The EU should not accept any cuts to the proposed allocation of funds to defence and security in the next long-term EU budget, German MEP Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann said in Strasbourg on Wednesday.

“Without security, we have no discussion anymore about anything,” the chair of the European Parliament’s committee on defence and security (SEDE) told the European Newsroom (enr) on the sidelines of Parliament’s plenary session.

The European Commission has proposed €131 billion for investment in defence, security and space under the European Competitiveness Fund in the EU’s 2028–2034 budget. This represents a five-fold increase compared with the current budget period.

Asked what compromise she would accept on the size, funding or allocation of defence spending to secure a budget agreement, Strack-Zimmermann said: “We need everything without compromises.”

The next long-term budget requires unanimous agreement among EU member states and the European Parliament’s consent.

Support for Ukraine

Strack-Zimmermann accused Russia of trying to deter European leaders from visiting Kyiv and undermine their support for Ukraine following attacks during German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s visit last Sunday.

Asked about accelerating deliveries to Ukraine to defend itself against Russia’s war of agression, Strack-Zimmermann said funding was available but action required approval from national governments.

Ukraine needed humanitarian, military and economic assistance, including money to produce more weapons to protect its people, she said.

All in on SAFE

Strack-Zimmermann urged countries to move faster on joint defence procurement, backing the EU’s Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument.

SAFE provides up to €150 billion in competitively priced loans to member states aimed at accelerating large-scale investment in critical capabilities.

“We have more than 150 different weapons systems and to protect Europe we need this SAFE program,” the German politician said.

She said the programme had attracted interest both within and outside the EU. According to the European Commission, 19 EU member states have submitted defence investment plans, such as France, Italy and Poland, but not Germany.

The first non-European country to participate in SAFE was Canada, which concluded an agreement with the EU in June.

Russia launched a large-scale missile and drone attack across Ukraine overnight into 7 October, killing at least 11 people and injuring more than 30. Kyiv, Pryluky, Kremenchuk and several other cities were struck as Moscow used ballistic and cruise missiles alongside 130 attack drones, with energy infrastructure among the principal targets.

Russia fired 70 missiles and 130 drones at Ukraine during one of the largest combined aerial attacks of recent months, striking Kyiv and at least a dozen regions between Tuesday evening and Wednesday morning.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said at least 11 people had been killed and 34 wounded in the attacks. He said energy infrastructure was among Russia’s principal targets and described ballistic missiles as the most difficult element of the assault for Ukrainian air defences. Reuters reported the remarks and casualty figures.

According to the Ukrainian Air Force’s preliminary assessment, the attack began at about 6pm on 6 October and involved a mixture of ballistic, anti-ship and cruise missiles launched from Russian territory, aircraft and the Caspian Sea. Russia also deployed 130 Shahed-type, Gerbera and decoy drones, including 46 jet-powered attack drones.

By 9am, Ukrainian forces said they had destroyed or electronically suppressed 161 aerial targets: 117 drones, 39 cruise missiles and five ballistic or other high-speed missiles. Six additional cruise missiles were still being assessed. Missile and drone impacts were recorded at 18 locations, while debris from intercepted weapons fell at another five.

The main directions of attack were the Kyiv, Kharkiv, Poltava and Dnipropetrovsk regions.

Residential buildings hit in Pryluky and Kyiv

Some of the heaviest civilian casualties were reported in Pryluky, in Chernihiv region, where a missile struck a multi-storey residential building. Emergency officials initially reported four people killed and 20 injured, including three children. Rescue teams continued searching the damaged structure on Wednesday morning. Associated Press reported on the rescue operation and casualties.

In Kyiv, ballistic missiles reached the capital during the night, with explosions reported shortly after 3am. Two people were killed. A non-residential building in the Podilskyi district was hit and caught fire, while garages burned in Darnytskyi district. The wider Kyiv region was simultaneously attacked by missiles and drones, damaging three production and warehouse facilities in the Obukhiv district.

Two people were also killed and seven wounded in Kremenchuk, in Poltava region, where missiles and drones struck the city and surrounding district. Damage was reported to residential buildings and an industrial facility. Further strikes were recorded in Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia and Oleksandriia.

Zelenskyy said Russia had deliberately sought to inflict serious damage on Ukraine’s energy system. “One of the key targets was our energy infrastructure,” he said, adding that further air-defence supplies had become an immediate requirement.

The attack came only hours after the Ukrainian president said intelligence services had obtained information indicating that Russia was preparing another major aerial operation. In his address on Tuesday evening, he urged Ukrainians to respond to air-raid warnings and said the country’s ability to withstand the expected attack would depend partly on the availability of Western-supplied defensive systems. His latest statements are available through the official presidential website.

The scale and composition of Wednesday’s barrage again exposed the pressure being placed on Ukraine’s layered air-defence network. EU Today has previously examined the shortage of Patriot interceptors capable of engaging ballistic missiles, which travel considerably faster than cruise missiles and drones and leave defence crews much less time to respond.

Russia’s use of different weapons within the same attack also forces Ukraine to employ several types of interception simultaneously. Cheap drones can be engaged by mobile fire groups, electronic warfare and interceptor drones, while ballistic missiles generally require more sophisticated systems such as Patriot.

Moscow’s Defence Ministry said its forces had carried out a “massive strike” using long-range precision weapons and drones against Ukrainian military-industrial facilities. It claimed that missile and drone production and storage sites, as well as port and ship-repair infrastructure, had been targeted. Those claims could not independently establish the nature of individual sites hit. Ukrainian authorities meanwhile documented damage to homes, businesses, energy facilities and other civilian infrastructure.

The overnight assault follows several weeks of intensified strikes as Ukraine approaches another winter under pressure on its power network. During German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s visit to Kyiv at the weekend, Berlin announced a new assistance package of more than €1.3 billion, including military support and funding intended to help protect and repair the country’s energy infrastructure ahead of winter.

Wednesday’s attack demonstrated why those two areas — air defence and the resilience of the electricity system — have become increasingly closely connected. Even with more than 160 incoming weapons intercepted or suppressed, missiles and drones reached targets across several regions, leaving casualties and damage hundreds of kilometres apart.

Two merchant vessels have been attacked by aerial and maritime drones in Bulgaria’s exclusive economic zone in the Black Sea, sinking one ship and forcing the evacuation of another. The incident follows a deadly attack on a grain carrier off Romania a day earlier and has prompted concern over the growing risks to civilian shipping close to EU and NATO territory.

Two commercial vessels were struck by drones in Bulgaria’s exclusive economic zone early on Tuesday, 6 October, in the first known attack of its kind on merchant shipping in Bulgarian waters.

The Togo-flagged ALFA WATAN suffered severe structural damage and sank, while the Palau-flagged ABLE caught fire. Bulgarian Prime Minister Rumen Radev said the vessels were attacked at around 3am by both aerial and maritime drones about 70 nautical miles east of the coastal town of Byala. The Bulgarian government said a search-and-rescue operation was continuing for the crew of the ALFA WATAN, whose fate remained unknown.

All 18 people aboard the ABLE were rescued after abandoning the burning vessel. The Bulgarian-flagged passenger and freight ferry DIOSCURIA was diverted to the area and initially took the crew on board before Bulgarian Navy and Border Police vessels transferred them towards Varna.

The crew comprised 11 Turkish and seven Indian nationals. Two sailors were taken to hospital, including an Indian crew member suffering from burns and the Turkish captain, who sustained a head injury. Bulgarian public broadcaster BNT reported that the remaining 16 sailors subsequently arrived safely in Varna for medical checks.

The ABLE was reportedly carrying grain towards Istanbul. The cargo aboard the ALFA WATAN, which had been heading north towards Romania, has not been officially established.

Radev convened an emergency meeting involving the ministries of defence, interior, transport and environment, alongside the presidency and Bulgaria’s security services. He described the attack as an unacceptable violation of international and maritime law and warned of its effect on commercial navigation in the Black Sea.

Bulgarian authorities have not publicly identified who launched the drones. Investigations are examining both the weapons used and the circumstances surrounding the attack. One rescued Turkish sailor told Bulgarian television that he believed the ABLE had been hit by a Russian underwater drone, but that account has not been independently established and Sofia has made no formal attribution.

Foreign Minister Velislava Petrova said Bulgaria was in contact with its European and NATO partners and described Black Sea security as inseparable from wider European security. She said civilian crews and freedom of navigation must be protected and that Bulgaria would work with its allies to assess the wider consequences for maritime security.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen also condemned attacks against civilian shipping, saying the situation in the Black Sea was becoming increasingly concerning. She said commercial vessels and their crews were being targeted as investigations continued into the latest incidents.

Tuesday’s attack came less than 24 hours after another commercial vessel caught fire and sank in Romania’s exclusive economic zone. The Turkish-owned Royad Mammadov, sailing under the flag of Saint Kitts and Nevis, had left the Ukrainian Danube port of Izmail carrying corn for Ravenna in Italy.

Romanian authorities confirmed that two people died and 11 crew members were rescued. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said the vessel had been struck by two Russian drones, although Romanian authorities did not themselves publicly attribute the incident to Russia.

The two incidents in consecutive days mark a further geographical expansion of the risks facing commercial shipping in the western Black Sea. EU Today has previously reported how strikes near Romania have moved maritime war risks closer to NATO territory, while a separate maritime drone explosion at Constanța raised questions over the ability of coastal states to detect and respond to unmanned systems approaching commercial infrastructure.

The distinction between territorial waters and an exclusive economic zone remains important. The attacks occurred outside Bulgaria’s territorial sea and therefore do not amount simply to an attack on Bulgarian territory. They nevertheless took place in an area where Bulgaria has internationally recognised economic rights and responsibilities, including search-and-rescue and environmental obligations.

The immediate concern for Sofia is the search for the missing crew of the ALFA WATAN and the possibility of pollution from the wreck. The wider concern for the EU is the increasingly exposed position of civilian shipping routes linking Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey.

Ukraine’s maritime export routes remain particularly important for agricultural trade. Repeated attacks on merchant vessels can increase insurance premiums, discourage shipowners from entering the region and raise transport costs even when ports themselves remain operational. Russian attacks on Odesa and its export infrastructure have already placed Ukraine’s Black Sea grain corridor under sustained pressure.

With merchant ships now struck in the economic zones of both Romania and Bulgaria on consecutive days, Black Sea maritime security has moved further onto the agenda of EU and NATO governments along the western coast.

A large fire has broken out at the Volodarskaya petroleum-products station outside Moscow following an extensive overnight drone attack. The facility occupies an important position in the pipeline network supplying petrol, diesel and aviation fuel to the Russian capital and its principal airports.

A major fire was reported at the Volodarskaya linear production and dispatch station in Moscow region early on Tuesday, bringing Ukraine’s campaign against Russian fuel infrastructure to another important point in the capital’s supply network.

Footage published from the area around Konstantinovo showed a substantial blaze at the facility, with reports from local residents that storage tanks were burning. The material identified the site as the Volodarskaya station, operated by Transneft-Upper Volga and connected to the petroleum-products network serving the Moscow region.

The extent of the damage was not immediately clear. There had been no detailed assessment from Transneft by Tuesday morning establishing whether pumping equipment, pipelines or only storage facilities had been affected. This distinction will determine whether the attack produces a temporary disruption or a more significant problem for Moscow’s fuel distribution system.

The strike formed part of a large overnight drone attack on Moscow and surrounding districts. Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin reported repeated interceptions of drones approaching the capital, while air-defence activity continued across Moscow region. Russian aviation authorities temporarily restricted operations at Vnukovo, Domodedovo, Sheremetyevo and Zhukovsky airports for flight-safety reasons.

There is no evidence at this stage that the airport restrictions resulted from fuel shortages. They were imposed during the drone attack itself. The longer-term significance of Volodarskaya lies instead in the station’s role within the pipeline and storage infrastructure serving the Russian capital.

A major link in Moscow’s fuel network

Volodarskaya is connected to Moscow’s ring petroleum-products pipeline, through which petrol, diesel and aviation kerosene can be moved between refineries, storage facilities and major consumers.

Its importance is documented by Transneft itself. In 2024, the company said it had returned a 32-kilometre petroleum-products pipeline between the Moscow refinery and Volodarskaya to operation as part of a project to increase fuel deliveries across Moscow region.

According to the company’s figures, the project allowed aviation-fuel deliveries to Moscow’s airports to rise almost twofold, to as much as three million tonnes a year. Potential diesel deliveries to Moscow region consumers increased to 2.8 million tonnes annually, while petrol volumes reached 1.6 million tonnes. Transneft specifically identified Vnukovo, Domodedovo and Sheremetyevo as airports supplied through the expanded system.

Transneft has also expanded storage at Volodarskaya. The company previously said it had commissioned additional petroleum-product tanks at the station to support fuel supplies to Moscow and aviation-fuel transportation to the capital’s airports.

Those figures do not mean that every litre of fuel consumed by Moscow depends on Volodarskaya. Russia can move petroleum products by rail and road, and the Moscow region has other storage and distribution facilities. But replacing pipeline volumes on the scale handled by the Moscow system would place additional demands on those alternatives, particularly if disruption were prolonged.

The attack also follows repeated Ukrainian strikes against refining infrastructure supplying European Russia. On 20 September, EU Today reported that a mass drone attack had hit the Moscow Oil Refinery at Kapotnya, one of the main fuel-processing plants serving the capital. The strike reportedly affected its ELOU-AVT-6 primary processing unit, increasing pressure on a refinery that had already been targeted earlier in the year.

The broader campaign has moved beyond individual refineries. Ukraine has increasingly targeted different stages of Russia’s energy system, including storage depots, pumping infrastructure, ports and export terminals. Earlier attacks on the Omsk refinery and Baltic export infrastructure illustrated Kyiv’s effort to put pressure on both domestic fuel processing and the logistics through which Russian oil reaches international markets.

That approach is intended to force Russia to repair several parts of the system simultaneously rather than simply compensate for the temporary loss of production at one refinery. EU Today has previously examined how sustained strikes can put physical pressure on Russia’s oil economy where sanctions alone have limits.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on 3 October that Ukraine intended to intensify attacks on Russian oil refineries in response to Moscow’s continuing strikes against Ukrainian cities, while maintaining that Ukrainian operations would not deliberately target civilians.

Volodarskaya adds another element to that campaign. A refinery converts crude oil into usable fuels; a pumping and storage station determines how those products reach consumers. Damaging one without the other may create disruption that can be bypassed. Sustained damage to both processing and distribution infrastructure is more difficult to compensate for.

Much therefore depends on what happened inside Volodarskaya overnight. If the damage is confined to several storage tanks, the Moscow fuel network may be able to absorb the loss. Damage to pumping installations or pipeline connections would have wider consequences, particularly if the facility is attacked repeatedly.

The strike nevertheless demonstrates that a fuel installation closely connected to Moscow’s aviation and transport system can be reached despite the dense air-defence network surrounding the capital. The scale of its effect will become clearer once satellite imagery and operational information show which parts of the Volodarskaya complex were actually damaged.

EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas has warned that Russia is intensifying hybrid operations across Europe, citing sabotage attempts, airspace violations and Russian drones and missiles crossing into Moldovan territory.

Her intervention adds pressure for a more coordinated European response to hostile activity below the threshold of conventional warfare.

Russia is putting lives at risk across Europe through an expanding campaign of hybrid activity, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said on Monday, after another series of Russian drones and missiles entered Moldovan airspace.

Speaking in Brussels alongside Moldovan Prime Minister Vasile Tofan and Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos, Kallas said Europe had experienced an increase in sabotage attempts and airspace violations during recent weeks.

“Russian missiles and drones violated Moldovan airspace again over the weekend,” she said, describing the incidents as unacceptable.

According to the official EU record of the press conference, Kallas said the Kremlin was seeking to create fear and interfere with European decision-making, and argued that the response should include greater resilience and continued support for Ukraine.

Her remarks follow Russia’s renewed large-scale attacks against Ukraine’s energy system and continued reports of drones crossing borders beyond Ukrainian territory.

Moldova’s defence authorities reported that three drones entered Moldovan airspace during Russia’s 30 September attack on Ukraine. Moldova, which shares a long border with Ukraine and is seeking EU membership, has repeatedly accused Moscow of attempting to destabilise the country.

The latest incidents broaden a European debate that has been developing for months: how governments should respond to hostile operations that are deliberate and potentially dangerous but fall short of an overt military attack.

EU Today reported on 28 September that European governments were discussing an emergency security protocol intended to improve coordination when member states face sabotage and other hybrid threats.

That followed earlier warnings concerning suspected attacks on infrastructure, cyber operations, interference campaigns and airspace violations across several European countries.

The problem is partly one of attribution and partly one of thresholds.

A conventional armed attack on a NATO member may trigger consultation under Article 4 or, in sufficiently serious circumstances, collective defence provisions under Article 5. The European Union also has its own mutual assistance provision under Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union.

Hybrid activity is frequently designed to remain below those thresholds.

Cyberattacks, covert sabotage, GPS interference, disinformation, drones and operations conducted through intermediaries can impose costs without giving governments an obvious basis for a military response.

Kallas’s warning comes as Germany has also reported an increase in activity it attributes to Russia.

Chancellor Friedrich Merz has warned that Germany faces growing hybrid pressure involving drones and cyber operations. European security services have separately investigated suspected Russian involvement in sabotage and attacks on infrastructure in several countries.

Moscow has denied Western accusations that it is directing such operations.

The EU has already used sanctions against individuals and entities accused of Russian hybrid activity, while governments are considering faster systems for sharing intelligence and attributing incidents.

EU Today examined the debate in September as the European Parliament considered proposals for quicker attribution, stronger intelligence-sharing and improved protection of critical infrastructure.

Moldova occupies a particularly exposed position.

The EU has provided €317 million through the European Peace Facility for Moldovan defence modernisation, according to Kallas, including €120 million allocated in 2026 for air defence. Brussels is also supporting Moldova through its EU Partnership Mission, which provides assistance against hybrid and cyber threats.

Unlike Ukraine, Moldova is not a NATO member and has constitutional neutrality. Its ability to counter Russian missiles or drones entering its airspace is therefore closely connected to the development of its own detection and air-defence capabilities.

For the EU, repeated incidents involving Moldova, NATO airspace and European infrastructure are increasingly being considered as parts of the same security problem rather than isolated events.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has announced a new package worth more than €1.3 billion for Ukraine during a visit to Kyiv, combining additional military assistance with support for the country’s damaged energy infrastructure as German-Ukrainian industrial co-operation expands.

Merz visited the Ukrainian capital on Sunday while Russian drone attacks continued against Kyiv.

According to the Ukrainian presidency’s account of the meeting, the package includes more than €1 billion for defence and additional financing for the energy sector ahead of winter. Separate reporting put the energy component at approximately €350 million.

The visit also produced an extensive group of bilateral agreements involving governments and companies.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Ukraine and Germany had concluded 15 agreements and documents, most concerning security co-operation, production, procurement, orders for German industry and joint projects in Ukraine. He put the total value of the agreements reached during the visit at more than €8.5 billion.

A narrower set of industrial agreements reported during the visit was valued at about €6.6 billion and included air-defence, radar and drone projects.

The visit went beyond another transfer of military aid.

Germany and Ukraine are increasingly constructing a defence relationship based on procurement, industrial production and the transfer of Ukrainian battlefield experience to European manufacturers.

At the Ukrainian-German Business Forum, Zelenskyy said the new security package would strengthen Ukraine’s armed forces immediately while industrial agreements were intended to build longer-term production capacity.

The direction corresponds with a wider shift in European support for Ukraine.

Military assistance is increasingly moving away from transfers of existing national stocks towards contracts financing new weapons production. In July, the EU released €3.47 billion for Ukrainian defence procurement, including financing intended for drones, missiles, air defence and combat aircraft requirements.

Kyiv has since asked European partners to accelerate further financing as the demands of the war outpace scheduled disbursements. EU Today reported in September that Ukraine was seeking early access to part of its 2027 EU funding to close a military budget gap.

The German agreements add a bilateral industrial track to that European system.

They also reflect changes on the battlefield.

Russia has continued to expand large-scale drone and missile attacks, increasing the importance of interceptor production, radar coverage and lower-cost methods of destroying unmanned aircraft. Ukraine’s air-defence problem is increasingly an industrial one: inexpensive attack drones cannot sustainably be countered only with scarce and costly surface-to-air missiles.

EU Today has previously examined how Ukraine’s air-defence battle has become an industrial equation, determined as much by production rates and cost ratios as by the technical performance of individual systems.

German-Ukrainian co-operation is increasingly being shaped by that requirement.

Merz has presented continuing support for Ukraine as a direct German and European security interest, rather than assistance based solely on solidarity with Kyiv.

The argument has acquired greater force as German authorities investigate Russian-linked sabotage and hybrid operations on German territory.

In September, investigators reportedly traced the attempted bombing of a Ukrainian cargo aircraft at Leipzig/Halle Airport to a suspected Russian military-intelligence organiser, with EU Today reporting details of the alleged GRU-linked logistics network.

For Berlin, support for Ukraine is now increasingly seen as part of Germany’s own security.

Merz’s visit also carries a domestic political dimension. His government is committing Germany to considerably higher defence expenditure at a time when the CDU has suffered severe electoral setbacks in eastern Germany and voters remain concerned over public finances and economic performance.

Yet Germany’s military and industrial engagement with Ukraine is continuing to expand.

The new package announced in Kyiv is important in itself, particularly as Ukraine prepares for another winter of Russian attacks on its energy infrastructure. The wider development, however, lies in the growing number of defence-production agreements accompanying it.

European governments have spent much of the war debating how to replenish their own weapons stocks while sustaining Ukraine.

The German approach increasingly points towards a different model: Ukrainian operational experience, Ukrainian procurement requirements and European industrial capacity being brought into the same defence-production system.

Two Iranian nationals have been charged with terrorism offences over an alleged plot targeting the Jewish community in Manchester, with investigators accusing them of researching potential targets and obtaining instructions and materials for an improvised explosive device.

Rahman Salehi, of Salford, and Salam Ahmadyan, 36, of Liverpool, were charged on Friday, 2 October, with engaging in conduct in preparation for terrorist acts, contrary to Section 5 of the Terrorism Act 2006.

According to the Metropolitan Police announcement detailing the charges, both men are Iranian nationals and were arrested in Manchester on Sunday, 20 September.

They have been remanded in custody and are due to appear at Westminster Magistrates’ Court on Saturday, 3 October.

The arrests followed what police described as a long-running counter-terrorism investigation into a suspected plot directed against the Jewish community in the Manchester area.

Police allege that the two men were communicating with a third person overseas who may have been in Iran. No allegation has been made in the charges released so far that the Iranian government directed the suspected plot.

The particulars published by Counter Terrorism Policing allege that Salehi and Ahmadyan used encrypted communications and obtained material containing instructions for manufacturing an explosive device.

Investigators say the men acquired instructions relating to a device using powdered chlorine and vehicle brake fluid, along with video material concerning the manufacture or assembly of an improvised explosive device.

They are further accused of acquiring liquids, components and equipment, researching potential targets, obtaining images, maps and plans, and carrying out reconnaissance at locations considered as possible targets.

The Crown Prosecution Service confirmed that prosecutors had authorised charges after reviewing evidence gathered during the investigation.

Frank Ferguson, Chief Crown Prosecutor for the CPS Special Crime and Counter Terrorism Division, said prosecutors had concluded that there was sufficient evidence for the case to be put before a court.

The CPS stressed that the proceedings are now active and that both men have the right to a fair trial. The charges are allegations and no finding of guilt has been made.

Arrests during Jewish High Holy Days

The arrests took place shortly before Yom Kippur, the holiest day in the Jewish calendar, and came amid heightened security surrounding Jewish institutions in Britain.

Deputy Assistant Commissioner Vicki Evans, Senior National Coordinator for Counter Terrorism Policing, said the investigation had disrupted what police believed to be a plot targeting Manchester’s Jewish community.

The timing is particularly sensitive because it comes one year after the terrorist attack at the Heaton Park Hebrew Congregation synagogue in Manchester on 2 October 2025.

Two worshippers were killed in that attack, which took place on Yom Kippur. EU Today reported at the time on the Manchester synagogue attack and the security concerns facing Britain’s Jewish population.

The latest case also comes against the background of a series of alleged Iranian-linked threats and attacks involving Jewish and Israeli targets in Britain.

British security agencies have repeatedly warned about Iranian activity on UK territory. The government said earlier this year that more than 20 potentially lethal Iran-backed plots had been tracked by British security agencies over the preceding year.

Concerns intensified following attacks on Jewish-linked premises during 2026. In July, the government imposed sanctions on an Iran-linked organisation that had claimed responsibility for attacks on Jewish and Israeli-linked locations.

The group, the Islamic Movement of Companions of the Right, was subsequently designated under Britain’s new state-threat legislation alongside Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

EU Today has previously examined Iran-linked security threats in Britain following counter-terrorism arrests involving Iranian nationals, as well as alleged Iranian-linked plots targeting Jewish institutions elsewhere in Europe and North America.

Britain expands protection for Jewish communities

The Manchester case comes as the British government increases security around synagogues, Jewish schools and community centres.

In July, ministers announced more than £250 million in additional funding over three years to strengthen protection for Jewish communities.

The package includes funding for more than 500 additional police officers across England and Wales, including around 80 officers in Greater Manchester, as well as additional resources for Counter Terrorism Policing.

The UK’s national terrorism threat level was raised to severe in April, meaning that an attack is considered highly likely. The government said the decision reflected both an increased threat from Islamist and extreme-right terrorism and a wider background of state-linked physical threats against the Jewish community.

EU Today has also reported on the government’s £250 million programme to strengthen Jewish community security and the broader increase in antisemitic incidents and violence affecting Jewish communities across Britain.

The allegations against Salehi and Ahmadyan will now be considered by the courts. Prosecutors have warned against publishing material that could prejudice the proceedings.

Latvians are voting for a new parliament on Saturday after an election campaign dominated by security, repeated drone incidents, support for Ukraine and mounting pressure on household finances.

Latvians went to the polls on Saturday, 3 October, to elect the country’s 100-seat Saeima in an election taking place against an unusually tense security backdrop on NATO’s eastern frontier.

Fourteen parties and electoral alliances are contesting the election, with 1,428 candidates seeking seats in parliament, according to Latvia’s Central Election Commission. Voting takes place across five constituencies — Riga, Vidzeme, Latgale, Kurzeme and Zemgale — with polling stations open until 20:00 local time.

Security has occupied a prominent place in the campaign after a series of drone incidents brought the consequences of Russia’s war against Ukraine directly into Latvian airspace.

Prime Minister Andris Kulbergs, who took office in May after the previous coalition collapsed during a political crisis over the handling of drone incursions, is seeking a new mandate for his centrist United List. EU Today reported at the time that Prime Minister Evika Siliņa resigned after her coalition fractured amid criticism of Latvia’s response to repeated unmanned aircraft incidents along the Russian border. The collapse followed a succession of drone-related security incidents.

Kulbergs has campaigned on continued support for Ukraine and stronger Latvian defences, including additional counter-drone capabilities. His party entered election day ahead in the opinion polls, although the fragmented political landscape means coalition negotiations are likely to determine the eventual composition of the government.

An SKDS poll conducted between 4 and 16 September put United List on 14.4 per cent. Sovereign Power/Alliance of Young Latvians followed on 9.4 per cent, while Latvia First stood on 9.2 per cent. The Progressives recorded 6.2 per cent and the National Alliance 5.6 per cent. When only voters who had decided how they intended to vote were counted, seven political forces were projected to cross the 5 per cent threshold for representation in parliament.

The survey also showed a substantial pool of undecided or disengaged voters shortly before polling day, leaving considerable uncertainty around the final distribution of seats.

Russia and the war in neighbouring Ukraine have also produced sharper divisions between the competing parties.

Kulbergs has maintained Latvia’s strong support for Kyiv, while Sovereign Power has opposed military assistance to Ukraine and called for greater emphasis on negotiations. Latvia First has also sought votes among parts of the country’s Russian-speaking population, particularly in eastern Latvia, where questions surrounding language policy, relations with Moscow and the economic consequences of the war remain politically sensitive.

Latvia’s geographical position gives those arguments a significance extending beyond domestic politics. The country shares a border with Russia and Belarus and hosts allied troops as part of NATO’s reinforced eastern presence.

Earlier this year, drones crossed into Latvia from Russian territory, including incidents that exposed weaknesses in detecting and intercepting relatively small unmanned aircraft. EU Today reported in March that Latvia’s defence minister cut short a visit to Kyiv after another drone crossed the border from Russia. Further incidents followed in May.

Latvian intelligence has meanwhile warned about the changing nature of Moscow’s approach towards the country. In January, the Constitution Protection Bureau said Russia’s perception of Latvia was becoming increasingly similar to its view of Ukraine before the full-scale invasion, while stressing that it did not assess Russia as posing an immediate direct military threat at that stage. The warning was examined by EU Today earlier this year.

Riga has responded with one of NATO’s highest levels of defence expenditure.

Latvia’s Ministry of Defence says the country will spend about €2.16 billion on defence in 2026, equivalent to approximately 4.7 per cent of GDP under its updated calculation, as it moves towards a target of 5 per cent. Priorities include strengthening the armed forces, developing military infrastructure and improving defences along the eastern border. The Latvian defence ministry’s budget programme places additional emphasis on domestic defence production and military innovation.

Security is not the only issue facing voters. The cost of living, pensions, public services and regional economic disparities have also featured heavily during the campaign, particularly outside Riga.

The security debate, however, has given this election a wider European dimension. Latvia’s next government will take office while Russia’s war against Ukraine continues immediately beyond NATO’s eastern frontier and while the Baltic states are investing heavily in air defence, border protection and military readiness.

The official result will determine the composition of the 15th Saeima for the next four years. With several parties competing around the parliamentary threshold and no single force close to a majority, the subsequent coalition negotiations are likely to be almost as consequential as Saturday’s vote itself.

China has warned that it will respond if the European Union introduces new trade restrictions targeting Chinese companies or products, as France and Germany push for stronger European instruments to address what they regard as unfair commercial practices.

China’s Ministry of Commerce issued the warning after reports that several EU governments were discussing a mechanism modelled partly on Section 301 of US trade law, which allows Washington to investigate foreign trade practices and impose countermeasures.

Beijing described such an approach as protectionist and unilateral and warned that it could damage continuing negotiations between China and the EU.

“If the European side insists on introducing discriminatory restrictive measures against Chinese companies or products,” the ministry said, China would “resolutely respond” to defend the interests of its industries.

The warning comes as Europe’s trade relationship with China is moving further up the political agenda.

According to the European Commission’s latest EU-China trade figures, EU exports to China were worth €199.5 billion in 2025 while imports reached €559.5 billion.

The goods deficit stood at €359.9 billion, compared with €312.2 billion in 2024.

China remained the EU’s largest source of goods imports and its fourth-largest export market.

Brussels argues that the scale of the imbalance is connected not only to competitiveness but also to state support, market-access restrictions and other structural differences between the two economies.

China disputes that assessment and has repeatedly accused the EU of using industrial and security arguments to justify protectionism.

The argument is already visible in several industries.

The EU imposed countervailing duties on Chinese battery electric vehicles after an investigation concluded that state subsidies were giving Chinese manufacturers an unfair advantage in the European market.

Brussels has subsequently widened its attention to other parts of the automotive industry. Earlier this month, EU Today reported that the EU was considering restrictions affecting Chinese hybrid cars as policymakers looked for ways to contain the growing trade imbalance.

The automotive dispute is important because Europe is simultaneously trying to attract Chinese manufacturing investment.

France and Spain addressed that question during President Emmanuel Macron’s state visit to Madrid.

Macron and Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez agreed on the need for greater European unity in responding to Chinese competition. They also discussed whether Chinese investors entering strategically important European industries should be required to provide stronger commitments on issues such as technology transfer.

Macron said that companies on both sides of the Pyrenees needed protection when they faced unfair competition and argued that “the only response that works is European.”

France has generally favoured stronger European trade defences.

Germany has traditionally approached the issue more cautiously because major German manufacturers have substantial commercial exposure to China. Increasing competition from Chinese producers, particularly in industrial sectors where German companies were once dominant, has altered the debate.

Reports that Berlin and Paris are now working together on a stronger trade instrument therefore suggest a potentially important shift.

The two countries are said to be considering a European mechanism inspired by the American Section 301 process, although no final proposal has yet been adopted by the European Commission.

EU trade law already provides several instruments.

Brussels can impose anti-dumping or anti-subsidy duties following investigations, use the Foreign Subsidies Regulation to examine state-backed investment and procurement, and deploy the Anti-Coercion Instrument where another country uses economic pressure against the EU or a member state.

The discussion now concerns whether those instruments are sufficient when governments believe a problem extends across industries rather than affecting an individual product.

The debate comes only weeks after EU Today reported that Brussels was preparing additional pressure on Chinese hybrid-car imports, demonstrating how quickly EU-China trade disputes are expanding beyond the original electric-vehicle case.

At the same time, Brussels and Beijing have established a Trade and Investment Consultations mechanism, with workstreams covering trade balances, export controls, intellectual property and World Trade Organisation reform.

China’s Commerce Ministry has warned that introducing tougher measures while those talks continue would damage trust.

That leaves the EU facing two parallel choices: continue negotiations intended to narrow the trade dispute while also developing stronger instruments in case those negotiations fail.

France and Germany are increasingly arguing that Europe needs greater leverage.

Beijing’s response is that using that leverage against Chinese companies would bring countermeasures.

The next stage will depend on whether the Franco-German proposal develops into a formal EU initiative. If it does, the dispute will move beyond duties on particular products towards a broader argument over how Europe intends to manage its economic relationship with China.

Europe is facing more immediate cyber threats, but whether its member states are prepared to deal with it collectively is becoming a question harder to answer.

Even as drone threats, such as Russia’s bomb plot at the Leipzig-Halle airport in Germany in August, dominated European headlines in September, other, less visible hybrid attacks are also being waged against the EU every day, whose sheer weight of numbers should also cause grave concern.

Poland, for instance, recorded 4,200 cyber-security incidents in military networks and systems in 2024 and 7,100 in 2025, Polish cyber command spokesperson, Przemek Lipczyński, told EUobserver.

In 2025, Polish security systems blocked four million phishing emails targeted at soldiers and defence personnel.

And Poland aside, evolving technology meant Russian cyber-attacks “do not know any border”, said Jamila Boutemeur, the EU’s head of cybersecurity body, in what amounted to a single market for hacking.

For its part, the European Union has built its cybersecurity architecture around the Boutemeur’s European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, ENISA, in Athens, as well as the 27 national cybersecurity agencies.

But as Russia’s threat levels up, the European structure is seeing familiar problems: information is not always shared, responsibilities remain divided between national governments and EU institutions, while ENISA itself is being asked to do more with limited resources.

And the European Court of Auditors (ECA) confirmed it on 21 September in its ENISA study.

“The architecture is there, the structure is there. Now it’s a matter of willingness and trust,” to effectively fight back, said George-Marius Hyzler, the ECA’s main auditor.

Stress test shows EU cracks

“It always boils down to the same thing, lack of information sharing,” he said, identifying the EU’s key weakness.

And for Czech Greens MEP Markéta Gregorová, who is also the lead rapporteur on the EU’s incoming Cybersecurity Act 2 (CSA2), duplication of work also bedevilled the EU’s response.

“The [ECA] auditors describe a system that does not work” and was “wasteful”, she told EUobserver.

“Six European legal acts force the same company to report the same incident to different authorities. Two EU bodies monitor the same threats,” Gregorová said.

She also advocated a stronger operational role for ENISA.

But the EU fault lines have underlying political as well as legal tensions.

Cybersecurity remains largely within the competence of the member states, and governments differ in how much new power they are willing to delegate to European institutions.

And for Dimitar Lilkov, from the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, there were three main sources of friction: national security, trust, and money.

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This story is a part of the weekly newsletter about security, defence, and tech in the eastern flank of Nato, How we cee it.

Over the past few weeks, a new wave of fear has engulfed Europe. A number of intelligence and government officials have spoken out, saying Russia could possibly attack a Nato country within months, not years.

On 18 September, Polish prime minister Donald Tusk warned that Russia is planning hybrid strikes with drones or rockets on European countries that support Ukraine, such as Poland.

Two days later, Czech intelligence chief Michal Koudelka told the Guardian that, as well as increased drone activity, a small-scale invasion of Nato territory bordering Russia could be part of the Kremlin’s plans.

Then, last Thursday, Denmark’s defence intelligence service said that Russia is likely to intensify its hybrid war against the West in the coming months, with more frequent attacks against Nato countries.

On the same day, speaking at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, Poland’s foreign minister Radosław Sikorski said, according to TVP World: “We are receiving information … that Russia is preparing something big this year.”

This is not the first time a wave of comments like this has appeared. A similar situation arose last year, when various officials in Europe took turns escalating their rhetoric about the Russian threat.

It is possible that they are speaking out again because new information has surfaced within the intelligence community. The communication goal could be letting Russia know that they know. Much like CIA director John Ratcliffe’s visit to Moscow last month, this could be an effort to make sure Russia doesn’t miscalculate.

The warnings also come in a different context from last year, when the Baltic countries were sounding the alarm. Russia has noticeably been turning up the temperature of its activity around Europe.

Back in July, a cruise missile crashed in Poland. According to experts, it was not a misguided missile, but one deliberately aimed at Poland. Then, in early August, a drone carrying an explosive device was discovered at Leipzig/Halle Airport in eastern Germany, close to Ukrainian cargo planes.

Germany’s interior minister Alexander Dobrindt said the Leipzig airport attack followed the “well-established pattern of Russian hybrid operations in Europe,” the BBC reported.

According to German investigators, who spoke to Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, the incident was also connected to other events, such as an attempted arson attack on a drone manufacturer in eastern Slovakia, and an arson attack in Munich on September 3, when several incendiary devices were thrown from a passing car onto a construction site near the headquarters of defence firms Rohde & Schwarz and Helsing.

In fact, there have been so many different incidents recently that the semi-regular drone incursions into Romania and the Baltics have become almost normalised and struggle to make headlines anymore.

Hypothetical scenarios abound

Scenarios of where Russia could take its hybrid attacks next are as abundant as onlookers’ creativity allows. They range from small attacks on factories, through the seizure of a small piece of land by an elite drone unit, all the way to the capture of the Suwałki corridor – a strategic piece of land between the Baltic states and mainland Europe.

Most recently, the CIA warned that while all eyes had so far been on the Baltics, Russia may be preparing a drone strike against Spain, France, and Italy.

According to Marko Mihkelson, chairman of the Estonian parliament’s foreign affairs committee, the snowball of speculation about an imminent Russian attack on Europe is gathering pace.

But as he sees it, isolated facts are being mixed with wishful thinking, worst-case scenarios and, at times, little more than the need to grab attention.

As he wrote in an opinion piece for the Estonian news agency ERR: “Russia understands that it can confuse and paralyse us through information operations alone. Constant speculation about the Baltic states and Poland risks creating the impression that this is primarily a problem for two or three countries on Russia’s doorstep, while the rest of Europe can somehow remain untouched.”

According to Mihkelson, Russia’s campaign against the West would not necessarily begin with a conventional attack.

It could start by undermining Nato from within: interfering in elections, amplifying polarising narratives, exploiting political divisions, and spreading fear. It could seek to isolate Ukraine by limiting Western support, and then test Nato’s willingness to stand together.

As for worries that Russia will attempt to grab land from the Baltics or Poland, there are no significant material or military changes to note along the borders.

Belarus did hold a four-day military exercise near its border with the Suwałki corridor in mid-September, but that is nothing close to the signals we were getting from Russia just before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Back then, physical military infrastructure was being constructed ahead of the attack.

There are also no significant changes in the Russian military’s posture to launch a land attack against the Baltics.

Estonian government officials confirm this. According to Estonia’s minister of defence, Martin Herem, its assessment of the Russian threat remains unchanged.

That means Russia’s main effort remains focused on its war in Ukraine, and neither Estonia, Denmark, nor other Nato allies currently see a threat requiring raised military readiness.

Military experts in Lithuania also see no signs of new escalation. This doesn’t mean Russia won’t continue to be dangerous. It means that Russia has been engaged in provocations against Nato countries for years already, and similar behaviour will continue.

“No one is currently planning to conquer us – not at this moment, nor this year. In this case, specific, very precise attacks or provocations are more likely, designed not so much to cause physical damage as to sow serious panic in people’s minds,” Deividas Šlekys, a professor at Vilnius University’s Institute of Political Science and International Relations, told the Lithuanian wire LRT on Monday (28 September).

And so, while last autumn it was the Baltic states sounding the alarm about a potential Russian attack, now their officials are looking to calm the panic about their aggressive neighbour.

On Tuesday (22 September), the Lithuanian parliament backed a proposal to lift the constitutional ban on the deployment of nuclear weapons and foreign military bases on the country’s territory.

Lithuanian radio LRT reported on the development, which paves the way for nuclear weapons in the country.

Lawmakers overwhelmingly approved the constitutional amendment to lift the ban, with 99 votes in favour, 13 against and five abstentions. The proposal must pass two further parliamentary votes, three months apart, before it comes into effect.

This comes as Europe as a whole debates nuclear deterrence.

In March, French president Emmanuel Macron announced a new French nuclear doctrine. He also raised the possibility of extending France’s nuclear umbrella over countries that could temporarily host French strategic aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

However, the final decision on their use would remain in the hands of the French president.

France is the only EU member state with its own nuclear weapons and has a similar number of nuclear warheads to the United Kingdom, which sources them from the US.

However, France has long advocated greater autonomy from the US. Macron has justified this due to the inflammatory rhetoric of US president Donald Trump, who puts into question US commitments to European allies.

Ten European countries have joined France’s forward deterrence programme: the United Kingdom, Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland, which joined this month ending military neutrality after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

It was in the context of the new European nuclear architecture that MP Remigijus Motuzas, chair of the Lithuanian parliament’s foreign affairs committee, plus another 50 Lithuanian MPs tabled a proposal to lift the constitutional ban on deploying nuclear weapons on the Baltic country’s territory.

Lithuania borders Russia’s heavily-militarised Kaliningrad exclave and Belarus, Moscow’s closest ally in its war against Ukraine.

“Given the situation we are in, the geopolitical situation and what is happening, I think it is certainly worth it,” parliamentary speaker Juozas Olekas said in May, referring to nuclear deterrence.

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European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen at the podium Photographer: Dati Bendo © European Union

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen used her State of the Union address on Wednesday (16 September) to make the case for a more independent Europe, confronting war, economic competition, AI disruption and climate change — while proposing Canada become the EU’s first associate member.

Opening her #SOTEU speech with Charles Dickens’ “best of times, worst of times”, von der Leyen described a Union stronger but also more exposed to external threats.

“The state of our Union is the strongest it has ever been,” she said, while acknowledging it could feel “as precarious as it has ever been”. “Europe has chosen to forge its own path. And a stronger, independent Europe is now emerging.”

Competitiveness and energy

Von der Leyen called kickstarting Europe’s economy her “number one priority”, promising faster permitting, less red tape and further integration of the Single Market.

The Commission will propose a new Banking Package and create a European Corporation on Critical Raw Materials to secure supplies needed for chips, batteries, clean technology and defence.

With high energy costs weighing on European industry, von der Leyen called for faster electrification and investment in grids, renewables and nuclear power to reduce dependence on imported fossil fuels.

Climate after a 'summer of truth'

After a summer of fires, drought and extreme heat, von der Leyen promised a climate resilience framework focused on 100 of Europe’s most vulnerable territories, alongside a Climate Insurance Alliance, European Heatwave Plan and Water Initiative.

She also floated a future European Firefighting Fleet, declaring that Europe “can, must and will stay the course” on its climate targets.

AI: Opportunity and threat

AI was presented as both an economic opportunity and an emerging security threat. Von der Leyen warned that advanced models could enable hacking “on a level we never thought possible” and pledged closer cooperation with Canada, the UK and others on AI security.

At the same time, Europe will expand computing capacity and push AI into health, transport, agriculture, manufacturing, defence and space. “Above all, we want AI with human agency,” she said.

Jobs, housing and social rights

The Commission plans a Quality Jobs Act before the end of the year and a European Care Deal, alongside measures tackling housing pressures.

Von der Leyen said technological change must benefit workers, while strongly defending women’s rights and Europe’s social model.

PHOTO  European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney at the podium Photographer: Dati Bendo © European Union

Canada moves closer

One of the biggest surprises came with Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney in the chamber.

Von der Leyen proposed an “Alliance for the Future” spanning technology, defence, energy, critical minerals, AI and the Arctic — before going further.

“I would like to work with you on opening the door for Canada to be the first associate member of the EU,” she told Carney. “We share one ocean, one set of values, one way of seeing the world.”

Security, defence and Ukraine

With drone incursions, cyberattacks and sabotage raising security concerns inside the EU, von der Leyen proposed a new European security strategy and an Emergency Security Protocol for incidents falling below the threshold of armed aggression.

She also wants to establish a European Security Council and strengthen joint European defence capabilities.

Ukraine faces what von der Leyen called the “toughest winter of the war”. She promised humanitarian and energy support, stronger air defences and deeper defence-industrial cooperation with Kyiv.

Borders, democracy and children online

The Commission will propose an Emergency Response Framework for exceptional migration crises and strengthen Frontex, while launching a Mediterranean Youth Skills and Jobs initiative.

Von der Leyen also announced an EU KIDS ACT, including no social media for under-13s and restrictions for children under 15, followed by a broader Digital Fairness Act.

Political groups draw battle lines

EPP leader Manfred Weber backed the focus on AI, defence and competitiveness but pushed against restrictive climate policies. “Climate change is a reality,” he said, arguing Europe needed “innovation and not bans.”

S&D leader Iratxe García Pérez demanded that von der Leyen turn “words into action”, backing climate investment, housing and worker protections while warning that simplification must not become deregulation.

Renew Europe leader Valérie Hayer made a pointed appeal for the Parliament’s pro-European majority, as the EPP has increasingly worked with parties further to the right on some legislation. “There’s only one possible majority. It’s our pro-European majority,” she said. “We need to do more. We need more Europe, and we need it more quickly.”

Greens/EFA co-chair Terry Reintke accused EU leaders of failing to respond urgently enough to extreme heat and wildfires. “We are in the middle of a climate emergency,” she said, demanding stronger Green Deal implementation while insisting: “We are not powerless. Europe is strong, and Europe can be even stronger.”

ECR co-chair Patryk Jaki struck a sharply different note, attacking the Commission over bureaucracy, energy costs and industrial competitiveness. Europe, he argued, was “as weak as it’s ever been.”

Von der Leyen closed on the central theme running through the speech: European sovereignty in an increasingly hostile world.

“The fate of Europe,” she said, “must remain in the hands of Europeans.”

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen during her speech in 2025 Photographer: Dati Bendo © European Union, 2025

Ursula von der Leyen is expected to make the case for a more independent and resilient Europe in her State of the European Union address on Wednesday (16 September). But analysts and political groups in the European Parliament are demanding something more concrete: evidence that the Commission can turn its expanding ambitions into results Europeans can see.

The State of the European Union address, commonly known in Brussels as the “SOTEU”, is the Commission president’s annual speech to Parliament setting out priorities for the year ahead. Modeled in part on the US president’s State of the Union address to Congress, the EU version began in 2010 under then Commission president José Manuel Barroso. Von der Leyen will deliver this year’s address at 9:00 tomorrow morning (16 September).

The speech comes as Europe is confronted with an ongoing war in Ukraine, a fragmenting global trading system and the challenge of strengthening defence while reviving competitiveness and financing the green transition. At home, von der Leyen must reconcile political groups that broadly agree on the need for a stronger Europe but differ over what that means.

For Manfred Weber, chairman of von der Leyen’s centre-right European People’s Party group, the focus should be on voters’ economic and security concerns.

“Europe’s priorities must reflect people’s concerns: jobs, the cost of living and economic security,” Weber said. He called for a stronger economy and well-paid jobs, tighter control of Europe’s borders, leadership on AI, continued support for Ukraine and “a strong European defence pillar”.

On the centre-left, Iratxe García Pérez, president of the Socialists and Democrats group, argues that the Commission has relied too heavily on deregulation.

“Europe needs more than announcements,” García Pérez said. “It needs concrete policies backed by the necessary resources.” The S&D wants greater emphasis on affordable food, housing and energy, quality jobs and climate action, alongside European sovereignty in defence and digital technologies.

Renew Europe is also making delivery the benchmark, calling on von der Leyen to present “a credible plan turning European ambition into visible results” and framing the choice as one between united European action and fragmentation.

Analysts at the European Policy Centre see the same challenge extending to Europe’s position in the world.

“Von der Leyen will tell us that the EU is forging new partnerships around the globe,” said Almut Möller, the EPC’s director for European and Global Affairs. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s attendance will reinforce the geopolitical dimension of the speech.

But strategic autonomy goes beyond defence and trade. Georg Riekeles, the EPC’s head of political economy, identifies financial dependence as an overlooked vulnerability. With the international financial system becoming less stable, Europe cannot assume Washington and the US Federal Reserve will play the stabilising role they did in previous crises. Von der Leyen “must therefore address financial sovereignty as a core element of European security”, he argues.

Technology poses another test. Elizabeth Kuiper, the EPC’s head of health and societal resilience, says von der Leyen should “reject the trade-off between competitiveness, technological progress, and the EU’s social model”, particularly as AI affects employment, income security and social cohesion.

Climate policy presents a similar collision between ambition and resources. Stefan Šipka, the EPC’s head of sustainable prosperity, argues that Europe needs “a robust delivery mindset, no more strategies” as it tries to combine defence, decarbonisation and economic security.

The common thread is delivery. Von der Leyen has no shortage of strategic objectives. The harder task on Wednesday will be explaining how they fit together, how Europe will finance them and what takes priority when they conflict.

For EPC policy analyst Eric Maurice, von der Leyen “must provide strategic focus and political clarity”.

“As the midterm in her second term approaches,” Maurice said, “it is time for von der Leyen to present a vision and deliver.”

Europe is rearming. Defence budgets are rising, factories are expanding, and new EU instruments are pouring money into ammunition production and joint procurement. But money is only part of Europe’s defence problems. The main constraint is that its systems remain slow, fragmented and poorly suited to an age when military technology can change in months rather than decades.

Three transformations are hitting the continent at once. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has brought back large-scale war to European soil. Washington’s growing focus on the Indo-Pacific, its renewed interest in Greenland and its push to move NATO from “burden sharing” towards what might be called “burden shifting” mean that Europe will have to provide not only more money for the alliance but also a larger share of its combat power. At the same time, technology is changing warfare faster than traditional procurement systems can keep up.

At present, procurement systems work as follows: a military identifies a requirement; officials draw up specifications; companies compete for a contract and, years later, a system enters service. The problem is that, by then, the technologies shaping the battlefield may have changed dramatically. Promising technologies can become obsolete or fall by the wayside before they ever reach soldiers.

Ukraine has demonstrated a different model. Operational problems generate ideas; engineers turn them into prototypes; soldiers test them; manufacturers improve and scale them; battlefield experience feeds into the next iteration. Technology can also work in the other direction: new capabilities, such as cheap drones, can create tactics that planners had not previously considered.

The real measure of defence-industrial success should not be how many platforms roll off the line, but how fast capability can be imagined, built, tested, industrialised, fielded and adapted again

Europe needs to make this cycle permanent. I propose a model called Adaptive Defence Industrial Ecosystem Management, or ADIEM. The principle is for governments to move from being regulators and buyers to orchestrators of a defence ecosystem that links governments, armed forces, defence and tech companies, start-ups, universities and investors in a continuous loop. The real measure of defence-industrial success should not be how many platforms roll off the line, but how fast capability can be imagined, built, tested, industrialised, fielded and adapted again.

Industrial resilience and human capital are central to this model. Ukraine has shown that sustained operations depend on raw materials, reliable energy, resilient logistics and skilled labour quite as much as on the platforms themselves. And because digital capability now depends as much on software and data engineering as on heavy manufacturing, Europe’s defence sector competes directly with the commercial tech industry for the same scarce talent. This makes the appeal of a defence career a strategic question.

How to make ADIEM work

Reform defence governance. Create permanent structures that bring together military planning, industrial policy, innovation and procurement around shared capability goals. Give them room to depart from standard rules where those rules are the obstacle.

Start with battlefield problems. Build capabilities around what armed forces need to achieve. It works in reverse too: a new system needs a concept of operations written for it before it is bought at scale. Treat these as living documents that evolve with experimentation and real-world lessons.

Make procurement faster and more flexible. Use a hybrid procurement method. While central procurement agencies buy major systems, individual units are allowed to meet certain urgent combat needs. Alongside that, break large procurements into smaller contracts with incremental delivery, allow continuous software updates, use open architecture and speed up certification.

Build a genuine innovation ecosystem. Give start-ups, universities and public labs clear routes to deployment. Reward experimentation and operational relevance over novelty for its own sake.

Achieve affordable mass. Create dedicated programmes for weapon systems that are effective enough, cheap enough to buy in large numbers and simple enough to replace quickly. These include drones, autonomous vehicles, loitering munitions, low-cost intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems and electronic warfare.

Invest in human capital. Build a long-term pipeline of software engineers, AI specialists, systems engineers and skilled production workers, and change how the sector is perceived—presenting it as a high-technology field, not just a traditional military one.

Institutionalise experimentation. Set up permanent centres where soldiers, engineers, researchers and industry jointly evaluate new operational concepts and technologies. Test continuously rather than only in the run-up to a procurement decision.

Develop digital defence infrastructure. Invest in a sovereign defence cloud, secure data architecture, digital twins and common digital standards.

Governments also need to reform the institutions through which capability is developed, not just the funding lines that feed them. And while Europe has much of what it needs­—sophisticated armed forces, world-class manufacturers, strong universities and a growing defence-tech sector—it still lacks a system capable of connecting them quickly enough. That is the purpose of ADIEM: to connect these actors in a continuously adapting ecosystem, with governments acting as orchestrators rather than simply regulators and buyers.

Source

If you are developing technologies that could shape the future of defence, this is your opportunity.

Registrations are now open for the 5th edition of the EUDIS Defence Hackathon, taking place onsite from 15 to 17 October 2026 across eight locations in Europe. Engineers, startups, researchers, developers and defence professionals are invited to join one of Europe's flagship defence innovation initiatives, work on real operational challenges and connect directly with experts, industry leaders and fellow innovators shaping the future of European defence.

This autumn, participants will tackle one of the most pressing topics in defence innovation: Autonomy on the Battlefield. From operating in GNSS-denied environments to enabling autonomous swarms for reconnaissance and logistics, teams will develop practical solutions with real-world relevance. Alongside these two challenges, each host location will also propose a third challenge reflecting regional priorities and expertise.

More than a hackathon

The EUDIS Defence Hackathon is designed for innovators who want to go beyond ideas. Over three intensive onsite days, teams will work side by side with mentors from the defence industry, research organisations and operational environments to develop solutions addressing genuine capability needs.

The onsite format is at the heart of the experience. It gives participants the opportunity to collaborate directly with fellow innovators, engage with defence experts and end-users, and build valuable relationships within Europe's growing defence innovation ecosystem. Whether you are looking for future collaborations, industry insights or your first step into the European defence market, EUDIS is designed to create meaningful connections.

But the experience does not end there.

Winning teams will undergo a Mentoring Programme, a two-month programme offering expert guidance on product development, business strategy and defence market positioning. Participants will also take part in dedicated defence innovation bootcamp, receive support to refine their solutions and have opportunities to pitch their projects to investors and other stakeholders. Together, these activities help accelerate promising ideas while opening the door to Europe's defence innovation ecosystem.

Join a growing European innovation community

Since its launch, the EUDIS Defence Hackathons has brought together more than 2,300 participants through 30 hackathons organised across Europe. Each edition strengthens connections between innovators, industry, investors, defence stakeholders and EU

institutions, creating new opportunities for collaboration and helping innovative technologies move closer to real-world deployment.

The Autumn 2026 edition will take place simultaneously in:

• Austria
• Cyprus
• Ireland
• Italy
• Latvia
• Norway
• Portugal
• Sweden

Ukrainian participation encouraged

The European Commission actively encourages Ukrainian citizens to participate across all locations, whether as competitors, mentors or jury members. Ukrainian expertise and operational experience continue to play an important role in developing innovative and deployable defence solutions.

How to participate

Registrations are now open for the Autumn 2026 EUDIS Defence Hackathon.

The programme is open to startups, SMEs, engineering teams, researchers and technology professionals from eligible countries who are ready to tackle real operational defence challenges and collaborate with Europe's defence innovation community.

Key dates

• Participant registrations: Open now
• Hackathon: 15–17 October 2026 (onsite)
• Locations: Austria, Cyprus, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Norway, Portugal and Sweden

Interested? 

Register today and find full details on the challenges, eligibility criteria and local hackathon locations here. 

For media enquiries, partnerships or additional information, please contact: contact@eudis-hackathon.eu

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte Photographer: Dati Bendo © European Union
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said on Wednesday (2 September) that Europe and NATO would increase pressure on Russia after Germany attributed an attempted attack on cargo planes at Leipzig/Halle Airport to Moscow, calling the incident a “new escalation” on European Union soil, writes Catherine Feore.

“This was an attack using military-grade material, carried out by Russian operatives on European Union soil. We will not tolerate it,” von der Leyen said alongside NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte in Brussels.

The German government said on Tuesday (1 September) that its investigation and intelligence findings established Russian responsibility for the attempted attack at Leipzig/Halle Airport last month. Russia has denied responsibility.

The meeting took place as foreign ministers and the EU's High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy were meeting to discuss Russia and Ukraine among other issues.

“Had this attack succeeded, this would have resulted in enormous damage and possibly even loss of life,” von der Leyen said. “We stand in full solidarity with Germany.”

“If the intention was to make us think twice about supporting Ukraine, I can tell you it has only strengthened my resolve. Intimidation will not work.”

Von der Leyen said the Leipzig incident was part of a wider pattern of Russian activity confronting Europe, including airspace incursions, drones disrupting airports and interference with critical infrastructure.

“Leipzig marks a new escalation on European Union soil, directly attributed to Russia,” she said. 

Von der Leyen outlined three areas for a stepped-up European response: stronger protection of European infrastructure backed by additional sanctions on Russia, increased air-defence support for Ukraine, and an acceleration of Europe’s own defence build-up in close cooperation with NATO.

Infrastructure and sanctions

First, von der Leyen said Europe must strengthen the protection of infrastructure that could be targeted by Russian hybrid operations and be prepared to respond more quickly when attacks occur.

“We must treat our everyday infrastructure as frontline targets, and protect them accordingly,” she said.

The EU already has rapid response teams that can assist member states faced with such attacks, she said, arguing that Europe’s ability to prepare and respond would itself act as a deterrent.

Von der Leyen also said the EU was ready to intensify economic pressure on Moscow through sanctions. “Our sanctions have weakened Russia’s economy. We can use more sanctions and have them ready to impose as soon as such dangerous, life-threatening acts are attributed,” she said. “Every loophole Russia exploits is one we must close.”

European foreign ministers were discussing new listings in Ireland on Wednesday, she said, while the Commission was examining further ways to “cut deeper into Russia’s war chest”.

More air defence for Ukraine

Von der Leyen said her second priority was strengthening support for Ukraine, announcing that the EU had received a new request worth several billion euros for air-defence capabilities.

“Today, I can confirm that we have received a new payment request,” she said. “It is worth several billion euro, and would cover Ukraine’s air defenses, including the highly advanced PAC-3 Patriot air defense systems.”

Member states were considering the request, she said.

“I can say that it’s going in the right direction.”

Von der Leyen also pointed to European work with Ukraine on the FRIO project to develop anti-ballistic missile defences, as well as the EU’s €90 billion support loan.

“Since June, we have issued €8.5 billion for drones and missiles for Ukraine from this loan,” she said, adding that the funding could also be used to buy fighter aircraft from European industry.

Faster European defence build-up

Von der Leyen’s third priority was to accelerate Europe’s defence build-up alongside NATO, with air defence at the centre of the effort.

“Air defenses are critical,” she said. “We need a faster, more integrated alert system across Europe, and then we must intercept the threats faster.”

She pointed to the EU’s €800 billion defence investment plan, including €150 billion through the SAFE instrument, as a way for European countries to increase defence investment jointly.

“We are in a new era of European security,” von der Leyen said. “European investment in defense strengthens NATO and re-energizes our industrial base.”

Rutte backed von der Leyen’s assessment of the threat, saying Russia had become “increasingly reckless” as its war against Ukraine continued.

“We have seen more drones and missiles crossing into our airspace along our eastern flank, creating increased risk,” Rutte said.

“And we have also seen an increase in malign activities targeting our territory directly, whether it is fires set in factories producing defense equipment for Ukraine, or indeed the Russian hybrid attack in Leipzig.”

“The examples are many. The dangers Russia poses are clear,” he added.

Rutte said NATO was working “around the clock” to ensure it could protect its population and said Moscow would fail if it hoped attacks such as Leipzig would undermine Western backing for Kyiv.

“If Russia thinks we will be divided by the threat, or if they think we will be deterred from supporting Ukraine, they are mistaken,” he said. “Our unity is unshaken. Our support to Ukraine is clear.”

Rutte said NATO allies had agreed to provide at least €70 billion to support Ukraine this year and the same amount next year, with the EU loan forming a “crucial element” of that support.

The NATO chief also backed the push for additional air defence and increased defence production, saying higher spending had to translate into additional military capabilities and greater industrial capacity.

Von der Leyen said the EU and NATO would not be intimidated into reducing their support for Ukraine. “Europe and NATO will not just maintain our pressure on Russia; we will increase it,” she said. “We will not stop — not until Russia stops bombing and killing innocent children, men and women in Ukraine. We will continue, we will prevail, and we will deter anyone who attacks our freedom and our security.”

Erdogan said the participants agreed on several issues, including establishing and activating the alliance’s secretariat.

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US secretary of state Marco Rubio described NATO’s July gathering in Ankara, two months before it convened, as “one of the more important leaders’ summits in [its] history.” The summit confirmed that Europeans have accepted America’s expectation that they do more for their own security. The Ankara declaration recognised that “European allies and Canada, working together with the United States, are assuming greater responsibility for the alliance’s defence.” Accepting that shift is one thing; paying for it is another. For European policymakers the question is now fiscal. It turns on what Europe is willing to pay for. And for the EU’s frugal members, that means rethinking what they treat as strategic.

Getting defence into the budget

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, replacing US military capabilities in Europe could require around $1tn (about €900bn) in extra investment. NATO’s new target to invest 5% of GDP in defence similarly implies a sustained increase in European defence spending over the coming decade. Together they suggest that defence is no longer crisis spending but a permanent claim on European budgets.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the EU has found money for defence, but always as extraordinary spending. The European Defence Fund and SAFE (Security Action for Europe, a loan scheme for joint arms purchases), for example, sit outside the ordinary budget. Such instruments expire; the challenge is to embed this spending into the EU’s regular budget. Winning defence a permanent line in it makes negotiations over the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) far more than another exercise in budgetary bargaining.

The MFF is the EU’s seven-year budget—and where any pledge on defence would have to show up in funds. The commission’s proposal for 2028–34 reflects such a commitment. It allocates €131bn to defence and space, roughly five times the current level, and puts security among the EU’s central priorities.

Out of the negotiating box

Commission proposals rarely emerge intact from negotiation, and early signs suggest this pattern may repeat itself.

Commission proposals rarely emerge intact from negotiation, however, and early signs suggest this pattern may repeat itself. Cyprus, which held the presidency until the end of June, left a negotiating box on how to structure the next MFF that envisioned reductions in defence and security while protecting cohesion policy and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The box is the presidency’s draft compromise, the text the final deal is built from. The Irish presidency has opened with a strong focus on competitiveness and security, but Ireland leans heavily on farming too.

Budget negotiations are shaped by coalitions that defend long-established spending. The 16 member states of the “Friends of Cohesion” group, Spain, Italy and Poland among them, want robust funding for cohesion policy and agriculture, while frugal member states, such as Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden, are reluctant to expand the overall size of the EU budget. Defence enters as a comparative newcomer against policies with decades of institutional backing and organised constituencies behind them.

Germany’s position illustrates this dilemma. In a parliamentary inquiry, Alliance 90/The Greens asked the federal government how the EU can square four things at once: from 2028 it will need to start repaying NextGenerationEU, the €637bn joint borrowing agreed as a one-off in 2020 to fund members’ recovery from covid-19; forgo new revenue of its own (levies it collects directly rather than cheques from national treasuries); hold its budget roughly the same size; and still strengthen competitiveness, security and defence. The chancellor, Friedrich Merz, has repeatedly committed to the last three. The government answered that the EU could meet all three objectives by trimming across the whole budget. Yet such “horizontal cuts” only protect these priorities if all 27 members agree what to spare when deciding the cuts, and they are unlikely to agree. Other member states could favour different areas of the EU budget, cutting competitiveness or security harder than Germany intends.

New financing for a new era

The scale of investment required to deliver Europe’s defence transformation also exceeds what can realistically be financed through the MFF alone. While the seven-year budget can establish political priorities, provide long-term planning certainty and support common capability development, it cannot generate the sums required to finance Europe’s long-term defence.

Hence the appeal of joint EU borrowing: debt raised by the commission against member-state guarantees, the model already used for NextGenerationEU and SAFE. NextGenerationEU demonstrated that the EU can raise substantial resources when confronted with an existential crisis such as the covid-19 pandemic. Europe’s security has changed just as fundamentally, which makes the case for borrowing together just as strong. If defence is a collective problem, leaving the bill to strained national budgets makes little sense. However, borrowing on that scale is politically out of reach: creditor states intend NextGenerationEU to stay an exception rather than a template. Something narrower—bonds (or comparable fiscal mechanisms) that fund defence alone or the technologies Europe cannot do without may prove necessary if the EU wants to match its strategic ambitions with adequate financial resources.

Europe has accepted that it must carry more of its own defence. The MFF negotiations will show whether its budget can pay for it. With NATO entering a new era of European burden-sharing, the EU cannot afford a budget that reflects the priorities of a different geopolitical age. The world has moved on—it is time that frugal member states like Germany did so, too.

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