The South Korean government has released images from its first successful test of a domestically developed hypersonic boost-glide vehicle. This includes shots of the vehicle impacting the water at the end of its flight. A weapon of this kind would give South Korea a significant new way to hold targets in North Korea at risk amid an ever-deepening arms race on the Peninsula.
South Korea’s Presidential Office, more commonly referred to as the Cheong Wa Dae or the Blue House, announced the test in a Korean-language press release yesterday. The Blue House initially released a video of President Lee Jae Myung and others observing the test from a conference room at the Anheung Proving Ground, which is located in South Chungcheong Province on the country’s western coast. South Korea’s Agency for Defense Development (ADD) manages testing at Anheung. A series of still images from the test itself was subsequently posted on the Blue House’s website.
Included in the still image gallery are shots showing the launch of the missile, a formal name for which has not yet been disclosed, from a wheeled transport-erector-launcher on a platform sitting just off the coast. The low resolution of the pictures makes it hard to tell whether the missile and/or the TEL are of an existing South Korean design or are based on one. We will come back to this later on.
As mentioned, there are also pictures of the hypersonic boost-glide vehicle hitting the water. At first glance, the vehicle looks to have a broadly conical design with stabilizing fins at the base. However, at least one of the fins looks to be truncated. Closer inspection of the available images shows further indicators that might point to it actually having a more wedge-shaped design with a distinct top and bottom, though it is still not definitely clear given the low resolution. Conical boost-glide vehicles are generally understood to be easier to design, relatively speaking, than wedge-shaped ones. Historically, hypersonic boost-glide vehicles of any kind have proven to be technically complex and challenging to turn into viable operational weapons, even by countries with extensive past experience with their development.
“This test launch was conducted to verify, for the first time, the vehicle’s core technologies in a hypersonic flight environment: the performance of ultra-high-temperature heat-resistant materials, guidance and control capabilities, and the ability to perform irregular flight maneuvers at low altitudes,” the Blue House said in its release yesterday, per a machine translation of the Korean text. “The HGV [hypersonic boost-glide vehicle] successfully separated after ascending to the target altitude and executed its planned flight path within the hypersonic environment without any issues.”
With all this in mind, the fact that the vehicle just remained intact through to impact is noteworthy. At the time of writing, South Korean authorities do not appear to have disclosed more specific details about the test, including how far the boost-glide vehicle traveled before hitting the water or what peak speed it reached. Important questions also remain about how the vehicle is guided during the mid-course and terminal phases of flight, challenges that do not appear to have been addressed by this particular test.
In general, unpowered hypersonic boost-glide vehicles need to be brought first to an optimal altitude and speed. This is typically achieved using a sufficiently sized rocket booster, with existing ballistic missile designs often serving as a starting point.
Once released from the booster, a boost-glide vehicle flies along a relatively shallow flight path within the Earth’s atmosphere. The vehicle is able to maneuver along the way, sometimes erratically, while traveling at hypersonic speeds, generally defined as anything about Mach 5.
All of this sets hypersonic weapons of this kind apart from traditional ballistic missiles, even ones with advanced maneuverability capabilities, which all follow a broadly arcing trajectory to their targets. The combination of speed, flight trajectory, and maneuverability offered by hypersonic boost-glide vehicles creates distinct challenges for opponents. They are hard to spot and track, let alone attempt to intercept, and there is less time for defenders to react overall. This ability to penetrate enemy air defenses and cover ground rapidly makes these weapons particularly attractive for strikes on very high-value and time-sensitive targets.
“The HGV [hypersonic boost-glide vehicle] is a ‘key strategic asset capable of changing the game on the battlefield,’ as its unpredictable flight trajectory and overwhelming speed allow it to launch surprise strikes against key strategic targets during contingencies,” the Blue House’s release explicitly noted, again according to a machine translation.
With all this in mind, South Korea does have an entire family of domestically-produced ground-launched ballistic missiles that could be suitable starting places for launching an unpowered hypersonic boost-glide vehicle. President Lee was notably shown a TEL for the country’s newest Hyunmoo-5 ballistic missile at Anheung yesterday, though no explicit connection has been drawn between that weapon and the hypersonic test. The Hyunmoo-5 is itself still a relatively new development, having only entered service around the end of last year.
When it comes to new South Korean arms developments, the Hyunmoo-5, which entered service around the end of last year, has been and continues to be a major point of discussion by itself. It is officially categorized as a short-range design, despite how big it is (35 tons gross weight), which is said to be due largely to the equally substantial size of its warhead (17,000 pounds). Past reports have raised the possibility that it could be capable of flying out to intermediate ranges if the warhead weight were reduced. Short-range ballistic missiles are defined as ones with ranges between 190 and 620 miles (300 and 1,000 kilometers), while intermediate-range ballistic missiles can hit targets out to between 1,864 and 3,418 miles (3,000 to 5,500 kilometers). Medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) fall in between these two categories.
With its massive unitary warhead, the Hyunmoo-5 already gives South Korea an important new way to hold deeply buried and otherwise hardened targets in North Korea at risk. This fits in directly with the country’s broader Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) policy, as TWZ has previously written:
“While the Hyunmoo-5 has been widely reported as a future pillar of the KMPR, its specific ability to penetrate deeply buried bunkers, such as those used by the North Korean leadership, the same functions mean that it can also fulfill elements of the ‘kill chain.’ In this way, it could be used as part of a pre-emptive strike, to try and knock out North Korea’s launch capability by targeting its hardened command-and-control facilities and missile storage areas.”
By virtue of the very high speeds they reach in the terminal phase of flight, hypersonic boost-glide vehicles also offer bunker-busting benefits on top of the other aforementioned advantages they bring to the table.
In addition, the hypersonic boost-glide vehicle test reflects a broader arms race that has been expanding in scale and scope for years now. South Korea is also developing an air-breathing hypersonic cruise missile, seen in the composite image below, as well as new air- and sea-launched ballistic missiles, the latter of which will be loaded on new surface warships and submarines.
Though there are always questions about the actual maturity and viability of the designs, North Korea continues to churn out its own new missile developments. This includes two separate test launches of purported new hypersonic designs just in recent weeks. Tit-for-tat missile launches are not entirely uncommon on the peninsula, but there are limits to how quickly a test like the one South Korea conducted yesterday involving an emerging technology can reasonably be staged.
Friction between the North and South has been at a particular high point, in general, following an incident on September 21, in which three South Korean troops were injured along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), as well as the United Nations Command (UNC) on the Peninsula, have said a North Korean landmine placed in violation of the Armistice Agreement was to blame. South Korean authorities have demanded an apology and raised the prospect of some form of action in response, though President Lee has more recently sought to downplay the situation. The government in North Korea has denied the accusations and threatened an “immediate and powerful counteraction” should South Korea seek to retaliate.
An operational hypersonic boost-glide vehicle capability would also expand South Korea’s capacity to challenge opponents regionally beyond North Korea. Though the regime in Pyongyang represents the most proximate national security threat to the country, China and Russia have also been growing points of concern for South Korean authorities in recent years.
“We must secure our national security through our own strength,” President Lee said after yesterday’s hypersonic test, per the Blue House’s release. “The government must not rest on today’s success but must further advance the technology so that the hypersonic glide vehicle can establish itself as a robust strategic asset safeguarding our future security.”
South Korea’s very public test of its new hypersonic boost-glide vehicle underscores the country’s still-expanding efforts to broaden its options for striking even the best-defended targets in North Korea, as well as projecting power elsewhere regionally. At the same time, it remains to be seen when the South Koreans may field a real operational capability in this regard.
Contact the author: joe@twz.com
The post First Look At Hypersonic Boost-Glide Vehicle Just Tested By South Korea appeared first on TWZ.
Austrian police detained Ukrainian investigative journalist Mykhailo Tkach and cameraman Yaroslav Bondarenko in Vienna yesterday, on 8 October. Both were later released, but the circumstances of their detention remain unclear, and the prosecutor’s office said suspicion against them had not been substantiated so far.
The detention lasted more than 12 hours, the first time Tkach had been held that long while on a reporting assignment abroad. The case unfolded alongside a separate Austrian espionage investigation involving two men suspected of working for Ukraine’s military intelligence. Authorities have not said whether the cases are connected.
In a video published by Ukrainska Pravda, Tkach said seven people wearing masks and carrying weapons approached their car at a traffic light about 3–5 kilometers from central Vienna, broke its windows, and pointed weapons at them.
He said the people did not identify themselves or explain their actions. The journalists were pulled from the car, forced face down onto the road, searched, and had their hands taped behind their backs, according to Tkach. He said he initially thought they were being kidnapped because he did not see identification or have time to notice police markings. He realized they were police only after seeing police vehicles.
“As I felt it, they detained us like terrorists,” Tkach said.
He added that people shouted and pointed weapons, and there was no communication. He said one person put a knee on his neck and shouted at him to be quiet. He also saw glass from the broken window fly into Bondarenko’s face.
In a second report, Ukrainska Pravda said Tkach’s account of a document presented to him listed three allegations: espionage in the interests of Ukrainian military intelligence, participation in a criminal organization, and, as far as he remembered, causing harm to Austria. He said investigators did not explain the evidence behind the allegations.
Vienna prosecutor’s office spokesperson Nina Bussek told the Austrian Press Agency (APA) that suspicion against the two journalists had arisen during other investigations but had not been substantiated. She said it currently appeared that the suspicion was not holding up. Austrian officials have not publicly addressed Tkach’s account of the force used.
Tkach and Bondarenko were in Vienna on an assignment to find Ruslan Kravchenko, Ukraine’s former prosecutor general, Ukrainska Pravda reported. Kravchenko was dismissed on 15 September amid an investigation by Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau and Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office into alleged protection of fraudulent call centers. He denied involvement. Der Standard reported that it remained unclear whether the journalists’ detention was connected to their reporting on him.
Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Heorhii Tykhyi confirmed Tkach’s release and said the Ukrainian consul had requested access to him, according to NV. Musaieva said Bondarenko had been injured and hospitalized.
A statement signed by Ukrainian media and civil society organizations, including Euromaidan Press, called for an immediate, transparent, and independent investigation of law enforcement’s actions. The signatories also demanded an independent review of the force used, the return of seized equipment, and necessary medical and legal assistance.
Austrian Interior Minister Gerhard Karner confirmed the arrests of four Ukrainians, according to ORF. The two men detained on 5 October were placed in pretrial detention until 21 October on suspicion of secret intelligence activity against Austria. APA reported that they were suspected employees of Ukraine’s military intelligence service. Both deny the allegations.
The U.S. Navy is preparing to sign a contract with Lockheed Martin to integrate the stealthy AGM-158C Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) onto the Air Force’s B-52 Stratofortress bombers, according to an October 7 government notice. The effort would add another long-range maritime strike option to the U.S. bomber force as the military looks to counter increasingly capable adversary naval forces, especially in the Indo-Pacific theater.
The planned contract comes months after the Air Force revealed that the stealthy B-2 bomber can also launch LRASM, a capability that had not previously been publicly disclosed. You can read more about that here.
The latest Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) notice says the command intends to enter into sole-source negotiations with Lockheed Martin and subsequently award a cost-plus-fixed-fee delivery order covering LRASM integration on the B-52. The work would include missile software updates, associated testing, repairs to test assets, and failure review boards.
The notice does not provide a schedule for completing the integration or fielding the capability.
The B-52 is already capable of carrying large numbers of air-launched cruise missiles, including the AGM-158 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) family. LRASM is derived from that family, sharing a similar general form factor while incorporating features specifically designed to find and attack ships in contested maritime environments.
The B-52 can carry up to 20 JASSMs, and the weapons have the same dimensions, but the government notice does not specify how many LRASMs the bomber would ultimately carry.
This is not the first time the B-52’s LRASM integration has been in the works.
As long ago as November 2019, Naval News reported that $10 million in Fiscal Year 2019 funding had been allocated to study integrating the missile onto the bomber, with Lockheed Martin and the Navy and Air Force expected to work on the effort. At the time, officials said the fielding timeline and the bomber’s eventual missile capacity had yet to be determined.
The U.S. Air Force’s Fiscal Year 2027 budget proposal further outlines plans to integrate the latest variants of LRASM and JASSM onto the B-52, including versions not yet cleared for use on the bomber. According to the document, the effort, which is intended to enable the deployment of next-generation stealthy cruise missiles against targets protected by sophisticated integrated air defense systems, will focus on engineering and manufacturing development, software updates, and weapons integration. Planned work in FY2027 includes incorporating the missiles’ operational flight programs into the B-52’s baseline bomber software, validating safe weapon separation from both wing-mounted stations and the internal carriage launcher, updating armament interfaces, and completing system-safety testing.
LRASM is designed to attack high-value surface vessels at long distances while reducing the exposure of the aircraft launching it. Its guidance combines GPS-assisted inertial navigation with onboard sensors and autonomous target-recognition capabilities intended to help it operate in heavily defended environments. Its imaging infrared seeker supports terminal target acquisition without relying on active radar emissions in that phase of flight. The missile operates with a high degree of autonomy, enabled by an integrated route-planning capability linked to its onboard electronic support measures (ESM) system. LRASM also has a datalink that allows it to get threat updates while in flight. It can also work cooperatively with other LRASMs during coordinated strikes.
The missile’s precise operational range is not publicly disclosed. However, the baseline LRASM is reported to be able to strike targets at between 200 and 300 miles, in line with the AGM-158A JASSM. The forthcoming C-3 version is expected to have the same reach as the JASSM-ER, which is reported to be around 600 miles.
For the B-52, the addition of LRASM would provide a dedicated anti-ship weapon alongside its established land-attack arsenal. A bomber operating at a considerable distance from a hostile fleet could launch multiple missiles toward maritime targets, complicating an adversary’s air-defense and interception problem. The aircraft’s payload capacity could also allow it to contribute substantial missile volume to a coordinated strike.
The B-52 was previously adapted to carry AGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missiles, although the weapon is not listed among the bomber’s current publicly documented armament. Compared to the Harpoon, however, LRASM represents a quantum leap in capability, offering drastically greater range, a stealthy design, and the ability to react to threats and adapt in real time. Combined, these traits make for a far more survivable and lethal anti-ship capability.
The B-52 also has a demonstrated naval mine-laying capability through the Quickstrike family of aerial mines. This includes carrying 2,000-pound Quickstrike-ER mines fitted with GPS-aided, winged guidance kits, allowing them to glide to designated points in the water from more than 40 miles away. The system enables the bomber to seed minefields with greater precision while remaining farther from potentially defended waters, threatening enemy shipping routes, port access, and naval movements.
The B-52 effort comes against the backdrop of the Air Force’s newly acknowledged use of LRASM on the B-2, which adds a different dimension to the service’s anti-ship capabilities.
LRASM was also previously integrated on the B-1B, meaning that all three of the Air Force’s strategic bombers will eventually be able to employ it.
The renewed focus on bomber-launched anti-ship weapons reflects the challenges posed by modern naval forces, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. China’s expanding surface fleet, increasingly sophisticated air defenses, and layered anti-access/area-denial capabilities have made the ability to attack ships from a distance an important consideration for U.S. military planning.
LRASM is designed to help address those challenges by combining long-range flight with reduced observability and autonomous terminal targeting. Its onboard sensors and navigation capabilities are intended to help it identify and engage appropriate targets in environments where communications and external targeting support may be limited or contested.
Bomber integration also offers a way to increase the number of potential launch platforms without relying exclusively on tactical aircraft or surface combatants. A B-52 carrying a substantial missile load could contribute to a coordinated attack alongside B-1s, stealth bombers, naval aircraft, and other forces.
The B-52’s payload capacity would make it particularly useful for delivering larger quantities of weapons from outside the most heavily defended areas.
The planned B-52 integration also fits into a broader effort to expand LRASM’s availability across the U.S. military. Publicly discussed integration efforts have included the F-15E, F-15EX, F-16C/D, certain variants of the F-35, and the Navy’s P-8A Poseidon, in addition to established launch platforms, namely the Navy’s F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fighters and the B-1.
Meanwhile, the B-52 fleet is currently preparing for a slew of major upgrades. These include a critical radar overhaul alongside new engines, enhanced communications systems, and other improvements. The scope of these changes is significant enough that the aircraft will be redesignated from B-52H to B-52J. The bombers are also slated to further expand their weapons capabilities, including through the addition of the Long-Range Stand Off (LRSO) nuclear cruise missile. The upgraded B-52Js are expected to remain in service through at least 2050.
Even in its current configuration, the B-52 is particularly well suited to carrying the LRASM, given its substantial payload capacity and ability to launch weapons from standoff distances beyond the reach of enemy air defenses. Its upgraded networking capabilities will greatly enhance its effectiveness by allowing it to operate as part of a broader kill web, drawing on data from multiple platforms and sensors to support targeting over vast distances. In more dynamic operational environments, the bomber’s new radar can generate its own targeting information in real time. The B-2, B-1, and the B-52 all offer distinct levels of penetration and weapons-delivery capability, with the forthcoming B-21 able to push deeper into contested airspace; it will certainly employ LRASM too.
The integration of LRASM onto the B-52 could prove critical to generating the volume of sorties needed to counter China’s expanding naval fleet. With its substantial payload capacity and ability to launch missiles from standoff distances, the B-52 could deliver significant anti-ship firepower across the vast distances of the Indo-Pacific. These missions would likely involve very long-range sorties, making the bomber’s payload capacity, endurance and networking capabilities particularly valuable in sustaining operations against Chinese naval forces.
If the LRASM integration proceeds as planned, the result would be another addition to the U.S. military’s long-range anti-ship arsenal, giving the Air Force’s venerable B-52 a more explicit role in the growing emphasis on striking hostile fleets at a distance.
Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com
The post B-52 To Get Stealthy AGM-158C Long-Range Anti-Ship Missiles appeared first on TWZ.
Diplomatie et monde
L’Allemagne réarme, elle renoue le fil coupe par la défaite c’est le fait le plus important de la période. Le reste n’est que distraction.
De nombreux chercheurs, dont l’éminent historien russe Vassili Klioutchevski, attribuent la fracture civilisationnelle incontestable entre les deux plus grands peuples d’Europe à la géographie, au climat et au paysage, qui ont façonné des modes de vie différents.
Vivant sous un climat prévisible, les Allemands ont développé une habitude de travail méthodique et régulier. Ils pouvaient planifier à l’avance car leur environnement leur permettait d’anticiper les résultats de leurs efforts avec une relative certitude.
Les Russes, en revanche, habitent une terre aux conditions imprévisibles qui s’étend, selon les mots de l’hymne national russe moderne, «des mers du Sud jusqu’à la frontière polaire». Ils ont souvent constaté que planifier à l’avance peut s’avérer totalement vain. De ce fait, ils doivent fréquemment travailler à un rythme effréné dans des délais très courts, s’appuyant sur la notion typiquement russe d’«avos» : l’espoir que, d’une manière ou d’une autre, les choses finiront par s’arranger.
Ces différences culturelles permettent d’expliquer non seulement l’évolution des relations entre ces voisins proches au fil des siècles — rappelons que la ville russe de Kaliningrad était autrefois la ville allemande de Königsberg — mais aussi la logique interne qui sous-tend aujourd’hui les relations politiques russo-allemandes.
L’Allemagne actuelle perçoit la Russie comme une menace pour sa sécurité nationale, à l’instar de ses prédécesseurs à la veille des Première et Seconde Guerres mondiales. Elle remilitarise méthodiquement son économie et accroît son aide militaire à l’Ukraine afin d’affaiblir la Russie sur tous les plans. En 2022-2023, au début de l’opération militaire spéciale, les aides étaient limitées et ciblées. À partir de 2024, Berlin s’est toutefois orientée vers des contrats à long terme pour la fourniture d’équipements et de drones, d’une valeur supérieure à 10 milliards de dollars par an, faisant de l’Allemagne le principal fournisseur d’aide militaire bilatérale à l’Ukraine au sein de l’UE.
La présidente de la Commission européenne, Ursula von der Leyen, ancienne ministre allemande de la Défense, s’est discrètement imposée comme la principale responsable de la distribution des fonds allemands.
Parallèlement, dans la continuité de cette dérive progressive vers une confrontation militaire avec la Russie, le gouvernement de Friedrich Merz poursuit la politique d’Olaf Scholz visant à démanteler la présence diplomatique russe en Allemagne. Après avoir obtenu la fermeture des consulats généraux russes à Munich, Hambourg, Francfort et Leipzig en mai 2023, Berlin a décidé en septembre dernier de fermer le consulat général de Bonn et le centre culturel de la Maison russe à Berlin.
Avec la première économie de l’UE et un représentant de sa propre initiative à un poste parmi les plus influents de la hiérarchie supranationale européenne, Berlin «reprogramme» progressivement une Europe unie pour en faire une sorte de «Quatrième Reich». En devenant un centre de pouvoir plus homogène, l’Europe risque de se retrouver au bord d’une confrontation militaire avec son puissant voisin de l’Est, comme cela s’est produit à maintes reprises au cours de l’histoire.
Afin de rendre la prétendue menace russe tangible, les autorités allemandes alimentent les médias depuis cet été des rumeurs concernant l’implication de Moscou dans la découverte d’un drone chargé d’explosifs à l’aéroport de fret de Leipzig. Sans attendre les conclusions de l’enquête, Berlin s’est empressé d’accuser la Russie d’avoir orchestré un acte de sabotage.
Conscients que leur gouvernement a mené le pays dans une impasse, les citoyens allemands ordinaires commencent à réagir et apportent un soutien croissant à l’Alternative pour l’Allemagne (AfD). Ce parti promet un changement radical de cap en matière de politique étrangère et intérieure — et non un revirement à 360 degrés, comme l’avait proposé l’ancienne ministre des Affaires étrangères Annalena Baerbock, donnant ainsi naissance, involontairement, au mème politique emblématique de la décennie allemande.
Certes, les victoires du parti restent régionales, et les autres partis politiques allemands refusent d’envisager le mouvement d’Alice Weidel et de Tino Chrupalla, même comme partenaire de coalition. Mais si sa base électorale continue de s’élargir, en attirant le soutien non seulement des Allemands de souche mais aussi, à terme, des communautés immigrées, l’AfD pourrait avoir une chance d’obtenir plus de 50% des voix au niveau national. Cela lui permettrait de former un gouvernement à elle seule.
Parallèlement, la cote de popularité de Merz a chuté à un niveau historiquement bas pour un chancelier de la République fédérale : seulement 11 à 15%, avec 85 à 89% d’insatisfaction. Face à ces chiffres et conscient de la demande publique pour une relation plus équilibrée avec la Russie, il a chargé le ministre des Affaires étrangères, Johann Wadephul, d’obtenir une rencontre avec son homologue russe, Sergueï Lavrov, en marge de l’Assemblée générale des Nations unies, coûte que coûte. Le récit de Lavrov illustre clairement le peu de substance de cette rencontre :
«Quant au ministre allemand des Affaires étrangères, Johann Wadephul, il a sollicité une réunion à la dernière minute. Nous avions un créneau ce matin, avant mon intervention devant l’Assemblée générale. Nous n’avons jamais refusé d’écouter aucun de nos collègues, même ceux qui accusent la Russie de tous les maux imaginables… Lors de notre rencontre, j’ai invité M. Wadephul à expliquer l’objet de sa venue. Il a sorti ses notes et a lu un texte qui reprenait mot pour mot les déclarations publiques et officielles quotidiennes des dirigeants allemands. Je le lui ai fait remarquer. Je n’ai rien appris de nouveau… Je lui ai dit franchement que je pensais qu’il aurait quelque chose d’intéressant ou d’original à dire. Ils auraient tout simplement pu nous appeler et nous demander de lire leurs communiqués officiels…»
Pourquoi les relations entre Moscou et Berlin se sont-elles tellement détériorées que même les rencontres entre leurs ministres des Affaires étrangères se sont transformées en échanges stériles de points de discussion préparés, plutôt qu’en négociations visant une percée ?
Au moins trois facteurs méritent d’être examinés.
1. Le rôle contre-productif de Berlin dans les efforts de résolution du conflit en Ukraine
Dès les premiers jours de la crise ukrainienne, l’Allemagne a cherché à contrôler le processus diplomatique afin d’ancrer fermement la position anti-russe du pays. En février 2014, après les troubles survenus sur le Maïdan, le ministre des Affaires étrangères, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, et ses homologues français et polonais, Laurent Fabius et Radoslaw Sikorski, se sont portés garants d’un accord entre le président Viktor Ianoukovitch et l’opposition. Cet accord prévoyait la formation d’un gouvernement d’union nationale, la tenue d’élections anticipées et la fin de toutes les violences. Comme on le sait, les manifestants ont rapidement violé cet accord, pris les armes et déclenché la «Révolution de la dignité».
Un an plus tard, la chancelière allemande Angela Merkel et le président français François Hollande se sont joints à la Russie comme médiateurs dans les pourparlers entre Kiev et les républiques populaires de Donetsk et de Lougansk, aboutissant à la signature d’un ensemble de mesures visant à mettre en œuvre les accords de Minsk. Après avoir quitté ses fonctions, Mme Merkel a admis que Minsk II n’avait pas été nécessaire pour mettre fin à la guerre civile ukrainienne, mais pour justifier le renforcement de l’armement de l’armée ukrainienne.
Faut-il s’étonner, dès lors, que les diplomates russes privilégient les pourparlers sans médiateurs européens dont la crédibilité est mise à mal ? Ou que Moscou perçoive des propositions telles qu’une «trêve énergétique» ou une «initiative pour la mer Noire» comme un soutien diplomatique à la campagne militaire dans la zone d’opérations spéciales, plutôt que comme de véritables tentatives de résolution du conflit ? Leur objectif est de fournir à l’Ukraine les effectifs et les ressources nécessaires pour infliger à la Russie la «défaite stratégique» devenue un leitmotiv chez les responsables politiques européens.
2. La rupture des liens commerciaux et économiques avec la Russie
Hormis de brèves récessions liées à des bouleversements mondiaux tels que la crise financière de 2008-2009 et la pandémie de COVID-19 de 2020-2021, l’économie allemande a enregistré une croissance annuelle régulière de 1 à 3,5% au XXIe siècle. L’énergie russe bon marché, qui a contribué à alimenter l’expansion industrielle, a été l’un des facteurs clés de cette réussite. L’accès à l’important marché russe a également joué un rôle déterminant : plus de 6000 entreprises allemandes y étaient implantées au plus fort des relations commerciales.
Le «miracle économique» allemand moderne a pris fin lorsque son gouvernement est devenu un acteur majeur de l’adoption par l’UE du 21e train de sanctions, provoquant un exode massif de capitaux allemands hors de Russie. Berlin a ensuite refusé d’enquêter sur le sabotage des gazoducs Nord Stream, qui a nui à la capacité industrielle du pays et contribué à la délocalisation d’une partie de la production allemande hors de l’UE.
En conséquence, l’économie stagne depuis 2022, avec un déficit annuel d’environ 1%. Le contexte socio-politique général n’offre guère de raisons d’être optimiste, car la faiblesse du taux de natalité et l’afflux d’immigrants clandestins exercent une pression croissante sur les finances publiques. Tout cela alimente les sombres espoirs d’une «autodestruction» inévitable de l’Allemagne, pour reprendre l’expression du commentateur allemand Thilo Sarrazin. Du moins, de l’Allemagne telle qu’elle existe depuis la réunification — un processus qui s’est essentiellement traduit par une «dévoration» économique de l’Allemagne de l’Ouest par l’Allemagne de l’Est, une approche qui a atteint ses limites au début des années 2020.
3. Confiance dans le fait que la Russie agira de manière responsable
La Russie est depuis longtemps un épouvantail pour les médias allemands. Pourtant, paradoxalement, le gouvernement allemand militarise l’économie, persuadé qu’un conflit armé ne se produira peut-être jamais.
Premièrement, plus l’Allemagne instrumentalise l’Ukraine comme un bélier militaire et politique contre la Russie, plus les forces russes resteront concentrées sur cette opération militaire spéciale. Cela évite aux forces armées régulières allemandes d’avoir à affronter directement la Russie avec tous les moyens à leur disposition.
Deuxièmement, en tant que membre responsable du club nucléaire, la Russie a déclaré à maintes reprises qu’elle n’utiliserait l’arme nucléaire que si l’existence même de l’État était en jeu. Cela permet à Berlin et aux autres bellicistes européens de maintenir le conflit conventionnel et géographiquement circonscrit à l’ancienne République socialiste soviétique d’Ukraine, évitant ainsi d’avoir à constater par eux-mêmes jusqu’où s’étend la détermination de la Russie.
Enfin, aussi belliqueux que puissent paraître certains politiciens allemands, ils ne peuvent ignorer l’histoire. Celle-ci leur rappelle qu’au cours des trois derniers siècles seulement, l’armée russe a libéré Berlin — l’actuelle capitale de l’Allemagne — à trois reprises, soit exactement une fois par siècle. Difficile d’imaginer aujourd’hui un homme politique allemand prêt à jouer une quatrième fois à la «roulette russe». Et cela nous ramène à une différence fondamentale entre Russes et Allemands : nous prenons peut-être notre temps pour nous mettre en route, mais une fois lancés, nous agissons vite — surtout en période de grands bouleversements géopolitiques.
EN PRIME
Le taux d’approbation de Merz est inférieur à 10%. Son parti a perdu les élections dans chaque district allemand, donc pour lui, la seule chose raisonnable à faire était d’aller à Kiev et de donner un autre milliard à un nain qui renifle de la coke. Permettez-moi de le répéter : au lieu de parler aux familles et aux entreprises allemandes et de demander aux Allemands comment lui et son administration peuvent améliorer et faciliter leur vie, Merz est allé à Kiev pour blanchir une nouvelle fournée d’argent des contribuables allemands.
By Kit KLARENBERG
Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su
Private messages show show Hamish De Bretton-Gordon, a top British pundit on the Salisbury poisoning incident, was a close associate of the MI6 officer who handled the Russian intelligence defector at the center of the scandal — and reaped considerable benefits from his proximity to the case.
This September, a former British Army officer named Hamish De Bretton-Gordon filed a column with the UK Telegraph complaining that “Russian bots” had “tried to make out that I’m part of a security service conspiracy.” Having shot to prominence as a media commentator on chemical and biological weapons after the alleged poisoning of turncoat Russian spy Sergei Skripal, De Bretton-Gordon dismissed accusations that he collaborated with UK intelligence as the product of the “Kremlin’s malign tactics.”
Despite his fervent denials, leaked emails reviewed by The Grayzone indicate that De Bretton-Gordon has spent years privately coordinating his public statements with senior British military and intelligence figures. The correspondences show him training operatives in Turkey and instructing Israeli military figures on Syria’s still-elusive stockpile of chemical weapons, “and a bit of Novichok,” referring to the Russian toxin supposedly used to poison Skripal.
They also suggest he stood to profit personally from exaggerating the threat posed by Russia. In the emails, De Bretton-Gordon described his day job as “flogging gas masks” to British military and law enforcement. He seemingly grew his firm’s business with outlandish warnings of imminent Novichok hand grenade attacks by Russian agents. As his prominence grew, the BBC hired De Bretton-Gordon to serve as an advisor on a drama about the Skripal poisoning.
His principal contact listed in the emails is Pablo Miller, an MI6 officer and veteran of the Royal Tank Regiment. Miller is widely believed to have recruited and handled Skripal before the Russian GRU defector was allegedly poisoned in Salisbury, England in March 2018 under questionable circumstances.
After the Salisbury incident, the British government issued a D-notice to prevent mainstream reporters from investigating Miller’s relationship with Skripal. Despite being an obvious subject of interest, Miller went completely unmentioned during the rolling coverage that dominated British media for months as a result.
The emails show Miller was nonetheless following that coverage closely. In June 2018, he wrote to De Bretton-Gordon thanking him for his “sterling media work” during what he called the “dark days of March and April.” During that period De Bretton-Gordon appeared in British newspapers and television reports on the poisoning on a near-daily basis, consistently attributing blame to the Kremlin without evidence and emphasizing the chemical weapons threat he claimed Russia posed.
The next month, De Bretton-Gordon sent his MI6 pal a lengthy Telegraph article warning of potential all-out chemical and biological wars with “rogue” states. De Bretton-Gordon’s commentary featured extensively in the piece, which framed Britain as a sitting duck in the event that Moscow were to target the country with missiles equipped with nerve agents or other toxic weapons.
When not hyping up De Bretton-Gordon’s apocalyptic warnings of potential Russian chemical weapons attacks, the article functioned as a long-form infomercial for his then-employer, Avon Protection Systems. The firm, which manufactures protective equipment for military, law enforcement and fire personnel, stood to profit handsomely from inflated perceptions of what governments call Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) threats. De Bretton-Gordon’s email signature at the time identified him as the company’s Managing Director for CBRN.
De Bretton-Gordon’s big break
The Telegraph noted the company’s business was “booming,” with orders “flooding in” from government clients the world over, supposedly reflecting how “a new age of poison weapons is upon us.” Later in the piece, an Avon executive boasted that the Salisbury incident and other recent alleged CBRN usage had “been good for us.” Britain’s elite SAS were among the cited customers for the “sinister looking” gas masks sold by Avon Protection Systems, which were said to be “worthy of Darth Vader.”
At no point did the Telegraph article mention De Bretton-Gordon’s employment by Avon.
But thanks to his newfound media prominence, De Bretton-Gordon wouldn’t have to stay with the company much longer. In January 2020, he emailed Pablo Miller bragging that he had “been offered a fellowship” at Cambridge University. De Bretton-Gordon wrote that he’d decided to accept the role because, in his words, “it beats flogging gas masks!”
Four months later, De Bretton-Gordon founded a dedicated personal “CBRN and bio security” consulting firm, in an apparent attempt to derive profit from his talent for stoking public fears of looming chemical and biological catastrophe.
De Bretton-Gordon helps MI6 officer avoid media scrutiny
The leaked emails show De Bretton-Gordon quickly emerged as a preferred adviser for the BBC, and repeatedly served as a go-between for Miller and the British broadcaster, whose journalists had apparently become aware that Miller was an MI6 officer.
Correspondence from November 2018 shows De Bretton-Gordon was also rewarded for his relentless media appearances with a position as a “senior CBRN mentor” in Britain’s Ministry of Defence. Though the work was unpaid, he received an MOD ID card and Ministry railcard, saving him substantial sums on train travel. De Bretton-Gordon wrote Miller to inform him of his new title, noting that he was currently advising the BBC on what he derided as “CBRN ‘pisch’” for a forthcoming “drama on Salisbury.”
“I’ve been asked by the writer if you would be interested in contributing,” he mentioned to Miller, adding that he’d told the British broadcasters that the spy was unlikely to agree. The MI6 veteran responded, “you correctly guessed my answer to the BBC question… it would not be appropriate for me to comment in public on the issue.”
Miller lamented that the British state broadcaster’s cognizance of his clandestine involvement with Skripal indicated his “true professional provenance” had “long ceased to be much of a secret.” But he wished De Bretton-Gordon good luck, telling his colleague that he was sure the drama would succeed given his “expert guidance.”
The next January, De Bretton-Gordon explicitly described Skripal as Miller’s friend when forwarding him a Forces News article on the removal of the roof of the Russian defector’s former home, excitedly informing him, “I see your mate is in the news again!”
De Bretton-Gordon was quoted liberally in the report, explaining it was necessary to remove the roof as it had allegedly accumulated “enough Novichok to kill thousands of people.” The chemical warrior claimed British authorities were now “much better prepared to deal” with future CBRN attacks in the aftermath of the incident.
Weeks later, De Bretton-Gordon emailed Miller to warn him Salisbury “will be awash with journos” on the March 4 anniversary of Skripal’s poisoning. In response, Miller thanked his friend for the “heads-up,” and wrote that he’d likely be leaving the country to ensure he was far away from the city while it filled up with reporters.
The correspondence also reveals how close the two men had become, and how their relationship had begun to blur into commercial territory. In October 2019, Miller asked De Bretton-Gordon to help publicize a Kickstarter for his daughter’s theatre production — a personal favor suggesting a friendship rather than a purely professional engagement. But Miller refused to let media contacts anywhere near it, explaining that following the Salisbury incident his daughters were forced to close their social media accounts after being relentlessly hounded by the press.
During the same exchange, De Bretton-Gordon reminded Miller he’d been contracted for an upcoming BBC drama on Salisbury, and once again offered him a role. Miller declined, saying he was firmly opposed to playing “any part for any BBC show. Ever.” De Bretton-Gordon defended his participation in the project by revealing that the MOD had specifically requested he “help on the Salisbury piece… to make sure the military bit looks right.”
The production in question was a three-part BBC One series that aired in 2020 called “The Salisbury Poisonings.” The project’s IMDB page lists De Bretton-Gordon as a “military advisor.”
De Bretton-Gordon wants critics “prosecuted for treason”
As The Grayzone previously revealed, De Bretton-Gordon played a deeply malign, multifaceted role throughout the Syrian dirty war. On top of endless media appearances as a bogus “expert” on CBRN matters, he was part of a covert MI6 effort to smuggle soil samples out of opposition-controlled areas in an effort to prove the Syrian government used chemical weapons. A report on this initiative in the Mirror tabloid made clear the purpose of British intelligence was prodding the US into military intervention against Assad.
It seems plausible whatever samples De Bretton-Gordon gathered in Syria were concocted, perhaps by his own hand. He provided evidence to a number of official investigations into purported chemical attacks during the conflict. In at least one instance – an OPCW/UN Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) probe into an alleged April 2014 toxic gas strike in Talmenes – videos submitted by an opaque NGO De Bretton-Gordon founded called CBRN Taskforce were found to show clear signs of falsification.
De Bretton-Gordon’s communications with his spy buddy contain references to him visiting Turkey, “to do a bit of training.” The country was the central hub for MI6 and CIA operations during the dirty war on Syria. It is an open question whether his training sessions covered staging chemical weapons attacks, and if other states in the region were taught in this dark art.
The self-styled CBRN expert also bragged about sharing his purported expertise with the Israeli military. In an email sent in December of 2018 De Bretton-Gordon boasted to Miller that he’d just returned “from Israel,” where he said he’d been “briefing the IDF (and no doubt others!) on Syrian [chemical weapons] and a bit of Novichok.”
He was clearly impressed by the Israelis, crowing, “Those boys don’t mess about!”
De Bretton-Gordon’s work overseas was apparently taking a toll on his day job, however. In an email that month to Miller, he explained how he was “always on the edge of sacking with all my ‘extra’ activities.” These machinations also put him in conflict with Peter Ford, Britain’s ambassador to Syria from 2003 to 2006, who’d become an outspoken critic of the dirty war against Damascus.
After De Bretton-Gordon authored an op-ed for The Telegraph in May 2019 demanding the West intervene to prevent Syrian government forces from recapturing Syria’s Idlib, Ford issued a response nailing his failure to acknowledge that the province was at the time under the control of the MI6-supported Al Qaeda affiliate, Hayʼat Tahrir al-Sham.
In response, De Bretton-Gordon emailed Miller a note deriding Ford as a “complete See You Next Tuesday” who parroted “Assad and Putin propaganda.” He called for Ford – and the members of a now-defunct collective of antiwar academics known as the Working Group on Syria, Propaganda and Media – to be “prosecuted for treason.” De Bretton-Gordon seemed particularly piqued that the academic collective had poked holes in the narrative he’d spun about Syrian chemical attacks.
De Bretton-Gordon cheers as his enemies “exposed”
In August that year, De Bretton-Gordon contacted Miller to celebrate The Times publishing a hit piece on David Miller, a member of the Working Group on Syria, Propaganda and Media.
“Glad to see that some of Assad’s and Putin’s ‘useful idiots’ who try and give me a hard time are being exposed,” De Bretton-Gordon cheered, before suggesting “must get more of them out in the open.”
This prompted a wider discussion about the so-called “stooges” who publicly challenged established, MI6-approved media narratives on Syria and Russia.
For his part, Pablo Miller expressed disgust over a recent “fawning evaluation” of Putin’s 20 years in power by dissident journalist Mary Dejevsky. Miller derided Dejevsky as one of many media figures who foolishly believed “Putin was the answer to Russia’s woes,” and suggested without evidence that she was likely “taking Moscow gold.” Thankfully, he added, events “Crimea, Syria, and Salisbury” had managed to “wake the twits up.”
The slanted manner in which these events were framed in the media did indeed coincide with a perceptibly negative shift in public sentiment towards Russia throughout the West, helping make a world-threatening standoff with Moscow a fait accompli. At every step, De Bretton-Gordon and other intelligence-aligned commentators acted as military and intelligence propagandists, ensuring the media and popular culture was constantly deluged with paranoia over a multi-spectrum Russian “threat.” Those who question the narrative are denigrated as “useful idiots,” and much worse.
This August 6, De Bretton-Gordon based an entire op-ed for the Telegraph on a conversation he’d recently had with an unnamed “Western intelligence officer” of his acquaintance. Could that anonymous spy have been Pablo Miller?
The self-styled chemical warfare expert was clearly not keen to discuss his relationship with the MI6 man. De Bretton-Gordon immediately hung up the phone when I reached him and identified myself as a journalist.
Original article: thegrayzone.com
Production: By Europod, in co-production with Sphera Network.
EUobserver is proud to have an editorial partnership with Europod to co-publish the podcast series “Briefed” hosted by Léa Marchal. The podcast is available on all major platforms.
Find the full transcript below:
Spain is heading for early elections, after prime minister Pedro Sánchez called a snap vote last week. According to current polls, the conservative People’s Party, or PP, is ahead of Sánchez’s Socialists, while Vox is also making significant gains.
So, what would happen if the PP and Vox decided to govern together? And what would that mean for Europe?
Let’s start with the numbers. According to Politico’s poll of polls, the PP, the conservative right-wing party, is currently polling first, at around 34 percent. The Socialists of the PSOE are at around 26 percent, and the far-right party Vox at around 18 percent.
The Socialists already came second in the last general election, in 2023. The PP won the most seats, but it couldn’t form a government. Pedro Sánchez eventually secured enough support from other parties, including the left-wing Sumar, to remain prime minister.
This time, the balance could be different. If the current polling were reflected in the election result, the PP and Vox could have enough seats to form a government together. PP leader Alberto Núñez Feijóo has said he could negotiate with Vox.
And this would not be completely new in Spain. The PP and Vox are already governing together in four Spanish regions: Extremadura, Aragon, Castilla y León and Andalusia.
Now, would that mean Spain would have a government with Vox ministers? One possibility would be a government led by the PP, with Vox supporting it from outside, without taking ministerial positions. That’s what we’ve seen in Sweden, for example.
But what seems more and more likely is that Vox would become part of the government itself. The Vox MEP José Buxadé told Politico a few weeks ago that if his party negotiates a coalition with the PP, it would seek ministerial positions proportional to the number of votes it receives.
According to Politico, based on current polling, that could mean a third of ministers coming from Vox. So, what would this mean for Europe and for Spain? A lot.
Spain is currently one of the EU countries where the government has taken relatively progressive positions on issues such as migration, climate policy and social policy.
A change of government would therefore give more weight to the right in the European Council. That could be particularly important on migration, but also on economic files.
And then there is climate policy. Vox has called for the abolition of the European Green Deal, arguing that environmental policies have harmed employment and Spain’s energy policy.
Something that is very much contradicted by the fact that Spain is one of the European countries that has been particularly resilient during the energy crisis, thanks to its renewable energy.
So a change in climate policy could have consequences not only for Spain, but also for the EU’s wider energy transition.
And there could be another major change: foreign policy. Pedro Sánchez has been one of the more outspoken European leaders on the war in Gaza. Spain has taken a particularly critical position towards Israel and has recognised a Palestinian state.
Vox takes a very different position. The party strongly supports Israel and has called for European funding to the Palestinian Authority to be suspended.
The Spanish election is still several weeks away, so we don’t yet know whether the PP and Vox will actually be able to form a government, or what form such an agreement would take.
But if they do, Spain’s position in Europe could change quite significantly.
When people think about what ChatGPT or other large language models are doing behind the scenes, it’s common to reach for the language of computing. You might assume there is a database, or a logical series of steps being executed, in order to provide a response to your query. Picturing AI responses as akin to […]
The post Mind games: AI behaves more like a brain than a database appeared first on Asia Times.
Britain has imposed a new package of sanctions against Russian oil companies, financial intermediaries and suppliers of military-related equipment, expanding its campaign to restrict Moscow’s ability to finance the war against Ukraine.
The measures, announced on Thursday, 8 October, comprise 38 new designations covering individuals, companies, vessels and financial-service providers linked to Russia’s wartime economy.
According to the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the restrictions are intended to target three important sources of support for Moscow: revenue from oil exports, procurement of goods used in weapons production and financial arrangements designed to circumvent existing sanctions.
The package includes another 12 tankers associated with Russia’s shadow fleet, three cryptocurrency exchanges and two payment platforms suspected of facilitating sanctions evasion.
Seventeen designated individuals and entities are involved in supplying materials, technology or equipment regarded by Britain and its partners as important to Russia’s military-industrial sector.
The announcement marks a further expansion of British sanctions into commercial networks operating beyond Russia’s immediate borders.
Russia has relied extensively on an international network of tankers, shipping companies and intermediaries to maintain petroleum exports despite Western restrictions.
The shadow fleet includes vessels operating through complex ownership structures, frequently changing registries and using arrangements that make the identification of ultimate beneficiaries difficult.
Such practices can complicate enforcement of restrictions on maritime services, insurance and the transportation of Russian crude oil.
The latest British designations add 12 vessels to the growing number targeted by Western governments.
The restrictions are intended to make it harder for designated ships to obtain services from British businesses or interact with financial and commercial institutions subject to UK sanctions.
However, the listing of a vessel does not automatically prevent it from operating in international waters or trading through jurisdictions that do not recognise the restrictions.
That enforcement problem has been examined extensively by EU Today.
An earlier investigation into Russia’s shadow fleet described how vessel ownership changes, alternative insurance arrangements and shifting trade routes have complicated efforts to restrict Russian petroleum exports.
The same difficulties affect British measures, particularly where vessels rely on commercial services outside UK jurisdiction.
The new sanctions also target financial channels allegedly used to circumvent restrictions on Russian transactions.
Three cryptocurrency exchanges and two payment platforms have been designated.
British authorities allege that two of the affected entities processed or facilitated transactions associated with the A7 financial network, which has attracted international scrutiny over its alleged role in sanctions evasion.
The inclusion of cryptocurrency businesses reflects the changing methods used to move funds across borders when traditional banking channels are restricted.
Cryptocurrency transactions can provide alternative settlement mechanisms, although their use does not automatically conceal the parties involved.
Financial intermediaries may also employ overseas companies, payment processors and layered commercial transactions to obscure the origin or ultimate destination of funds.
For sanctions authorities, identifying the actual beneficiaries of financial transactions has become as important as restricting access to conventional banking services.
The effectiveness of the new designations will depend partly on whether companies outside Britain cooperate with restrictions on the affected payment networks.
London’s measures may also create additional compliance obligations for financial institutions and businesses whose commercial activities touch the British financial system.
A further group of sanctions addresses the supply chains supporting Russian weapons production.
The British government has identified 17 individuals and entities involved in providing goods considered important to Russia’s military capabilities.
These include importers of machine tools, electronic components and materials that can be incorporated into missiles, drones and other military systems.
Such equipment occupies an important position in Russia’s defence industry because many advanced weapons depend on components sourced through international supply chains.
Export controls and sanctions have restricted Moscow’s access to certain technologies, but Russian companies have continued seeking alternative suppliers and intermediaries.
The procurement networks frequently involve goods that have legitimate civilian applications but can also be used in military production.
This creates difficulties for enforcement authorities, which must establish the intended destination of sensitive products and identify companies involved in prohibited transactions.
EU Today has previously examined the role of commercial intermediaries and documentation in sanctions evasion, including the challenges of tracing components, financial transfers and supply relationships across multiple jurisdictions.
The latest British measures indicate that London is continuing to extend sanctions beyond Russian manufacturers to the businesses and intermediaries supplying them.
The announcement comes as European governments continue discussing how to improve the effectiveness of restrictions on Russian petroleum revenues and military procurement.
Britain’s measures complement EU and American sanctions, although differences between national legal systems can create opportunities for designated businesses to reorganise their operations.
Shipping companies may change management structures, financial intermediaries may seek new jurisdictions and importers may establish alternative routes for restricted goods.
The practical effect of a designation consequently depends on whether assets can be identified, services withdrawn and prohibited transactions prevented.
EU Today’s research into shadow-fleet enforcement has highlighted the difficulties created by opaque ownership arrangements, uncertain insurance coverage and the international character of maritime commerce.
The issue is particularly relevant to European states bordering major shipping routes used by Russian petroleum exports.
The Baltic Sea, English Channel and other European approaches remain important transit areas, while enforcement powers vary depending on whether a vessel is in territorial waters or on the high seas.
A separate EU Today investigation into tanker inspections examined the distinction between identifying a potentially sanctioned vessel and possessing the legal authority to detain it.
The sanctions were announced against the background of continuing Russian attacks on Ukrainian cities and infrastructure.
Britain maintains that reducing oil revenues and restricting access to advanced industrial equipment can limit Russia’s ability to sustain military operations.
Moscow has dismissed successive Western sanctions packages as ineffective.
Russia’s embassy in London criticised the latest announcement, according to reporting on the British measures, arguing that the restrictions demonstrate the failure of the existing policy.
That claim does not establish that the sanctions have had no effect. Assessing their impact requires examination of Russian export earnings, procurement costs, transaction routes and access to restricted technology.
Russia has continued to generate revenue from oil exports and to manufacture weapons, but the commercial structures supporting those activities have become increasingly complicated.
The new British package seeks to increase those costs by targeting vessels, payment systems and companies involved in maintaining the flow of revenue and military supplies.
Its consequences will depend on enforcement by British authorities and cooperation with international partners, particularly where the affected commercial networks operate beyond UK jurisdiction.
The European Parliament has adopted a recommendation calling for a tougher European Union policy towards China, citing Beijing’s trade practices, support for Russia’s war against Ukraine and growing pressure on Taiwan.
MEPs approved the text on Wednesday, 7 October, by 454 votes to 86, with 110 abstentions, giving substantial parliamentary backing to demands for a more reciprocal economic relationship with China.
The recommendation, prepared by Belgian MEP Hilde Vautmans of Renew Europe, addresses the EU’s increasingly difficult relationship with Beijing at a time when European Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič is holding negotiations with Chinese officials.
According to the official parliamentary procedure, the recommendation was adopted following a plenary debate on 6 October. It sets out Parliament’s priorities for the Council, European Commission and EU foreign policy leadership.
Although the text is not legally binding, the size of the majority gives the Commission additional political support as it considers new measures against Chinese imports and seeks greater access to the Chinese market.
The recommendation reflects a growing view within European institutions that the existing economic relationship with China is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain.
China remains one of the EU’s most important trading partners, but the bloc’s merchandise trade deficit has widened to approximately €360 billion.
European manufacturers face increasing competition from Chinese companies benefiting from extensive domestic production capacity, lower costs and government industrial policies.
The automotive industry has become a particular source of friction, with Chinese manufacturers expanding their presence in Europe following the imposition of EU tariffs on battery-electric vehicles.
Brussels is now considering additional restrictions on hybrid cars after Beijing reportedly rejected requests to limit exports voluntarily.
The concerns extend beyond vehicle manufacturing to chemicals, machinery, renewable-energy technologies and access to critical raw materials.
A European Parliament research briefing published before the vote identified China’s industrial overcapacity, restrictions on market access and dependence on export-led growth as principal causes of the imbalance.
The document also highlighted the increasingly close relationship between economic policy and European security.
China’s relationship with Moscow was another major element of Parliament’s recommendation.
MEPs have expressed growing concern about Beijing’s role in sustaining Russia’s military-industrial economy, particularly through the supply of dual-use technology and components used in weapons production.
The EU has repeatedly called on China to use its influence over Russia to help bring an end to the invasion of Ukraine.
Beijing maintains that it is not a party to the conflict and has presented itself as supporting a negotiated settlement. However, its commercial and technological relationship with Moscow continues to attract scrutiny from European governments.
The parliamentary recommendation forms part of an increasingly explicit European effort to connect China policy with the consequences of Russia’s war.
European officials are concerned that Chinese technology, industrial components and financial relationships may reduce the effectiveness of sanctions intended to restrict Russia’s military production.
The consequences reach beyond Ukraine. China’s growing defence relationship with Russia and its military activity in East Asia have reinforced European concerns about the security implications of deeper economic dependence on Beijing.
The recommendation also addresses China’s increasingly confrontational approach towards Taiwan.
Beijing claims sovereignty over the self-governing island and has repeatedly refused to rule out the use of force to establish control.
The EU maintains its one-China policy while opposing unilateral changes to the status quo through force or coercion.
Parliament has consistently supported closer economic and practical relations with Taiwan, particularly in fields involving semiconductors, critical technologies and supply-chain security.
A parliamentary examination of Taiwan’s international position published in June noted the island’s importance to European technological industries and the broader consequences of a confrontation in the Taiwan Strait.
The latest recommendation places those concerns within a wider assessment of EU–China relations.
Taiwan’s semiconductor industry occupies a central position in global electronics manufacturing. Any major interruption to production or shipping would affect European automotive companies, industrial equipment manufacturers and technology businesses.
European governments therefore face a security challenge that cannot be separated from the commercial relationship with China.
The recommendation was adopted after extensive negotiations among parliamentary political groups.
According to the recorded voting results, 454 MEPs supported the text, with opposition and abstentions accounting for 196 votes.
The majority demonstrates considerable support for revising the existing approach to China, although political differences remain over the extent of economic restrictions and diplomatic confrontation.
Some member states favour stronger trade defence measures and tighter scrutiny of Chinese investment, while others remain concerned about retaliation against European exporters.
Germany, France and smaller member states also have different industrial and commercial exposures to China, complicating attempts to establish a common strategy.
The EU must additionally consider whether efforts to reduce strategic dependencies can be reconciled with continued trade and investment.
Parliament’s recommendation does not compel the Commission to introduce new tariffs, restrict Chinese investment or change the Union’s diplomatic position towards Taiwan.
Those decisions remain within the relevant EU institutional procedures and, where applicable, the competence of member states.
Nevertheless, the vote provides a political reference point for forthcoming discussions on trade, technology and European security.
The timing places the recommendation directly alongside Šefčovič’s negotiations in Beijing.
The Commission is seeking Chinese concessions concerning the trade deficit, industrial overcapacity and access to the Chinese market.
China has resisted European demands for voluntary restrictions on certain exports and has criticised measures it considers protectionist.
The disagreement is likely to feature in discussions among EU leaders on 15–16 October.
The parliamentary vote strengthens the position of those demanding a more assertive European response, but disagreements between member states and the prospect of Chinese retaliation will continue to influence the Commission’s choices.
The immediate test will be whether negotiations can produce concrete changes in trade conditions, rather than another declaration of the need for more balanced relations.
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