Intelligence services from five European countries warn that Russia is expanding assassination and sabotage operations against defence manufacturers supplying Ukraine. The threats coincide with an alleged plot against Poland’s prime minister and defence minister, raising concerns about Moscow’s efforts to undermine European military assistance through intimidation and political destabilisation.

European intelligence agencies have warned that Russia is intensifying efforts to assassinate executives of defence companies supplying Ukraine, extending its campaign of sabotage and intimidation into the European military-industrial sector.

According to intelligence assessments obtained from five European security services, Moscow has ordered an expansion of covert operations targeting senior figures at major arms manufacturers and smaller companies producing drones and military components. Germany’s domestic intelligence agency, the BfV, has reportedly advised executives to strengthen personal security, while some manufacturers have already increased protection for senior personnel.

The warnings emerged alongside reports of an alleged assassination plot against Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and Defence Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz. Polish authorities convened an emergency security meeting and subsequently detained a suspect. No connection between the Polish case and Russian intelligence has been established.

Europe becomes Moscow’s principal target

The apparent expansion of Russian covert operations reflects a shift in Moscow’s calculations concerning Western military assistance.

President Vladimir Putin had reason to anticipate that Donald Trump’s return to the White House would weaken American support for Kyiv. Trump repeatedly questioned US military expenditure on Ukraine and advocated a negotiated settlement with Russia. A substantial reduction in American weapons deliveries could have increased pressure on Ukraine to accept Moscow’s territorial demands.

Instead, European governments assumed greater responsibility for sustaining Ukrainian defence capabilities, including financing weapons purchases and expanding domestic production.

The European Union’s €90 billion support programme for 2026–2027 allocates €60 billion to defence procurement and industrial capacity. The EU has also established mechanisms allowing Ukraine to participate in European joint procurement programmes.

Disrupting European manufacturers therefore offers Moscow a means of restricting Ukraine’s military capabilities without directly confronting NATO.

Assassination threats can interfere with procurement even when attacks are never carried out. Large manufacturers can afford extensive security arrangements, but smaller companies producing electronics, drone components and specialised equipment often lack comparable resources.

Intimidation could delay contracts, discourage investment and persuade individual suppliers to withdraw from Ukrainian defence programmes.

Sabotage as an instrument of political pressure

Russia’s alleged interest in targeting defence executives is not unprecedented. In 2024, American intelligence reportedly uncovered a Russian plot to assassinate Armin Papperger, chief executive of Rheinmetall, one of Germany’s principal suppliers of ammunition and military equipment to Ukraine.

As EU Today previously reported, Moscow has also publicly identified European factories involved in Ukrainian drone production, increasing concerns that civilian industrial facilities could become targets of Russian operations.

European authorities have investigated suspected Russian involvement in arson, infrastructure attacks and clandestine networks. An earlier cross-border investigation into alleged assassination and sabotage preparations demonstrated how intermediaries could be recruited to conduct operations while obscuring their sponsors.

Such activity also carries political consequences. Attacks against infrastructure and industrial facilities can reinforce public fears about confrontation with Russia, particularly during elections when parties advocating accommodation with Moscow seek to exploit security concerns.

Poland has already experienced mounting Russian hybrid pressure, including threats to critical infrastructure and information operations intended to aggravate domestic political divisions.

Putin’s strategy against European rearmament

Ukraine’s continuing strikes against Russian refineries and military-industrial facilities have added economic and operational pressures to Moscow’s prolonged war effort. Russia retains substantial military production capacity, but the costs of sustaining the conflict remain considerable.

Interfering with European weapons manufacturing could serve two objectives: restricting Ukraine’s access to equipment and obstructing Europe’s longer-term rearmament.

The Kremlin does not necessarily need European governments to abandon Ukraine formally. Production delays, disrupted contracts and reluctant suppliers could reduce the practical effect of military assistance even while political commitments remain unchanged.

European governments have acknowledged the industrial challenge. In its June conclusions on European defence, the European Council called for accelerated manufacturing capacity, stronger supply chains and closer cooperation with Ukraine’s defence industry.

Russia’s apparent strategy seeks to exploit the dependence of these programmes on private companies and skilled civilian personnel.

The warnings from European intelligence agencies suggest that protecting defence executives, engineers and contractors is becoming part of the continent’s wider security responsibilities.

For Moscow, intimidation offers the possibility of weakening Ukrainian military resistance without an open confrontation with NATO. For European governments, preventing covert operations from disrupting weapons production is increasingly inseparable from their commitment to sustain Ukraine’s defence.

O Farense venceu hoje em casa o lanterna-vermelha Feirense por 2-1, na sétima jornada da II Liga de Futebol, seguindo em terceiro na competição, com 14 pontos.

O jogo, que foi o primeiro no campeonato para Rui Ferreira no regresso ao comando técnico do Feirense, começou equilibrado, mas num livre descaído para a esquerda, Matheus cruzou para a cabeça de Gonçalo Silva que adiantou os algarvios aos 29 minutos.

Logo no início da segunda parte, ao minuto 50, o Farense aumentou a vantagem com um golo de Singh, sendo que o Feirense reduziu à passagem do minuto 80, com um golo de cabeça de Jair Monteiro, fixando o resultado final.

O Farense soma 14 pontos, ocupando a terceira posição da II Liga, apenas atrás do Lusitânia de Lourosa e do Sporting B, que têm, respetivamente, 17 e 15 pontos.

O próximo jogo dos “leões de Faro” é para a Taça de Portugal, frente à equipa de Marco de Canaveses, no dia 17 de outubro, às 15h. Para a liga, o próximo adversário é o Penafiel, atualmente 4.º classificado, no dia 24, pelas 18h, no Estádio de São Luís.

The global defense industry appears to be entering a period of structural transformation, driven by rising military spending, technological change, and increasing private-capital involvement.

The “Aerospace & Defense M&A Report 2026: Deal Activity, Market Trends and Outlook,” published by Ropes & Gray LLP  on October 7, 2026, says that Aerospace and Defense Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A), Private Equity (PE), and Venture Capital (VC) funding are likely to expand further, showing that 2026 is on track to be one of “the strongest deal-making years” on record.

The report highlights that Defense Tech/Services is the fastest-growing segment at a 22% Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR), followed by Aerospace at 16% CAGR; Aircraft Manufacturers, Parts & Components at 14% CAGR; and Air, Land, & Sea Defense at 9% CAGR.

The report argues that the growth is not simply a temporary response to international conflicts. Governments are rebuilding industrial capacity, replenishing weapons inventories, strengthening supply chains, and accelerating the development of advanced military technologies.

In the United States, the largest market, proposed increases in defense resources, procurement reforms, longer-term contracts, and financial support for defense technology companies aim to attract private capital and expand manufacturing capacity.

In Europe, the EU’s Security Action for Europe initiative aims to mobilize about €800 billion in defense-related investment through national fiscal flexibility, loans, and related financing support.

Germany’s increased spending and procurement reforms can accelerate equipment acquisition and industrial expansion. Collectively, these policies are reshaping the geography of defense investment in Europe.

In fact, the report says that  Europe has emerged as a major driver of new activity. “Europe has become a primary engine of deal flow, not a secondary market. Rising national budgets and new EU-wide financing mechanisms are reshaping where capital is being deployed as well as dictating deployment speed”, it says. NATO’s higher spending ambitions, European rearmament and new financing arrangements are encouraging companies to expand, consolidate and acquire specialist capabilities.

Meanwhile, the Indo-Pacific is undergoing a rapid, structural alignment driven by what regional planners call a “contested era.”

China is consolidating its domestic defense industry, though restrictions on cross-border investment limit Western investors’ access. Japan is rapidly reshaping its defense posture and adapting to an environment where the traditional binary definitions of “peacetime” and “wartime” have effectively blurred.

In this era of continuous competition, the report says Japan has elevated allied burden-sharing to its foundational organizing principle.

This shift is most visible in the digital domain. With the operationalization of Japan’s Active Cyber Defense Oversight Commission, Tokyo has adopted a proactive cyber defense strategy. By implementing legal public-private threat reporting and neutralized-access protocols, Japan is signaling a willingness to legally counter and neutralize state-sponsored infrastructure targeting before cyber assaults can cripple critical domestic networks.

One of the report’s most important observations is that defense investment is increasingly a private-equity story. Private-equity firms are acquiring established manufacturers, selling businesses to strategic buyers and building larger companies through additional acquisitions. Venture capital is also financing newer businesses developing military technologies.

Among the ten largest transactions listed for 2026 up to September 30 was GE Aerospace’s $11.8 billion acquisition of Consolidated Precision Products. Other major deals involved aerospace leasing, maritime defense, aircraft components, and specialist detection technologies.

Dubai Aerospace Enterprise bought Macquarie Airfinance for $9.0 billion in what was a leasing consolidation. In a move that signals European rearmament, land-defense scaling, and main-battle tank production, KfW Group (German State Bank) is backing KNDS [Franco-German tank maker Krauss-Maffei Wegmann + Nexter] with $7.8 billion.

In other words, private investors are no longer confined to peripheral suppliers. They are becoming key participants in the industrial ecosystem that supports national defense.

Significantly, the traditional reliance on a handful of legacy prime contractors is giving way to an ecosystem heavily backed by private equity and venture capital.

The private sector is now driving global defense deal-making as it pivots toward software-defined defense, autonomy, and next-generation platforms.

The report shows how defense technology is changing the industry’s center of gravity. Although aerospace and defense remains one of the most active and strategically complex sectors for private capital deployment, software-defined defense, autonomy, and next-generation platforms are pulling ahead as the fastest-growing corner of the market.

Investors are particularly interested in artificial intelligence and software-defined defense systems; autonomous platforms, including unmanned aircraft and maritime systems; counter-drone and missile-defense capabilities; space infrastructure and surveillance; and specialist electronics, communications, and mission-critical components.

However, while these technologies can drive rapid growth, they also carry risks due to restrictive policies in the US and Europe. The report notes that regulatory compliance is becoming a structural hurdle rather than an afterthought.

In the United States, the largest market by transaction value, more national security vetting—including CFIUS (Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States) and FOCI (Foreign Ownership, Control, or Influence) mitigation—is becoming foundational to ensuring a clean exit.

In other words, the global defense landscape seems to be marked by a distinct paradox.

On the one hand, geopolitical threat vectors are accelerating at breakneck speed. On the other hand, the financial and regulatory machinery needed to field next-generation capabilities faces structural friction.

As a result, companies may depend heavily on a single government customer, handle classified information, or face restrictions on intellectual property developed under government contracts. Cybersecurity compliance and access to sensitive facilities can also complicate acquisitions.

In the United States, the CFIUS can scrutinize foreign investment for national-security risks. FOCI can also affect access to classified work and sensitive facilities.

Similarly, European foreign-investment screening is marked with many complexities. Even businesses that are not conventional arms manufacturers may face scrutiny if they supply strategically important electronics, software, communications or other dual-use technologies.

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Commercial risks matter too. Fixed-price government contracts can leave manufacturers exposed when costs rise unexpectedly. Buyers must therefore examine contract liabilities, working capital, supply-chain resilience, workforce retention and the restrictions that could affect a future sale, the report advises.

The report’s overall conclusion, therefore, is that while defense investment opportunities are expanding,  success increasingly depends on technological relevance, reliable industrial execution, regulatory compliance and the ability to navigate national-security restrictions throughout the ownership cycle.

What lessons could India draw from the trends above?

For India, the report is particularly relevant because it highlights a shift in how advanced military capabilities are developed and financed. The implications extend beyond aircraft, missiles, and ships to defense electronics, artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, space technology, supply chains, and foreign investment.

India’s first opportunity is to integrate more deeply into international aerospace and defense supply chains. As Western manufacturers expand production and diversify their suppliers, Indian companies could become more important producers of precision components, avionics, electronics, aerospace structures, and maintenance services.

The most instructive lesson may come from GE Aerospace’s September 8, 2026 acquisition of Consolidated Precision Products (CPP). Experts say that it was a paradigm shift in aerospace and heavy industrial manufacturing. For decades, aerospace primes aggressively outsourced manufacturing to optimize their balance sheets, shifting capital-expenditure risks onto multi-tiered supply chains.

But years of systemic, compounding engine delays—magnified by the Pratt & Whitney GTF powder metal crisis and Boeing’s structural manufacturing gridlock — exposed a fatal flaw: primes (like GE) outsourced execution, but they could never outsource the risk.

Therefore, GE Aerospace decided to buy the absolute bottleneck of jet engine production: structural castings and complex airfoils. Its deal with private equity firms Warburg Pincus and Berkshire Partners is meant to address persistent, industry-wide shortages of critical engine parts and airfoils. In other words, GE bought the supply chain to control the delivery.

For India, this implies that beyond focusing on “Make in India” as screwdriver assembly, it should also consider “Own the Supply Chain.”

Second, as defense technology gains primacy, expanding AI-enabled systems, autonomous platforms, counter-drone technology, advanced sensors, and space infrastructure could be more relevant for India than producing isolated components.

Some experts argue that because European primes are cash-rich and seeking low-cost engineering, they would prefer a JV with India to meet capacity needs.

Lastly, as the Ropes & Gray LLP  report illustrates, private equity and venture capital can help consolidate fragmented industries, finance expansion, and support specialized technology businesses. India could adapt this approach to build stronger domestic defense suppliers.

• Author and veteran journalist Prakash Nanda is Chairman of the Editorial Board of the EurAsian Times and has been commenting on politics, foreign policy, and strategic affairs for nearly three decades. He is a former National Fellow of the Indian Council for Historical Research and a recipient of the Seoul Peace Prize Scholarship.
• The author can be reached at prakash.nanda (at) hotmail.com

The post Europe Is Rearming — and U.S. Wall Street is Writing the Checks, Including GE’s Nearly $12 Billion Deal appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

VTM

Uma mulher, de 25 anos, ficou gravemente ferida na sequência de uma colisão entre dois veículos ligeiros, ocorrida por volta das 8h00, na variante entre Benagouro e a A24.

Segundo o comandante dos Bombeiros Voluntários da Cruz Branca, Orlando Matos, a vítima ficou encarcerada no interior da viatura, tendo sido necessária a intervenção dos meios de socorro para a retirar. A mulher foi transportada para o Hospital de Vila Real.

A mulher sofreu uma fratura, necessitou de assistência hospitalar e teve mesmo que ser sujeita a cirurgia referiu Orlando Matos à VTM.

O alerta para o acidente foi dado antes das 8h00, tendo sido mobilizados meios de socorro para o local, incluindo elementos dos bombeiros, duas ambulâncias, com dois elementos cada uma, a VMER e elementos da GNR.

No total, segundo dados da Proteção Civil estiveram no local 9 operacionais e três meios terrestres.

As circunstâncias em que ocorreu a colisão não são, para já, conhecidas.

The post Colisão entre dois veículos provoca um ferido grave appeared first on A Voz de Trás-os-Montes.

VTM

O homem, com cerca de 65 anos, que ontem foi atingido por uma árvore de grande porte na zona industrial de Chaves, acabou por falecer no Hospital de Chaves, para onde tinha sido transportado em estado grave. A informação foi confirmada pelo segundo-comandante dos Bombeiros Voluntários de Salvação Pública, Ricardo Rebelo. 

O acidente ocorreu na manhã de sábado, 10 de outubro, quando a vítima, residente em Torre de Ervededo, se encontrava a realizar trabalhos de limpeza num terreno, na freguesia de Santa Cruz Trindade, no concelho de Chaves, tendo sido atingida pela árvore.

O alerta para a ocorrência foi dado pelas 10h57, tendo sido mobilizados vários meios de socorro para o local. Apesar da assistência prestada, o homem acabou por não resistir aos ferimentos.

Segundo Ricardo Rebelo, segundo-comandante dos Bombeiros Voluntários de Salvação Pública, o homem sofreu duas paragens cardiorrespiratórias após dar entrada no hospital, onde o óbito viria a ser declarado horas mais tarde.

No local estiveram cinco elementos dos Bombeiros Voluntários de Salvação Pública, apoiados por uma viatura, dois elementos da Viatura Médica de Emergência e Reanimação (VMER) de Chaves, o INEM e militares da Guarda Nacional Republicana (GNR).

A operação mobilizou um total de 14 operacionais e cinco viaturas.

The post Homem não resiste a ferimentos após ser atingido por árvore appeared first on A Voz de Trás-os-Montes.

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Paul draws a sharp contrast between tongues and prophecy, but he’s careful to not declare tongues worthless or a problem. He makes this clear with , “Now I want you all to speak in tongues, but even more to prophesy.” But that line is sandwiched between two harsh statements. Paul’s point is that speaking in... Continue Reading

Raising children well weaponizes them for advancing the gospel. Building well enables you to fight well. I wanted my stories to reenchant the world — but what if I raised sharp children who are renegades, mavericks, iconoclasts, insurgents, and terrors to all the dark enchantments of unbelief? Kids don’t anchor ambition; they amplify it. They... Continue Reading

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We’ve simply been reading a chapter of Proverbs each day as a family at the breakfast table. We’ve done the time-tested practice of reading the chapter that corresponds to the day of the month (for instance, Proverbs 12 on the 12th, etc.) My wife and I and our two older boys take turns reading verses... Continue Reading

Our theology may be sound, but we’re often worse than our theology. Deep down, we can still harbor contempt for those who we perceive haven’t come as far as we have—or at least as far as we think they should have by now. Can you truly delight in people who aren’t like you, who do... Continue Reading

We might wonder, though, how God can forgive sin and yet “not clear the guilty”? Isn’t that the nature of forgiveness: to clear guilt, to leave wrongs unpunished? This tension confronts us all throughout Scripture, as well as our experiences in life: How can God be both good and just? One answer is that in... Continue Reading

VTM

Um homem, com cerca de 65 anos, ficou ferido com gravidade na sequência de um acidente com uma árvore, ocorrido esta manhã na zona industrial de Chaves, na freguesia de Santa Cruz Trindade.

À VTM, o 2° Comandante dos Bombeiros Voluntários de Salvação Pública, Ricardo Rebelo, referiu que a vítima estaria a cortar uma árvore quando foi atingida pela mesma.

O alerta foi dado às 10h57. Para o local foram mobilizados cinco operacionais dos Bombeiros de Salvação Pública, a Viatura Médica de Emergência e Reanimação (VMER) de Chaves, uma ambulância do INEM de Chaves e dois veículos da Guarda Nacional Republicana (GNR), com um total de cinco militares.

A vítima foi considerada ferido grave e transportada para o Hospital de Chaves.

As circunstâncias em que ocorreu o acidente são, para já, desconhecidas e estão a ser investigadas pelas autoridades.

The post Homem em estado grave após ser atingido por árvore appeared first on A Voz de Trás-os-Montes.

Russia’s demands for the extradition of International Criminal Court judges and Washington’s sweeping sanctions against the institution have converged within days. The two governments have different grievances, but the consequences of their actions increasingly overlap, raising questions about the political relationship between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin and the future of international criminal justice.

Russia and the United States have intensified their campaigns against the International Criminal Court (ICC) almost simultaneously, exposing an increasingly consequential convergence between the policies of Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump.

On 8 October, Moscow demanded the extradition of ICC President Tomoko Akane and eight other current and former officials. The following day, Washington announced sanctions against the court as an institution, extending earlier measures against individual judges and prosecutors.

The timing raises an obvious question: are these independent campaigns arising from different disputes with international justice, or do they reflect a broader political understanding between Washington and Moscow?

There is no publicly established evidence of a coordinated operation or an agreement between Trump and Putin to undermine the ICC. Nevertheless, the strategic consequences of their respective actions are remarkably similar. Both weaken an institution pursuing criminal proceedings against political leaders whom the two governments seek to protect.

Different grievances, overlapping interests

Russia’s hostility towards the ICC is directly connected to the arrest warrant issued against Putin in March 2023 over the alleged unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children from occupied territories.

The court subsequently issued warrants against senior Russian military commanders, including Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov, over alleged crimes involving attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure.

Moscow’s response has been to pursue ICC personnel through its own criminal justice system. The latest extradition demands follow convictions handed down in absentia by a Russian court in December 2025.

Washington’s confrontation with the ICC has a different immediate origin. The Trump administration objects to the court’s jurisdiction over American nationals and Israeli officials, particularly following the arrest warrants issued against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former defence minister Yoav Gallant.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio has presented the American campaign as a defence of US sovereignty. Yet the sanctions announced on 9 October are not confined to the Israeli proceedings or any investigation involving American personnel.

They target the institution itself, potentially disrupting financial transactions and commercial relationships essential to its operation. This distinction matters because a court-wide restriction necessarily affects investigations beyond those cited by Washington. That includes Ukraine.

The Anchorage question

The political context cannot be separated from the relationship between Trump and Putin, including their meeting in Anchorage, Alaska, in August 2025.

The summit formed part of Trump’s efforts to negotiate directly with Moscow over the war in Ukraine. The American president has repeatedly treated relations with Putin as a question of diplomatic bargaining, seeking arrangements that might produce an agreement where conventional Western pressure has failed.

Against this background, suggestions that pressure on the ICC might form part of a wider accommodation with Moscow warrant scrutiny. However, the proposition that Trump specifically offered Putin assistance in neutralising the court during their Anchorage discussions remains unsubstantiated. There is no verified public account establishing such a commitment.

A more defensible conclusion is that Washington’s independently declared campaign against the ICC also advances an important Russian interest. For Putin, the benefit is clear. Measures designed to restrict the court’s financial and administrative capacity could complicate investigations into Russian conduct, irrespective of the American administration’s stated intentions.

The relationship therefore need not involve explicit coordination to produce politically significant results.

Why sanctions against the institution matter

The escalation from targeting individual prosecutors to sanctioning the entire ICC represents a substantial change. Previous American measures imposed personal and financial restrictions on selected officials. The latest approach threatens the broader infrastructure upon which international criminal proceedings depend.

The court requires banking facilities, secure communications, technology services and commercial suppliers. American sanctions can reach beyond US territory because of the international financial system’s dependence on dollar transactions and American service providers.

The ICC had already anticipated this vulnerability. According to details disclosed in September, the institution has pursued alternatives to American software and financial services to reduce its exposure.

Nevertheless, operational continuity and investigative effectiveness are not necessarily the same thing. The court may remain formally functional while facing additional costs, delays and restrictions affecting prosecutors, investigators and international cooperation.

For Ukraine, this is particularly significant. The ICC holds and evaluates evidence connected to alleged Russian war crimes, including the deportation of children and attacks on civilian infrastructure. Its proceedings preserve a judicial process independent of whatever diplomatic settlement Washington and Moscow might eventually negotiate.

Weakening that capacity would not invalidate existing warrants or automatically destroy evidence, but it could make the pursuit of accountability more difficult.

Europe’s response and its limitations

The European Union now faces a dispute with Washington over an institution that European governments have spent decades supporting.

On 9 October, eight governments issued a joint statement, reaffirming their support for the ICC and rejecting the American sanctions. The signatories included Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Britain, Japan and Canada.

The European Commission also indicated that the EU was prepared to take measures necessary to preserve the court’s operations. Such assurances are politically important, but they do not automatically resolve the practical consequences of American restrictions.

European financial institutions and technology suppliers must consider their own exposure to US sanctions. Sustaining the court may require alternative payment arrangements, commercial protections and potentially further European regulatory intervention.

The EU has discussed extending its blocking statute to shield European operators from the effects of American sanctions. Whether that mechanism can provide sufficient protection remains uncertain.

The dispute also extends beyond the ICC’s current investigations. Ukraine and the Council of Europe are developing a separate Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression, designed to address jurisdictional limitations preventing the ICC from prosecuting Russia’s leadership for the decision to launch the invasion.

The two institutions have distinct legal mandates, although cooperation between them is envisaged. Undermining the ICC would not automatically prevent the special tribunal from operating, but it would weaken an important part of the wider international accountability framework.

A convergence with consequences for Ukraine

Washington and Moscow have not adopted identical positions towards the ICC. Russia seeks to discredit and punish the officials responsible for pursuing Putin. The Trump administration is attempting to restrict the court’s authority and operational capacity, principally in response to proceedings involving Americans and Israelis.

Yet their actions converge at precisely the point where the ICC’s independence becomes politically inconvenient. The distinction between motive and consequence is essential. It would be premature to describe the American sanctions as evidence of a secret bargain struck in Anchorage. It would be equally mistaken to overlook the assistance these measures could provide to Moscow.

The broader concern is that the United States, traditionally central to Western efforts to hold Russia accountable for its invasion of Ukraine, is now applying pressure to one of the principal institutions carrying out that work.

For European governments, the immediate question is no longer simply whether they support the International Criminal Court. It is whether they are prepared to protect its practical independence when the political and financial pressure comes not only from Russia, but also from Washington.

The United States is one of the few developed Western democracies that still carries out the death penalty, with dozens of executions every year.

However, even by American standards, the execution planned for December is unusually severe.

Secretary of War Pete Hegseth has said that Major Nidal Malik Hasan, sentenced to death in 2013 by a general court-martial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), will be executed by firing squad at Fort Hood, Texas, and that the execution will be public.

The Pentagon has since said it will livestream the execution.

It was here in Fort Hood, Texas, that Major Hasan opened fire inside a crowded medical readiness center at Fort Hood, killing 13 people and injuring 32 others in 2009.

Before opening fire on unarmed soldiers, Hasan shouted “Allahu Akbar.” He also shot at the backs of soldiers fleeing toward the parking lot.

Hasan later said it was an effort to stop them from going to Afghanistan and killing his fellow Muslims.

This will mark the first U.S. military execution in over 60 years, the first military execution by firing squad since World War II, and the world’s first-ever officially livestreamed execution.

The last time the U.S. military carried out an execution was in 1961, when Army Pvt. John Bennett was executed by hanging.

The last time the U.S. military carried out a death sentence by firing squad was in 1945.

The best-known case is Private Eddie Slovik, shot by a 12-man firing squad in France in January 1945 for desertion, the only U.S. soldier executed for desertion during the Second World War and since the Civil War.

Nearly 10 months later, Dan J. Lee was executed by the U.S. military’s firing squad in the Philippines in November 1945 for murder and/or rape.

Hasan, therefore, could become the first U.S. servicemember to be executed by a firing squad in over eight decades.

His execution could also become the world’s first officially live-streamed death penalty.

Public executions were common in the medieval period.

In “Discipline and Punish,” French philosopher Michel Foucault writes that the death penalty was a “spectacle.”

“Public torture and execution of criminals provided one of the most popular spectacles of eighteenth-century France,” Foucault wrote in his book.

However, gradually, most countries outlawed public executions.

The UK abolished public executions in 1868 with the passing of the Capital Punishment Amendment Act 1868, which moved all executions behind prison walls.

France followed suit in 1939. In the U.S., the last public execution was carried out in 1936.

Amnesty International said in its report on executions in 2025 that it knew of at least 17 public executions – 11 in Iran and 6 in Afghanistan.

The U.S., therefore, joins a handful of countries like Iran and Afghanistan where public executions are still carried out.

Notably, the U.S. is currently at war with Iran and fought a 20-year-long war with Afghanistan from 2001 to 2021.

The question, then, is what precisely Washington hopes to achieve by joining the league of its adversaries?

Live Streaming of Death Penalty By Firing Squad

It is noteworthy that the general court-martial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) only awarded the death sentence to Hasan in 2013.

Military appeals later affirmed that sentence. The Supreme Court declined review in 2025.

In October 2026, Defense Secretary Hegseth recommended death by firing squad, and President Trump approved the recommendation.

Hegseth later said that the execution will be public, with the Pentagon clarifying that it will be live-streamed.

Hegseth explained part of the reason himself.

“Execution by firing squad. Army major betrays his country. Radical Islamist kills a bunch of Americans at Fort Hood. Of course, we’re going to do it at Fort Hood and do it on a Thursday. We’re going to do it at 1 o’clock, which is when he did it, and it’s going to be soldiers with rifles executing the firing squad,” Hegseth said in an interview with Jack Posobiec on Real America’s Voice.

“It was a radical Islamist attack in uniform inside the ranks, and so he’s going to get a firing squad of soldiers, as it should be. And we’ll make sure that people can watch it, that it’s public, because people need to understand that there are serious consequences for these types of things.”

“Army firing squad for convicted terrorist Nidal Malik Hasan, the jihadist who opened fire on unarmed American soldiers at Fort Hood in 2009. He killed 13 people and wounded 32 others while shouting ‘Allahu Akbar’ during the attack,” Chief Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell said.

The remarks make it clear that the Pentagon wants to send a strong message against internal threats and reassert the Uniform Code of Military Justice’s (UCMJ) ultimate authority.

It is notable that while, in theory, the UCMJ has the power to award the death penalty for criminal behavior in the armed forces, in practice, the awarding of the death penalty by the UCMJ, and its actual implementation, has had a chequered history.

The UCMJ and Death Penalty

UCMJ is the federal criminal code and procedural system that governs the U.S. armed forces.

The UCMJ was enacted in 1950 and took effect in 1951.

The code creates one uniform system of military justice for all branches. Its rules apply to active-duty members of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and Space Force; certain reservists on duty; and others such as prisoners of war or retired members.

Its stated objective is to promote justice, maintain good order and discipline, support efficiency and effectiveness in the armed forces, and thereby strengthen national security. It balances the military’s need for discipline and readiness with procedural protections for the accused.

It contains punitive articles that define both uniquely military offenses, such as desertion, absence without leave, insubordination, and disrespect, and ordinary crimes, like murder, larceny, and sexual offenses.

The general courts-martial under the UCMJ have the authority to impose the death penalty.

From its founding in 1951 till 1961, the U.S. Army carried out 10 executions awarded by the UCMJ, all by hanging.

The last military execution in the U.S. was carried out in 1961, after President Eisenhower approved it.

However, in 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a landmark judgment in the Furman v. Georgia case, effectively placed a temporary moratorium on the death penalty across the United States.

In 1984, President Ronald Reagan signed an order that set detailed rules for military death-penalty trials.

It established that the court-martial could not sentence someone to death just because the crime was serious. The prosecutors must also establish one more “aggravating” factor, such as the killing of more than one person, or killing someone during robbery.

Furthermore, the panel could impose the death sentence only if all members agreed on guilt and the sentence. Under these rules, the UCMJ authorized capital punishment again.

From 1984 till mid-2000s, the military sought the death sentence against the accused in 47 cases.

The panel, however, awarded the death penalty in only 15 out of those 47 cases. Even in these 15 cases, many were later reduced to life imprisonment on appeal or commuted.

For instance, former President Barack Obama commuted Dwight Loving’s 1989 sentence to life in 2017.

Currently, four men remain under a UCMJ death sentence: Ronald Gray (1988), Hasan Akbar (2005), Timothy Hennis (2010), and Nidal Hasan (2013).

Notably, former President George Bush approved Gray’s death sentence in 2008, becoming the first U.S. President since Eisenhower, after a gap of 47 years, to approve a death sentence awarded by the UCMJ.

However, a federal judge stayed that execution so Gray could challenge the sentence in court. His execution has still not been carried out.

Now Trump has become only the second President to approve the death sentence awarded by the UCMJ in 65 years.

Hasan’s death sentence is set for December 3.

Notably, President Trump has not only approved Hasan’s death sentence, but also approved his execution by a firing squad and its live-streaming.

Hasan’s execution, therefore, could mark the return of military executions in the U.S. after over six decades.

• Sumit Ahlawat has over a decade of experience in news media. He has worked with Press Trust of India, Times Now, Zee News, Economic Times, and Microsoft News. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Media and Modern  History from the University of Sheffield, UK. 
• He can be reached at ahlawat.sumit85 (at) gmail.com

The post Fort Hood Live Execution: How Nidal Hasan’s Livestreamed Firing Squad Could Strengthen UCMJ’s Authority appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

As Russian missiles continue to devastate Ukraine, Germany’s disgraced former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder finds time to celebrate Vladimir Putin’s birthday. His latest Moscow pilgrimage is another reminder of the scandalous relationship between German political power and Russian energy money.

There are few spectacles quite so nauseating as a former democratic leader enthusiastically embracing the dictator whose aggression has brought death and destruction to Europe.

Yet there was Gerhard Schröder, Germany’s former Chancellor, grinning alongside Vladimir Putin at the Russian president’s 74th birthday celebrations, apparently oblivious to the moral obscenity of the occasion.

According to Reuters, Schröder visited Putin’s home in Moscow, where the two old friends were photographed smiling and shaking hands against a suitably cosy backdrop of traditional Russian furnishings.

How touching. While Ukrainians endure another year of Russian bombardment, Schröder enjoys the hospitality of the man responsible.

The photographs could scarcely provide a more damning illustration of how completely one of Germany’s former leaders has lost his moral compass.

From German Chancellor to Kremlin’s Favourite German

Schröder’s relationship with Putin has long since ceased to be merely an embarrassing personal friendship. It represents one of the most troubling examples of the revolving door between European political office and Russian commercial interests.

Having served as German Chancellor between 1998 and 2005, Schröder promptly embarked upon a remarkably lucrative second career in the Russian energy industry.

His involvement with Nord Stream was particularly scandalous.

While still Chancellor, Schröder championed the Baltic Sea gas pipeline linking Russia directly to Germany. Shortly after leaving office, he accepted a senior position with the consortium responsible for the project.

The arrangement raised an obvious and deeply uncomfortable question: had German energy policy been shaped exclusively by national interests, or had the groundwork also been laid for an exceptionally rewarding retirement?

There is no need to allege criminal wrongdoing to recognise the appalling appearance of a conflict of interest.

Schröder subsequently became chairman of the supervisory board of Rosneft, Russia’s state-controlled oil giant, in 2017.

This was three years after Putin’s illegal annexation of Crimea, when any responsible European statesman should already have understood the dangers of strengthening Moscow’s financial and strategic position.

Instead, Schröder continued to prosper within the Russian energy establishment.

Nord Stream: The Pipeline That Helped Putin

The Nord Stream controversy was never simply about natural gas.

It was about geopolitical leverage, European security and the extraordinary willingness of successive German governments to disregard warnings from Poland, Ukraine and the Baltic states.

Those countries understood precisely what Berlin preferred not to acknowledge: energy dependence on an authoritarian Russia was a strategic vulnerability.

Schröder became one of the most prominent advocates of precisely that dependence.

The Nord Stream 2 project subsequently became entangled in further controversy surrounding a foundation established in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, ostensibly for environmental purposes, which helped companies involved in completing the pipeline navigate American sanctions.

The foundation received €20 million from Nord Stream 2 AG. The affair prompted parliamentary scrutiny and questions about Russian corporate influence over German political decision-making.

Schröder’s involvement in the wider Nord Stream enterprise remains a central feature of that controversy.

No Shame, No Apology

Even Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 failed to produce the moral reckoning that Schröder’s conduct demanded.

He eventually relinquished his Rosneft position and declined a proposed Gazprom board appointment. His political reputation, however, was already in ruins.

The Bundestag stripped him of his parliamentary office and staff privileges. His own Social Democratic Party faced demands to expel him, although attempts to remove him ultimately failed.

Yet Schröder apparently remains incapable of recognising why his behaviour disgusts so many Germans.

His latest Moscow appearance has provoked outrage from Chancellor Friedrich Merz, whose government described the birthday visit as profoundly immoral. SPD co-leader Lars Klingbeil condemned it as completely unacceptable.

A Useful Friend for the Kremlin

There is another dimension to this disgrace.

Putin has previously suggested that Schröder could serve as an intermediary in negotiations concerning European security. European governments understandably rejected the proposal.

Why would Europe entrust its security to a man whose professional judgement has been so closely associated with Russian commercial interests?

Schröder’s latest Russian appointment, on the supervisory board of supermarket operator Hyperglobus, merely reinforces the impression that Moscow remains an irresistible attraction.

Perhaps he regards himself as a bridge between Russia and Germany. If so, it is a bridge built upon extraordinary political misjudgement.

Schröder is entitled to choose his friends. Europeans are equally entitled to judge him by those choices.

History will remember that, while Ukraine fought for its survival, a former German Chancellor travelled to Moscow to celebrate the birthday of Vladimir Putin, the man directing its destruction.

It is difficult to imagine a more humiliating epitaph for a once-powerful European statesman.

Main Image: Kremlin.ru

President Donald Trump announced an agreement with Vladimir Putin on Friday, 9th October, under which Russia will resume substantial diesel exports to American and international markets, despite Washington’s existing sanctions against Moscow over its invasion of Ukraine.

According to Trump’s announcement following the telephone conversation, Russia will immediately release more than 300,000 tonnes of diesel, followed by 500,000 tonnes in November and another million tonnes shortly afterwards. A further three million tonnes could become available once Russian refining capacity permits.

The announcement was accompanied by a temporary authorisation from the US Treasury allowing transactions involving Russian diesel until 7 April 2027. It represents a substantial departure from the administration’s recent sanctions policy, which had sought to restrict Russian energy revenues and strengthen Washington’s negotiating position over Ukraine.

The timing is politically significant. Trump faces congressional midterm elections on 3 November, while diesel prices have become a growing economic concern for American businesses and consumers. The agreement gives the White House an opportunity to present itself as addressing fuel costs, although its practical effect on prices remains uncertain.

Russian diesel cannot resolve the global supply shortage

Trump has linked the proposed Russian deliveries to his administration’s efforts to restore energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz, arguing that the combined measures will produce a rapid reduction in diesel prices.

The disruption of maritime energy supplies following the confrontation with Iran has, however, created a problem considerably larger than the quantities Russia has initially promised.

The first two deliveries amount to approximately 800,000 tonnes. Even including the subsequent million tonnes, the announced volumes are modest relative to global consumption. Their arrival may provide temporary relief in individual markets, but there is little evidence that they could independently reverse the wider shortage.

Russia’s capacity to maintain larger exports is also uncertain.

Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries have disrupted production and contributed to restrictions on petroleum exports. Moscow has periodically imposed limits to protect domestic supplies, while damaged facilities require repairs before returning to normal operations.

The condition of those refineries is explicitly acknowledged in Trump’s announcement, which makes the proposed additional three million tonnes dependent on their recovery.

This introduces a further contradiction. Washington is seeking Russian diesel at precisely the moment Ukraine is attempting to reduce Moscow’s capacity to refine and export petroleum products.

The economic benefits of the agreement may consequently depend partly on developments in a military campaign that the United States has previously supported through intelligence cooperation with Kyiv.

Zelenskyy rejects sanctions relief without Russian concessions

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy responded critically to the agreement, describing the relaxation of economic pressure as a concession to Putin that had not been accompanied by any meaningful Russian commitment to de-escalation.

In his response to the American decision, Zelenskyy argued that Moscow would exploit renewed export revenues to prolong its war rather than make concessions towards a settlement.

Ukraine has indicated that it remains prepared to consider reciprocal measures concerning attacks on energy infrastructure. Such arrangements would require Russia to stop striking Ukrainian facilities in exchange for restrictions on Ukrainian operations against Russian energy targets.

No comparable undertaking was announced as part of Friday’s diesel agreement.

This distinction is central to Kyiv’s objections. Sanctions relief has traditionally been regarded as leverage to obtain changes in Russian behaviour. In the present arrangement, Moscow stands to receive additional commercial opportunities without publicly agreeing to alter its military campaign.

Lukoil negotiations raise further questions

The agreement also comes amid separate discussions concerning the international assets of Lukoil, Russia’s second-largest oil producer.

A recent account of negotiations involving American investors and Russian officials described proposals involving Lukoil’s overseas oilfields, refineries and distribution businesses.

The discussions have reportedly involved figures connected to Trump’s diplomatic efforts, including Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, alongside Russian representatives.

On Friday, another development complicated the proposed transaction when Carlyle withdrew from the competition to acquire Lukoil’s international assets, previously valued at approximately $22 billion.

The negotiations illustrate the extent to which potential commercial cooperation has entered the broader American-Russian relationship.

There is no verified evidence, however, that the diesel agreement was concluded to facilitate a particular acquisition or benefit individuals connected to Trump’s administration. The commercial negotiations and Friday’s sanctions decision remain separate developments unless further evidence establishes a direct connection.

Washington and Europe move in different directions

The American decision creates an additional complication for European sanctions policy.

On 7th October, EU ambassadors agreed to expand sanctions against Russia’s military-industrial network, approving 1,646 additional designations, many directed at the production of ballistic missiles used against Ukraine.

Britain has also introduced further restrictions on Russian oil-related businesses, tankers and financial intermediaries, reinforcing its stated objective of limiting Moscow’s ability to finance the war.

The contrast with Washington’s diesel authorisation is substantial. While European governments are attempting to restrict Russian petroleum revenues, the United States is providing a temporary legal route for renewed sales.

The development also recalls the difficulties already examined by EU Today in its reporting on sanctions enforcement against Russia’s shadow fleet, where differences in national restrictions and their application have complicated efforts to control petroleum exports.

For Moscow, the significance of Friday’s agreement extends beyond the immediate revenue generated by diesel sales. It establishes that the United States is prepared to relax particular economic restrictions before securing a settlement over Ukraine.

Whether the arrangement ultimately lowers American fuel prices will depend on production, shipping and international market conditions. The diplomatic consequence is already apparent: Russia has obtained an opportunity to restore part of its international energy trade without accepting publicly announced conditions concerning its war against Ukraine.

For Kyiv and European governments, the question is whether this remains a narrowly defined response to an energy shortage or marks the beginning of a broader American policy of separating commercial relations with Moscow from negotiations over Ukraine.

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