On October 25, Brazilians will return to the polls to choose between President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Flávio Bolsonaro, son of former president Jair Bolsonaro, who was sentenced to 27 years in prison for his role in an attempted coup. The first round gave Flávio 47% of valid votes against Lula’s 45%, revealing the enduring strength of the far right four years after its electoral defeat. The runoff takes place as Donald Trump seeks to restore US domination over Latin America, with Brazil emerging as a consequential battleground in Washington’s campaign to contain China’s growing relations with the region.
Over the past two decades, Brazil and China have built a political partnership that has expanded the space for independent action among countries of the Global South. Under Lula and Xi Jinping, this relationship has deepened through cooperation in industrial development, infrastructure, science, and technology. The election will determine whether this project advances or Brazil’s international orientation is subordinated to Washington’s renewed Monroe Doctrine as part of the continent’s rightward shift.
Since Lula’s return to the presidency in 2023, the two governments have connected Chinese cooperation with Brazil’s development programs, including Nova Indústria Brasil, the Growth Acceleration Program (PAC), and the Ecological Transformation Plan. Lula’s May 2025 visit to Beijing produced 36 agreements covering infrastructure, finance, artificial intelligence, public health, and industrial cooperation. Behind these agreements is a long-standing challenge: overcoming Brazil’s dependent position in the international division of labor, where commodity exports continue to outweigh advanced industrial and technological development.
This cooperation has also reached Brazilian popular movements. Through the International Association for Popular Cooperation (Baobab), Brazil’s Landless Rural Workers’ Movement (MST) and other organizations have worked with Chinese institutions on agricultural mechanization, bioinputs, and digital technologies for family farming. These initiatives include the Digital Family Farming and Agroecology Laboratory and IARAA, an artificial intelligence project for agroecology and agrarian reform developed by Brazilian popular movements using Chinese open-source models. In a countryside marked by extreme concentrations of land, machinery, and capital, such cooperation offers new tools to peasant organizations fighting for agrarian reform and the production of healthy food.
Brazil’s relationship with China also reveals the different class interests at work in the country, with contradictions particularly visible in the countryside. Massive exports of soybeans, meat, and minerals have continued under both Bolsonaro and Lula, but their governments have pursued very different political relationships with Beijing. While Jair Bolsonaro attacked China and aligned himself with Washington, Lula has sought to deepen strategic cooperation, including in industrial development, technology, and agrarian reform. Flávio Bolsonaro now promises an “economically pragmatic” relationship with China while cultivating close ties with Trump. For sectors of Brazil’s ruling classes that profit from commodity exports, continuing to sell to China while embracing Washington’s political agenda presents little contradiction. For Brazil’s efforts to rebuild its industry and develop technological sovereignty, the consequences are far greater.
Washington’s ambitions were made explicit in its November 2025 National Security Strategy, which announced a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, seeking to restore US pre-eminence in the Western Hemisphere and deny outside powers control over strategic resources and infrastructure. Five days later, China published its third Latin America policy paper, reaffirming sovereignty, non-interference, regional integration, technological cooperation, and support for the region as a Zone of Peace. The two documents reveal fundamentally different approaches to the political future of the continent.
Brazil’s position is decisive. As Latin America’s largest economy, a founding BRICS member, and a leading participant in Mercosur, it possesses industrial, scientific, and political capacities that could strengthen independent development across Latin America and beyond.
The emergence of a new technological era makes this struggle particularly consequential. Brazil is among the few countries of the Global South capable of pursuing digital and technological sovereignty that could benefit its neighbors and parts of Africa. Its roughly 23% share of global rare earth reserves is an important starting point, but control over minerals alone is insufficient. The greater challenge is developing the capacity to process them, manufacture advanced components, and build the digital infrastructure, artificial intelligence systems, and technologies that will shape future production.
Flávio has made his orientation clear. Speaking at the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in the United States in March 2026, he offered Brazil as the “solution” to Washington’s dependence on China for critical minerals, explicitly linking rare earths to artificial intelligence and US military superiority. Chinese economic reporting has also described proposals from his team to exclude China from rare-earth supply chains. Rather than using Brazil’s resources to develop its own industrial and technological capacities, this agenda would place them at the service of US technological and military power.
The same political orientation extends to digital sovereignty. In July 2026, Flávio’s campaign submitted proposals to US trade authorities that included preventing Brazil’s Pix payment system from connecting to non-Western international payment networks and loosening commitments within Mercosur. These proposals converge with a wider US campaign involving tariffs, digital regulation, strategic minerals, and attempts to influence Brazil’s electoral process. Meanwhile, Washington’s January 2026 bombing on Venezuela and kidnapping of Nicolás Maduro and Cilia Flores demonstrated how far it is prepared to go to impose its will on the continent.
Brazil, particularly under Lula, has helped build institutions through which countries of the Global South can reduce their dependence on Western-dominated structures. At the July 2025 BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro, the group advanced cooperation on development finance, local-currency transactions, and international institutional reform. The New Development Bank, headed by former Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff, is an important expression of this effort.
The BRICS cannot automatically overcome economic dependency or guarantee sovereignty for working people. Yet its expansion offers greater room for independent development, provided that participating governments have the political commitment to use these possibilities.
Brazil’s history reveals how difficult that independence has been to defend. In 1961, vice-president João Goulart became the first high-ranking representative of a Latin American government to visit the People’s Republic of China, meeting Mao Zedong when revolutionary China remained diplomatically isolated and subjected to US sanctions. Three years later, Goulart was overthrown in a US-backed civil-military coup that inaugurated a 21-year dictatorship. The early history of China–Brazil friendship was inseparable from struggles over national sovereignty, agrarian reform, and the forces determined to suppress them.
The international material conditions for South–South cooperation are considerably more favorable today, but political direction remains decisive. Jair Bolsonaro hosted the 2019 BRICS summit in Brasília while pursuing close alignment with Washington. A government can weaken institutions from within by abandoning the commitments that give them political substance.
The far right’s resurgence also reflects the enduring power of Brazil’s own ruling classes. Bolsonarismo has a domestic base among sections of agribusiness, finance, the security apparatus, militias, conservative religious networks, and major media. These forces, whose electoral and institutional advances have continued, were strengthened by the 2016 parliamentary coup against Dilma Rousseff and the judicial persecution of Lula. They possess their own organizations, material interests, and sources of power, which do not disappear when an election is lost. Their economic dependence on Chinese markets has not prevented their support for Washington’s political agenda.
Beijing has followed the Brazilian election closely, reflecting the importance of the political relationship built between Lula and Xi over years of cooperation. In July, Xi reaffirmed China’s support for Brazil against external interference during a conversation with Lula, which also covered cooperation in artificial intelligence, satellites, mineral processing, and relations between China and Mercosur. In September, Foreign Minister Wang Yi received Lula’s adviser and former foreign minister Celso Amorim in Beijing, reaffirming the bilateral strategic partnership.
China’s principle of non-interference means that the choice of Brazil’s government belongs to the Brazilian people, but Beijing’s diplomatic restraint should not be confused with an absence of political interests or an assumption that all governments would pursue the same relationship. Chinese analysts have described the possible outlook under Flávio as one of “cold politics, hot economics”: commodity trade would likely continue, but the political relationship and cooperation in strategic sectors could deteriorate. The experience of Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency has already shown the limits of commercial interests in sustaining a broader political partnership.
For the Brazilian people, the consequences extend well beyond foreign policy. The election will also shape the struggles over labor rights, public services, agrarian reform, and the defence of democratic space. Brazil’s renewed role in South–South cooperation under Lula has opened possibilities for a development project that responds to the needs of its working people, but realizing those possibilities depends on the political and social forces capable of carrying it forward.
The Brazilian people have fought through dictatorship, neoliberal restructuring, parliamentary coups, and the rise of the far right to defend their political and social gains. This election is another moment in that longer struggle, now unfolding amid renewed US imperial intervention and a transformation of the world’s technological foundations. The future of China–Brazil cooperation will depend on the capacity of organized popular forces to build a sovereign national project and turn international cooperation into lasting changes in people’s lives.
Tings Chak 翟庭君 is the Asia Co-Coordinator of Tricontinental: Institute for Social Researchand an editor of the international edition of Wenhua Zongheng: A Journal of Contemporary Chinese Thought.
Seven US senators from both parties said the Trump administration's decision to authorize Russian diesel imports conflicts with a 2022 law banning Russian energy imports and accused it of failing to consult Congress, in a statement on 11 October.
The dispute comes as the war with Iran drives up US fuel prices, which US President Donald Trump has blamed on Ukraine's strikes on Russian refineries. Trump says Russian supplies will help bring prices down, while lawmakers warn that purchases could provide Moscow with revenue to continue its war against Ukraine.
The senators—Republicans Susan Collins, Lisa Murkowski, Thom Tillis, and John Curtis, and Democrats Jeanne Shaheen, Richard Blumenthal, and Ron Wyden—called on the administration to reverse course, saying the US should not provide Russian President Vladimir Putin with “a financial lifeline.”
The law, signed on 8 April 2022, allows the president to end the import ban only after submitting a certification to Congress. The certification must find that Russia has agreed to pull out its forces and stop the fighting on terms Ukraine's free and independent government accepts, no longer poses an immediate threat of attack to any NATO member, and recognizes Ukrainians' right to pick their own government.
The law also requires consultation with four congressional committees and a report at least 45 days before certification. The termination takes effect 90 days after certification unless a joint resolution of disapproval is enacted into law during that period. The senators allege the administration failed to meet the consultation and reporting requirements. Their statement does not establish whether a certification has been submitted.
The Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control issued General License No. 135 on 9 October, authorizing certain transactions involving Russian-origin diesel that would otherwise be restricted under US sanctions regulations. It runs until 7 April 2027 and cites sanctions regulations, not the 2022 import-ban law.
Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent defended the deal on Fox News on 11 October, saying the administration would proceed under existing legal authority. He said lawmakers who argued that either the earlier law or the current Lindsey Graham sanctions law prohibited the deal were wrong, and argued the agreement would lower prices, Reuters reported.
Trump said on Truth Social that Russia would immediately supply more than 300,000 tons of diesel to US and global markets, followed by 500,000 tons in November and 1 million tons after that. He said Russia would deliver another 3 million tons “within a short period of time,” depending on the condition of its diesel refineries. The promised volumes have not been independently verified.
Russia partially lifted its diesel export ban on 10 October, allowing 500,000 tons onto the global market at this stage, the Russian government said, according to state news agency TASS.
Pennsylvania Republican Rep. Brian Fitzpatrick plans to introduce the Ronald Reagan Peace Through Strength Act to block Russian oil purchases and use a discharge petition to force a House vote, Axios reported. The procedure can force consideration of a bill if 218 House members sign. Republican Rep. Don Bacon said he would support the bill and called Trump's decision a serious mistake, according to Ukrainska Pravda.
On CBS's Face the Nation on 11 October, Senate Majority Whip John Barrasso, a Republican from Wyoming, called the deal “another point of leverage” for Trump to use against Putin. Asked whether the decision violated US law, Barrasso said the president was balancing competing priorities and had to make tough decisions.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy wrote on Telegram on 9 October:
“Allowing Russia to sell petroleum products is an investment in a war that must be ended, not prolonged.”
Trump also expects Ukraine to stop striking Russian refineries under his proposed energy ceasefire, a White House official told Axios. Zelenskyy said Kyiv would halt such strikes if Moscow did the same.
Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis has apparently started to realize that the ruling conservative New Democracy party will hardly manage to achieve the necessary 30+% of the votes in the upcoming elections and secure a majority government like in the last two parliamentary votes. Over the weekend, PM Mitsotakis made clear if the election result […]
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The EU adopted its largest-ever round of sanctions listings on 12 October, targeting the suppliers behind Russia’s war industry, the Council of the EU announced. The bloc acted as Russia keeps killing Ukrainian civilians every day, while US President Donald Trump eases sanctions on Russian diesel.
Russia’s planned winter campaign against Ukraine’s infrastructure depends on arms factories fed by a web of component suppliers and on oil revenue that still flows despite Ukraine’s refinery strikes, so every supplier cut off from that web raises the cost of waging it. As Washington eases off, Europe’s own pressure has a gap: its ports still take record volumes of Russian Arctic gas, and a full ban on long-term contracts starts only in 2027.
More than half of the new listings hit the supply chain for ballistic missiles that Russia “uses to kill Ukrainian civilians every day,” EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said in the statement. Russian attacks killed more than 150 people in the past week, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on 11 October.
The list names 826 Russian companies, mid-level firms the Council calls the “core” of Russia’s arms industry, with at least €20 billion in yearly turnover, and 743 people who run them. They make parts for missiles, drones, and military aircraft, from semiconductors and radars to explosives and navigation systems. Their assets are frozen, EU firms may not finance them, and the executives may not enter the EU.
Foreign ministers ratified a deal EU envoys reached on 7 October. Ukraine’s sanctions commissioner Vladyslav Vlasiuk said 60% of the listings came from Ukrainian proposals.
EU foreign ministers in Luxembourg vowed to keep the sanctions despite Trump’s diesel deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Euronews reported. Kallas addressed Washington directly as she arrived.
“The US is our biggest ally, but our message is clear: if we want to end this war, the only way we can do this is (by) putting more pressure on Russia,” Kallas said.
Irish Foreign Minister Helen McEntee called the deal “concerning,” and Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys said it was “not the European way.” Kallas warned that an energy truce covering only refineries would favor Russia, since Ukraine has one refinery and Russia “plenty.”
Trump announced the diesel deal on 9 October, and the US Treasury waived sanctions on Russian diesel until April 2027. Zelenskyy said the EU would provide about €3 billion more in military aid this week.
Trump expects Ukraine to stop hitting Russian refineries under his proposed energy ceasefire, a White House official told Axios. Zelenskyy said Kyiv would halt such strikes if Moscow did the same. On 10 October, Trump told reporters it was time for Ukraine to get a new president. Germany’s foreign minister, Britain’s defense secretary, and a senior lawmaker from Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s party backed Zelenskyy, while the Kremlin sided with Trump.
Zelenskyy offered to hold elections after a 60-day ceasefire, and Kallas said elections are impossible while the war goes on. The Institute for the Study of War assessed that Russia exploits Ukraine’s legal ban on wartime elections to drag out the war.
Russia offers Ukraine a single day without strikes for its elections. Russian leader Vladimir Putin is ready to order a halt to strikes on Ukraine only on the day of a presidential election, if Kyiv decides to hold one, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov says, Russian state agency TASS reported.
The offer answers Ukraine’s call for a real pause: on 11 October, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated Ukraine could hold elections if Putin agreed to a full ceasefire of at least 60 days, ABC News reported. Against the backdrop of Russian strikes that killed more than 150 Ukrainian civilians in a single week, Moscow counters with a one-day truce confined to voting day.
“...If they really want to hold elections in Kyiv, the president of Russia, the supreme commander-in-chief, will be ready to give the order not to strike Ukraine on election day. Specifically on election day,” Peskov said.
His statements followed US President Donald Trump’s call on 10 October for Ukraine to choose a new president, saying a change of leadership could help reach peace with Russia, according to Suspilne.
Trump also criticized Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries amid his new agreements to supply a low volume of diesel into the US.
Peskov has outright dismissed the longer truce. Ukraine needs 60 days not to hold elections but to heal its wounds and continue the war, he argues.
He has claimed Russia had been willing to resume peace talks after Russia’s own State Duma elections, but accused Ukraine of launching massive strikes on Moscow to disrupt that vote. Peskov has gone further, claiming Ukraine shelled polling stations and killed several members of district election commissions in the Russian-occupied regions it calls its own.
The accusations are Russia’s and remain unverified. Peskov offered no evidence for the claims about polling stations or election officials, which echo long-running Kremlin talking points.
He also made no mention of Russia’s own strikes on Ukrainian civilian targets over the same period, including attacks on energy sites and residential buildings.
On 9 October, three weeks after signing the first major Russia oil sanctions in two years, Donald Trump agreed with Vladimir Putin to bring Russian diesel back to world markets. The US Treasury suspended its sanctions on that trade until April 2027 the same day. In the two days before, Russian strikes had killed more than 80 Ukrainian civilians.
Europe answered on 12 October with its largest sanctions package yet: nearly 1,600 new listings, almost all in Russia’s military-industrial complex. Its core, says Ukraine’s sanctions envoy Vladyslav Vlasiuk, is Russia’s missile program and the electronics inside it, from capacitors to semiconductors. Six in ten listings came from Ukrainian proposals, and Brussels adopted them within weeks.
That is the right reflex, and proof that Europe can move fast when it chooses. But the package names companies and people one by one. On the measures that cut whole sectors, the ones that would hurt Moscow most, Europe still waits for Washington.
It waits for Trump to decide whether to enforce the Graham Act he signed in September. It waits for him to decide whether to lean on Hungary and Slovakia or let them off. It waits for the G7 to rule on tanker services before touching its own ships. Europe keeps asking the Trump administration to decide things it is perfectly able to decide itself.
If the EU is serious about ending a war on its own continent, it does not need a miracle from Washington. It needs to pull the levers already in its hands. Here they are.
1. Fix export-control enforcement on dual-use goods. It is unacceptable that the newest Russian drones and missiles contain not only Chinese parts but American and European ones. The "War and Sanctions" portal logs what turns up. The EU should find and close the enforcement gaps in its own dual-use export law. Choking the supply to Russia's war industry serves Ukraine and Europe alike.
2. Force Hungary and Slovakia off Russian oil. The EU banned Russian oil imports in 2022, with temporary exemptions for landlocked states: Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary. Czechia has since diversified and dropped Russian oil entirely. Slovakia and Hungary can do the same; the Czech case proves it is a question of will, not feasibility. Ending the exemptions would also make good on REPowerEU's central promise, phasing out Russian energy. The gas-import ban is already decided. Oil is the gap that remains.
3. Close the Greek and Maltese tanker loophole. Up to 40% of Russia's seaborne oil travels on European tankers, Greek and Maltese. The EU has banned maritime services for Russian oil since 2022, with one exception: cargoes sold below the price cap. This spring the Council discussed scrapping that exception, which would have meant a full ban, then made any change conditional on coordination with the G7. Once again, Europe is asking Washington to act for it. The EU should overcome Greek and Maltese resistance and ban every maritime service for Russian oil: transport, insurance, and the rest.
4. Stop the shadow fleet in European waters. Russia ships oil to India, China, and Türkiye through a shadow fleet of aging, often uninsured tankers. Europe can check their insurance and turn away any that lack EU or G7 cover, especially in the North Sea and the Baltic, where any spill would be an ecological disaster, and an uninsured operator would not pay for it.
Patrols in territorial waters and exclusive economic zones have to be reinforced. Russia also uses these ships for espionage, sabotage, and damage to undersea infrastructure. Strengthen NATO's Baltic Sentry. Consider adding a maritime operation by the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force or the Coalition of the Willing across the North and Baltic Seas and the Skagerrak, before the Danish straits. If the Russian Baltic Fleet escalates, Europe should be ready for confrontation. Moscow should hear that it is not feared and that it will be stopped. At sea, it is weaker than even NATO's Baltic Sea states alone, never mind NATO's European members together.
5. Scrap the Lingen nuclear-fuel deal. In July, Lower Saxony approved a plan for the French state company Framatome to make nuclear fuel jointly with Rosatom, Russia's builder of nuclear weapons, at Lingen. It is dressed up as serving REPowerEU, since the venture lets Hungary, Slovakia, and Bulgaria buy fuel from a Franco-Russian joint operation instead of straight from Rosatom.
This is nonsense. Ukraine was once wholly dependent on Russian nuclear fuel and diversified fast; Finland and Czechia have done the same. Hungary, Slovakia, and Bulgaria can follow. Stretching the dependence out and hiding it behind a French partner is the opposite of what REPowerEU is for. Lower Saxony's own environment minister called the deal "grundfalsch," fundamentally wrong.
6. Build a Ukraine Fund from frozen Russian assets. Supporting Ukraine will cost more next year, not less, so it is time to get serious about Russia's frozen assets. Not confiscation, which European capitals still resist, and not a simple transfer to Kyiv, which amounts to the same thing, but a dedicated EU-run Ukraine Fund that could invest these assets and use them better than they are used now. ICUV has set it all out in a policy paper.
7. Adopt the Graham-bill sanctions. Sanction every Russian state company (majority or controlling state stake) and every Russian oligarch who has not taken a public anti-war stand. Forbes counts 155 Russian billionaires.
8. Cut every Russian and Belarusian bank off SWIFT. Russia still has 301 operating banks, yet only 103 Russian banks and financial institutions sit under the EU's transaction ban, and just a handful of Belarusian ones. Gazprombank, which the US Treasury says pays Russia's soldiers, is still not on the EU list. Stop listing banks one by one: disconnect the entire Russian and Belarusian banking systems and put them under a full transaction ban, with narrow exceptions for food, medicine, and humanitarian trade.
9. End land transit to and from Russia, Kaliningrad included. Stop all overland freight, rail and road, between the EU and Russia. Baltic ports should carry no Russian trade at all, not just grain. Halt the gas transit to Kaliningrad through Lithuania's pipelines, too; let it arrive by sea, where Russia already runs an LNG terminal. Winters are mild now, so the real effect is mostly higher costs, and even that is worth doing.
10. Ban visas for Russian (ex-)servicemen and their families. The EU's 21st sanctions package laid the legal basis in July and then set no start date. Bring it into force, and extend it to the families.
11. Launch the Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression and the Claims Commission. Speed up the creation of, and accession to, the tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine, and the convention establishing a Claims Commission.
Europe cannot escape this burden. A Russian victory, even a partial one such as a peace on Moscow's terms, would cost it far more than helping Ukraine to a partial victory of its own, a peace along the line of contact. If Europe wants the war to end, it has to lead, alongside Ukraine, instead of waiting on a miracle from the Trump administration. The tools are already in its hands.
Editor's note. The opinions expressed in our Opinion section belong to their authors. Euromaidan Press' editorial team may or may not share them.
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You need 35 years of National Insurance contributions to get the full state pension. Ah, says David Craig, but the unemployed get 'pension credit', which pays exactly the same and comes with piles of freebies thrown in.
The post Want the Highest State Pension? Don’t Bother Working Too Much appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.
SpaceX will not cut Ukraine off from Starlink satellite communications, Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov, presidential adviser on defense technology, says. The reason is that the company could lose a large share of its revenue.
Ukraine’s troops and drones lean heavily on Starlink, a network Kyiv neither owns nor controls, and Elon Musk has used that control against it before. The latest shutdown fears spread after Elon Musk supported US President Donald Trump's criticism of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.
“Not a year goes by without it coming up again: ‘They’ll cut off our Starlink.’ The enemy’s Telegram channels fuel these rumors. We have good and stable partner relations with SpaceX,” Flash writes.
Musk is first of all a businessman, and Ukraine brings SpaceX significant profit, so he is sure no one will switch Starlink off in Ukraine, Flash said. Unexpected moves are possible, he added, but of a different kind, such as turning Starlink on for Russia inside its own territory.
The fears did not appear in a vacuum. After Trump allowed Russian diesel back to US markets, talk spread of "sanctions" on Ukraine if it keeps hitting the Russian refineries that fund Moscow, with the Financial Times reporting, citing European officials, that Trump’s administration has threatened to halt the mechanism for buying US weapons for Ukraine, known as PURL.
Axios has also reported, citing a Ukrainian and an American official, that Washington has threatened to stop sharing intelligence with Ukraine if it continues striking Russian refineries.
The scare feeds a longer effort to reduce dependence. Ukraine is working on a satellite system of its own, something similar to Starlink but beyond Musk’s control, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on 4 October.
The timing is the reason, he said: some states will share the technology with Russia late this year or early next, and the Chinese are among them. Moscow is already fielding its own Starlink-style constellation, Rassvet, though for now it reaches Ukraine only in brief passes.
President Donald Trump’s decision to reopen trade in Russian diesel has implications extending well beyond American fuel prices. The agreement, announced ahead of November’s congressional elections, coincides with negotiations over Russian energy assets and mounting American pressure on Ukraine to suspend attacks against Moscow’s oil infrastructure.
The US Treasury’s General Licence 135, issued on 9 October, authorises transactions involving Russian-origin diesel until 7 April 2027. Unlike Trump’s public announcement, which referred to specific quantities destined for the American market, the licence establishes no corresponding volume ceiling or restriction confining authorised trade to the United States.
Its provisions permit American businesses to participate in eligible international transactions involving Russian diesel, including associated financial and commercial services. Existing sanctions remain formally in force, but an important category of Russian petroleum trade has been reopened.
The arrangement potentially benefits not only Russian producers but also American commodity traders, financial institutions and intermediaries capable of purchasing Russian fuel and distributing it internationally.
The legal mechanism offers Washington considerable flexibility. Rather than formally abandoning restrictions imposed over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the administration can authorise selected transactions while maintaining the broader sanctions framework.
Congress’s Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 strengthened the legislative basis for economic pressure on Moscow but also provided presidential waiver powers.
General Licence 135 was issued under existing Treasury sanctions authorities, rather than necessarily through those waiver provisions. Nevertheless, the combined framework leaves the administration substantial discretion over the practical application of economic restrictions.
Washington can consequently maintain its declared sanctions policy while selectively restoring commercial relations with Russia. European governments, which have maintained extensive restrictions on Russian energy, have little influence over such unilateral American exemptions.
The timing becomes more revealing when considered alongside negotiations over Lukoil’s international assets.
American investors have been exploring the acquisition of the Russian company’s overseas operations, including oilfields, refineries, storage facilities and retail distribution networks. The portfolio has been valued at approximately $20–22 billion.
Among the prospective investors is billionaire Todd Boehly, while discussions concerning Russian-American economic cooperation have involved Trump’s representatives Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner.
An American-controlled acquisition of Lukoil’s international network could complement the commercial opportunities created by the diesel authorisation.
Russian petroleum products could potentially be purchased and marketed through American-controlled businesses, allowing Russian suppliers to retain export revenues while intermediaries earn profits from financing, distribution and resale.
No evidence establishes that General Licence 135 was specifically designed for the prospective Lukoil purchasers, or that Trump personally holds an interest in the proposed transactions. Nevertheless, the parallel negotiations suggest the possibility of an emerging commercial arrangement under which American intermediaries assume a greater role in Russian energy exports.
The consequences for Ukraine could be considerable.
Kyiv has expanded attacks against Russian refineries, fuel depots and petroleum infrastructure, seeking to reduce Moscow’s export earnings and disrupt supplies supporting its armed forces.
Trump has repeatedly criticised these strikes, linking them to higher international fuel prices. His administration now has an additional commercial reason to seek their suspension.
On 11 October, Trump announced an energy ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine, although President Volodymyr Zelenskyy indicated that Kyiv had not agreed to such an arrangement.
Ukraine has maintained that any suspension of attacks against Russian energy facilities must be matched by an end to Moscow’s strikes on Ukrainian power infrastructure.
An agreement protecting Russian refineries without equivalent Russian concessions would preserve an important source of Kremlin revenue while depriving Kyiv of military and economic leverage.
The immediate political advantage for Trump is apparent. Rising diesel prices have become a concern ahead of the 3 November midterm elections, particularly among farmers and transport businesses. Additional Russian supplies offer the administration an opportunity to demonstrate action on domestic fuel costs.
Yet the six-month Treasury authorisation extends considerably beyond the election, suggesting commercial objectives that cannot be explained exclusively by short-term electoral considerations.
The emerging pattern is one of bilateral economic engagement with Moscow proceeding independently of a settlement in Ukraine. Russian energy trade is being selectively reopened, American investors are pursuing Russian-owned assets, and Washington is seeking restrictions on Ukrainian operations against the infrastructure underpinning those commercial interests.
For European governments, this threatens the cohesion of the sanctions regime. Brussels may continue restricting Russian energy revenues while Washington authorises transactions that restore access to international markets.
The larger prospect is a system in which Russia retains export earnings, American intermediaries acquire profitable commercial positions, and sanctions become instruments of bilateral negotiation rather than coordinated Western pressure.
Trump’s diesel agreement may therefore represent the opening stage of a wider economic accommodation with Putin, negotiated while Russia continues its war against Ukraine and without any corresponding Russian commitment to withdraw from occupied territory.
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