Russia’s demands for the extradition of International Criminal Court judges and Washington’s sweeping sanctions against the institution have converged within days. The two governments have different grievances, but the consequences of their actions increasingly overlap, raising questions about the political relationship between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin and the future of international criminal justice.
Russia and the United States have intensified their campaigns against the International Criminal Court (ICC) almost simultaneously, exposing an increasingly consequential convergence between the policies of Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump.
On 8 October, Moscow demanded the extradition of ICC President Tomoko Akane and eight other current and former officials. The following day, Washington announced sanctions against the court as an institution, extending earlier measures against individual judges and prosecutors.
The timing raises an obvious question: are these independent campaigns arising from different disputes with international justice, or do they reflect a broader political understanding between Washington and Moscow?
There is no publicly established evidence of a coordinated operation or an agreement between Trump and Putin to undermine the ICC. Nevertheless, the strategic consequences of their respective actions are remarkably similar. Both weaken an institution pursuing criminal proceedings against political leaders whom the two governments seek to protect.
Different grievances, overlapping interests
Russia’s hostility towards the ICC is directly connected to the arrest warrant issued against Putin in March 2023 over the alleged unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children from occupied territories.
The court subsequently issued warrants against senior Russian military commanders, including Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov, over alleged crimes involving attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure.
Moscow’s response has been to pursue ICC personnel through its own criminal justice system. The latest extradition demands follow convictions handed down in absentia by a Russian court in December 2025.
Washington’s confrontation with the ICC has a different immediate origin. The Trump administration objects to the court’s jurisdiction over American nationals and Israeli officials, particularly following the arrest warrants issued against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former defence minister Yoav Gallant.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio has presented the American campaign as a defence of US sovereignty. Yet the sanctions announced on 9 October are not confined to the Israeli proceedings or any investigation involving American personnel.
They target the institution itself, potentially disrupting financial transactions and commercial relationships essential to its operation. This distinction matters because a court-wide restriction necessarily affects investigations beyond those cited by Washington. That includes Ukraine.
The Anchorage question
The political context cannot be separated from the relationship between Trump and Putin, including their meeting in Anchorage, Alaska, in August 2025.
The summit formed part of Trump’s efforts to negotiate directly with Moscow over the war in Ukraine. The American president has repeatedly treated relations with Putin as a question of diplomatic bargaining, seeking arrangements that might produce an agreement where conventional Western pressure has failed.
Against this background, suggestions that pressure on the ICC might form part of a wider accommodation with Moscow warrant scrutiny. However, the proposition that Trump specifically offered Putin assistance in neutralising the court during their Anchorage discussions remains unsubstantiated. There is no verified public account establishing such a commitment.
A more defensible conclusion is that Washington’s independently declared campaign against the ICC also advances an important Russian interest. For Putin, the benefit is clear. Measures designed to restrict the court’s financial and administrative capacity could complicate investigations into Russian conduct, irrespective of the American administration’s stated intentions.
The relationship therefore need not involve explicit coordination to produce politically significant results.
Why sanctions against the institution matter
The escalation from targeting individual prosecutors to sanctioning the entire ICC represents a substantial change. Previous American measures imposed personal and financial restrictions on selected officials. The latest approach threatens the broader infrastructure upon which international criminal proceedings depend.
The court requires banking facilities, secure communications, technology services and commercial suppliers. American sanctions can reach beyond US territory because of the international financial system’s dependence on dollar transactions and American service providers.
The ICC had already anticipated this vulnerability. According to details disclosed in September, the institution has pursued alternatives to American software and financial services to reduce its exposure.
Nevertheless, operational continuity and investigative effectiveness are not necessarily the same thing. The court may remain formally functional while facing additional costs, delays and restrictions affecting prosecutors, investigators and international cooperation.
For Ukraine, this is particularly significant. The ICC holds and evaluates evidence connected to alleged Russian war crimes, including the deportation of children and attacks on civilian infrastructure. Its proceedings preserve a judicial process independent of whatever diplomatic settlement Washington and Moscow might eventually negotiate.
Weakening that capacity would not invalidate existing warrants or automatically destroy evidence, but it could make the pursuit of accountability more difficult.
Europe’s response and its limitations
The European Union now faces a dispute with Washington over an institution that European governments have spent decades supporting.
On 9 October, eight governments issued a joint statement, reaffirming their support for the ICC and rejecting the American sanctions. The signatories included Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Britain, Japan and Canada.
The European Commission also indicated that the EU was prepared to take measures necessary to preserve the court’s operations. Such assurances are politically important, but they do not automatically resolve the practical consequences of American restrictions.
European financial institutions and technology suppliers must consider their own exposure to US sanctions. Sustaining the court may require alternative payment arrangements, commercial protections and potentially further European regulatory intervention.
The EU has discussed extending its blocking statute to shield European operators from the effects of American sanctions. Whether that mechanism can provide sufficient protection remains uncertain.
The dispute also extends beyond the ICC’s current investigations. Ukraine and the Council of Europe are developing a separate Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression, designed to address jurisdictional limitations preventing the ICC from prosecuting Russia’s leadership for the decision to launch the invasion.
The two institutions have distinct legal mandates, although cooperation between them is envisaged. Undermining the ICC would not automatically prevent the special tribunal from operating, but it would weaken an important part of the wider international accountability framework.
A convergence with consequences for Ukraine
Washington and Moscow have not adopted identical positions towards the ICC. Russia seeks to discredit and punish the officials responsible for pursuing Putin. The Trump administration is attempting to restrict the court’s authority and operational capacity, principally in response to proceedings involving Americans and Israelis.
Yet their actions converge at precisely the point where the ICC’s independence becomes politically inconvenient. The distinction between motive and consequence is essential. It would be premature to describe the American sanctions as evidence of a secret bargain struck in Anchorage. It would be equally mistaken to overlook the assistance these measures could provide to Moscow.
The broader concern is that the United States, traditionally central to Western efforts to hold Russia accountable for its invasion of Ukraine, is now applying pressure to one of the principal institutions carrying out that work.
For European governments, the immediate question is no longer simply whether they support the International Criminal Court. It is whether they are prepared to protect its practical independence when the political and financial pressure comes not only from Russia, but also from Washington.
US President Donald Trump has accused the Norwegian Nobel Committee of discrediting the Peace Prize after it awarded the 2026 honour to South African jurist Navanethem Pillay, warning Norway that Washington would not forget the decision.
US President Donald Trump has launched an attack on Norway and the Nobel Peace Prize committee after being overlooked for the 2026 award, declaring that the decision had permanently damaged the prize’s credibility and left an indelible stain on the country responsible for selecting its recipient.
Speaking at a campaign rally on Friday, 9 October, Trump insisted that his diplomatic achievements entitled him to the distinction and accused the committee of allowing political ideology to determine its choice.
His remarks followed the announcement that South African lawyer and former United Nations human rights chief Navanethem “Navi” Pillay had received this year’s prize for her contribution to peace and international law.
“The United States of America, represented by me as your president, should have received the Nobel Peace Prize, but didn’t,” Trump told supporters.
He described the committee’s decision as disgraceful and embarrassing before issuing a pointed warning: “We will not forget, Norway.”
The American president went further, claiming that the award had been discredited by radical ideologues whom he characterised as opponents of democracy and civilisation. He also questioned Pillay’s qualifications, telling his audience that he had never heard of the South African jurist.
Born in Durban in 1941 under South Africa’s apartheid system, Pillay became a prominent human rights lawyer before serving as a judge at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and subsequently at the International Criminal Court (ICC). She was also UN High Commissioner for Human Rights between 2008 and 2014.
Her judicial career included work on cases involving genocide and sexual violence during the Rwandan conflict. More recently, she chaired the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel. Israel rejected the commission’s findings.
The award comes at a contentious moment in Washington’s relations with international judicial institutions. On the same day as the Nobel announcement, the Trump administration introduced new sanctions against the ICC, expanding American restrictions and bringing Washington into conflict with European governments that support the institution.
Trump’s Claims of Diplomatic Success
Trump has repeatedly argued that his interventions in international disputes justify receiving the Nobel Peace Prize. During Friday’s rally, he claimed to have settled eight wars and suggested that he was approaching further breakthroughs involving Iran and Russia’s war against Ukraine.
Those claims remain contested. Several disputes cited by Trump have not resulted in comprehensive peace agreements, while others involved ceasefires or diplomatic arrangements that did not permanently resolve the underlying conflicts.
His administration also participated alongside Israel in the war against Iran earlier this year. Although Washington subsequently pursued a negotiated settlement, the conflict raised questions about the relationship between American military intervention and Trump’s presentation of himself as an international peacemaker.
Trump has likewise maintained that he can secure an end to the war in Ukraine, although Russian military operations continue and no comprehensive settlement has been reached.
The president’s dispute with the Nobel Committee is not new. He has frequently contrasted his diplomatic record with that of former President Barack Obama, who received the prize in 2009, less than a year after taking office.
Machado’s Medal and the Norwegian Connection
Trump’s frustration has also been shaped by his relationship with Venezuelan opposition leader María Corina Machado, who received the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize for her campaign for democratic rights and political change in Venezuela.
In January 2026, Machado presented her Nobel medal to Trump in a symbolic gesture. However, the Nobel Committee subsequently reaffirmed that a Nobel Prize cannot be transferred to another person, regardless of what happens to the physical medal.
The president’s latest criticism also draws Norway into a dispute over which its government has no direct authority. The Nobel Peace Prize is awarded by an independent five-member committee appointed by the Norwegian parliament, rather than by the Norwegian government.
Under the rules governing the award, the committee is responsible for selecting the individual or organisation judged to have made the greatest contribution to peace in accordance with Alfred Nobel’s will.
Trump’s warning therefore raises a separate diplomatic question: whether his dissatisfaction with an independent committee’s decision will have consequences for relations with Norway, a longstanding NATO ally.
For European governments, the controversy also comes against the background of Washington’s escalating confrontation with international courts. Russia has separately demanded the extradition of ICC President Tomoko Akane and other judicial officials over proceedings connected with the war in Ukraine.
The Nobel Committee’s decision to honour a former ICC judge, just as the institution faces pressure from both Moscow and Washington, has consequently acquired significance beyond the question of Trump’s personal ambitions.
The 2026 Nobel Peace Prize will be formally presented in Oslo on 10 December.
Washington has extended its sanctions campaign against the International Criminal Court to the institution itself, threatening its banking arrangements, technology services and commercial contracts. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has warned European allies that the United States will seek to dismantle the tribunal unless its activities are curtailed.
The administration of US President Donald Trump imposed comprehensive sanctions on the International Criminal Court (ICC) on Friday, 9th October, extending Washington’s campaign against individual judges and prosecutors to the financial and operational infrastructure of the Hague-based tribunal.
The measures prohibit transactions with the ICC under American jurisdiction and potentially expose companies providing services to the institution to US penalties. Banks, insurers and technology suppliers could face restrictions, threatening the court’s ability to maintain essential operations.
In a statement announcing the measures, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio declared that Washington intended to deprive the tribunal of resources unless it abandoned proceedings that the administration considers an infringement of American sovereignty.
“Either the ICC will end its threats, or we will end the ICC,” Rubio said.
He also directed an explicit warning towards Washington’s European allies, many of which are parties to the ICC’s founding Rome Statute while relying on American military capabilities for their defence.
The administration expects those governments to restrain the court, Rubio said, linking their security dependence on the United States to Washington’s demands concerning international criminal justice.
The latest sanctions apply to the institution itself, extending their potential consequences to organisations and businesses maintaining commercial relationships with the court.
The US Treasury has issued four general licences allowing certain transactions involving telecommunications, software, pensions and ICC detainees. The exemptions are limited and leave broader restrictions in place.
The administration has also provided a period for American companies to wind down existing commercial arrangements.
The practical consequences could extend beyond US businesses. International banks and service providers with exposure to American financial markets may reconsider their relationships with the ICC to avoid sanctions risks.
The tribunal has spent months preparing for such restrictions. It has moved office computers away from Microsoft products towards open-source alternatives and established new arrangements for banking and health insurance.
Rubio’s warning to American allies introduces a direct confrontation with European governments that have undertaken treaty obligations to support the ICC.
All 27 EU member states are parties to the Rome Statute. Within NATO, only the United States and Turkey remain outside the court’s membership.
Washington’s demand that allied governments restrain the tribunal places those countries under pressure to reconcile their commitments to international criminal justice with their defence relationships with the United States.
The ICC’s registrar, Osvaldo Zavala Giler, has urged the European Union to consider activating its blocking legislation, designed to protect European operators against the extraterritorial application of certain foreign sanctions.
Such action would require political decisions in Brussels and would not automatically eliminate the commercial risks associated with American restrictions.
Rubio said the sanctions had been structured to allow member states to negotiate a settlement addressing Washington’s objections. He warned that further measures could follow if those negotiations failed.
ICC rejects attempts to interfere with proceedings
Deputy Prosecutor Nazhat Shameem Khan condemned the sanctions and insisted that the court would continue its work.
In her response to the American announcement, Khan described the measures as an attempt to undermine international law and the independence of the judiciary.
She said the court would continue its investigations and prosecutions across all active cases.
Washington’s confrontation with the ICC has intensified since the tribunal issued arrest warrants in November 2024 for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former defence minister Yoav Gallant over alleged crimes committed during the Gaza conflict.
The United States has also opposed investigations involving American military personnel in Afghanistan.
Although neither Washington nor Israel recognises the court’s jurisdiction, the Rome Statute permits the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over certain crimes committed on the territory of member states, irrespective of the nationality of the suspects.
The same jurisdictional principle underpins proceedings against Russian officials over alleged crimes committed in Ukraine.
The ICC issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin in March 2023 over the alleged unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children.
Russia pursues ICC officials as Washington imposes sanctions
Friday’s announcement follows a separate escalation in Moscow’s campaign against the tribunal.
As EU Today reported on 9th October, Russian prosecutors have demanded that the Netherlands extradite ICC President Tomoko Akane and eight other current and former court officials.
The requests follow their convictions in absentia by a Moscow court in December 2025 for their involvement in proceedings against Russian officials.
The Netherlands, which hosts the ICC, is not expected to comply with Moscow’s demands.
The Russian and American measures arise from different disputes, but both seek to exert pressure on the tribunal over judicial proceedings involving their respective governments or allies.
The ICC’s earlier condemnation of American sanctions warned that targeting judicial personnel threatened the court’s independence and obstructed access to justice for victims of international crimes.
Sanctions coincide with Nobel Peace Prize announcement
The American measures were announced hours after South African jurist Navi Pillay, a former ICC appeals judge, was awarded the 2026 Nobel Peace Prize for her contribution to international criminal justice.
Pillay served on the ICC’s Appeals Chamber between 2003 and 2008. The Nobel committee drew attention to political attacks against international judicial institutions in explaining its decision.
The timing was coincidental, with the American sanctions having been prepared before Friday’s award.
The ICC currently has 125 member states and an annual budget of approximately €196 million. Its investigations encompass alleged crimes in Ukraine, the Palestinian territories, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and several other jurisdictions.
The new sanctions could significantly restrict the court’s access to the financial and commercial services on which those investigations depend.
For the European Union, the immediate question is whether its governments will provide practical protection to an institution whose independence they have repeatedly pledged to defend.
Washington has made clear that it expects the opposite: European allies should use their influence to curtail the court’s activities or face further American measures.
The special protection programme for Portuguese “Football Leaks” whistleblower, Rui Pinto, will remain in force, after the decision of September 22 to terminate it was ruled invalid, the Ministry of
The Norwegian Nobel committee said Pillay, who is serving as a judge at the international court of justice (ICJ), has “shown that legal measures can help prevent acts of war and violence”.
Russian prosecutors have asked the Netherlands to surrender Tomoko Akane and eight other International Criminal Court officials convicted in absentia by a Moscow court, extending the Kremlin’s retaliation against those investigating alleged war crimes in Ukraine.
Russia has demanded the extradition of International Criminal Court (ICC) President Tomoko Akane from the Netherlands, seeking to enforce criminal sentences against judges and prosecutors involved in issuing arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin and senior Russian military officials.
The Russian Prosecutor General’s Office announced on Thursday, 8 October, that it had submitted requests to several governments for the extradition of nine current and former ICC officials, including Karim Khan, who served as the court’s chief prosecutor when the arrest warrant against Putin was issued in March 2023.
The requests follow a ruling by Moscow City Court on 12 December 2025, when nine ICC officials were convicted in absentia and sentenced to prison terms ranging from three and a half to 15 years. Their alleged offences arose from their participation in investigations and judicial decisions concerning Russian officials suspected of international crimes.
Moscow’s latest move is unlikely to secure Akane’s extradition from the Netherlands, which hosts the ICC and is among its principal supporters. Russian authorities are nevertheless seeking cooperation from several countries, potentially exposing court officials to arrest when travelling to jurisdictions maintaining close relations with Moscow.
Japan Protests Against Russian Demands
Japan has condemned the proceedings against Akane, a Japanese national who became ICC president in March 2024.
Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Masanao Ozaki said Tokyo had repeatedly protested to Moscow over its treatment of ICC personnel and regarded the latest measures as unjustified and unacceptable.
He indicated that Japan would consider further diplomatic action in consultation with the court and other states parties to the Rome Statute.
Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi reaffirmed Japan’s support for the ICC during a parliamentary session on Friday, 9 October, saying Tokyo would continue to defend the institution as part of its commitment to international law.
Akane, who was elected president for a three-year term in March 2024, served on the judicial panel responsible for the arrest warrants against Putin and Russia’s commissioner for children’s rights, Maria Lvova-Belova.
Russian investigators opened criminal proceedings against the judges shortly after those warrants were announced, subsequently adding other ICC officials to their wanted lists as investigations concerning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine progressed.
Moscow’s Retaliation Against the Court
The confrontation began on 17 March 2023, when the ICC issued arrest warrants against Putin and Lvova-Belova over the alleged unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children from occupied areas to Russia.
The judges found reasonable grounds to believe that both officials bore individual criminal responsibility for the alleged offences. The warrants remain in force, although neither suspect has been brought before the court.
The investigation concerns the removal of children from Ukrainian territory following Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. Ukrainian authorities have documented cases involving children transferred to Russia, placed with Russian families or subjected to measures intended to integrate them into Russian society.
Russia maintains that the transfers were humanitarian evacuations. The ICC’s investigation concerns whether children were unlawfully deported or transferred from occupied territory, conduct prohibited under international humanitarian law.
Russian prosecutors responded by expanding their criminal cases against ICC personnel. The charges included knowingly prosecuting innocent individuals and attacking representatives of a foreign state.
The December 2025 convictions provided Moscow with the domestic judgments it is now attempting to enforce through extradition requests.
Extradition Requests Raise Questions Over Travel
The Netherlands has not indicated any intention to surrender Akane. Dutch authorities have consistently supported the ICC’s independence, and the Russian convictions concern actions undertaken by officials in the exercise of their judicial responsibilities.
The position may be less predictable in countries maintaining extradition arrangements with Moscow. Although Russian convictions would not automatically require another state to surrender an ICC official, the existence of arrest warrants could complicate international travel and expose those named to detention pending legal proceedings.
The situation recalls the difficulties surrounding Putin’s own international movements since March 2023. His arrest warrant has restricted travel to ICC member states, which are generally required to cooperate with the court’s requests for arrest and surrender.
Russia’s withdrawal of its signature from the Rome Statute in 2016 did not prevent the ICC from investigating alleged crimes committed on Ukrainian territory. Ukraine had already accepted the court’s jurisdiction and became a full member on 1 January 2025.
The ICC investigation into Ukraine continues, covering alleged offences committed since 21 November 2013 within the scope of Ukraine’s acceptance of jurisdiction.
US Sanctions Add to Difficulties Facing ICC
The Russian extradition demands coincide with a separate dispute between the ICC and the United States, whose government has sanctioned several members of the court.
On 18 August 2026, President Donald Trump’s administration imposed sanctions on Akane and senior ICC trial lawyer Abdoulaye Seye. Washington has objected to investigations involving American personnel and Israeli officials, arguing that the court has exceeded its jurisdiction.
The American measures primarily involve financial restrictions, while Russia has pursued criminal convictions and extradition requests. Both have placed ICC personnel under pressure for their involvement in proceedings opposed by governments outside the Rome Statute system.
The European Union has repeatedly defended the ICC against attempts to interfere with its investigations. The Netherlands, as host country, has particular responsibilities concerning the court’s operations and the security of its personnel.
Moscow’s latest requests are therefore expected to meet resistance from European governments. Their possible consequences elsewhere will depend on the countries approached and whether local authorities are prepared to act on Russian arrest warrants.
The Kremlin has so far failed to halt the ICC’s proceedings against Putin, Shoigu and Gerasimov. Its response has been to pursue the judges and prosecutors responsible, seeking prison sentences against international judicial officials while the allegations against Russia’s own leadership remain before the court.
Israeli rifles seized en route to Brazil’s TCP drug faction – the same group that controls “Complexo de Israel.” Israel armed Medellín in the 80s. Coincidence?
Last week, 7 ARAD-7 rifles of Israeli manufacture were seized by the Brazilian Federal Police at a transport company located in Niterói, Rio de Janeiro, while they were being prepared to be sent to drug traffickers of the Terceiro Comando Puro (TCP) organization. These are the same drug traffickers who control a territory called “Complexo de Israel,” which brings together the favelas Cidade Alta, Parada de Lucas, Vigário Geral, Cinco Bocas, and Pica-Pau.
Two years ago, we wrote here at the Strategic Culture Foundation an article about the danger of “narcopentecostalism” – the deep linkage between drug trafficking and neo-Pentecostalism in some favelas – pointing to this new phenomenon as a possible national security threat for Brazil, as well as a potential focus of activities aimed at destabilizing the social fabric and religious persecution. Indeed, in TCP territories, Catholic churches and Afro-Brazilian religious centers are closed and violently attacked.
Nevertheless, at the time we wrote that article, in July 2024, there were not yet enough material elements to incisively affirm the existence of a direct connection between narcopentecostalism and the State of Israel. TCP traffickers exalted the State of Israel, used Israeli patches and uniforms, but all of this was circumstantial and could be explained by mere adherence to evangelical discourse.
Now, however, we have more specific evidence to be able to return to the topic and raise concern about the possible link between Israel and one of Brazil’s main drug trafficking organizations.
After all, to date it is still not known how these modern Israeli rifles reached the logistical branch of an important Brazilian criminal organization, when this specific rifle is still uncommon among Brazilian police forces and nonexistent among the military.
The first objection that could be raised would be about Israel’s “interest” in arming or financing a criminal organization in Brazil. Well, it would not be the first time.
In the 1980s, 500 automatic weapons (including IMI Galil rifles and Uzi submachine guns) and 200,000 rounds of ammunition were found in a warehouse belonging to the Medellín Cartel, one of the largest drug trafficking organizations in Colombia. At the time, “independent investigations” concluded that the person responsible for the operation, the mercenary and retired Israeli military officer Yair Klein, had acted on his own. Klein himself, however, always stated that his activities in Colombia (which involved not only arms sales but also the training of paramilitary groups) had the knowledge and authorization of Israeli authorities.
Klein’s link to the Israeli state apparatus, demonstrating that he was not really an “independent agent,” is confirmed by the fact that when he was arrested in Sierra Leone in 1999 for selling weapons to insurgents of the Revolutionary United Front, the State of Israel intervened to secure his release, as well as refused all extradition requests.
Another interesting and recent piece of news involves Mexico, where authorities declared that 80% of the weapons found with soldiers of the drug cartels were of U.S. origin… and most of the remaining 20% were of Israeli origin. Indeed, Israel officially exported 24,000 automatic weapons between 2006 and 2018 to Mexico’s military and police institutions, and another 18,000 in more recent years. Note, however, that estimates from independent observatories suggest that Mexican cartels as a whole possess an arsenal of several hundred thousand automatic weapons. If something like 15-20% of these weapons are of Israeli origin, then we are talking about any number between 20,000 and 100,000 Israeli-origin weapons in the hands of the cartels. These are numbers that simply do not match the figures of official Israeli arms exports to Mexican security forces.
One last point that may draw attention is the recent attention the U.S. has given to Brazilian criminal organizations, with the PCC and CV groups categorized as terrorist groups by Donald Trump’s government. What draws attention is the fact that the TCP – the 3rd largest criminal organization in Brazil, with a presence in some other countries in the region, operations in several Brazilian states, and at least one verifiable link to an individual connected to Al-Qaeda’s financing network, not to mention an operational alliance with the PCC – was left out of the categorization.
Naturally, it could be a coincidence. But even so, it is an interesting coincidence that the neo-Pentecostal criminal organization apparently armed by Israel is exactly the one that was not categorized as terrorist by the White House.
A major scandal has erupted at Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service (BND), one of the most serious cases to hit the agency in recent years.
Germany’s Federal Prosecutor General is investigating former BND President August Hanning on suspicion of espionage against the state, obtaining state secrets, attempted treason, and engaging in intelligence activities. Another long-serving employee of the agency is facing charges of aiding and abetting attempted treason and espionage against the state. Both men have been detained, and the Federal Prosecutor General’s Office has confirmed their arrests.
Information: What is Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service (BND)?
The Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) is Germany’s official foreign intelligence service. Its founder was Reinhard Gehlen, who served as the head of intelligence on the Eastern Front during Nazi Germany. In its early years, the agency recruited numerous former members of Nazi organizations such as the Gestapo and the SS. During the Cold War and in the period that followed, the agency continued to be one of “American imperialism’s biggest partners” in Europe.
Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) officers detained Hanning at his home in Nordwalde, near Münster, in the early hours of the morning. This was reported by WDR, NDR and Süddeutsche Zeitung.
At the same time, another former senior BND employee was detained in Bavaria. The suspect, identified as Manfred D., was reportedly Hanning’s former chief of staff and had worked at the BND until spring 2026. Investigators searched locations associated with the suspects both there and in Berlin.
Information: What is the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA)?
The Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt – BKA) is Germany’s federal criminal police agency responsible for combating crime at the national level.
The two senior figures in German intelligence are expected to appear before a judge today or tomorrow. The judge will formally notify them of the arrest warrants and decide whether they will remain in custody pending trial.
What are the charges?
First of all, it is alleged that D., Hanning’s former chief of staff, provided Hanning with highly classified information from the BND in exchange for money until at least 2022. It is not unusual for retired intelligence officers to take on roles such as security consultants for various organizations after leaving government service. In Hanning’s case, however, investigators suspect that the former BND chief may have prepared a security analysis for a foreign intelligence service “in at least one instance.”
According to information obtained by WDR, NDR and Süddeutsche Zeitung, that foreign service was not Russia.
In another case, Hanning is alleged to have used information obtained from internal BND documents in his communications with a foreign agent.
In fact, the story of how Hanning first came onto investigators’ radar goes back to last year.
According to information obtained by Tagesschau from intelligence sources, Hanning came under investigation after searches were carried out at his home and offices in September last year. At the time, the Hamburg State Criminal Police Office (LKA) was searching for evidence related to the kidnapping of Christina Block’s children.
Child abduction and sensitive documents
The case concerned allegations by the Hamburg prosecutor’s office against restaurant entrepreneur Christina Block and her lawyer, Ingo Bott, over the abduction of children. Prosecutors accuse Block of arranging the kidnapping of her two young children at the end of 2023 amid a custody dispute with her former husband. Hanning is also alleged to have been involved in the attempted abduction. Hanning denies the allegations.
According to the allegations, Hanning, together with a former LKA employee who was his business associate, conspired to hand the children’s father a hard drive containing images and videos of child sexual abuse material.
Information: Who is Christina Block?
Christina Block is the daughter and heiress of Eugen Block, founder of Germany’s well-known Block House steakhouse chain. She is accused of instigating or planning the violent abduction of her two youngest children from Denmark and their transfer to Germany on New Year’s Eve 2023.
The LKA also discovered an electronic data storage device containing highly sensitive material while examining materials seized from Hanning last year.
According to the findings, the former intelligence chief had access to highly classified BND documents from the recent past that he had absolutely no reason to possess. Hanning’s tenure at the BND, meanwhile, had ended in November 2005.
In total, D. is believed to have passed approximately 2,000 documents to Hanning. A significant portion of these reportedly consisted of briefings prepared for the weekly “intelligence situation” meetings held at the Chancellery, where the heads of the country’s security agencies exchange information.
According to information obtained by investigators, the documents included reports on highly sensitive subjects such as Iran’s nuclear program and the Russian military. Intelligence sources say that some of the documents even contained information obtained from foreign intelligence services.
The leaking of such material is being described in the intelligence community as virtually a “super-GAU.”
Information: What is a super-GAU?
Super-GAU is a German-derived term referring to the largest and most destructive situation or catastrophe imaginable, going beyond even the worst-case scenario that has been designed for. It is derived from the German expression “Größter anzunehmender Unfall” (“the greatest assumed accident”).
‘Treason against the state’ allegations
Following the Hamburg LKA’s investigation, the documents seized were handed over to federal authorities. The Federal Prosecutor General’s Office launched a secret investigation into Hanning and the alleged informant within the BND in May 2026.
It is not yet known how long Hanning had been receiving confidential internal information. According to security sources, the most recent documents seized date from June 2022.
It is also unclear how the alleged informant inside the BND managed to remove the material from the tightly secured agency.
The BND was asked for an urgent statement on the matter. The agency referred the case to the Federal Prosecutor General’s Office, citing the fact that an ongoing investigation was involved.
August Hanning’s lawyers have so far failed to respond to an urgent request for comment on the allegations.
Not the BND’s first case
For the BND, this is the second serious case to emerge within a matter of several years.
A former BND official is currently on trial before the Higher Regional Court in Berlin, accused of spying for Russia together with another suspect in 2022. In that case as well, highly classified information concerning BND cyber operations was allegedly leaked outside the agency.
If the allegations against Hanning and the other suspect are confirmed, the case will reach unprecedented proportions in the history of German intelligence.
There has never been another case in German history in which suspicions of treason against the state have targeted such a senior government official as a former head of an intelligence agency.
August Hanning is also a prominent figure in the intelligence world. Throughout his career, he held positions at key points in Germany’s security architecture. Before becoming president of the BND, he served as an official responsible for confidentiality and security at West Germany’s diplomatic mission in East Germany.
He later held various positions at the Federal Chancellery, including serving as Coordinator of the Federal Intelligence Services. Hanning, who holds a doctorate in law, became head of the BND in 1998.
After leaving the intelligence service, he became a State Secretary at the Federal Ministry of the Interior at the end of 2005. Four years later, he was placed into temporary retirement.
Of course, it would not be enough to view this case simply as an instance of “rot” within the institution. We reach this conclusion particularly by recalling how German intelligence has been involved in dirty operations from the very foundation of the agency and throughout its history.
It was not merely a matter of one former director. German intelligence has been involved in numerous dirty operations, from employing Nazi war criminals to Operation Rubikon, carried out jointly with the CIA, and NATO’s secret stay-behind/Gladio networks. In all of these cases, methods strikingly similar to those employed by Hanning were used.
What happened in Hanning’s case is that he continued using what he had learned during his retirement — and was caught.
From this perspective, the Hanning affair can be read not so much as the story of a “rotten official,” but rather as the story of an “official who got caught.”
In this episode of Rattling the Bars, host Mansa Musa interviews archivist, photographer, and veteran Black Panther Party member Billy X Jennings.
Joining the Party at age 17 after relocating from Hobson City, Alabama, to Oakland, Jennings managed BPP offices and served as bodyguard to Huey P. Newton. During Bobby Seale’s 1973 Oakland mayoral run, Jennings helped spearhead an unprecedented electoral effort: “…an organizing event on the highest level the parties had ever been. I mean, the party is known for organizing, but to go into electoral politics and do what we did for a first time basis, it changed over. Even though Bobby lost that election, it changed openly because it opened up so many doors. Part of his job was to kick down doors because we were the Vanguard.”
Today, Jennings operates the official Black Panther Party Alumni website and leads political education initiatives across the Bay Area for the Party’s 60th Anniversary.
The following is a rushed transcript and may contain errors. It will be updated.
Mansa Musa:
Welcome to the edition of Rattling the Bars. I’m your host, Mansa Musa. This year marks the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Black Panther Party, which started in Oakland in 1966. Today, I’m honored to be joined by Billy Jennings, AKA Billy X, well-known archivist in Oakland, member of the Black Panther Party, a photographer who runs the official Black Panther Party alumni website called It’s About Time. Thank you for joining me, Billy.
Billy X Jennings:
Hey, thanks for having me again. Good morning to everyone.
Mansa Musa:
And as we talked earlier, I was in different spaces and hoping I had met you while I was in Oakland. So this would more or less be like a reunion, but this is my first time meeting you. I’m really honored. I heard a lot about you. I know a lot about your work, and it’s an honor to be able to interview you about the party and some of the things and some of your experiences.
Billy X Jennings:
Okay.
Mansa Musa:
Please introduce yourself to our audience, who you are and how you came to be involved in the Black Panther Party.
Billy X Jennings:
Well, my name is Billy X. Jennings. I’m a member of the Black Panther Party. I joined in 1968 when I was 17 years old. And I came about joining the party because I’m from a historical town in Alabama in the South where most original members came from the South and migrated to California. So I came from a place called Hopson City, Alabama. And the tradition there, Hobson City have had the right to vote since 1890. And we were one of the only black municipal cities, little towns that could vote and had that right to do that. And so I came from a very strong area that had embedded that kind of thought into my mind. And when I traveled to California and I saw the Black Panther Party on TV for the first time in 1967 when they went to Sacramento, California, it blew my mind.
I was in high school at the time and I immediately changed our social… We had a social club called the Buccaneers. I changed it to the Panthers the next day. I didn’t know anything about the party with just that symbolism and how they stood up to the police and read their demands and so forth. It made a change happen in me. And it wasn’t until I graduated from high school, I decided to move to Oakland. And when I moved to Oakland, it was during the time that Huey knew the trial had just started and I was going to a college that’s two blocks away from where Huey was going on trial at the courthouse. And when the trial started, we would hear them saying Free Huey off the preg, free Huey. And I went over there one day and I was reading a book simultaneously at the same time called The Audible Malcolm X.
So what I read, I had read in the book already, but I heard Bobby Steele speak at a rally for Huey and they were saying the same thing. So it got me really interested in the party. And so I started going to the rallies to Free Huey. I met some Panthers and then they said their Panther office was going to open in my area. And when it did, I went down and joined, became a Panther in training and I’ve been working with the party ever since.
Mansa Musa:
Okay. And take us back to the party’s founding because you came in two years after its founding. And also you came in to your own observation and to what we know to be a fact, you came in at a point where they had just started to become on the radar of the feds, but more importantly, they was definitely on the radar of the Oakland police, LA police. And so talk about what was it like to be able to be in that space and ultimately find yourself in a position to be the bodyguard for Huey Newton once he got out.
Billy X Jennings:
Well, my process started at the very beginning. In 1968, there was a certain method the party employed. Before you became a Panther, you had to become a Panther in training, which requires six to eight week training. They give you a list of books that has about 35 different books, about books by Franc Fanon, Mao Saintong, Che Guevara, Pruma, and other revolutionaries to read. And you had to attend political education class on a weekly basis. Panthers at that time was required to read two hours a day. A Panther had to secure and have what we call technical equipment. Technical equipment was a firearm of some type, because at that time I joined the Black Panther Party, it was called Black Panther Party for self-defense. Later on, we dropped off the self-defense, but at that particular time, the party was engaged into patrolling
Police officers in the community, observing them and making sure they don’t beat and brutalize people. So the first six weeks is reading and studying and learning the rules of the Black Panther Party. And then you’re given a section. The city is divided into different sections. I worked in the section four in East Oakland. Section four had a section leader. They had a geographical area that they were responsible for. And so I was in section four. At that very beginning when I first started, we were theorizing about the breakfast program. It hadn’t came about, but we were still looking for geographical locations to have these breakfast programs in the future. So we did that. And every Panther is required to sell the Black Panther Party newspaper, which is the voice of the party. And at that time, the party was growing tremendously by leaps and bounds.
We had people flying into California from Kansas City, Chicago, New York, all to get this education. Before you can open up a chapter of the Black Panther Party or a branch of the Black Panther Party, you have to come to Oakland first and get educated. And you have to meet the leadership. The leadership has to eyeball you and find out your level of consciousness, what type of person you are before you can go back and represent the party. So this whole process was going on. People were flocking to the party. The party got so big that in 1969, we had put a stop on membership and we call that particular part of the party’s history the purge because the party had grown… I mean, the party was attractive. I mean, black coats, leather coats, I mean sunglasses and Afros at the same time. So this was a big thing for our culture.
At the same time, our culture level was rising even in music. James Brown had a record out in 1968 that elevated people’s social conscience, I’m Black and I’m proud. It moved people from the level of being a Negro, because that’s what the newspapers and that other people was referring us to. But in our community, we’re referring to ourselves as Black or African. And when James Brown came out with Black and I’m Proud, you could never go back to ever saying he was a Negro no more. There was different progress being made, but James Brown couldn’t sing no song like that. It wasn’t for groups like the Black Panther Party. Groups like The Shot Light Can’t Sing got to give more power to the
Mansa Musa:
People
Billy X Jennings:
Like the Black Panther Party, paving the way to educate people to lift up their consciousness. And so my role in the party, I came up as a Panther in training. I became a officer of the day, which is the person who runs the office. And from there I was transferred to central headquarters. Now, my name came about because my captain at that time was a legendary Panther called Robert Bay. Robert Bay ran the East Oakland office. Robert Bay was also an age of the central committee. And when Huey Newton got out of jail in 1970, the central committee made Robert Bay his permanent bodyguard and assistant. Now, I worked in that capacity as well after Huey got out of jail, mostly going to… I went to court with Huey on a daily basis because he was let out on appeal. He wasn’t just let out.
He had to go back to court and defend himself. And so my job became that. And also at the same time, I became to the Newton family. Mr. Newton, Mrs. Newton, I lived three or four blocks from them. I would walk over their house around the corner, mow their lawn. I’d be taken to the pharmacy, driving to doctors because they’re old people and they don’t drive so much. So that became my responsibility and me and Huey’s relationship grew behind that. So we had good personal relationship.
I worked central headquarters. Working at central headquarters was key to who I am today because I know Panthers from everywhere because every Panther had to call the central headquarters on a weekly basis or if the office gets ready or they need lawyer resources and stuff like that, I pick up the phone, write on the messages or tell them what they need to know. So I know Panthers from almost all the chapters and branches. And so I worked that group for a while. Then I was drafted into Bobby Seal’s campaign when he ran for mayor of open. I ran Bobby Seal’s campaign office in East Oakland. And it was an organizing event on the highest level the parties had ever been. I mean, the party is known for organizing, but to go into electorial politics and do what we did for a first time basis, it changed over.
Even though Bobby lost that election, it changed openly because it opened up so many doors. Part of his job was to kick down doors because we were the Vanguard. We had lead to struggle and there’s other people who follow behind us. I mean, our life was constantly in threat because we were on the front line, police department, clientele pro, all those things aimed at members of the Black Panther Party. So not only did we have the burden of dealing with the system, we had to deal with the authorities as well.
Mansa Musa:
Talk about, and you’re familiar with Eddie Conway, right? And so Eddie Conway, when he got locked up, he organized a chapter for the Black Panther Party in the prison, which I became a part of. And everything you outlined, as you was talking, I was reflecting on, we had to read at least two albums. We had every aspect of the thing that you outlined as what the party was doing, Eddie had us doing the same thing. We had political education classes, we had military classes, we had first aid classes. All our class was structured around an environment that we was in, and our technic class was finding a hole to get out of prison by any means necessary. So we had that type of mentality. So Billy, as an archivist, you have a lot of distortions in terms of the images that’s being projected of the party and it’s been dubbed Panther Porn, and just to note that it’s images that’s being perpetuated by the federal government, it’s images that’s become more idolization of the party versus the images as an archivist.
What would you say is the most positive or how would you characterize the imagery of the party as from an archivist in terms of educating people and raising their conscience? I see you with a shotgun. I know you in Sacramento. I know why you in Sacramento and I know why you coming out like that. That’s a good thing. But then I turn around, I see somebody standing on the corner. They got a picture of somebody standing on the corner with their mug broke and they got a bandela on and it had nothing to do with organizing, had nothing to do with raising people’s conscience. It’s got more to do with projecting the image of a thug, for lack of a better word. Talk about that if you can.
Billy X Jennings:
Well, the party was vilified on the highest level from the government who lied on us continuously to the media that used disinformation to scare people. The big image they had was, oh, these Negroes, they have guns. They’re angry. They hate white people. That’s their basic pitch on everything. Let it be Republican New Africa or any Black group, they paint them as very threatening group. And because we had guns, I mean, there was nothing… It wasn’t against the law in California to have guns, to have them in public long as they was not loaded, which we knew that. So the images they printed of the Black Panther Party was to vilify us and to scare white people and to frighten Black people. So it was all a part of their method to control who we were. They were trying to identify who we were. We could only define that.
We defined our own selves. And so that’s why we started a Panther newspaper in 1967 to get our voices and views out. So even though we had Time, Newsweek, Life Magazine, the Black Panther Party was cranking out close to 250 to 300,000 copies of papers per week into the community to combat this disinformation about the Black Panther Party. The 10 point program outlines what the Black Panther Party was all about, what we stood for.
Only on one aspect, which is 0.97, we talk about defending ourselves with guns. Other
Than that, we’re talking about social change in all levels, in education, housing and so forth. That was a threat to them because they did not want anyone to rocking the boat and we are rocking the boat. We are waking people up from their deep sleep. I mean, we’re telling people to read. We’re showing people what books to read. We are the Vanguard. People are following us. They didn’t want that. We had people in the white community, they wanted to join in with us. We had people from the Latino community, they want to join with us. You had people from around the world reading the 10 point program and looking at the positive aspect of the Black Panther Party. And that’s how we get the New Zealand Panthers and the Panthers from Africa and Panthers from India and the UK because of our social programs, how we was dealing with the oppressor here.
And so they follow those same examples there. They started social program, they started demanding and fighting for their rights. And that’s what the oppressor hates. They hate for people to wake up. And we were waking up big time in the 60s with the music, the culture, the back to Africa, who we are. How could you be a Negro in 1970 after all has been presented before you? So those things have changed. The party was a part of that change, that
Mansa Musa:
Consciousness. Talk about, because to your point, I remember reading the paper and when United Farm Workers, the party was one of the first papers to one, educate people on what their issues were, two, organize the boycott certain wines that they was taking and exploiting their labor and not giving them equal pay. So talk about the party’s social contribution to raising people’s concept, but more importantly, the elasticity of it, because can you see some of the influences today? Oh,
Billy X Jennings:
Definitely. Definitely. I can see the influences of the Rainbow Coalition. And that was something that Fred Hampton talked about. I could see the coalition building of the Black Panther Party. We’re working with the Brown Beret, the Young Lords, the Young Patriots. We’re working with the welfare rights groups. We’re working with the BSU, the Black Student Unions on campus. We’re working with prison groups. There was a number of prison groups throughout the country that started Black Panther Party off in San Quentin, in Algeria, Raway and other prisons because the ideology of the Black Panther Party was strong. What we were talking about, there was backbone to it. Everything we did was dialectic materialism, right? We were dialectic people. We looked at things from all sides. We just didn’t look at things in one side. Black Panther Party was an international group from the very start. Dewey and Bobby were international.
You can look at our reading list, those 35 books that come from Fanon, that’s from Africa, Mao Zeitang from China. So there was all kind of influences in the party. And so it was a big job just working to educate and organize people on all levels. Because in our community, action speaks. People learn in various ways, but in our community, people relate to action. They see something, they learn from it. Just like the breakfast program. We started the breakfast program in California and within two weeks it was a national program because people said, “Hey, we can do that here. This is how they did it. We can do it here.” The party set examples that people could follow in every aspect. We were on the forefront of fighting racism on all levels.
“We started the breakfast program in California, and within two weeks it was a national program because people said, 'Hey, we can do that here. This is how they did it. We can do it here.' The party set examples that people could follow in every aspect. We were on the forefront of fighting racism on all levels.”
The enemy to be feared is the habit of deciding on the most serious matters without discussing them, and of presenting them as if they were inevitable.
There are phrases which, on their own, say more about a state than a Defence White Paper. One such phrase appeared in the Corriere della Sera on 4 October, in an interview with the Chief of the Army General Staff, Lieutenant General Carmine Masiello: “On the eastern flank, we were asked to deploy units capable of providing a real deterrent: we are leading the multinational battlegroup in Bulgaria and are present in Latvia and Hungary. War does not ask for permission, and the contingent must be ready to respond.”
A few lines earlier, the same general had opened the interview as follows: “We are at war. A hybrid war, but war nonetheless.” The attentive reader will pause to consider three words. We have been asked. By whom? Real deterrence. Compared to what deterrence, until now, has been unreal? We are at war. Who has declared it? These are questions that the Italian public debate should ask itself seriously, without indulging either in the caricature of the warmongering military or in the conditioned reflex that treats every doubt as enemy propaganda. The argument put forward in these pages is simple: the idea of direct involvement by Italy and European countries in an armed conflict with Russia is strategic folly, and the bellicose rhetoric that is making it seem conceivable protects no one. It makes the situation worse.
It is best to start with the facts, because the controversy surrounding the interview has misrepresented some of them. The contingents mentioned by Masiello are not a development from the past week. Italy has been participating in NATO’s forward presence in Latvia since 2017 and, since 2022, has been leading the multinational battlegroup in Bulgaria – established following Russia’s conflict with Ukraine alongside those from Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. The Madrid Summit in June 2022 then committed the allies to strengthening these groups to brigade level ‘where and when required’. The general’s statement that ‘we were asked’ therefore has a clear source: the Alliance’s planning, approved by the North Atlantic Council, to which the Italian government has given its consent.
Parliament, too, has formally expressed its view. Law 145 of 2016 stipulates that the government must approve international missions annually and that Parliament must authorise them. For 2026, the Council of Ministers’ resolution is dated 14 May; the Chamber of Deputies approved the authorisation resolution on 28 July, for missions valid from 1 January to 31 December. On closer inspection, this situation is more serious than the mere omission denounced by many commentators. Parliament was not bypassed: it was called upon at the end of July to ratify what had been in progress for seven months, as part of a single package bringing together dozens of different missions, from Lebanon to the Horn of Africa. Voting against the eastern flank means, in this context, voting against the whole package. It is a procedure that produces consensus without generating debate.
The problem, then, is not strictly legal. It is political, and concerns the quality of the decision. It is one thing to maintain a contingent in an allied country for reassurance purposes. It is quite another to publicly declare that that contingent must provide ‘real deterrence’ and be ‘ready to respond’ to a war that ‘does not ask for permission’. This shift in function – from a symbolic presence to combat readiness – has not been the subject of any specific parliamentary debate. Italians learnt of it from an interview published at the weekend, in a tone one might use to describe the modernisation of barracks.
A war that no one has authorised
Article 78 of the Constitution is so clear that it sounds almost embarrassing today: ‘The Chambers shall declare a state of war and confer upon the Government the necessary powers.’ Article 11 adds that Italy repudiates war as an instrument of aggression and as a means of resolving international disputes. In this context, the phrase ‘we are at war’, uttered by the head of the Armed Forces, is not merely a lexical detail. Neither House has declared a state of war. No government has been granted extraordinary powers. If words have any meaning, that phrase describes a condition that is not recognised by the legal system.
The contrast with Masiello’s own words from two and a half years ago is striking. In May 2024, in another interview, the general had been unequivocal in the opposite sense: ‘Let’s be clear: we are not at war,’ he had said, referring to a ‘sub-threshold’ conflict. The material reality described then and now is essentially the same: cyber-attacks, sabotage, disinformation, airspace violations. What has changed is the verbal framework. And in international politics, the framework is never neutral. Those who repeat every day that we are already at war accustom public opinion to the idea that actual war is merely the next step on a path that has already begun. This is precisely the process that the literature on threat construction describes as securitisation: a problem is shifted from the ordinary political sphere to that of emergency, where the usual rules – including debate – appear to be a luxury.
It is no coincidence that, in that very interview, the priority highlighted is the distribution to military personnel of a ‘cognitive self-defence manual’ against disinformation. The stated aim is to protect personnel. The side effect is to delimit the scope of what is conceivable: if every voice that questions the necessity of conflict can be interpreted as an emotional lever wielded by the enemy, dissent becomes a security issue. A democracy that fears manipulation should respond with more debate, not less.
Deterrence that produces what it fears
The strategic crux of the matter is the very concept of deterrence. Deterrence works when the adversary perceives our stance as both defensive and credible. It ceases to work – and indeed becomes counterproductive – when the measures a state adopts to feel secure are interpreted by the other as offensive preparations. This is the security dilemma: in a system without a higher authority, many of the means by which a state increases its own security reduce that of others, triggering a spiral that neither actor had intended.
The eastern flank is where this spiral is most visible. From Moscow’s perspective, allied brigades permanently deployed a few hundred kilometres from St Petersburg and the Belarusian border, exercises in the Baltic and attempts to stop Russian ships in transit are signs of encirclement. Putin stated this explicitly at the Valdai Forum in early October, describing the Western manoeuvres in the Baltic as an escalation. One might regard that interpretation as self-serving, and in part it is. But deterrence is not measured by our intentions: it is measured by the perceptions of those who are to be deterred. Ignoring them does not make them go away.
There is also one factor that should be of the greatest concern, and it is Masiello himself who articulates it. In hybrid warfare, the general explains, the risk is ‘not only to suffer, but to slip, by mistake, into an open confrontation’. This is a valuable admission. It means that the Italian military leadership considers the possibility of an unintended war – arising from an accident, a misinterpretation or a chain of automatic responses – to be very real. Thomas Schelling referred to this mechanism as ‘the threat that leaves something to chance’: the more forces are in contact and ready to react, the more control over the crisis slips from the hands of political decision-makers. If the main risk is error, the rational response is to reduce friction and increase the number of communication channels. Yet whilst the readiness of troops near the border is being stepped up, the tone of rhetoric is moving in the opposite direction.
In Moscow, Putin spoke clearly
At the Valdai Forum, Putin reiterated that Russia has no intention of attacking anyone ‘neither in 2029, nor in 2030, nor in 2050’, adding that in the event of an attack, Moscow would respond with all means at its disposal, including nuclear weapons. A few days earlier, in St Petersburg, he had said that Russia is in no way preparing to go to war with Europe. The usual response in the Italian press is that these reassurances are worthless: Formiche pointed out, for example, that even the 1994 Budapest Memorandum contained written commitments that were subsequently breached.
This argument deserves a serious response, not a slogan. No one is obliged to take the statements of a head of state – be they Russian or American – at face value. But mistrust of others’ words does not justify abandoning diplomacy: it makes it all the more necessary. Public statements serve precisely this purpose: to establish commitments that can be verified, negotiated, translated into measures of mutual trust, limits on troop deployments, notifications of military exercises, and direct military lines of communication. This is precisely what Europe did during the decades of the Cold War, with the Helsinki Final Act and the subsequent Vienna documents, when mistrust of Moscow was at least as great as it is today. Responding to every overture by increasing military readiness amounts to choosing not to verify. And those who fail to verify their adversary’s intentions end up planning for the worst-case scenario, which, by dint of being planned for, becomes the most likely outcome.
The reverse is also true. If it is genuinely believed that Russia is preparing an act of aggression against an EU member state, then the matter is of such gravity as to demand a public and parliamentary debate commensurate with its importance, based on the available evidence, intelligence assessments and the alternatives under consideration. Not an interview. The two things are mutually exclusive: either the threat is existential, in which case the nation must be mobilised; or it is not, in which case the language of imminence is a mistake.
To die for whom and for what?
The question currently circulating on social media – whether Italians are prepared to die for the Baltic states or for Zelensky – is phrased brutally, but it hits upon a real issue. European public opinion, and Italian public opinion in particular, has never given an explicit mandate for direct military confrontation with Russia. Surveys in recent years have consistently ranked Italy amongst the European countries most opposed to sending troops and most in favour of a negotiated solution. A democratic system that prepares for war against the prevailing will of its citizens, without even consulting them, accumulates a debt of legitimacy that would be called in at the worst possible moment: precisely when national cohesion is most needed.
Nor is there any need to demonise the Baltic states to recognise the problem. Their perception of the threat has historical roots that a Western European struggles to fully comprehend. The point is another: in a thirty-two-member alliance, the most hardline positions tend to set the tone for the whole, because no government wants to appear the least supportive. Italy has different geopolitical interests, focused on the Mediterranean, Africa, the Balkans and its energy ties with the East. A country in that position has everything to lose from a conflict in the Baltic and nothing to gain. Its historical role, from Andreotti to Prodi, has been that of a mediator, not an outpost. To abandon this role in order to align with the hardline stance is a choice that someone should openly advocate, rather than letting it seep out through an interview.
Finally, there is the practical reality, which the general himself does not hide. Masiello speaks of the return of the ‘importance of mass’: forces are quickly worn down, and without the capacity to replenish them, a prolonged conflict cannot be sustained. In short: a conventional war with Russia would be a war of attrition, fought with ammunition stocks that Europe does not possess and with an industrial base that would take years to reconvert. Against a nuclear power that has just reiterated that it regards nuclear weapons as part of its defence. There is no rational interpretation of Italy’s national interest in which this scenario is acceptable.
Alternatives do exist and do not require naivety. The first is institutional: to separate missions on the eastern flank from the annual budget and subject them to a specific vote, preceded by a public hearing of military and government leaders on the nature of the mandate. If Italian soldiers are asked to be ‘ready to respond’, Parliament has the right and the duty to know to what, under what rules of engagement, and within what limits.
The second concerns language. The military leadership has a responsibility to prepare the forces, not to influence public opinion on the underlying political judgement – namely, whether or not Italy is at war. That assessment is the remit of the constitutional bodies. A return to verbal restraint is not a concession: it is the condition for deterrence to remain defensive even in the eyes of those observing it from Moscow.
The third is diplomatic. Any Russian declaration of non-aggression should be taken at face value in the technical sense of the term: put to the test with concrete proposals for risk reduction, starting with the Baltic, where the density of ships, aircraft and units in close proximity makes an incident more likely than elsewhere. Rome has the credibility and the history to champion such an initiative at European level. The fact that it is not doing so, and that the issue emerges only from the words of a general, is the real cause for alarm in this affair.
The enemy to be feared is not a country a thousand kilometres from our borders. It is the habit – which is taking root here – of deciding on the most serious matters without discussing them, and of presenting them as if they were inevitable; a psychopathology that is dramatically eroding the last remnants of common sense.
They stuck the prisoner full of seven different syringes, but she didn’t die. She just experienced extreme suffering, minute after excruciating minute, before eventually losing consciousness.
Her name is Christa Pike. As of this writing, she is still alive.
Pike committed a horrific violent crime as a young woman after a life of nightmarish abuse. She was physically and sexually abused by her mother’s live-in boyfriend, was raped by a neighbor when she was eleven, and attempted suicide at the age of twelve.
And now she is on a respirator in a hospital as doctors fight to save her life, presumably so that the state of Tennessee can try to kill her again.
It’s all so absurd. People are so cruel to each other.
We inflict pain upon our neighbors, and our neighbors pass that pain on to other neighbors, and it just goes on and on like that until one day you’re watching a woman strapped to a gurney flailing around in anguish as panicked executioners plunge needle after needle into her body to stop her outlawed heartbeat.
We are bound to each other so intimately like that. A rapist was abused by his father, who was abused by his uncle, who was abused by his priest, who was abused by his teacher, generation after generation of human trauma stretching back to our evolutionary ancestors frantically struggling to survive predation in the middle of the food chain. A baton passed from hand to hand through the sands of time in a vast relay marathon of suffering.
The course of my life has been directly influenced by my abusers, and by their abusers, and by the people who abused them, and it is only by sheer chance that this ancient stream of samsara carried me to be typing words on a laptop in Melbourne instead of fighting for my life after a botched execution in Tennessee.
You cannot make a deep study of trauma and human dysfunction and still sustain a belief in the death penalty. Once you’ve explored your inner depths enough to understand how many factors have contributed to your life being the way it is and caused your mind to operate the way it operates, you can’t really claim that anyone had sufficient control over the way their life unfolded to justify killing them for their crimes.
You can still form judgements about people regarding who you want to spend time with and form relationships with, but even in the most chaotic and destructive among us you can still see a fundamental innocence. I can keep my distance from wild crocodiles without believing they are evil. We can still immobilize dangerous people to protect our society without assigning ourselves the right to take their life.
As humanity moves more deeply into consciousness, this insight will become more and more brightly illuminated, and we will begin healing our trauma so that the relay baton of suffering stops with us. The vindictive, judgmental scales will fall from our eyes, and there will be a widespread recognition of the fact that, underneath all the savagery and sadism and exploitation and abuse, we were always ultimately just confused and damaged children stumbling through a giant universe that we did not understand.
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, also known as ICTY, was illegally founded in May of 1993 when the Security Council of the United Nations was steamrolled into adopting a politically engineered resolution to that effect. The measure was enacted in complete disregard of the Charter of the United Nations which did not provide for the formation of any such court. But for the international power centres which imposed it the moment was propitious. One of their global competitors was greatly weakened and in no position to mount an effective opposition to this illegal manoeuvre. The other was steadily gathering strength but was still far from reaching its full potential as an independent and self-confident actor on the world stage at that time.
ICTY, with its seat at The Hague, was created ostensibly to prosecute serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991. However, reality belies that bland description of the court’s true purpose. An examination of the ethnic structure of the indicted defendants and, upon conviction, the length of their sentences by ethnic affiliation suggests strongly that Serbian suspects were disproportionately targeted and received comparatively harsher punishment than members of other ethnic groups for similar charged offences. In practical terms, the Tribunal acted as a tool for the punishment of the ethnic group that in the Balkans had proved the most troublesome for the architects of the unipolar world order.
Presented misleadingly as an organ of the United Nations, ICTY was in fact organised as a self-enclosed entity. Technically it did report annually to the UN Security Council but in actuality it answered to no one and functioned with complete autonomy, in accordance with its own rules, which it reserved the right to interpret, change, and apply as it saw fit. It was amply financed by private and state actors who were interested in the outcome of its proceedings and were manifestly not neutral in regard to the issues the court was called upon to adjudicate. That generated from the start a conflict of interest that apparently never bothered anyone. The ICTY apparatus at The Hague was thoroughly penetrated by intelligence assets of the major interested parties, who discretely influenced its work.
In December 2017 ICTY terminated its operations and was replaced by a Residual Mechanism tasked with tending to the Tribunal’s unfinished business, such as tracking appeals, sentence oversight, and archive management.
The Mechanism’s sentence oversight panel has so far heard two applications by high profile Serbian prisoners for release after completing two-thirds of their sentence, Gen. Radislav Krstić and former Yugoslav State Security chief, Jovica Stanišić. Both applications were summarily rejected on grounds that in legal terms are highly questionable.
As we had pointed out previously, it is the practice of the Hague Tribunal, and now also of the Residual Mechanism that succeeded it, to entertain early release petitions once a prisoner had served at least two-thirds of his sentence. The court’s response to such a petition is discretionary as there are no mandatory rules governing the way it should react. But following an informal practice, the vast majority of early release petitions submitted to the President of the Tribunal and now the Mechanism have been routinely adjudicated in the applicant’s favour. Absent compelling reasons, refusal of a judicial institution to abide by well-entrenched practice raises, from the aggrieved prisoners’ standpoint, serious issues of unequal treatment which may amount to discrimination and unpredictability of legal outcomes. Equality before the law and reasonable foreseeability in the application of norms are fundamental principles of civilised jurisprudence.
Gen. Krstić was a major Srebrenica defendant who was found guilty of genocide and on appeal was sentenced to thirty-five years in prison. Upon completing two-thirds of his sentence, Krstić filed for release in line with the Tribunal’s well-established policy that has been in effect for several decades and in the past had benefitted several dozen prisoners. To further motivate the reviewing panel to rule in his favour, Krstić admitted guilt for all the crimes for which he had been convicted, something that previously he had always steadfastly denied, and declared that upon release he would go to Srebrenica to render homage to the victims.
Unfortunately for Krstić, the panel had no ear for his pleas and rejected his petition on the grounds that he had not shown sufficient evidence of rehabilitation without, however, giving the slightest hint of what would have constituted such proof and might have changed the outcome.
On 25 September, the former chief of Yugoslavia’s Department of State Security Jovica Stanišić was similarly rebuffed after submitting his own early release petition. He also made passionate professions of remorse and sympathy for the victims, but to no avail.
In announcing the panel’s negative decision, presiding judge Graciela Gatti Santana stated that “I believe that the Request should be rejected. Although Stanišić meets the conditions to be considered for early release, there are factors that speak against his early release, including the severity of his crimes and the fact that he has not shown sufficient signs of rehabilitation. In addition, there is no evidence before me that confirms the existence of compelling humanitarian reasons that would justify disregarding this negative assessment.”
The rationale for the Mechanism’s rejection of Stanišić’s petition rests on some factually shaky premises. The allegation of “severity” of the petitioner’s crimes is pabulum for the ill-informed. Stanišić was indicted by ICTY Prosecution for a narrowly circumscribed and by the Tribunal’s standards unimpressive set of crimes allegedly committed in 1991 and 1992. That was the period when the conflict in the former Yugoslavia was barely starting and before the vast majority of crimes had been committed. The conflict ended much later, in the fall of 1995. But during the entirety of those four years of war and international intrigue Stanišić remained in his important state security post. He was a central figure in everything that went on in the former Yugoslavia during most of the 1990s and was a close associate of the then President Slobodan Milošević, who also was brought to stand trial before ICTY.
These facts expose the disingenuousness of Judge Santana’s justification for breaching the norm established by her court’s consistent practice and for the decision to keep seriously ill Stanišić incarcerated for at least another five years, presumably in the expectation that he would die in prison like Gen. Mladić and never have a chance to write his memoirs.
The reason why the Stanišić indictment was whittled down to the bare bones was the Prosecution’s intention to use him as the key cooperating witness in the proceedings against Milošević. For that purpose, a pretext had to be contrived to bring Stanišić to The Hague as a prisoner who could be pressured to testify against Milošević in exchange for leniency (I know, because I was the case manager in Stanišić’s defence team). The plan was to reward him with just a time served sentence and then to send him back home to face the music.
Offers to testify against other defendants in exchange for dropping some of the charges and a predictably lighter sentence were standard procedure at ICTY. Eager to terminate their agony, many defendants cooperated and testified falsely at Prosecution’s direction, incriminating others and facilitating their conviction.
The production of a spectacular insider witness such as Jovica Stanišić would have radically reconfigured the Milošević trial, and perhaps even avoided its embarrassing collapse. The Prosecution however went away disappointed. Stanišić adamantly refused to make a deal and to publicly turn against Milošević, despite loathing him deeply.
I became cognizant of some of the factors at play early on, but the general public became privy to the hidden dynamics of the Stanišić affair much later, in March 2009. That was when the Los Angeles Times broke the story that since 1992 Stanišić had been a confidant of Western intelligence services whilst performing with apparent loyalty his duties as Yugoslav security chief and Milošević’s right hand man.
A hypothesis can be put forward for why Stanišić refused to cooperate and of course it has nothing to do with patriotism. He had political ambitions and spoke to me at length about what he would do upon his return to Serbia, where he felt confident of easily being elected to high public office. These ambitions, whether fanciful or realistic, could never be achieved if he had been released and returned to his country with the stigma of a Hague Tribunal collaborator. Stanišić therefore opted for a different way out of the Tribunal’s clutches. He calculated that his former associates in the foreign intelligence services, who wielded decisive influence in the Tribunal’s corridors, would remember his past services and feel morally obligated to ensure his release on honourable terms, after acquittal following an apparently proper trial.
But just like the Prosecution, Stanišić also miscalculated. He bet on the wrong horse. In the eyes of his former “friends” Stanišić was a relic of the past, of little or no residual utility. They had fresh faces, other players that they were cultivating to take the helm after driving Milošević out. The most that they would have been willing to arrange for him was a symbolic time served sentence in return for spilling the beans on his former boss.
Jovica Stanišić is another embodiment of Kissinger’s famous dictum, a lesson that Eastern European bumpkins never seem to learn.
À partir du début du XXe siècle, la république a cherché à mieux encadrer les protestations populaires dans la rue en privilégiant l'évitement. Depuis les années 2000, l'approche est plus punitive. La priorité est donnée à l'arrestation des « fauteurs de troubles ». Une évolution qui favorise les violences et pose la question du respect du droit de manifester.
À la tribune du Palais-Bourbon, un député dénonce les violences qu'ont subies quelques jours plus tôt des protestataires, dans une petite ville du nord de la France. La journée a débuté par un regroupement devant une usine. Vers 9 heures, « les gendarmes, sur ordre du lieutenant et sans provocation, ont chargé. Un homme a été blessé, un enfant a eu l'oreille à moitié coupée. La colère de la foule a commencé là et s'est manifestée en effet par des pierres lancées ». Après un moment d'apaisement, la situation se tend à nouveau : « Vers 3 heures [de l'après-midi], de nouvelles bousculades ont lieu et le nombre des manifestants grossit. » Puis la violence se déchaîne : « Les gendarmes frappent de tous côtés. Des femmes, des enfants et des vieillards sont renversés. L'exaspération monte. Un grand nombre de citoyens ripostent aux gendarmes avec des pierres. » Soudain, c'est le drame : « Un grand désordre règne et c'est à ce moment que, sans qu'on sache qui en a donné l'ordre, sans sommation préalable, un terrible feu de peloton a été tiré dans cette masse de monde. (…) La place était couverte de blessés et de morts. » Interpellé, le ministre de l'intérieur répond avec véhémence : « Nous avons donné des ordres pour assurer la tranquillité publique ; nous les avons donnés avec netteté, fermeté et prudence. » Il livre ensuite son propre récit : « La gendarmerie locale a pu distinguer dans la foule toute la clientèle ordinaire des contrebandiers et des gens sans aveu qu'on peut évaluer à cinq ou six cents, parmi lesquels plus d'un quart d'étrangers. Toute la journée la force publique et l'armée ont eu à subir les injures, provocations et agressions de plus en plus violentes de la foule, et ce n'est qu'à la dernière extrémité et sous l'impression du danger qu'il n'était plus en leur pouvoir de conjurer autrement qu'elles ont dû recourir à la force des armes. »
Il conclut : « Je ne sais si les agents, lassés par les provocations de la foule, se sont laissé entraîner à quelques violences ; mais ce que je sais bien c'est que des hommes dont on n'a pas encore parlé ont été blessés et mis en danger de mort en accomplissant leur devoir. (…) Je tiens à envoyer mes remerciements à tous ces braves gens. » Cette dernière tirade déclenche la colère d'un député, qui le traite à deux reprises d'« assassin », et se voit exclu temporairement de l'Hémicycle.
Revendication de la « modération, [de la] fermeté et [de la] prudence » de l'État, controverse sur la responsabilité de l'escalade violente (manifestants ou gendarmes), rôle des « perturbateurs » (étrangers notamment), soutien inconditionnel aux forces de l'ordre : la scène fait écho aux polémiques qui entourent ces dernières semaines la répression des mouvements contre la réforme des retraites ou contre les mégabassines, comme à Sainte-Soline le 25 mars dernier. Pourtant, le député, bien que socialiste, n'appartient pas à la Nouvelle Union populaire écologique et sociale (Nupes) et le ministre n'est pas M. Gérald Darmanin. Il s'agit respectivement d'Ernest Roche et de Jean Antoine Ernest Constans, qui s'affrontent à la Chambre le 4 mai 1891, trois jours après le massacre de Fourmies, qui a fait neuf morts (dont deux enfants) et trente-cinq blessés par balle parmi les ouvriers réclamant la journée de huit heures et le repos du 1er-Mai (1).
« Citoyens temporairement égarés »
Une telle similarité des échanges étonne car, depuis la fin du XIXe siècle, le maintien de l'ordre a beaucoup évolué. Il ne relève plus de l'armée, alors chargée de ce que l'on appelait les « émotions populaires ». Dès que la police locale ou la gendarmerie étaient en difficulté, on la faisait intervenir, comme le 145e régiment d'infanterie à Fourmies. Des Trois Glorieuses de 1830 à la « semaine sanglante » de 1871 en passant par les journées de juin 1848, l'écrasement des crises sociales ou de régime provoque des milliers de morts et des dizaines de milliers de blessés. Mais cette répression brutale ne constituait guère un problème politique, ni même moral. Pour les élites d'alors, le peuple est par nature différent. Il constitue une masse dépourvue de volonté individuelle, prête à suivre aveuglément quelques meneurs dans l'émeute (2). Anne Robert Jacques Turgot, contrôleur général des finances de Louis XVI, livre un condensé de cet imaginaire social dans sa lettre aux élus des états de Bourgogne du 18 avril 1775. À la suite des pillages et de la destruction d'un moulin par des paysans en colère contre le prix du grain, il écrit : « Il faut avant tout en imposer à la populace et être le plus fort », puis « arrêter les chefs de l'émeute, qu'on peut aisément connaître et découvrir », l'impunité étant considérée comme « un grand encouragement pour les émeutes à venir ».
À la fin du XIXe siècle, cette philosophie n'est plus guère soutenable. La domination politique restait le monopole de la noblesse sous l'Ancien Régime ; elle était réservée aux plus fortunés sous la monarchie censitaire ; l'instauration du suffrage universel masculin en 1848 admet le peuple en politique. Les formes les plus coutumières et personnelles d'autorité se dévaluent avec l'apparition des clubs, des comités électoraux, des ligues (comme celle de l'enseignement), des sociétés de secours mutuel, puis des partis. Ces structures organisent les citoyens et constituent le creuset de discours, de programmes et d'idéologies qui mettent particulièrement l'accent sur la question sociale et la condition des travailleurs (3). La mobilisation politique n'est pas pour rien dans l'avènement de la IIIe République et la consolidation des républicains, à partir de 1877. Même si cela va prendre des années, il devient délicat pour le nouveau régime de garantir d'un côté des libertés d'expression (avec par exemple les lois sur la presse de 1881), mais aussi celles de se réunir et de se syndiquer, tout en faisant tirer par la troupe sur ceux qui les exercent. D'autant que l'armée n'est pas toujours fiable. Lors de la révolte des vignerons de 1907 (qui fait sept morts à Narbonne), le 17e régiment d'infanterie se mutine et fraternise avec les manifestants, mettant en difficulté le gouvernement de Georges Clemenceau.
Le début du XXe siècle est donc marqué par plusieurs projets de loi visant à mettre en place une force spécialisée dans la gestion des protestations, distincte de l'armée. Après de multiples hésitations, celle-ci voit finalement le jour le 22 juillet 1921, avec la création de 111 « pelotons mobiles de gendarmerie ». Rebaptisée « garde républicaine mobile » en 1926, cette force comptait 21 000 hommes en 1939 et avait le quasi-monopole du maintien de l'ordre sur le territoire français, à l'exception de Paris. Elle développe une doctrine, un entraînement et des savoir-faire originaux (4). Il s'agit de ne plus traiter les protestataires comme des ennemis ou des adversaires mais comme des « individus temporairement suggestionnés », pour reprendre la terminologie des années 1930, ou des « citoyens temporairement égarés », pour utiliser celle des années 1970. Ceci suppose d'éviter les contacts directs avec ces derniers, dont l'expérience montre qu'ils dégénèrent toujours en affrontements. On leur préfère des techniques de canalisation, de contention et de dispersion des foules, qui impliquent notamment de laisser toujours une porte de sortie. La discipline collective, le barrage des corps, la crosse du fusil et la matraque constituent dans un premier temps les seuls outils disponibles. Ils sont complétés après la seconde guerre mondiale par des technologies permettant de tenir les manifestants à distance, comme le gaz lacrymogène — inenvisageable auparavant en France en raison du souvenir des tranchées —, les grenades offensives et les lances à incendie. En 1944, la police se dote à son tour d'unités spécifiques, les compagnies républicaines de sécurité (CRS), qui comptent près de 13 000 hommes en 1947 et reproduisent l'organisation, la doctrine et l'équipement de la gendarmerie mobile.
Les deux forces s'engagent dans les rugueux conflits sociaux de la période (comme les grèves des mineurs de 1947-1948), au prix d'un grand nombre de blessés de part et d'autre. Mais on remarque une diminution significative des décès parmi les protestataires, notamment en province. Paris reste une exception, le préfet disposant de ses propres unités, prises parmi les effectifs de la police municipale (5). Elles ne disposent ni de l'entraînement ni du savoir-faire de leurs collègues et n'hésitent pas à déchaîner leur brutalité et à « régler leurs comptes » avec les Algériens (sept victimes lors de la manifestation du 14 juillet 1953 et plusieurs dizaines le 17 octobre 1961 (6)) ou les communistes (dix morts au métro Charonne à Paris, le 8 février 1962).
La crise de mai-juin 1968, par sa virulence et son ampleur, met à rude épreuve le ministère de l'intérieur. Contrairement au discours officiel, cinq morts sont à déplorer (trois étudiants à Paris, à Flins et dans le Calvados, et deux ouvriers à Sochaux) mais, surtout, les forces de l'ordre sont apparues dépassées en nombre et en équipement. En conséquence, vingt mille policiers sont recrutés entre 1968 et 1974, et CRS comme gendarmes mobiles reçoivent de nouvelles protections corporelles (casques, visières, jambières, boucliers, masques à gaz) et du matériel offensif et défensif, comme les fourgons-pompe, les véhicules blindés à roues de la gendarmerie (VBRG) et des grenades plus diversifiées. En avril 1969 ouvre également à Saint-Astier, en Dordogne, le Centre de perfectionnement de la gendarmerie mobile (CPGM), destiné à la formation continue des personnels. En 1977, une véritable ville — Cigaville — avec des bâtiments, des rues et des places y est construite, permettant de s'entraîner à toutes les situations du maintien de l'ordre, y compris les plus dures (barricades, cocktails Molotov). Les CRS en profitent aussi, avant de se doter de leurs propres centres. Ces entraînements visent à inculquer aux personnels une discipline collective et une maîtrise d'eux-mêmes permettant de gérer la peur et le stress inhérents à leurs missions.
Une nouvelle actualisation significative de l'équipement s'opère à la suite de la manifestation des marins-pêcheurs de Rennes du 4 février 1994, considérée par les professionnels comme l'une des plus violentes de la période contemporaine (usage de fusées de détresse et de harpons, blessures « de guerre » chez des policiers et gendarmes, incendie du parlement de Bretagne). Des grilles sont apposées sur les véhicules, et surtout apparaissent les tenues de « Robocop », comme les nomment les intéressés : uniformes ignifugés, manchettes, coudières, épaulières et casque en Kevlar, protège-nuque, etc. (7).
La « violence contenue » revendiquée par les forces de l'ordre laisse dans son sillage un vaste cortège de blessés et de mutilés. Mais les victimes mortelles sont rares après 1968, au point que l'on se souvient encore des noms de Malik Oussekine, tué par des voltigeurs motocyclistes lors du mouvement étudiant contre la loi Devaquet, en décembre 1986, ou de Rémi Fraisse, qui décède des suites de la déflagration d'une grenade à Sivens, en octobre 2014 (8). Les responsables policiers en sont même venus à vanter un « modèle français » de maintien de l'ordre. Ils regardent avec circonspection les difficultés des polices étrangères pour faire face au mouvement altermondialiste (comme à Seattle en 1999, à Göteborg et à Gênes en 2001) et restent à l'écart des réflexions qui se mènent au niveau européen.
Pourtant, quelque chose change graduellement à partir de la fin des années 1990. Les principaux responsables gouvernementaux considèrent que la conflictualité sociale a diminué et voient dans les compagnies de CRS et les escadrons de gendarmerie mobile (EGM) un réservoir de personnels pouvant être aisément redéployés dans la lutte contre l'« insécurité », dont ils ont fait une priorité. Amorcé sous le gouvernement de M. Lionel Jospin (1997-2002), ce mouvement s'accélère par la suite. Le programme d'action annexé à la loi d'orientation et de programmation pour la sécurité intérieure du 29 août 2002 indique ainsi : « Les forces mobiles ont été créées dans un contexte historique particulier marqué par des périodes d'émeutes et de troubles collectifs. La démocratie apaisée que notre pays connaît depuis de nombreuses années permet aujourd'hui un changement radical de la doctrine d'emploi des forces mobiles. Cette politique systématique rompant avec la priorité de l'ordre public permet de mettre les trente mille hommes qui constituent aujourd'hui les forces mobiles au service de la sécurité quotidienne. »
Le nombre de policiers et de gendarmes disponibles pour le maintien de l'ordre diminue. Ils ne sont plus que 25 786 en 2015, soit une baisse de presque 15 % par rapport à 2002, alors même que leurs missions se sont diversifiées. La saturation qui en découle pour ces unités s'est traduite par la montée en puissance des compagnies d'intervention (CDI). Existant localement sous des formats divers, elles sont composées de policiers de sécurité publique qui remplissent surtout des missions de sécurisation dans la lutte contre les « violences urbaines » et les trafics de stupéfiants. Reconnaissables à leurs casques barrés de deux bandes bleu roi (qui les distinguent des jaunes des CRS), elles sont devenues depuis la fin des années 2000 un élément central du maintien de l'ordre. Outre le renfort numérique qu'elles apportent, elles sont plus autonomes dans leur commandement et leur action que les CRS et les EGM, considérés comme trop statiques. Elles apparaissent également mieux ajustées que ces derniers à la judiciarisation du maintien de l'ordre.
L'arrestation ne faisait partie qu'à la marge de la gestion des manifestations (par exemple après leur dissolution). Le général Bertrand Cavallier, ancien responsable du CPGM, explique que la doctrine traditionnelle consiste d'abord à « absorber une violence qui est généralement une violence passagère. C'est le concept de désordre acceptable. Quel est l'effet final recherché ? Va-t-on s'intéresser à quelques dégradations ou va-t-on comprendre qu'après cette montée de fièvre il y a un retour à la normale et que l'on va pouvoir discuter et essayer de répondre aux attentes des manifestants, même si ces manifestants ont été violents (9) ? ». À partir du début des années 2000, le tournant punitif des gouvernements qui se succèdent se fait sentir sur ce terrain également. Il s'agit d'en finir avec l'« impunité » et donc d'identifier et d'arrêter des fauteurs de troubles. Les CRS et les gendarmes vidéastes font leur apparition, et plus récemment les « produits marquants codés », laissant des traces sur la peau et les vêtements. Des techniques qui permettent d'intervenir a posteriori. Les procureurs n'hésitent plus à autoriser les arrestations préventives et à organiser leurs services pour agir dans l'urgence. Surtout, on assiste à une actualisation tactique qui sépare les manifestants conformes de ceux qui se livrent à des actes illégaux (les « casseurs »), qu'il faut maintenant aller chercher au cœur même des cortèges. Cette distinction se retrouve clairement dans le schéma national du maintien de l'ordre adopté en 2021. Il formule deux objectifs « distincts ou complémentaires » de la gestion de la manifestation, « la dispersion sans délai des groupes hostiles et des interpellations rapides et ciblées facilitées par la mise en œuvre de dispositifs tactiques permettant d'aller au contact des individus identifiés ». Bien que les EGM et les CRS disposent d'unités capables d'assurer ces tâches, elles sont en pratique assumées par les CDI et surtout par les brigades anticriminalité (BAC) et les controversées brigades de répression de l'action violente motorisées (BRAV-M), créées en 2019.
Malgré tous les efforts rhétoriques pour expliquer la complémentarité de ces tactiques, elles sont partiellement contradictoires. « Impacter » ou « percuter » des « groupes hostiles » a souvent pour effet de stopper les cortèges et de porter la violence en leur sein. Les charges comme les gaz lacrymogènes ne sont pas sélectifs. Ils touchent d'abord les moins aguerris, provoquent l'incompréhension et attisent la colère. De plus, le risque physique d'intervenir dans une foule, en petit nombre de surcroît, augmente la probabilité d'user de la force. De multiples vidéos postées sur les réseaux sociaux attestent le désordre causé par l'intervention de ces polices urbaines, quand elles ne montrent pas les conflits qui éclatent avec les gendarmes mobiles ou les CRS, dont elles désorganisent les dispositifs. Facilement mises en difficulté, elles ont également plus volontiers recours aux grenades de désencerclement et aux lanceurs de balles de défense (comme le LBD 40).
Apparue au milieu des années 1990 (sous le nom commercial de Flash-Ball), cette arme « à létalité réduite » était destinée à l'origine à des unités spécialisées dans la neutralisation des forcenés ou des preneurs d'otages. Elle s'est graduellement diffusée au sein des BAC et des CDI puis s'est généralisée après l'embrasement des banlieues françaises en 2005. Ce sont d'abord ces policiers qui en systématisent l'usage dans les manifestations. Lors de la crise des « gilets jaunes », sur les 13 460 tirs de LBD recensés entre le 17 novembre 2018 et le 5 février 2019, 85 % étaient imputables aux polices urbaines, contre 15 % aux CRS. Sur la même période, la gendarmerie rapportait un millier de tirs (10). Si la controverse sur les ravages qu'elles ont provoqués a fait diminuer l'usage de ces armes, il ne s'en est pas moins banalisé. Le rapport annuel de l'inspection générale de la police nationale (IGPN) relève ainsi 6 684 tirs en 2021, contre 1 514 en 2012, soit quatre fois plus en neuf ans.
Enfin, le rôle dévolu aux polices urbaines dans les manifestations modifie les représentations des manifestants. Portés par leur socialisation professionnelle à se penser comme des « chasseurs », leurs agents ne sont guère enclins à considérer ces derniers comme des « citoyens momentanément égarés ». Ils les voient plutôt comme des délinquants (ou comme leurs complices) et n'hésitent pas à les traiter comme tels : humiliations et brimades diverses, arrestations musclées, etc.
Tous ces facteurs concourent à expliquer la « brutalisation du maintien de l'ordre (11) » repérable depuis le milieu des années 2010, dont le mouvement des « gilets jaunes » a pour l'heure constitué l'acmé. Toutefois, celle-ci reste inintelligible si on ne la relie pas à la délégitimation de la manifestation comme mode d'action politique.
La force intimide, la justice neutralise
Le maintien de l'ordre ne se limite pas à un face-à-face entre policiers et protestataires. Il s'agit d'une relation à trois qui implique également les gouvernants. Tout au long du XXe siècle s'est graduellement développé un ordre manifestant. Celui-ci implique une adaptation des forces de l'ordre, mais aussi des citoyens, lesquels abandonnent progressivement le registre de l'émeute pour des répertoires plus codifiés comme la manifestation. La mise en place de cortèges, de banderoles, de revendications, de mots et de services d'ordre procède de cet apprentissage protestataire (12). Toutefois, il n'est possible que parce qu'il permet la négociation politique, c'est-à-dire qu'il est reconnu comme une expression démocratique du dissensus. Le commissaire Jean-Marc Berlioz, directeur adjoint de la sécurité publique à la préfecture de police de Paris, observait en 1997 : « Désormais tout citoyen est appelé un jour à devenir manifestant, et je partage l'analyse qui veut que la manifestation soit un correctif à l'élection (13). »
Une telle formule semble désormais heurter les représentations des élites gouvernantes, qui n'ont pas la même expérience de l'action collective que leurs aînées. L'élection, même fragile, dont ils tirent leur position est perçue comme la seule source de légitimité et pratiquement comme un chèque en blanc. Le refus du dialogue avec les centrales syndicales (pourtant représentatives, elles aussi) et les groupes mobilisés (comme les personnels soignants) tout comme l'utilisation jusqu'à la dernière extrémité des outils légaux pour museler le Parlement (« 49-3 », limitation du temps des débats, sanctions disciplinaires) attestent une conception verticale du pouvoir qui fait peu cas de la contestation.
Dans les discours, les expressions comme « foules », « meutes » ou « hordes » réactivent une vision de la populace ignare et brutale que n'aurait pas reniée Turgot. On applique d'ailleurs une politique semblable dans ses principes : exhiber la force pour intimider et utiliser la justice pour neutraliser, même temporairement. Charges intempestives, usage abusif des gaz, des LBD ou des « nasses », zones interdites, gardes à vue préventives, amendes, fichages policiers et déferrements en masse se combinent ainsi pour rendre les manifestations plus inhospitalières, incertaines et insécurisantes.
Or la brutalisation du maintien de l'ordre et celle du jeu politique sont les deux faces d'un même processus. Le refus de la négociation et le déni de l'expression manifestante provoquent une colère qui augmente le niveau de violence. La focalisation des médias sur la moindre poubelle brûlée ou sur la dégradation de mobilier urbain renforce cette dynamique. Dans les luttes « pour l'imposition du sens de l'événement (14) », le choix de rapporter les actes les plus spectaculaires plutôt que les revendications exprimées — souvent avec beaucoup d'inventivité — confortent les premiers. Ils trouvent en effet un écho inversement proportionnel à leur poids dans la mobilisation. En retour, ils provoquent un durcissement de l'action policière et facilitent la disqualification de mouvements pourtant massifs, réduits aux menées de ceux que les ministres de l'intérieur nomment commodément les « black blocs », les « anarcho-autonomes » ou l'« ultragauche ».
On perçoit les bénéfices politiques immédiats de cette dislocation de l'ordre manifestant. Ses effets demeurent plus douteux à moyen terme. Elle produit d'abord une adaptation des protestataires. Ils apprennent à mieux se protéger (équipements contre les gaz, apparition des street medics, etc.), à rendre visibles les violences policières (en les filmant) et adoptent des stratégies favorisant la confrontation, la mobilité et l'imprévisibilité plutôt que l'expression de mots d'ordre. Ces évolutions pourraient ensuite déboucher sur un retour à des modes d'action plus radicaux, comme l'émeute, le sabotage, l'incendie, le blocage ou l'occupation.
Des élites ignorantes
Mais, surtout, le gouvernement d'un pays suppose un consentement minimal de ceux sur lesquels il s'exerce, c'est-à-dire des contreparties. Juste après le drame de Fourmies, le député Alexandre Millerand — qui deviendra plusieurs fois ministre, puis président de la République (1920-1924) — interpelle le ministre Constans : « Si la République a été fondée, si elle existe, si elle a été maintenue à travers toutes les crises, vous ne le devez, vous le savez bien d'ailleurs, qu'à ces millions de travailleurs de l'usine, des champs, de la mine qui attendent aujourd'hui de la République les réformes sociales qu'elle leur doit. » Son discours résonne étrangement avec celui de M. Gérard Mardiné, alors secrétaire général de la Confédération française de l'encadrement — Confédération générale des cadres (CFE-CGC), qui s'adressait le 15 février 2023 à la commission des affaires sociales du Sénat : « Votre politique, vous la menez pour qui ? Pour les salariés français ou pour les fonds de pension anglo-saxons ? »
Tous deux nous rappellent que l'instauration et la consolidation d'un État démocratique en France sont inséparables des protections qu'il a dû apporter à la condition salariale, c'est-à-dire des compromis trouvés entre le travail et le capital (15). Le déséquilibre manifeste qui s'est instauré en faveur des plus privilégiés — et que l'on n'essaie même plus de dissimuler — sape ce contrat social implicite. Les élites politiques qui en sont responsables démontent ainsi pierre à pierre une construction dont elles sont les héritières ignorantes. La démocratie représentative ne fonctionne pas comme un dialogue courtois et feutré entre les actionnaires d'un conseil d'administration ou les membres des comités directeurs d'institutions financières internationales. Elle vit et s'exprime aussi par les éclats de mobilisations collectives qui actualisent périodiquement les rapports de forces entre représentants et représentés. En rappelant publiquement l'intérêt du plus grand nombre, elles contribuent à la légitimité de la délégation politique, bien mieux que les consignes de politique pénale, les circulaires sur la composition des grenades lacrymogènes ou les doctrines d'emploi des LBD.
(1) Ces citations sont extraites du Journal officiel de la République française du 5 mai 1891, https://gallica.bnf.fr
(2) Déborah Cohen, La Nature du peuple. Les formes de l'imaginaire social (XVIIIe – XXIe siècles), Champ Vallon, Ceyzérieu, 2010.
(3) Christophe Charle, Histoire sociale de la France au XIXe siècle, Seuil, Paris, 1991.
(4) Patrick Bruneteaux, Maintenir l'ordre. Les transformations de la violence d'État en régime démocratique, Presses de Sciences Po, Paris, 1996.
(5) La police parisienne n'est intégrée dans la police nationale qu'en 1966.
(6) Emmanuel Blanchard, La Police parisienne et les Algériens (1944-1962), Nouveau Monde, Paris, 2011.
(7) David Dufresne, Maintien de l'ordre. Enquête, Hachette, Paris, 2007.
(8) Il faut y ajouter Vital Michalon, victime d'une grenade lors des mobilisations contre l'installation d'une centrale nucléaire à Creys-Malville, en juillet 1977, et Zineb Redouane, tuée par un tir de lacrymogène dans son appartement en décembre 2018 à Marseille.
CATS has cracked down on crime and increased police presence on Blue Line light rail system. But nonpaying customers remain major concern.
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The recent Tamil Nadu Dalit Women’s Conference held in Chennai highlighted the everyday violence imposed on Dalit women and urged economic empowerment as the biggest leveller.
Souvent condamnés jeunes à des très longues peines, des dizaines de milliers de détenus américains ont aujourd'hui atteint un âge canonique, obligés de finir leurs jours dans des prisons où rien n'a été pensé pour eux. Grimper sur un lit superposé, attendre debout dans une file, mastiquer une nourriture inadaptée, sans même parler de rencontrer un médecin : chaque tâche du quotidien est une épreuve.
L'imam Jamil Abdullah Al-Amin, également connu sous le nom de H. Rap Brown, fut l'une des voix les plus influentes du mouvement pour les droits civiques et du Black Power aux États-Unis, au sein du Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) et du Black Panther Party notamment. Surveillé par le Bureau fédéral d'enquête (FBI), il a été condamné à la prison à perpétuité en 2002 pour le meurtre de l'adjoint d'un shérif, une accusation qu'il a toujours rejetée. Il est mort le 23 novembre 2025, à 82 ans, dans un hôpital pénitentiaire de Caroline du Nord, après une longue dégradation de son état de santé.
H. Rap Brown est loin d'être le seul à avoir vieilli et péri derrière les barreaux. En 2022, 186 146 personnes incarcérées aux États-Unis avaient dépassé les 55 ans — le seuil pour être considéré comme « âgé » dans de nombreux États —, contre environ 42 300 en 2000 (1). « On vieillit plus vite en prison, explique M. Jose Saldaña, ancien militant de l'organisation révolutionnaire portoricaine Young Lords, libéré en 2018 après trente-huit ans d'incarcération. Le stress, le manque de nourriture, être jour et nuit enfermé dans une cellule, être séparé de sa famille… Ça accélère le vieillissement. » Les personnes détenues présentent en effet, plus tôt et plus fréquemment que la population générale, des pathologies chroniques, des handicaps, des troubles cognitifs ou des maladies cardio-vasculaires. Un prisonnier de 59 ans présenterait ainsi, en moyenne, les conditions gériatriques d'un homme de 75 ans, tandis que l'espérance de vie diminue de deux ans pour chaque année d'enfermement (2).
Ce vieillissement est en grande partie l'héritage différé de plusieurs décennies de politiques répressives et d'incarcération de masse. À partir des années 1970, puis surtout dans les années 1980 et 1990, les États et le gouvernement fédéral ont multiplié les peines minimales obligatoires, les lois dites « three strikes » (des « trois prises »), qui prévoient des peines très lourdes, voire la perpétuité, en cas de récidives successives, et les dispositifs de « truth in sentencing » (« vérité des peines »), qui obligent les condamnés à purger une large part de leur peine avant de pouvoir prétendre à une libération. En allongeant considérablement les durées d'incarcération et en restreignant les possibilités de sortie, ces politiques ont progressivement transformé la population carcérale : des hommes et des femmes entrés en prison jeunes ou à l'âge adulte y sont restés pendant des décennies, jusqu'à vieillir derrière les barreaux. La part des prisonniers seniors a ainsi bondi de 3 % en 1991 à 15,7 % en 2022. En Floride, 29 % de la population carcérale actuelle a plus de 50 ans. Dans moins de cinq ans, ce sera le cas d'un tiers des prisonniers américains.
À même le sol pendant des heures
Cette transformation pose une myriade de difficultés logistiques et financières. Les prisons ont été pensées pour des personnes autonomes, mobiles et capables de supporter les contraintes physiques de la détention. « Elles ne sont pas construites pour les personnes porteuses de handicap, qui ont besoin d'un fauteuil roulant, d'un déambulateur ou même d'une canne », observe le chercheur Thomas Baker. Un migrant mexicain actuellement enfermé à Adelanto, en Californie, nous raconte qu'un de ses codétenus âgés se douche rarement, l'opération étant trop périlleuse avec un déambulateur. « Les détenus âgés n'ont pas accès au soutien dont ils ont besoin : ils doivent quotidiennement accomplir des tâches au-delà de leurs capacités physiques, comme monter sur un lit superposé, attendre debout dans une file, mastiquer de la nourriture inadaptée… », détaille la chercheuse et avocate Michele Deitch, directrice du Prison and Jail Innovation Lab. Quant aux personnes atteintes de démence, elles sont incapables d'obéir aux règles drastiques de la détention, ce que les surveillants ne tolèrent pas.
Les prisons américaines manquent de moyens et de personnel. Dans le Michigan, par exemple, 910 postes pénitentiaires, 504 postes médicaux et 55 postes administratifs étaient vacants en décembre 2024, soit près de 15 % des effectifs (3). Dans le Colorado, pour pallier cette situation, l'administration pénitentiaire a réassigné des agents à des postes de sécurité, abaissé l'âge de recrutement à 18 ans et imposé de nombreuses heures supplémentaires à ses employés. Pour les détenus âgés, ce sous-effectif a des conséquences très concrètes : consultations médicales retardées, diagnostics et traitements repoussés, déplacements limités… Dans une prison de Los Angeles visitée par l'American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), les patients devaient attendre leurs soins à même le sol pendant des heures. Selon Baker, le problème est notamment géographique. « Les prisons américaines se trouvent souvent dans des zones rurales éloignées. Il est difficile de convaincre les rares professionnels de santé qui voudraient bien travailler en prison de faire de longs déplacements vers ces lieux peu attractifs. » Le vieillissement des détenus accentue les failles d'un système déjà sous tension.
Ces difficultés n'exonèrent pas les établissements pénitentiaires de leurs obligations légales. La loi relative aux Américains porteurs de handicap (ADA) les oblige en effet à rendre leurs espaces comme leurs activités accessibles à tous, et à fournir certains équipements et aménagements adaptés. Mais beaucoup de détenus connaissent mal leurs droits ou n'ont pas les moyens de les faire valoir. Ils doivent donc le plus souvent se débrouiller seuls, ou s'entraider. « Quand je suis arrivé en prison en 1980, j'ai croisé un autre prisonnier, plus vieux. Il m'avait dit : “Si tu ne dois avoir que deux livres avec toi, que ce soient ton livre sacré et un dictionnaire médical.” C'est devenu ma deuxième Bible. J'ai appris à lire mes résultats d'examens et, dès que quelque chose clochait, j'écrivais pour demander à voir un médecin », relate M. Saldaña. À son tour, il a aidé un autre prisonnier : « Je lui ai montré comment porter plainte parce que sa cellule ne respectait pas la loi. Ils étaient censés tout adapter : le lit, le fauteuil, les toilettes, les lavabos… Pour se venger de sa plainte, ils l'ont mis à l'isolement, l'ont laissé tout seul sur un lit, où il se souillait ; ils glissaient sur le sol un plateau-repas qu'il ne pouvait pas attraper… » Difficile de savoir combien de détenus âgés vivent de telles situations. Selon les associations spécialisées, les abus et maltraitances seraient monnaie courante, mais la plupart ne sont pas signalés, faute de pouvoir recueillir aisément la parole des détenus. « Cela passe essentiellement par des échanges de courriers. Cela prend du temps, les gens ne savent pas toujours bien écrire ou donner les détails qui nous sont utiles », explique Mme Jia Min Cheng, avocate de l'organisation Disability Rights California (DRC).
Faut-il maintenir en détention des individus âgés dont le risque de récidive est faible, alors que leur prise en charge coûte cher ? Une étude publiée en 2017, portant sur plus de 25 000 personnes libérées de prison, montre que 13,4 % de celles qui avaient 65 ans ou plus ont été de nouveau arrêtées dans les huit années suivantes, contre 67,7 % des moins de 21 ans (4). En outre, les prisonniers âgés coûtent environ trois fois plus cher à l'administration pénitentiaire que les détenus plus jeunes, principalement en raison de leurs besoins médicaux. « Difficile à défendre auprès des contribuables », souligne Baker. Dans ce contexte, de nombreux États prévoient des dispositifs permettant d'abréger l'incarcération des personnes âgées ou gravement malades : la medical parole, ou libération pour « raison médicale », et la geriatric parole, qui permet d'examiner le cas d'un détenu à partir d'un certain âge. Dans les faits, ces mécanismes restent peu utilisés. « La plupart des membres des commissions sont nommés par le gouverneur. Et ils sont très frileux, ils ont peur de prendre les mauvaises décisions, que ça se répercute sur le gouverneur. Alors ils jouent la sécurité », constate Deitch. Selon les données fédérales, 84 % des 31 069 demandes de libération compassionnelle soumises aux tribunaux entre 2019 et 2023 ont été rejetées (5).
Pour ceux qui sortent, une autre épreuve commence : la réinsertion. Comment retrouver un logement et des repères après plusieurs décennies derrière les barreaux ? « Il ne s'agit pas de relâcher les prisonniers si c'est pour qu'ils deviennent des sans-abri. Il faut des soutiens pour les accompagner », rappelle la chercheuse. « La réinsertion est difficile, confirme M. Saldaña. C'est pour ça qu'on se bat pour que les gens soient libérés à un âge où ils sont encore “productifs''. » Il cite l'exemple d'Osborne, un programme de logements à New York pour les personnes âgées anciennement incarcérées : une résidence entièrement adaptée, avec des logements indépendants et accessibles, une cour… Mais les secondes chances comme celle-ci restent rares. M. Saldaña a lui-même essuyé quatre refus de libération conditionnelle avant de convaincre la commission.
Et, pour ceux qui ne sortiront jamais, reste une question : comment mourir en prison ? Gravement malades ou condamnés à la perpétuité, les détenus finissent souvent leurs jours en cellule ou dans un service de soins palliatifs — quand il en existe… À Kilby, en Alabama, où il a passé treize ans derrière les barreaux, M. David Garlock a participé à un programme d'hospice assuré par des détenus volontaires. « Ils ont mis une affichette à la recherche de bénévoles pour l'hospice. On était trente-deux volontaires au départ de la formation. Après avoir appris qu'on devrait changer des couches, des pansements, laver les patients…, nous n'étions plus que trois », racontait-il lors d'une conférence (6). Ce modèle de soins par des pairs existe dans plusieurs prisons américaines mais reste peu répandu. À Vacaville, en Californie, le service de soins palliatifs fait lui aussi appel à des détenus pour accompagner les patients. Ils sont rémunérés 24 cents de l'heure, contre environ 1 dollar pour ceux employés au nettoyage de l'établissement. En prison, loin de leur famille, les détenus sont aussi condamnés à prendre soin des autres jusqu'à leur dernier souffle.
Danny Tommo, the anti-migrant activist, has been denied bail after appearing in court for allegedly slashing a migrant boat in the Channel – despite the five suspects in the RAF Fairford terror plot all being bailed.
Residents are shaken and demanding answers after ICE agents terrorized a quiet, suburban neighborhood in Frederick, Maryland, earlier this month. On September 4, federal agents swarmed the Tasker’s Chance neighborhood in West Frederick, invaded the home of one family, and eventually left without making any arrests. ICE agents were filmed beating peaceful protestors and menacingly driving their unmarked cars onto sidewalks and private property while local police officers stood by and watched. In this on-the-ground report, TRNN takes you to the very spot in Frederick where these terrifying events transpired, and we speak with an eyewitness who saw everything.
The following is a rushed transcript and may contain errors. It will be updated.
Reporter 1:
Breaking story in Frederick. We have been told that ICE agents have been camped out in the Taskers Chance neighborhood. Neighbors
Reporter 2:
Say ICE has made a move on one home under the cover of night. That’s exactly what you are seeing right now.
Soolah:
There were protestors next to me. There are protestors across the street. And then I turned to this car and it was right here. And then I heard out of the side, the siren go off and I turned and here’s this car coming at me from on the sidewalk. By
Reporter 1:
Friday night, protestors were chanting on the sidewalk, also trying to block the street and a home they believed ICE was targeting. That’s when Santos says ICE became aggressive. This video shows when an ICE officer drove up on the sidewalk toward protestors. Santos and local activist Sula Kemp say ICE officers became violent.
Maximillian Alvarez:
I’m standing here in Frederick, Maryland, just over an hour west from Baltimore, and I’m standing in a quiet residential neighborhood where just over a week ago, ICE agents in unmarked cars swarmed this neighborhood, surrounded the house behind me. ICE agents are on video beating peaceful protestors with their batons, menacingly driving their cars onto the curbs into the directions of protestors. And I’m standing here with Sula, who is a local resident of the area and who was here the night of those events. Sula, thanks so much for joining me here. Can you walk listeners through what happened and what you saw that night?
Soolah:
Okay. I was asked by as many people were asked to come and help. So I had that time and I was able to come down and I saw different ICE peoples actually around this whole neighborhood. They were in different pockets and locations. I hadn’t even come to this street. I had gone to two streets down and then the next street right over and you could see where they were positioned. And then there was also one that was driving around that seemed to be sort of intimidating by chasing cars, which I thought was really strange behavior because you didn’t see anything on the vehicle to say who it was. It didn’t say police, it didn’t say anything. Didn’t have any markings on the cars. So we didn’t know who they were. Assumed they were ice and their lights were just kind of on. They’re just sitting in their cars parked on the street.
So then there was a call later. I was there about three hours and then somebody had just said they need people on this street specific. So I was like, “Well, I’ll just walk over.” And they said that there was one car that had a spotlight on protestors. And what they were apparently trying to do on this street was just line the sidewalk, a public space with protestors. So that was fine. So I was like, “All right, let me take my phone and go to the other side and get the perspective of the spotlight being put onto the protestors.” So I did that. I first took a bit of video from this side as an observer and then went to the other side and stood there and watched just cars. And then all of a sudden as I was standing on the sidewalk, I heard a siren go off, just a few bursts of it.
And I happened to turn my camera and there was a car on the sidewalk coming toward me and telling me, and everybody who’s on the sidewalk, “Move, move, get out of the way.” At some point they sa, “You’re impeding a federal investigation.”
Maximillian Alvarez:
We’re talking about a car driving up
Soolah:
Right
Maximillian Alvarez:
Here where we’re standing.
Soolah:
Right. On the sidewalk, public space.
Maximillian Alvarez:
These are people’s houses. They’re driving onto people’s property.
Soolah:
Well, and if you or I had done that, what would’ve happened to us?
Maximillian Alvarez:
Yeah, they’d throw my ass in jail.
Soolah:
Reckless endangerment of people. And it was crazy. They stopped for a hot second and I jumped onto the grass at first and then I stepped back onto the sidewalk because I was like, “I don’t know what’s happening.” Just a natural response. I was like, “Wait a minute, I’m on the sidewalk.” So I stepped back on the sidewalk and then he started really coming. He did not stop and he sped up toward me first and then there was a woman behind me. And then there was another person, another protestor that they did hit and started to push with their car.
Maximillian Alvarez:
So you were standing right around here?
Soolah:
I was right here. And there was a car there. There was a car across the street. So I had my camera on this car. There were protestors next to me. There were protestors across the street. And then I turned to this car and it was right here. And then I heard out of the side, the siren go off and I turned and here’s this car coming at me from on the sidewalk. I jumped over to here. He passed me. He hit another protestor and then pushed that protestor out of the way. And then the protestors at some point have been sitting down, just linked arms, sitting down, singing and chanting right in the middle of the street, which is fine. They can do whatever they want to.
Maximillian Alvarez:
Community members surrounding one of their neighbor’s homes to try to protect them. Yeah. And then agents of the state come in and start beating the hell out of them for it.
Soolah:
Yeah. So they sat in the road and then they did get up and did that protection. And it’s a typical thing that people do to blockade, but peacefully, they didn’t do anything. They just linked arms. You can’t do much when you’re linked arms. And it’s a whole group of people. And then all of a sudden Frederick Police were coming and then they moved up to the porch area and started beating them up.
Maximillian Alvarez:
You and I are standing here right now on this quiet residential street. People who are watching this may have only seen a small slice of this street on line. What they can’t see is that this is the quietest residential street you can imagine. There’s nothing happening here. You would think with all the ICE agents and vehicles that were here last week that this would be a hotbed of overrun with criminals and criminal activity. It’s just families and houses.
Soolah:
Yeah, it’s very quiet here. You can drive around here and people are working, people are doing their lives and that’s it. So it’d be like every day storm into your everyday world in your suburban America, and that’s what happened. And when you look at now, it’s quiet, it’s peaceful here. So they brought a sense of terror and they brought a sense of unsafety. So yeah, the main set of protestors, they’re stationed on the sidewalk here right at the stop sign. There’s a whole group here. And then there was an ice vehicle here. There was an ice vehicle behind –
Maximillian Alvarez:
Right behind
Soolah:
Where I’m standing. Right behind where you’re standing. Because they started sort of parading in, it looked like a little ice parade. And I’m just joking about that because it was so weird. Once they got into the house, I could hear up in one of the rooms them banging stuff around. And another protestor had asked me, who was observing, asked me, “Do you hear that?” I was like, “Oh yeah,” because it was loud. I don’t know how the house was on the inside when this was all done, but this was a lot. And then I actually went and looked through the back part. They had a shed or some kind of building out in the back there, and you could see these guys go into the back and they started searching. They didn’t know how to get open the shed or whatever because it’s big, but eventually they did.
And it was eerie. It was very eerie.
Maximillian Alvarez:
And it feels reminiscent of the Gestapo view.
Soolah:
It does because who bangs down a door like that? Who goes through looking for whomever? And apparently they didn’t take anybody. I don’t understand why it all happened in the first place.
Maximillian Alvarez:
Yeah. So all that terror for nothing?
Soolah:
All that terror for nothing.
Maximillian Alvarez:
How do you move on from something like this? How does this community move on? How are folks responding?
Soolah:
I know right now they’re collecting donations for the people who were beaten because they had hospital bills. And it’s really hard because I don’t know them all personally. I came because just like anybody else, we don’t know each other half the time, but we do see something in need. So they do have a donation set up for them specifically. I am not sure what the next steps are. I know that I have personally tried to contact the attorney general’s office a few times. I haven’t heard anything yet. And I’m hoping that somebody who’s above, in some kind of governmental stance or something, because who feels safe going to the police when you watch the police stand there? There’s the question. I didn’t report anything to them, even though I had a vehicle come at me on the sidewalk. I doubt anybody else is really going to feel comfortable or safe, and maybe that’s the point.
Maybe that was the point too. I can’t speak for that, but it’s just what goes in my head, why would I contact you to tell you what happened? So I want to go higher up.
Maximillian Alvarez:
And so when you were here and you had federal agents and unmarked cars and you also had local police, did you feel in that moment like the police were there to protect you?
Soolah:
No. And the wild thing too is on the car that, at least this car that came at me, you couldn’t tell who they were because their license plate was tinted out. There’s nothing identifying that either. So who are these people? I don’t know if Frederick Police had some kind of directive because I don’t know what even drew them out here in the first place. Maybe they heard that people were getting beat maybe, but they were here before that happened. So maybe they have to take a specific. I don’t know. I literally do not know. And if that’s the case, if they have a specific directive or they don’t know what to do, maybe that needs to be talked about. Maybe something like this, when you have unmarked cars doing reckless behavior with their cars, doing reckless behavior towards other people, what is the community’s protect and serve folks going to do for the community?
Yeah.
Maximillian Alvarez:
Who are you protecting? Who are you
Soolah:
Serving?
Maximillian Alvarez:
Not us.
Soolah:
There are tax dollars going into all of this too, that people are going to step back and go, “Wait a minute, what’s happening here? I’m putting money toward them and it’s whoever was called out here for that night.” Who knows? I don’t know. But at the end of the day, who are they protecting?
ICE agents terrorized this suburban neighborhood in Frederick, Maryland, and beat peaceful protestors while local cops just watched. We speak with an eyewitness who saw and filmed everything.
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