wirtschaft (IW) erreicht die ostdeutsche Wirtschaft 36 Jahre nach der Wiedervereinigung nur etwas mehr als 79% des westdeutschen Niveaus. Bei einer Reihe von Indikatoren ist sogar ein Rückschritt zu beobachten. Die Forscher sehen das größte Risiko dabei in der demografischen Situation im Osten.

Der einheitliche IW-Index spiegelt den Prozess des Aufholens des Rückstands seit 1990 wider. Neben dem Wirtschaftsindikator pro Kopf werden die Entwicklung der Arbeitsproduktivität, der Kapitalstock in der Wirtschaft, der Anteil hochqualifizierter Fachkräfte im Bereich Forschung und Entwicklung, die Erwerbsquote sowie der Anteil der Arbeitslosen und Selbstständigen berücksichtigt.

Laut dem IW hinkt Ostdeutschland bei einer ganzen Reihe von Indikatoren hinterher oder verzeichnet keine Fortschritte. So sinkt beispielsweise die Erwerbsquote. Bezogen auf die Gesamtbevölkerung erreichte der Osten im Jahr 2010 noch knapp 89% des Westniveaus, im Jahr 2025 hingegen nur noch etwas mehr als 85%.

Auch die Investitionen sind ins Stocken geraten. Gemessen am Wert aller Maschinen, Fabriken, Straßen und Gebäude pro Kopf – also am Kapitalstock – holt der Osten seinen Rückstand seit 15 Jahren praktisch nicht mehr auf. Im Jahr 2010 lag dieser Wert bei knapp 77% des Westniveaus, im Jahr 2025 bei etwas mehr als 79%.

Was die Zahl der Beschäftigten im Bereich Forschung und Entwicklung betrifft, erreicht der Osten nur etwas mehr als 46% des Westniveaus.

Natürlich können die neuen Bundesländer auch einige bemerkenswerte Erfolge vorweisen: die Ansiedlung des Tesla-Werks in Grünheide (Brandenburg), den in Europa führenden Cluster für die Halbleiterfertigung in Dresden und den Ausbau erneuerbarer Energien.

Doch diese seltenen Ausnahmen bestätigen leider die traurige Regel: Ostdeutschland bleibt in Bezug auf seinen wirtschaftlichen Entwicklungsstand hinter dem Westen zurück. Und dieser ungünstige Trend wird offenbar noch lange anhalten.

Germany is moving ahead with plans to give its unusually large F125 frigates a medium-range air-defense capability, helping address one of the most conspicuous weaknesses of a four-ship class that has long attracted attention for having relatively little combat power for its size.

Diehl Defense and Germany’s Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support (BAAINBw) have signed a contract to adapt and develop the IRIS-T SLM surface-to-air missile system for operational use aboard the German Navy’s F125 frigates. Under the agreement, Diehl will build prototypes and conduct comprehensive test firings intended to validate the system’s integration and performance within the existing F125 architecture. Each frigate will be fitted with two new launchers, each capable of holding 16 missiles, for a total of 32.

“The aim is to make the system mission-capable on the German Navy’s F125 frigates,” Diehl said in today’s announcement. The company described the prototype construction and test-firing phase as necessary to ensure “the seamless integration and maximum performance” of IRIS-T SLM within the frigate’s existing architecture.

The program has moved notably quickly, reflecting the urgency of the requirement.

Germany began examining the feasibility of integrating IRIS-T SLM with the F125 in 2024, with BAAINBw and Diehl studying the technical risks and requirements of adapting the normally land-based system for shipboard use. That effort led to the development of a navalized demonstrator in 2025. In October of that year, the F125 frigate Baden-Württemberg took part in a German Navy Maritime Firing Exercise off Andøya, Norway, carrying an experimental anti-air warfare module based on IRIS-T SLM. Diehl says the module went from concept to firing in less than 10 months and met all established test and evaluation objectives.

The Bundeswehr subsequently reported that Baden-Württemberg fired three live IRIS-T SLM missiles during the exercise. The ship’s radar supplied target data to the missile system, demonstrating the basic integration between the F125’s sensors and the navalized air defense architecture.

The exercise established that the concept could work at sea; the contract signed now is intended to turn that demonstration into a qualified fleet capability.

The German parliament’s Budget Committee approved the adaptation effort on September 23, with the German Defense Ministry describing it as a means of expanding the F125’s self-defense capabilities in response to the current air threat. The ministry also pointed to IRIS-T SLM’s combat experience in Ukraine.

The effort needs to be seen in the context of why the F125 has been such a controversial warship in the first place.

As TWZ examined in 2017, the F125 is a roughly 7,200-ton, 490-foot warship with an unusually small core crew and a concept of operations centered on long-duration deployments, stabilization missions, crisis management, conflict prevention, and international intervention rather than high-end fleet combat. The class was designed to spend long periods away from Germany and operate with relatively modest manpower requirements.

But its armament does not remotely match the size and sophistication of the hull. As completed, the ships were equipped with eight RGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missiles, a 127mm gun, remotely operated guns and, for close-quarters air defense, two RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile launchers. The F125 has no medium- or long-range surface-to-air missile capability and no organic sonar or dedicated anti-submarine warfare weapon system.

At the same time, the TRS-4D/NR radar and other sensors can see far beyond the engagement envelope of the close-in air-defense weapons, but there is little the ship itself can do with that information against an aircraft or incoming missile at medium range.

Nearly a decade later, IRIS-T SLM is emerging as an answer to at least part of that problem.

Even with IRIS-T SLM, the F125 is well short of being an air warfare destroyer. It also still lacks an organic anti-submarine warfare capability or the kind of large vertical-launch missile battery found on Germany’s F124 frigates.

However, it does fill a gap between the F125’s original short-range defenses and the capabilities of other ships or aircraft operating around it.

IRIS-T SLM is designed as a medium-range surface-to-air system, with an engagement range of around 25 miles and an altitude envelope of approximately 65,000 feet. As shown in the 2025 demonstration, the F125’s radar can feed information directly into the missile system, exploiting the ship’s existing sensor capabilities.

Rather than rely heavily on escorts for protection against airborne threats outside the short range of RAM, an IRIS-T-equipped F125 could at least contribute to its own medium-range air defense. Recent operations in the Middle East have underscored the importance of this in contested maritime environments.

It also gives the ships a more useful role in a task group. The threat environment has changed substantially since the F125’s original concept was drafted. Cruise missiles, drones, loitering munitions, and increasingly sophisticated aircraft mean that even ships operating away from a major naval war can face threats well beyond the range of their existing close-in defenses.

In November 2024, Germany confirmed that the F125 frigate Baden-Württemberg, returning from an Indo-Pacific deployment, would avoid the Red Sea and sail around Africa because of the Houthi missile and drone threat. The German Defense Ministry explicitly cited the ship’s limited air defense capability and its inability to provide an effective air-defense umbrella for itself or its accompanying replenishment ship.

Ironically, the F125’s large hull, extensive electrical power, sophisticated radar, substantial aviation facilities, long endurance and relatively spacious mission areas were always supposed to provide room for a flexible approach to future missions. Yet the class’s original weight and integration constraints made adding major weapons difficult, a concern TWZ also highlighted in 2017.

IRIS-T SLM offers Germany a way to add a meaningful capability without undertaking the much more invasive redesign associated with installing a conventional vertical-launch system. The 2025 demonstration used an AAW module mounted on the ship’s deck rather than a conventional VLS installation, and today’s program is focused on adapting the system to the F125 architecture.

Once IRIS-T SLM is installed, the F125 will still be an unusual frigate. It is enormous by the standards of its mission, optimized for endurance, and lacks some of the weapons traditionally associated with a high-end surface combatant. But it will bring more to a contested fight.

The program should give the class a credible medium-range air-defense role, and provide Germany with a way to get considerably more utility out of four ships whose original design philosophy was always somewhat controversial.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Germany Is Finally Giving Its F125 Frigates Some More Teeth With IRIS-T SLM Surface-To-Air Missiles appeared first on TWZ.

 Al Mayadeen | October 2, 2026

The European Union has begun assessing contingency scenarios in case German Chancellor Friedrich Merz leaves office or becomes increasingly focused on domestic political difficulties, Politico Europe reported Friday, citing diplomats and European officials.

According to the report, governments in two European countries have held internal discussions on how a possible end to Merz’s chancellorship could affect EU policymaking.

The discussions reportedly reflect growing concern in Brussels over political instability in Germany following major electoral setbacks for Merz’s governing conservatives and renewed tensions within the coalition.

Recent regional elections have weakened Merz politically. Reuters reported that the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) suffered its worst-ever result in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania in September, failing to clear the threshold to enter the state parliament, while the Alternative for Germany (AfD) made further gains.

Berlin’s Political Turmoil Raises EU Concerns

Politico Europe reported that officials consider two scenarios particularly disruptive: Germany being left without an effective leader or a right-wing government emerging in Berlin. However, the report said both scenarios are viewed as unlikely in the short term.

Under Germany’s constitutional system, a chancellor cannot simply be replaced by a successor appointed by the governing party. The Bundestag elects the chancellor, meaning any leadership change would require the necessary parliamentary majority.

For Brussels, the political uncertainty matters because Germany remains the EU’s largest economy and a central actor in negotiations over major bloc-wide policies.

Reuters reported Thursday that Merz is facing growing domestic pressure, while speculation about possible successors has emerged within the CDU. Merz has nevertheless rejected calls to step aside and continues to pursue his government’s policy agenda.

EU Budget Dispute Adds Pressure

Merz’s domestic political position could also affect negotiations over the EU’s next seven-year budget.

According to Politico Europe, Germany is part of a group of member states, including the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, and Finland, seeking substantial reductions to the proposed long-term EU budget. The report said officials believe domestic political pressure could encourage Berlin to take a tougher negotiating position in Brussels.

The budget dispute comes as EU governments debate competing priorities, including defense, industrial investment, infrastructure, and support for Ukraine.

Military Buildup Remains Central to Merz’s Agenda

Despite the political pressure, Merz’s government continues to prioritize strengthening Germany’s armed forces. Reuters reported that Berlin’s debt-financed investment drive is supporting both infrastructure and military expansion, while the government has committed hundreds of billions of euros to rebuilding the armed forces.

Merz has also reaffirmed Germany’s support for Ukraine and called for stronger European military capabilities, while accusing Russia of conducting hybrid attacks against Europe. Moscow has rejected such accusations.

Any change in Berlin’s political leadership would therefore carry implications beyond Germany, potentially affecting EU budget negotiations, defense policy, relations with Russia, and the bloc’s wider strategic direction.

Zack Polanski has repeatedly said that his family "fled the Nazis", but it's now emerged that all four of his grandparents were born in Britain, long before the war.

The post Zack Polanski Said his Family “Fled the Nazis”. But All Four of His Grandparents Were Born in Britain – Long Before the War appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.

A few inches below the forest floor in the eastern Taunus hills lies a stretch of the Roman frontier that has barely been examined. The Kapersburg fort, near Rosbach vor der Höhe in Hesse, is one of the best preserved on the German limes, the chain of Roman border defences. Research has long concentrated on […]

France and Germany are moving towards a possible compromise over the future of Europe’s automotive industry, linking negotiations over EU vehicle-emission rules with a separate dispute over how strongly European-made products should be favoured in subsidies and public procurement.

The negotiations bring together two issues that have divided Paris and Berlin: Germany’s demand for greater flexibility in rules governing combustion-engine vehicles and France’s campaign for stronger “Made in Europe” requirements in EU industrial policy.

Officials involved in the discussions believe a broader Franco-German agreement may now be possible, although differences remain over how European content should be defined and whether products made in countries with EU free-trade agreements should receive similar treatment.

The automotive dispute follows the Commission’s decision in December 2025 to propose significant changes to rules that had originally required a 100 per cent reduction in tailpipe CO₂ emissions from new cars from 2035.

Under the revised automotive package, manufacturers would instead face a 90 per cent tailpipe-emissions reduction requirement from 2035.

The remaining 10 per cent could be compensated through mechanisms linked to low-carbon steel produced in the EU and the use of e-fuels and biofuels.

EU Today reported before the Commission presented the package that pressure from Germany, Italy and European manufacturers was forcing Brussels to reconsider the original 2035 framework.

The subsequent proposal confirmed the shift.

In March, EU Today also examined the Commission’s decision to link low-carbon European steel directly to vehicle-emissions compliance, creating a connection between automotive climate rules and support for Europe’s heavy industry.

Germany has continued to argue for a technology-neutral approach.

Berlin wants legislation to leave scope for combustion engines operating on renewable or low-carbon fuels rather than treating battery-electric vehicles as the only route towards lower emissions.

That position is particularly important for Germany because of the scale of its automotive sector and the large industrial supply chain built around combustion-engine technology.

France’s priority is different.

Paris wants EU industrial policy to ensure that public subsidies and procurement increasingly support products manufactured inside Europe.

The argument centres on the Commission’s Industrial Accelerator Act, proposed in March as part of a wider strategy to strengthen European manufacturing.

The legislation introduces “Made in EU” and low-carbon requirements for public procurement and public support schemes covering strategic sectors including automotive manufacturing, steel, cement and aluminium.

The dispute is over what “European” should mean.

France favours a relatively strict definition focused principally on production inside the EU’s 27 member states.

Germany has advocated what Economy Minister Katherina Reiche has described as a “Made with Europe” approach, under which some products from close trading partners could qualify if those countries provide equivalent market access to European companies.

That could potentially include states such as Norway and Switzerland and partners including Canada.

Spain has been among countries seeking a middle position between the French and German approaches.

The issue matters because modern automotive supply chains do not stop at the EU’s external border.

Battery materials, semiconductors, electric motors and other components can pass through several countries before final assembly, while Britain and Turkey remain deeply integrated into European vehicle production.

The EU-UK relationship is particularly sensitive because stricter rules of origin for electric vehicles are due to apply from 2027.

EU Today previously reported that European and British manufacturers were seeking another delay to those rules because the regional battery supply chain had not developed as quickly as originally expected.

At the same time, the EU is attempting to reduce dependence on Chinese electric vehicles, batteries and critical inputs.

The Commission has committed €1.8 billion to a Battery Booster strategy intended to strengthen the European battery value chain.

European electric-vehicle demand is continuing to grow. A 16-market European survey examined by EU Today showed battery-electric cars taking more than a quarter of new registrations in July, although large differences remain between national markets.

Manufacturers must therefore make investment decisions while several important elements of the regulatory framework remain under negotiation.

Factory conversion, battery plants and new vehicle platforms require investments planned years in advance. The conditions applying after 2030 will directly affect where those investments are made.

A Franco-German understanding would not determine the final EU rules. The European Parliament, Commission and other member states remain part of both legislative negotiations.

It could, however, bridge two of the most important disputes: Germany’s demand for greater technological flexibility in the 2035 vehicle regime and France’s demand that public money be used more directly to support European production.

The negotiations now underway suggest Paris and Berlin are increasingly treating those questions as parts of the same industrial bargain.

First published in Respekt.

In Germany’s recent state elections, voters as young as 16 could cast ballots. The results confirmed a global trend of political division between young women and men.

“On 1 January, we both deleted Instagram, TikTok and Snapchat. And whichever of us would be the first to start watching Reels again or download Instagram would have to eat a slice of rotten cheese,” Greta and Lena told Germany’s Deutschlandfunk radio station.

The 16-year-old girls live in a village in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and chose to delete social media because they had been spending far too much time on it. They often scrolled on TikTok or Instagram late into the night, affecting their performance at school. This summer, however, both reinstalled TikTok for a month. This time without the punishment of a slice of rotten cheese.

They did so for an experiment with journalists from Deutschlandfunk. The journalists wanted to find out what political content the girls would consume through TikTok, the popular Chinese social network, during the peak of the election campaign. Mecklenburg-Vorpommern went to the polls on the third weekend of September. And, as is well known, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) swept the state, just as it had two weeks prior in Saxony-Anhalt.

Greta and Lena, however, were in a markedly different position from their peers in Saxony-Anhalt. For the first time, the north-eastern federal state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern had allowed 16- and 17-year-olds to vote in state elections. Since young people consume much of their news on social media, Greta and Lena immersed themselves in TikTok, one of the networks now most popular among young Europeans.

For the first few minutes, the girls watched a range of non-political videos — recipes, tomato growing and “silly” AI videos. Then, at around the third minute of scrolling, the first political content appeared. First came a video about Erich Honecker, the former East German communist politician. “Why am I seeing so much stuff about the GDR here?” Greta wondered. As she continued scrolling, she came across AfD co-leader Alice Weidel herself.

It was the first moment when the girls began to notice how quickly their initially apolitical feed was changing. “I feel as if it is constantly just AfD,” Greta said later. She added that she had not searched for any such content in advance. Over the following month, the girls kept a diary of their feed and observed how, after political videos, more and more similar content began appearing — not only from the parties themselves, but also from a range of accounts that picked up and further spread their messages.

The experiment confirmed what has been known for some time: TikTok and other networks alongside it can quickly form the political world a young person sees and the views they come to adopt. At the same time, algorithms are accelerating a trend of a political divide between young women and men, which was also reflected in the results of the state elections mentioned above in Germany.

Algorithms exacerbate polarisation

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European governments and the United States are negotiating over emergency diesel reserves as a global shortage of refined fuel places increasing pressure on transport, agriculture and industry.

The Trump administration has urged France and Germany to release diesel from their strategic stocks, while raising the possibility of restricting American diesel exports if European governments fail to put additional supplies on the market.

Washington has asked Europe to release about 120 million barrels over six months, according to people familiar with the talks.

The demand puts European governments in a difficult position. Releasing reserves could help reduce prices in the short term, but it would also reduce the emergency buffer available if disruption to Russian or Middle Eastern supplies becomes more severe.

The European Commission, France, Italy, Ireland and Britain held discussions on 1 October over possible diesel stock releases. Germany has been involved separately in discussions with Washington.

France and Germany hold a substantial share of Europe’s emergency diesel reserves.

Under the EU’s Oil Stocks Directive, member states must maintain emergency crude oil or petroleum-product stocks equivalent to at least 90 days of net imports or 61 days of domestic consumption, whichever is higher.

The requirement exists to provide a buffer against major supply interruptions rather than normal market fluctuations.

Europe’s dependence on imported oil remains substantial. Oil accounted for around 38 per cent of the EU energy mix in 2024, while approximately 95 per cent of crude oil consumed in the bloc was imported.

The latest dispute follows months of mounting pressure in the diesel market.

EU Today reported in September that President Donald Trump had urged Ukraine to reduce attacks on Russian refining infrastructure as global diesel supplies tightened.

Moscow has since extended restrictions on diesel exports. At the same time, disruption to Middle Eastern refining and shipping has constrained another major source of supply, while China moved on 1 October to suspend most fuel-product exports outside Hong Kong and Macau.

The result has been a particularly sharp problem for Europe because its refining capacity has declined over the past two decades and it has become increasingly dependent on imported middle distillates.

European dependence on outside energy supplies was already becoming more expensive before the latest diesel shortage. Recent Eurostat figures showed that the value of EU petroleum-oil imports increased by 55.8 per cent in the second quarter of 2026, even though the physical volume imported rose by only 1.2 per cent.

The United States has become an increasingly important diesel supplier since Europe sharply reduced imports of Russian refined products following Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

That means a US export restriction would have an immediate impact on the European market.

EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič said after discussions with US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer that Brussels wanted a coordinated transatlantic approach to lowering diesel prices.

He said restrictions on US diesel exports would damage Europe’s economic performance and that both sides had agreed to remain in close contact.

Šefčovič also noted that the EU had exceeded its commitment to purchase US energy under the trade agreement reached at Turnberry in 2025.

US Energy Secretary Chris Wright, meanwhile, said he was “highly confident” European governments would release additional stocks.

Wright argued that coordinated action was particularly important as the northern hemisphere moved into the harvest season and towards winter, when demand for diesel and heating fuels normally increases.

Emergency releases have already been used on an exceptional scale this year.

In March, the 32 members of the International Energy Agency agreed to make 400 million barrels of oil from emergency reserves available to the market after disruption caused by the Middle East conflict.

It was the largest coordinated stock release in the organisation’s history.

A further European release would therefore come only months after governments had already drawn on strategic reserves to stabilise markets.

The pressure is increasing as oil prices again move higher. Brent crude settled above $102 a barrel on 1 October amid concerns over Chinese fuel exports and further US military deployments to the Middle East.

EU energy officials are now considering whether the immediate risk of high diesel prices outweighs the value of keeping fuel in reserve against a potentially more serious supply disruption later in the year.