Zelensky insists only Ukrainians decide and offers a 60-day ceasefire for elections

Diplomatic and political relations between the United States and Ukraine have reached an interesting juncture. The reported rift between U.S. President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy reveals cracks in the coalition.

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Since before 2022, Western leaders have supported Kyiv as a way of defending democracy and sovereignty on a global scale. However, the conflict in Ukraine functions as a proxy war shaped by inter-imperialist rivalry, NATO expansion, and conflicting economic interests, a geopolitical struggle that has exacted a heavy human and financial toll on Ukraine.

Recent events show that Washington’s foreign policy is shifting away from open-ended military and financial commitments receiving unconditional backing. Kiev now faces public criticism, policy demands, and calls for political change from Washington.

Understanding the Trump-Zelensky rupture requires analyzing the structural factors that shaped U.S. influence over Ukraine long before the current war began.

U.S. Imperial Influence and Post-Soviet Interventionism

The foundation of U.S. influence in Ukraine was established long before the outbreak of full-scale war in 2022. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States worked to integrate former Soviet republics into global capitalist frameworks.

Through international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, Ukraine received loans tied to economic structural adjustments. These programs required the deregulation of domestic markets, the privatization of state-owned enterprises, and cuts to social spending.

Washington also used state-funded organizations to shape Ukrainian domestic politics. Between 1991 and 2014, the U.S. government provided over $5 billion in assistance to Ukraine, as publicly confirmed by former Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland. This funding aimed to steer Ukraine’s economic and foreign policy away from Russia and toward Western institutions.

The political transition of 2014 marked a major turning point in U.S.-Ukraine relations. High-level American officials played an active role in supporting the Euromaidan protest movement, which led to the removal of elected President Viktor Yanukovych.

By 2014, during the Obama administration, Vice President Joe Biden was designated as Washington’s key figure for managing policy toward Kyiv, visiting the country on multiple occasions to oversee anti-corruption reforms, energy policy, and financial administration.

After 2014, Ukraine’s economic orientation toward European Union moved away from historical trade ties with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Transition that caused Ukranian severe economic disruption.

Ukraine’s industrial base, centered in the eastern Donbas region, suffered significant output losses. Between 2014 and 2016, Ukraine’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) shrank by nearly half in dollar terms, falling from approximately $183 billion in 2013 to under $93 billion in 2015, according to World Bank figures. Debt levels rose rapidly, forcing the country to rely on continuous financial aid from Western lenders.

Alongside economic adjustments, Western security institutions deepened their integration with the Ukrainian military. Between 2014 and 2021, the U.S. provided over $2.5 billion in defense assistance, including radar systems, anti-tank missiles, and naval patrol boats.

Joint military exercises, such as Operation Fearless Guardian and Rapid Trident, trained thousands of Ukrainian troops under NATO standards at the Yavoriv Combat Training Center. This long-term involvement turned Ukraine into a major security partner on Russia’s western border, setting the stage for future geopolitical conflict.

Zelensky on Trump:

If you're in the middle, you have to stay in the middle, not on the wrong side.

I think Trump's advisers are wrong. I don't know who is pushing him to the wrong side.

This is not the right side of history. pic.twitter.com/RyMNITUUFY

— Clash Report (@clashreport) October 14, 2026

NATO Expansion and Washington’s Provocations

Following the end of the Cold War, successive U.S. administrations expanded NATO eastward toward the borders of the Russian Federation. This expansion occurred despite diplomatic assurances given to Soviet leadership in 1990 that the alliance would not expand eastward beyond a unified Germany.

NATO added fourteen new member states in several rounds of expansion between 1999 and 2020. At the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, NATO declared that Ukraine and Georgia would eventually become members of the alliance.

Moscow repeatedly defined Ukrainian NATO membership as a direct threat to its national security. Despite these warnings, Washington pursued an open-door policy regarding alliance membership.

Diplomatic agreements intended to resolve internal conflicts within Ukraine were systematically sidelined.

Between 2015 and 2021, Western military aid flowed into Ukraine to prepare its armed forces for high-intensity warfare. Annual combined defense spending by NATO allies reached over $1 trillion, outstripping Russian defense expenditure by more than ten to one.

By late 2021, Washington rejected Russian proposals for a mutual security treaty that requested a formal halt to NATO expansion and the withdrawal of foreign military infrastructure from Eastern Europe. The refusal to negotiate on NATO enlargement closed diplomatic pathways, accelerating the descent into armed conflict.

President Trump on Ukraine war: "Zelensky could've settled it many times, but he chose not to." pic.twitter.com/mTn4uboLZY

— CSPAN (@cspan) October 10, 2026

Trump’s Pragmatic Realism and Criticism of Zelensky

The return in 2025 of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency brought a shift in Washington’s foreign policy approach toward Ukraine. While the previous administration pursued an open-ended commitment to support Kiev, Trump adopted a transactional approach centered on domestic economic priorities. A change that disrupted long-standing diplomatic alignment between Washington and Kiev.

Tensions surfaced between Trump and Zelensky during their February 2025 Oval Office meeting. Trump criticized Ukraine’s strategic management of the conflict and questioned the scale of U.S. financial support.

Trump emphasized that American assistance would no longer be an unlimited resource, telling Zelensky that Kiev needed to negotiate a settlement or risk losing U.S. security backing.

Trump also criticized the economic war costs and their impact on global commodity markets. By mid-2026, military casualties on both sides reached an estimated two million, with millions of Ukrainians displaced internally and across Europe.

Trump pointed to these statistics to argue that continued fighting was unsustainable and detrimental to Western economic stability.

A major friction emerged over Ukraine’s military strategy of targeting Russian energy infrastructure. Since July 2026, Ukrainian drone attacks have hit several Russian oil refineries and technology hubs in regions such as Saratov, Ryazan, and Leningrad, as well as in Tatarstan.

Trump publicly condemned these strikes, stating that attacks on Russian fuel production exacerbated global energy shortages and drove up U.S. domestic diesel prices.

The U.S. Treasury Department subsequently issued temporary sanctions exemptions permitting Russian diesel exports to stabilize global supply.

When Zelensky criticized the exemptions as weakness, Trump warned that continued Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil infrastructure could result in a suspension of U.S. intelligence-sharing with Kiev.

Demands for Leadership Change and Diplomatic Strains

The diplomatic rift between Washington and Kyiv widened further following public disputes over regional energy policy. By October 2026, U.S. officials had negotiated temporary exemptions for Russian diesel exports in an effort to curb rising domestic fuel prices and alleviate the global diesel shortage.

Zelenskyy publicly rejected these exemptions, characterizing the agreements with Moscow on energy trade as a violation of Western policy.

In response to Kiev’s objections, Donald Trump publicly called for leadership changes in Ukraine. Speaking to reporters, Trump stated that Ukraine should select a new leader capable of negotiating a diplomatic resolution to end the conflict.

Trump argued that Zelensky had missed previous opportunities to secure a negotiated settlement with Russia, resulting in continued loss of territory and economic disruption.

Zelensky stated that leadership decisions in Ukraine belong solely to the Ukrainian electorate. However, Zelensky noted that organizing national elections during active military operations presents significant legal and logistical obstacles under current martial law provisions.

Zelensky proposed a condition for holding vote proceedings, stating that Washington and international partners must secure a total 60-day ceasefire from Moscow to guarantee security for voters and civilian infrastructure.

⚡️BREAKING: Zelensky Criticizes President Trump for Blaming him for the Rise in Diesel Prices

"They're increasing because of the war in the Middle East, the blocking of the Strait of Hormuz. People have to hear reality. Don't play games with people" pic.twitter.com/MBc8WHoiPf

— Iran Observer (@IranObserver0) October 11, 2026

Implications for the War and Global Power Dynamics

The political alliance established after 2014 between the U.S. and Ukraine was built on mutual strategic interests: Washington sought to project power eastward and contain Russian influence, while Kiev relied on Western capital and security aid to modernize its institutions and military forces.

However, the human and material costs of prolonged warfare have strained this arrangement. With military casualties exceeding two million and Western defense stocks under pressure, Washington has adjusted its political priorities.

The friction between Trump and Zelensky shows how peripheral security partners can become vulnerable when strategic or economic calculations of the power change.

A leadership transition in Kiev, whether through scheduled elections under a temporary ceasefire or political restructuring, would significantly impact the Ukrainian – Russian war.

A change in government could negotiate a formal cease-fire, but it also carries risks of internal political instability and reduced military coordination along the front line.

Sources: Xinhua – Al Jazeera – Al Mayadeen – Anadolu Agency – TRT World – RT – Brasil de Fato – Press TV – TASS – CGTN – BBC – DW – France 24 – EFE – TeleSUR

Washington is pressing the victim, not the aggressor, a Ukrainian diplomat says. President Donald Trump is using the threat of cutting military aid and intelligence as a tool to pressure Ukraine, while failing to apply enough pressure on Russia to stop the war, says Oleksandr Khara, executive director of the Center for Defense Strategies, Espreso reports.

Ukraine’s drones and air defense still lean on US satellite intelligence and weapons, which gives Trump room to squeeze Kyiv rather than Moscow. Khara argues Trump wants to end the war on Ukraine’s and Europe’s account to restore normal relations with Russian ruler Vladimir Putin, treating Ukraine as the weak link to be pushed.

“Trump wants to use restrictions, levers of influence on Ukraine to achieve his goal. To end or stop this war at any cost, at the expense of Ukraine and Europe, to restore normal relations with Putin,” Khara said.

Using American aid as leverage over Kyiv is not new for Trump, the diplomat noted, recalling earlier instances in which support was blocked or suspended.

The pressure points Trump picks, and the ones he leaves alone

Trump wants a visible success in ending the war, Khara says, partly against the backdrop of US domestic politics. He has economic tools to press Moscow but is in no hurry to use them, and his administration is instead gradually loosening sanctions on Russia.

“He doesn’t want to pressure Russia. He thinks Ukraine is the weak link and that it needs to be pushed,” Khara stressed.

Ukraine’s dependence on US support has fallen thanks to European partners, he added, so Kyiv has more room to keep fighting even as European states keep buying American weapons for it.

The one trade Kyiv might accept, and the pressure until then

An energy ceasefire is possible only on strict terms, Khara believes. Kyiv could agree to stop striking Russian refineries only if Moscow halts attacks on Ukraine’s power generation and transmission, heating, and the Black Sea ports and the ships heading to them.

Until such a deal exists, Ukraine must hit harder, he argued, because steadily draining Russia’s economic resources is what could force the Kremlin to reconsider.

“As long as there is no such agreement, and no desire from Russia, we must increase this pressure and destroy as much of their energy infrastructure as possible,” Khara said.

The EU is shying away from triggering rules that would shield people and companies working at or with the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague from US sanctions, preferring instead months-long diplomatic outreach.

The European Commission on Wednesday (14 October) told reporters in Brussels that it was doing everything to seek “practical solutions”, while hoping that its diplomacy will help the court, which prosecutes people for war crimes, genocide, and other atrocities.

“We haven’t made any decisions yet. But we continue to discuss at every level,” said a commission spokesperson, when pressed on whether a little-known blocking statue, which would presumably damper the impact of the US sanctions, remains an option.

And an EU summit in Brussels on Thursday is expected to ask the US to reverse the decision, according to draft conclusions seen by EUobserver.

The EU’s little-known “blocking statute” would prevent EU companies and banks from complying with the sanctions. It was first used against US sanctions on Cuba, Iran and Libya.

The Trump administration had, last Friday, announced financial sanctions on the ICC as part of a larger assault to dismantle the court, after it issued arrest warrants for Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, its former defence minister Yoav Gallant, and Hamas military commander Mohammed Deif.

This article continues, but the full version is available only to EUobserver.com subscribers. Visit account.euobserver.com/membership

Head of group opposing measure, which would bar Somerville from dealing with firms supporting alleged Israeli international law violations, says 'it makes Jews feel unwelcome'

Ursula von der Leyen has the answer. Borrow even more money. Borrow like there’s no tomorrow.

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The most remarkable thing about the rapid demise of the U.S. is that when it hits the bottom of the ocean floor economically, it will be in a better state than the EU. The panic among EU leaders, in particular Ursula von der Leyen, is breathtaking. Barely a week passes before she makes another crackpot policy announcement, gives herself a salary increase, or makes a statement about needing to give even more money to Ukraine. But in recent months these announcements have become more radical and existential, and we are seeing a new dawn now in the EU where the only solution to cover up the feral spending and borrowing is to fabricate a war with Russia and then blame Putin for the whole fiasco.

Every now and again we get a sober reminder about the economic situation of the U.S., EU and Russia. The recent news that Putin is going to sell around 2 million tonnes of diesel oil to “global markets” (as U.S. media phrases it), the lion’s share going to the U.S. before, during and just after the midterm elections in a bid to stabilise the price to help Trump. We will have to assume that countries who buy some of their diesel from the U.S. will continue doing so, but it might, in fact, be Russian oil.

There’s a lot of fake news buzzing around originating from Trump, who likes to distract journalists away from the top issues. It’s hard to see how the American public will respond to Trump’s latest decision to buy Russian diesel, but it’s hard to see this being a solution to the global oil crisis, let alone Trump’s record-low ratings. Will Trump really go ahead with a new wave of strikes on Iran after the midterms, as he has said? Or is it that his own intelligence agencies have picked up information that Iran is poised for a massive strike, and so therefore he is obliged to send even more troops, plus a carrier, to the region?

Regardless of how France and Germany get their diesel in the coming weeks, after Trump forced these governments to dip into their own reserves by threatening a U.S. export ban, it’s hard to see how the Achilles heel of most EU economies – crude oil products – can still be controlled by Moscow. While intellectually challenged figures like Mark Rutte make such stupid comments about how Russia could never win a war with NATO based on comparative GDP data, this latest move might be a huge wake-up call for Macron and Merz, the latter facing dismally low poll ratings. How do you continue to fund a war in Ukraine with the ‘frenemy’ relationship pushed to breaking point, such as is the case now with the U.S. having to buy diesel from Russia? EU countries loathe Putin, as the one hope they had to magically breathe new life into EU economies by taking Ukraine under its wing was shattered when Russian forces invaded. Putin is everything they are not. Nobody can deny Putin is a leader – the very thing that is so desperately lacking in EU countries. Leadership.

But the situation now has reached farce. With a global diesel crisis brought about by Trump’s war with Iran, EU countries are expected to buy diesel on the international market, topped up by Russia. In fact, buying oil from your enemy is nothing new. Countries have been doing this for decades. Even in Syria, we saw terror groups in the north-east of the country take over the oil infrastructure and then sell oil back to the Assad regime.

It’s hard to see how EU countries will draw a line in the sand between their geostrategic military objectives and their very realistic need for a stable oil supply. But in the midst of this chaos, Ursula von der Leyen has the answer. Borrow even more money. Borrow like there’s no tomorrow. Her latest proposal is to expand the current seven-year EU budget to 2 trillion euros, and there is only one way this can be achieved, as member states are never going to cough up more for the EU experiment. She will be forced to borrow from international banks to replace a previous loan of 750 billion euros for COVID. This is the solution for failing economies. Where once for so many years EU apparatchiks would defend the EU’s failure to implement its own rule book, in preference for constantly adopting new legislation, now this seems to have been replaced by ‘create a panic about Russia and make the EU a sort of executive of NATO without a single trace of democratic virtue’. Von der Leyen doesn’t stipulate what this massive increase is for, but we can assume some of it will be siphoned off for Ukraine. Madness on steroids. But hidden in the text is a new series of taxes which the EU itself could impose on individuals, and so in the smoke-and-mirrors confusion we see there is a back-door way to start taxing EU citizens, something Brussels never touched before. How long has the whole project got?

Ukraine has loosened its reliance on Washington but still depends on the United States in three military areas that let US President Donald Trump keep pressuring Kyiv, The Telegraph wrote on 12 October. That pressure now centers on the energy ceasefire Trump declared on 11 October, with US officials reportedly warning Kyiv not to hit Russian energy during the truce. Kyiv backs a mutual truce, but Moscow has not confirmed it, and Russian strikes on Ukraine’s grid have continued.

The paper named three such ties: satellite intelligence, Patriot interceptors, and American weapons bought with European money. A pause in any of them would hit just as Russia’s winter campaign begins. Ukraine says an intercepted document reportedly lays out up to 1,000 Russian missiles, drones, and bombs for 60 critical sites this winter, so any pause in US intelligence, interceptors, or PURL deliveries would land as that campaign gets under way.

Satellite intelligence: the US still holds the key

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other US services still pass precise satellite data that help Ukrainian forces hit targets inside Russia, by the paper’s estimate. Trump briefly suspended that flow in March 2025 to pressure Zelenskyy. A Ukrainian official told Axios that Trump envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner threatened during 9 October talks in Miami to cut off US intelligence.

Patriot interceptors: no quick substitute

The Telegraph called interceptor missiles the second and probably sharpest dependency. Only American Patriot systems can down Russia’s most powerful missiles, which strike Ukrainian cities daily, the paper wrote. Kyiv’s PAC-3 stocks ran dry mainly because US reserves were diverted to the Middle East after America’s war against Iran, the paper added. Kyiv had warned in March that a long Middle East war would squeeze its PAC-3 supply.

Five European defense firms—Destinus, MBDA Deutschland, Safran, Airbus, and Thales—signed a letter of intent in July to develop a joint interceptor, but a testable prototype is not expected before next year, the paper wrote. Ukraine is also building its own interceptor with European allies under the FREYJA program.

US arms bought with European money

The third is buying American arms with European money through the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL), a NATO-run purchasing scheme. US officials have reportedly warned Europe that Trump may halt those supplies if Ukraine keeps striking Russian oil refineries.

France's military was taking a tanker suspected to be part of Russia's "shadow fleet" skirting Western sanctions to Reunion island on Tuesday in what Moscow called another act of "piracy."

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung welcomed the PanStar Acro and its crew home on Tuesday after the container ship completed the country’s first round-trip commercial trial through the Arctic to Europe, hailing the voyage as a potential alternative to traditional shipping lanes even as questions remain over commercial viability and cooperation with Russia.

Russian munitions brought down a stairwell of an apartment building in Kharkiv on the evening of 12 October, and rescuers recovered three bodies from the rubble overnight, local authorities reported. Survivors described fire, falling glass, and pets left behind. The strike came days after Washington waived sanctions on Russian diesel, as it expects Kyiv to stop hitting Russian refineries.

Russia hits Ukraine’s cities every day as it readies a winter campaign against Ukrainian infrastructure, and its oil exports keep bringing in the money that pays for the drones and missiles. A halt to Ukraine’s refinery strikes with no matching halt to Russia’s strikes would leave Moscow’s fuel income intact while Kharkiv digs through rubble. Estonia’s prime minister has already urged Europe to help Ukraine destroy those refineries instead.

A stairwell gone in Kholodnohirskyi district

Russian munitions hit Kharkiv’s Kholodnohirskyi district repeatedly from around 21:17, and Mayor Ihor Terekhov preliminarily identified them as Banderols. At 22:21, he said one strike had hit a residential building, possibly trapping people. He then added in a follow-up post: “Very serious destruction—an entire stairwell has collapsed.”

The strike destroyed an entrance of the four-story building, the State Emergency Service (DSNS) said. It counted 11 injured across the city’s evening strikes, and a rescuer was hospitalized, while Terekhov put the number at 10. By 06:56 on 13 October, rescuers had found a third body. Oblast head Oleh Syniehubov confirmed three dead and said the search continued. Experts will check whether the building is still fit to live in, he added.

Over 24 hours, Russian attacks killed three people in Kharkiv and injured 37, including two children treated for acute stress, Syniehubov reported.

“I realize I’m on fire”: two residents recall the strike

Larysa Maksimenko had just put her bedridden husband to sleep when the strike hit, she told Suspilne Kharkiv. She suffered a head wound and burns.

“I went to the kitchen to switch on the kettle for myself, to have some coffee. I realize I’m on fire. Then glass fell on me. I came to, and I’m buried under everything. All covered in blood,” she said.

The window bars were broken, and medics carried her husband out through the window. Rescuers later found a woman under the rubble in her apartment, likely a neighbor, Maksimenko said. All she wants now, she said, is to get to her husband in hospital.

Viacheslav Chibitko, who lives on the second floor next to the collapsed entrance, saw a flash, and then everything blew out. He got his three dogs out, but five cats are still inside. During the clearing, a concrete slab fell on a rescuer, Suspilne’s correspondent reported. Crews pulled him out and handed him to medics.

Kyiv’s toll rises, and strikes hit other cities overnight

The evening drone strike on a 25-story building in Kyiv’s Darnytskyi district killed two people, Kyiv prosecutors reported. The second victim was found dead in a car near the building. Prosecutors counted at least seven injured, including a 17-year-old girl, while Mayor Vitali Klitschko counted 11 in the capital.

From 18:00 on 12 October, Russia launched five ballistic missiles, nine loitering munitions, and 108 attack drones, Ukraine’s Air Force reported. Air defenses downed or suppressed 88 drones. A Russian drone attack injured four patients at a medical facility in Khmelnytskyi Oblast, oblast head Serhii Tiurin said. In Dnipro, a Russian attack injured a 64-year-old man, oblast head Oleksandr Hanzha reported. A downed Russian drone set two houses on fire in Murovane near Lviv, oblast head Maksym Kozytskyi said.

On 12 October, a Russian Smerch rocket with a cluster warhead hit a house in Cherkaske, Donetsk Oblast, killing three people, including a 13-year-old girl, oblast head Vadym Filashkin reported.

Russian attacks killed more than 150 people in the week to 11 October, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said. Russian bombs killed at least 20 people in Zaporizhzhia on 10 October, by the oblast’s count. On 9 October, the US waived its sanctions on Russian diesel until April 2027. The White House expects Kyiv to halt refinery strikes under its proposed energy ceasefire.

The European Union has adopted an unprecedented package of sanctions against Russia’s military-industrial complex, blacklisting 1,569 companies and individuals involved in supplying weapons for Moscow’s war against Ukraine.

The Council measures announced on 12 October target 826 companies and 743 executives. Unlike earlier sanctions targeting political figures, the latest listings reach deeper into the industrial supply chains needed to manufacture missiles, drones, aircraft and ammunition.

Ballistic missile supply chains

EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said more than half the new listings concerned ballistic missile production. The Council identified electronics manufacturers, semiconductor suppliers, radar specialists, navigation equipment firms and producers of explosives.

These businesses occupy positions in production networks that enable Russia to sustain the manufacture of weapons despite restrictions on its access to Western technologies. The Council announcement estimates their combined annual turnover at at least €20 billion and employment at more than 250,000.

The move follows intensive Russian missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian cities and energy installations. European governments increasingly seek to undermine Moscow’s operational capacity by identifying businesses that procure or manufacture components for its armed forces.

Enforcement beyond EU borders

Listed firms face asset freezes, while EU businesses and citizens cannot make funds or economic resources available to them. The named executives also face travel restrictions. Suppliers and financial institutions will need to check commercial transactions for links to sanctioned entities.

The actual impact on Russian output remains uncertain. Businesses with few assets in Europe may experience limited immediate disruption. Moscow has developed alternative procurement channels through third countries, some involving intermediaries that acquire electronics or equipment originally manufactured elsewhere.

Sanctions effectiveness therefore depends on customs intelligence, financial due diligence, international cooperation and the willingness of commercial partners to stop dealing with listed companies. Targeting managers individually is also intended to raise the personal costs of directing Russia’s military production.

A test for Europe’s economic pressure

Precision navigation systems, sophisticated electronics and specialised manufacturing technology remain difficult to substitute rapidly. Nevertheless, listing a supplier cannot by itself prevent components from moving through indirect trading routes.

The sanctions coincide with renewed discussion of a possible halt to attacks on energy infrastructure. Brussels is signalling that negotiations about the war’s conduct need not entail relief from restrictions on Russia’s defence economy.

Whether the measures reduce missile production will depend on changes in procurement and output over the coming months. Their immediate significance is the EU’s decision to extend restrictions beyond the most visible weapons producers into the broader industrial networks sustaining Russia’s war.

Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence (HUR) released information on the components of Russia’s Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile and the companies involved in its production, according to a statement dated 12 October.

Russia has used Kinzhal missiles to strike targets across Ukraine since the start of its full-scale invasion. However, 22 of the 58 companies in Russia’s Kinzhal production network are not subject to sanctions, the intelligence agency noted.

Kinzhal missile: design, components, and production changes

Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence has published an interactive 3D model of the Russian Kinzhal missile on its War&Sanctions portal.

The 9-S-7760 missile, known as the Kh-47M2 Kinzhal, uses solid fuel and has a single stage. This means the missile does not consist of multiple stages that separate sequentially during flight. About 90% of its components are identical to those used in the 9M723 ballistic missile of the Iskander-M system, HUR noted.

The Kinzhal is equipped with a radar homing seeker, an active jamming station, and a decoy deployment system, according to the statement. The homing seeker helps the missile determine the direction to its target, while decoys are designed to make interception by air defense systems more difficult.

The missile can carry one of two types of warheads: a penetrating high-explosive warhead or a nuclear warhead. Russia is also developing a version with a high-explosive fragmentation warhead that strikes targets through an explosion and fragments. HUR believes this development may be linked to problems with the missile’s accuracy.

In 2026, Russia significantly reduced its state procurement order for Kinzhal missiles and redirected some production resources, components, and raw materials towards manufacturing Iskander-M missiles, HUR noted. Another reason is the limited number of MiG-31I and MiG-31K aircraft used to launch Kinzhal missiles, the intelligence agency reported.

Ukraine intercepts Kinzhal missiles, but has limited resources to do so

Despite their high speed, Russian Kinzhal missiles can be intercepted using US-made Patriot surface-to-air missile systems. In particular, PAC-3 interceptor missiles are designed to destroy ballistic targets and can be used against threats such as the Kinzhal and Zircon, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense reported.

Ukraine is seeking additional Patriot interceptor missiles to defend against Russian ballistic attacks during the winter.

Most of the approximately 1,000 missiles Kyiv has contracted for are not expected to arrive for several years, prompting Ukraine to ask its allies to supply missiles from their existing stockpiles, Defense News reported on 12 October 2026.

Sanctions loopholes allow Russia to obtain foreign components for Kinzhal missiles

Russia continues to use foreign components in missile production despite sanctions. For instance, the US-made Texas Instruments processors were found again in a newer version of the Kinzhal missile, Ukrainian presidential commissioner for sanctions policy Vladyslav Vlasiuk said in September, Interfax reported. According to him, foreign electronics continue to reach Russia through various supply channels.

Earlier, Ukraine had provided its partners with information on more than 100 Russian companies involved in ballistic missile production and urged them to impose sanctions on those entities, according to the President's Office.

On 12 October, the EU Council imposed sanctions on 1,569 individuals and entities linked to Russia’s military-industrial complex, including 826 Russian companies and 743 company CEOs.

La netta bocciatura dell’iniziativa sulla neutralità lascia formalmente intatto lo storico status della Confederazione, ma consolida una traiettoria iniziata con le sanzioni contro la Russia nel 2022 e proseguita con una crescente interoperabilità militare con la NATO.

Segue nostro Telegram.

Le votazioni referendarie federali tenutesi in Svizzera il 27 settembre hanno prodotto due risultati particolarmente netti. Gli elettori hanno respinto con il 72,53% dei voti l’iniziativa «Per un’alimentazione sicura», che chiedeva di rafforzare la produzione nazionale sostenibile, favorire una maggiore presenza degli alimenti vegetali e garantire una migliore protezione delle risorse idriche. Ancora maggiore, sotto il profilo politico e geopolitico, è stata tuttavia la portata della bocciatura dell’iniziativa «Salvaguardia della neutralità svizzera»: il 70,16% degli elettori ha votato contro, mentre soltanto il 29,84% si è espresso a favore, con un’affluenza del 47,07%. Nessuno dei ventisei cantoni ha approvato la proposta.

Per evitare equivoci, sottolineiamo che il quesito non chiedeva di abolire lo storico status della Confederazione né di aderire alla NATO. La scelta riguardava piuttosto il significato concreto da attribuire alla neutralità nel nuovo contesto internazionale: mantenerne l’interpretazione flessibile sviluppata dal governo negli ultimi anni oppure fissarne nella Costituzione una definizione molto più stringente, capace di limitare tanto la partecipazione alle sanzioni quanto la cooperazione con alleanze militari.

Anche dopo il voto, dunque, la Svizzera rimane formalmente neutrale, non appartiene alla NATO e non è vincolata agli obblighi di difesa collettiva previsti dall’articolo 5 del Trattato nordatlantico. Tuttavia, soprattutto dal 2022, la distanza tra questa neutralità giuridica e la collocazione politico-strategica effettiva della Confederazione si è progressivamente ridotta. Il voto del 27 settembre, di conseguenza, non avvia questa trasformazione che sta avendo luogo da anni, ma respinge il tentativo di imporle un limite costituzionale.

L’iniziativa, in particolare, chiedeva di sancire che la neutralità svizzera fosse «permanente e armata» e, soprattutto, di tradurre tale principio in obblighi precisi. La Confederazione non avrebbe potuto aderire a un’alleanza militare o difensiva né collaborare con essa, salvo nel caso di un’aggressione diretta contro la Svizzera o di preparativi concreti in vista di tale aggressione. Berna non avrebbe inoltre potuto partecipare a conflitti militari tra Stati terzi né adottare sanzioni contro Stati belligeranti, fatta eccezione per quelle imposte dalle Nazioni Unite e per i provvedimenti necessari a impedirne l’elusione. Il testo prevedeva infine che la Svizzera utilizzasse attivamente la propria neutralità per svolgere un ruolo di mediazione.

In termini geopolitici, il cuore della proposta era dunque duplice: impedire che la Svizzera continuasse a recepire autonomamente i sistemi sanzionatori elaborati dall’Unione Europea contro una delle parti di un conflitto e porre un limite all’intensificazione della cooperazione con la NATO. Non si trattava quindi soltanto di riaffermare simbolicamente un principio storico, ma di ricostruire uno spazio di autonomia tra la Confederazione e le strutture politico-militari occidentali.

Il punto di svolta dell’attuale evoluzione va individuato nel 28 febbraio 2022. Quattro giorni dopo l’inizio dell’operazione militare speciale russa in Ucraina, il Consiglio federale decise di associarsi alle sanzioni adottate dall’Unione Europea contro Mosca. La scelta suscitò immediatamente un dibattito sulla compatibilità di tale allineamento con la neutralità tradizionale. Il governo rispose distinguendo tra il diritto della neutralità, che riguarda principalmente gli obblighi militari di uno Stato neutrale, e la più ampia politica di neutralità, all’interno della quale Berna ritiene di disporre di un considerevole margine di manovra. Secondo questa interpretazione, l’adesione alle sanzioni dell’UE non avrebbe modificato lo status neutrale della Svizzera, poiché la Confederazione continuava a non sostenere militarmente nessuna delle parti belligeranti.

Sul piano strettamente giuridico, questa distinzione permette a Berna di continuare a definirsi neutrale. Sul piano politico, però, il 2022 ha segnato un cambiamento qualitativo. Per la prima volta nella crisi che contrappone frontalmente Russia e blocco euro-atlantico, la Svizzera non si è limitata a esprimere una posizione diplomatica, ma ha integrato nella propria legislazione il sistema di misure economiche punitive costruito dall’Unione Europea contro Mosca. La neutralità militare formale è rimasta intatta, ma l’equidistanza economica e politica si è sensibilmente ridotta.

Oltretutto, questa scelta non è stata episodica, in quanto Berna ha continuato a recepire progressivamente i successivi pacchetti di sanzioni europee. Ancora il 19 agosto scorso, poco più di un mese prima del referendum, il Consiglio federale ha deciso di attuare ulteriori misure contenute nel ventesimo pacchetto di sanzioni dell’UE contro la Russia. La stessa Segreteria di Stato dell’economia ha descritto la decisione come conforme alla «prassi seguita finora», confermando che l’allineamento alle misure europee è ormai divenuto una componente strutturale della politica svizzera verso Mosca. Circa 2.790 persone e organizzazioni risultavano allora sottoposte a congelamento patrimoniale in Svizzera in relazione al conflitto ucraino.

Il processo non si è però fermato alla dimensione economica. Dalle sanzioni del 2022 si è progressivamente passati a un rafforzamento della cooperazione nel campo della sicurezza e della difesa, facendo emergere con maggiore evidenza la direzione strategica assunta dalla Confederazione.

Sempre a rigor di precisione, va sottolineato che la Svizzera partecipa al programma NATO Partnership for Peace dal 1996, dimostrando che la collaborazione con l’Alleanza Atlantica non costituisce una conseguenza esclusiva del conflitto ucraino. La novità degli ultimi anni consiste piuttosto nell’intensità e negli obiettivi di tale cooperazione. Nel dicembre 2025, infatti, Svizzera e NATO hanno definito un Individually Tailored Partnership Programme per il periodo 2025-2028, esplicitamente inserito dall’amministrazione federale nella volontà del Consiglio federale di «intensificare la cooperazione internazionale nella politica di sicurezza».

Il concetto che viene utilizzato per descrivere questa cooperazione con la NATO è quello di interoperabilità. Essa punta infatti anche a sviluppare e mantenere capacità che consentano alle Forze armate svizzere di operare insieme a quelle dei membri della NATO e degli altri Paesi partner. L’Alleanza stessa indica tra i settori della relazione con Berna lo sviluppo delle capacità delle forze svizzere di lavorare con quelle NATO nelle operazioni multinazionali.

Prima l’allineamento economico alle sanzioni europee, poi l’approfondimento della cooperazione nella politica di sicurezza, quindi la ricerca di una maggiore interoperabilità militare con l’Alleanza Atlantica. Nessuno di questi passaggi, preso isolatamente, abolisce la neutralità svizzera. Considerati nel loro insieme, tuttavia, descrivono una progressiva integrazione de facto della Confederazione nell’architettura strategica occidentale.

Lo stesso Consiglio federale, nella campagna contro l’iniziativa, ha difeso esplicitamente questa possibilità. Secondo il governo, la crescente instabilità europea rende necessario orientare la politica di sicurezza e di difesa verso una maggiore cooperazione internazionale. Berna considera compatibile con la neutralità la partecipazione a esercitazioni militari internazionali non direttamente collegate a una guerra e sostiene che un’eventuale cooperazione difensiva con altri Stati in caso di aggressione debba essere preparata in anticipo. Il governo riconosceva inoltre che un’approvazione dell’iniziativa avrebbe comportato una riduzione della cooperazione con la NATO, compresi settori come le esercitazioni congiunte e lo scambio di dati.

La neutralità, dunque, viene progressivamente ridefinita non più come mantenimento di una significativa distanza dalle strutture militari dei blocchi, ma come assenza dell’obbligo formale di intervenire militarmente al loro fianco. Entro questo perimetro molto più ristretto diventano compatibili con la neutralità tanto le sanzioni economiche coordinate con l’Unione Europea quanto la preparazione operativa con la NATO.

La Confederazione si colloca così in uno spazio intermedio: non è membro dell’Alleanza Atlantica, ma aumenta la propria capacità di operare insieme ai suoi membri; non appartiene all’Unione Europea, ma ne recepisce ripetutamente le misure coercitive contro la Russia; non rinuncia formalmente alla neutralità, ma interpreta questo principio in modo tale da rendere possibile una crescente integrazione nelle strutture politiche e di sicurezza dell’Occidente.

La Svizzera, del resto, non è mai stata neutrale nel senso di un’impossibile equidistanza ideologica assoluta. Già durante la Guerra fredda, essa apparteneva economicamente, culturalmente e politicamente al mondo occidentale. La specificità della sua neutralità consisteva soprattutto nel mantenimento di un’autonomia strategica rispetto alle alleanze militari e ai conflitti tra i blocchi. La trasformazione contemporanea non consiste quindi nel passaggio improvviso di una Svizzera neutrale a una Svizzera occidentale, perché la Confederazione è sempre appartenuta all’Occidente in senso storico e socioeconomico. Il cambiamento riguarda piuttosto il passaggio da un’appartenenza occidentale accompagnata da una marcata autonomia strategica a un’integrazione sempre più profonda nelle politiche economiche, di sicurezza e militari del campo euro-atlantico.

Resta dunque una neutralità formalmente intatta, ma sempre più distante dalla funzione politica che l’aveva storicamente caratterizzata. La Svizzera continua a non essere membro della NATO e conserva tutti gli strumenti giuridici per definirsi uno Stato neutrale. Allo stesso tempo, recepisce le sanzioni dell’Unione Europea contro la Russia, approfondisce il coordinamento della propria politica di sicurezza con i partner occidentali e prepara le proprie Forze armate a una crescente interoperabilità con quelle dell’Alleanza Atlantica.

The European Union has imposed sanctions on some of Russia’s most important shipyards, including major submarine builders, naval ship-repair facilities and yards involved in commercial vessel construction, as part of...

Seven US senators from both parties said the Trump administration's decision to authorize Russian diesel imports conflicts with a 2022 law banning Russian energy imports and accused it of failing to consult Congress, in a statement on 11 October.

The dispute comes as the war with Iran drives up US fuel prices, which US President Donald Trump has blamed on Ukraine's strikes on Russian refineries. Trump says Russian supplies will help bring prices down, while lawmakers warn that purchases could provide Moscow with revenue to continue its war against Ukraine.

The senators—Republicans Susan Collins, Lisa Murkowski, Thom Tillis, and John Curtis, and Democrats Jeanne Shaheen, Richard Blumenthal, and Ron Wyden—called on the administration to reverse course, saying the US should not provide Russian President Vladimir Putin with “a financial lifeline.”

What the 2022 law requires before the ban can end

The law, signed on 8 April 2022, allows the president to end the import ban only after submitting a certification to Congress. The certification must find that Russia has agreed to pull out its forces and stop the fighting on terms Ukraine's free and independent government accepts, no longer poses an immediate threat of attack to any NATO member, and recognizes Ukrainians' right to pick their own government.

The law also requires consultation with four congressional committees and a report at least 45 days before certification. The termination takes effect 90 days after certification unless a joint resolution of disapproval is enacted into law during that period. The senators allege the administration failed to meet the consultation and reporting requirements. Their statement does not establish whether a certification has been submitted.

Treasury’s license cites sanctions rules, not the 2022 law

The Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control issued General License No. 135 on 9 October, authorizing certain transactions involving Russian-origin diesel that would otherwise be restricted under US sanctions regulations. It runs until 7 April 2027 and cites sanctions regulations, not the 2022 import-ban law.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent defended the deal on Fox News on 11 October, saying the administration would proceed under existing legal authority. He said lawmakers who argued that either the earlier law or the current Lindsey Graham sanctions law prohibited the deal were wrong, and argued the agreement would lower prices, Reuters reported.

How much diesel Trump says Russia will supply

Trump said on Truth Social that Russia would immediately supply more than 300,000 tons of diesel to US and global markets, followed by 500,000 tons in November and 1 million tons after that. He said Russia would deliver another 3 million tons “within a short period of time,” depending on the condition of its diesel refineries. The promised volumes have not been independently verified.

Russia partially lifted its diesel export ban on 10 October, allowing 500,000 tons onto the global market at this stage, the Russian government said, according to state news agency TASS.

A House bill to block Russian oil purchases

Pennsylvania Republican Rep. Brian Fitzpatrick plans to introduce the Ronald Reagan Peace Through Strength Act to block Russian oil purchases and use a discharge petition to force a House vote, Axios reported. The procedure can force consideration of a bill if 218 House members sign. Republican Rep. Don Bacon said he would support the bill and called Trump's decision a serious mistake, according to Ukrainska Pravda.

Barrasso defends the deal. Zelenskyy calls it an investment in war

On CBS's Face the Nation on 11 October, Senate Majority Whip John Barrasso, a Republican from Wyoming, called the deal “another point of leverage” for Trump to use against Putin. Asked whether the decision violated US law, Barrasso said the president was balancing competing priorities and had to make tough decisions.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy wrote on Telegram on 9 October:

“Allowing Russia to sell petroleum products is an investment in a war that must be ended, not prolonged.”

Trump also expects Ukraine to stop striking Russian refineries under his proposed energy ceasefire, a White House official told Axios. Zelenskyy said Kyiv would halt such strikes if Moscow did the same.

The EU adopted its largest-ever round of sanctions listings on 12 October, targeting the suppliers behind Russia’s war industry, the Council of the EU announced. The bloc acted as Russia keeps killing Ukrainian civilians every day, while US President Donald Trump eases sanctions on Russian diesel.

Russia’s planned winter campaign against Ukraine’s infrastructure depends on arms factories fed by a web of component suppliers and on oil revenue that still flows despite Ukraine’s refinery strikes, so every supplier cut off from that web raises the cost of waging it. As Washington eases off, Europe’s own pressure has a gap: its ports still take record volumes of Russian Arctic gas, and a full ban on long-term contracts starts only in 2027.

Missile suppliers top the list

More than half of the new listings hit the supply chain for ballistic missiles that Russia “uses to kill Ukrainian civilians every day,” EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said in the statement. Russian attacks killed more than 150 people in the past week, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on 11 October.

The list names 826 Russian companies, mid-level firms the Council calls the “core” of Russia’s arms industry, with at least €20 billion in yearly turnover, and 743 people who run them. They make parts for missiles, drones, and military aircraft, from semiconductors and radars to explosives and navigation systems. Their assets are frozen, EU firms may not finance them, and the executives may not enter the EU.

Foreign ministers ratified a deal EU envoys reached on 7 October. Ukraine’s sanctions commissioner Vladyslav Vlasiuk said 60% of the listings came from Ukrainian proposals.

Ministers reject the diesel deal

EU foreign ministers in Luxembourg vowed to keep the sanctions despite Trump’s diesel deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Euronews reported. Kallas addressed Washington directly as she arrived.

“The US is our biggest ally, but our message is clear: if we want to end this war, the only way we can do this is (by) putting more pressure on Russia,” Kallas said.

Irish Foreign Minister Helen McEntee called the deal “concerning,” and Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys said it was “not the European way.” Kallas warned that an energy truce covering only refineries would favor Russia, since Ukraine has one refinery and Russia “plenty.”

Trump announced the diesel deal on 9 October, and the US Treasury waived sanctions on Russian diesel until April 2027. Zelenskyy said the EU would provide about €3 billion more in military aid this week.

Washington presses Kyiv

Trump expects Ukraine to stop hitting Russian refineries under his proposed energy ceasefire, a White House official told Axios. Zelenskyy said Kyiv would halt such strikes if Moscow did the same. On 10 October, Trump told reporters it was time for Ukraine to get a new president. Germany’s foreign minister, Britain’s defense secretary, and a senior lawmaker from Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s party backed Zelenskyy, while the Kremlin sided with Trump.

Zelenskyy offered to hold elections after a 60-day ceasefire, and Kallas said elections are impossible while the war goes on. The Institute for the Study of War assessed that Russia exploits Ukraine’s legal ban on wartime elections to drag out the war.

On 9 October, three weeks after signing the first major Russia oil sanctions in two years, Donald Trump agreed with Vladimir Putin to bring Russian diesel back to world markets. The US Treasury suspended its sanctions on that trade until April 2027 the same day. In the two days before, Russian strikes had killed more than 80 Ukrainian civilians.

Europe answered on 12 October with its largest sanctions package yet: nearly 1,600 new listings, almost all in Russia’s military-industrial complex. Its core, says Ukraine’s sanctions envoy Vladyslav Vlasiuk, is Russia’s missile program and the electronics inside it, from capacitors to semiconductors. Six in ten listings came from Ukrainian proposals, and Brussels adopted them within weeks.

That is the right reflex, and proof that Europe can move fast when it chooses. But the package names companies and people one by one. On the measures that cut whole sectors, the ones that would hurt Moscow most, Europe still waits for Washington.

It waits for Trump to decide whether to enforce the Graham Act he signed in September. It waits for him to decide whether to lean on Hungary and Slovakia or let them off. It waits for the G7 to rule on tanker services before touching its own ships. Europe keeps asking the Trump administration to decide things it is perfectly able to decide itself.

If the EU is serious about ending a war on its own continent, it does not need a miracle from Washington. It needs to pull the levers already in its hands. Here they are.

Strip Russian weapons of European parts

1. Fix export-control enforcement on dual-use goods. It is unacceptable that the newest Russian drones and missiles contain not only Chinese parts but American and European ones. The "War and Sanctions" portal logs what turns up. The EU should find and close the enforcement gaps in its own dual-use export law. Choking the supply to Russia's war industry serves Ukraine and Europe alike.

Cut Russia's energy money

2. Force Hungary and Slovakia off Russian oil. The EU banned Russian oil imports in 2022, with temporary exemptions for landlocked states: Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary. Czechia has since diversified and dropped Russian oil entirely. Slovakia and Hungary can do the same; the Czech case proves it is a question of will, not feasibility. Ending the exemptions would also make good on REPowerEU's central promise, phasing out Russian energy. The gas-import ban is already decided. Oil is the gap that remains.

3. Close the Greek and Maltese tanker loophole. Up to 40% of Russia's seaborne oil travels on European tankers, Greek and Maltese. The EU has banned maritime services for Russian oil since 2022, with one exception: cargoes sold below the price cap. This spring the Council discussed scrapping that exception, which would have meant a full ban, then made any change conditional on coordination with the G7. Once again, Europe is asking Washington to act for it. The EU should overcome Greek and Maltese resistance and ban every maritime service for Russian oil: transport, insurance, and the rest.

4. Stop the shadow fleet in European waters. Russia ships oil to India, China, and Türkiye through a shadow fleet of aging, often uninsured tankers. Europe can check their insurance and turn away any that lack EU or G7 cover, especially in the North Sea and the Baltic, where any spill would be an ecological disaster, and an uninsured operator would not pay for it.

Patrols in territorial waters and exclusive economic zones have to be reinforced. Russia also uses these ships for espionage, sabotage, and damage to undersea infrastructure. Strengthen NATO's Baltic Sentry. Consider adding a maritime operation by the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force or the Coalition of the Willing across the North and Baltic Seas and the Skagerrak, before the Danish straits. If the Russian Baltic Fleet escalates, Europe should be ready for confrontation. Moscow should hear that it is not feared and that it will be stopped. At sea, it is weaker than even NATO's Baltic Sea states alone, never mind NATO's European members together.

5. Scrap the Lingen nuclear-fuel deal. In July, Lower Saxony approved a plan for the French state company Framatome to make nuclear fuel jointly with Rosatom, Russia's builder of nuclear weapons, at Lingen. It is dressed up as serving REPowerEU, since the venture lets Hungary, Slovakia, and Bulgaria buy fuel from a Franco-Russian joint operation instead of straight from Rosatom.

This is nonsense. Ukraine was once wholly dependent on Russian nuclear fuel and diversified fast; Finland and Czechia have done the same. Hungary, Slovakia, and Bulgaria can follow. Stretching the dependence out and hiding it behind a French partner is the opposite of what REPowerEU is for. Lower Saxony's own environment minister called the deal "grundfalsch," fundamentally wrong.

Fund Ukraine from Russia's own money

6. Build a Ukraine Fund from frozen Russian assets. Supporting Ukraine will cost more next year, not less, so it is time to get serious about Russia's frozen assets. Not confiscation, which European capitals still resist, and not a simple transfer to Kyiv, which amounts to the same thing, but a dedicated EU-run Ukraine Fund that could invest these assets and use them better than they are used now. ICUV has set it all out in a policy paper.

Isolate Russia further

7. Adopt the Graham-bill sanctions. Sanction every Russian state company (majority or controlling state stake) and every Russian oligarch who has not taken a public anti-war stand. Forbes counts 155 Russian billionaires.

8. Cut every Russian and Belarusian bank off SWIFT. Russia still has 301 operating banks, yet only 103 Russian banks and financial institutions sit under the EU's transaction ban, and just a handful of Belarusian ones. Gazprombank, which the US Treasury says pays Russia's soldiers, is still not on the EU list. Stop listing banks one by one: disconnect the entire Russian and Belarusian banking systems and put them under a full transaction ban, with narrow exceptions for food, medicine, and humanitarian trade.

9. End land transit to and from Russia, Kaliningrad included. Stop all overland freight, rail and road, between the EU and Russia. Baltic ports should carry no Russian trade at all, not just grain. Halt the gas transit to Kaliningrad through Lithuania's pipelines, too; let it arrive by sea, where Russia already runs an LNG terminal. Winters are mild now, so the real effect is mostly higher costs, and even that is worth doing.

10. Ban visas for Russian (ex-)servicemen and their families. The EU's 21st sanctions package laid the legal basis in July and then set no start date. Bring it into force, and extend it to the families.

Deliver accountability

11. Launch the Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression and the Claims Commission. Speed up the creation of, and accession to, the tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine, and the convention establishing a Claims Commission.

The point

Europe cannot escape this burden. A Russian victory, even a partial one such as a peace on Moscow's terms, would cost it far more than helping Ukraine to a partial victory of its own, a peace along the line of contact. If Europe wants the war to end, it has to lead, alongside Ukraine, instead of waiting on a miracle from the Trump administration. The tools are already in its hands.

Editor's note. The opinions expressed in our Opinion section belong to their authors. Euromaidan Press' editorial team may or may not share them.

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Meanwhile, Moscow wants someone in the Ukrainian leadership to acknowledge the reality on the ground.

On Monday, the European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas informed that the European Union foreign ministers adopted nearly 1,600 new sanctions listings targeting Russia’s military-industrial complex.

RELATED:

U.S. Temporarily Authorizes Russian Diesel Imports Until April 2027

She said more than half of the new listings were linked to the production chain for ballistic missiles, adding that it was the largest single expansion of the bloc’s sanctions list since the start of the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

The measures are aimed at making it significantly harder, slower and more expensive for Russia to produce weapons used against Ukraine, she said.

Speaking ahead of the Foreign Affairs Council meeting in Luxembourg, Kallas said the new listings would also address what she described as “sham elections in Russia regarding the occupied territories of Ukraine.”

Kallas reiterated the EU’s position that continued pressure on Russia was necessary to end the conflict. She also called for greater coordination with the United States on sanctions against Russia, saying that such alignment would strengthen pressure on Moscow.

EU announces its ‘largest expansion’ of anti-Russia sanctions with 22nd package

EU foreign ministers approved nearly 1,600 new sanctions listings, with more than half reportedly linked to the production chain for ballistic missiles pic.twitter.com/0JNWYaJw1t

— RT Intl (@RT_on_X) October 12, 2026

Ukraine Needs Political Will to Reach Peaceful Settlement: Kremlin

On Sunday, Kremlin Spokesman Dmitry Peskov said that Moscow wanted someone in the Ukrainian leadership to demonstrate the political will to recognize realities on the ground and work toward a peaceful settlement.

Peskov made the remarks in an interview with RIA Novosti in response to U.S. President Donald Trump’s comments on replacing Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.

On Saturday, Trump told journalists that it was time for Ukraine to elect a new president. He said Zelensky could have brought the Russia-Ukraine conflict to an end on several occasions but did not want to do so.

On Sunday, Zelensky told ABC News that he was ready to hold presidential elections in Ukraine if Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to a 60-day ceasefire.

teleSUR/ JF

Source: Xinhua

Donald Trump has presented his agreement with Vladimir Putin as a means of reducing American fuel prices. Yet the Treasury authorisation extends far beyond the announced diesel shipments, opening opportunities for international trade in Russian petroleum products as American investors negotiate the acquisition of Lukoil’s overseas assets.

President Donald Trump’s decision to reopen trade in Russian diesel has implications extending well beyond American fuel prices. The agreement, announced ahead of November’s congressional elections, coincides with negotiations over Russian energy assets and mounting American pressure on Ukraine to suspend attacks against Moscow’s oil infrastructure.

The US Treasury’s General Licence 135, issued on 9 October, authorises transactions involving Russian-origin diesel until 7 April 2027. Unlike Trump’s public announcement, which referred to specific quantities destined for the American market, the licence establishes no corresponding volume ceiling or restriction confining authorised trade to the United States.

Its provisions permit American businesses to participate in eligible international transactions involving Russian diesel, including associated financial and commercial services. Existing sanctions remain formally in force, but an important category of Russian petroleum trade has been reopened.

The arrangement potentially benefits not only Russian producers but also American commodity traders, financial institutions and intermediaries capable of purchasing Russian fuel and distributing it internationally.

Sanctions relief without removing sanctions

The legal mechanism offers Washington considerable flexibility. Rather than formally abandoning restrictions imposed over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the administration can authorise selected transactions while maintaining the broader sanctions framework.

Congress’s Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 strengthened the legislative basis for economic pressure on Moscow but also provided presidential waiver powers.

General Licence 135 was issued under existing Treasury sanctions authorities, rather than necessarily through those waiver provisions. Nevertheless, the combined framework leaves the administration substantial discretion over the practical application of economic restrictions.

Washington can consequently maintain its declared sanctions policy while selectively restoring commercial relations with Russia. European governments, which have maintained extensive restrictions on Russian energy, have little influence over such unilateral American exemptions.

The Lukoil connection

The timing becomes more revealing when considered alongside negotiations over Lukoil’s international assets.

American investors have been exploring the acquisition of the Russian company’s overseas operations, including oilfields, refineries, storage facilities and retail distribution networks. The portfolio has been valued at approximately $20–22 billion.

Among the prospective investors is billionaire Todd Boehly, while discussions concerning Russian-American economic cooperation have involved Trump’s representatives Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner.

An American-controlled acquisition of Lukoil’s international network could complement the commercial opportunities created by the diesel authorisation.

Russian petroleum products could potentially be purchased and marketed through American-controlled businesses, allowing Russian suppliers to retain export revenues while intermediaries earn profits from financing, distribution and resale.

No evidence establishes that General Licence 135 was specifically designed for the prospective Lukoil purchasers, or that Trump personally holds an interest in the proposed transactions. Nevertheless, the parallel negotiations suggest the possibility of an emerging commercial arrangement under which American intermediaries assume a greater role in Russian energy exports.

Ukraine and the conflict of interests

The consequences for Ukraine could be considerable.

Kyiv has expanded attacks against Russian refineries, fuel depots and petroleum infrastructure, seeking to reduce Moscow’s export earnings and disrupt supplies supporting its armed forces.

Trump has repeatedly criticised these strikes, linking them to higher international fuel prices. His administration now has an additional commercial reason to seek their suspension.

On 11 October, Trump announced an energy ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine, although President Volodymyr Zelenskyy indicated that Kyiv had not agreed to such an arrangement.

Ukraine has maintained that any suspension of attacks against Russian energy facilities must be matched by an end to Moscow’s strikes on Ukrainian power infrastructure.

An agreement protecting Russian refineries without equivalent Russian concessions would preserve an important source of Kremlin revenue while depriving Kyiv of military and economic leverage.

A separate accommodation with Moscow?

The immediate political advantage for Trump is apparent. Rising diesel prices have become a concern ahead of the 3 November midterm elections, particularly among farmers and transport businesses. Additional Russian supplies offer the administration an opportunity to demonstrate action on domestic fuel costs.

Yet the six-month Treasury authorisation extends considerably beyond the election, suggesting commercial objectives that cannot be explained exclusively by short-term electoral considerations.

The emerging pattern is one of bilateral economic engagement with Moscow proceeding independently of a settlement in Ukraine. Russian energy trade is being selectively reopened, American investors are pursuing Russian-owned assets, and Washington is seeking restrictions on Ukrainian operations against the infrastructure underpinning those commercial interests.

For European governments, this threatens the cohesion of the sanctions regime. Brussels may continue restricting Russian energy revenues while Washington authorises transactions that restore access to international markets.

The larger prospect is a system in which Russia retains export earnings, American intermediaries acquire profitable commercial positions, and sanctions become instruments of bilateral negotiation rather than coordinated Western pressure.

Trump’s diesel agreement may therefore represent the opening stage of a wider economic accommodation with Putin, negotiated while Russia continues its war against Ukraine and without any corresponding Russian commitment to withdraw from occupied territory.

By Jan Wolfe Oct 11 (Reuters) – Republican US Senator Thom Tillis on Sunday said President Donald Trump’s diesel supply deal with Russia may be illegal and will put American lives at risk, adding to bipartisan...

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

No one expected that Donald Trump, after a congratulatory birthday phone call to his Russian counterpart, would declare that Russian diesel fuel would prove to be the solution to America’s current fuel shortages. If the Trump presidency has yielded anything it is a lot of interesting headlines that seem to come out of nowhere, that can sadly, quite often, fade right back into the mist from whence they came. Sometimes Trump’s words can fill us with hope like this ‘Diesel Deal’, and others like his recent UN speech, where he threatened to potentially kill all Iranians, fill us with dread. This declaration by our enigmatic leader presents a very interesting media narrative and a potential end to ‘Project Ukraine’ that is worth taking a deeper dive into.

Trump has blamed Zelensky for the global energy shortages, especially those concerning diesel fuel. At the time, everyone thought this was just a cheap Twitter-style deflection from the failed war against Iran, which certainly caused a lot of fuel transport disruption. That is to say, the White House was projecting this crisis, that it allowed to happen, or actively caused, to be thrown onto the scapegoat Zelensky. However, this form of deflection or projection is no longer just words in a pre-election narrative, but has become action. Sanctions on Russian diesel have been lifted and the first shipment is already on its way as I write these words. Something tangible has occurred.

Zelensky was actually warned some six times to stop attacking Russian oil infrastructure. Blow up children in the Donbass and beyond ‘sure’, but attacking what the West wants from Russia more than anything is ‘totally unacceptable’. Zelensky, who as stated above was warned half-a-dozen times to back of strikes on oil/gas, upon hearing of Trump’s decision to purchase Russian diesel fuel did the following:

1) He quickly attacked Russian oil infrastructure again seemingly to spite the U.S. President

2) He immediately cut off peace talks in Miami with the Trump’s aides, the Kushner-Witkoff duo, which is yet another spitting in the face of Donald Trump.

The wildest thing of all is that the ‘narcissist’ Trump has already publically thanked President Putin twice for this deal. Appearing at a rally, Americans standing behind Trump wildly cheered in favor of the announcement of peace with Russia plus extra fuel for America. Russophobia is a hobby of the globalist bourgeoisie and Epstein Island, not American truckers and farmers.

It’s a great narrative, let’s hope it lasts

Trump has now put 100% of the blame for global energy/fuel problems directly onto Zelensky, and called him out personally for keeping the war going over the last two years. Thus, the narrative is forming into something like: If the war in Ukraine is the cause of the fuel shortages, and Zelensky is the cause of the war continuing, that means the U.S. can make a deal with Russia even if ‘they started it’, with the corollary that Zelensky logically needs to go as he is the source of the problem. But going even deeper into the narrative we can see the most interesting thing of all or as they like to say online ‘the quiet part’: Trump has essentially declared that Russian energy output is of vital strategic interest to the United States.

It is these kind of words that take the black pill out of my mouth and directly inject ‘hopium’ into my bloodstream. The idea of the American President declaring that NOT being at war with Russia is of vital strategic interest to the USA is something I have been dreaming of my entire adult life. This is exactly the logic that we need to finally and ultimately end the Cold War + Project for a New American Century mentality in politics and finally allow the USA to rebuild and invest into itself. This very well could be America’s mulitpolar awakening by using a logic trap similar to the other ones that have been used to do the exact opposite and keep the USA locked in eternal foreign wars of luxury for ‘national security’. This new logic trap could look something like this: “So you want war with Russia? That must mean you want to harm America, you dirty traitor! You’ll take the fuel from farmer Joe and our kids will starve, you monster! Russia being left alone to produce fuel is a national security interest of America, are you against our country’s national security? Do you want to weaken manly America for those gay Europeans?”.

But as we slam that hopium injection into our veins we have to remember that Donald Trump has said a lot of things, changed his mind many times, or was forced to change it, and perhaps isn’t quite the unilateral decider that he makes himself out to be on TV.

It takes two to tango, but one orange man to keep his word.

The transcripts from this now famous birthday phone chat look very different on the American and Russian sides, which is par for the course. Trump’s team tends to write discussed things as proven facts whereas the Russians are more noncommittal in their language. But the diesel sanctions are gone for now and the boats are moving, so this looks to be real… at least until the mid-term votes are cast.

The American side has since threatened to cut Zelensky off from intelligence sharing, which could be an instant deathblow to their military efforts as many experts believe that only U.S. intel has allowed them to survive this long. Without such targeting data they will be sent back to 20^th century warfare instantly, and they would no longer be able to strike deep into Russia. RT wrote the following on this issue:

A Ukrainian official told Axios that Witkoff and Kushner threatened to cut off US intelligence sharing with Kiev if it continued to ignore Trump’s requests to halt strikes on Russian oil refineries, but the US official denied that any such threat had been made.

But here is where we have to hold our breath, for despite how nice this new narrative sounds, and how it is the perfect exit for the USA from its participation in Project Ukraine we should not forget the words of President Putin from some time ago when he talked about the true power of any U.S. President:

“So a person is elected — he comes with ideas… Then people with briefcases come visit him, well-dressed, in dark suits — kind of like mine.”

So the real question might be, will the Zionist Lobby, Epstein Elite, Three-Letter Organizations, Influential Billionaires, and all the other spooks on Capitol Hill actually let President Trump actually end this war? Will the POTUS be allowed to do this?

We should recall that after Zelensky acted disgracefully in the White House at the start of Trump’s second term everyone thought this conflict would be over. Trump the famous narcissist seemed visibly angry and offended on camera during their verbal spat. But the war went on. There was the Anchorage Summit, which had tons of hype and everyone thought then that the U.S. would pull support from Kiev. But it did not. Trump’s enemies including the Biden Clan are linked to massive corruption in Ukraine which has all been exposed. This would have been a great off ramp from the conflict, but Trump did not or could not take it. And in general, Trump’s rhetoric towards Zelensky and other European politicians has been overtly harsh and disrespectful. The man accused of being a ‘blowhard’ somehow always speaks quite politely behind the backs and to the faces of Putin and Xi.

Thus, although I want peace and mutually-respectful cooperation between the USA and Russia perhaps this deal will only last till the midterm elections, when all of a sudden Zelensky will go back to being “a bastard, but he’s our bastard”, and the conflict will go marching on. Perhaps this is our October Surprise from the Republican side of the aisle? And in December we can all be ‘surprised again’ when the war resumes full-force and thousands more Slavs die on the battlefield?

Now, Donald Trump with gritted teeth is slinging forth the idea that he thinks “it’s time for Ukraine to get a new President”. But after the votes are counted in America he may just go back to passively hating and tolerating Zelensky till the end of his term or till an Oreshnik finds the mark one day. We also cannot forget that the West has been lobbying for a major ceasefire from the Russians for a long time. Presumably this would be used to regroup, rest, rearm and then just go right back to fighting till the last Ukrainian. Now Trump wants elections in Kiev, which will probably demand a ceasefire to enact. But will he be pushing for a three-day ceasefire, or try to trick the Russians into agreeing to a month-long freeze or more?

One ‘good’ sign on this issue from a Russian standpoint is that there are now already calls for Zelensky to resign over this issue on Twitter/X coming from all sides even pro-Ukrainian ones:

“’Zelensky must resign’ – Ukrainian media. That was quick. Zelensky ignored Trump’s warnings not to attack Russian oil refineries SIX times. This morning, Zelensky has bombed another Russian oil refinery. Ukrainians are calling for Zelensky‘s resignation.

Former Ukrainian MP and Metinvest co-owner Vadym Novynskyi has called on Zelensky to resign and hand over all power to Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada following the Trump-Putin agreements.”

We have to remember that Ukraine in 2026 is already a police state where any dissent means you could get thrown into a bus and taken to the front to die or vanish into a prison as a Russian ‘spy’. Thus, when important people gang up against Zelensky openly it is much more of a potent statement than Hollywood actors safely making Tik-Toks against Trump from their luxurious bedrooms.

The rest of the world won’t sit around and do nothing.

Some moronic ‘Putin sold out the BRICS’ counter-narrative is sure to arise from Kiev’s bot accounts soon. Obviously someone is going to say that the Kremlin threw their Iranian brothers to the Zio-lobby machine! But in actuality, it looks like the Iranians are going to just ship their oil through Russia and sell it as ‘Russian’ and everyone will be happy. The Caspian Sea will be even more busy in the near future. If sanctioned accomplished anything they really increased trade between Russia and Iran.

No one in Moscow is planning on selling out Tehran; they want America to join the Multipolar World while still saving face and reduce the global threat level of nuclear war which is vastly too high at present. Iran and China were surely consulted on this issue before any Diesel Deal was finalized.

The real danger of Trump calling for the removal of Zelensky comes from Europe, where certain factions, politicians and their financiers may take radical action in response. And Trump’s reaction to this response could be even more radical now. Would it be possible that NATO might greenlight the Baltics to just open up another front to ‘see what happens’? Will France finally go through on its threat and just deploy troops openly en masse to save the Napoleon in Green from political or potentially physical death? So far the EU has only threatened even more sanctions. If the previous 20+ packages of sanctions failed, I wonder what is left to actually sanction. Ursula is promising the biggest and most expansive sanctions packet for Monday, October 12^th, but I doubt it will change anything. The only thing that would change the situation is if the EU did something really aggressive, drastic and stupid militarily.

What about the rest of the sanctions?

The Russian media has done a disservice to the public by writing that “Trump will lift sanctions” over-and-over again when the only sanctions being lifted are on diesel exports for half a year. All of the rest of the sanctions are still there. You still cannot fly directly from Moscow to New York, and money transfers via SWIFT are still mostly blocked. We have to remember that at least in theory sanctions are a form of punishment for crimes committed against, in this case, international law and the United States. So how can relations between the USA and Russian Federation truly be normalized when one still accuses the other of crimes it believes it did not even commit?

After Project Ukraine ends things could change rapidly, but there can be no true friendship until Washington trusts Aeroflot enough to let them land on U.S. territory. We cannot be both under a sanctions war and normalized at the same time. But this new Trump narrative, if he can stick with it to its logical conclusion, is the perfect off-ramp for America and the way we can finally end this war and go back to some sense of normalcy with the apocalypse pushed far off into the future beyond all of our lifespans.