The EU adopted its largest-ever round of sanctions listings on 12 October, targeting the suppliers behind Russia’s war industry, the Council of the EU announced. The bloc acted as Russia keeps killing Ukrainian civilians every day, while US President Donald Trump eases sanctions on Russian diesel.
Russia’s planned winter campaign against Ukraine’s infrastructure depends on arms factories fed by a web of component suppliers and on oil revenue that still flows despite Ukraine’s refinery strikes, so every supplier cut off from that web raises the cost of waging it. As Washington eases off, Europe’s own pressure has a gap: its ports still take record volumes of Russian Arctic gas, and a full ban on long-term contracts starts only in 2027.
More than half of the new listings hit the supply chain for ballistic missiles that Russia “uses to kill Ukrainian civilians every day,” EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said in the statement. Russian attacks killed more than 150 people in the past week, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on 11 October.
The list names 826 Russian companies, mid-level firms the Council calls the “core” of Russia’s arms industry, with at least €20 billion in yearly turnover, and 743 people who run them. They make parts for missiles, drones, and military aircraft, from semiconductors and radars to explosives and navigation systems. Their assets are frozen, EU firms may not finance them, and the executives may not enter the EU.
Foreign ministers ratified a deal EU envoys reached on 7 October. Ukraine’s sanctions commissioner Vladyslav Vlasiuk said 60% of the listings came from Ukrainian proposals.
EU foreign ministers in Luxembourg vowed to keep the sanctions despite Trump’s diesel deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Euronews reported. Kallas addressed Washington directly as she arrived.
“The US is our biggest ally, but our message is clear: if we want to end this war, the only way we can do this is (by) putting more pressure on Russia,” Kallas said.
Irish Foreign Minister Helen McEntee called the deal “concerning,” and Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys said it was “not the European way.” Kallas warned that an energy truce covering only refineries would favor Russia, since Ukraine has one refinery and Russia “plenty.”
Trump announced the diesel deal on 9 October, and the US Treasury waived sanctions on Russian diesel until April 2027. Zelenskyy said the EU would provide about €3 billion more in military aid this week.
Trump expects Ukraine to stop hitting Russian refineries under his proposed energy ceasefire, a White House official told Axios. Zelenskyy said Kyiv would halt such strikes if Moscow did the same. On 10 October, Trump told reporters it was time for Ukraine to get a new president. Germany’s foreign minister, Britain’s defense secretary, and a senior lawmaker from Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s party backed Zelenskyy, while the Kremlin sided with Trump.
Zelenskyy offered to hold elections after a 60-day ceasefire, and Kallas said elections are impossible while the war goes on. The Institute for the Study of War assessed that Russia exploits Ukraine’s legal ban on wartime elections to drag out the war.
UK Prime Minister Andy Burnham said Russia interfered in the 2016 referendum that took Britain out of the European Union, in podcast excerpts released on 11 October, the Associated Press reported. His remarks are believed to be the first time a British prime minister has publicly acknowledged such meddling.
Russia’s information war keeps running through Europe’s ballots. German security sources said in August that Moscow was escalating disinformation before state elections, and Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation found more than 200 Russian fake news sites aimed at France last year.
Burnham told The Rest Is Politics podcast that he asked his advisers whether Russia had interfered in the 2016 vote. He asked after taking office in July.
“I’ve had the clear answer that yes, there was,” he said.
He argued that such things must now be put clearly on the record. He did not say how Russia interfered or offer evidence, and Moscow has long denied interfering in foreign votes.
Burnham said he had discussed Russian interference with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz in Berlin the previous week. “You know he was saying to me that the AfD are clearly linked to Russia, funded I believe,” Burnham said, referring to Germany’s far-right Alternative for Germany party. Putting such interference on the record would help “voters in Germany and France understand that some of this politics is instigated via our enemies, namely Russia,” he added.
In 2020, Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee found that the government had actively avoided investigating whether Russia meddled in the referendum. The report noted open-source signs of Russian attempts to sway the Brexit campaign. The government, it said, had never looked for hard evidence.
The government rejected the committee’s call for a review.
“We have seen no evidence of successful interference in the EU Referendum,” it said.
That same year, London said Russian actors had almost certainly tried to interfere in the 2019 general election. The government said they did it by amplifying leaked UK-US trade documents online.
Three weeks ago, Burnham stopped short of this. At the UN General Assembly on 22 September, he said the Kremlin spends around £1.3 billion each year on manipulating information. That is roughly $1.7 billion at recent exchange rates. He cited evidence that Russian agencies tried to interfere in the 2019 general election, but he did not mention 2016.
In the same speech, he said Britain had already helped Moldova protect its elections from Russian interference.
The Alternative for Germany (AfD) has reached 40 percent support in Brandenburg for the first time in a new poll, twice the level of the governing Social Democrats (SPD) and enough to make any coalition without the party or its potential partners extremely difficult.
The Insa survey, conducted for the Märkische Allgemeine Zeitung, Märkische Oderzeitung and Lausitzer Rundschau and published this week, put the AfD at 40 percent, up 6 points from the institute’s previous Brandenburg poll in March.
BRANDENBURG | Sonntagsfrage Landtagswahl INSA/MAZ, MOZ, LR AfD: 40% (+6) SPD: 20% (-4) CDU: 9% (-5) LINKE: 9% (+2) BSW: 7% (-1) GRÜNE: 7% (+2) Sonstige: 8% Änderungen zur letzten Umfrage vom 21. März 2026 Verlauf: https://t.co/R7Fb0r9hmo #ltwbb https://t.co/Ww2EhzqHy6
— Deutschland Wählt (@Wahlen_DE) October 9, 2026
The Social Democrats of longtime Minister-President Dietmar Woidke stood at 20 percent, down four points. The Christian Democrats (CDU), the SPD’s current coalition partner, fell five points to 9 percent. The Left Party also reached 9 percent, while the Greens and the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) each stood at 7 percent.
It is important to note that the next regular state election is not due until autumn 2029, which means support could shift substantially in three years. Nevertheless, the result for the AfD mirrors nationwide trends, especially in the east of Germany, where the AfD recently won in neighboring Saxony-Anhalt by earning 43.8 percent of the vote in the September election.
Brandenburg’s AfD state leader René Springer called the result “a tremendous vote of confidence” that showed “how great the desire for a political new beginning in Brandenburg is.” He added that the party’s goal remained an absolute majority so it could govern the state alone.
The numbers underscore the difficulty of forming a government that excludes both the AfD and the left-wing BSW.
— Remix News & Views (@RMXnews) January 16, 2026
The current SPD-CDU coalition would command only 29 percent. In the 2024 state election, the SPD won with 30.9 percent, the AfD finished second with 29.2 percent, the BSW took 13.5 percent and the CDU 12.1 percent.
After that vote, Woidke initially formed a coalition with the BSW; the alliance collapsed earlier this year following internal BSW disputes, including the departure of Finance Minister Robert Crumbach and other lawmakers, and the SPD later reached a new agreement with the CDU.
Given the poll results in Brandenburg, another possible government coalition would involve the BSW and AfD. Currently, in Saxony-Anhalt, both parties are in discussions to form a ruling government. If that government forms and manages to hold together, it could form a template for ruling governments in the east of the country, where AfD and BSW are strongest. At the same time, the AfD is rapidly growing in the west of the country as well, which is key to its national support, as the western states have far higher population numbers and political weight than the east.
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Prosecutors have opened an investigation into a local Christian Democratic Union (CDU) mayoral candidate of Turkish origin who is accused of staging a racially motivated attack on his own car days before an election he lost badly.
The Itzehoe public prosecutor’s office is examining allegations that Baris Karabacak faked the incident, according to the German newspaper Bild. Authorities obtained and executed a search warrant against the politician and seized at least one electronic device.
Karabacak, an entrepreneur who had previously served as chair of the Uetersen city council, was the CDU’s candidate in the Sept. 27 mayoral election in the town of roughly 18,000 people in the Pinneberg district of Schleswig-Holstein. He finished a distant third with 10.7 percent of the vote. Incumbent Mayor Dirk Woschei of the Social Democrats was reelected in the first round with 51.3 percent; independent candidate Marvin Schöpp received 38.1 percent.
A few days before the vote, local media including public broadcaster NDR reported that the windows of Karabacak’s car had been smashed overnight. A campaign flyer bearing an added message in all capital letters reading “NO TURKS — ALL OUT” was left behind. Police initially investigated the matter as possible incitement to hatred.
At the time, state CDU General Secretary Lukas Kilian publicly backed his party colleague and expressed pride in the CDU’s diversity. Woschei also offered solidarity, stating that political competition must be conducted with arguments and that “violence, hate and racist messages are an attack on the city’s democratic culture.”
Kilian’s tone has since shifted sharply. He told Bild he was “stunned” by the new allegations.
“Anyone who fakes a racist crime abuses the solidarity of many people and mocks the victims of real racism. There is no place for that in the CDU,” Kilian said. The state party has said that if the accusations are confirmed, Karabacak will be asked to resign his membership; failure to do so would trigger expulsion proceedings.
The case remains under investigation, and no charges have been filed. Karabacak has not publicly commented on the prosecutor’s probe.
The episode has drawn attention in a town where Karabacak had earlier faced internal party and council criticism over his leadership style before resigning as city council chair earlier in 2026 and then securing the CDU’s mayoral nomination.
This is also notably not the first alleged hate crime hoax from a German politician. In 2023, Remix News reported on Manoj Subramaniam, a 33-year-old former local Green councilor in the German town of Erkelenz, who claimed he had been subjected to sustained acts of harassment by anonymous right-wing extremists. He showed police evidence of the abuse he had received, which included a threatening letter with a razor blade inserted and a swastika drawn onto his vehicle in red paint.
The case made national headlines last year with several prominent politicians offering their solidarity with Subramaniam for the alleged abuse he had received.
“Right-wing extremists are threatening political volunteers to silence them. Thank you, Manoj Subramaniam, for not being silent and raising your voice,” stated Lamya Kaddor, a member of the Bundestag.
Federal police took protective measures for the politician’s safety, and an intensive investigation was initiated by state security, all at considerable cost to the taxpayer. The only issue, however, was that Subramaniam had made it all up.
“The defendant actually wrote this note himself,” revealed Justus Wassenberg, the press spokesman for the public prosecutor’s office.
It transpired that Subramaniam had also drawn SS runes and a swastika onto the doorbell panel outside his house.
Subramaniam subsequently resigned from his position as a local councilor, and the Erkelenz District Court issued the disgraced politician a penalty order of €3,600 for faking criminal offenses, a fine he appealed.
He reportedly cried during his trial when his appeal failed.
The investigation into the early 2026 firebombing of Brandenburg Antisemitism Commissioner Andreas Büttner’s home stunned the public.
While the case was initially treated as an Islamist or antisemitic hate crime, the German Public Prosecutor General’s Office now identifies two men from Büttner’s “own circle,” which belongs to the left, as the primary suspects.
One of the men is also linked to the threatening letter sent to Büttner. Meanwhile, Büttner said he was shocked and described it as the biggest betrayal of his life. He also stated that if the two were responsible, the act had nothing to do with antisemitism in his view. So far, the prosecutor’s office has continued to list Büttner as a witness or injured party, not a suspect. News outlets have highlighted that there was a €3,000 transfer from Büttner to one of the men shortly before the incident, which he called a loan, and other joint activities.
These details prompted public questions and speculation in some outlets about possible staging or a “false-flag” element, but no official finding has supported the claim that Büttner ordered or knew of the act in advance. The case still reportedly remains under investigation.
The post ‘NO TURKS – ALL OUT’ – CDU candidate with Turkish background allegedly faked hate crime attack right before local German election appeared first on Remix News.
Russia suffered vastly more casualties than Ukraine in September, a senior NATO military official told Bloomberg. Ukraine’s General Staff put the month’s Russian toll only slightly lower.
September’s toll lands on a recruitment system that was already falling short. Ukraine’s military intelligence (HUR) estimated that Russian losses outran new contracts in June and July, when monthly losses ran lower. In August, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, citing military intelligence, warned that Russia is preparing a mass call-up after its parliamentary elections. That vote ended on 20 September.
Russian casualties passed 50,000 in September, up to 28,000 of them killed, the official said. Ukraine’s losses over the same month came to about 5,000, according to the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity. Russia does not release casualty figures, Bloomberg noted. In late August, Pavlo Palisa, deputy head of Ukraine’s Presidential Office, put Russia’s July losses at 43,000 killed and wounded. Bloomberg could not confirm his figures.
To push forward, Russia keeps feeding troops into “kill zones,” the official said. These are stretches of ground saturated with armed drones, mines, and artillery fire. Maksym, call sign Rumyn, is a deputy company commander in the 46th Airmobile Brigade’s drone battalion. In April, he said the zone once ran 3–5 km deep and is now several times larger.
Russia’s defense spending is expected to near $199 billion this year, Bloomberg reported, citing two sources close to the government. That is about 40% above the plan the government set in late 2025.
Russian President Vladimir Putin would struggle to wind down the invasion without a political cost, Martin Jäger said last week. He heads Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service (BND).
German industry expects Russian sabotage against the country’s companies to persist and take more forms, the deputy head of the Federation of German Industries (BDI) told Handelsblatt. His warning follows alarms from Germany’s intelligence services, which describe the country as a main target of Russia’s covert campaign in Europe.
Russia keeps striking Ukrainian cities and power plants every day while trying to weaken the European support that keeps Ukraine fighting. Germany is home to arms makers producing with and for Ukraine, so pressure on its companies targets the supply behind Ukraine’s defense.
The warning came from Holger Lösch, the BDI’s deputy managing director.
“German industry is preparing for the threat to persist and for attack methods to become more varied,” he told Handelsblatt. “Companies don’t end up in the crosshairs by chance,” he added.
Russian influence and sabotage operations are no longer an abstract scenario, and companies, critical infrastructure, and defense supply chains are already among their targets, Lösch said. Companies now receive more threat warnings, and their cooperation with the authorities has improved significantly, he noted. “What is still missing are joint procedures to quickly derive concrete measures from warnings,” Lösch said, calling the protection of the economy a cornerstone of national security.
The warning comes a week after a public hearing of the intelligence oversight panel of the Bundestag, Germany’s parliament, on 5 October. There, Martin Jäger, head of Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service (BND), said Russia was waging a shadow war against Germany. “Germany has become a main obstacle to Russian hegemonic power projection in Europe and thus a target of Russian action,” Jäger said. “The danger of attacks against targets in Germany remains real and present,” he warned.
Sinan Selen, head of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), Germany’s domestic intelligence agency, told the same hearing that Russia was showing a readiness for sabotage and killings.
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said on 1 October that Germany was preparing for further hybrid attacks, “including serious ones,” and would respond “quickly and very clearly,” as it did after the drone attack at Leipzig airport.
In August, a drone carrying Semtex explosives hit the wing of a Ukrainian An-124 cargo plane at Leipzig/Halle Airport but did not explode. Germany blamed Russia on 1 September, and German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul said Germany was not at war with Russia but was a “target of war.”
German authorities suspect Russian intelligence of commissioning an arson attack near two Munich defense firms, and a confidential Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) assessment counted more than 165 suspected sabotage cases in Germany between January and August. The same assessment recorded 747 suspicious drone incidents involving 1,068 drones over critical infrastructure, military sites, and defense companies.
Germany’s Military Counterintelligence Service (MAD) warns that the threat from low-level agents, locals paid small sums for one-off jobs such as arson or photographing military sites, has increased significantly. European intelligence agencies also report that Russia is increasingly targeting defense company executives, including at smaller drone makers, and the BfV has advised some German firms to hire close protection.
As long as Germany keeps backing Ukraine, Russian pressure on its companies is unlikely to ease, and the gap between warnings and action that industry flagged leaves smaller firms, with fewer resources for security, the most exposed.
Die EU verlängert ihre Russland-Sanktionen um drei Jahre. Damit wird der Wirtschaftskrieg zum Geschäftsmodell: zugunsten US-amerikanischer Energiekonzerne und Fonds – und zulasten der Europäer. Wer sich in diesen Tagen die Entscheidung der EU anschaut, die Strafmaßnahmen gegen Russland für volle drei Jahre zu verlängern, muss sich unwillkürlich an Julian Assanges Diktum erinnert fühlen:
„Das eigentliche Ziel ist ein endloser Krieg, kein erfolgreicher Krieg.“
Denn der völkerrechtswidrige Wirtschaftskrieg gegen Russland mittels einseitiger Sanktionen, der in kolonialer Absicht formal auf eine Verhaltensänderung Moskaus gerichtet ist, wird zum Selbstzweck.
Ungeachtet der Zerstörungen, die die Sanktionen in der Wirtschaft der EU-Mitgliedstaaten selbst anrichten, schält sich immer deutlicher heraus: Die Verewigung der EU-Sanktionen, die bisher halbjährlich oder jährlich verlängert wurden, dient vor allem der Interessendurchsetzung von US-Energiekonzernen sowie der Profitmaximierung von US-Investmentfonds wie BlackRock. Durch die Sanktionen erlangen sie unter anderem eine Monopolstellung bei der Energieversorgung Europas und können zu viel höheren Preisen verkaufen als eine mögliche russische Konkurrenz.
Die Investmentfonds profitieren wiederum von der begleitenden Hochrüstungspolitik – nicht nur in den USA, sondern auch durch ihre Beteiligungen an deutschen Rüstungsschmieden wie Rheinmetall.
Es gibt also ein Profitinteresse sowohl daran, den Wirtschaftskrieg zu verlängern, als auch daran, die Situation gegenüber Russland zu eskalieren. Dieses Interesse schlägt über die Europäer voll durch.
Es mag paradox klingen, aber ein erfolgreicher Wirtschaftskrieg würde dieses Bereicherungsmodell rasch beenden. Dass man jetzt für die kommenden drei Jahre Sanktionen verhängt, zeigt denn auch, dass man kein Interesse an einer schnellen Beendigung des Stellvertreterkrieges des Westens in der Ukraine hat. Mit einer Verhaltensänderung wird nicht gerechnet. Die Sanktionen sind zum Modell geworden, die Europäer auszurauben. Sie sind nichts anderes als ein Unterwerfungsakt unter die Vorgaben aus den USA. Der Vasallenstatus der Europäer wird so weiter vertieft – bis hin zur Gefahr, dass man die Bereitschaft zeigt, sich selbst für Washington aufzuopfern.
Es ist denn auch kein Widerspruch dazu, dass man, während man die Sanktionen gegen 3.000 Personen und Organisationen verlängert, zwei russische Oligarchen jetzt davon ausnehmen will. Die Aufhebung der EU-Strafmaßnahmen gegen Alischer Usmanow und Michail Fridman dient den Interessen einzelner Mitgliedstaaten und ist offenbar der verzweifelte Versuch, Russland zum eigenen Vorteil destabilisieren zu wollen.
Grönland als Vertragsmodell
Immer deutlicher wird hingegen, dass sich die Europäer dem aktualisierten US-Kolonialmodell unterordnen. Während der deutsche Kanzler Merz das Abkommen über Grönland zwischen Dänemark und den USA als Erhalt der Souveränität feiert, spricht der Text der Vereinbarung eine ganz andere Sprache.
Das Abkommen von 1951 war an die NATO gebunden und an dänische Mitwirkung gekoppelt. Der neue Deal gilt ohne Enddatum und überdauert sogar eine mögliche Unabhängigkeit Grönlands. Die USA sichern sich dauerhafte Stützpunkte, können weitere Basen mit dem Schutz des amerikanischen Kontinents begründen und müssen über das Prinzip neuer Standorte nicht mehr verhandeln, sondern nur noch über deren Ausführung. US-Truppen bewegen sich frei zu Land, zu Wasser und in der Luft – nun auch unter Wasser –, ohne dass dänische Behörden in Grönland dafür noch die Regeln setzen.
Hinzu kommt ein Vetorecht: gegen militärische Präsenz von Nicht-NATO-Staaten und gegen Investitionen von außerhalb der westlichen Blöcke in sensible Sektoren und Ressourcen. Formal bleibt die Souveränität Dänemarks und das Selbstbestimmungsrecht Grönlands bestätigt. Tatsächlich entstehen quasi extraterritoriale Entitäten, in denen Kopenhagen und Nuuk nichts zu sagen haben. Die USA bestimmen die zentralen Bereiche der Politik auf der Insel und sichern sich ein privilegiertes Ausbeutungsrecht.
Ein Modell für die ganze Hemisphäre
Zugleich wurde ein Vertragsmodell geschaffen, das auch für andere Gegenden der westlichen und der nördlichen Hemisphäre gelten soll: von Venezuela über die Kanalzone in Panama bis hin zu den Küsten Kanadas.
Es ist zugleich das Modell für eine Zerschlagung Russlands, die als Folge des Abnutzungskriegs in der Ukraine angestrebt wird, um gegenüber China wieder in die Vorhand zu kommen und den eigenen Niedergang aufzuhalten.
Moral des Völkermords
Die Moral dieser Ordnung hat US-Präsident Donald Trump vor der UN mit seiner Auslöschungsdrohung gegenüber dem Iran zusammengefasst. Sollte der Iran nicht den Vorgaben aus Washington zustimmen, dann „treibe ich sie in die Hölle“. Es ist die Moral des Völkermords.
Es liegt auf der Hand, dass der immer höhere Einsatz des Westens im Versuch, die Welt zu kolonisieren, die entsprechenden Gegenkräfte auf den Plan rufen wird. Allein in Europa wird man diese bei einer Kompradorenbourgeoisie vergeblich suchen.
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On October 9, Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced blocking sanctions against the International Criminal Court as an institution: a ban on all transactions, the freezing of assets under US jurisdiction, and the cutoff of cloud services, software, and payment processing. “Either the ICC will end its threats, or we will end the ICC,” he said. The sanctions include a six-month transition period and take full effect by April 2027. That date, not the announcement itself, is Europe’s real deadline.
Rubio has repeatedly tied Israeli interests to US actions against the court. The ICC previously issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on charges of war crimes in Gaza. While the October 9 announcement focused heavily on protecting American personnel, the administration had previously denounced the tribunal’s investigations against “the United States and our close ally Israel” as “illegitimate and baseless,” indicating that Washington’s campaign is aimed at shielding both US and Israeli officials.
Europe: Between Declaration and Enforcement
The European Commission called the sanctions “deeply regrettable” and said it was “ready to take any necessary measures” to keep the Court functioning and protect operators within the Single Market. But the same formula contains a brake: the six-month delay “leaves room for dialogue.”
Kaja Kallas, speaking for the EU, called threats against the Court “unacceptable,” reaffirming commitment to the rules-based order but stopping short of announcing any protective mechanism. António Costa promised support through political, diplomatic, financial, and practical means, without naming a single concrete instrument.
Belgian Foreign Minister Maxime Prévot is one of those publicly demanding activation of the EU Blocking Statute. “The Court’s independence cannot depend on whom it investigates. Europe must act,” he said, after securing a place for the issue on the agenda of the October 12 meeting of EU foreign ministers.
The Netherlands, where the Court sits, asked the European Commission to prepare the statute but called it a “nuclear option,” emphasizing that six months provide space for dialogue. Germany and France joined a joint statement by eight countries expressing “strong disagreement,” without mentioning countermeasures.
Why the Blocking Statute Is No Panacea
The Blocking Statute (Council Regulation No. 2271/96 of 1996) was created to counter US extraterritorial sanctions related to Cuba, Iran, and Libya. Its mechanism includes a prohibition on EU companies and citizens complying with the designated third-country sanctions, a refusal to recognize foreign court judgments based on those sanctions, and the right to recover damages in court. In 2018, after the US withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal, the regulation was expanded.
Adding the US sanctions against the ICC to the regulation’s annex would mean a legal prohibition on European banks, insurers, and cloud providers complying with the US restrictions. But its purpose is not to save the ICC itself. It protects European operators and jurisdiction: the regulation binds European operators and cannot compel American banks, Microsoft, Amazon, or payment systems to keep servicing the Court.
Activating the statute in this case would be unprecedented: in its thirty years of existence, it has never been applied against US sanctions affecting an international judicial institution. Its earlier use concerned US measures against those same countries, which were bilateral trade restrictions rather than an assault on a body of international justice. If the EU goes ahead, it would be the first time the Blocking Statute is transformed from a trade-defense instrument into an instrument for defending what Brussels calls the “international legal order.”
That is why it is called “nuclear”: it means legal confrontation, but it does not solve the problem of technological dependence. The ICC relies on American banking services, payment systems, cloud servers, and software. The Blocking Statute can prohibit European companies from complying with the sanctions, but it does not create an alternative to dollar clearing, global payment networks, or the servers where the Court’s data is stored.
For Washington, it is enough that American companies themselves refuse to work with the ICC because of the risk of secondary sanctions; the Blocking Statute cannot prevent that.
What Is Already Happening and What Might Happen
The practical effects of the sanctions are already beginning to show. In response to earlier US measures, the ICC has shifted its office and collaboration software from Microsoft to openDesk, a German open-source platform, and developed workarounds for banking, insurance, and payroll. It has also paid staff months in advance to limit potential payroll disruption. But these safeguards do not eliminate the Court’s broader reliance on American financial and technological infrastructure, and full sanctions could still disrupt its operations.
The alternatives Europe can offer are limited: activating the Blocking Statute, developing payment and clearing alternatives to dollar-based infrastructure, and providing European cloud services. None can be implemented quickly enough to replace American financial and technological infrastructure by April 2027.
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The Asymmetry That Explains Everything
The ICC began work in 2002, and its early practice focused predominantly on African conflicts: the DRC, Uganda, Sudan, Kenya, and Libya. This imbalance fueled accusations of selectivity and neocolonialism; in 2025, three Sahel states announced their withdrawal, calling the Court an “instrument of neocolonial suppression.”
The United States signed the Rome Statute under Clinton but never ratified it; in 2002, Congress passed the American Service Members’ Protection Act, authorizing the president to use “all necessary means” to free any American detained by the ICC. Washington did not object to the Court’s early focus on African situations, even as it rejected jurisdiction over itself. Its opposition hardened once the ICC moved toward cases involving the US and its allies.
In 2020, after the Appeals Chamber authorized an investigation into crimes by US military personnel and the CIA in Afghanistan, Washington sanctioned Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda and a senior Court official. The following year, Prosecutor Karim Khan “deprioritized” the American component of the case. No US citizen has ever been indicted by the ICC.
Rubio calls the ICC a “body of globalists” threatening US sovereignty and has urged US allies to rein it in. The criticism has a real basis: the Court can hear cases involving crimes committed on the territory of a state party even if the accused’s country has not joined the Rome Statute. But the ICC remains a treaty court, dependent on state cooperation, Western donors, and political decisions of the UN Security Council.
Washington’s contradiction is built into the design itself: the US is attacking an institution that grew out of the liberal order it helped create. Europe’s is different: a declaratory commitment to international law coexists with the practical costs of reducing reliance on American infrastructure.
What October 12 Will Reveal
October 12 will show whether the EU moves from declarations to legal obligations. If the final document includes a European Commission decision to add the US sanctions against the ICC to the annex of Regulation 2271/96, that would mean a legal prohibition on European companies complying with the US measures — an unprecedented use of the Blocking Statute.
If the outcome is a general declaration, a call on Washington to rescind the sanctions, and a mandate for the Commission to “prepare options,” that would confirm a scenario in which Europe defends the principle of ICC independence but is not prepared to pay for that defense through a direct collision with US extraterritorial jurisdiction.
The probability of full and immediate activation of the statute on October 12 is low. A more realistic scenario is a political declaration of support, a Commission mandate to prepare a legal mechanism, and the preservation of the six-month pause for negotiations.
The Dilemma Beyond The Hague
The question is not whether the ICC survives past April 2027. The question is whether Europe can defend what Brussels calls the “international legal order” when the costs of that defense fall on its own companies, banks, and technological supply chains.
The Blocking Statute is a test of the EU’s ability to act not as a regulator but as a geopolitical player willing to bear the costs of conflict. If Europe limits itself to declarations and negotiations, it will confirm the formula Washington has already internalized: European sovereignty ends where American extraterritorial jurisdiction begins.
If it activates the statute, it will launch an open legal conflict with an ally on which its security depends. For now, every signal points to a third option: prepare the instrument, defer the decision, and bet that Washington will back down on its own.
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Europe is shortening the time it takes to wage a major war. Military transport approvals are meant to take hours rather than days, intelligence to feed more quickly into strike decisions, and a new generation of missiles to bring targets deep inside Russia within reach. Behind the forward garrisons, Europe is building transport networks, reserves, and ammunition production capacity. Taken together, these measures point beyond deterrence to practical preparations for waging war against Russia, including operations deep inside its territory.
The dates 2027, 2028, and 2030 in European rearmament programs can easily suggest that there is still time. But they mark a schedule for building military capabilities, not a guaranteed period of peace. The central question for the coming months is not whether armies will finish rearming in time, but whether a clash can be avoided before they do.
Estonia: A Narrow Front, a Deep Strike
Estonia offers a clear picture of the opening phase this system is being built to fight. The country’s military budget rose 42% in 2026 to €2.4 billion, or 5.4% of gross domestic product. Arms procurement accounts for €1.27 billion – more than half the total. Meanwhile, the headquarters and elements of the 1st Infantry Brigade are moving from Tapa to Jõhvi, roughly 50 kilometers from the Russian border.
A €20.5 million base is under construction in Narva, with €19 million coming from the European Union. Completion is scheduled for summer 2028. Its permanent garrison will number around 200, but it will accommodate up to 1,000 troops in a crisis. The gap between those figures reveals a base designed for rapid expansion. A small garrison is being equipped to receive reinforcements quickly, right on the border.
Holding that ground requires more than barracks. Procurement programs call for nine American HIMARS and nine South Korean Chunmoo multiple-launch rocket systems, both capable of firing ballistic missiles. The relevant munitions have stated ranges of up to 300 and 290 kilometers, respectively. The new concept combines holding the border with deep strikes from the first day of an invasion.
The scale of the response could far exceed that of the opening clash. A battle for a border town could lead to strikes on targets hundreds of kilometers away. Tallinn wants to deny its opponent the option of fighting a small war by preparing to expand its geographical scope.
This also changes what allied assistance means. Allied planning must account not only for how long a small army can hold out until reinforcements arrive, but also for how far the fighting may spread before they reach the front. A missile can be launched before a major formation completes its deployment. Allies may arrive to find that the conflict has already widened.
In such a situation, Estonia and the other Baltic states could serve not only as defensive positions but also as staging grounds for attacks on Russian territory. For Moscow, the issue is no longer simply the size of Estonian units, but the depth of the strikes they envisage. Tallinn, in turn, faces the question of who will sustain its forward forces if the first battles fail to decide the outcome. Sustaining such a war would require support from beyond Estonia. One national budget and a handful of batteries cannot carry that burden.
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Germany: An Industrial Base Behind the Garrison
On October 5, Martin Jäger, head of Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service, told the Bundestag: “The point of no return has been passed in the war with Ukraine, and NATO is considering a scenario involving a limited Russian military clash with the Baltic states.” He linked the more immediate danger to limited Russian action in the Baltics that could test the allies’ response. He said intelligence had seen no signs of preparations for a major attack on NATO. The discussion therefore concerns not only a major war after rearmament is complete, but a smaller confrontation capable of triggering an allied response.
In the Baltic scenario, Berlin is publicly discussing the risk of a clash while its forward force is still taking shape. The brigade’s readiness date is not the date on which the threat begins.
In Lithuania, Germany is building a permanent heavy brigade as one element of that support. Full readiness is scheduled for the end of 2027, with 4,800 military personnel and 200 civilian employees. Its core consists of the 122nd Panzergrenadier Battalion, the 203rd Tank Battalion, and a multinational battle group. Until the formation is complete, the Germany-based 37th Brigade is to provide support.
The forward formation is thus tied to forces farther inside Europe. Civilian infrastructure underscores the permanence of the deployment. A school for the children of Bundeswehr personnel opened in Vilnius in September 2025. Units are not simply moving in – families are settling down. A political commitment acquires a permanent address, and the safety of German personnel becomes part of any future crisis in the host country.
Münster, October 1, 2026. Rutte describes a headquarters capable of commanding 50,000 troops and responsible for NATO forces in Estonia and Latvia. Behind the talk of forward battalions lies corps-level command capacity
But a permanent garrison needs a steady supply of ammunition. Rheinmetall’s new plant in Unterlüß is scheduled to reach an annual output of 350,000 artillery shells in that same year, 2027. The nearly €500 million facility was built in 15 months. Across its entire production network, including overseas sites, the company is targeting roughly 1.5 million shells a year from 2027.
The brigade answers the question of who will enter the fight. The factories answer how to keep fighting once stockpiles run down. The 2027 target is for strengthening this system, not creating it from scratch. Reaching the factory’s planned capacity determines future supply volumes, but it does not set a date before which a clash is impossible. Initial stocks sustain the opening phase of combat. Regular deliveries determine whether its intensity can be maintained.
Between the factory and the front lies the transport network. Europe’s military mobility proposal calls for cross-border transport permits to be processed within three working days, with an emergency procedure taking no more than six hours. A proposed €17 billion would fund the relevant infrastructure under the 2028–2034 budget. For Germany, a transit country, that means bridges, railways, and the capacity of routes leading east.
On October 7, European Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius called for this work to accelerate, saying Europe was not yet able to deter Russia. Unlike an exercise, infrastructure upgrades remain after the columns return to barracks. A stronger bridge and a faster permit procedure create a lasting ability to concentrate forces.
A border battle thus gains industrial and logistical depth. But sustaining one’s own forward forces is only half the military equation. The other half is disrupting opposing forces’ supply and command systems. That requires more than additional railcars loaded with shells. It requires weapons with much greater reach.
Britain: A European Deep-Strike Arsenal
London is driving precisely this part of Europe’s preparations. On July 8, 2026, it announced an initiative bringing together roughly a dozen partners to invest more than $50 billion in long-range strike capabilities over ten years. The stated range bracket runs from 300 to more than 2,000 kilometers. Britain’s own commitment within the initiative is £3 billion by 2030.
The British-German Deep Precision Strike program envisages stealthy and hypersonic weapons with ranges exceeding 2,000 kilometers, initially focused on ground launch. Britain is investing £770 million over four years, with entry into service expected in the 2030s. Another £1.4 billion over four years is earmarked for Stratus, a program with France and Italy covering strikes against high-value targets and ships, as well as the suppression of air defenses.
Britain’s participation in PrSM (Precision Strike Missile), a precision-guided ballistic missile program with a stated range of up to 500 kilometers, adds another layer. The emerging capabilities span several range bands, from around 300 kilometers for the Estonian systems through 500 for PrSM to more than 2,000 for the British-German development. Although the programs are at different stages, they share a clear direction. Weapons for fighting at the border are being supplemented with weapons for striking deep behind it.
The missiles of the next decade show how far these strike capabilities are intended to expand. But the next crisis will unfold with whatever weapons are available when it begins. A 2,000-kilometer range is not a prerequisite for a clash in the Baltics. It changes the potential scale of the war, not the earliest date on which it can break out.
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Turning national purchases into a combined capability requires a common framework for employing them. In July 2025, General Christopher Donahue outlined elements of eastern-flank planning built around compatible launchers, fire control, and data sharing. He cited Kaliningrad as an example of military capabilities that could be neutralized by ground-based means in an exceptionally short time: “We have already planned this. We have already developed this.”
The discussion also included cloud-based data sharing and Palantir’s Maven Smart System, purchased by NATO to analyze information and support command decisions. The aim is to turn disparate reports into a common picture more quickly. When several armies use compatible command systems, their arsenals gain additional value. Range puts the target within reach, while data sharing allows missions to be coordinated.
But the deeper the planned strikes, the harder it becomes to separate support for a border battle from an expansion of the war. To the attacking side, a target may be part of the other side’s military supply system. To the other side, hitting it may signal that the conflict has crossed a new threshold. The use of conventional weapons thus leaves unresolved how to deter a response that would overturn the assumption of a limited clash.
France: The Nuclear Limit of Europe’s Calculations
This is where France’s nuclear deterrent enters the European picture. On October 6, Le Vigilant conducted an acceptance firing of an M51.3 ballistic missile following its refit. The missile carried no nuclear warhead. In service since October 2025, the variant carries new TNO-2 warheads. The French Defense Ministry cites improvements in range, accuracy, and the ability to penetrate missile defenses.
Brittany, October 6, 2026. Le Vigilant launches an M51.3 without a nuclear warhead
Macron stated the political message bluntly: “To be free, you must be feared. And to be feared, you must be strong.” France’s modernization adds a nuclear dimension to Europe’s conventional military buildup.
That European dimension is taking a more concrete form. On March 2, 2026, Macron outlined an “advanced deterrence” framework allowing partners to participate in French nuclear exercises and opening the possibility of temporary deployments of strategic forces on allied territory. Germany, Poland and Sweden were among the countries joining the dialogue. But the authority to use nuclear weapons – and to define the vital interests they protect – remains exclusively French. In the Baltic scenario, closer cooperation does not establish an automatic French nuclear response to a border clash. It leaves the decisive threshold in Paris, deliberately undefined.
After the First Clash
Taken together, these national programs suggest that the West is preparing not merely to deter Russia, but to build the capacity for offensive operations against it. In this reading, forward deployments, industrial expansion and deep-strike weapons are interconnected preparations for a war that could extend into Russian territory. They do not, by themselves, establish a single operational plan or prove a decision to initiate hostilities. Conventional forces are meant to make an opposing military operation prohibitively costly, while nuclear forces are meant to deter the most extreme escalation. The weakness is that neither side gets to decide how much damage the other will tolerate.
That problem is especially acute around Kaliningrad, where plans to suppress military infrastructure sit alongside the question of the region’s links to the rest of Russia. If actions during a crisis are perceived as an attempt to cut the region off by force, the argument will no longer be about intentions announced at a press conference. It will be about consequences the other side believes it must stop immediately.
The danger in the coming months lies in the gap between limited intent and an unrestricted response. Berlin is discussing localized action in the Baltics. Tallinn is preparing for deep strikes from day one, while foreign garrisons tie a border battle to allied involvement. Each side may consider its own move limited. Neither can count on the other side accepting its definition of what is permissible.
European capitals therefore need to define where military action would stop after the first clash, whether at the border or after strikes on depots, airfields or targets in Kaliningrad. The programs examined here spell out how to build military power, but offer no mechanism for ending the fighting. Missile range is not strategic foresight. Confidence that escalation can be controlled could turn a system of deterrence into a mechanism for widening the war well before 2030.
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The post The Baltic Fuse: How Europe Is Building the Infrastructure for War With Russia appeared first on South Front.
par Jules SEYES
Si l’Allemagne désirait interrompre les aéroports français, elle pourrait équiper ses Typhoon de missiles et créer une bulle de supériorité aérienne au-dessus du sol français. L’affirmation sonne-t-elle ridicule ? C’est exact, elle est pourtant l’exact miroir de l’alerte qu’El Mundo prête à la CIA selon laquelle les Russes pourraient équiper un navire de drones pour désactiver des aéroports occidentaux1. Comprendre pourquoi l’une sonne comme folle alors que l’autre paraît terrifiante suppose de saisir les méthodes d’analyse sur lesquelles elles reposent, avant d’analyser justement les présupposés des intentions.
Celles-ci étant un peu complexes, commençons par la doctrine, qui aura le mérite de clarifier le brouillard mental actuel. Un peu comme le brouillard de guerre auquel les militaires sont confrontés. Deux méthodes offrent un moyen de le briser : la méthode des moyens et celle des intentions.
La première repose sur un inventaire des ressources connues de l’adversaire pour évaluer l’ensemble des points qu’il peut toucher. C’est aujourd’hui l’exercice de la CIA : les Russes disposent de drones, ceux-ci peuvent être basés sur un navire, donc les Russes peuvent équiper un navire. L’exercice en début d’article relève de la même logique : prendre le nombre de chasseurs de la Bundeswehr, le nombre de Taurus en stock, puisque contrairement à nos SCALP ces armes n’ont pas été envoyées en Ukraine, et établir que cette combinaison a la capacité de mener une attaque surprise au-dessus de la France.
Le problème de cette méthode est de livrer un arc de menace souvent inutilisable, car il existe trop d’axes de vulnérabilité pouvant être exploités. L’automne 1944 en offre l’illustration2. Les Allemands retirent alors plusieurs divisions du front. La reconnaissance aérienne alliée photographie, à partir de la mi-novembre, un trafic ferroviaire intense autour de Cologne, de Coblence et dans l’Eifel : gares de triage saturées, locomotives sous pression, une vingtaine de wagons plats chargés de chars Tigre sur la ligne d’Euskirchen. Début décembre, cent soixante-dix wagons plats chargés de blindés et de véhicules roulent entre Cologne et Limbourg. La nuit, les chasseurs de nuit repèrent des convois aux phares masqués. Des dépôts de ravitaillement apparaissent à Rheinbach et à Schleiden, des piles de bois propres à jeter des ponts près d’Echternach, des trains sanitaires à l’ouest du Rhin. Les écoutes radio identifient une armée blindée nouvelle, la 6e Panzerarmee. À la mi-décembre, face aux Ardennes, le VIIIe corps américain signale une activité d’artillerie inhabituelle, aucun mouvement visible et presque plus de prisonniers. Cette force, dont la valeur combative était connue, pouvait être engagée de bien des manières.
Une seconde méthode doit alors entrer en jeu : celle des intentions. En fonction des moyens connus, on établit ce que l’ennemi voudra toucher. Plus précise, celle-ci possède l’inconvénient de reposer sur des déterminants bien moins solides, puisque liés à la compréhension de la psychologie de l’adversaire.
Ces indices remontent à tous les états-majors alliés, et chacun les interprète selon le tempérament de son chef. Au quartier général d’Eisenhower, commandant suprême des forces alliées, homme de coalition et de logistique, domine une conviction : les Allemands sont trop fatigués pour attaquer. Les divisions retirées sont donc évaluées comme des rotations de repos et une reconstitution de réserve. Le 15 décembre encore, son bureau des opérations n’a rien à signaler dans les Ardennes. Patton, chef de la Troisième Armée, passe pour le plus offensif des généraux américains : il ne conçoit la guerre qu’en mouvement et à l’attaque. Son état-major projette cette volonté offensive sur l’ennemi allemand. Elle reflète en réalité la psychologie des analystes, elle-même dérivée de la psychologie des chefs. Son chef du renseignement, le colonel Oscar Koch, lit les mêmes indices comme la préparation d’un coup et présente à Patton, le 9 décembre, sa conclusion : une contre-offensive allemande est possible dans les Ardennes. Patton fait aussitôt préparer les plans qui permettront à la Troisième Armée de pivoter vers le nord. Le lendemain du rapport rassurant d’Eisenhower, l’offensive allemande éclate. Autrement dit, la méthode des intentions en dit souvent plus sur la manière de penser des analystes que sur leur compréhension fine de l’adversaire. Bien conscients de ces défauts, les militaires appliquent les méthodes classiques d’analyse stratégique pour filtrer l’ensemble. La première d’entre elles est le rapport coût-avantage : qu’est-ce que l’adversaire a à gagner ? Pour quel coût ?
Ici, vous constatez par exemple la différence de pensée entre Eisenhower et Patton. Pour le premier, le coût est en carburant ; le second pense en termes d’avantage moral de l’offensive. D’où la divergence d’analyse. Si nous prenons notre exemple d’avions allemands équipés de Taurus, le coût est une guerre franco-allemande, voire OTAN-Allemagne si l’article 5 venait à jouer. Aucune attaque, même couronnée de succès, ne pourrait provoquer des dégâts suffisants pour compenser les coûts d’un conflit avec une puissance nucléaire. En pratique, l’Allemagne aurait beaucoup à perdre et peu à gagner, puisque son influence dans l’appareil d’État et l’UE lui permet d’obtenir satisfaction dans des domaines cruciaux, telle la fermeture de Fessenheim.
Alors, la Russie ?
La CIA vient de nous gratifier d’un de ces mémos qui relèvent à la fois de la plus pure vérité et du plus pur mépris du public destiné à recevoir la fuite. Voici la menace : «Le point faible de l’Europe» : la menace d’une attaque russe contre la France et l’Espagne est réelle, selon la CIA.
Le scénario de l’attaque impliquerait des drones Gerbera3, de petits appareils à la charge explosive réduite dont l’intérêt est perturbateur et non de faire des victimes : fermer un aéroport, par exemple. Ils seraient lancés depuis des navires marchands déguisés en trafic commercial ordinaire et postés en Méditerranée.
Je vous avouerai qu’en ouvrant ce mémo, je m’étais attendu à un scénario sérieux, pas à cela. À la découverte du propos, son outrance m’a fait passer à la limite de l’insulte. Voilà une proposition d’attaque étatique dont le but serait de «perturber» ? Se rend-on compte du terme ? Une attaque pour perturber ? Schlieffen se retourne dans sa tombe, Napoléon s’étrangle avec sa bataille décisive, Manstein est fort heureusement mort. Car, hélas, un État ne gaspille pas la surprise en lançant un tapotage gentil. S’il faut recourir à la violence, alors il faut d’emblée prendre un avantage définitif pour maintenir au plus court la durée de la campagne. Sun Tzu le notait déjà : aucun pays n’a jamais tiré profit d’une guerre prolongée.
Le projet proposé contredit tous ces principes et, dès lors, il ne pose qu’une seule question : le code militaire russe a-t-il supprimé la peine de mort pour les traîtres ? Eh oui, désolé de décevoir ces intervenants de plateaux qui se prétendent experts malgré leurs abus propagandistes, mais ce que la CIA nous propose est de lancer une attaque inefficace pour ruiner la réputation que les Russes ont acquise auprès du reste du monde. Nous parlons bien sûr des pays sérieux, hors de l’Occident malade où les journalistes reprennent ce scénario comme un sujet sérieux.
En clair, une balance coût-bénéfice où il n’y aurait que des coûts pour la Russie et aucun bénéfice. Eh oui, car fermer un aéroport fait peut-être perdre quelques millions à des entreprises, mais cela n’a AUCUN impact stratégique. Pire, il est inutile de mobiliser un drone Gerbera, un navire ou tout autre moyen militaire : un coup de fil d’un gamin pour annoncer une bombe suffit. Ou bien une voiture piégée.
Bref, l’aventure proposée n’apporte aucun bénéfice stratégique et se fait avec des moyens disproportionnés qui coûteraient énormément à la Russie. Seul un traître à la Russie peut avoir cette idée. Je sais, en Occident, nous sommes habitués avec les relais US, mais plus en Russie : les réseaux qui ont soutenu V. Poutine après son arrivée au pouvoir s’en sont assurés. Ou en tout cas, ils ont fait monter le prix de la passe. Un officier russe réclamerait une méga-malle de billets pour seulement proposer cela à ses chefs, vu qu’il sait que ce serait (si ses chefs sont gentils) la fin de sa carrière. Quant à le mettre en œuvre sans validation politique, il aurait intérêt à avoir le bon billet d’avion pour s’éclipser au plus vite.
Car là est le point qui permet aux individus tarés que l’Occident nomme journalistes de procéder à cette propagande goebbelsienne (enfin, je m’excuse auprès du docteur Goebbels pour cet amalgame insultant) : les moyens existent. Exact, la Russie possède les drones, les navires. Elle aligne même un porte-avions et surtout un arsenal de missiles de toute première qualité. Depuis les années cinquante, l’URSS dispose de bombardiers stratégiques et de missiles capables de frapper le territoire français. La menace n’a donc rien de nouveau, puisque la Russie peut transformer la France en parking si elle le désire.
L’alerte de la CIA ajoute-t-elle de nouvelles capacités ? La réponse est non, une fois, deux fois, mille fois NON !
Héritière, État successeur de l’URSS, la Russie dispose depuis sa naissance des moyens de nous mettre à terre si elle accepte les millions de morts qu’exigera l’absorption de la salve nucléaire française. Une poignée de drones n’y ajoute rien, n’y retranche rien. D’autant plus que la Russie dispose de missiles hypersoniques Orechnik en mesure d’infliger de douloureux dégâts à notre territoire. Par exemple, mais je ne voudrais pas exciter LCI, par une frappe d’Orechnik contre des centrales nucléaires ou, en non nucléaire, contre nos barrages. Nous n’aurions aucun moyen de riposte non nucléaire.
Dès lors, oui, les Russes peuvent monter des drones sur un navire, ils peuvent monter des Grad aussi, ou toute autre arme à plus ou moins grande portée. Dans un tel scénario, l’élément coûteux est le navire sacrifié, pas les munitions embarquées. L’alerte donnée, qui n’est que l’une des alertes autour desquelles on nous a fait résonner tambours et trompettes, n’apporte rien de structurellement nouveau. Un bricolage de drones pour frapper notre territoire n’a rien de complexe. Après tout, le gouvernement de Kiev a bien réussi à introduire des drones sur le territoire russe pour frapper des bombardiers stratégiques.
Seulement, à ce jeu, tout le monde peut jouer ou presque. Il faut le restreindre : l’équipe Le Maire, Breton ne peut pas jouer, mais c’est lié à l’incompétence des joueurs. La France, par exemple, possède encore quelques officiers de valeur capables d’organiser l’affaire. (Non, pas le colonel monté hors de propos en lui accrochant des étoiles comme des guirlandes de Noël, et qui fait aujourd’hui comme s’il dirigeait l’armée française.)
Le problème est que ces gens refuseraient de monter une telle opération. Frapper la Russie, comme frapper la France pour la Russie, exige que la première balle soit mortelle. On tire au cœur ou on ne tire pas, et dans ce cas, entre puissances nucléaires, la question n’est pas celle des moyens, mais celle de la volonté. Même si nous avons TOUT fait, par une politique irresponsable, pour irriter les Russes, ils n’ont nullement annoncé leur intention de répondre à la hauteur de notre bêtise.
Reste l’intention : les Russes peuvent nous frapper, c’est acquis, ils peuvent le faire depuis des décennies pour un coût fixé. Resterait le gain d’une frappe : faire cesser l’appui français à l’Ukraine. Dans ce domaine, hélas, hormis l’agacement entre les oreilles d’entendre les rodomontades et pseudo-discours d’Emmanuel Macron, qui justifient toute envie de retourner une paire de claques justement méritée, la vérité commande de constater l’épuisement de nos moyens : la macronie a déjà envoyé à peu près tout ce qu’elle pouvait racler dans les fonds de tiroirs ; quant à l’argent, l’Allemagne ou la Grande-Bretagne peuvent le fournir. Les véritables acteurs sont les Anglais, par l’usage des moyens de leurs services secrets très actifs dans la guerre des drones, et les Allemands pour la livraison de munitions. Pour peser sur les opérations en Ukraine, une frappe russe devrait cibler en priorité ces deux pays.
Sauf à vouloir faire de l’éducation prioritaire, mais dans ce cas, l’ambassade de Russie peut se contenter d’engager un professeur de SEGPA pour l’envoyer à l’Élysée. Pour la fessée, il serait même inutile d’engager : Montjoie Saint-Denis a fait des petits.
Prise sous un angle militaire, l’information n’apportait rien, et si les journalistes en avaient fait une lecture correcte, ils l’auraient classée verticalement.
Ce n’était bien évidemment pas le but, mais au contraire d’avoir un thème pour parler de menace russe afin de poursuivre la propagande par martèlement, qui vise à abrutir les téléspectateurs de menaces pour leur faire admettre le concept sans esprit critique. Ça marche avec les résidents de maison de retraite au stade pré-Rivotril.
Tel est le problème de nos gouvernants. Faute d’agression russe, il faut créer le sentiment d’une agression, ce qui est le but de ces annonces : entretenir l’hystérie et donner un prétexte pour prononcer les mots agression, guerre, menaces, puissants générateurs d’un sentiment d’insécurité dans la population soumise à ce discours anxiogène.
Ça n’a qu’un défaut : messieurs les journalistes, vous avez repris en connaissance de cause une publication des services américains pour engager notre pays sur une trajectoire fausse et dangereuse pour sa sécurité.
Soit vous êtes des idiots congénitaux, ce que la CIA n’exclut peut-être pas, et je vais m’offrir de partager le soupçon. Soit vous le faites délibérément. Même en tenant compte de votre bêtise, tous les journalistes français ne peuvent pas être aussi désavantagés par la nature ; il aurait donc dû en rester assez pour faire échouer la manipulation.
Cela fait de vous, en tant que catégorie, des traîtres à votre nation, susceptibles de subir les foudres judiciaires au moment où le pouvoir changera de main et cessera de couvrir vos abus. Il ne s’agit pas de menaces, mais d’une évaluation juridique. VOUS mettez objectivement notre nation en danger !
La méthode marcherait si, justement, conscients de la menace sur leur esprit, beaucoup de citoyens ne s’étaient pas dirigés vers internet.
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Publiéà l’origine par Reseau International
Según revela Instituto Alemán de Economía (IW), durante la primera mitad de la década de 2020-2025, la economía germana creció un 0,2% anual y esa tasa se debió mayormente al gasto público, el cual, solamente en el segundo trimestre del 2026, fue superior a la media anual de 2019.
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Escríbenos: info@strategic-culture.su
Lo que significa que se diluye la “Alemania como motor económico europeo” de la que tanto se habló en el último medio siglo.
El empresariado invirtió muy poco en estos años y en el entorno productivo y de realce económico nacional ha caído drásticamente.
El mismo gobierno federal reconoció, a principios de este mes, que la situación de crecimiento es “precaria” y, en los círculos cerrados del empresariado escasean los vaticinios halagueños para el 2027 y 2028.
Creditreform informó que 1 de cada 3 empresas está muy endeudada y que las inversiones retrocedieron a su rango de 2013.
Durante el pasado mes de abril, más de 2 mil empresas quebraron, destacándose entre estas empresas las abocadas al transporte, la logística, la hotelería y la cervecería.
Klaus Wohlrabe, jefe de estudios del Instituto Ifo de Investigación Económica, declaró que todavía no se vislumbra una recuperación real para el mercado laboral y “Los despidos continúan en la industria manufacturera y el comercio”.
Por su parte, Rolf Bürkl, experto en consumo del NIM, dijo que “La mayoría de los hogares prevé que los altos precios de la energía reduzcan su poder adquisitivo” y, en consecuencia, “se muestran más escépticos sobre sus perspectivas de ingresos para los próximos doce meses”.
El agricultor e influencer, Hannes Kuhnwald («Landwirt aus MV»), pronosticó que se avecina una crisis en la agricultura ya que “Cada vez cierran más explotaciones. Y las pequeñas son las primeras en verse afectadas. Ahora, las grandes empresas se benefician de ello. Y muchas corporaciones también”, afirmando que las explotaciones pequeñas y medianas no pueden competir con las compañías grandes y que, por lo tanto, la clase política debería aplicar medidas sensatas para proteger de la pauperización, la quiebra y la exclusión económica a los pequeños y medianos productores agrícolas.
Dentro de la misma Alemania hay quienes se quejan de la forma en que llegan los fondos provenientes de la UE, pidiendo, como una de las soluciones más rápidas, que dichos fondos lleguen hacia abajo de una forma más equitativa.
Simultáneamente, se produce, en esta segunda mitad del 2026, un descenso pronunciado en las ventas del sector minorista, cuyos niveles son, según consignas las estadísticas más fiables, de mayor caída en los últimos cinco años.
Hay negocios de los más consolidados que, debido a la situación, están llegando al límite.
El Grupo Theo Müller -líder de la industria alimentaria- anunció, en esta semana, que cerrará dos de sus plantas más importantes con la consecuencia de cientos de empleados que serán despedidos.
Asimismo, en entorno de Volkswagen seguirá convulso en lo que resta de este año y en 2027.
Publicado originalmente por Geopolítica rugiente
The story of infrastructure in capitalist vs. socialist systems
By Hua BIN
Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su
A friend visited Germany recently and told a story how a delayed train caused him to miss the flight home.
I was shocked since you could set your watch by the Deutsche Bahn when I was living in Germany back in 1997.
I was doing an internship at Mercedes Benz in Stuttgart in those days. I could time my walk from the apartment to the bus stop, then connect with a train to the office with less than 5 minutes in total waiting time.
The bus and train schedules were synced so perfectly that you could count on a two-minutes’ walk and exactly 2 minutes wait in between. Both buses and trains were on time to a fault.
I had a particular fondness for DB since I traveled around Germany almost every weekend with its 35 Mark Schones-Wochenende Ticket (happy weekend ticket). Unfortunately that service was discontinued in 2019.
In the winter of 1997, I got lost on a hike with several friends in the Black Forest near Baden-Baden.
We were only able to walk out of the cold night after stumbling upon a rail track that led us to a small rural train stop. I can still remember the warm platform light to this day.
I’ve held German rail in high regard ever since.
So you can imagine how incredulous I was about the delay and bad service my friend complained about.
This prompted me to read about what happened to Deutsche Bahn over the last 30 years. In a nutshell, things certainly have changed for the worse.
Deutsche Bahn today defines an on-time train as one arriving less than 6 minutes behind schedule – a long cry from the clock-setting punctuality of the late 90s.
Even by such a low bar, punctuality hovers around 50 to 60%, well below DB’s own target of 70%.
The official explanation is aging infrastructure, heavy construction, and overloaded tracks.
However, as I dig a bit deeper, the decline of the German rail efficiency seems to stem from a deeply flawed privatization in 1994 which led to decades of extreme infrastructure underinvestment.
The 1994 Bahnreform merged the old East and West state railways with a clear mandate: DB was supposed to operate as a profit-seeking private corporation to prepare for an eventual stock market IPO.
To attract investors, DB prioritized extreme cost-cutting over public service.
They aggressively cut staff, outsourced maintenance, and began divesting into global logistics companies (like DB Schenker) rather than focusing on domestic rail.
Under the guise of maximizing efficiency, DB severely downsized its physical network to save money.
Nearly 8,000 kilometers of secondary rail lines were completely dismantled. Thousands of track crossovers, passing loops, and spare sidetracks were removed.
In 1997, if a train broke down or was delayed, a dispatcher could easily reroute it around the problem using these spare tracks.
Today, the network is stripped of its buffers. If one commuter train stalls near Frankfurt, it acts like a broken-down car on a single-lane highway, causing immediate, cascading delays across the entire country.
The problem is compounded by a mixed-rail system where fast Intercity Express (ICE) trains share the same physical tracks with slow regional commuter trains and heavy freight cargo.
In comparison, Chinese high-speed rail or France’s TGV networks mostly operate on dedicated high-speed tracks.
As the DB physical network was drastically thinned out, annual passenger numbers went up from 1.5 billion passengers in 1994 to 2.4 billion today.
Back in the 90s, it was still very common to live near where you worked in Germany. Over the last 30 years, skyrocketing housing costs in major hubs like Frankfurt, Munich, Berlin, and Hamburg forced a massive portion of the workforce to move further out into surrounding suburban regions and smaller towns.
As a result, Germany experienced a commuter explosion, with millions of people traveling significantly longer distances back and forth every single day.
Now, the Deutsche Bahn system runs at 100% capacity nearly constantly. Any small delays can quickly snowball into network chaos.
To make things even harder, Germany’s strict structural debt limits have restricted state spending.
For years, Germany spends only a fraction of what its neighbors do on rail. For example, Switzerland invests over €400 per citizen annually into rail infrastructure. Germany routinely spends around €100.
DB’s disastrous experience with privatization mirrors what happened with other similar projects such as the Thames Water in the UK.
When Margaret Thatcher’s government privatized the UK water sector in 1989, Thames Water was handed to private investors with a clean slate and zero debt.
However, successive private owners treated the utility—which serves 16 million customers across London and southern England—as a corporate cash cow.
Private investors – Wall Street banks and hedge funds – loaded the utility with a mountain of debt and extracted hundreds of millions in management fees and dividends.
Instead of using revenue to upgrade Victorian-era pipes and treatment centers, money was funneled to shareholders and executive bonuses. By 2026, that debt has ballooned to roughly £20 billion.
While the financial engineering generated short-term returns for private equity, the physical infrastructure rotted.
Thames Water has become a national scandal as it has spilled billions of liters of raw sewage directly into the River Thames and local waterways.
Due to aging infrastructure, 25% of all treated water leaks straight out of the pipes before ever reaching customer homes.
Amid severe dry spells and record temperatures, Thames Water repeatedly implements prolonged hosepipe bans because the system lacks structural resilience to manage the region’s water security.
Most privatization projects of public utilities have witnessed a similar pattern of chronic underinvestment, extreme operational cost cutting, and unsustainable debt leverage while enriching financial investors.
Deutsche Bahn and Thames Water are symbols of public goods degradation for private investor gains in rentier capitalist economies.
In stark contrast, Chinese infrastructure remains firmly in the domain of public ownership.
While Europe and the US follow a policy of reactive, austerity-driven, rent-collecting management of their nations’ infrastructure, China has adopted a strategy of anticipatory, supply-led construction – often years ahead of demand.
Back in the 90s, China still was heavily reliant on decades-old, technically backward rail networks that suffered regular breakdowns.
I still remember sitting in rail cars with no air-conditioning in the height of summer for hours when the train from Beijing to Chongqing broke down due to an engine failure during a trip home from college.
The ride used to take 40 hours by scheduled timetable. Today the same trip takes less than 7 hours on highspeed rail.
When China started building its national highspeed rail network in 2004, there was an avalanche of negative press from the West.
Western “experts” eagerly called out how wasteful the project was and how the rail would never generate a positive return on investment.
Despite the nay-sayers, the country has built over 50,000 kilometers of highspeed rail in the last 20 years, over 70% of the world’s total capacity.
Just today, China announced the completion of 4 new highspeed rail lines in 4 provinces, adding another 1,142 kilometers to the network.
One of the lines is the 318-km Harbin–Yichun Line, which is now China’s northernmost highspeed rail traversing alpine permafrost.
The network now covers 97% of all cities with over 500,000 residents. It operates on dedicated rail lines and achieves 98% departure punctuality and 95% arrival punctuality.
Rather than aiming to achieve profitability and high return for every single line, the Chinese highspeed rail system serves as a public good that generate system-level benefits for the entire economy and the public.
Deutsche Bahn and China Rail represent two systems that operate on completely opposite philosophies, leading to radically different outcomes in rail performance and economic impact.
Building ahead of demand vs. Managing declining assets
China’s infrastructure strategy rests on the philosophy that building massive, high-capacity transport networks creates economic growth and future demand, rather than just responding to it.
By constructing the world’s largest highspeed rail network, largely ahead of full demand saturation, China bypassed the bottleneck phase entirely.
On the other hand, Germany operates on a strict “just-in-time” for-profit corporate framework.
Investments are only approved if existing capacity is mathematically proven to be completely exhausted.
This means that by the time a project is planned, funded, and built, the demand has already vastly outpaced the upgrade, leaving the network perpetually lagging behind.
China recognized early on that mixing slow freight and fast passenger trains limits a network’s ultimate capacity. Beijing built an entirely separate, dedicated network for the high-speed Fuxing and Hexie trains.
On the other side, because Germany tried to save money by avoiding the construction of entirely new corridors, they forced ultra-fast commuter trains to share the exact same physical tracks with heavy cargo trains.
When one slow freight train breaks down, the entire national express system grinds to a halt.
Economic Multiplier vs. Direct Profit
The Chinese state views high-speed rail as a public utility and an economic multiplier.
Even if individual rail lines operate at a financial loss or carry high debt, the investment is justified by the massive economic productivity, regional integration, and urban development it unlocks.
As part of the 1994 privatization, the German government treated Deutsche Bahn like a standard commercial enterprise.
Success was measured by cutting operational costs and generating a direct financial profit, which directly starved the physical tracks of preventative maintenance.
One would probably think the German model at least achieved higher ROI for investors even though China achieves higher total societal benefits.
Yet, reality has an ironic twist – the German model ultimately failed the investors, too.
Deutsche Bahn ended up in a financial worst-of-both-worlds scenario.
In a standard capitalist system, starving an asset of maintenance to boost short-term balance sheets usually generates high dividends for investors or pushes stock prices up.
But because DB’s privatization was half-baked, it achieved neither. The only investor in Deutsche Bahn is still the German Federal Government as its IPO plan was abandoned 2 decades ago.
Because the network was run into the ground to cut short-term corporate costs, the long-term liabilities eventually caught up.
Rather than paying rich dividends, DB has cost taxpayers billions in bailouts. The company recently reported a €2.3 billion net loss.
To manage its staggering debts, DB was forced to sell off its highly profitable global logistics subsidiary, DB Schenker, just to artificially steady its balance sheet.
By treating a core public monopoly like a private business, Germany didn’t create a highly profitable enterprise; they created an operational bottleneck that costs the broader German economy billions in lost corporate productivity every year.
China’s model operates on the opposite financial wavelength.
In a socialist market economy, critical infrastructure is heavily state directed through State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs).
While China Rail carries a massive debt load from building its expansive high-speed network, the losses are directly absorbed by the state.
From Beijing’s perspective, the direct financial return on investment of the railway itself is secondary. The real payoff is the societal and macroeconomic ROI.
By connecting far-flung cities, the state slashes shipping friction, drives real estate value, unlocks regional labor markets, and creates economic mobility.
The state effectively subsidizes the train ticket to capture a massive tax and economic growth harvest across the rest of society.
A prime example is the Greater Bay Area in Guangdong, where 7 metropolises, including Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong, are connected into an integrated web via highspeed rail, metro subways, and a network of highways.
The region enjoys unprecedented supply chain density and is ranked as the No. 1 most innovative cluster of cities in the world by the UN’s World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), ahead of Silicon Valley.
The same formula is repeated in nearly every natural monopoly domain – telecom, electric and water utilities, national highway network, and banking.
Rather than allowing private capital to derive rentier-income from such assets, as what happens in capitalist societies, Beijing firmly controls these commanding-heights of the economy in the public hands.
The German capitalist model tries to draw a neat box around Deutsche Bahn and demand that the box itself be profitable. China’s state-led model views the railway as just one cog in a larger national engine.
Ultimately, Deutsche Bahn’s 30-year experiment has proved that for critical public monopolies like rail, trying to squeeze out the last penny of corporate micro-profits usually breaks the system entirely.
Original article: huabinoliver.substack.com
Pistorius eilt nach Washington, unterschreibt Rüstungsdeals und hört nur Lob. Die SPD, einst Partei von Brandts Ostpolitik, schreibt Deutschland in die US-Konzeption einer NATO 3.0 ein und schiebt uns in die Feuerlinie gegen eine Atommacht.
„Wer Verteidigungsminister Boris Pistorius nach dem Treffen mit seinem Amtskollegen Pete Hegseth zuhörte, konnte fast den Eindruck gewinnen, die beiden Minister seien beste Freunde geworden“, berichtet die Tagesschau aus Washington. Dabei geht es um Deutschlands Beitrag dazu, die Dinge in Europa zu eskalieren.
Es scheint eine ferne Zeit zu sein, in der die SPD einst für Dialog und Versöhnung mit unseren europäischen Nachbarn stand. „Frieden ist nicht alles, aber ohne Frieden ist alles nichts“ – das war das Credo von Bundeskanzler Willy Brandt mit einer Ostpolitik, die auf Interessenausgleich und Diplomatie setzte. Eine eigenständige Politik der Annäherung gen Osten war zugleich auch ein Stück Souveränitätsgewinn gegenüber den USA.
In diesen Tagen erleben wir eine völlige Abkehr von diesen Erkenntnissen. Die SPD positioniert sich als Teil der Merz-Regierung gegen den erklärten Feind Russland im Osten. Während selbst die USA teilweise den Dialog mit Moskau wagen, ist aus Berlin lediglich die Ansage zu hören, in wenigen Jahren die größte Armee Europas aufstellen zu wollen. Die SPD ist dabei in der Koalition die Partei, die scheinbar am willfährigsten Deutschland in die US-Konzeption einer NATO 3.0 einschreiben will. Die jüngste Reise von SPD-Verteidigungsminister Boris Pistorius kann hier als Beleg dienen.
Lizenz zum Zuschlagen tief in Russland
Pistorius war zu seinem US-Kollegen Kriegsminister Pete Hegseth geeilt, um eine deutsch-US-amerikanische Absichtserklärung über eine intensivierte gemeinsame Rüstungskooperation zu unterzeichnen. Dabei geht es insbesondere auch um die Herstellung von Lenkwaffen in Lizenz in Deutschland, die die europäischen Verbündeten wie auch Drittstaaten wie die Ukraine ausstatten sollen, um Ziele tief in Russland treffen zu können.
Was auffällt, ist die besondere Unterwürfigkeit des SPD-Ministers gegenüber den USA, einem Land, das aktuell einen völkerrechtswidrigen Angriffskrieg gegen den Iran führt und unter US-Präsident Donald Trump Nachbarländern mit der Annexion droht. Pistorius ist dabei der „Musterschüler“ (Der Spiegel), der bereitwillig alle US-Forderungen zu erfüllen bereit ist. Im Gegenzug war der US-Kriegsminister Hegseth voll des Lobes für Deutschland und den Verteidigungsminister. Und Pistorius jubilierte:
„Ich habe kein kritisches Wort zu Deutschland gehört, überhaupt keins. Im Gegenteil: viel Anerkennung in den verschiedenen Bereichen und auch Dankbarkeit für die Rolle, die wir in Europa übernehmen.“
Im Rahmen der NATO-3.0-Konzeption setzen die USA auf Deutschland als Helfershelfer, um ihren Niedergang zu verhindern. Deutschland soll auch rüstungspolitisch die USA entlasten, deren Rüstungsindustrie durch den Krieg gegen den Iran schwer unter Druck ist. Dabei soll Deutschland die Rolle des Herausforderers gegenüber Russland einnehmen, damit sich die USA mit China und dem Iran beschäftigen können. Die SPD ist die Speerspitze, um die Forderungen aus den USA zu erfüllen.
Deutschland soll die Kriege der USA in Europa führen. Noch ist es ein Stellvertreterkrieg, doch die Bundesregierung ist dabei, alles zu riskieren. Eine Verweigerung wie zu Zeiten des Irak-Krieges durch SPD-Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder gilt den SPD-Granden von heute als Verrat. Insbesondere Verteidigungsminister Pistorius steht Gewehr bei Fuß.
Unter den Bus – und stolz darauf
Die Vorstellung, dass die USA keine Verbündeten kennen, sondern nur Interessen, dürfte nicht ins strategische Kalkül des SPD-Manns passen. Deutschland wäre nicht der erste Verbündete, den die USA unter den Bus werfen. Saudi-Arabien könnte aktuell darüber Zeugnis ablegen.
Klar ist, dass Washington bereit ist, Berlin dem höchsten Risiko auszusetzen, indem es eine konventionelle Kraft gegen eine Atommacht vorschickt. Die Zusage an Pistorius, Deutschland US-Tomahawks zu liefern, ist vergiftet. Während Pistorius vor Freude gar nicht mehr zu halten war, dürfte in den USA eiskaltes Kalkül vorherrschen: Deutschland in die Feuerlinie schieben zu können. Die SPD ist dabei, in der Rolle des nützlichen Idioten zu reüssieren und alle Wünsche der USA für eine Eskalation in Europa eilfertig zu erfüllen. Welch ein Absturz.
Originalbeitrag NachDenkSeiten
Strategic Culture Foundation | October 9, 2026
The European Union is witnessing a full-blown social revolt. Governing political parties and their economic policies are held in open contempt as public protests and strikes escalate across multiple countries.
Protests, mass marches, and industrial strikes are spreading across the EU in France, Belgium, Spain, Italy, Germany, Ireland, Portugal, and other countries. The grievances are various, from students and teachers over woeful education services, to healthcare professionals and transportation workers denouncing crumby wages and pension cuts.
But at the core is a warmongering, dehumanizing system of capitalist inequality.
Unbearable living costs for basic needs, from food to housing, are driving millions onto the streets in desperation and anger at the lack of adequate political response to their concerns. As one French student said: “Too young to be listened to, old enough to be tear-gassed.”
The entire political system is being brought into disrepute for its dysfunction and indifference towards meeting rudimentary human needs. Then, infuriating all the more, are lies from the elite rulers and their propaganda media about “national defense and threat of war from Russia.”
In Spain this week, an 87-year-old frail woman known as Maricarmen died in hospital after she was evicted from her Madrid home because she could not pay the extortionate rent increase. Her plight has come to galvanize a nationwide protest against Spain’s housing crisis, a crisis that is repeated across every European country. Protesters shouted furiously that the pitiful old woman was “murdered by the state and corporations.”
In France, the brutality of police against student protests has shocked the nation and the world. Nearly 7,000 young people have been arrested, as riot police tear gas and shoot at largely peaceful rallies. Students gathering at the Place de la Bastille in Paris and other cities vow that they will not back down. One student had his hand blown off by a police stun grenade while another teenager lost an eye from a rubber bullet fired at close range.
The Place de la Bastille is where the French Revolution manifested in 1798 against a hated aristocracy amid abject misery. Today, the tensions are boiling towards another momentous rebellion, this time inspiring again similar movements across Europe.
These protests and the inhumane suffering that underlie them are channeling uprisings all over the EU.
There is a palpable sense that populations en masse have had enough of decades of inequality and chronic deprivation inflicted by capitalist policies that enrich a few and are enforced by governments slavishly serving the interests of capital over the needs of the citizen majority.
Western media reports talk about “cash-strapped” governments under pressure from bond markets to reduce record debt levels while workers, students and pensioners demand more public investment and relief from economic hardship.
That is a misleading partial portrayal of the problem. Omitted is the crucial backdrop that European governments are directing vast economic resources towards militarism and the proxy war in Ukraine against Russia. That is what is causing the “cash-strapped governments.” In other words, their declared fiscal straits are a policy choice, not some mysterious dilemma.
The social crisis sweeping across Europe is also seen in the United States and other Western-aligned nations. The background is a failed economic system that no longer provides a modicum of acceptable living conditions. The problem has been decades in the making from growing inequality and diminishing political representation. Today it is even questionable if Western states are democracies, controlled as they are by corporate oligarchies.
Nevertheless, the social crisis that is unfolding across Europe has been intensified and amplified by European political rulers operating in a relentless war mode against Russia.
The European Union has pumped hundreds of billions of euros into Ukraine over the past four years to prop up a NeoNazi regime run by a corrupt dictatorship – all for the objective of defeating Russia. The EU leaders – many of them unelected, like Ursula von der Leyen, Kaja Kallas and António Costa – are driven by an obsessive Russophobia. But that is only part of the explanation.
Other elected leaders and parties like France’s Macron and Germany’s Merz are also despised for their elitism and delusions of grandeur. Merz declares that he wants to make Germany the strongest military in Europe, in total tin-ear deafness to his nation’s economic and social problems and the sinister historical connotations of resurrecting Nazi Germany. Meanwhile, as his government suffers electoral defeat after defeat, European elites deprecate German voters as being blind because they dare to choose parties that are opposed to war with Russia.
There are many grounds for the Europe-wide contempt of ruling parties. Inequality, poverty, unemployment, soaring living costs, declining wages, deteriorating public services. Uncontrolled immigration amid the pressure on inadequate public resources is another cause for grievance. Europe’s complicity in the Israeli genocidal war on Palestinians, and Europe’s complicity in Trump’s aggression towards Iran, Yemen, Cuba, and so on, are other factors.
However, the bogus narrative that governments are “cash-strapped” is a cause for immense public disgust. There are plenty of economic resources to meet public needs. It’s a question of those resources not being permitted to create just and humane societies under the prevailing capitalist system with its priority of enriching a tiny elite class.
The conditions of “tight budgets” and “austerity for the masses” are created by deliberate policies of militarism and fuelling a proxy war in Ukraine.
European “leaders” and their NATO lobbyists like Mark Rutte demand hundreds of billions of euros to boost military industries while at the same time calling for draconian cuts in public spending and social welfare in order to pay for this reckless militarism. The EU is “lending” an additional €90 billion over the next two years alone just to prop up the corrupt regime in Kiev so that it can keep fighting a futile war with Russia. The perverse priority is driven by the military-industrial complex and its corporate investors. It is also driven by an ideological, propagandized mindset that demonizes Russia as an enemy. President Putin and other Russian voices have repeatedly stated that they do not want war with Europe. They say the conflict in Ukraine has root causes that can be resolved through diplomatic engagement. Why are European politicians implacably opposed to peace?
A major factor is covering for internal political and economic failure of the European system. The EU’s economies, as with those in the U.S. and other Western states, are bankrupt dystopias in terms of delivering on social and democratic needs. The failure has been compounded by the costs of war in Ukraine.
That failure is criminal and fatal for the politicians and governments who have overseen the policies. Thus, the political class, including the propaganda news media, cannot admit their criminal policies.
In the face of their own internal contradictions, the European political elites are seeking a solution by externalizing Russia as an enemy. This is the same modus operandi that European rulers have used for the past century and more, unleashing two world wars as a result.
These criminal politicians and their dysfunctional economic system are again pushing war as their escape plan for survival at the expense of millions of lives and at the risk of starting a third world war, one that this time around could involve catastrophic nuclear nemesis.
It is damning of virtually every European government, including primarily the British, that there are no calls for diplomacy and political settlement with Russia. They are committed to waging war on Russia to absolve themselves from the social devastation they are responsible for.
One positive thing, though, is that increasing numbers of people can see through the chicanery and lies. A German student placard summed it up: “We won’t fight your wars… Education not bombs!”
A day of reckoning is imminent. Criminal political leaders and their warmongering system are exposed like never before and in a way that demands total revolt as a proper solution. The consequences are not to be externalized this time. Chickens are coming home to roost, as Malcom X once said.
Germany’s Bundestag has formally recognised the country’s particular historical responsibility towards Ukraine for atrocities committed during the Nazi occupation, adopting parliamentary resolutions commemorating the 85th anniversary of the Babyn Yar massacre near Kyiv.
The decision, taken on 9 October, has implications beyond historical remembrance. For decades, Germany’s responsibility for the destruction inflicted on the Soviet Union during the Second World War was frequently interpreted through its relationship with Russia. Moscow occupied a privileged position in German efforts at reconciliation, although some of the Nazi occupation’s worst atrocities took place in territories belonging to present-day Ukraine and Belarus.
The Bundestag’s parliamentary debate and resolutions reflect a different emphasis. Germany’s historical obligations are now being connected explicitly to Ukraine’s sovereignty and its defence against Russia’s invasion, challenging an interpretation of the past that had long influenced Berlin’s approach towards Moscow.
Following German reunification, reconciliation with Russia became a central element of Berlin’s eastern policy. The Soviet Union’s immense wartime losses, officially estimated at approximately 27 million people, were frequently invoked to explain Germany’s special obligation to maintain constructive relations with Moscow.
That historical argument became intertwined with political and economic considerations, contributing to the belief that Russia should remain closely integrated into Europe’s security and economic arrangements, even as relations with its neighbours deteriorated.
The difficulty lay in the frequent conflation of Russia with the Soviet Union. Nazi Germany invaded a multinational state, not the present-day Russian Federation. Ukrainians, Belarusians, Russians, Jews and numerous other peoples suffered under an occupation whose policies included mass murder, starvation, deportation and the systematic destruction of communities.
Ukraine was among the principal territories where the German war of annihilation unfolded. The Holocaust by bullets, the destruction of entire settlements, the exploitation of occupied agricultural regions and the deportation of civilians for forced labour were central features of Nazi rule there.
Nevertheless, German political discourse often approached this history primarily through the framework of German-Russian reconciliation. The suffering of Ukraine and Belarus was acknowledged, but neither country occupied a comparable position in Berlin’s strategic thinking.
This imbalance has been examined by German scholars of foreign policy, who have argued that the historical justification for rapprochement with Russia sometimes obscured the distinct wartime experiences of other former Soviet republics.
The anniversary of Babyn Yar provides a particularly direct illustration of the historical problem.
On 29 and 30 September 1941, German SS and police units, with assistance from local collaborators, murdered 33,771 Jewish men, women and children in a ravine outside Kyiv. The massacre was among the largest single mass shootings of the Holocaust.
Killings continued at the site throughout the German occupation. Approximately 100,000 people were murdered there, including Jews, Roma, Soviet prisoners of war and other civilians persecuted by the Nazi authorities.
Babyn Yar was not an isolated atrocity. Similar mass executions occurred across occupied Ukraine, while millions of people suffered under German military occupation. The country’s experience formed a substantial part of the wider catastrophe conventionally remembered in Germany as the war against the Soviet Union.
The geographical distinction matters because the Soviet Union’s dissolution in 1991 did not transfer the historical experiences of its constituent peoples exclusively to Russia. Nor did Moscow’s position as the principal diplomatic successor to the USSR confer ownership of their wartime suffering.
Recognition of Ukraine’s separate experience therefore requires more than acknowledging the location of Nazi crimes. It involves reconsidering the political assumptions that allowed Russia to become Germany’s principal partner in commemorating a history shared by several nations.
In its resolution on the Babyn Yar anniversary, Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s CDU/CSU and its Social Democratic coalition partner explicitly connected remembrance of Nazi crimes with Germany’s present obligations towards Ukraine.
The document declares that responsibility for German atrocities does not end with commemorating their victims. It requires opposition to antisemitism, racism, historical revisionism and imperialist violence.
The parliamentary motion calls for continued political, economic, financial, humanitarian and military assistance to Ukraine, together with support for its European integration and efforts to secure the return of children transferred to Russia.
The opposition Greens separately submitted a resolution centred on Germany’s historical responsibility towards Ukraine, advocating greater attention to the German occupation in historical education, research and cooperation between memorial institutions.
The development does not mean that Germany has only now recognised Ukrainian victims of Nazi persecution. German officials have previously acknowledged responsibility towards Ukraine alongside Russia and Belarus. In 2016, then foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier explicitly referred to the suffering of all three countries in an address marking the German invasion of the Soviet Union.
What has changed is the political weight attached to that recognition. The historical relationship with Moscow can no longer be treated as the principal expression of Germany’s obligations arising from the war, particularly when Russia is conducting a war of territorial conquest against another country devastated by Nazi aggression.
The reassessment also exposes a contradiction in Germany’s earlier Russia policy.
Historical responsibility was among the arguments used to defend engagement with Moscow, including economic cooperation and efforts to accommodate Russian security concerns. Such reasoning remained influential even after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014.
The Nord Stream pipeline projects exemplified the wider policy of maintaining substantial economic ties with Russia despite objections from Ukraine and several Central and Eastern European governments. Those projects had commercial and geopolitical motivations, but they developed within a political culture in which reconciliation with Moscow carried particular historical significance.
Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 fundamentally undermined that approach. Germany subsequently expanded military assistance to Ukraine, while President Steinmeier acknowledged serious errors in his previous assessment of relations with Moscow.
The Bundestag’s latest resolution adds a historical dimension to that policy correction. Rather than regarding restraint towards Russia as the principal lesson of Germany’s wartime conduct, parliament has articulated a responsibility to assist Ukraine in preserving its independence.
The two positions are not necessarily incompatible as matters of historical remembrance. Germany retains an obligation to commemorate Russian victims of Nazism, just as it does Ukrainian, Belarusian and other victims. The distinction concerns whether responsibility for past atrocities should influence contemporary policy towards the Russian state when that state itself is violating another nation’s sovereignty.
That question has become increasingly important as German political parties debate the duration and extent of military assistance to Kyiv. Calls for renewed accommodation with Moscow continue to feature in domestic politics, including among those opposed to further weapons deliveries.
The Bundestag’s recognition of Ukraine’s particular historical experience does not resolve those disputes or establish a new military commitment. It does, however, challenge one of the historical arguments that shaped Germany’s previous relationship with Russia.
The significance of the Babyn Yar anniversary therefore extends beyond the commemoration of crimes committed in 1941. It concerns a belated adjustment in Germany’s understanding of where its wartime responsibilities lie, and the extent to which those responsibilities should inform its conduct towards Ukraine today.
The German Bundestag has made a historic decision, officially recognizing Germany’s special responsibility to Ukraine for the crimes of Nazism. On 9 October, it adopted two resolutions ahead of the 85th anniversary of the Babyn Yar massacre and linked that responsibility to Germany’s current help for Ukraine amid Russian aggression, Oleksii Makeiev, Ukraine’s ambassador to Berlin, says.
Babyn Yar in Kyiv became one of Europe’s largest sites of the mass murder of Jews during the Holocaust, where more than 100,000 people were killed over two years of Nazi occupation. Germany now casts a debt from that war as a moral duty to help defend Kyiv against Russia today.
Both motions stress the importance of researching Nazi crimes in Ukraine and preserving the memory of their victims. One came from the governing CDU/CSU and SPD parties, the other from the opposition Greens, a rare alignment of coalition and opposition on a single theme.
“The situation is unique: two motions on this subject were approved at once, from the coalition and the opposition. By the usual parliamentary logic, that should not happen,” Makeiev says.
The coalition motion backs research and documentation of Nazi crimes in Ukraine and closer work among German, Ukrainian, and other European archives and memorial institutions. It also calls for countering antisemitism, racism, and historical revisionism, and for continued political, economic, financial, humanitarian, and military support for Ukraine.
Makeiev says he felt a sense of deja vu watching the debate from the visitors’ gallery.
“I was in that same gallery in the fall of 2022. I saw how German democratic parliamentary groups can demonstrate unity on what matters most. At that time, the Bundestag recognized the Holodomor of 1932–1933 as genocide,” he adds.
A separate point of the resolution concerns Ukrainian children and teenagers who Russia has illegally taken from Ukraine. The document calls for efforts to return about 20,000 of them to their parents or relatives, folding the issue into Germany’s wider policy toward Ukraine.
The director of the Babyn Yar National Historical and Memorial Preserve, Rosa Tapanova, considers the Bundestag’s decision an important step toward re-examining the shared history of Ukraine and Germany and overcoming distortions of historical memory propagated for decades by the Soviet authorities and now being exploited by Russia.
“The Bundestag’s decision marked an important step toward Germany’s recognition of its historical responsibility toward Ukraine," she says.
The Bundestag’s decision and the participation of German representatives in commemorative events underscore the importance of continued Ukrainian-German dialogue. For the Babyn Yar National Historical and Memorial Preserve, this work encompasses historical research, the documentation of testimonies, educational and memorial projects, and international cooperation.
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