Brazilian presidential candidate Flávio Bolsonaro confirmed Wednesday that he will attend the Band network debate with President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, scheduled for Sunday, October 18, a turnaround that clears the way for the first face-to-face encounter of the campaign.

Less than 24 hours after announcing that he would not participate in Sunday’s debate on Bandeirantes channel, the senator and presidential candidate Flávio Bolsonaro backed down and confirmed this Wednesday that he will debate with the Worker’s party candidate, Lula da Silva. The event will take place on October 18 at 8 P.M. local time.

Bolsonaro, who had announced the previous day that he would not attend the program, changed his decision after Lula confirmed his presence to expose the differences between the two government projects and allow voters to compare the proposals of both candidates.

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In the recording broadcast on social networks, the son of former President Jair Bolsonaro presented his turnaround as a calculated provocation. “Lula, how predictable you are, aren’t you? All it took was for me to say I wasn’t going to take part in the Band debate for you, the next minute, to say you were going. And of course I will be at the debate, I just wanted you to confirm it,” he said.

The challenge did not stop there. “I am going to rub the truth in your face and refute you live for millions of Brazilians; I’ll be waiting for you at the Band debate, Lula,” Bolsonaro added.

The meeting, organized by the chain Bandeirantes, comes one week from the start scheduled for October 25 and will be the first time in this campaign that both face to face.

Tuesday’s Opposite Stance

On Tuesday, Bolsonaro’s position had been the opposite. After an event of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB), the senator gave reporters a brief refusal. “I’m not going, it’s not planned to attend that debate on Sunday,” he said, adding that his attendance at the October 23 Globo debate would depend on what his technical team decides.

The turnaround came after Lula confirmed that he would attend the program. For his part, Lula had confirmed his presence the same day, also by video. “I hope my opponent shows up so that the people know the differences between programs and candidacies. I will be there,” he said.

Band kept the event on the calendar despite the initial resistance of the Liberal Party’s candidate and had announced it would leave the absent candidate’s lectern empty throughout the broadcast. With Wednesday’s confirmation, the set will have both contenders.

A Campaign of Cancellations

Neither candidate attended a debate before the first round. Band’s August 23 debate was held without the frontrunners, and those called by a media consortium on September 14 and by Record on September 23 were canceled because no one confirmed attendance.

The October 1 Globo debate also fell through. Lula said on September 30 that he would not attend, and Bolsonaro, who had promised to show up even without his rival, withdrew about two hours before airtime. He blamed what he called “censorship” imposed, in his version, by the Superior Electoral Court (TSE), whose justice Estela Aranha had barred the network from keeping the lectern reserved for the president on the set.

According to the Superior Electoral Court, in the first round on October 4 Bolsonaro won 56.1 million votes, or 47.03% of valid votes, and Lula 53.9 million, or 45.16%.

This Sunday’s debate will be the first in which Bolsonaro and Lula of the leftist Workers’ Party (PT) face off, given that none participated in the media clashes before the first round. Another debate is still scheduled for October 23 at Globo, two days before the election, the most influential TV network in the South American country.

With the balloting set for October 25, the results show a competitive contest after a first round in which the difference was also tight. In this scenario, the televised debate scheduled for Sunday represents a new instance for the two aspirants to present their positions to the Brazilian electorate.

This story originally appeared in Panamerican Dispatch on Oct. 14, 2026, and is shared here with permission.

Meta, the parent company of Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp, said technical glitches impacted posts and ads from President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s campaign, but has categorically denied any electoral interference benefiting other candidates.

Lula’s campaign petitioned the Superior Electoral Court and the National Agency for Data Protection last week, alleging “strong suspicions of an attempted interference in the Brazilian electoral process to benefit the candidacy of Flávio Bolsonaro.”

The Superior Electoral Court gave Meta 48 hours to respond, and the company submitted a document on Monday, October 12, reiterating the claim regarding technical issues and asserting that its algorithms are neutral and auditable.

Meta Acknowledges Glitches but Denies Interference

In a document submitted to the Superior Electoral Court, Meta acknowledged the occurrence of technical glitches that affected ads and posts from Lula’s campaign but rejected the campaign’s central accusation: that it was favoring the far-right candidacy of Flávio Bolsonaro.

“Facebook Brazil categorically rejects such a premise. The claim is false, unsubstantiated, and does not hold up when confronted with the facts and objective data presented herein,” reads a statement from the company, which is led by Mark Zuckerberg, who has allied himself with President Donald Trump in the US.

The company maintains that “Meta’s content distribution systems do not operate based on ideological criteria” and that “Meta does not operate its systems to disadvantage or favor candidates.”

According to the document, community standards apply equally to all users, and neutrality is described as a “design attribute of the systems themselves, with criteria that are objective, public, and auditable by the Electoral Court.” The company also stated that the technical issues mentioned did not exclusively affect Brazil or specific accounts.

What Meta failed to provide, according to Lula’s campaign, was concrete evidence that the glitches had affected other Brazilian candidates or other markets to a similar degree. The lack of verifiable data to support the claim of widespread impact is precisely the point Lula’s team disputes; this makes the “technical issue” explanation insufficient as a response to the formal complaint filed with regulatory agencies.

Accusations by the Lula campaign and the Involvement of Regulatory Agencies

On Saturday, October 10, Lula’s campaign filed a formal complaint with the Superior Electoral Court and the National Agency for Data Protection describing a pattern of issues that has persisted, according to the campaign, since last December: ad account failures, interruptions in view counts, and restrictions on boosting posts. Collectively, Lula’s team said, these incidents systematically reduced the president’s digital reach on Meta’s platforms.

To support the suspicion that their opponent was being favored, the Workers’ Party’s communications department conducted an analysis revealing a significant figure: Flávio Bolsonaro’s page recorded, on average, 2.96 times more engagement than Lula’s, despite having 17.2% fewer followers.

The PT campaign questions the company’s explanation: “The company claims that this ‘glitch’ affected other advertisers and markets but provided no evidence of this—let alone proof that the problem affected other candidates in Brazil as well. Once again, Meta claims it was a ‘technical issue’.”

The involvement of regulatory agencies signals that the dispute will not remain confined to the realm of public statements. By setting a 48-hour deadline for the company to respond, the Superior Electoral Court acknowledged the seriousness of the allegation during the pre-election period. The Data Protection Agency, for its part, has the authority to investigate how platforms handle personal data, opening up a regulatory front that runs parallel to the electoral process.

Meta’s Track Record in Elections and the Issue of Neutrality

Meta cites its own track record as a defense against claims of bias. In the document submitted to the Superior Electoral Court, the company states that its “institutional conduct across more than 200 elections since 2016—and in Brazil since 2018—is incompatible, both logically and historically, with the theory of deliberate manipulation in favor of a candidate.”

The company also says it has made investments exceeding $30 billion in security teams and technology over the past decade, including artificial intelligence systems and human analysis teams covering more than 70 languages.

The problem with this argument is that the company’s track record is not free from controversy. In March 2018, the company then known as Facebook Inc. acknowledged “failures” that allowed Cambridge Analytica to harvest data from tens of millions of users to target campaigns during the 2016 US presidential election—when Donald Trump was first elected—and the UK’s Brexit campaign. In July 2019, the company was fined $5 billion by the US Federal Trade Commission for allegedly misleading users regarding privacy controls over their information, a direct consequence of the scandal.

The current context adds a significant political dimension: following Trump’s inauguration in January 2025, Mark Zuckerberg announced he would work alongside the Republican leader against countries or governments advocating for social media regulation, a stance that repositions Meta within the global contest over digital sovereignty.

In Brazil, where the debate on platform regulation is ongoing, citing a “technical issue” to explain reach disparities during an election campaign cannot be accepted as a sufficient response—especially given a history that combines admitted failures, multi-billion-dollar fines, and the declared political alignment of the company’s top executive.

This article first appeared in Revista Forum, was translated by Panamerican Dispatch with authorization from the author, and can be read in its original Portuguese here.

Images of children brandishing replica firearms at campaign events spark formal investigations by human rights and legal oversight bodies.

Brazil’s 2026 electoral cycle has been marked by a rise in political violence across various states. Security data records 354 incidents of political violence over the past two years.

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These incidents include threats, physical assaults, and armed attacks targeting candidates, local election officials, and political organizers.

The root of this political tension lies in the structural polarization generated during previous presidential campaigns and administrations.

Former President Jair Bolsonaro and his political movement, known as “Bolsonarismo”, built an electoral base around conservative social values, the expansion of agribusiness, and a national security strategy centered on arming the population.

As a consequence, in the 2026 campaign of Senator Flávio Bolsonaro, public security emerged as a primary concern for the electorate. The conservative coalition’s political strategy relies heavily on proposals for punitive criminal justice and the expansion of individual gun-ownership rights as solutions to urban and rural crime.

Critics and human rights organizations argue that the mass dissemination of political content promoting firearm use has created an environment where political disagreements escalate into physical violence.

The normalization of violent political rhetoric during nationwide public events has altered public discourse, turning political participation into a high-risk activity for grassroots organizers and opposition candidates.

Ideological Origins and the Pro-Gun Movement

The political platform supporting firearm expansion in Brazil is driven by a legislative coalition known as the Bullets, Beef, and Bibles caucus.

This group represents an alliance between public security hardliners, large-scale agribusiness producers, and conservative evangelical leaders. Together, these sectors advocated for statutory changes to alter the Disarmament Statute enacted in 2003.

During Jair Bolsonaro’s presidential term from 2019 to 2022, executive decrees relaxed requirements for acquiring firearms and ammunition.

The administration expanded the privileges granted to registered Collectors, Marksmen, and Hunters, known as CACs. Official records indicate that the number of registered CACs grew significantly during these four years, allowing private individuals to acquire high-caliber weapons and purchase thousands of rounds of ammunition annually.

Executive Order 9,847, signed in May 2019, allowed licensed gun owners to purchase up to 5,000 rounds of ammunition per weapon each year, up from the previous limit of 50.

The legal expansion of firearm access altered security dynamics in rural and urban areas. Studies published by the demonstrated a direct correlation between the rise in privately held firearms and the frequency of lethal altercations in local communities.

While pro-gun advocacy organizations maintain that private gun ownership provides individual self-defense against criminal enterprises, public safety researchers observed that a higher volume of civilian weapons eventually entered illicit markets through theft and improper registration.

In rural regions, the growth of armed civilian groups reinforced existing land disputes. Property owners, illegal loggers, and informal land prospectors utilized expanded firearm access to defend economic claims against rural workers and Indigenous groups.

The text reads, “WARNING: Extremely graphic images, yet necessary for those with short memories. Bolsonaro supporters beating women at protests, ransacking Congress, and shooting people. All the terrorism of that scum that wants to return. Spread this far and wide.”

Public Demonstrations, Armed Symbolism, and Religious Reactions

Political rallies in this 2026 campaign held across major urban centers featured recurring uses of military and firearm symbolism. During campaign events held in Brasília, São Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro, Bolsonaro supporters displayed replica firearms, tactical equipment, and political banners encouraging armed civilian mobilization.

A widely circulated image from a political rally showed a child positioned on top of a sound truck alongside campaign organizers, holding a firearm replica and mimicking shooting gestures toward the crowd.

Human rights organizations, including the National Council for the Rights of Children and Adolescents, issued formal statements criticizing the inclusion of minors in events promoting firearm use, pointing to federal child protection statutes that prohibit exposing children to violent material or weapons training.

Religious leaders responded to the increasing presence of violent messaging in political life. During the annual feast day celebrations at the National Sanctuary of Aparecida, Archbishop Orlando Brandes delivered a sermon addressing national unity, public ethics, and political discourse.

In his address, Archbishop Brandes stated that “a civil society cannot be built on hatred and weapons” and urged citizens to reject violent language in favor of peace and social justice.

The National Conference of Brazilian Bishops published subsequent declarations emphasizing that Christian ethical principles conflict with policies promoting unrestricted firearm ownership and armed confrontation. Church leaders called on political candidates to focus their platforms on poverty alleviation, healthcare, and education rather than public arming.

Territorial Conflicts and Impact on Indigenous Communities

The proliferation of firearms and political rhetoric supporting land expansion intensified territorial pressure on Indigenous populations, particularly in the Amazon region.

Representatives of the Parakanã people, living in the Apyterewa Indigenous Territory in the state of Pará, submitted official complaints to the Federal Public Ministry and the National Indian Foundation documenting increasing land incursions by armed squatters, illegal loggers, and cattle ranchers aligned with local conservative political networks.

The Apyterewa territory, formally demarcated and ratified by federal decree in 2007, remains one of the areas most impacted by illegal deforestation and land grabbing in northern Brazil.

Community leaders reported that armed individuals entered protected areas, established informal access roads, and issued death threats against Indigenous leaders who monitored territorial boundaries.

Deforestation data from the National Institute for Space Research tracked a steady increase in forest clearing within the Parakanã territory during periods of diminished federal oversight.

Indigenous rights organizations highlighted that territorial conflicts represent both an environmental concern and a violation of constitutional rights guaranteed under the 1988 Brazilian Constitution.

The ongoing displacement pressure on the Parakanã and neighboring Indigenous groups underscores the direct connection between national political debates on gun ownership and rural security dynamics in remote regions.

Lula’s Counter-Proposals and Public Security Strategy

President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva implemented regulatory changes aimed at restricting civilian access to firearms and strengthening state control over public security.

Immediately upon taking office, the federal administration issued Executive Decree 11,366, which suspended the issuance of new registrations for civilian weapon owners, restricted the purchase of high-caliber ammunition, and transferred the oversight of registered Collectors, Marksmen, and Hunters from the Brazilian Army to the Federal Police.

The policy platform of the governing coalition focuses on replacing civilian arming with coordinated state law enforcement and social crime prevention programs.

The administration re-established the National Public Security Program with Citizenship, allocating federal funds to municipal crime prevention, community policing, and educational initiatives aimed at vulnerable youth.

In federal security speeches, President Lula emphasized that reducing lethal violence requires public investment in infrastructure, basic sanitation, and job creation rather than increasing civilian weapon ownership.

To address territorial conflicts in protected areas, the federal government reactivated inter-agency enforcement operations involving the National Public Security Force, the Federal Police, and environmental protection agencies.

The Ministry of Indigenous Peoples, established under the current administration, coordinated with the National Indian Foundation to resume the formal demarcation of Indigenous territories and conduct police operations to remove illegal miners and squatters from protected lands.

Future Outlook for Democratic Governance

The structural debate over firearm access, public safety, and campaign violence highlights a central division in Brazilian political life. Data collected by public safety research organizations demonstrates that the expansion of civilian weapons between 2019 and 2022 coincided with increased lethal incidents in rural land disputes and higher rates of political intimidation during national election cycles.

The resolution of these security challenges depends on the enforcement of constitutional protections, the regulation of civilian firearms, and the institutional support provided to Indigenous and rural communities. As Brazil navigates its upcoming electoral process, democratic institutions, civil society organizations, and international human rights bodies continue to monitor the impact of violent rhetoric on public participation and state stability.

Establishing long-term public safety requires a balanced policy approach that pairs rigorous law enforcement with targeted social investments. Rebuilding public security institutions, disarming illegal paramilitaries, and safeguarding protected territories remain central requirements for maintaining social stability and protecting democratic norms across the country.

Sources: TRT World – Xinhua – CGTN – Brasil de Fato – Resumen Latinoamericano – Página 12 – Radio del Sur – Folha S. Paulo – BBC – CNN – Barricada TV – El Mundo – Sputnik

BRICS Pay non è una valuta né una rete di regolamento: è interoperabilità. E a Nuova Delhi i leader si sono limitati a “prenderne atto”.

Segue nostro Telegram.

Cosa è e cosa non è

Alla vigilia del diciottesimo vertice BRICS, ospitato al Bharat Mandapam di Nuova Delhi il 12 e 13 settembre 2026, una parte della stampa specializzata dava per imminente il debutto di BRICS Pay. Le guide al vertice indicavano proprio la capitale indiana come sede del pieno dispiegamento del sistema, con la Reserve Bank of India incaricata del coordinamento tecnico. Il testo approvato dai leader racconta un’altra storia. La Dichiarazione di Nuova Delhi, 140 paragrafi adottati per consenso, si limita a «prendere atto» del lavoro svolto dalla BRICS Payment Task Force sull’interoperabilità dei canali di pagamento e di messaggistica e sulle discussioni relative al regolamento in valute locali, precisando che ciò avviene nel rispetto delle priorità nazionali e nella consapevolezza che non esiste una soluzione valida per tutti. La proposta indiana di collegare le valute digitali delle banche centrali, su cui Nuova Delhi aveva investito una parte consistente del capitale politico della propria presidenza, nel documento non compare.

La distanza tra attese e risultato non va letta come un incidente diplomatico. Riflette due condizioni strutturali che la pubblicistica sulla de-dollarizzazione tende a sottovalutare. La prima è che i Paesi BRICS, presi uno per uno, hanno ancora buone ragioni per regolare in dollari una parte rilevante dei propri scambi. La seconda è che un sistema di pagamento comune non è un problema di ingegneria finanziaria. È un atto di governo condiviso, che richiede regole vincolanti, un’istanza di arbitrato e la disponibilità a fidarsi delle banche centrali altrui. A Nuova Delhi nessuna di queste condizioni era sul tavolo.

Il nome induce in errore. BRICS Pay non è una moneta e non è, almeno nella configurazione discussa finora, un circuito di regolamento. È un livello di interoperabilità pensato per mettere in comunicazione sistemi nazionali già esistenti: il russo SPFS, nato dopo le sanzioni del 2014; il cinese CIPS, operativo dal 2015; l’indiano UPI e il brasiliano Pix, costruiti per i pagamenti domestici istantanei e solo in seguito proiettati all’estero. Il progetto ha preso forma durante la presidenza russa del 2024, nel quadro della BRICS Cross-Border Payments Initiative accolta a Kazan, un’iniziativa che la stessa dichiarazione di quel vertice qualificava come volontaria e non vincolante.

Per capire dove si colloca il progetto conviene distinguere tre piani che il dibattito pubblico confonde di continuo. Il primo è la messaggistica, cioè la trasmissione standardizzata degli ordini di pagamento tra istituzioni finanziarie: è il terreno di SWIFT, ed è qui che BRICS Pay si propone come alternativa. Il secondo è il regolamento, il trasferimento effettivo di valore tra conti presso banche centrali o banche corrispondenti, con tutto ciò che comporta in termini di liquidità, rischio di controparte e gestione dei saldi. Il terzo è l’unità di conto, la moneta in cui i contratti sono denominati. Un’alternativa a SWIFT agisce soltanto sul primo piano. Se un esportatore indiano fattura in dollari e la banca russa regola in dollari presso un corrispondente, aver trasmesso il messaggio su un canale non occidentale cambia ben poco.

L’interoperabilità ha però un vantaggio politico evidente, ed è la ragione per cui è diventata la formula di compromesso del gruppo: consente a ciascun Paese di conservare la propria moneta e il proprio sistema finanziario. Una moneta comune imporrebbe rinunce di tutt’altra portata, dalle regole di emissione e di cambio alla gestione dei Paesi strutturalmente in avanzo o in disavanzo. Non a caso Sudhakar Dalela, segretario per le relazioni economiche del ministero degli Esteri indiano, ha ribadito durante il vertice che una valuta BRICS non è in discussione, aggiungendo la prudente clausola «per ora».

La storia del dossier è la storia di un lessico che avanza di millimetri. Nel 2010, a Brasília, i quattro Paesi fondatori si impegnavano a studiare la fattibilità di una cooperazione monetaria e di accordi di regolamento in valuta locale. A Ufa, nel 2015, si riconosceva il potenziale delle valute nazionali; a Xiamen, due anni dopo, si parlava di swap valutari e di investimenti diretti in moneta locale. Dal 2019 l’attenzione si è spostata sulle infrastrutture di pagamento, con l’avvio dei lavori della Payment Task Force. Johannesburg, nel 2023, ha evocato per la prima volta l’interconnessione dei sistemi di pagamento transfrontalieri; Kazan ha lanciato l’iniziativa volontaria; Rio, nel 2025, ha accolto un rapporto tecnico sul sistema di pagamenti transfrontalieri BRICS che a oltre un anno di distanza non è stato reso pubblico. Sedici anni dopo Brasília, Nuova Delhi «prende atto». La successione dei verbi (studiare, riconoscere, accogliere, prendere atto) è già un indicatore: in un organismo che decide per consenso, il grado di impegno reale si legge nella grammatica dei comunicati.

L’ambizione indiana e il prezzo del consenso

L’India aveva fatto dei pagamenti transfrontalieri uno dei pilastri della propria presidenza. A gennaio la Reserve Bank of India aveva proposto di collegare le valute digitali di banca centrale dei Paesi membri per facilitare commercio e turismo; ad agosto il governatore Sanjay Malhotra confermava che erano in corso discussioni sul collegamento dei sistemi di pagamento veloce e delle CBDC; alla vigilia del vertice il ministro del Commercio Piyush Goyal rilanciava l’invito a regolare gli scambi in moneta locale. Già il 10 settembre, tuttavia, Reuters riferiva di ostacoli politici e tecnici in grado di limitare i progressi, e ne indicava due in particolare: l’interruzione dei rapporti finanziari tra Emirati Arabi Uniti e Iran e la riluttanza della stessa India ad approfondire la connettività finanziaria con la Cina senza una fiducia reciproca più solida.

Il secondo ostacolo merita attenzione, perché rovescia un’immagine corrente. Il freno più robusto a un’integrazione dei pagamenti BRICS non viene da Washington, ma dal Paese che presiedeva il vertice. Nuova Delhi vuole infrastrutture che rendano più semplice il commercio in rupie e più economiche le rimesse della sua diaspora. Non vuole che queste infrastrutture passino per nodi cinesi, né che il loro effetto netto sia un’espansione dello yuan in Asia meridionale. L’incontro tra Narendra Modi e Xi Jinping a margine del vertice ha segnato un disgelo prudente, ma il disavanzo commerciale indiano verso la Cina, raddoppiato nell’arco di un decennio, resta una frattura che nessun comunicato può ricomporre.

C’è poi l’effetto dell’allargamento. Con undici membri e dieci Paesi partner, il gruppo comprende oggi Stati che nella guerra del 2026 si sono trovati su fronti opposti. A maggio la riunione dei ministri degli Esteri, sempre a Nuova Delhi, si era chiusa senza un comunicato congiunto, costringendo la presidenza indiana a una dichiarazione a titolo proprio. L’unanimità di settembre è stata ottenuta abbassando la soglia degli impegni. La dichiarazione critica dazi e sanzioni unilaterali senza nominare gli Stati Uniti e, sul dossier finanziario, rinvia a un lavoro tecnico di cui non fissa né scadenze né obiettivi. Ajay Srivastava, fondatore del Global Trade Research Initiative, ha osservato che il testo non prevede alcuna azione concreta e che, in assenza di un piano coordinato, il commercio in valute locali potrà crescere solo gradualmente, senza raggiungere volumi significativi.

Va segnalato, per scrupolo di metodo, che alcune testate hanno presentato il vertice come il momento del «lancio» di BRICS Pay. Il testo della dichiarazione, così come riportato dalle fonti che lo hanno esaminato nel dettaglio, non autorizza questa lettura. La confusione tra annuncio e realizzazione è uno dei tratti ricorrenti della comunicazione sul tema, e contribuisce a gonfiare aspettative che poi ricadono sulla credibilità del gruppo.

Le buone ragioni del dollaro

Le statistiche disponibili spiegano meglio di qualsiasi dichiarazione perché la de-dollarizzazione resti, per ora, più un tema di dibattito che una tendenza misurabile. Secondo l’ultima indagine triennale della Banca dei regolamenti internazionali, nell’aprile 2025 il dollaro compariva in circa l’89% delle transazioni valutarie mondiali, una quota in lieve aumento rispetto al 2022, mentre lo yuan si fermava all’8,5%. Sul versante delle riserve, i dati del Fondo monetario internazionale indicano per il primo trimestre del 2026 una quota del dollaro pari al 57,13%, contro l’1,99% della valuta cinese. La tendenza di lungo periodo è di erosione: intorno al 1999 il dollaro superava il 70% delle riserve allocate. Ma la diversificazione si disperde su una costellazione di valute minori, la cui quota residua è più che raddoppiata dal 2021, e non si concentra sulle monete dei Paesi BRICS.

La ragione non è la sudditanza, è il calcolo. Il dollaro offre ciò che nessuna alternativa offre ancora: mercati profondi e liquidi, strumenti di copertura a basso costo, un enorme stock di debito denominato nella stessa valuta e la possibilità di convertire in qualsiasi momento il ricavato di una transazione in un attivo considerato sicuro. Barry Eichengreen ha descritto questi vantaggi in termini di effetti di rete: una moneta è utile in proporzione al numero di soggetti che già la usano, e ciò rende costosa qualunque transizione tentata da un solo attore o da un piccolo gruppo. Per un importatore brasiliano o un esportatore indonesiano pagare in dollari significa pagare nella moneta che la controparte accetta senza trattare.

Scendendo al livello dei singoli membri, il quadro si fa ancora più netto. L’India ha dichiarato a più riprese di non avere interesse a indebolire il dollaro: nel dicembre 2024 il ministro degli Esteri Subrahmanyam Jaishankar ricordava che gli Stati Uniti sono il primo partner commerciale del Paese, e nell’estate 2025 il portavoce del ministero ribadiva che la de-dollarizzazione non rientra nell’agenda finanziaria indiana. Emirati Arabi Uniti e Arabia Saudita mantengono le proprie valute ancorate al dollaro e fondano la propria sicurezza su un rapporto con Washington che nessun circuito di pagamento alternativo potrebbe compensare. Riyadh, del resto, continua a stare nel gruppo in una posizione ambigua: la presidenza indiana la elencava tra gli undici membri, ma a Nuova Delhi la delegazione saudita si è presentata con lo status di Paese invitato. Egitto ed Etiopia, che negli ultimi anni hanno negoziato programmi con il Fondo monetario e portano un debito estero in valuta forte, non possono permettersi di complicare il rapporto con i propri creditori. Il Brasile di Lula ha rilanciato più volte l’idea di una moneta commerciale comune, ma il suo sistema di punta, Pix, rimane un successo domestico.

Restano la Russia e l’Iran, per i quali l’uscita dal dollaro non è una scelta ma una necessità imposta dalle sanzioni, e la Cina, che ha un interesse reale all’internazionalizzazione dello yuan ma lo persegue attraverso infrastrutture proprie, a cominciare da CIPS, e senza rinunciare ai controlli sui capitali che limitano l’attrattiva della sua moneta come riserva. Anche per chi ha le motivazioni più forti, tuttavia, il regolamento in valute locali ha mostrato limiti precisi. L’esperienza russo-indiana è istruttiva. Il forte aumento delle importazioni indiane di petrolio russo dopo il 2022 ha lasciato Mosca con ingenti saldi in rupie difficili da impiegare, un problema che lo stesso Sergej Lavrov ammise pubblicamente nel maggio 2023. Quando gli scambi sono squilibrati, la moneta del Paese in disavanzo si accumula presso il Paese in avanzo, e il dollaro torna a essere la via d’uscita più semplice.

A questi incentivi si somma il costo esplicito di una rottura. Donald Trump ha minacciato dazi del 100% contro i Paesi BRICS che sostenessero una moneta alternativa al dollaro e, dopo il vertice di Rio del 2025, un dazio aggiuntivo del 10% per chi si allineasse alle politiche del gruppo da lui definite antiamericane. Alla vigilia di Nuova Delhi l’economista di Natixis Alicia García-Herrero prevedeva che i leader avrebbero discusso di pagamenti transfrontalieri senza tentare di sostituire il dollaro. È andata esattamente così.

Una scelta politica

Si arriva così al punto centrale. Un sistema di pagamento non è un’infrastruttura neutrale. Susan Strange collocava la struttura finanziaria, cioè il controllo sul credito e sui canali attraverso cui circola, tra le quattro fonti del potere strutturale nell’economia politica internazionale. Gli Stati che controllano i nodi centrali delle reti economiche globali, di cui SWIFT è l’esempio canonico, possano trasformarli in strumenti di coercizione, sfruttandone sia la funzione di osservatorio sia la capacità di esclusione. È proprio questa esperienza, culminata nell’esclusione delle principali banche russe da SWIFT nel 2022, ad aver dato slancio politico al progetto BRICS.

La stessa lezione, però, vale all’interno del gruppo. Chi costruisce una rete alternativa deve stabilire dove si trovano i nodi, chi ne gestisce i dati, quale diritto regola le controversie, chi fornisce liquidità nei momenti di tensione e come si compensano i saldi tra economie in avanzo e in disavanzo. Ognuna di queste decisioni redistribuisce potere. Per l’India un sistema imperniato su CIPS significherebbe sostituire una dipendenza da Washington con una dipendenza da Pechino, cioè da un rivale con cui condivide una frontiera contesa. Per gli Emirati collegarsi a un circuito in cui transita l’Iran vorrebbe dire esporsi al rischio di sanzioni secondarie, proprio mentre i due Paesi escono da una guerra vissuta su fronti opposti. Il problema non è la tecnologia: le componenti nazionali esistono e funzionano. Manca un accordo su chi governa l’insieme.

La storia monetaria del Novecento offre due riferimenti utili. Il primo è la proposta keynesiana di una International Clearing Union, presentata dal Tesoro britannico nel 1943, che affrontava esattamente il nodo degli squilibri persistenti imponendo oneri simmetrici ai Paesi in avanzo e a quelli in disavanzo. Un BRICS Pay che volesse andare oltre la messaggistica avrebbe bisogno di un meccanismo analogo di compensazione multilaterale, e dunque di regole capaci di vincolare anche la Cina, principale creditore commerciale del gruppo. Il secondo riferimento è la tesi di Charles Kindleberger sulla stabilità del sistema internazionale come bene pubblico, che richiede un attore disposto a sostenerne i costi. Nell’ordine del dollaro quel ruolo è svolto, con tutti gli abusi che ne derivano, dagli Stati Uniti. Nel partenariato BRICS l’unico candidato plausibile è la Cina, e gli altri membri non intendono riconoscerle quella funzione. Qui sta il dilemma costitutivo di un ordine monetario multipolare: moltiplica i poli, ma lascia vacante il posto di chi garantisce il sistema.

A ciò si aggiunge la fragilità istituzionale. Il gruppo opera senza un segretariato permanente, con presidenze annuali a rotazione che affidano la continuità dei dossier tecnici alla volontà del Paese di turno. L’allargamento ha accresciuto l’eterogeneità degli interessi senza dotare il partenariato di strumenti decisionali più robusti. Un sistema di pagamento unificato richiederebbe un trattato, o almeno un accordo vincolante di governance, mentre l’iniziativa sui pagamenti transfrontalieri è, per esplicita scelta dei firmatari, volontaria e non vincolante. Finché questa asimmetria tra ambizione e forma giuridica non sarà sciolta, BRICS Pay resterà ciò che è oggi: un marchio politico sovrapposto a un insieme di corridoi bilaterali. La stabilità del partenariato non è dunque una condizione accessoria del progetto. Ne è il presupposto.

Verso la presidenza cinese del 2027

Con il passaggio della presidenza alla Cina per il 2027, l’orizzonte di valutazione più utile è quello dei prossimi diciotto-ventiquattro mesi. Le valutazioni che seguono poggiano su evidenze di qualità moderata, costituite in larga parte dai testi ufficiali e dalla stampa economica internazionale.

Lo scenario che considero altamente probabile è quello di un mosaico bilaterale. Crescono i corridoi già avviati, come quelli tra India ed Emirati e tra India e Russia, mentre l’architettura comune resta allo stadio di studio. Il commercio in valute locali aumenta in termini assoluti, ma la quota del dollaro negli scambi intra-BRICS si riduce solo in misura marginale.

Uno scenario alternativo, cui attribuisco una probabilità moderata, prevede che la presidenza cinese usi il 2027 per promuovere un nucleo a geometria variabile, costruito attorno a CIPS e SPFS, con l’adesione di Russia, Iran e di alcuni Paesi partner. Il marchio BRICS Pay verrebbe formalmente attivato, ma per una parte soltanto del gruppo e con ogni probabilità senza l’India. Sarebbe un risultato politicamente spendibile per Pechino e Mosca, ma renderebbe esplicita la frattura che oggi il linguaggio delle dichiarazioni riesce ancora a coprire.

L’entrata in funzione, entro il 2028, di un sistema unificato e operativo per tutti i membri resta invece altamente improbabile.

Gli indicatori da seguire sono pochi e concreti: la pubblicazione del rapporto tecnico accolto a Rio; l’eventuale firma di un accordo vincolante sulla governance dei pagamenti; la creazione di un meccanismo multilaterale di compensazione o di linee di swap dedicate, magari affidate alla Nuova Banca di Sviluppo; la posizione indiana su un collegamento con CIPS; la formalizzazione, o il definitivo abbandono, della membership saudita. Un comunicato che parli di «lancio» senza alcuno di questi elementi andrà letto per ciò che è, un annuncio.

Il multipolarismo ha finora prodotto soprattutto una pluralità di opzioni nazionali, utili a ciascun Paese per ridurre l’esposizione alle sanzioni e per negoziare da posizioni migliori con Washington. Trasformare queste opzioni in un sistema richiede un partenariato che riconosca un interesse comune più forte delle rivalità interne. Quel partenariato è ancora in evoluzione, e BRICS Pay ne seguirà i tempi, non il contrario.

On October 25, Brazilians will return to the polls to choose between President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Flávio Bolsonaro, son of former president Jair Bolsonaro, who was sentenced to 27 years in prison for his role in an attempted coup. The first round gave Flávio 47% of valid votes against Lula’s 45%, revealing the enduring strength of the far right four years after its electoral defeat. The runoff takes place as Donald Trump seeks to restore US domination over Latin America, with Brazil emerging as a consequential battleground in Washington’s campaign to contain China’s growing relations with the region.

Read more: Why did Brazil’s far right win the first round?

Over the past two decades, Brazil and China have built a political partnership that has expanded the space for independent action among countries of the Global South. Under Lula and Xi Jinping, this relationship has deepened through cooperation in industrial development, infrastructure, science, and technology. The election will determine whether this project advances or Brazil’s international orientation is subordinated to Washington’s renewed Monroe Doctrine as part of the continent’s rightward shift.

Read more: Brazil’s angry tide and the struggles ahead

Since Lula’s return to the presidency in 2023, the two governments have connected Chinese cooperation with Brazil’s development programs, including Nova Indústria Brasil, the Growth Acceleration Program (PAC), and the Ecological Transformation Plan. Lula’s May 2025 visit to Beijing produced 36 agreements covering infrastructure, finance, artificial intelligence, public health, and industrial cooperation. Behind these agreements is a long-standing challenge: overcoming Brazil’s dependent position in the international division of labor, where commodity exports continue to outweigh advanced industrial and technological development.

This cooperation has also reached Brazilian popular movements. Through the International Association for Popular Cooperation (Baobab), Brazil’s Landless Rural Workers’ Movement (MST) and other organizations have worked with Chinese institutions on agricultural mechanization, bioinputs, and digital technologies for family farming. These initiatives include the Digital Family Farming and Agroecology Laboratory and IARAA, an artificial intelligence project for agroecology and agrarian reform developed by Brazilian popular movements using Chinese open-source models. In a countryside marked by extreme concentrations of land, machinery, and capital, such cooperation offers new tools to peasant organizations fighting for agrarian reform and the production of healthy food.

Brazil’s relationship with China also reveals the different class interests at work in the country, with contradictions particularly visible in the countryside. Massive exports of soybeans, meat, and minerals have continued under both Bolsonaro and Lula, but their governments have pursued very different political relationships with Beijing. While Jair Bolsonaro attacked China and aligned himself with Washington, Lula has sought to deepen strategic cooperation, including in industrial development, technology, and agrarian reform. Flávio Bolsonaro now promises an “economically pragmatic” relationship with China while cultivating close ties with Trump. For sectors of Brazil’s ruling classes that profit from commodity exports, continuing to sell to China while embracing Washington’s political agenda presents little contradiction. For Brazil’s efforts to rebuild its industry and develop technological sovereignty, the consequences are far greater.

The return of the Monroe Doctrine

Washington’s ambitions were made explicit in its November 2025 National Security Strategy, which announced a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, seeking to restore US pre-eminence in the Western Hemisphere and deny outside powers control over strategic resources and infrastructure. Five days later, China published its third Latin America policy paper, reaffirming sovereignty, non-interference, regional integration, technological cooperation, and support for the region as a Zone of Peace. The two documents reveal fundamentally different approaches to the political future of the continent.

Brazil’s position is decisive. As Latin America’s largest economy, a founding BRICS member, and a leading participant in Mercosur, it possesses industrial, scientific, and political capacities that could strengthen independent development across Latin America and beyond.

The emergence of a new technological era makes this struggle particularly consequential. Brazil is among the few countries of the Global South capable of pursuing digital and technological sovereignty that could benefit its neighbors and parts of Africa. Its roughly 23% share of global rare earth reserves is an important starting point, but control over minerals alone is insufficient. The greater challenge is developing the capacity to process them, manufacture advanced components, and build the digital infrastructure, artificial intelligence systems, and technologies that will shape future production.

Flávio has made his orientation clear. Speaking at the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in the United States in March 2026, he offered Brazil as the “solution” to Washington’s dependence on China for critical minerals, explicitly linking rare earths to artificial intelligence and US military superiority. Chinese economic reporting has also described proposals from his team to exclude China from rare-earth supply chains. Rather than using Brazil’s resources to develop its own industrial and technological capacities, this agenda would place them at the service of US technological and military power.

The same political orientation extends to digital sovereignty. In July 2026, Flávio’s campaign submitted proposals to US trade authorities that included preventing Brazil’s Pix payment system from connecting to non-Western international payment networks and loosening commitments within Mercosur. These proposals converge with a wider US campaign involving tariffs, digital regulation, strategic minerals, and attempts to influence Brazil’s electoral process. Meanwhile, Washington’s January 2026 bombing on Venezuela and kidnapping of Nicolás Maduro and Cilia Flores demonstrated how far it is prepared to go to impose its will on the continent.

BRICS and the struggle for an independent foreign policy

Brazil, particularly under Lula, has helped build institutions through which countries of the Global South can reduce their dependence on Western-dominated structures. At the July 2025 BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro, the group advanced cooperation on development finance, local-currency transactions, and international institutional reform. The New Development Bank, headed by former Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff, is an important expression of this effort.

The BRICS cannot automatically overcome economic dependency or guarantee sovereignty for working people. Yet its expansion offers greater room for independent development, provided that participating governments have the political commitment to use these possibilities.

Brazil’s history reveals how difficult that independence has been to defend. In 1961, vice-president João Goulart became the first high-ranking representative of a Latin American government to visit the People’s Republic of China, meeting Mao Zedong when revolutionary China remained diplomatically isolated and subjected to US sanctions. Three years later, Goulart was overthrown in a US-backed civil-military coup that inaugurated a 21-year dictatorship. The early history of China–Brazil friendship was inseparable from struggles over national sovereignty, agrarian reform, and the forces determined to suppress them.

The international material conditions for South–South cooperation are considerably more favorable today, but political direction remains decisive. Jair Bolsonaro hosted the 2019 BRICS summit in Brasília while pursuing close alignment with Washington. A government can weaken institutions from within by abandoning the commitments that give them political substance.

The far right’s resurgence also reflects the enduring power of Brazil’s own ruling classes. Bolsonarismo has a domestic base among sections of agribusiness, finance, the security apparatus, militias, conservative religious networks, and major media. These forces, whose electoral and institutional advances have continued, were strengthened by the 2016 parliamentary coup against Dilma Rousseff and the judicial persecution of Lula. They possess their own organizations, material interests, and sources of power, which do not disappear when an election is lost. Their economic dependence on Chinese markets has not prevented their support for Washington’s political agenda.

Beyond the election

Beijing has followed the Brazilian election closely, reflecting the importance of the political relationship built between Lula and Xi over years of cooperation. In July, Xi reaffirmed China’s support for Brazil against external interference during a conversation with Lula, which also covered cooperation in artificial intelligence, satellites, mineral processing, and relations between China and Mercosur. In September, Foreign Minister Wang Yi received Lula’s adviser and former foreign minister Celso Amorim in Beijing, reaffirming the bilateral strategic partnership.

China’s principle of non-interference means that the choice of Brazil’s government belongs to the Brazilian people, but Beijing’s diplomatic restraint should not be confused with an absence of political interests or an assumption that all governments would pursue the same relationship. Chinese analysts have described the possible outlook under Flávio as one of “cold politics, hot economics”: commodity trade would likely continue, but the political relationship and cooperation in strategic sectors could deteriorate. The experience of Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency has already shown the limits of commercial interests in sustaining a broader political partnership.

For the Brazilian people, the consequences extend well beyond foreign policy. The election will also shape the struggles over labor rights, public services, agrarian reform, and the defence of democratic space. Brazil’s renewed role in South–South cooperation under Lula has opened possibilities for a development project that responds to the needs of its working people, but realizing those possibilities depends on the political and social forces capable of carrying it forward.

The Brazilian people have fought through dictatorship, neoliberal restructuring, parliamentary coups, and the rise of the far right to defend their political and social gains. This election is another moment in that longer struggle, now unfolding amid renewed US imperial intervention and a transformation of the world’s technological foundations. The future of China–Brazil cooperation will depend on the capacity of organized popular forces to build a sovereign national project and turn international cooperation into lasting changes in people’s lives.

Tings Chak 翟庭君 is the Asia Co-Coordinator of Tricontinental: Institute for Social Researchand an editor of the international edition of Wenhua Zongheng: A Journal of Contemporary Chinese Thought.

As Flávio Bolsonaro promises $38 billion in spending cuts, huge crowds of students take to the streets across Brazil to support Lula and fight for their right to quality education.

This Sunday, the fact that Lula brought out the largest crowd to São Paulo’s Paulista Avenue since the Diretas Já movement in the waning days of the U.S.-backed military dictatorship, with estimates of over 1 million, has rightfully occupied a lot of headline space, even in bourgeois media outlets like Globo which notoriously lies about crowd size at leftist marches and protests.

RELATED: Lula Shifts Digital Strategy for Runoff Against Bolsonaro in Brazil

But across Brazil, scores of other campaign marches have brought out huge crowds in the past few days, even in small and mid sized cities, like the conservative city of Uberlândia, which saw 50,000 people come out to show their support for Lula on October 8.

This Sunday I headed to May 13 Park in Recife’s Santo Amaro neighborhood to cover a Lula rally for TeleSur that had been organized by labor unions, the Workers’ Party and social movements like UNE, the National Union of Students (União Nacional dos Estudantes). I had covered Lula’s surprise visit to Recife on September 25 and witnessed the hastily assembled crowd of 80,000 firsthand. Within minutes of arriving at the park, I knew this one was going to be much bigger.

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As I nudged my way through the crowd with my camera equipment, I saw Mayllane Silva, state director of UNE, Brazil’s oldest social movement, which is historically connected to the Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB). I asked her why UNE helped organize the rally.

“UNE is out on the streets today because we believe President Lula’s reelection is essential to defending education in our country,” she said. “We can’t leave education in Flávio Bolsonaro’s hands, given that he wants to take our universities out from under the Education Ministry. He wants to tear down education in our country. That’s why UNE isn’t just out on the streets here in Pernambuco, but all across Brazil, to say we want President Lula reelected president so we can defend our education system.”

During the presidency of Flávio Bolsonaro’s father, Jair, the government gutted funding for the federal public university system, leaving many of Brazil’s most prestigious public schools, like the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, on the verge of bankruptcy. The large number of young people present was certainly tied to the fight to protect public education against more of the Bolsonaro family’s market friendly spending cuts, but it was clear that the fight was bigger than that.

A young man named Álvaro Luís told me, “We’re here for all of the minority groups that suffer daily attacks from bolsonarismo. We’re here to fight for those who are unprotected. We are here for the Afro-Brazilians, the working class, for the LGBT community, for women and children, and for a better future for our country.”

When President Lula was first elected in 2002, less than 4% of Brazil’s public university students were Afro-Brazilian, and the vast majority had graduated from prestigious private high schools. The Workers’ Party introduced an affirmative action system that represented an improvement over the U.S. model, because it based university entrance quotas on social class and graduating from public elementary and high schools, as well as on race. Today the share of Afro-Brazilian students matches their share of the population at large, roughly 52%. Millions of low income young people became the first in their families to attend college, and many now worry that under Bolsonaro, university will regress into being an elite privilege.

I approached a young woman who was holding a handmade sign that said, “Fire on the Racists,” and asked why she had come out. “My name is Alana Lima. I have a bachelor’s degree in journalism from the Federal University of Pernambuco, and I was an affirmative action student. I am the daughter of a woman who worked as a kitchen maid and a man who didn’t finish elementary school. I am here today because I know the power that education has to transform people’s lives, and I don’t want this right, which was denied to our ancestors, to be denied to future generations.”

I’ve been covering protests and rallies in Recife for five years now, and this was the largest I had ever seen. Although no size estimate has been made by any credible source at the time of writing this article, I estimate that it was easily twice as large as the crowd of 80,000 that came out to see Lula in person on September 25.

Drone footage shows the crowd simultaneously filling the Princesa Isabel Bridge, which connects the Santo Amaro neighborhood to Antônio Vaz Island, crossing the island, and at the same time occupying the entire Buarque do Macedo Bridge to Recife Antigo Island.

As the march reached its final destination at Marco Zero, the original founding point of Recife, newly elected and reelected lawmakers from the Workers’ Party (PT), the Communist Party of Brazil (PC do B) and the Socialism and Freedom Party (PSOL) made speeches reminding the crowd of what will be lost if Bolsonaro takes a chainsaw to the national budget like the ones wielded by Milei and Musk.

Drone footage of Buarque do Macedo Bridge

Jones Manoel, who was recently elected federal deputy for PSOL, said, “Federal investment in our state will dry up, and important public assets like the Abreu e Lima refinery could end up privatized. So it’s essential that all of Pernambuco’s working class mobilizes to guarantee President Lula’s reelection.”

Even with the size of the rally, the maracatu drum groups, and the humorous chants against Flávio Bolsonaro that seemed to energize the crowd, there was a palpable underlying tension. Toward the end, I ran into a friend who works at one of the Lula administration’s national ministries. Midway through a cheerful exchange of pleasantries, her smile vanished for a second. “I’m really nervous about this,” she said.

Brazil’s presidential runoff will take place on October 25.

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Sete trans eleitas no Brasil com financiamento indireto de George Soros via ANTRA, ABGLT e Washington Brazil Office. Política identitária artificial.

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Sete políticos autodenominados “mulheres trans” foram eleitos para cargos legislativos nas eleições gerais ocorridas no último domingo (04) no Brasil.

Erika Hilton (PSOL) e Duda Salabert (PSOL) foram reeleitas, enquanto Thabatta Pimenta (PSOL) estreará na Câmara Federal. Por sua vez, nos estados foram reeleitas Linda Brasil (PSOL) em Sergipe e Dani Balbi (PCdoB) no Rio de Janeiro, enquanto Sofia Favero (PSOL) foi eleita pela primeira vez para a Assembleia Legislativa de São Paulo e Natasha Ferreira (PT) também estreará na Assembleia Legislativa do Rio Grande do Sul.

A principal pauta dessas candidaturas é o transativismo. É a típica política identitária: defender seus próprios interesses, interesses de um setor minúsculo da classe média, contra os interesses da maioria dos explorados e oprimidos. Os transativistas vêm se destacando no Brasil por sua oposição aos direitos básicos das mulheres e pela utilização do aparato repressivo do Estado (Judiciário e polícia) para perseguir os cidadãos comuns, geralmente trabalhadores humildes, tachados de “transfóbicos”.

Tal empreitada não é feita através de um trabalho de conscientização política, nem muito menos é fruto de esforços dos oprimidos que, organizados de forma independente, conseguem criar um movimento social contra os interesses dos poderosos. Não. É um movimento integralmente artificial e financiado pelos mais poderosos entre os poderosos.

As Open Society Foundations, do especulador financeiro multibilionário George Soros, admitem abertamentem há dez anos que “há muito tempo apoiam organizações trans e intersexo em todo o mundo”. Ainda em 2013, as OSF apresentavam seu ponto de vista sobre a transexualidade: “a identidade de gênero é o sentido interno de uma pessoa de ser um homem, uma mulher ou outro gênero.”

As OSF são a ponta de um guarda-chuva, pelo qual repassam fundos para organizações captadoras de forma hierárquica. Assim, a organização mãe originada da iniciativa de George Soros ainda na década de 1980 para derrubar a União Soviética e seus aliados consegue levar financiamento a um número incontável de ONGs.

No Brasil, a Associação Nacional de Travestis e Transexuais (ANTRA) recebe financiamento indireto das OSF. Estas repassaram 25,8 milhões de reais ao Fundo Brasil de Direitos Humanos entre 2016 e 2024. O Fundo Brasil, por sua vez, aportou 400 mil reais à ANTRA em 2024.

Além disso, Bruna Benevides, presidente da ANTRA, é integrante do conselho deliberativo da Conectas Direitos Humanos, ONG que é a maior receptora de fundos das OSF (34 milhões de reais até 2024).

Em relatório com mapeamento e lista de candidaturas para as eleições deste ano, a ANTRA assegura ter um “compromisso inegociável de eleger pessoas trans”. No total, foram 116 candidaturas registradas como “trans” pelo Brasil.

Após o resultado eleitoral, a organização comemorou a eleição das sete “mulheres trans” para cargos legislativos: “estávamos ansiosas por este resultado! Ampliamos nossas presenças com votações extremamente expressivas e demos uma bela resposta à transfobia!”

Quem também celebrou o resultado foi a Associação Brasileira de Lésbicas, Gays, Bissexuais, Travestis, Transexuais e Intersexos (ABGLT): “as pessoas LGBTQIA+ ampliaram sua participação política e demonstraram, nas urnas, a força que construímos”, destacando a eleição de “mulheres trans” para a Câmara Federal. A publicação foi feita nas redes sociais, em parceria com a ANTRA e Bruna Benevides.

A ABGLT é afiliada ao Washington Brazil Office, entidade de lobby sediada na capital dos Estados Unidos e que recebeu 300 mil dólares de financiamento das Open Society Foundations em 2023. Ela também é parceira institucional da Associação Brasileira de Organizações Não Governamentais (Abong), que recebeu R$ 4,3 milhões de financiamento das OSF entre 2016 e 2024.

A Abong também recebeu, no ano passado, R$ 1,5 milhão em recursos de emendas parlamentares de Erika Hilton, que é presidente da Frente Parlamentar Mista por Cidadania e Direitos LGBTI+ do Congresso Nacional. Esse montante era destinado a ações de “empoderamento e capacitação da comunidade LGBTQIA+”, “fortalecimento das paradas LGBTQIA+” e “advocacy e colaboração com a Frente Parlamentar LGBT+” da própria Hilton.

Hilton tem relações mais profundas com o guarda-chuva de George Soros. Um documentário biográfico de Hilton recebeu financiamento do William Greaves Research & Development Fund. Dirigido por Chica Andrade, que é um dos organizadores da Associação de Profissionais Audiovisuais Trans, o filme aparentemente ainda não foi concluído, ou ao menos ainda não foi lançado – embora a previsão de lançamento fosse para o início deste ano. O Fundo William Greaves contemplou o documentário em seu programa de financiamento de 2023-2024 com 25 mil dólares. O Fundo pertence à Firelight Media, uma organização sem fins lucrativos sediada em Nova Iorque que tem entre seus apoiadores as Open Society Foundations.

Hilton também é profundamente relacionada com a ANTRA e com Bruna Benevides. Em 2024, a deputada indicou Benevides para receber a Medalha do Mérito Legislativo da Câmara Federal e deu apoio institucional ao Guia para Migrantes Trans nos EUA, elaborado pela ANTRA. Em 2025, a associação enviou à deputada uma proposta legislativa para alterar o Código Penal e aumentar as penas por crimes cometidos contra “mulheres trans”. Em setembro deste ano, a ANTRA apresentou uma representação à Procuradoria-Geral Eleitoral pedindo apuração de “possíveis episódios de violência política de gênero” contra Hilton – Benevides foi quem apresentou publicamente a posição da entidade.

Duda Salabert também deu apoio institucional ao guia da ANTRA. Thabatta Pimenta participou, ao lado de Benevides, do XX Seminário LGBTQIA+ do Congresso Nacional em 2023, bem como do EleiTrans, encontro de transexuais famosos que se apresentam como lideranças que foi promovido pelo Projeto Pajubá e que contou com a colaboração da ANTRA, ABGLT e Abong.

Linda Brasil, por sua vez, participou de atividades institucionais da ANTRA. Em janeiro de 2025, por exemplo, esteve na cerimônia do acordo entre o Ministério das Mulheres e a ANTRA, ao lado de Benevides. A deputada estadual do PSOL foi uma das principais figuras políticas transexuais a participar da “Marsha Trans Brasil” deste ano, organizada pela ANTRA e pelo Instituto Brasileiro de Transmasculinidades (Ibrat).

Dani Balbi esteve junto com Linda na manifestação. Em 2023, Balbi apresentou na Assembleia Legislativa do Rio de Janeiro um projeto concedendo a Benevides o Prêmio Cidadania, Direito e Respeito à Diversidade

Natasha Ferreira também participou do EleiTrans e da “Marsha Trans Brasil”.

This story originally appeared in Panamerican Dispatch on Oct. 08, 2026, and is shared here with permission.

No doubt you’ve seen it yourself, or read about it: Meta, the tech giant behind Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp, manipulating engagement on certain accounts or banning pages and posts outright to limit the reach of specific political groups.

Here’s something that happened to me. I recently set up a second Instagram account. I never interacted with, followed or liked any far right content. I only followed progressive accounts: Brasil 247’s page, the Landless Rural Workers’ Movement, Lula and a few others. So what showed up first in my feed? A reel from Lucas Pavanato. Yes, the same far right extremist who won more than 3 million votes for federal deputy on the strength of his viral social media clips. Let’s be honest about how he got those millions of views. It wasn’t charisma, and it certainly wasn’t political substance.

Jeferson Miola, a columnist and political analyst at Brasil 247, shared an account of his own: “Instagram took down the page of SAJU, the legal aid service run by the law school at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul,” he said. “SAJU was founded in 1950, and it provides free legal help to low income people. Instagram removed the page after it posted support for Lula’s reelection. That’s a university institution being shut down for political and ideological reasons. It’s a clear restriction of freedom of expression.”

When media personality Fábio Porchat, who has 7.5 million followers on Instagram alone, posted a video video calling out abuses at senatorial candidate Michelle Bolsonaro’s prosperity gospel church, Lagoinha, Instagram pulled it offline with no explanation. It only went back online after a wave of public pressure.

I could list case after case all day. But one account stood out to me in particular: someone who actually works at Meta Brazil. I’m protecting her identity, as journalism allows, so I’ll call her Lira. Here’s what she told me:

“At Meta, there’s a whole team of human moderators who review content. They decide what gets approved and what gets flagged, whether it’s political violence, sexual content, or anything else that crosses their line. These are people with judgment and critical thinking, making real decisions, even while working within the platform’s guidelines. Right in the middle of Brazil’s election season, a large number of them were laid off and replaced almost immediately by AI systems. That means decisions are now coming from a single automated command, possibly issued from the US, designed to boost certain content while burying the rest.”

It’s no secret that Meta has been cutting jobs worldwide. What’s not public is which jobs these were, what those employees actually did, or why the company chose this specific moment in Brazil’s political calendar to make the switch.

There’s a bigger issue here too. AI doesn’t just follow orders, it scales them, instantly and at massive reach, whether the intent behind them is good or bad. All it takes is one command. Maybe from one billionaire.

Zuckerberg’s Unapologetic Support for Trump

Lira’s story connects a lot of dots. Pavanato showing up in my feed, Porchat’s video disappearing, a university page getting banned: all of it could trace back to a single AI instruction, one that executes instantly with no human review at all.

In 2025, Meta’s CEO doubled down on his alignment with the Trump administration, the same administration that openly admits to meddling in Brazil’s politics. “The government can either be actively against you, adding friction and getting in your way, or it can actively help you break down barriers,” Zuckerberg said. Asked about backing Trump specifically, he called it “the right thing to do.”

This partnership isn’t subtle. The support runs both ways, and there’s a real appetite here to control entire countries, Brazil especially. Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court and federal government still try to regulate social media and hold Big Tech accountable to the Constitution, as we saw recently with Discord. For Meta, getting Flávio Bolsonaro into the presidency would mean restoring the lawless digital free for all his father presided over. That’s not just a preference. It’s a profitable mission for Meta, and one that’s more alive than ever. After all, how do you think those viral, extremist friendly clips that get far right candidates elected actually come about, if not with some help from Big Tech?

Laís Gouveia has been a reporter at Brasil 247 since 2018. Before that, she was educational policy director at the National Student Union (União Nacional dos Estudantes/UNE) and an editor at Portal Vermelho.

This article originally ran at Brasil 247, was translated, with consent, by Panamerican Dispatch, and can be read in its original Portuguese here.

Lee en español aquí

Brazil’s general election on October 4 delivered a severe warning to the left. Flávio Bolsonaro, the presidential candidate of the Liberal Party (PL), finished ahead of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, with approximately 47% against 45%. Neither secured a majority, sending them into a runoff on October 25. More troubling than this narrow presidential gap was the advance of bolsonarismo through Congress. The election has strengthened a political movement whose ambitions extend beyond defeating Lula to reshaping the institutions that obstruct its exercise of power.

The imprisonment (house arrest) and electoral exclusion of Jair Bolsonaro have not dissolved his movement. His son Flávio carries its presidential banner, while other members of the family have won seats in Congress. Michelle Bolsonaro, Jair’s wife, and Carlos Bolsonaro, his son, enter the Senate; Jair Renan, another son, and Renato, Jair’s brother, enter the Chamber of Deputies. Nepobolsonarismo is an appropriate name for this family’s expansion through the state. Yet the family is only the most visible expression of a broader project, rooted in powerful economic interests and a deeply organized reactionary politics.

A presidential contest with continental stakes

Lula remains the principal obstacle to the return of this project to the presidency. His defeat would affect workers and peasants throughout Brazil, but also the possibilities for regional cooperation and an independent Latin American foreign policy. Brazil’s size, industrial capacity, raw minerals (such as critical minerals), agricultural resources, and diplomatic reach give its political direction continental significance. A government that subordinates these assets to Washington’s priorities would weaken the space available to neighboring countries seeking their own paths of development.

The first-round geography demonstrates both Lula’s strength and his difficulties. He retained a commanding position in the Northeast, while Flávio led across the other four regions. São Paulo’s enormous electorate provided a particularly important advantage to the right. These divisions cannot be explained by an opposition between an enlightened population and an ignorant one. They require an examination of the different conditions of work, the organization of political life, and the capacity of competing movements to interpret people’s frustrations.

Lula approaches the runoff with a substantial social record. Unemployment fell to 5.3% in the quarter ending in August, the lowest rate for that period in the statistical series beginning in 2012. Such improvements matter enormously to families for whom a regular wage brings relief from daily uncertainty. But an improved national indicator does not settle the political argument. Employment can coexist with exhausting journeys, expensive housing, inadequate public services, and the insecurity of debt. The distance between statistical improvement and lived experience remains terrain on which the right operates.

Bolsonarismo, or Brazil’s far right of a special type, translates these frustrations into resentment against the left, all public institutions, and vulnerable sections of society. Its promise of order offers an immediate language for fear, while concealing the economic arrangements that produce insecurity. The left cannot answer this merely by advertising government achievements. It must connect those achievements to a credible program for changing everyday life, and explain which interests prevent further advances. A worker struggling with debt needs more than reassurance that the economy is performing well. This has been the problem for Lula, whose program for the future does not seem to promise more than what has been delivered till now.

The senate: a struggle over institutional power

The Senate election is particularly consequential because 54 of its 81 seats were contested. Senators serve eight-year terms, so the results will shape national politics well beyond the next presidential administration. The PL won 19 seats and will hold 28 in the new Senate, making it the largest party. The PT will have nine. The bolsonaristas have therefore established a formidable position, although the PL itself remains short of a majority and must bargain with other parties.

Michelle Bolsonaro and Bia Kicis took both seats in the Federal District, while Carlos Bolsonaro and Carol de Toni won the two seats in Santa Catarina. These victories show the movement’s ability to organize coordinated campaigns and concentrate support behind its candidates. There were important successes for the left: Rui Costa and Jaques Wagner won in Bahia, Humberto Costa retained representation in Pernambuco, and Marília Campos won in Minas Gerais. These results preserve points of resistance within an increasingly hostile chamber. The Senate’s significance extends beyond ordinary legislation. The bolsonaristas have made their confrontation with the Supreme Federal Court a central political objective, including demands to impeach its ministers. Their strengthened representation increases their capacity to pursue that confrontation and to influence the election of the Senate president. Predictions of an automatic majority for impeachment should be treated cautiously: party affiliation, campaign declarations, and votes in a specific proceeding are different things. Nevertheless, the danger of using legislative power to intimidate the judiciary has plainly grown.

This is part of a struggle over the conditions under which the far right can govern. The judicial proceedings against Jair Bolsonaro did not remove the social forces supporting him. Those forces now seek greater leverage over institutions capable of restraining them. For the left, defending democratic space must therefore accompany the struggle to expand social rights. Workers’ organizations cannot afford to lose the freedoms through which they organize, educate, and confront capital.

Federal deputies: the right advances, the left finds openings

All 513 seats in the Chamber of Deputies were up for election this year. The PL secured 121, consolidating its position as the largest party in this chamber as well as in the Senate. The federation of the Workers’ Party, Communist Party of Brazil, and Green Party won 88 seats, with the PT itself taking 70. The federation’s growth is significant, but it leaves Lula’s allies far from a majority. Parties of the right hold 303 seats, while the broader parliamentary left holds 124.

The outcome strengthens the far right of a special type within a legislature already dominated by conservative interests. It also weakens some established brokers of parliamentary power, such as the centrão, the collection of parties that trades legislative support for influence over appointments and public resources, although it remains indispensable for majority building. What bargaining will take place within the centrão will now take place alongside a larger and more assertive PL. If Lula wins in the second round, he will confront substantial congressional resistance, but if Flávio wins, the same Congress could facilitate a reactionary program.

Yet the election also brought important representatives of a fighting Left into the Chamber. Jones Manoel, the communist historian elected through PSOL in Pernambuco, received 249,077 votes and finished first in Recife. Elias Jabbour, the communist geographer, was elected for the PCdoB in Rio de Janeiro. Their victories suggest an audience for political education and socialist arguments, even amid the right’s advance. They offer resources for rebuilding confidence among people who have grown impatient with the narrowing ambitions of parliamentary politics. Jones Manoel has already offered to assist Lula’s runoff campaign, including its digital communication, while proposing stronger attention to demands such as free public transport. This is a useful example of political clarity: criticism of the government’s limitations can coexist with active mobilization against the far right of a special type. Such unity does not require workers to abandon their demands. It becomes stronger when those demands supply the campaign’s energy and direction.

The task before October 25

The runoff cannot be won through negotiations among party leaders alone. It requires organized activity in workplaces, neighborhoods, universities, and rural communities, with a program people can recognize in their own lives. Transport, wages, housing, debt, public healthcare, and the time consumed by work must become the substance of a democratic campaign. Defense of sovereignty becomes tangible when it is connected to the ability to use Brazil’s wealth for the needs of its people.

The angry tide has advanced, but it has not carried away the millions who still seek another Brazil. The new communist deputies, the surviving mass organizations (especially the landless workers of the MST), and Lula’s enormous electoral base provide foundations for resistance. The immediate task is to defeat Flávio Bolsonaro. The longer task is to build a popular power strong enough to prevent the oligarchy from deciding, election after election, how little change the majority will be allowed.

Vijay Prashad is an Indian historian and journalist. He is the author of forty books, including Washington Bullets, Red Star Over the Third World, The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World, The Poorer Nations: A Possible History of the Global South, and How the International Monetary Fund Suffocates Africa, written with Grieve Chelwa. He is the executive director of Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research, the chief correspondent for Globetrotter, and the chief editor of LeftWord Books (New Delhi). He also appeared in the films Shadow World (2016) and Two Meetings (2017).

This article was produced by Globetrotter.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

Last week, 7 ARAD-7 rifles of Israeli manufacture were seized by the Brazilian Federal Police at a transport company located in Niterói, Rio de Janeiro, while they were being prepared to be sent to drug traffickers of the Terceiro Comando Puro (TCP) organization. These are the same drug traffickers who control a territory called “Complexo de Israel,” which brings together the favelas Cidade Alta, Parada de Lucas, Vigário Geral, Cinco Bocas, and Pica-Pau.

Two years ago, we wrote here at the Strategic Culture Foundation an article about the danger of “narcopentecostalism” – the deep linkage between drug trafficking and neo-Pentecostalism in some favelas – pointing to this new phenomenon as a possible national security threat for Brazil, as well as a potential focus of activities aimed at destabilizing the social fabric and religious persecution. Indeed, in TCP territories, Catholic churches and Afro-Brazilian religious centers are closed and violently attacked.

Nevertheless, at the time we wrote that article, in July 2024, there were not yet enough material elements to incisively affirm the existence of a direct connection between narcopentecostalism and the State of Israel. TCP traffickers exalted the State of Israel, used Israeli patches and uniforms, but all of this was circumstantial and could be explained by mere adherence to evangelical discourse.

Now, however, we have more specific evidence to be able to return to the topic and raise concern about the possible link between Israel and one of Brazil’s main drug trafficking organizations.

After all, to date it is still not known how these modern Israeli rifles reached the logistical branch of an important Brazilian criminal organization, when this specific rifle is still uncommon among Brazilian police forces and nonexistent among the military.

The first objection that could be raised would be about Israel’s “interest” in arming or financing a criminal organization in Brazil. Well, it would not be the first time.

In the 1980s, 500 automatic weapons (including IMI Galil rifles and Uzi submachine guns) and 200,000 rounds of ammunition were found in a warehouse belonging to the Medellín Cartel, one of the largest drug trafficking organizations in Colombia. At the time, “independent investigations” concluded that the person responsible for the operation, the mercenary and retired Israeli military officer Yair Klein, had acted on his own. Klein himself, however, always stated that his activities in Colombia (which involved not only arms sales but also the training of paramilitary groups) had the knowledge and authorization of Israeli authorities.

Klein’s link to the Israeli state apparatus, demonstrating that he was not really an “independent agent,” is confirmed by the fact that when he was arrested in Sierra Leone in 1999 for selling weapons to insurgents of the Revolutionary United Front, the State of Israel intervened to secure his release, as well as refused all extradition requests.

Another interesting and recent piece of news involves Mexico, where authorities declared that 80% of the weapons found with soldiers of the drug cartels were of U.S. origin… and most of the remaining 20% were of Israeli origin. Indeed, Israel officially exported 24,000 automatic weapons between 2006 and 2018 to Mexico’s military and police institutions, and another 18,000 in more recent years. Note, however, that estimates from independent observatories suggest that Mexican cartels as a whole possess an arsenal of several hundred thousand automatic weapons. If something like 15-20% of these weapons are of Israeli origin, then we are talking about any number between 20,000 and 100,000 Israeli-origin weapons in the hands of the cartels. These are numbers that simply do not match the figures of official Israeli arms exports to Mexican security forces.

One last point that may draw attention is the recent attention the U.S. has given to Brazilian criminal organizations, with the PCC and CV groups categorized as terrorist groups by Donald Trump’s government. What draws attention is the fact that the TCP – the 3rd largest criminal organization in Brazil, with a presence in some other countries in the region, operations in several Brazilian states, and at least one verifiable link to an individual connected to Al-Qaeda’s financing network, not to mention an operational alliance with the PCC – was left out of the categorization.

Naturally, it could be a coincidence. But even so, it is an interesting coincidence that the neo-Pentecostal criminal organization apparently armed by Israel is exactly the one that was not categorized as terrorist by the White House.

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This story originally appeared in Panamerican Dispatch on Oct. 07, 2026, and is shared here with permission.

The CIA is allegedly working behind the scenes in Brazil’s election, planting stories to favor Flávio Bolsonaro and build a positive narrative about the senator.

The claims come from John Kiriakou, a former CIA agent who has become something of a celebrity in recent years. Earlier this week, he took to social media to flag what he called “credible” evidence of the spy agency’s involvement in Brazil’s election.

On Tuesday, Kiriakou gave more details on his podcast.

“I heard a rumor from a former CIA colleague of mine this past weekend that the agency is actively working behind the scenes to support Bolsonaro,” he said.

“And the way they’re doing it is by planting pro-Bolsonaro stories in both the Brazilian press and the international press,” he claimed.

He offered no evidence and was careful to say he doesn’t know whether this account is true. But he argued that it fits the agency’s pattern of behavior over the years.

“There’s a long history of CIA involvement in elections abroad, controlling the media narrative,” he said.

He noted that much of the Brazilian press has swung behind Bolsonaro.

“This is despite the fact that Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency was one mistake after another,” he said.

The former agent pointed to the former president’s 27 year prison sentence, calling his conduct “incredibly corrupt.”

Kiriakou said the runoff projections don’t favor Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and suggested the right has already secured one of its biggest wins in Brazilian history.

“Lula is likely to lose the election, and I think the younger Bolsonaro will end up pardoning his father,” he predicted.

He also noted that Donald Trump has already endorsed Flávio Bolsonaro’s candidacy, acknowledging that doing so could be a “violation of international rules.”

Earlier in the week, Kiriakou wrote on social media that he met with Lula three years ago. On Tuesday, he explained that a Lula aide had reached out so the two could discuss government transparency.

According to the former agent, one topic in that conversation was police violence under Jair Bolsonaro’s government. He said he suggested that Lula confront that issue directly, and that doing so had led police to turn against Lula.

Who Is This Former Agent?

In 2013, Kiriakou pleaded guilty to revealing the identity of an undercover agent, the first case of its kind in 27 years. He had worked for the CIA from 1990 to 2004 and was sentenced to 30 months in federal prison as part of a plea deal.

He admitted to disclosing to a reporter the identity of an undercover officer who had taken part in harsh interrogations of alleged Al Qaeda members held at secret CIA detention sites.

Kiriakou first drew national attention in 2007, during the George W. Bush administration, when he told ABC News in an interview that waterboarding, a technique that simulates drowning, had been used on a Guantánamo detainee named Abu Zubaydah.

Then CIA Director David Petraeus issued a statement praising the plea deal with Kiriakou, even though four other charges against him were dropped. The case “represents an important victory for our agency, for our intelligence community and for our country,” Petraeus said.

It was the first time in 27 years that someone had been found guilty of revealing the identity of an undercover agent.

This article first ran in ICL Notícias, was translated by Panamerican Dispatch, and can be read in its original Portuguese here.

Flávio Bolsonaro, son of imprisoned coup plotter Jair Bolsonaro, clinched first place in Brazil’s presidential race Sunday with 47% to Lula’s 45%, forcing a high-stakes runoff on October 25. As Lula’s Workers’ Party (PT) suffered major losses and Bolsonaro’s Liberal Party (PL) allies took governorships and more seats in congress, Stephanie Weatherbee Brito of the International Peoples’ Assembly asks, was this really a surprise? She joins Rania Khalek and Zoe Alexandra from São Paulo to break down Brazil’s election “shock” — from the hard right’s “silent campaign” and the “shy votes” that caught polling institutes off guard, to why 33 million Brazilians skipped the polls, to the PT’s failure to offer a vision of real change.

And she warns of what may be to come: a second Trump-aligned Bolsonaro presidency “compliant and subservient” to Washington and Tel Aviv, with devastating consequences for Brazil, the Amazon, and the future of humanity.

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Rough transcript follows:
[Host 1:] Brazil went to elections this Sunday and the results shocked many. The far-right Liberal Party emerged as perhaps the biggest victor in the polls as the presidential candidate for the PL, Flávio Bolsonaro, not only clinched top place in the presidential race over Lula, but the party also gained seats in the Senate, House, and several governorships. The Workers’ Party meanwhile suffered significant losses, and incumbent progressive president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva finished in second place with 45% to Flávio’s 47%. Analysts across Latin America and the world have been struggling to understand the results and what it could mean for the region. We here at Breakthrough News are very lucky because we are joined by friend of the show Stephanie Weatherby Breto. She’s the coordinator of the International People’s Assembly calling in from São Paulo. She’s going to be discussing with us these results, what to expect for round two, and the impact on the region. Stephanie, thank you so much for joining us today.

[Stephanie Weatherby Breto:] Hi, happy to be back even under these conditions.

[Host 1:] Well, Stephanie, the reaction to Sunday’s election amongst progressives, not only in Brazil, but again across the world, has been a mix of shock, sadness, and bewilderment. I want to ask you first, how should we understand the results? Was October 4th a victory for the far right?

[Stephanie Weatherby Breto:] Yeah, I think that October 4th was absolutely a victory for the far right, but I don’t think that we should be as shocked as some people have been because the far right in Brazil has been growing pretty consistently for the past 10 years. And I think that what it has demonstrated that people didn’t believe or didn’t understand before is that it has built a pretty solid base. It is not just a reaction movement. It’s not a spontaneous movement built over social media. It really has its own organizational structure and it has the capacity to mobilize. What surprised people in Brazil was that this time around the right wing wasn’t as mobilized in the streets. Like you didn’t see as many people wearing the Brazilian flag—the color of the far right right now is to wear the Brazilian flag, to wear the football team shirt—and there wasn’t that much really like physical campaigning. Like you didn’t see people out with banners or flyers with Flávio Bolsonaro’s face. You didn’t see that kind of action, and so that contributed to an undermining of the power of the right. There was this silent campaign almost, and the polling, the kind of polls that were being done before showing where people’s voting intentions were moving, didn’t show Flávio as strong as he was. But that has happened in the past. Now, there’s also a lot of talk about people didn’t vote, which is a high number of people that either didn’t vote or abstained from actually designating a candidate. They didn’t choose a candidate on their ballot. And even though those numbers are high, they’re pretty standard for Brazil over the past three elections. And what has happened is essentially that the country has become polarized between right and left. Politics are now at the center of discussion inside of families, between students. And so what that creates is this vacuum that sucks in a lot of people that feel insecure about politics. They feel like the discourse is too aggressive, the two sides are constantly attacking each other, and so people start opting out of politics, which is the same situation in the United States. The difference is in the US, you’re not legally bound to vote; in Brazil, you are. So what you see is a lot of people canceling out their ballot. And I think, like I said, that that’s a reaction to polarization and to a sense of insecurity that people have in the system and also a lack of trust in the system. People don’t think that it makes any difference.

[Host 2:] We want to try to—we’re having a little bit of an audio kerfuffle. Okay, we’re going to try to power through, but we may try to stop and fix it. Let’s see how it goes. I know you can’t tell, Stephanie, because you can’t hear it, but we can. But no, I appreciate what you’re saying here. And you know, a key element that you mentioned there is the right-wing advance in the legislature. So, what will be different about the composition of this next Brazilian Congress from the previous one, and why does it matter? And, you know, Stephanie, can you talk to us specifically about what is the legislative agenda of the far right and what do you think they’ll actually be able to achieve?

[Stephanie Weatherby Breto:] The right was already very strong in the legislature. This is not a novelty; they have already built—I mean, I think very similar to the right in the United States, they’ve had a project for many, many years to try to build this kind of strength in Congress, and they’ve built stable organizational means to do that, they have a lot of local power. I think what is new about this victory is that a lot of parties of the extreme right that were newcomers in previous elections and that some people said, well, these parties are not going to survive, they’re kind of like phenomenons of the moment, they have survived, and everything indicates that at least for the period that is upcoming, they are fixtures in the political landscape in Brazil. Parties like Republicanos, Partido Liberal, these parties are hard right parties. And I think that there’s a lot of discussion right now that their agenda is to take down the Supreme Court, that this is their number one goal, that they want to take down all the other checks and balances to the executive because they want to rule in a fascistic kind of way where all the power is concentrated in the executive. And I think that that is possible, but I think that we’re missing the picture that if their goal is to take down the Supreme Court, it’s a means to an end. It’s not an end in and of itself. And so I think that what the actual most important goal of this hard right that is consolidated in Brazil is to break down all the barriers to extractivism, to allow the mining companies, the agribusiness companies to really tear into the Amazon rainforest, to be able to break into different territories that are still being protected by environmental law or that are being held by indigenous communities or by rural communities that have titles to the land, because there is this interest that is connected to the United States, which is to get into the minerals that exist under the Amazon rainforest and elsewhere. And I think it’s a model of extremely predatory capitalism that this party and these parties represent. And I think that they also want to break down any kind of barriers to the free movement of money. They want to liberalize finance even more than it already is. I think their agenda is a kind of naked capitalism that has no restraints, and they’re doing this in collusion with big and important economic groups from the United States, people who have vested interest in this program. Of course, they also intend to scale back social programs. Brazil has built over decades a form of welfare state. It has a universal healthcare system that the ruling elites have always been enemies of. They want to privatize healthcare, they want to privatize education. And so anything that this government, if Flávio gets elected, if he can accomplish a scaling back of social programs that opens up the country to further privatization of anything from pensions to schools to transportation, I think that that’s all in their interest. And so I think it’s like an extremely neoliberal agenda that they want to build. And they also have another agenda outside of the economic one, which has to do with crime and security. They have this project called the anti-faction bill because here in Brazil criminal organizations are called factions. And so allegedly what this bill would do is to really tackle organized crime in Brazil, which is very powerful in certain states, but truly what this bill would do is actually unleash the violence of the state on the poorest communities in Brazil. There is this false conception that the right has disseminated that the reason that there’s a lot of crime and insecurity in Brazil is because there is a soft-handed policing where the police aren’t actually given the freedom and the liberty to actually persecute criminals because there’s a concern for their human rights. This is absolutely false. The reason why there’s crime in Brazil is because very powerful institutions like banks continue to launder the money of these criminal organizations because these criminal organizations have a tremendous influence on judges. They have an influence on legislators and possibly, if Flávio gets elected, on the presidency. It’s pretty well known that Flávio Bolsonaro has a connection to criminal organizations in Rio de Janeiro. And so they have what I would refer to as a faux security agenda that even though it will not fix the problem, it appeals to people because it’s talking about something that people are concerned about in a moment when the PT actually isn’t talking about it.

[Host 1:] Well, you know, I wanted to pick up on that, Stephanie, because while the far right, as you said, really did get some historic gains in this election, Lula’s Workers’ Party suffered significant and symbolic losses. Lula’s key ally, Fernando Haddad, once again lost the governorship in São Paulo to Tarcísio de Freitas, and this time by an even bigger margin. Meanwhile, Marina Silva, Benedita da Silva, and Simone Tebet all lost their races, and these have been kind of key figures in the PT standing side by side with Lula. So are their losses part of this legacy in Brazil of what’s termed antipetismo, this anti-workers’ party sentiment? Is it something else? Is it purely the popularity of the far right? What is behind this losing ground of the PT in Brazilian politics?

[Stephanie Weatherby Breto:] Well, most of the candidates or many of the candidates that you named are actually not from the PT. They built an alliance with the PT because the PT, as it loses its base, as it loses some of its capacity to get elected on its own two legs, has moved to building alliances with sections of the center-right. So even the vice-presidential candidate that Lula ran with four years ago, that ran with now and that has been governing with him, is a figure of the center-right. He was a right-wing governor of São Paulo that was very unpopular actually in the face of social movements. And so I think that I wouldn’t see this as a recourse of antipetismo. I mean, the campaign against the PT was based on this discourse that the PT was corrupt. But I think that the population has moved on from that. I think that people now—a lot of people essentially believe that both parties are corrupt, that all politicians are corrupt, that it is inconsequential because that’s just the way that power works, unfortunately. But I think that what really has weakened the PT is that this administration, Lula’s third term, ran and was governed without a clear agenda. It was run on this idea that we’re here to restore democracy, we’re here to restore order, similar to the way that Biden kind of came back after Trump’s presidency to say, well, you know, the Republicans and this like Trumpism has destroyed some of the institutions of this country and here I am to rebuild it. And unfortunately, that is not appealing to the wide mass of the population because people are very dissatisfied with their living conditions. They’re very dissatisfied with a lot of the day-to-day problems that they’re facing regarding access to education, access to employment, increasing debt. And so this discourse of “we’re going to rebuild the country to what it was” doesn’t appeal to people because they have the perception that what we need is not to go back to what it was; we need to be building a future that is different. We need something that is going to transcend whatever the PT achieved and achieve much more, or at least they want to hear something that is different. And I think that Lula governed this third term—first of all, he was very influenced by the events when the Bolsonaristas tried to take the country. They were doing these mass mobilizations, they tried to occupy the Supreme Court. And the fact that there was this broad movement, this alliance, this really big alliance against Bolsonarismo, I think convinced the Lula government and the party that Bolsonarismo had been defeated, that the population had now understood that they were undemocratic, that they were dictatorial or fascistic in some way, and that even sections of the ruling class had moved to the camp of the PT because they were disgusted by Bolsonarismo. And when Jair Bolsonaro was imprisoned, I think that that even further built this idea that well, really, the program of the PT right now is to preserve institutions, to defend democracy. And that is the last thing that I think people are thinking about. People don’t want a defense of the status quo. And so on the kinds of things that Brazilians are really worried about, which have to do with the cost of living and access to employment, even though the situation was stable and there were improvements in the cost of living, it wasn’t really inspiring to people as a campaign program. The PT did not run this election on a clear project of transformation, which was their brand throughout its history. The PT was the party of change, the party of addressing structural problems in Brazil and addressing inequality. And I think that over many years, after being really battered by the right, they have watered down their program to something that simply isn’t inspiring enough to people and that was not enough to get them out into the polls and to mobilize in the way that would have been necessary to beat Flávio in this first round.

[Host 1:] I mean, there are so many numbers that stand out from Sunday. Zoe had mentioned some of them earlier. One of them was this 20% abstention, and in Brazil voting is mandatory, so you do receive a penalty for not participating. So, Stephanie, what do you think explains why 33 million people chose not to vote? Are they expected to do so, do you think, in the second round? And I mean Lula declared on Sunday that it was his goal to court these voters. Do you think this is actually possible?

[Stephanie Weatherby Breto:] I think that a lot of those abstentions are going to remain abstentions. I think that what has created them is the climate of polarization. People have been repelled from politics. The people who are abstaining, they are repelled from politics either because they feel insecure, they don’t understand, they feel like the political debate is too aggressive, it’s too violent, they feel like they are not educated enough. But also, I think that people don’t see the difference. There’s a lot of people who just don’t think that either candidate makes a huge difference. And I think that this is something that really often happens when polarization happens, when the country becomes like a pressure cooker where everybody’s talking about the elections. Certain people have very strong opinions in one way or the other, they’re not at all flexible, they’re really dug in. It’s a situation that we know in the United States as well. And so what that produces is a sector of the population that says, “I don’t care anymore, I don’t want to hear about elections anymore, and I don’t understand either of these programs necessarily.” Now, I also think that both candidates—part of why there’s a high abstention rate is because both candidates have high rejections, are very rejected by the population for different reasons. Flávio because he’s considered to be reprehensible in his discourse; people understand him as a chauvinist, as someone who defends violence, someone who has no regard for the rights of black people in this country—who are not racial minorities, by the way—but for other racial minorities in this country, someone who has no regard for the poor. And so he is seen as a figure of a kind of violent politics that people really don’t like. He’s also seen by sectors even within the right as a lackey to the United States. Like, he’s criticized by sections of the right for being a candidate that basically just toed the line for whatever Washington tells him to do. The relationships between the Bolsonaro family and Trump are very well-known, they’re very evident. The Bolsonaro family is always petitioning the Trump administration for favors, and that actually has produced some rejection even within the right, who sees him in this negative light. Now, Lula has high rejection ratings for other reasons. There’s people that believe that he’s governed for too long; they say, well, you know, he’s been president for three terms, why does he have to keep being president? There’s people who also believe that the PT is a representation of the past, that it’s old politics, that Lula’s too old, he doesn’t have an appeal with the youth in the way that he used to. Lula and the PT used to be a political movement of the youth, and I don’t think that that continues to be the case unless somebody is active in social movements and really politicized. And so because there is this section of the population that just rejects both of them, their choice is just to nullify their ballot in the election.

[Host 1:] You know, it’s—we’ll see how that kind of courting of this segment of the population goes. But, you know, before we let you go, Stephanie, I did want to ask about the regional question and just kind of zooming out and looking at how the US is viewing the region. Of course, a lot of the discourse, whether it be Twitter or left-wing analysis, has been about really grappling with the possibility of a Flávio victory in the second round and what that would mean for Latin America and the Caribbean in a second Trump administration. So, on one hand, how would this impact regional ties? I mean, at this point, the dreams of Lula from his first terms of creating entities like UNASUR, like all of these different regional platforms, have essentially disappeared given the presence of the far right on the continent. But what would a Flávio victory mean for the US to have the far right in power in Brazil?

[Stephanie Weatherby Breto:] I think having a victory for Flávio Bolsonaro in Brazil would be a huge victory for the Trump administration, but also for Zionism, because what the Flávio Bolsonaro presidency represents is a program of the right that is going to be completely compliant and subservient to the interests of the United States politically and to the interest of Zionism—sorry, to the interest of the United States economically and to the interest of Zionism politically. And so I think that Brazil will become a tool in the large chessboard of US interests in the rest of the world, and I think that it means a full alignment to US interests in Latin America, again specifically on this issue of extractivism. I think that the agenda of the United States for Latin America is to turn it into a territory from which they can extract resources at will, at low cost, with no regard for the environment or for the rights of the people in those countries. And the Bolsonaro family definitely represents that kind of interest. You know, they’re very happy to play that role. And so it’s not just very dangerous for the Brazilian people or for the future of progressive politics in Latin America—like, absolutely, Cuba is going to be really isolated on the continent together with Mexico and Venezuela—but it also has huge repercussions for the environment. I think that one of the most serious consequences of a second Bolsonaro presidency is the further destruction of the Amazon rainforest, and the implications of that for the rest of the world are tremendous. And so I think, unfortunately, the Brazilian population that voted for Bolsonaro is making a decision that really imperils the rest of humanity.

[Host 1:] No, really important perspective there. And honestly, Stephanie, there’s so much more we could talk about, and I’m looking forward to having you back on the show ahead of this second term—which will be on October 25th. Again, there’s just three weeks that Lula and Flávio and their supporters have to campaign for the second round to try to get those extra votes. It will be a very interesting period. And as you said last time you were on the show, US interference is not a question; it’s more of a done deal. We just have to see how it is going to manifest. So I think that’s something else we’ll be definitely looking out for. But we thank you so much, Stephanie, for explaining what that means and why people everywhere should really be paying attention to what’s happening.

Lula falhou em atender às demandas do povo – e agora enfrenta as consequências.

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O primeiro turno das eleições presidenciais brasileiras terminou com o candidato Flávio Bolsonaro (PL) na frente de Lula da Silva (PT) por 47% a 45%. Nas eleições parlamentares, o PT e a esquerda sofreram derrotas esmagadoras em todo o país, indicando uma crescente rejeição da esquerda entre os brasileiros comuns. Agora, nas últimas semanas restantes antes da decisão final sobre quem governará o país a partir do próximo ano, a questão permanece aberta: que fatores serão considerados pelos eleitores na escolha do presidente?

O governo Lula tem tomado várias medidas consideradas “desesperadas” para reverter sua crise de impopularidade e retomar apoio na reta final das eleições. A ampliação de programas sociais é uma dessas medidas, mas sua eficiência política é cada vez mais contestável. Após décadas de redistribuição de renda nos governos PT, sem que isso representasse qualquer mudança real na situação dos trabalhadores, a avaliação dessas políticas tem se tornado cada vez mais negativa.

O problema central para Lula é que uma parcela significativa do eleitorado parece estar menos interessada em novas medidas paliativas e mais preocupada com problemas que permanecem presentes em sua vida cotidiana. Segurança pública, emprego, renda, inflação e qualidade dos serviços públicos têm impacto muito mais direto sobre a população do que os grandes debates promovidos pelo governo.

A segurança talvez seja o exemplo mais evidente. O avanço das organizações criminosas, a expansão territorial do crime organizado e a sensação de impunidade transformaram a violência em uma das principais preocupações nacionais. Para milhões de brasileiros, a questão deixou de ser uma discussão abstrata sobre políticas de segurança. Trata-se de uma realidade cotidiana que determina onde as pessoas podem morar, trabalhar, circular e até mesmo abrir um negócio – ainda mais especialmente nos grandes centros urbanos, como o Rio de Janeiro, onde o crime organizado já controla algo entre 60% e 70% do território total da cidade.

Nesse contexto, propostas associadas à agenda cultural progressista também podem produzir custos eleitorais importantes para a esquerda. O debate brasileiro sobre questões de gênero, identidade, educação e direitos de minorias passou a reproduzir cada vez mais conflitos políticos originados nos Estados Unidos e na Europa. Uma parte considerável da população, porém, não se identifica com essa agenda e considera que o Estado deveria concentrar seus esforços em problemas materiais mais urgentes.

Isso ajuda a explicar por que o segundo turno provavelmente será decidido muito mais por questões domésticas do que pela política externa – que é a parte mais elogiada do governo Lula na comunidade internacional de especialistas. Os BRICS, a Palestina ou a posição brasileira diante dos Estados Unidos podem mobilizar setores politizados da sociedade, mas definitivamente não constituem as principais preocupações do eleitor médio quando ele decide seu voto.

A política externa possui importância estratégica para o Estado brasileiro. O cidadão comum, entretanto, tende a avaliá-la através de seus efeitos concretos sobre a própria vida. Uma política externa considerada bem-sucedida não compensará, por si só, uma percepção de insegurança, desemprego ou deterioração dos serviços públicos. E à medida que o governo Lula evita combater o problema do crime organizado diretamente, cresce naturalmente a popularidade de uma direita que elogia os EUA por considerarem as facções criminosas brasileiras terroristas.

O mesmo vale para os já mencionados programas de transferência de renda. Esses mecanismos podem até possuir uma função social importante em um país marcado por desigualdades profundas, mas sua utilização como principal instrumento de política social apresenta limitações graves. Transferir renda pode aliviar uma situação de pobreza, mas não cria automaticamente empregos qualificados, não aumenta a produtividade e não reconstrói a indústria nacional. Pelo contrário, cria uma massa de precarizados dependentes de ajuda governamental. Quando a assistência se transforma em substituto permanente para políticas de desenvolvimento, o problema estrutural permanece.

É justamente nesse ponto que a disputa eleitoral entra em uma fase decisiva. O eleitor terá de escolher entre propostas diferentes para enfrentar problemas que não desapareceram durante os últimos anos. A capacidade de apresentar respostas convincentes para segurança, emprego, renda e ordem social poderá pesar mais do que discursos sobre grandes projetos geopolíticos.

O resultado do primeiro turno também demonstra que a direita brasileira conseguiu transformar o descontentamento doméstico em força eleitoral. A vantagem de Flávio Bolsonaro e a composição do novo Congresso indicam que existe uma demanda significativa por mudança. Isso não significa que todos esses eleitores compartilhem uma mesma visão sobre economia, política externa ou questões culturais. Significa, sobretudo, que existe uma insatisfação suficientemente ampla para alterar o equilíbrio político nacional.

Nas semanas restantes da campanha, portanto, a questão fundamental será saber se o governo conseguirá convencer o eleitorado de que suas políticas oferecem soluções duradouras ou se prevalecerá a percepção de que foram adotadas medidas paliativas para administrar problemas que continuam sem solução.

Falar sobre gênero, direitos humanos ou Palestina definitivamente não ajudará Lula a se reeleger.

By Mike ELK

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

There are still three weeks until the next round, and Lula could still win, but it’s gonna take a massive fight. Part of that fight is changing how the international media covers things.

With the Brazilian presidential election headed to a runoff, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva is down 47% to 45% and faces a massive fight ahead. I wanted to give a quick analysis of what happened and where things are going next.

Lula Could Still Win if He Can Consolidate Support from Third Parties

Lula lost by only 2%, and several third-party candidates, who took a combined 8% of the vote, have publicly indicated they would not endorse Flávio Bolsonaro in the second round.

Likewise, 29 million Brazilians did not vote in this round of the runoff and may be persuaded to vote for Lula in the second round if they fear Bolsonaro.

While Brasil defeated Jair Bolsonaro narrowly in 2022, it swung right again, much like the United States. Voters are upset, and they are taking it out on the party in power.

On Tuesday, the Brazilian Senate is scheduled to vote on a measure that would shorten the Brazilian workweek from six days to five days. Bolsonaro has opposed this measure, and Lula could use the vote to mobilize workers’ support against the Bolsonaro team.

It’s a tough road ahead for Lula, but not impossible.

What Hurt Lula in the First Round?

Three primary factors hurt Lula in the first round. First, Lula’s age and the fact that the Workers’ Party (PT) has held the presidency in Brazil for 18 of the last 24 years.

The second is that the Brazilian corporate media constantly manufactured scandals against Lula.

Finally, the role that US President Donald Trump played in training and validating the right-wing in Brasil, while not decisive, provided critical support. Here’s what went wrong for Lula.

1. Lula is 80 & His Party Ruled Brasil for 18 of the Last 24 Years

Like former US President Joe Biden, one problem Lula faces right now is that he is 80 years old. He doesn’t look as sharp as he used to, while Flávio Bolsonaro is nearly half his age—45 years younger.

Additionally, Lula’s party, the Workers’ Party (PT), has held the presidency for 18 of the last 24 years. Lula and Dilma, both members of the Workers’ Party (PT), held the presidency from 2002 to 2016. Lula was reelected in 2022 for his record third term. No Brazilian has ever won a third term.

Although the PT has rarely controlled Congress, it is seen as the ruling party because it has held the presidency for 18 of the last 24 years. Voters are likely to associate any problems in the country with the PT, which has held the presidency for so long.

While Brasil defeated Jair Bolsonaro narrowly in 2022, it swung right again, much like the United States. Voters are upset, and they are taking it out on the party in power.

Even worse, Lula failed to recruit young candidates, who may have excited voters to turn out in tight races. In what should have been a competitive Senate election in Rio de Janeiro, the PT recruited 84-year-old Bendedita da Silva, who lost in a landslide to Bolsonaro allies.

Last week, Lula skipped the presidential debate; so did Bolsonaro and its unclear how much this decision might have hurt him.

Lacking excitement, nearly 29 million Brazilians did not vote despite it being obligatory in Brasil.

2. Brazilian Media Manufacturing Scandals Against Lula

The Brazilian media market is extremely consolidated, and the heads of major networks like Globo have been going after Lula hard. They have been accused of manufacturing scandals against Lula.

Last November, the financial institution Banco Master collapsed amid allegations of massive fraud. The bank was being run like a Ponzi scheme, resulting in the largest financial collapse in Brazilian history, with nearly $8 billion in investors’ funds lost.

Despite Banco Master CEO Daniel Vorcaro being a very vocal Bolsonaro supporter, the Brazilian media has repeatedly tried to link the scandal to Lula’s Workers’ Party, as Vorcaro cultivated political ties on both sides of the aisle.

Every attack on Lula by the Trump administration generated headlines in Brasil and validated the wild claims made by Bolsonaro allies of a flawed Brazilian justice system.

Lula’s son, businessman Fábio Luís da Silva, commonly known as “Lulinha,” was scrutinized over large bank accounts worth millions of dollars. For months, Lulinha has offered to open his books and has claimed that he received no special favors from Banco Master. Still, the media repeatedly raised questions about Lulinha’s alleged impropriety.

At one point, media giant TV Globo made a giant infographic web with arrows, showing a complex network linked to Lula. Other reporters widely ridiculed the conspiracy theory map, and TV Globo eventually had to apologize publicly on air.

Then, in May, The Intercept Brasil released a WhatsApp message from Flávio Bolsonaro to Vorcaro, asking him for more than $26 million to fund a strange English-language biopic named Dark Horse, about his father. In the film, Jair Bolsonaro is portrayed by right-wing American actor Jim Caviezel, who played Jesus in the controversial 2004 film The Passion of the Christ.

Polling throughout the spring and summer showed Lula leading as the scandal remained fresh in people’s minds. Then, the Brazilian corporate media went into high gear to attack Lula. They went after Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes, who led the prosecution that jailed Bolsonaro.

Moraes has accused Brazilian Supreme Court Justice André Mendonca, a Bolsonaro appointee, of failing to follow proper procedure in his handling of the Banco Master scandal, leaking information to the press on Lula’s political allies while hiding information on Bolsonaro’s allies.

Moraes asked the Brazilian Federal police to investigate Mendonça’s violation of federal investigation procedures and for selectively leaking information to the press that would make Lula allies look bad while suppressing information on Bolsonaro allies.

Moraes accused Mendonça of attempting to “steer the production of evidence toward falsely accusing Supreme Court justices of crimes, expressly naming Justices Gilmar Mendes, Dias Toffoli, Luiz Fux, Alexandre de Moraes, and Nunes Marques, as well as the prosecutor general and the director-general of the Federal Police.”

3. Trump Trained and Emboldened Bolsonaro Allies

While I don’t want to underestimate the strength of fascists within Brasil, it’s important to note that Trump and his operatives did help the Bolsonaro family pull off an impressive comeback.

In March 2025, Eduardo Bolsonaro fled to the United States rather than face prosecution in Brasil for his role in trying to orchestrate a coup, and he was granted permanent residency status in July. While in the United States, Eduardo Bolsonaro has worked closely with Trump officials, including Special Presidential Envoy for Special Missions Richard Grenell, to oust Lula from power.

“It was a privilege to speak with Ambassador Richard Grenell at President Trump’s residence at Mar-a-Lago,” Eduardo Bolsonaro wrote on Instagram following a meeting with Grenel in 2025. “The conservative movement is global—and we are just getting started.”

Eduardo Bolsonaro worked closely with top Trump aides like Brad Parscale, Trump’s director of digital strategy, to learn the social media strategy that led Trump to win reelection.

As president, Trump worked hard to attack Lula. He placed punitive tariffs on Brazil for convicting Jair Bolsonaro, Eduardo’s father, for attempting to assassinate Lula and overthrow his government in 2022. These tariffs hurt Brasil’s economy.

More importantly, Trump’s constant denunciation of the jailing of Bolsonaro validated conspiracy theories of right-wingers that the justice process was flawed. When Alexandre de Moraes, who led Bolsonaro’s conviction, was implicated in the Banco Master scandal, it only reinforced these conspiracy theories.

Ahead of the Brazilian presidential election, the Trump administration has labeled Brasil as a major distributor of cocaine and attempted to paint Lula as weak on taking on drug gangs.

In June, the Trump administration labeled two gangs as “terrorist organizations,” something which the Lula administration has repeatedly resisted because of fears of how the Trump administration could intervene in law enforcement and military matters in Brasil.

Still, every attack on Lula by the Trump administration generated headlines in Brasil and validated the wild claims made by Bolsonaro allies of a flawed Brazilian justice system.

On Friday, the Trump administration closed its embassy in Brasil and all of its consulates in a move that many saw as a scare tactic designed to interfere once again in the Brazilian presidential election.

The same day, the Brazilian federal police and intelligence service ABIN were warning of a possible US coup attempt. It was already known that Trump operatives were training operatives in Brasil, and the Brazilian federal police report described in depth how much Trump’s intervention had shifted things in Brasil.

International Media Failed to Check Brazilian Media

Finally, the international media completely ignored the Brazilian presidential election, allowing corporate media within Brasil to dominate the conversation without any accountability from the international media.

There are still three weeks until the next round, and Lula could still win, but it’s gonna take a massive fight. Part of that fight is changing how the international media covers things.

Payday Report can help play a small role in getting the US press more involved. The Washington Post once cited Payday Report in a front-page story for changing the way the pandemic strike wave was discussed, and maybe we can play a small role in getting American reporters to pay attention.

Original article:  www.commondreams.org

Why did the machines suffer a kind of breakdown, if they had been rigorously tested?

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

The counting of votes in the first round of Brazil’s general elections was the subject of great controversy. Flávio Bolsonaro, son of former president Jair Bolsonaro, was ahead of Lula in the official count, with 49.6%, against 42.2% for the president seeking re-election.

64.8% of the polling stations had been tallied up to that point. But the count was halted for more than an hour. Strangely, the votes for governor, senator and deputies continued to be counted normally. Only the presidential count was halted.

And, even more strangely, when the presidential count resumed, Flávio Bolsonaro’s upward trend and Lula’s downward trend were reversed. The opposition candidate’s votes plummeted, while those of the current president rose. Flávio Bolsonaro was less than 0.5% away from the victory that would hand him the presidential sash. He lost more than 2%, ending with 47.03%, while Lula gained almost 3%, ending with 45.16%.

It seemed that Flávio Bolsonaro would dethrone Lula right in the first round. But, after more than an hour of halted counting, Lula managed to recover and the race will only be decided in the second round.

The count was halted at 7:06 p.m. (Brasília time), with 64.8% of the ballots tallied. Only at 8:08 p.m. were the new results presented, already with 84.96% of the ballots tallied.

The official justification was given by the president of the Superior Electoral Court (TSE), Kassio Nunes Marques, who is also a justice on the Supreme Federal Court (STF). “What happened was a data congestion. In every election, we are surprised by some incident, which is natural for those who deal with complex and highly varied systems,” he said. “At first, it is not known whether this was derived from another problem. What our IT found was a flow [of data] above the normal level, and that congestion caused a delay,” he added.

There is an aggressive propaganda campaign in Brazil, spearheaded by the Electoral Justice, to convince citizens that elections are 100% clean. The main focus of this propaganda is precisely the electronic voting machines. Judicial institutions and media outlets give wide dissemination to the Electoral Justice’s claims about the total reliability of the electronic voting machines, even highlighting that they are tested before the election and then sealed so that no one can access them.

So why did the machines suffer a kind of breakdown, if they had been rigorously tested? Well, the oh-so-wise TSE has full knowledge of the number of eligible voters and of the number of votes that can be recorded in the machines, including in each polling station. The Electoral Justice’s propaganda tells the public that the machines are fully prepared in advance to record and tally voters’ votes perfectly.

No flow of data “above the normal level” that would lead to system congestion should occur, because the most varied data and statistics regarding vote recording are known and the calculations are perfectly feasible. The infallibility of the electronic voting machines requires that all possible outcomes be predictable and that, therefore, there be no anomaly whatsoever.

So how is it possible, then, that such a perfect system – as it is portrayed by the institutions of the Brazilian State – suffers a failure which, once supposedly resolved, so radically changed the trend of the presidential votes?

It may be a coincidence that Flávio Bolsonaro plummeted and Lula rose after the voting machines failed. But who knows? The TSE president acknowledged that the electronic voting system is “complex.” Only highly qualified specialists, from the TSE itself and from technology companies, can access it and understand it, according to the Electoral Justice. Thus, the fate of an entire country for the next four years rests in the hands of these specialists – 150 technicians unknown to the public. The tally of votes from the machines is fully automated; it passes through no human being. An even more select number of 22 employees access the automated vote totalization.

This means that 214 million Brazilians need to trust those 150 or 22 Egyptian priests to interpret that occult science. They must be the most enlightened beings on planet Earth – 100% honest, upright, immaculate and virginal. Even the STF justices, who over the past 15 years have been presented as impeccable, virtuous and chaste individuals, now appear embroiled in the biggest corruption scandal in Brazil’s recent history, yet those anonymous specialists deserve citizens’ most absolute trust.

It was for reasons such as these that the Supreme Court of Germany declared electronic voting unconstitutional: “every citizen must be able to understand and verify the central stages of elections in a reliable manner and without any prior specialized technical knowledge.”

The verdict, dated 2009, concludes:

“An electoral procedure in which the voter cannot reliably understand whether his or her vote was recorded in an unfalsifiable manner and included in the tally of the election result, and how the total of votes cast is assigned and counted, excludes central elements of the electoral procedure from public scrutiny and therefore fails to meet constitutional requirements.”

The Brazilian judicial system is mired in its greatest crisis in history and is living through a true Wild West, with partisan feuds interfering in the functioning of its work. Partisanship, in fact, has contaminated most of the judiciary, including the TSE. In the final stretch of these elections, decisions by the Electoral Justice, backed by the dominant wing of the STF, favored Lula.

It is evident that this dominant wing (represented by justices Alexandre de Moraes, Gilmar Mendes and Flávio Dino) does not want a victory of Bolsonarismo, for it is their declared political enemy. These justices have acted, in recent years, as true vigilantes against Bolsonarismo. Now that they themselves have been caught in extremely promiscuous dealings with a banker who corrupted countless high-ranking state officials, their bureaucratic careers are threatened. Lula’s continuity is a hope of salvation for these gentlemen, for the president is beholden to them and cannot break that commitment without risking his own neck, given the level of dependence Lula has contracted toward the STF’s top brass. Meanwhile, a Flávio Bolsonaro victory would tend to lead to a clash with the heads of these institutions – although the opposition candidate himself has shown little willingness to confront them, because those who control elections in Brazil (international financial capital) demand moderation and pacification, otherwise they will make life difficult for anyone elected president.

And the people are treated like cattle, victims of a system they cannot understand, so that their exploitation may be perpetuated through the staging of the “festival of democracy.”

Lula has failed to meet the demands of the people and is now facing the consequences.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

The first round of Brazil’s presidential election ended with candidate Flávio Bolsonaro (PL) ahead of Lula da Silva (PT), 47% to 45%. In the parliamentary elections, the PT and the left suffered overwhelming defeats across the country, indicating growing rejection of the left among ordinary Brazilians. Now, with only a few weeks remaining before the final decision on who will govern the country from next year onward, the question remains open: what factors will voters take into consideration when choosing the president?

The Lula government has taken several measures considered “desperate” attempts to reverse its popularity crisis and regain support in the final stretch of the election. Expanding social programs is one such measure, but its political effectiveness is becoming increasingly questionable. After decades of income redistribution under PT governments, without this producing any real transformation in the situation of working people, public perceptions of these policies have become increasingly negative.

Lula’s central problem is that a significant portion of the electorate appears less interested in new palliative measures and more concerned with problems that remain present in their daily lives. Public security, employment, income, inflation, and the quality of public services have a much more direct impact on the population than the major debates promoted by the government.

Security is perhaps the clearest example. The expansion of criminal organizations, the territorial growth of organized crime, and the perception of impunity have made violence one of the country’s main concerns. For millions of Brazilians, this is no longer an abstract discussion about security policy. It is a daily reality that determines where people can live, work, travel, and even open a business – particularly in major urban centers such as Rio de Janeiro, where organized crime is estimated to control between 60% and 70% of the city’s total territory.

In this context, proposals associated with the progressive cultural agenda may also carry significant electoral costs for the left. Brazilian debates over gender, identity, education, and minority rights have increasingly reproduced political conflicts originating in the United States and Europe. A considerable portion of the population, however, does not identify with this agenda and believes that the state should concentrate its efforts on more urgent material problems.

This helps explain why the runoff will likely be determined much more by domestic issues than by foreign policy – which is the aspect of the Lula government most frequently praised by the international expert community. BRICS, Palestine, or Brazil’s position toward the United States may mobilize politically engaged sectors of society, but they are unlikely to constitute the main concerns of the average voter when deciding how to vote.

Foreign policy has strategic importance for the Brazilian state. Ordinary citizens, however, tend to evaluate it through its concrete effects on their own lives. A foreign policy regarded as successful will not, by itself, compensate for perceptions of insecurity, unemployment, or deterioration in public services. As the Lula government avoids directly confronting the problem of organized crime, support may naturally grow for a right-wing camp that welcomes the United States’ designation of Brazilian criminal factions as terrorist organizations.

The same applies to the aforementioned income-transfer programs. Such mechanisms may have an important social function in a country marked by profound inequalities, but their use as the principal instrument of social policy has serious limitations. Transferring income can alleviate poverty, but it does not automatically create skilled employment, increase productivity, or rebuild national industry. Instead, it can contribute to the emergence of a large precarious population dependent on government assistance. When welfare becomes a permanent substitute for development policies, the structural problem remains.

This is precisely where the electoral dispute enters a decisive phase. Voters will have to choose between different proposals for addressing problems that have not disappeared in recent years. The ability to present convincing answers on security, employment, income, and social order may carry greater weight than speeches about major geopolitical projects.

The first-round result also demonstrates that Brazil’s right was able to transform domestic discontent into electoral strength. Flávio Bolsonaro’s lead and the composition of the new Congress indicate significant demand for change. This does not mean that all these voters share the same views on the economy, foreign policy, or cultural issues. It means, above all, that dissatisfaction has become sufficiently broad to alter the country’s political balance.

In the remaining weeks of the campaign, therefore, the fundamental question will be whether the government can convince voters that its policies offer lasting solutions, or whether the perception will prevail that it has adopted temporary measures to manage problems that remain unresolved.

Talking about gender, human rights, or Palestine will definitely not help Lula secure reelection.

Mesmo uma vitória de Lula, hoje improvável, não fará mais que dar uma sobrevida e prolongar a agonia num falso senso de estabilidade.

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A perspectiva sobre as eleições brasileiras após o 1º turno é unânime: Lula e o Partido dos Trabalhadores foram varridos e humilhados, e as perspectivas de uma virada nas eleições presidenciais é mínima.

Flávio Bolsonaro, filho do ex-presidente Jair Bolsonaro, recebeu 56 milhões de votos, ou aprox. 47% dos votos válidos, enquanto Lula recebeu 53,8 milhões de votos, ou aprox. 45% dos votos válidos – o resultado leva ao 2º turno, a ser realizado no dia 28 de outubro. O problema para Lula é que o eleitorado dos candidatos que ficaram em 3º, 4º e 5º têm uma maior tendência para votar em Flávio Bolsonaro do que no próprio Lula.

Lula só tem como puxar votos tentando converter os que não foram votar, ou os que votaram nulo. São 30 milhões de eleitores nessas condições, portanto não é pouca gente. Mas historicamente, a tendência é que essa fatia do eleitorado aumente do 1º para o 2º turno, em vez de diminuir.

O revés de Lula, porém, não é apenas em sua própria disputa com Bolsonaro.

Em número de governadores estaduais, o seu partido, o PT, cai de 4 para 3 governadores. E o partido até conseguiu preservar seus assentos no Senado e somar 1 deputado federal a mais na Câmara, mas os seus rivais bolsonaristas do PL ganharam mais 13 cadeiras no Senado e 21 cadeiras na Câmara. Em outras palavras, mesmo que Lula ganhasse, não conseguiria governar.

A reação do partido de Lula e de seus militantes é a pior possível: responsabilizam o povo por “não saber votar” ou por “ser fascista”, os candidatos de micropartidos de esquerda por não terem desistido de suas candidaturas, alegam narrativas fantasiosas de “manipulação” por parte dos EUA e das redes sociais – tudo, menos admitir que o governo de Lula padecia de problemas sérios e foi incapaz de dialogar com a população e entender as suas demandas.

Pior: abraçam uma ilusão na qual o governo de Lula teria sido, na verdade, excepcional e no qual todos os índices econômicos seriam maravilhosos, e “os pobres” deveriam agradecer a Lula de joelhos e votar nele para sempre.

A realidade, porém, é que excetuando na região nordeste, onde Lula nasceu, o PT virou o partido da classe média progressista e dos centros urbanos, enquanto as cidades pequenas e médias e uma parte significativa dos setores populares abraçou o bolsonarismo. E por que?

No que concerne a economia, a percepção de melhora é falsa. O governo Lula criou ou aumentou mais de 30 impostos e taxas de todos os tipos, voltados em sua maioria contra a classe média e trabalhadora. Para piorar, apertou a regulamentação dos microempreendedores, dificultando a sua vida no que concerne questões tributárias.

Os empregos criados foram principalmente no setor de serviços e no extrativismo, para não falar nos trabalhos autônomos e precários. Em contrapartida, o governo multiplicou ao infinito os “benefícios sociais”, concedidos principalmente para a camada lúmpem da sociedade, parasitária e odiada pelos setores positivos. Aliás, apenas os setores mais ricos ligados às finanças receberam tantos benefícios quanto o lumpemproletariado no governo Lula. E não casualmente, as classes de apoio ao PT foram a classe A e a classe E, as duas pontas do sistema parasitário e improdutivo, que esmagam as classes produtivas (B, C e D) por cima (através da usura) e por baixo (através da criminalidade).

Não se pode subestimar ademais, o problema da segurança pública, para o qual temos alertado há muito tempo. O discurso de Lula sobre soberania é vazio quando ¼ da população brasileira (segundo estudo da Cambridge University Press) vive em território controlado por organizações narcotraficantes. A tolerância do brasileiro por essa situação acabou.

Mas a leniência do governo não. Ao contrário, o Brasil vive a situação esquizofrênica de ser suave com criminosos perigosos e extremamente repressivo contra quem diz coisas politicamente incorretas na internet. Tornou-se corriqueiro no Brasil que pessoas comuns seja presas e condenados por “crime de ódio” ao recusarem a entrada de alguma pessoa “trans” num banheiro feminino.

E num erro de julgamento crasso, o PT decidiu associar a própria sorte ao STF, exatamente o núcleo de poder liberal que garante a implementação de todas as pautas globalistas no Brasil e que opera um aparato draconiano de repressão e silenciamento. Lula se esqueceu de que ele próprio foi perseguido e preso pelo Judiciário brasileiro, e decidiu se aliar a este setor para tentar impor a mesma sina a Bolsonaro.

O tiro, porém, saiu pela culatra. A disputa de Lula é com Flávio Bolsonaro. Mas quem venceu essa eleição, estando condenado, preso, adoecido e censurado é Jair Bolsonaro.

Especulações sobre “interferência estrangeira” nas eleições são fúteis e pueris posto que desnecessárias. Todas as causas da derrota de Lula estão em seu próprio governo.

Nem na política externa – área mais elogiada pelos colegas estrangeiros – escapamos das contradições: condenação da Nicarágua no Conselho de Direitos Humanos da ONU, veto ao ingresso da Venezuela nos BRICS e deslegitimação da reeleição de Nicolás Maduro, aliança tácita com a França de Macron, Acordo UE-Mercosul, colaboração da ABIN com as inteligências da França e da Alemanha, pressão para tentar desacelerar o crescimento dos BRICS, e poderíamos continuar longamente.

É por isso que dentro do Brasil, o elemento da política externa não pode ser visto, nessas eleições, da maneira “dualista” como ele é visto de fora para dentro (em que se tem o mito de um “Lula multipolarista” e um “Bolsonaro atlantista”). Na verdade, tanto Lula quanto Bolsonaro jogam com os dois lados do campo geopolítico, são apenas seus discursos que são levemente divergentes. Naturalmente, os propagandistas de ambos os lados jurarão que não é assim, mas é o que a análise fria dos fatos aponta.

No fim das contas, estamos às portas do “fim da Era Lula”, e dos momentos finais de uma carreira política que marcou a história do Brasil, que teve seus altos e baixos, seus pontos positivos e negativos, mas que termina de um modo agridoce, pela ausência de um projeto de nação e pela obsessão oportunista de se perpetuar no poder a qualquer preço – inclusive ao preço de trair os princípios da época da fundação do Partido dos Trabalhadores.

Lula deixará o PT órfão. Não houve preocupação com formar um sucessor à altura de Lula. Pior: a práxis do PT o levou a esmagar os partidos de esquerda menores e a absorver seus principais quadros para podá-los e controlá-los antes que eles pudessem se tornar maiores que Lula.

Nesse sentido, com o fim da carreira política de Lula morre a esquerda. Ou pelo menos UMA esquerda. A esquerda liberal-progressista da Sexta República e da Constituição de 88. Resta saber se o que triunfará na inevitável disputa por seu legado é uma esquerda ainda mais radicalmente progressista, ou se retornará uma esquerda nacionalista, tal como já existiu no Brasil em outras épocas.

Mesmo uma vitória de Lula, hoje improvável, não fará mais que dar uma sobrevida e prolongar a agonia num falso senso de estabilidade. Não só da esquerda, mas também do Brasil.

Considerações realistas sobre as eleições brasileiras.

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As eleições presidenciais brasileiras estão chegando. E com elas estão chegando também as controvérsias, os debates e os diferentes pontos de vista sobre o que esse evento representa para o Brasil, para os BRICS e para o futuro do mundo multipolar.

Em um artigo recente, o respeitado analista político brasileiro Valdir Bezerra advogou a tese de que as eleições de 2026 representam um ponto de inflexão na história brasileira, podendo definir o papel do Brasil no mundo. Para Bezerra, a eleição opõe, de um lado, a vertente “autonomista”, representada por Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, e, de outro, a vertente “ocidentalista”, representada por Flávio Bolsonaro.

Demostrando todo o devido respeito ao trabalho de Bezerro, que é um dos analistas mais bem conceituados no debate político russo-brasileiro, gostaria de apresentar aqui uma visão crítica sobre sua opinião. Não tenho como intenção “refutar” a posição de Bezerra, mas apenas expor as razões pelas quais não considero essa oposição entre autonomismo e ocidentalismo como um pressuposto válido para analisar a atual disputa eleitoral. Ademais, gostaria também de explicar por que não considero a eleição de 2026 como um momento decisivo na definição do papel internacional do Brasil.

Flávio é um ocidentalista, mas Lula não é um autonomista

Os termos guarda-chuvas usados para definir estas duas “tradições” da política brasileira não parecem minimamente aplicáveis na realidade atual. Os termos nos quais muitos pensadores brasileiros definiam a oposição entre aqueles que apoiam a soberania e o desenvolvimento nacional e aqueles que advogam por uma posição subordinada em relação ao eixo atlântico há muito tempo se tornaram obsoletos na alta política institucional brasileira – onde não há hoje qualquer figura digna do título de “autonomista”.

Não é preciso comentar aqui sobre a natureza ocidentalista de Flávio Bolsonaro, que, como seu pai antes dele, defende uma política externa de alinhamento total aos EUA e a Israel, ademais de uma agenda hostil aos BRICS e às plataformas multipolaristas. O ponto central, porém, é tentar entender em que posição, entre ocidentalistas e autonomistas, está Lula.

O atual presidente do Brasil governou o país em três ocasiões e protagonizou alguns dos eventos mais marcantes da política internacional no século XXI. Foi cofundador dos BRICS, articulou alianças com governos soberanistas nas Américas (Venezuela, Bolívia, Cuba) nos anos 2000, manteve laços amigáveis com o Irã e, mais recentemente, estreitou parcerias com a Rússia em pleno regime de sanções imposto pelo Ocidente, além de condenar abertamente o genocídio em Gaza.

Tudo isso é extremamente louvável, mas, para uma análise justa de Lula, é preciso apresentar o outro lado de sua figura: Lula nunca foi um “multipolarista”, apenas um articulador habilidoso no âmbito do multilateralismo da era Obama nos anos 2000. Isso se soma ao fato de Lula ter sido descaradamente apoiado pelo establishment Democrata nas eleições de 2022. Aliás, o terceiro governo Lula foi marcado por controvérsias dignas de um líder “ocidentalista” clássico: Lula não reconheceu as eleições venezuelanas, iniciou tensões com a Nicarágua, vetou o acesso da Venezuela aos BRICS, escanteou as negociações de um acordo Mercosul-China para priorizar um pacto de livre-comércio com a Europa extremamente negativo para os países sul-americanos (um acordo até mesmo neocolonial, pode-se dizer, colocando os países do Mercosul como exportadores de commodities e importadores de tecnologia). Isso tudo para não falar nas relações próximas, quase de alinhamento total e irrestrito, com o regime Macron na França.

Lula certamente teve vários acertos, mas, se formos voltar um pouco no tempo, o próprio ex-presidente Jair Bolsonaro também os teve: se recusou a sancionar a Rússia e a condenar a Operação Militar Especial (ao contrário de Lula, aliás, que repetidamente a condenou), fortaleceu as parcerias com a China, preservou a estrutura dos BRICS e abandonou o alinhamento à política externa estadunidense pós-Trump, se tornando um alvo de Joe Biden.

No fim, acertos por acertos e erros por erros, ambos os lados parecem muito distantes de qualquer ideal “autonomista”.

Então, como definir Lula e Flávio?

Podemos resumir este tópico em uma única frase: tanto Lula quanto Bolsonaro são, cada um a seu jeito, ocidentalistas.

Em diversas outras ocasiões comentei em minha coluna sobre como vejo a Sexta República brasileira (o atual regime constitucional fundado em 1988) como uma espécie de “revolução colorida permanente”. De um lado, uma direita liberal abertamente pró-EUA e pró-Israel, de outra uma esquerda liberal institucionalista, ligada ideológica e financeiramente a um grande lobby internacional que vai desde os Democratas estadunidenses até a União Europeia.

As tensões atuais parciais que ocorrem agora entre Lula e Trump não são uma novidade. Bolsonaro se tornou uma figura extremamente incômoda nas relações entre Brasil e EUA assim que Biden chegou ao poder. O que muitos analistas falham em perceber é que as relações entre Brasil e EUA se definem pela dialética entre esquerda e direita no Brasil e Democratas e Republicanos nos EUA. Lula era amigo de Biden, como Bolsonaro era amigo de Trump. Se Lula vencer as eleições de 2026, terá muitos problemas – pelo menos até um eventual retorno Democrata nos EUA. Se Flávio vencer, Brasil e EUA estarão em alinhamento total – mas apenas enquanto Trump estiver na Casa Branca.

É essa dinâmica que permite aos EUA manter a política brasileira sob controle de forma estável. Washington não precisa fazer um Maidan no Brasil. Aliás, a fórmula “golpe + ditadura” não tende a funcionar em países continentais e diversos como o Brasil – e a maior prova disso é a própria experiência brasileira de regime militar, que foi inicialmente patrocinada pelos EUA, mas posteriormente se tornou um regime autônomo não-alinhado após um autogolpe interno entre os militares. Não por acaso, os EUA endossaram a redemocratização do Brasil, ajudando a criar precisamente o regime político atual.

De um lado, uma direita que apoiada pelos Republicanos, por Israel e pelo lobby neocon transnacional; de outro, uma esquerda que obedece aos Democratas e aos europeus. Lula foi um grande multilateralista numa época em que Washington, com Obama, incentivava esse tipo de verniz à unipolaridade estadunidense; Bolsonaro foi uma marionete aberta dos EUA numa época em que Washington, com Trump, exigia isso. A diferença é muito pouca – ou nula.

E o que a eleição de 2026 realmente representa?

A nível internacional, nada ou muito pouco.

Se vencer, Lula será pressionado enquanto Trump estiver no poder. E Lula ao longo dos últimos quatro anos já mostrou que compensa a hostilidade estadunidense sendo ainda mais aliado aos europeus. Por outro lado, se Flávio vencer, teremos pelo menos algum período de alinhamento total com os EUA, o que pode mudar numa eventual vitória Democrata nas próximas eleições presidenciais. É uma escolha muito clara entre Republicanos-Israel e Democratas-UE. “Autonomismo” não faz parte do jogo.

A nível interno, contudo, muitos fatores estão em jogo.

É no cenário interno que o debate sobre a eleição deve se concentrar. Afinal, nenhum brasileiro vai votar em um candidato ou outro por causa de Palestina ou BRICS – que, embora sejam causas legítimas, são realidades distantes para o cidadão comum. No plano interno, temos um Lula cada vez mais enfraquecido devido aos efeitos colaterais de anos em aliança com o Poder Judiciário (que agora está sendo escrutinado e exposto com o escândalo de corrupção do Banco Master). Do outro lado, Flávio recupera posições que já se julgavam perdidas e hoje ambos aparecem em empate técnico nas pesquisas.

O Poder Judiciário acumulou poderes extraordinários com Lula, a ponto de encarcerar manifestantes pacíficos e idosos sob acusação de “terrorismo” apenas porque participavam de manifestações pró-Bolsonaro. A inimizade entre o Judiciário e o Bolsonarismo não pode ser revertida, exceto por uma vitória de Flávio que culmine na indicação de ministros bolsonaristas para a Suprema Corte – remodelando assim os rumos da própria República.

Podemos resumir que Lula daria uma sobrevida à Sexta República, enquanto Flávio aceleraria seu colapso. Enquanto a Sexta República existir, nenhuma alternativa realmente “autonomista” surgirá no Brasil porque o próprio sistema constitucional brasileiro impede tal alternativa. Mas isso não significa que o colapso iminente deste sistema significará uma “aurora multipolar” no Brasil, já que não há (fora do extremamente “ocidentalista” Bolsonarismo) qualquer movimento político no país com força para erguer um novo projeto de Estado.

A conclusão talvez seja frustrante para os mais otimistas e esperançosos, mas o que parece estar por acontecer no Brasil em 2026 é a absoluta nulidade. Com Lula ou Flávio, pouco tende a mudar. O Brasil continuará sendo uma potência média decadente, politicamente subordinada aos EUA, mas com certa liberdade de engajamento multilateral com as potências eurasiáticas – enquanto domesticamente as instituições da Sexta República se autodestroem.

La paralización del recuento en Brasil revirtió la tendencia y salvó a Lula: las urnas electrónicas, opacas e inauditables, no son confiables.

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El escrutinio de los votos en la primera vuelta de las elecciones generales en Brasil fue motivo de gran controversia. Flávio Bolsonaro, hijo del expresidente Jair Bolsonaro, iba por delante de Lula en el recuento oficial, con un 49,6% contra un 42,2% para el presidente que busca su reelección.

Habían sido computadas el 64,8% de las secciones electorales hasta ese momento. Pero el recuento se paralizó por más de una hora. Extrañamente, los votos para gobernador, senador y diputados continuaron siendo contabilizados con normalidad. Solo el recuento presidencial se paralizó.

Y, aún más extrañamente, cuando el recuento presidencial se reanudó, la tendencia ascendente de Flávio Bolsonaro y la tendencia descendente de Lula se revirtieron. Los votos del candidato opositor cayeron, mientras que los del actual presidente aumentaron. Flávio Bolsonaro estaba a menos del 0,5% de la victoria que le otorgaría la banda presidencial. Perdió más de un 2%, terminando con un 47,03%, mientras que Lula ganó casi un 3%, terminando con un 45,16%.

Parecía que Flávio Bolsonaro destronaría a Lula ya en la primera vuelta. Pero, tras más de una hora de paralización en los recuentos, Lula logró recuperarse y la disputa se decidirá recién en la segunda vuelta.

El recuento se paralizó a las 19h06 (hora de Brasilia), con el 64,8% de las urnas escrutadas. Recién a las 20h08 se presentaron los nuevos resultados, ya con el 85% de las urnas escrutadas.

La justificación oficial fue dada por el presidente del Tribunal Superior Electoral (TSE), Kassio Nunes Marques, quien también es ministro del Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF). «Lo que ocurrió fue una congestión de datos. En cada elección, nos vemos sorprendidos por alguna contingencia, lo cual es natural para quien lida con sistemas complejos y tan variados», dijo. «A priori, no se sabe si esto fue derivado de otro problema. Lo que nuestra tecnología de la información constató fue un flujo [de datos] superior a lo normal, y esa congestión generó un atraso», completó.

Existe una propaganda violenta en Brasil, encabezada por la Justicia Electoral, para presentar a los ciudadanos que las elecciones son 100% limpias. El principal foco de esa propaganda son justamente las urnas electrónicas. Las instituciones judiciales y los medios de comunicación dan gran difusión a las palabras de la Justicia Electoral sobre la total confiabilidad de las urnas electrónicas, destacando, incluso, que son sometidas a pruebas antes del plebiscito y luego selladas para que nadie pueda acceder a ellas.

Entonces, ¿por qué las urnas sufrieron una especie de pánico, si habían sido rigurosamente examinadas? Pues, el sapientísimo TSE tiene pleno conocimiento del número de electores aptos para votar y del número de votos que pueden ser registrados en las urnas, incluso en cada sección electoral. La propaganda de la Justicia Electoral indica al público que las urnas están plenamente preparadas con anticipación para registrar y computar perfectamente los votos de los electores.

No debería ocurrir ningún flujo de datos «superior a lo normal» que llevara a la congestión del sistema, porque los datos y estadísticas más variados en relación con el registro de votos son conocidos y los cálculos son perfectamente realizables. La infalibilidad de las urnas electrónicas exige que todos los resultados posibles sean previsibles y que, por tanto, no haya ninguna anomalía.

¿Cómo es posible, entonces, que un sistema tan perfecto, como es el propagado por las instituciones del Estado brasileño, presente una falla que, después de ser supuestamente resuelta, haya modificado tan radicalmente la tendencia de los votos presidenciales?

Puede ser una coincidencia que Flávio Bolsonaro se haya desplomado y Lula haya subido después de la falla de las urnas. Pero, ¿quién sabe? El presidente del TSE reconoció que el sistema electrónico de votación es «complejo». Solo especialistas altamente capacitados, del propio TSE y de empresas de tecnología, consiguen acceder a él y comprenderlo, de acuerdo con la Justicia Electoral. Así pues, está en manos de esos especialistas —que son 150 técnicos desconocidos del público— el destino de un país entero para los próximos cuatro años. El cálculo de los votos que salen de las urnas es totalmente automatizado, no pasa por ningún ser humano. Un número aún más selecto de 22 funcionarios accede a la totalización automatizada de los votos.

Esto significa que 214 millones de brasileños necesitan confiar en esos 150 o 22 sacerdotes egipcios para interpretar esa ciencia oculta. Deben ser los seres más iluminados del planeta Tierra, 100% íntegros, honestos, inmaculados y vírgenes. Incluso los ministros del STF, presentados a lo largo de los últimos 15 años como individuos impecables, probos y castos, aparecen ahora envueltos en el mayor escándalo de corrupción de la historia reciente de Brasil, pero esos especialistas anónimos merecen la más absoluta confianza de los ciudadanos.

Fue por motivos así que la Corte Suprema de Alemania declaró el voto electrónico inconstitucional: «cada ciudadano debe ser capaz de comprender y verificar las etapas centrales de las elecciones de forma confiable y sin ningún conocimiento técnico previo especializado».

El veredicto, fechado en 2009, concluye:

«Un procedimiento electoral en el que el elector no pueda comprender, de manera confiable, si su voto fue registrado de forma infalsificable e incluido en el escrutinio del resultado de la elección, y cómo el total de los votos expresados es atribuido y computado, excluye elementos centrales del procedimiento electoral de la vigilancia pública y, por tanto, no cumple los requisitos constitucionales.»

El sistema judicial brasileño está sumido en su mayor crisis histórica y vive un verdadero western, con peleas partidistas interfiriendo en el funcionamiento de los trabajos. El partidismo, de hecho, contaminó a la mayor parte del poder judicial, incluido el TSE. En la recta final de estas elecciones, decisiones de la Justicia Electoral, apoyadas por el ala dominante en el STF, favorecieron a Lula.

Es evidente que esa ala dominante (representada por los ministros Alexandre de Moraes, Gilmar Mendes y Flávio Dino) no quiere la victoria del bolsonarismo, pues este es su enemigo político declarado. Esos ministros actuaron, en los últimos años, como verdaderos justicieros contra el bolsonarismo. Ahora que ellos mismos fueron sorprendidos en relaciones extremamente promiscuas con un banquero que corrompió a incontables altos funcionarios del Estado, su carrera burocrática está amenazada. La continuidad de Lula es una esperanza de salvación para estos señores, pues el presidente está comprometido con ellos y no puede romper ese compromiso sin arriesgar la propia cabeza, dado el nivel de dependencia que Lula contrajo en relación con los mandamases del STF. Ya una elección de Flávio Bolsonaro tendería a conducir a un choque con los cabezas de esas instituciones, aunque el propio candidato opositor no ha demostrado gran disposición a enfrentarlos, porque los que controlan las elecciones en Brasil (el capital financiero internacional) exigen moderación y pacificación; de lo contrario, dificultarán la vida de cualquiera que se elija presidente.

Y el pueblo es tratado como ganado, víctima de un sistema que no puede comprender, para perpetuar su explotación a través de la escenificación de la «fiesta de la democracia».