LA NEWSLETTER · GRATUITE
L'essentiel de l'actualité, passé au crible par les cinq plumes du Courrier. Dans votre boîte, chaque jour ouvré.
Gratuit. Vous restez libre de partir quand vous voulez.
JE M'INSCRIS lecourrierdesstrateges.frCommandé par quatre élus démocrates, le document du GAO dresse le constat d’une administration qui empile les initiatives sans feuille de route. Pour l’exercice 2025, l’ICE a reçu quelque 3,8 milliards de dollars destinés aux opérations de rétention. La loi budgétaire de juillet 2025 a ensuite débloqué 45 milliards de dollars de capacité jusqu’en 2029. Résultat : des démarrages et arrêts successifs, des chevauchements et, selon Heather MacLeod, directrice du GAO chargée de ces questions, « du gaspillage ».
ABONNEMENT
Deux grands formats par jour. Les cinq plumes du Courrier. La série Sécession, le dimanche.
Le monde commente. Vous, vous comprenez.
S'ABONNER lecourrierdesstrateges.frLe constat du GAO est sévère : l’ICE aurait lancé plusieurs initiatives simultanément sans disposer d’un plan stratégique permettant d’en articuler les besoins, les coûts et la durée. L’agence avait reçu environ 3,8 milliards de dollars pour ses opérations de rétention durant l’exercice 2025. En juillet 2025, la loi budgétaire a porté à 45 milliards de dollars la capacité de rétention prévue jusqu’en 2029.
Six opérations sont recensées : Guantanamo Bay, des bases militaires, onze entrepôts, l’achat de centres existants, les installations de Floride et l’utilisation d’établissements du Federal Bureau of Prisons.
Le cas des entrepôts est particulièrement parlant : environ 1 milliard de dollars ont été engagés en décembre 2025 pour onze sites, dont sept devaient finalement être revendus. Deux autres installations ont été achetées en juillet pour 1,5 milliard de dollars.
TELEGRAM · L'INFO EN CONTINU
La newsletter vous donne le matin. Le fil vous donne l'instant.
Gratuit, et en continu.
REJOINDRE LE FIL t.me/resterlibre« Alligator Alcatraz » concentre cette logique. Le centre floridien, mis en place en huit jours selon les responsables, a ouvert en juillet 2025 avant de fermer en juin 2026. Son coût atteint environ 1 milliard de dollars pour l’État de Floride. Le montage financier mérite attention : l’ICE n’a pas directement payé le centre. Le Department of Homeland Security(DHS) rembourse la Floride par l’intermédiaire d’une subvention de la FEMA de 608 millions de dollars, tandis que l’État attend encore plus de 500 millions.
À partir du milliard et des onze mois d’existence, cela représente un ordre de grandeur d’environ 3 millions de dollars par jour. Ce calcul n’est pas celui du GAO, mais il suffit à mesurer l’échelle de la dépense. Le GAO recommande donc l’élaboration rapide d’un plan stratégique. L’ICE accepte cette recommandation, mais indique qu’il lui faudra près d’un an pour y répondre. Pour le GAO, cette échéance cadre mal avec l’urgence invoquée.
Le Department of Homeland Security (DHS) conteste toutefois la lecture du rapport,affirmant que les coûts étaient « appropriés et nécessaires ». Le DHS revendique plus de 13,2 milliards d'économies. Ce chiffre n'est étayé nulle part dans le rapport : c'est une déclaration du ministère.
L'ICE a accepté d'élaborer un plan, mais pas avant près d'un an. Mme MacLeod juge elle-même ce délai peu compatible avec l'urgence. Un autre rapport sur les coûts est attendu avant la fin de l'année. Quand une administration reçoit des dizaines de milliards sans obligation de prioriser ni de séquencer, le contribuable finance la précipitation et l’improvisation. Le rapport du GAO ne tranche pas sur la politique migratoire ; il rappelle une vérité budgétaire élémentaire : ouvrir le robinet sans compteur produit mécaniquement de la dépense sans retour.
TIPS · SANS ABONNEMENT
Un média libre vit de ses lecteurs. Un pourboire ponctuel, sans compte ni engagement, quand le cœur vous en dit.
Vous donnez ce que vous voulez. Vous restez libre.
LAISSER UN POURBOIRE merci !La leçon budgétaire dépasse donc largement le débat migratoire américain : lorsqu’une administration dispose soudainement de dizaines de milliards, l’absence de plan préalable peut transformer la rapidité d’action en machine à dépenser. L’argent public n’est pas moins gaspillé parce qu’il est américain.
Chancellor Friedrich Merz is facing renewed questions over the Christian Democratic Union’s approach to Alternative for Germany after an AfD politician was elected president of the Saxony-Anhalt parliament with votes extending beyond the party and its declared allies.
Tobias Rausch secured 48 votes in Tuesday’s secret ballot. The AfD and the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance, or BSW, held a combined 44 votes, meaning that at least four members from elsewhere in the parliament supported him. Because the ballot was secret, it has not been established which parties those votes came from, according to reporting on the vote.
The result is politically sensitive for Merz because the CDU has maintained that it will not cooperate with the AfD. Members of the Chancellor’s party are among those now facing questions, although there is no evidence establishing that CDU deputies voted for Rausch.
Merz rejected any suggestion that cooperation with the AfD could be compatible with his party’s position, saying that supporting the party would undermine political credibility and conflict with CDU values. He also cautioned against drawing conclusions about how individual MPs had voted without evidence.
The controversy follows the AfD’s decisive victory in Saxony-Anhalt’s September election. EU Today reported at the time that the party won 43.8 per cent of the second vote, compared with 17.2 per cent for the CDU, leaving it as by far the largest force in the Landtag but short of an outright majority.
Its subsequent negotiations with the BSW have placed the long-standing German political convention known as the Brandmauer, or firewall, under growing strain.
Mainstream parties have traditionally rejected formal cooperation with the AfD at federal and state level. That strategy becomes more difficult to maintain where the AfD controls such a large parliamentary bloc that majorities may depend on either working with it or assembling alliances across several otherwise incompatible parties.
The BSW has openly rejected the firewall approach. Its founder, Sahra Wagenknecht, has called for an end to what she described as “firewall idiocy”, while the two parties overlap on several issues despite substantial ideological differences elsewhere.
Their most immediate area of agreement is Ukraine.
Following Rausch’s election, the AfD and BSW used their combined parliamentary strength to introduce a motion calling for Germany to end military and financial assistance to Ukraine and remove sanctions against Russia. Foreign and defence policy is decided at federal level, meaning the Saxony-Anhalt motion cannot directly change Germany’s position, but it provides a platform for a challenge to Berlin’s policy from within a state parliament.
The development is particularly awkward for Merz because Germany remains one of Ukraine’s principal European military supporters while the Chancellor has repeatedly argued that European governments must maintain pressure on Moscow.
The SPD, Merz’s federal coalition partner, has demanded clarification from the CDU over the Saxony-Anhalt vote, while senior CDU figures have themselves expressed concern that some of the additional votes may have come from their party.
Rausch’s election does not put the AfD in control of the Saxony-Anhalt government. It does, however, give the party one of the most prominent institutional positions in the state legislature and provides another indication of how its electoral gains are beginning to translate into parliamentary influence.
For the CDU, that is the immediate issue. Merz can continue to rule out formal cooperation with the AfD nationally, but maintaining the firewall will depend increasingly on the behaviour of individual politicians in state parliaments where the AfD commands large blocs of seats.
The calculation is clear: force Spain’s political argument onto territory more favourable to the left before migration, corruption allegations and parliamentary paralysis return to the foreground. But the polls suggest that the gamble could still deliver power to the centre-right People’s Party and Vox.
Pedro Sánchez’s decision to dissolve Spain’s parliament nine months ahead of schedule is more than an admission that his minority government had reached the limits of what it could achieve in the Congress of Deputies. It is an attempt to choose the terms on which his government will be judged.
The immediate trigger was the defeat of two emergency housing decrees after the conservative People’s Party (PP), Vox and Catalan separatist Junts voted against them. Housing had already moved rapidly to the centre of Spanish politics following the eviction of 87-year-old Maricarmen Abascal from the Madrid flat where she had lived for 71 years, followed by large demonstrations across the country. EU Today has previously reported on both the housing protests across Spain and Sánchez’s subsequent decision to call the election.
The prime minister is now attempting to convert legislative weakness into electoral advantage.
In his announcement on 5 October, Sánchez presented the election as a choice between a broader progressive majority capable of advancing social legislation and an opposition that had obstructed measures on housing and other domestic priorities. The government reinforced that strategy a day later by approving revised versions of the two housing decrees, containing 21 measures including tax incentives, assistance for first-time buyers and measures intended to increase supply. They will require validation by the Diputación Permanente, the standing parliamentary body that remains after dissolution.
The political calculation is straightforward. Housing offers Sánchez an issue on which anger is directed not only at government but at landlords, property investors, regional authorities and political parties opposing stronger regulation. The eviction of Abascal gave that argument a human symbol and transformed a long-running affordability problem into an immediate political confrontation.
That does not mean the strategy will work.
Most polling continues to place the PSOE behind the PP. Surveys put the Socialists at roughly 28 per cent, while Vox has risen to around 18 per cent. A PP-Vox combination is currently the only bloc consistently projected to command an outright parliamentary majority. One Sigma Dos survey published after the election announcement projected the two parties winning 203 of the Congress’s 350 seats.
Sánchez therefore appears to be playing less for immediate dominance than for mobilisation.
His problem before the housing protests was not simply the strength of the right. The broader left had become fragmented, while the government was being damaged by disputes over migration, particularly following the crisis in Ceuta, as well as corruption investigations involving figures associated with the PSOE. At the same time, Junts had become an increasingly unreliable parliamentary partner, leaving the government unable to guarantee major legislation or a new budget.
Housing changes the subject.
It allows Sánchez to argue that the central question is not whether his coalition has governed smoothly, but whether voters want a parliament prepared to intervene more aggressively in the housing market. The PP, however, is contesting precisely that framing. Alberto Núñez Feijóo argues that the housing shortage is itself a product of Sánchez’s eight years in government and has promised to raise annual construction towards 200,000 homes while reducing taxes.
The election may therefore develop into a dispute over responsibility rather than diagnosis. Both sides accept that housing has become a major national problem; they differ sharply over whether regulation or additional supply should dominate the response.
There is also a wider European dimension. Housing affordability is increasingly politically disruptive across the EU, including in major cities where construction has failed to keep pace with household formation, migration and demand for short-term accommodation. EU Today has examined similar pressures in Berlin’s housing market. Spain could now provide a test of whether housing can become powerful enough as an electoral issue to reverse the wider European movement towards the right.
For Ukraine, however, the consequences are likely to be less dramatic than Spain’s domestic political contest might suggest.
Sánchez committed €1 billion in bilateral military support to Ukraine for 2026, with Spain putting its cumulative bilateral military assistance since Russia’s full-scale invasion at almost €4 billion. Madrid has also trained more than 9,000 Ukrainian military personnel.
Spain is also home to a considerably larger Ukrainian community than the roughly 300,000 figure frequently cited. Government data showed 353,009 Ukrainian nationals holding valid residence documentation at the end of June, including 262,782 under temporary protection.
A PP-led government would alter Madrid’s domestic priorities and potentially its approach to defence spending and migration, particularly if Vox were required to sustain a parliamentary majority. Yet there is little basis at present for assuming that a change of government would produce a reversal of Spain’s fundamental position on Russia’s invasion or membership of the European and Atlantic security structures supporting Ukraine.
The more immediate question is whether Sánchez can make housing important enough to overcome the electoral arithmetic confronting him.
Calling the election has allowed him to escape a parliament in which his legislative coalition was steadily disintegrating and to enter a campaign around an issue capable of mobilising his electorate. It has not changed the fact that the PP and Vox begin that campaign with the stronger numbers.
Sánchez has chosen the battlefield. On 29th November, Spain will decide whether that was enough.
“He’s here, he’s there, he’s every fucking where: Roy Kent, Roy Kent!” chants the loyal Richmond crowd in tribute to the captain of the struggling English football club at the heart of the TV series Ted Lasso. It seemed almost prophetic of what awaited Brett Goldstein, the 46-year-old actor who plays the gruff Kent. Since joining the hit Apple TV comedy’s main cast, having originally been hired only as a writer, he has gone from being virtually unknown outside the United Kingdom to starring in a romantic comedy with Jennifer Lopez, appearing alongside Harrison Ford in a television series, and becoming Marvel’s new Hercules.
© Axelle/Bauer-Griffin (FilmMagic)
“There is only one president in this country and his name is Nicolás Maduro Moros,” Venezuela’s current interim president, Delcy Rodríguez, said on the same day as the U.S. attack that ended with the detention of the former chavista leader and his wife, Cilia Flores. Rodríguez described the military intervention in Caracas as an “illegal and illegitimate kidnapping of the president and first lady.” However, Venezuela later did not take any formal steps to demand the couple’s release or to request their immunity so they would not be tried in the United States.
© Jesus Vargas (Getty Images)
Russia’s Foreign Ministry renewed its warning to foreign diplomats and other foreign nationals on 3 October, urging them to leave Kyiv and saying Russian forces would continue large-scale strikes against targets in the Ukrainian capital and elsewhere. The warning said those who remained were exposing themselves to “mortal danger”, while Moscow sought to place responsibility for any consequences on the individuals and governments choosing to remain.
The military threat behind that warning is not theoretical. Russian missile and drone attacks on Kyiv have intensified, striking transport infrastructure, energy facilities and residential districts. EU Today has documented a succession of such attacks, including a September missile and drone barrage that killed three people and damaged residential and public buildings and a later jet-powered drone strike on the National Academy of Sciences in central Kyiv. Air alerts and attacks on the capital are now a routine part of the security environment in which foreign missions operate.
The significance of Moscow’s latest statement, however, goes beyond the question of physical safety. By telling foreign governments that their diplomats should leave and suggesting that those who stay must accept the consequences, Russia is attempting to change the political calculation surrounding Kyiv. If Western states began moving their embassies to Lviv or across the border into Poland, Moscow would have achieved something that continued military pressure has so far failed to deliver: a visible reduction in the international diplomatic presence in the Ukrainian capital.
That has not happened. Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry says it has received no request or notification from a foreign diplomatic mission indicating that it intends to relocate. Reports that some Western governments have considered contingency arrangements appear to concern emergency planning rather than decisions to withdraw, which is hardly surprising for embassies operating in a capital subjected to repeated missile and drone attacks. The distinction is important because preparing evacuation options is standard risk management; implementing them would be a political signal.
The European Union has gone further than simply denying evacuation plans. EU Ambassador Katarína Mathernová said that the EU Delegation, the EU Advisory Mission and all 25 EU member states maintaining embassies in Kyiv would remain in the capital. Her response was deliberately public, making clear that the Russian warning would not alter the diplomatic footprint of the EU or its member states in Ukraine.
Moscow has tried this before. In May, Russia issued a similar warning to diplomats and foreign nationals, prompting Brussels to summon the Russian chargé d’affaires. EU Today reported at the time that European officials viewed the warning as a threat against the foreign diplomatic community in Kyiv. Mathernová subsequently said that the EU would remain in Kyiv despite Russia’s renewed warnings, describing the pressure as an attempt to generate fear and isolate Ukraine.
The October warning has produced much the same result. One day later, Chancellor Friedrich Merz travelled to Kyiv, accompanied by Economy Minister Katherina Reiche and a German business delegation. His arrival was particularly difficult to reconcile with suggestions that European governments were preparing to abandon the capital. EU Today reported that the visit brought more than €1.3 billion in new German defence and energy commitments, while the German government presented the trip as a demonstration of continuing support for Ukraine.
Washington has taken a similar position. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the United States would make its own assessment of whether it was safe for American diplomats to remain in Kyiv and noted that Russia had been issuing such warnings for months. The US embassy has continued operating, while the State Department has maintained its highest-level travel warning for American citizens because of the continuing war. That distinction — between advising private citizens not to travel and maintaining an official diplomatic presence — reflects the different responsibilities involved.
There is also a legal dimension to Moscow’s attempt to shift responsibility. Russian statements create the impression that once diplomats have been warned, the consequences of any subsequent attack fall on those who chose to stay. International law does not support such an interpretation. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations establishes the inviolability of diplomatic premises and personnel, although the immediate obligation to protect foreign missions rests principally with Ukraine as the receiving state.
Russia’s conduct of military operations is governed primarily by international humanitarian law. Diplomats remain civilians, while diplomatic buildings remain civilian objects unless they are being used in circumstances that would make them military objectives. Warnings can form part of an attacker’s obligation to take precautions, but they do not transfer legal responsibility to civilians who remain in place. The International Committee of the Red Cross makes clear that civilians who stay after an advance warning continue to enjoy protection, and an attacking force must still comply with the rules of distinction, proportionality and precautions.
That legal point is relevant because the wording used by Moscow appears designed to establish a different political narrative. Russia can warn foreign governments that further strikes are coming, but such warnings cannot provide advance immunity for the way those attacks are conducted. Nor do they relieve Russia of responsibility if attacks unlawfully damage civilian or diplomatic property.
The continued presence of embassies in Kyiv also has practical significance for Ukraine. Foreign missions give governments direct access to Ukrainian institutions and their own assessment of political, military and economic conditions on the ground. Their diplomats meet ministers, military officials, civil society representatives and businesses, reducing governments’ dependence on second-hand reporting and allowing them to judge developments for themselves.
Relocating those missions would therefore have consequences beyond symbolism. Diplomatic relations could continue from Lviv, Warsaw or elsewhere, but Moscow would inevitably portray any large-scale withdrawal from Kyiv as evidence that foreign governments no longer regarded the Ukrainian capital as sustainable as a diplomatic centre. That helps explain why European governments have answered the latest warning so publicly and why maintaining a visible presence has itself become part of the political response.
Russia has increasingly sought to combine physical attacks with wider political effects. Its missile and drone campaign places pressure on Ukraine’s electricity system, transport network, air defences and civilian population. The warnings to foreign missions extend the same logic to Ukraine’s international relationships: increase the perceived cost of remaining in Kyiv and encourage foreign governments to reduce their presence.
So far, that strategy has not produced the intended result. The EU says all of its embassies are staying, Germany’s Chancellor travelled to Kyiv immediately after the warning and Washington has made clear that it will take its own decisions about the security of its mission. Russia can make the Ukrainian capital more dangerous, but it has not persuaded Ukraine’s principal partners to treat Kyiv as a city they must leave.
French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz have called for a new European Union trade instrument capable of acting rapidly against countries whose economic practices cause serious disruption to the European market.
In a joint initiative sent to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on Monday, the two governments proposed strengthening the EU’s ability to respond to what they describe as systemic market distortions, including dumping, widespread subsidies and restrictions affecting access to critical supplies.
The Franco-German proposal does not formally identify China as its target. However, many of the practices it describes correspond directly to long-standing European concerns over Chinese industrial policy, including excess manufacturing capacity, state support and restrictions on exports of critical minerals.
The initiative represents a further development in a harder European approach towards Beijing. EU Today reported last week that China had warned it would respond if the EU introduced new restrictions against Chinese companies or products.
Macron and Merz are proposing two additional instruments.
The first would be intended to reduce European companies’ dependence on single suppliers for strategically important products and raw materials. The second would allow the EU to restrict access to its internal market when a third country uses political or economic measures that seriously undermine fair competition.
Under the proposal, the Commission could initiate countermeasures unless a qualified majority of EU governments voted to block them. That would reverse the normal political dynamic in which Brussels must first secure sufficient support before acting.
German officials have argued that the EU needs powers comparable in effect to the United States’ Section 301 trade measures or China’s ability to restrict exports of critical raw materials.
The Commission has welcomed the Franco-German intervention as a contribution to its work on economic security and global trade imbalances. Any new instrument would, however, require legislation and approval by both EU governments and the European Parliament before it could be used.
The proposal comes amid growing concern in both Paris and Berlin over the effect of subsidised Chinese production on European manufacturers.
Germany’s position is particularly significant. Berlin has traditionally been more cautious than Paris about measures that could restrict trade with China, reflecting the importance of the Chinese market to German carmakers, engineering companies and chemical producers.
That position has shifted as German industry faces increased competition from Chinese electric vehicles, machinery and other manufactured goods.
EU Today has previously examined the emerging Franco-German alignment on tougher China trade defences and demands from German manufacturers for broader European action rather than product-by-product investigations.
The new proposals go considerably further by seeking a mechanism capable of dealing with entire sectors and acting much more quickly than conventional anti-dumping proceedings.
Chemicals, PET plastics and hybrid vehicles are among sectors identified in the Franco-German document as areas where additional action may be required.
The timing is also significant. EU leaders are due to discuss trade relations with China at their summit in Brussels on 15–16 October, while Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič is expected to hold talks with Chinese officials beforehand.
The Commission is already attempting to balance two objectives: maintaining Europe’s access to the Chinese market while reducing strategic dependencies that could be used as political leverage.
The Franco-German plan would give Brussels another instrument at the more coercive end of that policy. Its eventual importance will depend on whether governments agree to create it and how readily they would permit the Commission to use it against a major trading partner.
Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez announced a snap election for late November after two housing bills were defeated in a parliamentary vote on Friday, October 2. The bills came amid widespread mass mobilizations demanding urgent action on the country’s housing crisis, following the eviction of an 87-year-old woman in Madrid.
Hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets of approximately 50 cities over the weekend in support of these demands.
“It is true that there are still many injustices to correct, many social goals to achieve, and many problems to solve – above all in the areas of inequality, public services, and access to housing,” Sánchez said in his speech on Monday, as he appealed to voters to give progressive forces more decisive electoral support to allow them to implement reforms more easily.
While Sánchez’s administration has profiled itself as one of the more progressive governments in Europe in terms of international policy, national movements remain frustrated by the lack of decisiveness it has approached making changes at home – including in housing policy.
For years, tenants unions have been warning against the different ways house-owners, particularly real estate speculation funds, have exacerbated housing insecurity for the general population.
Existing anger spilled over as Maricarmen Abascal, an elderly tenant in Madrid, faced eviction from the home she had lived in for 70 years. After the development company Urbagestión Desarrollo e Inversión SL acquired the house Abascal lived in, they imposed a 275% rent increase that she was not able to meet, leading, after a lengthy legal process, to her eviction at the end of last month.
The mobilizations that followed addressed a wider set of problems. “Maricarmen’s situation reflects a housing model that prioritizes real estate profits while abandoning the very people who built our neighborhoods over the decades,” Madrid Tenants’ Union (Sindicato de Inquilinas e Inquilinos de Madrid) warned.
“Most serious of all is that this situation cannot be understood without considering the weight of laws inherited from the Franco regime that denied women basic rights,” the union emphasized in May. “The original contract was signed solely by Maricarmen’s father because the legal system of the time rendered women invisible within the family. Had that same contract been signed today, both parents would have been named as holders, and Maricarmen would remain fully protected.”
“Yet an extremely restrictive interpretation of the regulations has ultimately weighed more heavily than social reality, than the desire to protect those who rent, and more than seventy years of roots in a neighborhood,” they added. “For the Madrid Tenants’ Union, the position is clear: no formalistic interpretation of the law can justify evicting an 87-year-old woman from the home where she has lived her entire life simply to boost the profitability of a real estate investment.”
The protests formulated several demands to the government, including a ban on eviction of vulnerable tenants where alternative housing is not available; a limit to short-term and room rentals; a rent freeze; and an extension for contracts ending in 2026 and 2027.
Such demands were generally by the public, as well as by trade unions. “Housing and work are not separate struggles,” unions wrote, pledging to work towards a general strike for housing. “The rise in rents is a direct transfer of wealth from the working class to rentierism. Our wages end up, month after month, in the pockets of the rentiers who control our homes.”
The uproar pushed Sánchez’s government to reflect these demands in two bills it presented to parliament. Most considered this a significant breakthrough for the housing movement despite the official texts not fully corresponding to the protesters’ vocabulary and the vote taking place on two separate proposals.
Watered down or not, right-wing and far-right parties voted against both bills.
“We have a democracy held hostage by rentiers and speculators,” the progressive party Podemos wrote as protests rolled out over the weekend. “The housing mobilization must keep growing and move toward a general strike until the speculators and those who defend them in the institutions have nowhere left to hide.”
“Between now and November 29, the voices of all of us who want peace must be heard,” Irene Montero from Podemos added after the snap election announcement. “Those of us who want our sons and daughters to avoid war and to have healthcare and education, instead of money being spent on weapons; who want homes to live in; who want jobs and time to spend with our loved ones; and who want the cost of living to go down.”
Login